Besley, T.;
Preston, I.;
(2006)
Electoral bias and policy choice:
theory and evidence.
(IFS Working Papers
W06/03).
Institute for Fiscal Studies: London, UK.
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Abstract
This paper develops a new approach to studying how electoral bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of districting affects policy choice. We tie a commonly used measure of bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects policy choice. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in England. The results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies.
Type: | Working / discussion paper |
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Title: | Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
Publisher version: | http://www.ifs.org.uk/wps/wp0603.pdf |
Language: | English |
UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/2696 |



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