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Transparency, recruitment and retention in the public sector

Albano, G.L.; Leaver, C.; (2004) Transparency, recruitment and retention in the public sector. (Discussion Papers in Economics 04-05). Department of Economics, University College London: London, UK. Green open access

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This paper evaluates the impact of releasing performance measures on public sector recruitment and retention. We analyse the role played by the informativeness of disclosure by comparing a policy of transparency with confidentiality, and the role played by the timing of disclosure via a comparison with delayed (e.g. end of project) reporting. We show that relative wage compression in the public sector produces a recruitment-retention trade-off. Transparency minimises the cost of recruitment, delayed reporting minimises the cost of short-term retention, while confidentiality minimises the cost of long-term retention. The optimal disclosure policy varies with the type of public organisation - that is, with the relative value of public sector projects and the complexity of production - warning against the current ’one size fits all’ policy

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: Transparency, recruitment and retention in the public sector
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/silva/economics/research/pape...
Language: English
Additional information: Please also see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/14567 for a related item
Keywords: JEL classification: D82, D73, H1, J31, J44, J45. Recruitment and retention, wage compression, optimal disclosure policies
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/2573
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