Albano, G.L.; Leaver, C.; (2004) Transparency, recruitment and retention in the public sector. (Discussion Papers in Economics 04-05). Department of Economics, University College London: London, UK.

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Abstract

This paper evaluates the impact of releasing performance measures on public sector recruitment and retention. We analyse the role played by the informativeness of disclosure by comparing a policy of transparency with confidentiality, and the role played by the timing of disclosure via a comparison with delayed (e.g. end of project) reporting. We show that relative wage compression in the public sector produces a recruitment-retention trade-off. Transparency minimises the cost of recruitment, delayed reporting minimises the cost of short-term retention, while confidentiality minimises the cost of long-term retention. The optimal disclosure policy varies with the type of public organisation - that is, with the relative value of public sector projects and the complexity of production - warning against the current ’one size fits all’ policy

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