Armstrong, M.;
(2006)
Access pricing, bypass and universal service in
post.
(Discussion Papers in Economics
06-01).
Department of Economics, University College London: London, UK.
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Abstract
An incumbent postal service provider faces two issues which make the design of efficient access pricing especially difficult. First, universal service obligations, together with the presence of significant fixed costs, require retail prices to be out of line with underlying marginal costs. Second, competing firms may be able to bypass the incumbent's delivery network. Within a simple framework, this note analyses how access charges should best be set in the light of these twin constraints.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://www.ucl.ac.uk/silva/economics/research/pape... |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | For the version published in the Review of Network Economics, please see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/14556/, and also see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/15101/ for details of the version published in the American Economic Review |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/2549 |
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