

***Apatheia* in the Teachings of Evagrius Ponticus**

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I, Monica Tobon confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

This thesis is to my knowledge the first full-length examination of Evagrian *apatheia*.

Chapter One contextualises Evagrian *apatheia* by outlining Evagrius' cosmology and anthropology. Attention is drawn to the centrality within them of the distinction between unstable and stable movement and to Evagrius' characterisation of *apatheia* and *empathēia* in these terms. *Apatheia*, as the stable movement of the soul, is noted to be the foundation for the transformative contemplation by means of which the fallen *nous* re-ascends to union with God. The anthropology section describes Evagrius' understanding of the *nous*, soul, body and heart.

Chapter Two examines the psychology and phenomenology of *empathēia*. Section One focuses upon the *logismoi*, discussing what Evagrius means by the term *logismos*, noting the inherence of *pathos* to the *logismoi*, explaining his concept of the 'matter' of the *logismoi* and discussing his eightfold classification of 'most generic *logismoi*'. Section Two focuses upon *pathos*, discussing the meaning of the term within Greek philosophy, how Origen understands it and how Evagrius himself understands it. It then discusses the cognitive 'building blocks' of the *logismoi*, the *empathē noēmata* and the arousal of *pathos*. Section Three describes the phenomenology of *empathēia*.

Chapter Three establishes that the subject of *apatheia* is the tripartite soul in its entirety, then adduces evidence for *apatheia*'s being the stable movement of the soul. It then discusses Evagrius' spiritual characterisations of *apatheia* – first as death and resurrection and then as love and knowledge, the latter including practical moral knowledge as well as knowledge of transcendent realities. The holistic, embodied nature of spiritual knowledge as understood by Evagrius is emphasised, as is the inseparability of knowledge from love. His understanding of *apatheia* is shown to be profoundly Christian, and in particular Pauline. Following a discussion of how *apatheia* is attained, the chapter concludes with a summary description of *apatheia* as understood by Evagrius.

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Introduction

(i) Overview of thesis

Apatheia is central to Evagrius' anthropology and so to his understanding of the human condition and the economy of salvation. Accordingly, in order fully to appreciate what he means by it, it is necessary to examine it not only from a psychological perspective but also in relation to his overall spiritual vision, and this is what this thesis aims to do.

Chapter One contextualises *apatheia* by outlining Evagrius' cosmology and anthropology. The cosmology section draws attention to the significance of movement within Evagrius' schema, and in particular to the centrality of the distinction between unstable and stable movement, unstable movement being movement away from God, and stable movement, movement toward him. It argues that the Fall was - and continues to be - an unstable movement precipitated by the initial movement of the rational beings' self-determination away from God, while the re-ascent to God is a progressive stabilisation of the movements of the soul and *nous* effected by means of transformative contemplation. It is noted that *apatheia* is the stable movement of the soul, and the foundation for, and a necessary condition of, the contemplative ascent. The anthropology section begins by focusing on the *nous*, discussing its intrinsic passibility in both epistemic and metaphysical contexts (these being causally interdependent), and its true nature. It then describes the three parts of the soul by describing their action according to nature. Since *apatheia* is, for Evagrius, the natural state of the human being, this amounts to a description of the *apathēs* soul. There follows an account of Evagrius' understanding of the body in which it is argued that *apatheia* has a physical foundation in the form of the elimination of excess vital heat by means of dietary restriction, and that, accordingly, a distinction between 'spiritual' and 'profane' understandings of physical health is implicit in Evagrius' thought. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what Evagrius means by the term 'heart', since one of the ways in which he characterises *apatheia* is in terms of purity of heart.

Chapter Two turns to the psychology and phenomenology of *empathēia* on the basis that Evagrian *apatheia* is best understood by reference to his analysis of the condition that it replaces. The first section focuses upon the *logismoi*, the cognitive activity characteristic of *empathēia*. It begins by discussing what Evagrius means by the term *logismos*, then explains his concept of the ‘matter’ of the *logismoi*. It then turns to his eight-fold classification of ‘most generic *logismoi*’, considering each *logismos* in turn and the rationale for the sequence. The second part of the chapter focuses upon his understanding of *pathos*. It begins with an overview of how *pathos* was understood by Greek philosophy, and also by Origen, before analysing Evagrius’ own understanding of it, from which it emerges that his concept of a *pathos* has a far broader extension than the modern concept of an emotion or passion and that the fundamental spiritual significance with which he invests it derives from his understanding of *pathos* as a *de facto* valuation of something other than God over God himself; that is, as idolatry. It then looks at the cognitive ‘building blocks’ of the *logismoi*, the *empathē noēmata*: what they consist in, how they come into existence, and how they are both symptoms of the immersion of the *nous* in sensible reality and contributors to its continuing immersion. The following section focuses upon the arousal of *pathos* and shows that Evagrius believes that even when the agent is in the throes of fresh *pathos* she retains the capacity to refrain from acting it out and so committing a sin. It is shown how, in responding to temptation, the agent either reverses or repeats, on the microcosmic level, her primordial deflection from God, since a choice to resist temptation is a movement of her self-determination toward God and brings her incrementally closer to him, while a choice to succumb to it is a movement of her self-determination away from God, resulting in a ‘fall’ into *pathos* which further distances her from him and in so doing both echoes and continues the pre-cosmic Fall. The chapter concludes by summarising the phenomenology of *empathēia*, the soul’s unstable movement and consequently its pathology.

The first two chapters having laid the groundwork necessary for an understanding of *apatheia* in terms of the different contexts within which it is situated, Chapter Three focuses upon *apatheia* itself. It begins by asking which part of the human person is its real subject, given that Evagrius predicates it of various anthropological entities, and concludes that it is the tripartite soul as a whole. It then argues for the proposition that *apatheia* is the soul’s stable movement. The following two sections discuss the principal

ways in which Evagrius characterises *apatheia* in spiritual terms: first, as death and resurrection, and second, as love and knowledge, the latter including practical moral knowledge as well as knowledge of transcendent realities. The holistic, embodied nature of spiritual knowledge as understood by Evagrius is emphasised, as is the inseparability of knowledge from love. His understanding of *apatheia* is revealed to be profoundly Christian, and in particular Pauline. These two sections also show how Evagrius uses a variety of biblical expressions and concepts to refer to *apatheia* and thereby highlight its different dimensions, and how he exploits implicit allusions to biblical texts to expand upon the explicit content of his writings. The final section of the chapter completes the picture of *apatheia* by discussing how it is attained, with particular attention to the cultivation of inner watchfulness and discernment. Then Evagrius' distinction between 'imperfect' and 'perfect' *apatheia* is discussed, and finally it is noted that as well as being a manifestation of *apatheia* love is essential to its attainment. The chapter concludes with a summary description of Evagrian *apatheia*.

In the conclusion to the thesis as a whole it is noted that far from devaluing the physical body, Evagrius values it extremely highly, as evidenced by the fundamental role his spirituality assigns to the training of the *epithumētikon*, and that the expectations he has of the body and the nature of the transformations his *askēsis* seeks to elicit from it reflect the difficulties inherent in seeking to reconcile a positive valuation of physicality with a Platonic anthropology. It is noted that the demands placed upon the body by Evagrian *apatheia* are not essential to it but arise from the attempt to include within the remit of the 'spiritual body' the physical body understood in terms of a metaphysics that posits the material as fundamentally other than, and inferior to, the spiritual, and that accordingly the essential features of Evagrian *apatheia* could in principle be preserved while situating it within a more benign anthropology. Finally, the profound optimism of Evagrius' anthropology is noted, and also the fact that the emphasis placed by this thesis upon love as intrinsic both to spiritual knowledge and *apatheia* is aimed as a corrective to the view of some commentators that Evagrius prioritises knowledge over love.¹

¹ See below, 3.3, n.231; also n.228.

This thesis is, to my knowledge, the first full length examination of Evagrian *apatheia*, and as such builds upon the excellent introductory surveys by Guillaumont.² It analyses what precisely Evagrius means by *apatheia* by situating it within its broader cosmological and anthropological context, by examining his anthropology and how he construes *pathos* and its relationship in the soul to reason, and also by taking account not only of Evagrian *apatheia*'s unproblematic aspect as 'emotional integration' and 'freedom from [control by] the passions',³ but its problematic aspects in the form of what exactly is entailed by the establishment of virtue in the *pathētikon* part of the soul.⁴ This thesis is also, to my knowledge, the first examination of Evagrius' metaphysics explicitly to take account of his methodology as a writer and therefore of how he should be read.⁵ Finally, both in situating *apatheia* in its various contexts and in taking account of how Evagrius should be read, it demonstrates the thoroughgoing unity and coherence of his thought.⁶

This thesis does not attempt to situate Evagrian *apatheia* within its broader theological context, nor does it include any consideration of his orthodoxy or the anathemas against him, although I note in passing my view that the question remains open as to whether it is correct to interpret any of his teachings as doctrinal.⁷ Again, apart from certain specific points, no attempt has been made to note the philosophical or theological antecedents of Evagrius' ascetic teachings since this has already been done to an exemplary standard by Antoine and Claire Guillaumont and Paul Géhin in the introductions to, and commentaries upon, their critical editions. Nor has any attempt been made to situate either Evagrius himself or his contemplative teachings within their historical context, these questions having recently received careful attention from Konstantinovskiy. Finally, I do not include any biographical details for Evagrius as again this material is covered by several recent studies.⁸

² Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 98-112; 2004: 267-77).

³ Stewart (2001: 178), brackets his.

⁴ Cf. Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999: 144).

⁵ See below, section (ii).

⁶ *Pace*, for example, Bamberger (1981: lxxii), in whose view Evagrius 'made no successful attempt to integrate into a single whole the various traditions by which he was formed.'

⁷ See below, 1.1.1, n.19, 34.

⁸ Most notably Guillaumont (2004); Casiday (2006); Dysinger (2005); Sinkewicz (2003).

(ii) Reading Evagrius

Evagrius is a careful and talented pedagogue who takes seriously the need to tailor instruction to the capacity of its recipient, thus in the *Gnostikos*, his manual for the spiritual teacher, he defines the remit of the contemplative form of justice as follows:

δικαιοσύνης δὲ πάλιν, τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκάστῳ τοὺς λόγους ἀποδιδόναι, τὰ μὲν σκοτεινῶς ἀπαγγέλλουσιν, τὰ δὲ δι' αἰνιγμάτων σημαίνουσιν, τινὰ δὲ καὶ φανεροῦσαν πρὸς ὠφέλειαν τῶν ἀπλουστέρων.⁹

And as for justice, its role is to expound the *logoi* to each according to his worthiness, relating some things obscurely and indicating others by riddles, and revealing some things clearly for the benefit of the more simple.

Again, in the Prologue to the trilogy *Praktikos-Gnostikos-Kephalaia Gnostika* he describes his methodology in composing it as follows:

καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπικρύψαντες, τὰ δὲ συσκιάσαντες, ἵνα μὴ δώμεν τὰ ἅγια τοῖς κυσὶ μηδὲ βάλωμεν τοὺς μαργαρίτας ἔμπροσθεν τῶν χοίρων. Ἔσται δὲ ταῦτα ἐμφανῆ τοῖς τὸ αὐτὸ ἵχνος αὐτοῖς ἐμβεβηκόσιν.¹⁰

We have kept some things hidden and have obscured others, so as ‘not to give what is holy to dogs nor throw pearls before swine.’¹¹ But these things will be clear to those who have embarked upon the same trail.¹²

What this means in practice is that while Evagrius does indeed ‘reveal some things clearly’, he tends not to present his teachings in the form of straightforward narrative expositions, although there are exceptions to this, most notably the treatises *On the*

⁹ *Gnost.* 44.9-13.

¹⁰ *Prakt.* Prol. 9.

¹¹ Matt. 7:6. Cf. Origen, *Dialogue with Heraclides* 12.20-15.24, where Origen wrestles with the dilemma of how to address an audience that includes both the ‘worthy’ and the ‘unworthy’.

¹² As Casiday (2006: 32-3) points out, this claim ‘effectively indicates that Evagrius does not believe that some people are intrinsically unable to attain to the “secret teachings”; nor does he believe that scholarly research is required in order to understand the “secret teachings.” In principle, the “secret teachings” are available to anyone who undertakes the Christian life with diligence, attentiveness and understanding. Furthermore, we are not to seek the veiled and obscured teachings from some other source; rather, we are to follow Evagrius’ ascetic instructions so that, setting out on the same path, we may come to understand the fullness that is veiled and obscured in the concise form of the chapters. For those with eyes to see, then, the trilogy of *Praktikos*, *Gnostikos* and *Gnostic chapters* contains all that is required for a full description of the ascetic and gnostic teachings of the desert fathers.’

Foundations of the Monastic Life: A Presentation of the Practice of Stillness, To Eulogios: On the Confession of Thoughts and Counsel in their Regard, and On Thoughts. Instead, he generally favours the form of the proverb that characterises biblical wisdom literature and which he defines as follows:

Παροιμία ἐστὶν λόγος δι' αἰσθητῶν πραγμάτων σημαίνων πράγματα νοητά.¹³

A proverb is a sentence that symbolises intelligible realities by means of sensible realities.

This means that in reading Evagrius it is necessary to bear in mind that much of what he says can be presumed to have several layers of meaning, some or most of it accessible only through sustained meditation, along with, perhaps, recognition of implicit connections with Scripture, with other parts of the same text or with other Evagrian texts. Thus in the words of McGinn,

[Evagrius' aphorisms are] like the tips of mystical icebergs, revealing their true size and configuration only after prolonged meditation and extensive exploration beneath the surface.'¹⁴

Returning to the passage quoted above from the Prologue to Evagrius' great trilogy, the meanings of the word ἵχνος include 'track, footstep, trace, trail, track or route in the desert', such that it suggests, as Dysinger notes, 'a hunt for prey which leaves traces on a track or path, which are only visible to those who know what to look for',¹⁵ but also Evagrius' own footsteps, both literal and metaphorical, through a desert both physical and spiritual. Evagrius thus cautions his readers that his meanings will be most fully disclosed to those who are prepared to follow their trail through his writings and who have in some sense followed in his footsteps through the desert. While he is referring specifically to the trilogy, this methodology can be discerned throughout his writings, as Driscoll's study of the *Ad Monachos*, to which my own hermeneutic is indebted,

¹³ Sch. 1 on Prov. 1:1.

¹⁴ McGinn (1991:146). Cf., e.g., Driscoll (2003: 171): 'the proverbs of *Ad Monachos* were meant to be meditated on very slowly, perhaps a day at a time, a week at a time, even longer. It is in this kind of situation that we must take account of that reasoning by analogy which *Ad Monachos* employs.'

¹⁵ Dysinger (2005: 205).

demonstrates in relation to that particular text.¹⁶ By this method Evagrius aims to elicit from, and guide his reader in, the practice of contemplation and, like Socrates with Meno's slave boy,¹⁷ to stimulate us in the recollection of what we already know but have forgotten - in this case God, knowledge of whom we originally possessed in virtue of our creation in his image.¹⁸ Consequently, when it comes to reading Evagrius one must be prepared to follow trails throughout his writings and into Scripture, and, as far as possible, allow them to reveal their meanings in their own time. It follows that it is prudent to remain circumspect in assuming how much of his meaning one might have accessed at any one time and in expecting how much one might be able to access, and accordingly I note this caveat with regard to the present work.

(iii) Additional notes

I have chosen to leave a number of Greek terms untranslated since I do not consider them to have satisfactory English equivalents. I use these terms in transliterated form. Three are worthy of particular note at this point. The first is *apatheia* itself. This is normally translated in terms of freedom from emotion or passion, but Evagrian *apatheia* is partly constituted by love in the sense both of *agapē* and spiritual *erōs*,¹⁹ and its attainment enables the full manifestation in the soul of *agapē*,²⁰ so it includes both emotion and passion as we understand them. The second term is *nous*. This is normally translated as 'mind' or 'intellect', but the latter fails to convey the affectivity intrinsic to the Evagrian *nous*, while although 'mind' can be understood as including emotion, it remains for us weighted with post-Cartesian connotations. The third term is *thumos*. This is generally translated as 'irascibility', but for Evagrius it has a much wider scope, the *thumos* being, for example, the source within the soul of *agapē*.²¹

For the works of Evagrius included in Sinkewicz (2003) the translations I have used are his, sometimes with minor amendments, with the exception of the *Ad Monachos*, for

¹⁶ Driscoll (2003).

¹⁷ Cf. Plato, *Meno* 82b5 ff.

¹⁸ See below, 1.1.1.

¹⁹ See below, 1.2.2, 3.3, 4.

²⁰ See below, 3.3.

²¹ See below, 1.2.2.

which I have used that of Driscoll (2003). For Evagrius' Scholia on Psalms I have relied on a text kindly made available to me by Luke Dysinger, OSB, reconstructed according to the key of M-J Rondeau,²² based on the MS *Vaticanus Graecus 754*, and for the *Kephalaia Gnostika* I have relied almost exclusively on Dysinger's translation,²³ although occasionally I have used those of Sinkewicz or Driscoll, in which case this is noted. For the *Antirrhētikos* I have used the translation of Brakke (2009), and am grateful to him for making it available to me prior to publication. My thanks also to Robert Sinkewicz for supplying me with his working translation of the *Antirrhētikos*. Translations of the *Gnostikos* are mine from the Greek where available, and otherwise from the French of Guillaumont. Those of the Scholia on Proverbs and Ecclesiastes and the *Chapters of the Disciples of Evagrius* are my own. Translations of the *Great Letter* and *Epistula Fidei* are those of Casiday (2006), and those of other letters are credited in the footnotes. Translations of the Bible are from the *New Revised Standard Version*, usually with amendments, and those of other primary sources are either from the editions listed in the Bibliography or are credited in the footnotes.

Some of Evagrius' works, most notably the majority of the *Kephalaia Gnostika*, along with the *Antirrhētikos* and *Letters*, survive only in Syriac. Since my linguistic competence does not at present extend this far, I quote these in translation only.

I have referenced Evagrius' biblical scholia by the somewhat cumbersome device of Sch. (*n*) on (Book *n:n*) in order to indicate both the numbering of the scholion according to Géhin's edition and the biblical text which it concerns. In referring to the Book of Psalms I have used the Septuagint numbering.

Regrettably, Kevin Corrigan's perceptive study of Evagrian anthropology, *Evagrius and Gregory: Mind, Soul and Body in the 4th Century* (London: 2009) was published too late for consideration in this thesis.

²² M-J Rondeau, "Le commentaire sur les Psaumes d'Évagre le Pontique", *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 26 (1960), pp.307-48.

²³ At www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/02_Gno-Keph/.

Chapter 1

Cosmology and Anthropology

In order to understand the nature and significance of Evagrian *apatheia* it is necessary to start with his cosmology and anthropology. This chapter begins by describing his vision of the creation and fall of the *logikoi* and the nature and redemptive purpose of corporeal creation. It then considers in turn the principal components of the human being: the *nous*, the soul, the body and the heart.

1.1 Cosmology

The principal source for Evagrius' cosmology and some key aspects of his anthropology are the *Kephalaia Gnostika*, the study of which involves a number of serious hermeneutical and textual difficulties. Regarding the former, one is faced with the question of how far, as a twenty-first century layperson, one might hope to understand a text aimed at advanced contemplatives within a particular strand of fourth century desert monasticism, the author of which took care in its composition to 'keep some things hidden and obscure others, so as "not to give what is holy to dogs and throw pearls before swine"'.¹ The textual problems associated with the *Kephalaia* derive from their having been taken to contain doctrines condemned as heretical, as a result of which they do not survive in Greek, meaning that one is at the mercy of a translator and that consequently it is impossible to determine with any certainty what technical vocabulary Evagrius used or how he used it.² Because of these considerations what follows must be considered tentative.

Evagrius' use of two terms in the *Kephalaia Gnostika*, *logikos* and *nous*, needs some preliminary explanation.³ *Logikos*, 'rational', used as a substantive and almost always in

¹ *Prakt.* Prol. 58-60. 'These things', he continues, 'will be clear to those who have embarked upon the same path.'

² Cf. Ousley (1979: 142-3).

³ The following remarks are based upon Ousley (1979: 146-8).

the plural, is the term by which the *Kephalaia* generally denote the rational creatures who were God's first creation. It is common in the *Kephalaia* but rare elsewhere in Evagrius' works.⁴ It emphasises the rational creatures as part of pre-lapsarian creation - as they were before the Fall⁵ and will be following the *apokatastasis*.⁶ It is also sometimes used 'as a generic term for the rational creatures in whatever condition or state they may be'⁷ in which case it emphasises their identity as 'essentially rational creatures of the first creation.'⁸ Before the Fall a *nous* was identical with a *logikos*, but it is the *nous* that falls, becomes part of corporeal creation and is eventually restored to union with God in the *apokatastasis*. Thus the term *nous*, rather than *logikos*, is generally used to refer to the fallen rational creatures.

1.1.1 The creation and fall of the *logikoi*

Evagrius' vision of the origin of humankind owes much to Origen,⁹ but what in Origen is tentative and speculative becomes with Evagrius a thoroughgoing and highly integrated vision of reality. According to it, God's first creation¹⁰ was of incorporeal¹¹ *logikoi*, rational beings, created in his own image¹² to exist in knowledge of him:

Πᾶσα φύσις λογικῆ κτίσις νοερά ἐστὶ, θεός δε μόνος νοητὸς ἐστίν.¹³

Every rational nature is a knowing creation,¹⁴ and God alone is knowable.

⁴ The *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* records only two occurrences in works attributed to Evagrius - Sch. 33 on Prov. 3:19-20 and Sch. 275 on Prov. 24:22 - both of which use it in the plural and in the same sense as the *Kephalaia Gnostika*. The Scholia on Psalms contain a further four occurrences in the plural and used in this same sense.

⁵ Cf., e.g. *KG* 2.19, 66; 6.75.

⁶ Cf., e.g. *KG* 3.40.

⁷ Ousley (1979: 146).

⁸ Ousley (1979: 147).

⁹ Evagrius is not, however, an uncritical disciple of Origen. For example, he amends Origen's Christology in an attempt to bring it into line with Nicene orthodoxy - cf. Kline (1985) - and adopts the Platonic theory of the tripartite soul, rejected by Origen; see below, 1.2.

¹⁰ See below, n.21.

¹¹ E.g. *KG* 1:46; 2.61; 6.9, 20, 73. Cf. *DP* 1.7.1 (R).

¹² Cf. *KG* 3.32; 6.73.

¹³ *KG* 1.3. Cf. *KG* 1.50, 'Everything that has been created, has been created for the knowledge of God'; *KG* 1.87: 'All beings exist for the knowledge of God, but everything that exists for another is less than that for which it exists. Because of this, the knowledge of God is superior to all.

¹⁴ That is, created to know, apprehend or conceptualise.

For Evagrius, for x to know y entails the participation of x in y , and in the case of God, participation becomes union since the image of God consists in the receptivity of the *logikoi* to knowledge of God:

The image of God is not that which is susceptible of his wisdom, for corporeal nature would thus be the image of God. Rather, that which has become susceptible of the Unity – this is the Image of God.¹⁵

Since rational nature was created to exist in knowledge of God, the desire for knowledge is intrinsic to it and can only truly be satisfied by knowledge of God:

All rational nature was naturally made in order to exist and to know,¹⁶ and God is essential knowledge.¹⁷

God created the *logikoi* self-determining (*autexousioi*),¹⁸ and at some point (although the language of temporality is not, properly speaking, applicable since time did not yet

¹⁵ *KG* 3.32; cf. also *Gt.Let.* 16: ‘The mind is alone amongst all the creatures and orders in being ‘the true form that is receptive to the knowledge of the Father, for it is “being renewed in knowledge according to the image of its creator.”’ (cf. *Col.* 3:10).

¹⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 980a21: ‘All men by nature desire to know’ (πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει).

¹⁷ *KG* 1.89.1-2. Stewart (2001: 191) glosses ‘essential knowledge’ as ‘knowledge without an object exterior to the self. Although God is knowable, it does not follow that he can be understood, nor the *nous* made in his image; cf. *KG* 2.11: ‘Only our *nous* is incomprehensible for us, as well as God, its author. Indeed, it is not possible for us to understand what is a nature susceptible of the Blessed Trinity, nor to understand the Unity, essential knowledge.’ Nor can God be known completely; cf. *KG* 1.71: ‘The end of natural knowledge is the holy Unity, but ignorance has no end, for as it is said, there is no limit to his greatness’; cf. *Ps.* 144:3. Cf. also *Prakt.* 87: ‘The person making progress in *praktikē* diminishes the *pathē*; the one progressing in contemplation diminishes ignorance. For the *pathē* there will one day be complete destruction, but in the case of ignorance they say one form will have an end, the other will not’ (‘Ὁ μὲν προκόπτων ἐν πρακτικῇ τὰ πάθη μειοῖ, ὁ δὲ ἐν θεωρίᾳ τὴν ἀγνωσίαν· καὶ τῶν μὲν παθῶν ἔσται ποτὲ καὶ φθορὰ παντελής, τῆς δὲ ἀγνωσίας τῆς μὲν εἶναι πέρας, τῆς δὲ μὴ εἶναι φασί). Sinkewicz (2003: 259, n.88) notes that ‘the two forms of ignorance correspond to the two forms of knowledge, namely, knowledge of beings and knowledge of God or theology. Full knowledge of beings is obtained with perfect impassibility, but the knowledge of God is without limit and can never be exhausted.’ Cf. Sch. 2 on *Ps.* 144:3 (‘Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised, and of his greatness there is no limit’): ‘The contemplation of beings is limited; only the knowledge of the Holy Trinity is without limit, for it is essential wisdom.’ See also below, 1.1.3.

¹⁸ This is not stated explicitly but is implied by, e.g., Sch. 52.8-13 on *Eccl.* 6-10; *Gt.Let.* 26; *KG* 1.63. Cf. *DP* 2.9.2 (R), 6 (R).

exist),¹⁹ their union with God was disturbed by a movement arising among them in which they turned away from him. The movement was an exercise of their power of self-determination; that is, a choice or decision: in his Scholia on Ecclesiastes Evagrius defines ‘choice’ as ‘a certain movement of the *nous*’ (ἡ...προαίρεσις ἐστὶ ποιὰ νοῦ κίνησις)²⁰ and in his Scholia on Proverbs he defines ‘decision’ in the same way (ἡ βουλή ποιὰ νοῦ κίνησις).²¹ To all intents and purposes this movement was the Fall – or so it would seem. Certainly this is how Evagrius has often been understood.²² But I

¹⁹ Driscoll (2003: 5-6) draws attention to the question of how Evagrius’ doctrine of the creation of the *logikoi* should be interpreted. Referring to remarks by Bunge (1985: 156, n.19; 396: 52), he notes: ‘In general it is presumed that the Origenist theory of pre-existence of souls is shared by Evagrius and that this is to be understood as occurring within the temporal order [so Guillaumont, 1962: 103-4]. Bunge points out that the application of temporal sequence to the relation of mind, soul and body risks a serious misunderstanding of Evagrius, who, he claims, is attempting to speak of metahistorical realities with the language of space and time, that is, with the only language available to speak of such realities. Evagrius was aware of this difficulty and cautions that the mind in its relation to God admits in the strict sense the language of neither place nor names [the allusion is to *Gt.Let* 26]. Bunge would want a more sympathetic, because less obviously heterodox, reading of Evagrius on these questions to which later generations (and many contemporaries) applied too literally the categories of space and time.’ The publication in 2007 of the *Chapters of the Disciples of Evagrius* lends support to Bunge’s view. The *Chapters* often seem to state directly doctrines which in Evagrius’ own writings are merely implicit, and Chapter 25 reads: ‘Simple bodies are prior to composites, and the *nous* is not composite since it is not from matter, therefore it pre-exists the body, but not in time because time pertains to corporeal nature’ (Τὰ ἀπλᾶ σώματα πρότερά εἰσι τῶν συνθέτων, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀσύνθετός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἐξ ὕλης, ἄρα προϋπάρχει τοῦ σώματος, οὐ μὴν χρόνῳ· ὁ γὰρ χρόνος τῆς σωματικῆς φύσεώς ἐστιν). Cf. *KG* 2.87: ‘Temporal is the movement of bodies, but timeless the transformation of the incorporeals.’ See also Dysinger (2005: 31-32, n.98). In addition, it is my view that that the question remains open as to whether it is correct to interpret any of Evagrius’ teachings as speculative or doctrinal. As Dysinger (2005: 206-7) notes, ‘The *Kephalaia Gnostica* is above all else a workbook for meditation...one would need to exercise great care in using texts from [it] to assess the orthodoxy of Evagrius’ dogmatic theology. Nevertheless, this is precisely what theologians from Justinian down to the present have attempted to do.’

²⁰ Sch. 10.1-2 on Eccl. 2:11. Cf. also *Disc.* 118, quoted in n.24 below.

²¹ Sch. 23.1 on Prov. 2:17.

²² So, for example, Ousley, who speaks (1979: 118-19) of ‘the movement of the fall’ and states that ‘movement can be used as a term for the fall itself’; Sinkewicz (2003: xxxviii): ‘As a result of an original negligence, a movement arose among them, distancing them from substantial knowledge and creating a disparity among them, for not all fell away from knowledge to the same degree’; Dysinger (2005: 31): ‘Evagrius believed that history and time began with the ‘movement’ (κίνησις) or fall from primordial union with God of the intellects (νοῦ).’ Balthasar (1965: 184), maintains the distinction between ‘movement’ and ‘fall’ - ‘These spirits out of satiety (Origen) and carelessness (Evagrius) turned away in varying degrees from the unity that is God, and so “fell out of unity”’, as does Driscoll (2003: 6): ‘By use of their free will these minds grew lax in their contemplation of essential knowledge, producing a rupture in the original unity and causing the minds to fall away from the essential knowledge or unity’ - but neither draws out its implications. Kline (1985: 162-3) equates the movement with the Fall. O’Laughlin (1987: 123 ff) does not use the word ‘fall’ in this context, but he translates *kinēsis* as ‘disturbance’, so losing sight of the rich metaphysical connotations of the word ‘movement’. Stewart (2001: 176) speaks of the ‘disruption of [the] primordial unity through distracted “movement” away from contemplation, a possibility inherent in rational creatures endowed with free will’, but does not (at least explicitly) equate the

think there is an important distinction between the two. Consider, first, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 3.28:

The soul is the *nous* which, through negligence, has fallen from the Unity; and through its carelessness has descended to the rank of *praktikē*.²³

The fall of the soul was the result of negligence or carelessness. But what did it do negligently or carelessly that caused it to fall?

The Monad was not moved in itself: rather, it is moved by the receptivity of the *nous* which through inattentiveness turns its face away, and which through this deprivation begets ignorance.²⁴

The ‘inattentiveness of the *nous*’ is, I suggest, the same thing as the ‘negligence’ or ‘carelessness’ of the soul, and what the *nous* or soul did thus was choose to turn away from God.²⁵ This inattentive, negligent and/or careless movement was the cause of the

movement with the exercise of that free will. Rasmussen (2005: 149) notes that the *logikoi* fell as a result of a movement, but again does not consider the nature of the movement, or, therefore, how exactly it caused the Fall. Konstantinovsky notes (2009: 124) that ‘the fall of the mind into the state of psyche is...conceived by Evagrius in terms of a pre-cosmic catastrophe that Evagrius refers to as ‘the Movement’. However, the only definition of ‘the Movement’ that she cites is *KG* 3.22, ‘the first movement of the *logikoi* is the separation of the *nous* from the Unity that is in it’, which states what the effect of the movement is but not that it constitutes a decision or choice. Therefore she does not identify the precise nature of the movement, nor, accordingly, its distinctness from, and causal relation to, the Fall. At (2009: 156) she states that “‘the Movement’ is a wilful deviation of the created intellects from the life of contemplation”, which is essentially correct, but again there is no suggestion of a distinction between it and the Fall.

²³ *KG* 3.28. Cf. *Gt.Let.* 26: the mind, ‘falling at some point from its former rank through its free will, was called a soul’; see below, 1.1.2.

²⁴ *KG* 1.49.

²⁵ There are similarities in Origen’s description of the Fall but he does not seem to use the word ‘movement’ in this context in the same way that Evagrius does. At 1.3.8 (R) and 1.4.1(R) he speaks of a ‘loss or falling away’ rather than of a ‘movement’. At 2.9.2 (R) he uses the word ‘movement’, but more loosely than Evagrius: ‘The cause of the withdrawal will lie in this, that the movements of their minds are not rightly and worthily directed. For the Creator granted to the minds created by him the power of free and voluntary movement, in order that the good that was in them might become their own, since it was preserved by their own free will; but sloth and weariness of taking trouble to preserve the good, coupled with disregard and neglect of better things, began the process of withdrawal from the good...And so each mind, neglecting the good either more or less in proportion to its own movements, was drawn to the opposite of good’. *DP* 3.1.1-4 discusses the *autexousion* in terms of its being a movement of the *hē-gemonikon* but does not apply this to what at 2.9.2 is called the ‘withdrawal’. Thus while all the elements for Evagrius’ understanding of the movement are present in Origen, to understand it as a specific choice or decision, defined as a movement of the *nous*, to turn away from God, would seem to be uniquely Evagriusian

Fall. Accordingly, when Evagrius refers to the primal deflection of the *logikoi* from God he speaks in terms of the ‘movement’ rather than of ‘the Fall’, reserving the word ‘fall’ for the consequences of the movement. These consequences might be in the form of the cosmic Fall, as in *Kephalaia Gnostika* 3.28, and, again the following:

The ‘demon’ is the reasoning nature which, because of an abundance of *thumos*, has fallen from the service of God.²⁶

But they might also be in the form of the consequences of wrong moral choice - a misuse of our self-determination which itself echoes the primordial movement- namely a ‘fall’ into either *pathos* or sin:

ὁ τῆς ὑπερηφανίας δαίμων χαλεπωτάτης πτώσεως τῇ ψυχῇ πρόξενος γίνεται.²⁷

The demon of pride helps the soul to the harshest fall.²⁸

οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς χεῖρας πνεύματος πορνείας, μὴ ὑπὸ τῆς γαστριμαργίας καταπεσόντα.²⁹

It is not possible to fall into the hands of the spirit of fornication, unless one has fallen under the influence of gluttony.

For Evagrius, then, there is a substantive difference between a ‘movement’ and a ‘fall’ on both the cosmic and the psychological scales, such that a movement away from God, within either the cosmic or the psychological domain, causes a fall.³⁰

²⁶ *KG* 3.34.

²⁷ *Prakt.* 14.

²⁸ Evagrius goes on to describe this ‘fall’ as follows: ‘[The demon of pride] induces the soul to refuse to acknowledge that God is its helper and to think that it is itself the cause of its good actions, and to take a haughty view of its brothers as being unintelligent (ἀνοήτων) because they do not all hold the same opinion of it. Anger and sadness follow closely upon this as well as the ultimate evil, derangement of mind (ἔκστασις φρενῶν), madness, and the vision of a multitude of demons in the air.’

²⁹ *Th.* 1.6-8.

³⁰ For more uses by Evagrius of ‘fall’, cf., e.g., *Found.* 6: ‘Fear for a fall (τὸ πταῖσμα) and be steadfast in your cell’; *Eul.* 17.18: ‘Let him who has stumbled (ὁ πταίσας) not attempt to blame others or cause them to stumble (πταίνειν μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖτω) in order that he might not be the only one to fall into evil (συμπεσὼν τῷ κακῷ): this was also the work at the origin of the devil’s fall (ὁ ἔκπτωσις τοῦ διαβόλου)’ *AM* 42: ‘one who hates his brother will fall a mighty fall (ὁ...μισῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ πεσεῖται πτώμα ἐξάσιον)’; *AM* 104: ‘Do not trip up (μὴ ὑποσκελίσῃς) your brother and do not rejoice over a fall (πτώμα) of his’; *KG* 4.10: ‘Among writers of true doctrines, some have plunged from the first contemplation of nature, others from the second, and still others are fallen from the Blessed Trinity.’

Since the movement sundered the primal unity an initial expression of the Fall was the introduction of duality, and hence opposition, within the created order:

And while opposed to reasoning nature there is non-existence, and [opposed] to knowledge there is evil and ignorance, there is in these no opposition to God.³¹

Thus arose the dualities of good and evil, knowledge and ignorance and existence and non-existence, with good, knowledge and existence being properties of God,³² and evil, ignorance and non-existence their deprivation among the fallen creatures.³³

1.1.2 Corporeal creation

Following the movement God created,³⁴ through Christ, according to his manifold wisdom,³⁵ a hierarchy of worlds characterised by increasing degrees of corporeality to

³¹ *KG* 1.89.2-4; cf. *KG* 1.1.

³² For God as essentially good, cf. *KG* 1.1; as essential knowledge, *KG* 1.89.

³³ Although it is only ignorance that Evagrius states explicitly to be a *deprivatio*; cf. *KG* 1.49. For the movement as the cause of evil, cf. *KG* 1.51. That the origin of evil is the misuse by the *logikoi* of their self-determination is reiterated in the *Chapters of the Disciples*. Chapter 36 states, ‘And again: God has entrusted objects to us and asked us to use them with reason. It is therefore as a result of a use contrary to reason that we have made evil exist. Evil does not, therefore, exist naturally but through usage’ (Καὶ πάλιν πράγματα ἐνεπίστευσεν ἡμῖν ὁ θεὸς καὶ χρῆσιν εὐλογον αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς ἀπαιτεῖ· παρὰ τὴν ἄλογον οὖν χρῆσιν ὑφιστάνομεν τὴν κακίαν· ὑφίσταται οὖν ἡ κακία οὐ φυσικῶς ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν). Again, Chapter 118: ‘If *noēmata* of objects are evil, whoever created the *nous* in a certain way is responsible, and if objects were evil, whoever created them would be responsible himself. But plainly neither *noēmata* nor objects are evil, but it is the movement of our self-determination toward the worst.’ (Εἰ τὰ νοήματα τῶν πραγμάτων κακία εἰσίν, ὁ τοιοῦτον τὸν νοῦν κατασκευάσας αἴτιος, καὶ εἰ τὰ πράγματα κακία ἦσαν, ὁ δημιουργήσας αὐτὰ αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη αἴτιος· ἀλλ’ οὔτε τὰ νοήματα οὔτε τὰ πράγματα κακία εἰσὶ δηλονότι, ἀλλ’ ἡ κίνησις τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου ἢ πρὸς τὰ χεῖρονα.)

³⁴ Evagrius does not state directly that this was a second creation but it can be inferred from, e.g., *KG* 1.65 (quoted below, 3.3) and 4.58: ‘God, when he created the *logikoi*, was not in anything; but, when he creates the corporeal nature and the worlds which arise from it, he is in his Christ’. However, although I implicitly refer here to two creations and explicitly referred above to ‘God’s first creation’ (see n.3), my intention is not to commit myself to a particular interpretation of this difficult aspect of Evagrius’ thought. Dysinger (2005: 32, n.100) notes that ‘the question has been raised whether Evagrius can properly be said to have described the creation of the material world as a “second creation”’ and briefly summarises the arguments against such a view.

³⁵ Cf. *KG* 1.43; 2.2, 21, 70; 3.11, 81; 4.7; 5.84; Eph. 3.10; also *KG* 1.14; 2.70; Ps. 103:24; also *KG* 1.14. Briefly put, the difference, for Evagrius, between knowledge and wisdom is that knowledge relates to unity and wisdom to multiplicity, thus knowledge to God and wisdom to corporeal creation and therefore to Christ; cf., e.g., *KG* 1.14: ‘Our Lord made everything with wisdom (Ps. 103:24)’; *KG* 2.2: ‘In second

function as a ladder³⁶ by which, through putting their power of self-determination at the service of the re-ascent to God, the *logikoi* might make good their original misuse of that power – since they were created for union with God their choice to turn away from him was a misuse of it - and play an active role in their redemption.

Corporeal creation comprises bodies and souls for the *logikoi*, worlds associated with the bodies,³⁷ and ages across which the process of redemption unfolds³⁸ until the *apokatastasis* or final consummation. Although created equal among themselves,³⁹ each *logikos* differed in the extent of its inattentiveness, negligence or carelessness, consequently of its movement and consequently of its fall, and accordingly differentiation arose among them. The hierarchical structure of corporeal creation and its diversity of worlds, ages, souls and bodies reflect this differentiation.

Corporeal creation, is, accordingly, characterised by multiplicity, movement and change, in contrast to the simplicity and stillness of the primal Unity.⁴⁰ Its multiplicity, movement and mutability express both the Fall and the wisdom of God. But how can this be? How can they be both results of the Fall and aspects of God's providential design for the redemption of the *logikoi*?⁴¹ The answer, I think, lies in the distinction between different kinds of movement. Underlying the Fall and, therefore, corporeal creation is the introduction, by the *logikoi*, of movement into the created order; in the first instance it is the *noes* themselves that move, but as they fall they become souls and movement becomes intrinsic to soul.⁴² Movement, though, can be either stable or unstable. As we shall see, one of the principal ways in which Evagrius characterises *apatheia* and its opposite, *empathia*, is in terms of the contrast between stable and unstable movement, *apatheia* being the stable movement of the soul. His doing so is, I suggest, an instance of two working principles that we can safely impute to him: first, that movement is part of the nature

natural contemplation we see the manifold wisdom (Eph. 3:10) of Christ'; *KG* 3.11: 'Corporeal nature has received the manifold wisdom of Christ.'

³⁶ Cf. *KG* 4.43.

³⁷ Cf. *KG* 2.85; 3.26, 36, 78; 4.58; 5.4, 7.

³⁸ Cf. *KG* 1.11; 3.51.

³⁹ Cf. *Gt.Let.* 29; *DP* 2.9.6 (R).

⁴⁰ Cf., e.g., *KG* 1.65, quoted below, 3.3.

⁴¹ For the same thing being at once the result of evil and the remedy for it, cf. *KG* 1.51: 'The movement is the cause of evil but virtue is destructive of evil. However, virtue is the daughter of names and modes and the cause of these is the movement.'

⁴² See below, this section.

of soul, and, second, that stable movement is associated with proximity to God and unstable movement with distance from him. The primal movement of the *logikoi* was, as a deflection from God, unstable. It was also a change from a better state to a worse state. The change took the form of the introduction of opposition within the created order and differentiation among the *logikoi*, the twin bases for the multiplicity of corporeal creation. The primal movement in turn precipitated the further unstable movement in which the *logikoi* fell away from God. Then God intervened by creating the corporeal worlds, an imposition of stability upon chaos. Because stillness is found only in union with God, this means stability of movement rather than cessation of movement and is reflected in the ensoulment of the fallen *logikoi*. So the *logikoi* are the source of unstable movement, while God is the source of stable movement and stillness. Corporeal creation is God's stabilisation of the instability that was initiated by the *logikoi*, and it establishes a basis upon which they can progressively stabilise themselves and, in so doing, re-ascend to the stillness of union with him.

In proposing this interpretation of Evagrian cosmology I am going beyond anything he says directly and so a brief digression to explain my grounds for doing so is in order. What he says directly is that (i) a choice or decision is a movement of the *nous*;⁴³ (ii) before the primordial movement the condition of the *logikoi* in union with God was one of peace;⁴⁴ (iii) *pathos* is a kind of movement;⁴⁵ (iv) *empathēia* is characterised by unstable movement;⁴⁶ (v) *apatheia* is characterised by stability and peace,⁴⁷ and (vi) the *apathēs* soul or *nous* moves toward God.⁴⁸ Also relevant is his reserving of the term 'fall' for the consequence of a movement away from God.⁴⁹ These are the principal 'lines' I am 'reading between' in my interpretation of the Fall as the unstable movement of the *noes* and corporeal creation as God's stabilisation of it. If correct, it has strong echoes of parts of Plato's *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus*. From the *Timaeus* comes the idea of the creation of

⁴³ See above, this section.

⁴⁴ See below, n.47.

⁴⁵ See below, 2.2.2, 4.

⁴⁶ See below, 2.3, 3.1.

⁴⁷ See below, 3.1.

⁴⁸ See below, 3.1.

⁴⁹ See above, 1.1.1.

the world (κόσμος)⁵⁰ as the imposition of order upon a universe characterised by disorderly motion:

βουληθεῖς...ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα...οὕτω δὲ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὄρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας.⁵¹

God...wishing that all things should be good...and finding the visible universe in a state not of rest but of inharmonious and disorderly motion, reduced it to order from disorder.⁵²

The word ἡσυχία can be noted: ‘peace’ is, for Evagrius, in cosmological terms a characteristic of the pre-lapsarian unity and in psychological terms a characteristic of *apatheia*.⁵³ The association between movement and soul is found in both the *Timaeus* and the *Phaedrus*,⁵⁴ and the association of unstable movement with distance from God in the *Phaedrus*.⁵⁵ According to the *Timaeus* each of the three parts of the soul has its own movements (κινήσεις),⁵⁶ and ‘the movements that are akin to the divine in us [*sc.* the rational part of the soul] are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe’ (τῷ δ’ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖῳ συγγενεῖς εἰσιν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραί)⁵⁷ – that is, the movements proper to the rational part of the soul resemble the orderly and harmonious movements of the stars and planets, embodiments of cosmic *nous*.⁵⁸ Consequently, by observing and studying these we might learn to

μιμούμενοι τὰς τοῦ θεοῦ πάντως ἀπλανεῖς οὔσας, τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν πεπλανημένας καταστησαίμεθα.⁵⁹

⁵⁰ *Tim.* 29e4.

⁵¹ *Tim.* 30a2-5.

⁵² Translations of the *Timaeus* are those of Lee, amended. Cf. also the discussion, at *Philebus* 23c1ff, of the unlimited (ἄπειρον) and limit (πέρας).

⁵³ E.g. *KG* 1.65, quoted below, 3.3; *Prakt.* 64, quoted below, 3.1.

⁵⁴ E.g. *Tim.* 37a5 ff; *Phdr.* 245c6 ff. However, there is a difference in that while the *Phaedrus* derives all movement from soul, the *Timaeus* appears to make chaotic, disorderly movement independent of soul; I am grateful to Bob Sharples for pointing this out to me.

⁵⁵ In the form of the contrast between the movement of the gods through the heavens and the movement of the other souls who, because their wings are broken, are unable to rise aloft and follow the gods; cf. *Phdr.* 246e5 ff; see below, 2.3.

⁵⁶ *Tim.* 89d5.

⁵⁷ *Tim.* 90c7-d1,

⁵⁸ Cf. *Tim.* 47b7: ‘the revolutions of *nous* in the heavens’ (τὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ τοῦ νοῦ κατιδόντες περιόδους).

⁵⁹ *Tim.* 47c2-4.

correct the disorder of our own revolutions by imitating the invariability of those of God.

A person will only find respite from change and suffering when he helps the ‘motion of the Same and Uniform’ (τῆ ταύτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου περιόδῳ) within the soul to

συνεπισπόμενος τὸν πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ ὕστερον προσφύντα ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς, θορυβώδη καὶ ἄλογον ὄντα.⁶⁰

draw in its train all that multitude of riotous and irrational [feelings] which have clung to it as a result of its association with fire, water, air and earth.

until, having subdued them by reason (λόγῳ κρατήσας), he might return to the form of his first and best state (εἰς τὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εἶδος ἕξεως).⁶¹

In the *Timaeus*, then, the type of movement proper to the rational part of the soul is orderly, harmonious and stable, like the orbits of the heavenly bodies. It is, however, disrupted by embodiment and must be re-established by giving the rational part of the soul its ‘proper nourishment and movements’ (τὰς οἰκείας...τροφὰς καὶ κινήσεις),⁶² which means by living a rational life (κατὰ λόγον ζῶη)⁶³ rather than a life centred upon the lower parts of the soul.⁶⁴ This ‘return of the rational soul-part to its own original nature’ is the *homoiôsis theôi*, ‘likeness to God’, under its cosmological description.⁶⁵ So for both Plato and Evagrius we have within us something that resembles the divine. The natural condition of that ‘something’ is stability but it suffers destabilisation in relation to embodiment, as a result of which its resemblance to the divine is damaged. It must be re-stabilised by living in the right sort of way, and this restores its resemblance to the divine. This structural similarity in their respective accounts of the loss and restoration of our ‘likeness to God’,⁶⁶ along with the six points listed above, makes it likely, I sug-

⁶⁰ *Tim.* 42 c5-d1.

⁶¹ *Tim.* 42 d1.

⁶² *Tim.* 90c7.

⁶³ *Tim.* 89d4.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Tim.* 90b1 ff.

⁶⁵ Cf. Sedley, at Fine (1999: 320-1).

⁶⁶ Although of course the Christian *imago Dei* is construed in fundamentally different terms from the Platonic *homoiôsis theôi*.

gest, that Evagrius understands the Fall as unstable movement and the corporeal worlds as God's re-introduction of stability to the created order. However, in proposing that something like Plato's understanding of the cosmological and psychological role of movement underlies his thinking I am not relying on the possibility that he was actually working from the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus* or even that he had necessarily read them - although given his erudition and his intellectual milieu prior to his move to the desert⁶⁷ there seems no reason to doubt that he had – but rather on the fact (as I take it to be) that this sort of view would have been part and parcel of philosophical cosmology and psychology in Late Antiquity.

The creation of the *logikoi* in the image of God means, for Evagrius, in the image of the Triune God, such that the *nous* is itself triune. As it falls it fragments⁶⁸ into its aspects, the sundering of its unity with God being *ipso facto* that of its internal unity:

The first movement of the *logikoi* is the separation of the *nous* from the Unity that is in it.⁶⁹

[The mind] is one in nature, person and rank. Falling at some point from its former rank through its free will, it was called a soul. And it descended again and was named a body.⁷⁰

In the second of these passages there are again echoes of the *Timaeus*, where the Demiurge is said, 'in fashioning the universe' (τὸ πᾶν συνετεκταίνεται) to have 'implanted *nous* in soul and soul in body' (νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δ' ἐν σώματι συνιστάς).⁷¹ But

⁶⁷ See above, Introduction.

⁶⁸ Driscoll, following Bunge, prefers the term 'disintegration', explaining (2003: 7, n.20), '*Disintegration* is a word that Bunge prefers to use in an attempt to avoid words with strong temporal overtones. It has the advantage of showing the continuity of mind as the fundamental reality while at the same time showing that the present human condition does not represent a perfect manifestation of God's intentions in creation's regard.' Cf. Bunge (1986: 118). My own use of the present tense here is, likewise, an attempt to avoid temporal overtones.

⁶⁹ *KG* 3.22.

⁷⁰ *Gt.Let.* 26. Cf. also *DP* 2.7.3 (R): 'Mind when it fell was made soul.' Regarding man's constitution of *nous*, soul and body, cf. I Thess. 5:23: 'May your spirit (πνεῦμα) and soul (ψυχὴ) and body (σῶμα) be kept sound'. In anthropological terms Evagrius equates the *nous* with spirit.

⁷¹ *Tim.* 30b4-5.

although the *nous* in falling from God becomes colder and heavier,⁷² Evagrius' assertion that it was first 'called a soul' and then 'named a body' should not be understood as meaning simply that 'the actual "substance" of both body and soul is mind'.⁷³ On the contrary, Evagrius acknowledges the existence of matter independently of the *nous* and soul, and, in the form of the four elements, constitutive of bodies.⁷⁴ So he should, rather, be understood as meaning that in becoming colder and heavier the *nous* becomes a soul which is then joined to a material body⁷⁵ whose elemental constitution depends on how far that *nous* has fallen.⁷⁶ Nonetheless there is a real sense in which the embodied *nous* has, indeed, become corporeal, hence Evagrius' speaking of its being 'named a body'; as Konstantinovsky notes, Evagrius 'appears to uphold a Cratylean theory of referential language whereby, far from being purely conventional...names reveal what things truly are'.⁷⁷ The *nous* 'becomes a body' in virtue of its thoroughgoing immersion in, and attachment to, the sensible world; an immersion and attachment that result from the distancing of the *nous* from God and include the 'excessive love' of the *nous* for the body.⁷⁸ Corporeality is, however, unnatural to the *nous* and inimical to knowledge of God,⁷⁹ and so a fundamental part of *praktikē* is the attempt, through diet, to modify the body's *krasis*, its physiological constitution,⁸⁰ in order to render it, and *ipso facto* the *nous*, in effect less corporeal, in a process that Evagrius speaks of as 'liberating the body from its attributes'⁸¹ and equates with metaphorical death and that involves the

⁷² That the *nous* becomes colder in falling from God recalls Origen's suggestion (*DP* 2.8.3 (R)) of an etymological relationship between *psychesthai*, 'to cool', and *psyche*, 'soul'. However Evagrius does not take this up.

⁷³ Rasmussen (2005: 149). Thus Balthasar is incorrect when, having proposed (1965: 189) that '[we must] take quite literally the statement that bodies are themselves only a fallen condition of souls, quite as soul is merely the fallen condition of spirit', he goes on to state that 'Evagrius comes to formulate a radical idealism' (*ibid.*); see below, n.56.

⁷⁴ E.g. *KG* 1.29: 'Also as with bodies go colours, forms and numbers, thus also among the four elements matter is destroyed; for with them it possesses this, that it did not exist and it was made'; *KG* 1.47: 'Nothing in power in the soul is able to leave it through action and then to subsist independently, for [the soul] was by its nature made to exist in bodies'; *KG* 1.48: 'Everything attached to bodies accompanies those by whom they are engendered, but nothing of this is attached to soul'. Also *KG* 2.18, which contrasts 'the nature of bodies' with 'the reasoning nature'.

⁷⁵ E.g. *KG* 1.58: "'Mortal" [means] one who is by nature made to be freed from the body to which he is joined...All who have been joined to bodies will necessarily be liberated from them.'

⁷⁶ See below, this section.

⁷⁷ Konstantinovsky (2009: 131).

⁷⁸ Cf. *Disc.* 130.

⁷⁹ See below, 1.2.1.3.

⁸⁰ Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 281, n.49).

⁸¹ Cf. *Gt.Let.* 46.

progressive detachment of the *nous* from the sensible world.⁸² So the body, for Evagrius, is functionally part of the *nous* even though it is distinct in terms of its physical constitution.⁸³ Because his interest lies with the functional relation of the body to the *nous* I shall follow his example in speaking of the body as being an aspect of the *nous*.

The soul in turn fragments into three parts, the Platonic triad of *logistikon*, *thumos* and *epithumêtikon*.⁸⁴ The *logistikon* is the least fallen and so highest, while in humans at least, the *epithumêtikon* is the part of the soul most closely related to the body and therefore the lowest and most fallen.⁸⁵ However, although all three parts of the soul were in this sense latent in the pre-lapsarian *nous*, what became the *thumos* and *epithumêtikon* only took that form as a result of the Fall:

If all the powers that we and the beasts have in common belong to corporeal nature, it is evident that *thumos* and *epithumia* do not seem to have been created with the rational nature before the movement.⁸⁶

Evagrius understands the process by which part of the *nous* becomes *thumos* and *epithumêtikon*, as its renouncing the image of God and willingly becoming the image of animals',⁸⁷ and elsewhere he speaks of the *thumos* and *epithumêtikon* being 'yoked' (συζεύξας) to the human person.⁸⁸

⁸² See below, 1.2.3; 2.1.3.1; 3.2.

⁸³ Apposite here is Burnyeat's point that only when Descartes 'put subjective knowledge at the centre of epistemology – and thereby made idealism a possible position for a modern philosopher to take' did it become possible to ask whether anything other than mind exists, and, accordingly, for 'one's own *body* [to] become for philosophy a part of the external world'. In particular he cautions that 'Platonic soul-body dualism is not to the point here since it puts no *epistemological* barrier between soul and body. The body is part of the material or sensible world, which is not at all the same as being part of "the external world" in the modern sense'; cf. Burnyeat (1982: 33, 32; 30, n.39). For Evagrius the point at issue is precisely the *lack* of an epistemological barrier between the body and the soul, the body's claims upon our awareness competing directly with God's claim. It is in virtue of the strength of the epistemological connection between body and soul and its consequences for the *nous* that the body can be said to be functionally part of the *nous*, or, alternatively, the *nous* to be 'named a body'.

⁸⁴ Cf., e.g., *Prakt.* 86, 89. Evagrius differs from Origen in accepting the Platonic tripartition of the soul, the validity of which Origen doubts on the grounds that it lacks scriptural authority; cf. *DP* 3.4.1 (R).

⁸⁵ There are grounds for supposing that in demons the *thumos* is the most fallen part of the soul; see below, n.102.

⁸⁶ *KG* 6.85.

⁸⁷ Cf. *Gt.Let.* 46; Rom. 1:23; see below, 1.2.2.

⁸⁸ Cf. *Th.* 17.4.

It follows from Evagrius' view of the soul and body as fallen *nous* that, strictly speaking, the term *nous* does not refer to any single aspect of the human person, but, rather, encompasses within its scope the person in her entirety. Moreover, it refers not only to the human person but, equally, to angels and demons. Concomitantly, the part of the human person (or angel or demon) that we would normally think of as its mind is the *logistikon*. In practice, however, Evagrius almost always uses the term *nous* in preference to *logistikon*, and as a result *nous* in his usage, and consequently in mine, must be understood as having two main senses, that in which it refers to the human person as a whole and that in which it refers specifically to the human *logistikon* or mind.⁸⁹

At the *apokatastasis* fall and fragmentation will be reversed as body and soul are re-assimilated to the incorporeal *nous*, thereby restoring the image of God and with it both the internal unity of the *noes* and the unity of the *noes* with God:

Now it will happen that the names and numbers of 'body', 'soul' and 'mind' will pass away since they will be raised to the order of the mind...The mind's nature will be united to the nature of the Father in that it is his body; likewise, the names 'soul' and 'body' will be absorbed into the hypostases of the Son and the Spirit, and the one nature, three persons of God and of his image will endlessly remain.⁹⁰

Although allowing in principle for an open-ended number of worlds,⁹¹ Evagrius focuses on three, and accordingly on three orders of beings: angels, humans and demons. What determines which world and order of being a given *nous* is assigned to is the extent of its fall: angels are those who fell the least, demon those who fell the most and humans those in between.⁹² The order of demons is in turn subdivided into terrestrial and infernal de-

⁸⁹ Other senses being those relating to angels or demons or to the rational beings generically.

⁹⁰ *Gt.Let.* 22-3. Cf. *DP* 2.7.3 (R): 'Mind when it fell was made soul, and soul in its turn when furnished with the virtues will become mind.' It can be noted that in view of the relation between the psychological triad of *epithumētikon*, *thumos* and *logistikon* and the anthropological triad of body, soul and mind, and of the relation between the latter and the Persons of the Trinity, we can surmise (a) that the body in some way corresponds to the Holy Spirit, the *thumos* to the Son and the *logistikon* to the Father, and (b) that the internal relations of both the psychological and the anthropological triad in some way mirror – and so in turn might shed light upon – the relations between the Persons of the Trinity.

⁹¹ Particularly at *KG* 2.65, where he speaks of 'a multitude of worlds', but cf. also, e.g., *KG* 1.11, 65, 75; 2.85; 4.39; 5.7, 81; 6.67, 77.

⁹² Cf. Sch. 16 on Prov. 1:32; *KG* 4.13.

mons,⁹³ while above the angels are the archangels.⁹⁴ The constitution of the bodies and souls assigned to the *noes* is matched to their epistemic, spiritual and ontological, condition – for Evagrius these amount to the same thing - in a process that he identifies with the judgment of God.⁹⁵ In the case of bodies spiritual condition determines which of the four elements – fire, air, water or earth – predominates.

Ψυχὴ ψυχῆ ὁμοούσιον καὶ σῶμα σώματι, ἡ δὲ κρᾶσις οὐκ ἡ αὐτή, τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γέγονεν· ἡ γὰρ κρᾶσις κατὰ πλεονασμὸν τῶν στοιχείων ἢ κατ’ ἔλλειψιν γίνεται, τῆσδε ἢ τῆσδε τῆς ἀρετῆς· διὸ καὶ πολλοὶ μακαρισμοί, ἐπεὶ καὶ πολλὰ καταστάσεις· μακάριοι οὖν οἱ τοιάνδε κατάστασιν ἔχοντες, ὅτι τοιόνδε χάρισμα ἢ τοιάνδε χάριν λήψονται.⁹⁶

A soul is consubstantial with a soul and a body with a body, but the constitution is not the same: for that has come from the Creator as a result of our self-determination. For *krasis* varies according to the abundance or lack of elements, of this or that virtue. That is why there are many beatitudes:⁹⁷ because there are many states. Blessed are those who have a such-and-such a state, because they will receive that charism or that grace.

In the case of the soul, the spiritual condition of the *nous* again determines which part predominates:

The judgment of God is the creation of the world, in which he provides, proportionately measured for each one of the *logikoi*, a body.⁹⁸

In angels *nous* and fire predominate, but in human beings *epithumia* and earth, and among demons *thumos* and air.⁹⁹

The souls of angels consist primarily of *nous* and their bodies of fire; the souls of humans consist primarily of *epithumia*¹⁰⁰ and their bodies of earth, and the souls of de-

⁹³ Cf. Sch. 2 on Ps. 134:6; 9 on Ps.70:20; 13 on Ps.76:17; 1 on Ps. 55:3, 5 on Ps. 61:11; *KG* 3.79; Géhin (1987: 129).

⁹⁴ Cf. *KG* 2.68; 5.4; also 5.11.

⁹⁵ See below, 1.1.3.

⁹⁶ *Disc.* 113.9

⁹⁷ Cf. Matt. 5:3-10.

⁹⁸ *KG* 3.38.

⁹⁹ *KG* 1.68.

¹⁰⁰ So Plato, who at *Rep.* 442a5-6 declares the *epithumêtikon* to be ‘the greater part of each person’s soul’ (πλεῖστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἐκάστῳ).

mons consist primarily of *thumos* and their bodies of air. I take it that the reason why Evagrius speaks of *nous* rather than the *logistikon* predominating in angels is that their fall is so slight that they are barely ensouled. Also, it should be noted that although angels are embodied, Evagrius speaks of ‘incorporeal beings’ in a way that suggests he is referring to angels; for example he speaks of the *apathês nous* ‘[attaining] the company of incorporeal [beings] who fulfil all its spiritual desires.’¹⁰¹ So I take it that he refers to them as incorporeal because their bodies are so much more rarefied than our own.¹⁰² Humans are dominated by the *epithumêtikon* and demons by the *thumos*.¹⁰³

As the *nous* falls from God it becomes progressively heavier:

It is said that they are on high those who possess light bodies, and below (those who possess) heavy (bodies); and above the first those who are lighter than they; but below the second those who are heavier than they.¹⁰⁴

I take this to mean that angels have light bodies and archangels even lighter ones; demons heavy bodies and infernal demons even heavier ones. Distance from God also causes the *noes* to become colder: demons’ bodies are ‘very cold, similar to ice’.¹⁰⁵ ‘Heaviness’ and ‘coldness’ seem to relate to bodies alone; although that it is a consequence of this account that bodies comprised of air are ‘heavier’ and ‘thicker’ than bodies comprised of earth, demons being more fallen than humans, indicates that their reference is not necessarily physical in any obvious sense. Two additional properties, also indexed to distance from God, can relate to body, soul or *nous*, namely ‘thickness’ and

¹⁰¹ *KG* 1.85; cf. *KG* 1.27, 45, 70; 4.62; 5.32; 6.5.

¹⁰² Cf. Dysinger (2005: 41): ‘In certain texts [Evagrius] makes it clear that by “incorporeals” he means angels and perhaps other celestial beings such as stars. Yet he also teaches that all the *logikoi* have been united to bodies since the fall, and that none are therefore fully incorporeal. Thus in regard to the contemplation of angels Evagrius often uses the term “incorporeals” in a rather loose way to refer to beings whose bodies are less coarse and material than our own.’

¹⁰³ Cf. *KG* 3.34: ‘The demon is the rational nature which, because of an abundance of *thumos*, has fallen from the service of God’; also *KG* 5.11: ‘a demon is that which, because of an abundance of *thumos*, has fallen from the *praktikê*.’ Since demons are lower in the spiritual hierarchy than humans this implies a departure from the traditional, Platonic evaluation of the three parts of the soul according to which the *epithumêtikon* is the lowest part and the *thumos* the middle.

¹⁰⁴ *KG* 2.68.

¹⁰⁵ *KG* 6.25.

‘darkness’, thus Evagrius speaks of ‘thickened body’,¹⁰⁶ of ‘bodies that are very heavy and darkened’¹⁰⁷ and of the *nous* being thickened¹⁰⁸ and the soul darkened.¹⁰⁹

The question arises of how the constitutions of the souls and bodies of the *noes*, along with the other properties considered above, relate to the understanding of corporeal creation as the stabilisation of the Fall. Are heaviness, coldness, thickness and darkness, or a psychic predominance of, say, *epithumia* and physical predominance of earth, inherent in the instability of the *noes* or do they pertain instead to stability? The answer of course must be the latter since all of them relate to form and it is only with corporeal creation that the instability of the *noes* is given form. So in the case of humans, for example, a psychic preponderance of *epithumia* and a physical preponderance of earth are the most potentially effective form of stabilisation. In other words, my psychic and physical constitution were not inherent in the degree of fall or instability of the *nous* that is my essence, but, rather, are God’s response to it.

Finally, it can be noted that the fact that the three parts of the soul are aspects of the *nous* distinguishes Evagrius’ psychology from its philosophical antecedents. For both Platonists and Aristotelians reason and *pathos* are distinct and *pathos* is non-rational.¹¹⁰ The orthodox Stoics, on the other hand, regard the human soul as wholly rational and understand *pathos* in terms of impaired rationality (that is, as irrational in the sense of contrary to right reason). Accordingly, they do not partition the soul. Evagrius’ view, according to which the soul is partitioned into areas of more or less impaired rationality, therefore effectively combines Platonic tripartition with Stoic monism, while his view of *pathos* resembles that of the Stoics. The implications of his view in terms of *empa-*

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *KG* 3.68.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. *KG* 3.50.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *Pry.* 50.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *Prakt.* 23; also Sch. 7 on Ps. 30:10, ‘My eye was disturbed with anger’: ‘Nothing so darkens the *dianoia* as a disturbance in the *thumos*’ (οὐδὲν οὕτω σκοτεῖ διάνοιαν ὡς θυμὸς παραττόμενος). Cf. Eph. 4:18, ‘They are darkened in their *dianoia*, alienated from the life of God because of their ignorance and hardness of heart’ (ἐσκοτωμένοι τῇ διανοίᾳ ὄντες, ἀπηλλοτριωμένοι τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ θεοῦ διὰ τὴν ἄνοιαν τὴν οὖσαν ἐν αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὴν πώρωσιν τῆς καρδίας αὐτῶν); Rom. 1.21 ‘their senseless heart was darkened’ (ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία).

¹¹⁰ Although Aristotle alludes at *De Anima* 3.5 to *nous pathētikos*; see below, 1.2.1.

theia and *apatheia* are examined below.¹¹¹ Meanwhile it should be borne in mind when interpreting his and my references to the *nous*, soul, body or *pathētikon* part of the soul.

1.1.3 The therapeutic nature of corporeal creation

At the heart of Evagrius' understanding of the process of redemption is the graded ascent of the fallen *noes* back to union with God. This ascent is effected through contemplation: corresponding to each world is a level of contemplation, mastery of which brings participation in that world and the possibility of proceeding to the next.

Evagrius defines 'contemplation' as follows:

Contemplation is spiritual knowledge of things which have been and will be, which causes the *nous* to ascend to its first rank.¹¹²

The contemplation relating to a world consists in the acquisition of spiritual understanding concerning it; understanding, that is, of the aspect of God's wisdom that it embodies. This understanding is, however, no mere detached intellectual exercise but involves, as Dysinger points out, 'participation in the realities perceived'.¹¹³ It 'causes the *nous* to ascend to its first rank' because it leads to knowledge of God and so to a return to union with him.

God in his love has fashioned creation as an intermediary [between himself and the fallen *logikoi*]. It exists like a letter: through his power and his wisdom (that is, by his Son and his Spirit),¹¹⁴ he made known abroad his love for them so that they might be aware of it and drawn near. Through creation, they become aware

¹¹¹ See below, section 2.2.4. For an excellent discussion of how emotions can be states of reason see Nussbaum (1994: 366-86).

¹¹² *KG* 3.42.

¹¹³ Dysinger (2005: 37).

¹¹⁴ Evagrius adduces scriptural support for the comparison on the basis of an identification of the 'hand' and 'finger' of God – hand and finger being among the things used for writing – with the power and wisdom of God, and thus his Son and Spirit; cf. *Gt.Let.* 7 ff. It can be noted that he appears here to relate power and wisdom to Son and Spirit interchangeably, for example in paragraph 7 he asks 'How can the hand and finger stand for the wisdom and power – or rather, the Son and the Spirit?', suggesting that it is wisdom that equates with the Son, but then he says 'the "power" [is] the Son' and 'the "wisdom [is] the Spirit of God'. Then in paragraph 12, 'Just as the Wisdom and Power (that is, the Son and the Spirit)...'

not only of God the Father's love for them, but also of his power and wisdom. In reading a letter, one becomes aware through its beauty of the power and intelligence of the hand and finger that wrote it, as well as of the intention of the writer; likewise, one who contemplates creation with understanding becomes aware of the Creator's hand and finger, as well as of his intention – that is, his love.¹¹⁵

The visible and material creation is the sign of intelligible and immaterial creation, and visible things are types of invisible things.¹¹⁶ Thus corporeal creation points beyond itself, directing the contemplative *nous* to the spiritual realities that lie behind and above it. Signification and typification obtain across all metaphysical levels, culminating in, and so pointing toward, God himself:

The body by its actions reveals the soul that inhabits it, and in turn the soul by its movements proclaims the mind – which is its head; it is just the same with the mind – which is the body of the Spirit and the Word. Like the body with the soul, [the mind] reveals the one inhabiting it [that is, the mind's soul]; [the mind's] soul in turn reveals its mind – which is the Father.¹¹⁷

Because the knowability of God to the *nous* derives from the image of God, it is compromised by the loss of it:

It is clear that there are some things that ink and paper cannot relate – and likewise creation, which is like a letter, may be unable to convey its Author's complete intention ... to those who are far away, since they are not all according to his image.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ *Gt.Let.* 5-6. Cf. *Prakt.* 92: 'One of the sages of that time came to Antony the just and said: Father, how can you endure being deprived of the comfort of books? And he said: My book, philosopher, is the nature of beings (ἡ φύσις τῶν γεγονότων), and it is there when I want to read the *logoi* of God.' Also Sch. 8 on Ps. 138:16: 'The book of God is the contemplation of corporeals and incorporeals in which the pure *nous* comes to be written through knowledge (βιβλίον Θεοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ θεωρία σωμάτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε διὰ τῆς γνώσεως γράφεσθαι νοῦς καθαρός). For in this book are written the *logoi* of providence and judgment, through which too, God is known as creator, wise, provident and judging: creator through things that have come from non-being into being; wise through his concealed *logoi*, provident through what is accomplished for our virtue and knowledge; and again judge through the various bodies of the *logikoi* and through the multiform (ποικίλους) worlds and the ages they contain.'

¹¹⁶ *Gt.Let.* 12.

¹¹⁷ *Gt.Let.* 15.

¹¹⁸ *Gt.Let.* 18.

However, by ‘reading the letter’ of corporeal creation the *nous* can regain both knowledge, and image, of God¹¹⁹ since because of the interconnectedness of the epistemic and the ontological, or, to put it another way, because contemplation involves participation in the realities perceived, contemplation changes the *nous*:

ὡσπερ αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἀλλοιοῦνται διαφόρων ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι ποιοτήτων, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀλλοιοῦνται ποικίλαις θεωρίαις ἀνατενίζων ἀεί.¹²⁰

Just as the senses are changed through being receptive of different qualities, so also the *nous* is changed through constantly gazing in diverse contemplations.

Contemplative ascent is thus a process of transformation effected on the ‘ladder’ of corporeal creation.¹²¹ Since the soul and body are aspects of the *nous* they are included in this process, with participation in a world leading in due course to the acquisition of a soul and body belonging to that world, such that associated with epistemic transformation and ascent of the intelligible hierarchy is physical transformation and ascent of the corporeal hierarchy,¹²² these changes being progressive stabilisations of the movements of the body, soul and *nous*.

Contemplation requires detachment from the sensible world, which Evagrius calls separating the soul from the body¹²³ and equates with *apatheia*.¹²⁴ Accordingly, *apatheia* is the foundation for, and a necessary condition of, the contemplative ascent. Attaining it is the goal of asceticism, *praktikē*. Angels are sufficiently pure for contemplation to be their characteristic state and so do not need to practice asceticism, while demons are so impure that they cannot as yet practice it but are instead subject to an even harsher form of purification:

¹¹⁹ Cf. *Gt.Let.* 16, quoted above, n.21.

¹²⁰ *KG* 2.83.

¹²¹ *KG* 4.43 expresses the ubiquity of the symbol of the ladder in relation to this ascent: the ladder symbolises corporeal creation as a whole, being ‘the symbol of all worlds’, but also ‘the path of *praktikē*’, that is, the spiritual labours and experiences of the monk making the ascent. Cf. Gen. 28:12-13.

¹²² Cf. *KG* 3.20: ‘The change of the *organa* is the passage from bodies to bodies, according to the degree of the order of those who are joined to them.’

¹²³ Cf. *Prakt.* 52.

¹²⁴ See below, 3.2, 3.

Two among the worlds purify the passible part of the soul, one of them by *praktikê*, and the other by cruel torment.¹²⁵

Consequently the practice of asceticism is specific to the human condition, leading Evagrius to refer to the human body as a *praktikê* body.¹²⁶

Both angels and demons take an interest in human salvation, angels seeking to assist, and demons to hinder, it:

From the rational nature that is “beneath heaven”,¹²⁷ part of it fights; part assists the one who fights; and part contends with the one who fights, strenuously rising up and making war against him. The fighters are human beings; those assisting them are God’s angels; and their opponents are the foul demons.¹²⁸

Movement upon the ‘ladder’ of corporeal creation can be in either direction:

That which advances to knowledge approaches the excellent change of bodies; but that which [advances] to ignorance advances to the bad change.¹²⁹

Accordingly, humans can become demons as well as angels. Likewise demons can ascend, and angels fall, to the human estate. All of the *logikoi* – demons and angels as well as humans - are involved in the ascent since all are capable of salvation; the demons are not intrinsically evil since none of the *logikoi* were created vicious:

When we were created in the beginning, the seeds of virtue were found naturally in us, but of vice not.¹³⁰

¹²⁵ *KG* 5.5. Cf. *KG* 3.18: ‘Torment is the fiery suffering which purifies the passible part of the soul.’

¹²⁶ Cf. *KG* 3.48, 50; Sch. 8 on Ps. 1:5; all quoted below in this section.

¹²⁷ Eccl. 1:13.

¹²⁸ *Ant.* Prol. 1.

¹²⁹ *KG* 2.79; cf. also *KG* 2.73; 3.48; 3.50; 5.11; 6.57.1-3.

¹³⁰ *KG* 1.39. Cf. *Th.* 31; *Disc.* 128, 149, 171, 178. Also *KG* 1.40: ‘There was a time when evil did not exist, and there will be a time when it no longer exists; but there was never a time when virtue did not exist and there will never be a time when it does not exist: for the seeds of virtue are indestructible. And I am convinced by the rich man who was condemned to hell because of his evil and who felt pity for his brothers (Luke 16:19-31). For to have pity is a very beautiful seed of virtue.’ Dysinger, at Wiles and Yarnold (2001: 467-8) notes the uniqueness of this exegesis of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, which Evagrius repeats at *Th.* 31, *Let.* 43, *Let.* 59 and Sch. 62 on Prov. 5:14. He adds: ‘Evagrius suggests in this text that it is possible for the sufferings of hell to bring to fruition the imperishable “seeds of virtue” which were originally implanted within the soul at its creation. He was aware that this exegesis of the

Evagrius assigns great importance to what he calls ‘the *logoi* of providence and judgment’ as providing the key by which the redemptive nature of corporeal creation can be understood and so consciously participated in:

Τοὺς περὶ προνοίας καὶ κρίσεως κατὰ σαυτὸν ἀεὶ γύμναζε λόγους, φησὶν ὁ μέγας καὶ γνωστικὸς διδάσκαλος Δίδυμος, καὶ τούτων τὰς ὕλας διὰ μνήμης φέρειν πειράθητι· ἅπαντες γὰρ σχεδὸν ἐν τούτοις προσπταίουσι. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν περὶ κρίσεως λόγους ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν κόσμων εὐρήσεις· τοὺς δὲ περὶ προνοίας ἐν τοῖς τρόποις τοῖς ἀπὸ κακίας καὶ ἀγνωσίας ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἐπὶ γνῶσιν ἡμᾶς ἐπανάγουσι.¹³¹

‘Exercise yourself continuously in the *logoi* of providence and judgment’ said the great and *gnostikos* teacher Didymus, ‘and strive to bear in your memory their material [expressions]; for nearly all are brought to stumbling through this. And you will discover the *logoi* of judgment in the diversity of worlds and bodies, and those of providence in the means by which we return from vice and ignorance to virtue or knowledge.’¹³²

The first knowledge that is in the *logikoi* is that of the Blessed Trinity; then there took place the movement of freedom, the beneficial providence and the non-abandonment, and then the judgment, and again the movement of freedom, providence, the judgment, and that up to the Blessed Trinity. Thus a judgment is interposed between the movement of freedom and the providence of God.¹³³

God’s first judgment is his creation of the corporeal worlds and subsequent judgments occur at the end of each age:

parable of the rich man and Lazarus is very different from the considerably more pessimistic interpretation familiar to most of his contemporaries; nevertheless, Evagrius appears not only to have been convinced by (πέθει δέ με), but also deeply committed to, this interpretation, since he repeats it with only minor variations in five different places in his writings.’

¹³¹ *Gnost.* 48.

¹³² Trans. Dysinger (2005: 175), who notes that although Evagrius attributes the formula ‘the *logoi* of providence and judgment’ to Didymus the Blind, it is not found in any of Didymus’ extant writings, and the phrase seems to be unique to Evagrius, to the extent that Balthasar regarded its appearance in a text as a reliable indication of Evagrian authorship. Dysinger notes (*ibid.*) that it is also found in ten chapters of the *Kephalaia Gnostica*, in Evagrius’ first, sixth and seventh *Letters*, and in his scholia on Psalms, Proverbs and Ecclesiastes.

¹³³ *KG* 6.75.

Ὡσπερ τὰ νήπια μεταξύ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἐστίν, οὕτως καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι μεταξύ ἀγγέλων τε καὶ δαιμόνων εἰσίν, μήτε δαίμονες ὄντες, μήτε ἄγγελοι χρηματίζοντες μέχρι τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος.¹³⁴

Just as infants are between justice and injustice, so all humans are between the angels and the demons, neither being demons, nor having the name of angels until the completion of the age.

Κρίσις ἐστὶ δικαίων μὲν ἢ ἀπὸ πρακτικοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ ἀγγελικὰ μετάβασις· ἀσεβῶν δὲ ἀπὸ πρακτικοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ σκοτεινὰ καὶ ζοφερὰ μετάθεσις σώματα.¹³⁵

Judgment is for the just the passage from a *praktikê* body to angelic things: but for the ungodly it is the change from a *praktikê* body to darkened and gloomy bodies.¹³⁶

Just as the body and soul are transformed when the *nous* is transformed, so changing their constitution changes that of the *nous*. That of the body is changed by the physical disciplines of asceticism, and in particular, as we shall see, by dietary restriction;¹³⁷ that of the soul, by the cultivation of virtue. Both of these aspects of *praktikê* stabilise the movements of their respective objects and consequently those of the *nous*, or, to express it another way, both contribute to the freeing of the *nous* from the thralldom to external things that is *empathēia*. Given that the body and soul not only express the spiritual state of the *nous* but are means for changing it, they amount to remedial devices calibrated to its spiritual needs, such that the judgment of God is an exact prescription for each *nous*. Accordingly I think that Dysinger is correct to discern the medical sense of *krisis* in this aspect of Evagrius' use of the term:

Throughout his writings Evagrius makes extensive use of medical-therapeutic analogies to explain his model of spiritual progress; and it is possible that his use of the term *krisis*, “judgment”, reflects the ancient medical understanding of this term, rather than its legal use...The term *krisis* was used in classical medicine to describe a “critical period” which precedes or accompanies a significant turning

¹³⁴ Sch.16 on Prov. 1:32: cf. Matt. 28:20.

¹³⁵ Sch. 8 on Ps. 1:5. Cf. *KG* 2.59: “The just judgment” (2 Th. 1:5) of our Christ, is known by the fact of the transformation of bodies, of regions and of worlds; his forbearance, (makes known) those who struggle against virtue, and his mercy, especially those who are objects of his providence, without their being deserving.’

¹³⁶ Trans. Dysinger.

¹³⁷ See below, 1.6; 2.1.3.1.

point in an illness. The *krisis* heralds a change in the patient's condition; a "critical moment" of transformation in the patient's course which necessarily leads either to improvement or deterioration in the patient's condition. Evagrius similarly employs the term *krisis* to describe a fundamental transformation which facilitates the soul's movement either upwards towards virtue or downwards into vice and ignorance.¹³⁸

When, at the *apokatatastasis*, the *nous* re-attains to its 'first rank', the soul is reabsorbed into it as, regaining its pre-lapsarian unity, it becomes once more triune *nous* rather tripartite soul, but what happens to the body? How can an embodied *nous* be fully reunited to an incorporeal God? In fact Evagrius appears to leave open the question of the ultimate fate of the physical body;¹³⁹ what is, however, certain is that the experience by the incarnate *nous* of knowledge of God involves the experience of incorporeality.¹⁴⁰

If the perfection of the *nous* is immaterial knowledge, as it is said, and if immaterial knowledge is the Trinity only, it is evident that in perfection there will not remain anything of matter. And if that is so, the *nous*, henceforth naked, will become a seer of the Trinity.¹⁴¹

What is certain is that if the final consummation involves any sort of body, it will have none of the features that we associate with corporeality, body and soul being 'raised to the order of the *nous*' and the *nous* being once more the undamaged image of the incorporeal God.

¹³⁸ Dysinger (2005: 177). For discussion of Evagrius' use of medical language and theory see Dysinger (2005: 115-23). Cf. also *Disc.* 201-4; *33Ch.* 1-16.

¹³⁹ Cf. *KG* 6.58: 'Of those bodies that have been stable in the series of changes it is said that they will depart spiritual bodies. But whether that will happen at the end from matter or from *organa* which will have come to be – you, too, [should] examine [this].' Dysinger questions whether this means 'at the end by separation from matter. Thus it is difficult to know what to make of aphorisms such as *KG* 1.26: 'If the human body is a part of this world, but the form of this world is passing, it is also evident that the form of the body will pass' (cf. 1 Cor. 7:31); *KG* 1.58: 'all who have been joined to bodies will necessarily be liberated from them'; *KG* 2.77: 'In the last judgment it is not the transformation of bodies that will be made manifest; rather, it will make known their destruction.' Cf. also *KG* 2.17; 3.15, 38, 40, 66; *Prakt.* 49.

¹⁴⁰ See below, 3.2.

¹⁴¹ *KG* 3.15. Cf. 2.62: 'When the *noes* will have received the contemplation that concerns them, then also the entire nature of the body will be withdrawn'; 4.86: 'The *nous* that possesses a body does not see the incorporeals, and when it will be incorporeal it will not see the bodies'. However, at *KG* 6.58 he appears to allow that spiritual bodies might come into existence not by separation from matter but 'from *organa* which will have come to be.' Cf. also n.138 above.

1.1.4 Summary

Human beings, along with angels and demons, were originally created as undifferentiated *logikoi* to exist in contemplative union with God. This primal condition was ruptured by a movement of their self-determination in which they chose to turn away from him. As a deflection from God this movement was unstable. It initiated the further unstable movement of the Fall and brought opposition into the created order. It also engendered differentiation among the *logikoi* based on the degree of movement exercised by each one.

God's response was to create, through Christ, the corporeal worlds, in order to re-introduce stability to creation and provide the *logikoi* with a means of re-ascent. This involved furnishing the *logikoi* with souls and bodies whose constitution depends on extent of movement and consequent fall and therefore on spiritual state. In that way the three orders of angels, humans and demons came into being.

Created in the image of the triune God the *nous*, which prior to the Fall was identical with the *logikos*, is itself triune. As a result of the Fall it fragmented into its three aspects, becoming, in a process of progressive condensation as it fell ever further from God, the trichotomy of *nous*, soul and body. The soul comprises the Platonic triad of *logistikon*, *thumos* and *epithumētikon*. In humans these are the progressive stages of the ensoulment of the *nous*, the *logistikon* being the least fallen part and the *epithumētikon* the most fallen and so closest to the body. In angels the *logistikon* predominates, in demons the *thumos* and in humans *epithumia*.

In contrast to the simplicity and stillness of the primal Unity, corporeal creation is characterised by multiplicity, movement and change. Stable movement is associated with proximity to God, unstable movement with distance from him. In epistemological terms corporeal creation is a 'letter' from God to the fallen *logikoi*, by 'reading' which they are able to re-attain to knowledge of him. In metaphysical terms it is a 'ladder', by ascending which they can return to union with him. 'Reading' and 'ascent' are effected by contemplation, which, due to the interconnectedness of the epistemic and the ontological, transforms the *nous*, soul and body and culminates, at the *apokatastasis*, with soul

and body being once more ‘raised to the order of mind’ as the unity of the *nous* with God and *ipso facto* its internal unity is restored.

1.2 Anthropology

In the hierarchy of corporeal creation humankind occupies a place intermediate between the angels and the demons. The spiritual task distinctive to the human condition is to overcome our vulnerability to demonic influence. Success in it is marked by the attainment of *apatheia*, the state natural to human beings,¹⁴² and achieved by means of *praktikē*, asceticism. Thus both *praktikē* and *apatheia* are central to Evagrius’ understanding of what it is to be human: the human body is a body for *praktikē*¹⁴³ and *apatheia* the health of the soul.¹⁴⁴

1.2.1 The *nous*

The importance that Evagrius attaches to the *nous* is evident from the frequency with which he uses the term.¹⁴⁵ As already noted, it has two distinct senses in his usage.¹⁴⁶ In its primary sense it refers to the person in her entirety, and also to the other rational beings, since soul and body are but the progressively fallen aspects of the fragmented triune *nous*. This is the sense in which, prior to the movement, a given *nous* was identical with a given *logikos*, and in which it is the bearer of the image of God and the constant term in the successive transformations that will lead it back to union with God:

Only the *nous*, the image of God and the core of personal identity, persists throughout successive judgments: everything else compounded of the four elements – body, emotions, aptitudes, and the world in which these gifts are exercised – reflects the most recent judgment received by each reasoning being.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴² Cf. *Th.* 8, *Disc.* 140; see below, 2.2.1.

¹⁴³ Cf. *KG* 3.48, 50; *Sch.* 8 on Ps. 1:5; all quoted above, 1.1.3.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. *Prakt.* 56.

¹⁴⁵ According to the *TLG* and including the *Epistula Fidei* there are three hundred and twenty-three occurrences of the word *nous* in Evagrius’ Greek corpus.

¹⁴⁶ See above, 1.1.2.

¹⁴⁷ Dysinger (2005: 177-8).

In its second sense the word *nous* refers to the part of the fallen rational being that we would normally think of as its mind. Strictly speaking this is the *logistikon*, but in practice Evagrius prefers the term *nous*, thereby keeping his focus upon our true nature, prior to, above and beyond our present, ensouled condition.

The idea of the *nous* as subject to change and passible is central to Evagrius' anthropology and constitutes a radical departure from the Neoplatonism so evident in his thought. For the Neoplatonists, that the *nous* could in any way be subject to *pathos* was unthinkable,¹⁴⁸ and Plotinus in particular goes to considerable lengths to insulate not only the *nous* but the soul from any suggestion of passibility.¹⁴⁹ Aristotle allows the *nous* to be passible in relation to cognition,¹⁵⁰ but Evagrius goes much further in the mutability that he ascribes to the *nous*.

First and foremost the Evagrian *nous*, both pre- and post-lapsarian, is receptive to the essential knowledge that is God, and it is in this receptivity that the image of God consists.¹⁵¹ It is also receptive in relation to contemplation, 'the knowledge that comes from men'¹⁵² and sense-perception. In addition, the power of self-determination is, for Evagrius, a form of receptivity - presumably because the ability to turn away from God is a receptivity to that which is other than God - and it is this aspect of the receptivity of the *nous* that occasioned the movement and Fall:

The Monad was not moved in itself: rather, it is moved by the receptivity of the *nous* which through inattentiveness turns its face away, and which through this deprivation begets ignorance.¹⁵³

Because of the interconnectedness of the epistemic and metaphysical, the epistemic receptivity of the *nous* is reflected in a sweeping metaphysical passibility in virtue of which the *nous* is changed by whatever it receives. In the case of God the change in the

¹⁴⁸ See, e.g., Blumenthal (1991: 192 ff).

¹⁴⁹ Cf. in particular *Enn.* 3.5, "On the *apatheia* of things without body".

¹⁵⁰ And alludes specifically - albeit only once, at the end of *DA* 3.5 - to *nous pathētikos*, but this is by implication in opposition to the active *nous* or *nous poiētikos*; Aristotle never actually uses the latter term but, as Blumenthal (1991: 192) notes, 'its derivation from *De anim.* 430a11-12 is an easy step.'

¹⁵¹ See above, 1.1.1.

¹⁵² Cf. *Gnost.* 45.

¹⁵³ *KG* 1.49; see above, 1.1.1.

nous is a return to its own true nature of simplicity and incorporeality. In relation to contemplation it involves progression toward these. In relation to sense-perception, conversely, it involves the ‘imprinting’ of the *nous* by the *noēmata* it receives and consequently the perpetuation of its immersion in corporeality.

The following sections will discuss the passibility of the Evagrian *nous* in relation to sense-perception, its ability to range between incorporeality and corporeality and its true nature as *apathēs* and ‘the place of God’.¹⁵⁴

1.2.1.1 *The epistemic passibility of the Evagrian nous*

The susceptibility of the Evagrian *nous* to imprinting by certain sorts of *noēmata* is central to Evagrius’ spirituality and to the importance he attaches to *apatheia*. In this section I shall outline its nature and significance, then in Chapter Two I shall explain how *pathos* becomes implicated in it and to what effect.¹⁵⁵

*Noēmata*¹⁵⁶ are the basic elements of cognition; they are ‘the way the mind functions... its currency’.¹⁵⁷ They are not intrinsic to the *nous* but are received by it:

Τέσσαρες τρόποι εἰσὶν δι’ ὧν ὁ νοῦς λαμβάνει νοήματα· καὶ πρῶτος μὲν τρόπος, ὁ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν· δεύτερος, ὁ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς· τρίτος, ὁ διὰ τῆς μνήμης· καὶ τέταρτος, ὁ διὰ τῆς κράσεως.¹⁵⁸

There are four ways by which the *nous* grasps *noēmata*: the first way is through the eyes, the second through hearing, the third through memory, and the fourth through *krasis*.

¹⁵⁴ *Th.* 39.4; 40.9; *Rfl.* 25; *Let.* 39.

¹⁵⁵ See below, 2.2.3.

¹⁵⁶ Guillaumont (1998: 24) notes that the term *noēma* is of Aristotelian provenance, but that Evagrius’ use of it corresponds to the Stoic concept of a *phantasia* insofar as he uses it to denote “pour désigner l’image provoquée par la perception d’un objet sensible.” Inwood (1985: 56-7) describes a Stoic *phantasia* as an imprint or alteration of the *hegemonikon*; ‘a representational image in the mind... which resembles as an *eikōn* its correlate in the world and refers to it’; as we shall see, this corresponds exactly to an Evagrian *noēma*, although the understanding of the *hēgemonikon* would differ in each case.

¹⁵⁷ Stewart (2001: 187).

¹⁵⁸ *Rfl.* 17.

Although this seems to exclude sensory modalities other than sight and hearing, Evagrius elsewhere allows that the other senses also give rise to *noēmata*.¹⁵⁹ *Krasis*, the body's physiological constitution,¹⁶⁰ can be manipulated by the demons to introduce *noēmata* to the *nous*; Evagrius gives the example of a demon who, by touching a place in the brain and causing palpitations in the blood vessels,¹⁶¹ 'alters the light around the *nous*', thereby giving rise to 'some form associated with the senses' or causing a *logismos* to form in the *nous*.¹⁶²

Noēmata can be of either sensible or intelligible objects and can be divided into those that 'leave a form' upon the *nous* and those that do not:

καὶ διὰ μὲν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, μορφοῦντα μόνον λαμβάνει νοήματα· διὰ δὲ τῆς ἀκοῆς, καὶ μορφοῦντα καὶ μὴ μορφοῦντα, τῷ τὸν λόγον σημαίνειν καὶ πράγματα αἰσθητὰ καὶ θεωρητά· ἡ δὲ μνήμη καὶ ἡ κρᾶσις ἀκολουθοῦσι τῇ ἀκοῇ· ἐκάτερα γὰρ μορφοῦσι τὸν νοῦν καὶ οὐ μορφοῦσι μιμούμενα τὴν ἀκοήν.¹⁶³

Through the eyes the *nous* grasps only *noēmata* that leave a form; through hearing it grasps both those that leave a form and those that do not, since speech signifies both sensible and intelligible objects; memory and temperament follow upon hearing, for both leave a form or do not leave a form upon the *nous* in imitation of hearing.

What Evagrius here calls 'leaving a form' he elsewhere calls 'imprinting the *nous*'.

Only *noēmata* of sensible objects imprint the *nous*:

ὁ νοῦς πάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν πραγμάτων πέφυκε δέχεσθαι τὰ νοήματα καὶ τυποῦσθαι κατ' αὐτὰ διὰ τοῦ ὀργανικοῦ σώματος τούτου· ὅποια γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦ πράγματος ἡ μορφή, τοιαύτην ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν νοῦν δέξασθαι τὴν εἰκόνα· ὅθεν καὶ ὁμοιωματα λέγεται τὰ νοήματα τῶν πραγμάτων τῷ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκείνοις διασωζεῖν μορφήν.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ Cf. *Rfl.* 55; *Th.* 4.4; *Pry.* 61; also the discussion below of whether 'images' are necessarily visual.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 281, n.49).

¹⁶¹ Cf. *Pry.* 72.

¹⁶² *Pry.* 73; cf. *Pry.* 63: demons who 'through alteration in the body instil in the *nous* (διὰ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως τοῦ σώματος ἐμποιοῦσι τῷ νοῦ) *logismoi* or *noēmata* or contemplations (θεωρήματα).

¹⁶³ *Rfl.* 17.

¹⁶⁴ *Thoughts* 25.8-14. Cf. *Disc.* 77: 'The *nous* can receive only *noēmata*, and it takes the form of each *noēma*, like the eye when it sees itself in mirrors' (ὁ νοῦς μόνων νοημάτων ἐστὶ δεκτικὸς καὶ μορφοῦται πρὸς ἕκαστον νόημα ὡς μορφοῦται ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν ἐσόπτροις ὀπτανόμενος); also *Disc.* 85.

The *nous* receives naturally the *noēmata* of all sensible objects and an imprint¹⁶⁵ conforming to them through this instrumental body.¹⁶⁶ Whatever may be the form of the object, such is necessarily the image that the *nous* receives, whence the *noēmata* are called likenesses of objects¹⁶⁷ because they preserve the same form as them.

The perception of a sensible object, then, gives rise to the presence in the *nous* of a *noēma* which is a likeness of that object, and which imprints the *nous* with its form. This imprinting, it should be noted, is not related to the storage of the *noēma* in memory, since *noēmata* of intelligibles, which leave no imprint, are nonetheless stored in memory. Rather, when Evagrius speaks of *noēmata* imprinting the *nous* with a form, what he is referring to is simply the formation of mental images.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ The term is of Stoic origin; cf. Guillaumont (1998: 24-5).

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *DA* 412b5-6, where the soul is defined as ‘the first actuality of a natural instrumental body (σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ)’; Guillaumont (1998: 240, n.2).

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* 16a6-8, where affections (παθήματα) of the soul are described as ὁμοιώματα of πράγματα; also Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* 8:8.23.1, where *noēmata* are defined as likenesses (ὁμοιώματα) and imprints (ἐκτυπώματα) of objects (πράγματα); Guillaumont (1998: 241).

¹⁶⁸ That Evagrius speaks of such *noēmata* as ‘images’ or ‘likenesses’ of their objects raises anew the question of which sensory modalities can give rise to them since it suggests that they must be visual in nature - that is, mental pictures - and so derive from visible objects. Indeed, at *Rfl.* 55 Evagrius himself says as much: ‘Among *logismoι*, some give form to the *dianoia*, some do not give form. Those that derive from sight give form, while those that come upon us from the remaining senses do not give form’ (Τῶν λογισμῶν οἱ μὲν μορφοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ οὐ μορφοῦσι· καὶ μορφοῦσι μὲν, ὅσοι ἐξ ὀράσεως· οὐ μορφοῦσι δὲ, ὅσοι ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν αἰσθήσεων ἡμῖν ἐπισυμβαίνουνσι). But does he really mean to deny that *noēmata* of non-visible sensibles imprint the *νοῦς* with their likeness? Would he consider the *noēma* comprising my memory of the scent of a rose to be an imprint or form (at *Th.* 41 he uses these terms synonymously) and a likeness of the original, and accordingly an image, or only the visual image of the rose that my memory of the scent evokes? *Th.* 4.3-4 suggests that he would indeed regard the *noēma* of the scent as an imprint or form, a likeness and an image. Imprints and forms, he says there, ‘appear to occur in the *nous* either when it sees through the eyes, or hears through hearing, or through whatever sense faculty’ (ἐοικε συμβαίνειν τῷ νῷ ἢ δι’ ὀφθαλμῶν ὄρωντι ἢ δι’ ἀκοῆς ἀκούοντι ἢ δι’ αἰσθήσεως ποιῶς). This seems to contradict *Rfl.* 25, so what are we to make of it? Does the apparent inconsistency represent an oversight, equivocation, change of mind, or simply an emphasis upon the visual so overarching that it threatens to become exclusive? The latter, I suggest, is the answer. There can be no doubt that Evagrius is above all concerned with visual images, first and foremost because of the Second Commandment: ‘Do not make for yourself an idol, nor likeness of anything, whatever are in the heaven above, and whatever are in the earth below, and whatever are in the waters underneath the earth’ (Οὐ ποιήσεις σεαυτῷ εἶδωλον, οὐδὲ παντὸς ὁμοίωμα, ὅσα ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἄνω, καὶ ὅσα ἐν τῇ γῆ κάτω, καὶ ὅσα ἐν τοῖς ὕδασιν ὑποκάτω τῆς γῆς - Exod. 20:4; cf. Deut. 5:8). That for him *noēmata* of sensible objects can fall within the scope of this proscription is suggested by the fact that he sometimes refers to them as *eidōla* (e.g. at *Th.* 4.16, 16.28, 25.55, 36.17; *Prakt.* 23.6, 55.2), and also by *Th.* 37:23-5: ‘you troubled the *nous* at the time of prayer by constantly imagining the face of your enemy and deifying him, for certainly what the *nous* sees while praying is worthy of being called a god.’ (τὸν νοῦν κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς προσευχῆς ἐξετάρασες, τοῦ ἐχθροῦ σου τὸ πρόσωπον ἀεὶ φανταζόμενος καὶ τοῦτο θεοποιῶν· ὁ γὰρ βλέπει πάντως ὁ νοῦς προσευχόμενος, τοῦτο καὶ θεὸν ἄξιον ἐστὶν ὁμολογεῖν). This passage strikes to the heart of Eva-

Sometimes the scriptures use sensible imagery to convey spiritual truths. Evagrius discusses such cases using the example of the following phrase from Isa. 6:1:

εἶδον τὸν κύριον καθήμενον ἐπὶ θρόνου ὑψηλοῦ καὶ ἐπηρμένου.

I saw the Lord seated on a high and lofty throne.

He begins by splitting it into two parts. The first, ‘I saw the Lord’, seems to imprint the *nous* but in fact does not since, because God is incorporeal, no expression that signifies him can imprint the *nous*. On the other hand the predicate, ‘seated on a high and lofty throne’ could, since it describes a sensible object, imprint the *nous*. However its spiritual significance, which is its true meaning, does not imprint it: ‘the key is to move beyond a literal reading of the text, for there was no physical throne in Isaiah’s vision.’¹⁶⁹ In other words, if understood as referring to a physical throne then the *noēma* of a physical ‘high and lofty throne’ will imprint the *nous*, whereas if it is understood that the whole phrase is in fact a *noēma* of God, since ‘God is said to be seated there where he is known; for this reason the pure *nous* is called a throne of God’ (ἐκεῖ γὰρ λέγεται

grius’ interest in *noēmata* that imprint the *nous*. They lead it far away from God (cf. *Pry.* 56) for three reasons. First, they distract it (this can be providential when it is the demons that they distract it from; cf. Sch. 15 on Eccl. 10-13). Second, they focus the *nous* toward the sensible world. And third, the fact that they imprint the *nous* makes them hard to expunge from it. It is easy to see why Evagrius would regard such *noēmata* as falling within the scope of Exod. 20:4: they are likenesses of sensible things and, because of their capacity to occupy the *nous*, are liable to appear before it while it is trying to pray, therefore becoming in effect *de facto* idols (cf. *Let.* 7.1). But his preoccupation with the visual does not rest solely upon a literal reading of Scripture. Not only does he hold sight to be more powerful (κρείττων) than any of the other senses (cf. *Prayer* 150; *Gt.Let.* 4; also Casiday (2006: 213, n.7)); it is also clear that his own experience of troublesome *noēmata* is dominated by visual images. Nor should we forget the possibility of philosophical influences at work here; for example, his assimilation of sensible objects to visible ones and his contrast between the visible and the intelligible echoes Plato’s distinction at *Rep.* 507b9-10 between objects of sight and objects of intelligence, while the priority of sight in relation to the other senses is affirmed by both Plato and Aristotle (cf. *Phdr.* 250d3-4; *DA* 429a2-3). Thus Evagrius has compelling theological, philosophical and psychological reasons for emphasising the visual in his discussions of *noēmata* of sensible objects. Nonetheless he seems to allow that such *noēmata* can be non-visual, and so while his primary concern is undoubtedly with the visual image of the rose, he would, I think, consider the *noēma* of the scent to be an image too. So *noēmata* of sensible objects imprint the *nous* with an image of that object which is its likeness, and depending on the sensory modality involved this ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ can be either visual or non-visual in nature. Either way, it has the potential to impinge upon the *nous* at the time of prayer and as such to be a *de facto* idol.

¹⁶⁹ Stewart (2001: 200).

καθέξεσθαι ὁ θεὸς ἔνθα γινώσκεται· διὸ καὶ θρόνος λέγεται θεοῦ νοῦς καθαρός), then the *nous* will not be imprinted.¹⁷⁰

Generalising from this example, when a sensible object is presented to the *nous* through the medium of language and in a context where the expression in which it appears is susceptible of either literal or spiritual interpretation, the *noēma* to which it gives rise will only imprint the *nous* if the expression is understood literally. So rather than being a mechanistic process, the imprinting of the *nous* depends upon the attribution of significance and thus upon the agent.

What about expressions involving sensible imagery not susceptible of spiritual interpretation, and what about sensible objects themselves? Is the imprinting of the *nous* agent-dependent in either of these cases? I shall begin with the latter. In the case of objects, what is at issue is the distinction between the objects themselves and what Evagrius calls their *logoi*. Objects have no intrinsic value; rather, their value resides in their role as intermediaries between the contemplative and God:

οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πράγματα ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλ' οἱ λόγοι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐφ' οἷς καὶ εὐφραίνεσθαι πέφυκεν ἢ φύσις ἢ λογικὴ καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθόν· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω τρέφει καὶ ποτίζει τὸν νοῦν ὡς ἀρετὴ καὶ γνῶσις θεοῦ.¹⁷¹

it is not objects that are good, but the *logoi* of objects, by which rational nature is gladdened and does good, for nothing so nourishes and refreshes the *nous* as virtue and the knowledge of God.

On the basis of Evagrius' exegesis of Isa. 6:1 we might suppose that if the objects themselves are the focus of attention then their *noēmata* will imprint the *nous*, whereas if the focus is upon their *logoi* then the *noēmata* of the objects will not imprint the *nous* (nor of course will the *noēmata* of the *logoi*, being *noēmata* of intelligibles). This, I take it, is what Evagrius has in mind when, in his fifteenth scholion on Ecclesiastes, he distinguishes between 'perceiving in a sensible manner by means of the senses that which is sensible' (τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιβάλλων αἰσθητῶς) and the 'observation of objects by means of the senses' (ἢ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων κατανόησις τῶν πραγμάτων),

¹⁷⁰ *Th.* 41.13-15.

¹⁷¹ *Sch.* 15.22-5 on *Eccl.* 10-13.

affirming that while the former imprints the *nous*, the latter can be practised by the pure as well as by the impure. However, *Prayer 56* complicates this picture:

Οὐκ ἂν ὅτε μὴ ἐγχρονίζῃ ὁ νοῦς ἐν τοῖς ψιλοῖς νοήμασι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἤδη καὶ προσευχῆς κατέλιπε τόπον· δύναται γὰρ ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν ἀδολεσχεῖν, ἅπερ, καὶ εἰ ψιλὰ ῥήματά εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς πραγμάτων ὄντα θεωρήματα, τυποῦσι τὸν νοῦν, καὶ μακρὰν ἀπάγουσιν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ.

Even when the *nous* does not delay among the simple *noēmata* of objects, it has not yet attained the place of prayer; for it can remain in the contemplation of objects and be engaged in meditation on their *logoi*, which, even though they involve simple expressions, nevertheless, insofar as they are contemplations of objects, imprint the *nous* and lead it far from God.

Does this mean that, after all, contemplation also involves the imprinting of the *nous*? Dysinger reads *Kephalaia Gnostika* 2.83¹⁷² to mean that the change effected in the *nous* by contemplation is the result of its being imprinted,¹⁷³ but I don't think this is correct since, as I understand Evagrius, the imprinting of the *nous* makes it increasingly corporeal whereas contemplation involves a move away from corporeality; accordingly, I understand the change effected in the *nous* by contemplation to be in the order of a dissolving of existing imprints rather than the acquisition of new ones. Consequently I think that the above passage is most naturally read as meaning that, while in theory attention can be focused either on objects *qua* sensible or on their *logoi*, in practice some part of the person's attention is likely to remain focused on the objects *qua* sensible even if the greater part is focused on their *logoi*. Indeed, I shall argue below that the extent to which she can focus her attention on *logoi* to the exclusion of the sensible world depends upon the extent to which she has attained *apatheia*.

All sensible objects, then, have *logoi* and are therefore susceptible of spiritual interpretation; they are the individual characters of the 'letter from God' that is corporeal creation. In order to 'read' this 'letter' it is necessary to abstract from the objects to their spiritual significance, and insofar as this is done their *noēmata* will not imprint the *nous*.

¹⁷² Quoted above, 1.1.3.

¹⁷³ Cf. Dysinger (2005: 38).

The ability to discern such *logoi* is sometimes referred to by Evagrius, following Origen,¹⁷⁴ as a spiritual sense,¹⁷⁵ and requires that the *nous* be *apathēs*:

Just as each of the arts has need of a sharpened sense that conforms to its matter, so also the *nous* needs a spiritual sense in order to distinguish spiritual things.¹⁷⁶

μετὰ γὰρ τὴν κάθαρσιν οὐκ ἔτι ὡς περισπῶντα τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῦ μόνον ὁ καθαρὸς τὰ αἰσθητὰ πράγματα καθορῶ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐγκείμενα αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πνευματικὴν θεωρίαν.¹⁷⁷

after purification the one who has been purified no longer considers sensible objects only as diversions for his *nous* but as means placed in him to bring him to spiritual contemplation.

Spiritual sensation is *apatheia* of the reasoning soul, produced by the grace of God.¹⁷⁸

With sensible objects, then, as with sensible imagery, it is possible to avoid the imprinting of the *nous*. What about expressions involving sensible imagery not susceptible of spiritual interpretation? Here it would seem that the only way to avoid imprinting of the *nous* is to withhold attention from them, and indeed this is what Evagrius recommends that a person does when faced with demonic suggestion.¹⁷⁹

In sum, all cognition of objects external to the *nous* – that is, all cognition other than knowledge of God - involves the reception by the *nous* of *noēmata*. If these are of sen-

¹⁷⁴ Cf. *DP* 1.1.9 (R).

¹⁷⁵ Katz (2000: 132) notes, ‘As far as scholars can determine, the creation of the doctrine of the spiritual senses originated with Origen. Although there is some anticipation of the doctrine in the ideas of Philo, of Clement of Alexandria, and of Tertullian, Origen’s development of the doctrine of the spiritual senses flows out of his interest in psychology and principally out of his monumental work in scripture and in a special way from his own mystical interpretation of the Song of Songs.’ Cf., e.g., Origen, *C. Cant.*, Prol. 2; *DP* 1.1.9 (R); *Dialogue with Heraclides* 16 ff.

¹⁷⁶ *KG* 1.33; cf. *KG* 2.35: ‘The *nous* also possesses five spiritual senses, with which it senses the substances presented to it. Vision shows it intelligible objects [hazily? heavenly?]; with hearing it receives the *logoi* which concern them; the odour that is a stranger to deceit delights the nose, and the mouth receives the flavour of the latter; by the manner of touching it is confirmed, by grasping the exact demonstration of objects.’

¹⁷⁷ Sch. 15.4-7 on Eccl. 10-13.

¹⁷⁸ *KG* 1.37.

¹⁷⁹ To be precise, Evagrius warns against allowing demonic *logismoi* to linger in one’s awareness; cf. *Prakt.* 6; see below, 2.2.4.

sible objects or imagery perceived without regard for their spiritual significance then they imprint the *nous*, but if, although the perception is through the senses, the focus of attention is the *logoi* of the objects or imagery, then the resulting *noēmata* will not imprint the *nous*. Evagrius refers to the latter mode of cognition as ‘spiritual sensation’ and a prerequisite of it is *apatheia*.

1.2.1.2 *The metaphysical passibility of the Evagrian nous*

In metaphysical terms the changeability of the Evagrian *nous* is rooted in its power of self-determination, an exercise of which – that is, a choice or decision - is a movement of the *nous* (νοῦ κίνησις).¹⁸⁰ That movement is susceptible of degree and can be either toward or away from God and, accordingly, stable or unstable. If stable it tends toward stillness in the sense that movement toward God would, if uninterrupted, culminate in union with him. If unstable this, along with its distance from God, will tend to increase, since any stability must come from God. In other words, the *nous*, in virtue of its power of self-determination, is intrinsically capable of, and potentially susceptible to, infinite instability, and once it has turned away from God only his intervention can prevent it from spinning off into chaos.

By means of the corporeal worlds God re-introduced stability to the created order and made it possible for the *noes* to re-ascend to him. In virtue of the movement and Fall they had already undergone change, but so far the form this took, namely increasingly unstable movement, happened without further input from God. Their assumption of souls and bodies, on the other hand, although the actualisation of a potential already in them,¹⁸¹ did require such input and so a further creation.¹⁸²

Embodiment contains, but does not eliminate, the instability of the *nous*. The human *nous* experiences its instability through its susceptibility to imprinting by *noēmata* of sensible objects and to the changing emotions and mental states characteristic of our daily lives, most – but not all - of which are unstable movements and affections of the

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Sch. 10 on Eccl. 2:11; Sch. 23 on Prov. 2:17; see above, 1.1.2.

¹⁸¹ Cf. *KG* 2.29: ‘Just as fire potentially possesses its body, so also the *nous* potentially possesses the soul, when it is entirely mixed with the light of the Blessed Trinity.’

¹⁸² But see above, n.34.

nous; ¹⁸³ in other words, *pathē*.¹⁸⁴ The two - the imprinting of the *nous* and the experience of *pathos* - are connected: ‘appetite’, Evagrius tells us, ‘is the source of every pleasure, and sensation gives birth to appetite.’¹⁸⁵ Conversely, *apatheia* is the initial stabilisation of the *nous* that enables it to contemplate and thereby increase its stability and move closer to God. Contemplation does not involve the imprinting of the *nous* but nonetheless changes it as much as *pathos*.¹⁸⁶ But whereas the changes wrought in the *nous* by *pathos* are a sickening, those wrought by contemplation are healing. They are reflected in changes to the constitution of the body¹⁸⁷ - that is, to the aspect of the *nous* that is ‘named a body’¹⁸⁸ - in the gradual process whereby it, along with the soul, is ‘raised to the order of the mind.’¹⁸⁹

1.2.1.3 The true nature of the nous

Just as God is beyond all representation and sense perception (ὕπὲρ πᾶσαν ἔννοιαν καὶ αἴσθησιν);¹⁹⁰ immaterial (ἄυλος)¹⁹¹ and without quantity or shape (ἄποσος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος)¹⁹² or form (μορφή),¹⁹³ so the true nature of the *nous* is to be without form or matter.¹⁹⁴ That which was created to be receptive to the immaterial, formless God is itself immaterial and formless. God’s response to the Fall was to provide the *noes* with souls and bodies to enable them to re-ascend to him, and that in the first instance means overcoming their susceptibility to *pathos*; in other words, attaining *apatheia*. But although *apatheia* is part of the true nature of the *nous*, it is not the whole story and its attainment does not yet suffice for the *nous* fully to realise its true nature:

¹⁸³ Not all emotions, desires and so forth are unstable movements, only those that lead us away from God. For discussion of unstable affects – that is, *pathē* – see Chapter Two, and for stable affects, Chapter Three.

¹⁸⁴ Chapter Two focuses in detail upon Evagrius’ understanding of *pathos* and its effect upon us.

¹⁸⁵ *Prakt.* 4.2-3; see below, 2.2.2.

¹⁸⁶ See above, 1.1.3.

¹⁸⁷ The body and its transformations are discussed below, 1.4.

¹⁸⁸ *Gt.Let.* 26; see above, 1.1.2.

¹⁸⁹ *Gt.Let.* 22; see above, 1.1.2.

¹⁹⁰ *Pry.* 4.

¹⁹¹ *Pry.* 66.

¹⁹² *Pry.* 67.

¹⁹³ Cf. *Pry.* 114.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. *KG* 3.31: ‘Of the unity of the *nous* it is possible to speak, but its nature cannot be described because it has been constituted neither of form nor of matter (such that) there is no knowledge of quality.’

Οὐκ ὁ ἀπαθείας τετυχηκῶς, ἤδη καὶ προσεύχεται ἀληθῶς· δύναται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψιλοῖς νοήμασι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις αὐτῶν περισπᾶσθαι, καὶ μακρὰν ἀπέχειν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ.¹⁹⁵

One who has attained *apatheia* has not already found true prayer as well, for one can be among simple intellections and be distracted by the information they provide, and so be far from God.

By ‘simple intellections’ Evagrius means the *logoi* of bodies and incorporeals and judgment and providence. These relate to the various levels of contemplation and of the metaphysical hierarchy by means of which the *nous* ascends to God, but while an integral part of the ascent they too must be transcended if it is to be receptive to God himself. ‘True prayer’, which Evagrius also calls ‘pure prayer’,¹⁹⁶ is the highest level of contemplation.¹⁹⁷ It is both the immediate goal of the spiritual life and the route to its ultimate goal, the eschatological restoration of the *logikoi* to God, for which the *nous* must become naked, not only of *noēmata* but of soul and body:

The naked *nous* is that which, by the contemplation which concerns it, is united to knowledge of the Trinity.¹⁹⁸

Being without form or matter, the *nous* has no qualities and so its nature cannot be described.¹⁹⁹ It does, however, have a light associated with it,²⁰⁰ and Evagrius journeyed to John of Lycopolis to ask him about this:²⁰¹

¹⁹⁵ *Pry.* 55; cf. *Pry.* 57: ‘Even if the *nous* has transcended the contemplation of corporeal nature, it has not yet beheld perfectly the place of God, for it can be occupied with the knowledge of intelligible objects and so be involved with its multiplicity’ (Κἂν ὑπὲρ τὴν θεωρίαν τῆς σωματικῆς φύσεως ὁ νοῦς γένηται, οὕτω τέλειον τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ τόπον ἐθεάσατο· δύναται γὰρ ἐν τῇ τῶν νοητῶν εἶναι γνώσει, καὶ ποικίλλεσθαι πρὸς αὐτήν); also *Let.* 58.4: ‘When the mind has attained [knowledge of the Holy Trinity], it leaves all the intellections associated with objects.’ Trans. Sinkewicz (2003: 285,n.3).

¹⁹⁶ Cf., e.g., *Pry.* 70, 72.

¹⁹⁷ For ‘true prayer’ cf., e.g., *Pry.* 53, 55, 59, 60, 64; for ‘pure prayer’, e.g. *Pry.* 70, 72.

¹⁹⁸ *KG* 3.6; cf. *KG* 1.65; 3.15.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. *KG* 3.31.

²⁰⁰ Cf., e.g., *Prakt.* 64, quoted below, 3.1; *Disc.* 78, quoted below, 3.3; *KG* 1.74: ‘The light of the *nous* is divided into three: knowledge of the adorable and holy Trinity, of the incorporeal nature that has been created by it, and of the contemplation of beings. This light can be manipulated by both demons and angels; at *Pry.* 73 Evagrius speaks of ‘the light around the *nous*’ being manipulated by the demon of vain-glory, and at *Pry.* 74 of ‘the angel of God [moving] the light of the *nous* to an unerring activity.’

²⁰¹ Palladius (*HL* 35.4) reports that it took him, Palladius, eighteen days to make the same journey, ‘partly on foot, partly by sailing along the river’.

Concerning [the holy light in the eyes of the mind at the time of prayer], I and God's servant Ammonius wanted to know where it comes from, and we asked the holy John, the seer of Thebes, whether it is the nature of the mind to be luminous and thus it pours forth the light from itself or whether [the light] appears from something else outside and illumines [the mind]; but he answered us and said, "No human being is able to explain this, and indeed, apart from the grace of God the mind cannot be illumined in prayer by being set free from the many cruel enemies that are endeavouring to destroy it."²⁰²

Evagrius evidently concluded that as well as having a light of its own the *nous* can be illuminated from without:

Εἴ τις βούλοιο ἰδεῖν τὴν τοῦ νοῦ κατάστασιν, στερησάτω ἑαυτὸν πάντων τῶν νοημάτων, καὶ τότε ὄψεται αὐτὸν σαπφείρῳ ἢ οὐρανίῳ χρώματι παρεμφερῆ· τοῦτο ποιῆσαι ἄνευ ἀπαθείας, τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν· Θεοῦ γὰρ χρεία συνεργούντος τοῦ ἀναπνέοντος αὐτῷ τὸ συγγενὲς φῶς.²⁰³

If someone should want to behold the state of his *nous*, let him deprive himself of all *noēmata* and then he shall behold himself resembling sapphire or the colour of heaven.²⁰⁴ It is impossible to achieve this without *apatheia*, for he will need God to collaborate with him and breathe into him the connatural light.²⁰⁵

This is 'that light which at the time of prayer leaves an imprint of the place of God (τοῦ φωτὸς ἐκείνου τοῦ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς προσευχῆς ἐκτυποῦντος τὸν τόπον τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ).'²⁰⁶ But if only *noēmata* of sensible objects imprint the *nous* and if, moreover, such imprinting is inimical to prayer, what does Evagrius mean by this? In the very next chapter he states explicitly, in relation to Isa. 6:1, that the *noēma* of God does not imprint the *nous*.²⁰⁷ The answer, I suggest, is that it is partly deliberate oxymoron and partly metaphor, both intended to emphasise the singular and ineffable nature of the experience in question. As metaphor it compares it to our ordinary experience of the sensible world and declares it to be no less vivid; as oxymoron it reminds us that, unlike cog-

²⁰² *Ant.* 6.16; cf. *HL* 35.

²⁰³ *Rfl.* 2.9.

²⁰⁴ Cf. Exod. 24:9-11.

²⁰⁵ Cf. *Rfl.* 23: '[The *nous*] will lay aside the *pathē* through the virtues, and simple thoughts through spiritual contemplation; and this in turn it will lay aside when there appears to it the light;' *Rfl.* 27: 'Prayer is a state (*katastasis*) of the *nous* that arises under the influence of the unique light of the Holy Trinity.'

²⁰⁶ *Th.* 40.8-9.

²⁰⁷ Cf. *Th.* 41.17-19.

nition of sensible objects, that of God does not rely for its vividness upon the imprinting of the *nous*.

Evagrius understands the expression ‘the throne of God’ in Isa. 6:1 as referring to the pure *nous*, since ‘God is said to be seated there where he is known’.²⁰⁸ He also speaks of the *nous* as ‘the place of God’, as in the following:

Ὅταν ὁ νοῦς τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποδυσάμενος τὸν ἐκ χάριτος ἐπενδύσῃται, τότε καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κατάστασιν ὄψεται κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς προσευχῆς σαφείρῳ ἢ οὐρανίῳ χρώματι παρεμφερῆ, ἥντινα καὶ τόπον θεοῦ ἢ γραφὴ ὀνομάζει ὑπὸ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ὀφθέντα ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους Σινᾶ.²⁰⁹

When the *nous* has put off the old self and shall put on the one born of grace,²¹⁰ then it will see its own state in the time of prayer resembling sapphire or the colour of heaven; this state scripture calls the place of God that was seen by the elders on Mount Sinai.²¹¹

For Evagrius it is the *nous* that is the object of Paul’s injunction and the subject of the transformation from ‘old’ to ‘new’ self; as we shall see, he identifies the Pauline ‘new self’ with the person who has attained *apatheia*. The *nous* is the ‘place of God’ because it was created to know him.²¹²

The *nous*, then, is naturally incorporeal and has its own light. What about its relationship to movement? Is the true nature of the *nous* to be in stillness or in motion? I said above that stillness is found only in union with God and that corporeal creation is char-

²⁰⁸ *Th.* 41.14-15; see above, 1.2.1.1.

²⁰⁹ *Th.* 39, repeated almost verbatim in *Let* 39; cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 273, n.61). Cf. also *Rfl.* 2.9, quoted above; *Th.* 40.

²¹⁰ Cf. Col. 3:9-10.

²¹¹ Cf. Exod. 24:9-11.

²¹² That the ‘place of God’ is said to be located on a mountain reflects, for Evagrius, the fact that the return to God is an ascent; cf. *Let.* 58: ‘[T]he intelligible mountain is the knowledge of the Holy Trinity erected on a height difficult of access’ (trans. Sinkewicz (2003: 285, n.3)); also cf. *KG* 5.40: ‘The intelligible mountain is spiritual contemplation which is placed at a great height which it is difficult to approach; when the *nous* will have reached it, it will become a seer of all the *noēmata* of the objects below.’ Cf. *Rfl.* 25.3-6: ‘[T]he place of God is the rational soul, and his dwelling the luminous *nous* that has renounced worldly appetites and been taught to observe the *logoi* of (that which is on) the earth’ (τόπος ἐστὶ τοίνυν Θεοῦ, ψυχὴ λογικὴ· κατοικητήριον δὲ, νοῦς φωτοειδῆς τὰς κοσμικὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀρνησάμενος, τοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς λόγους ἀποσκοπεύειν δεδιδαγμένος); Sch. 2 on Ps. 75:3: ‘Place of God, the pure soul; dwelling of God, the contemplating *nous*’ (τόπος Θεοῦ ψυχὴ καθαρά. κατοικητήριον Θεοῦ, νοῦς θεωρητικός).

acterised by stability of movement as opposed to its cessation.²¹³ But at *Praktikos* 48 Evagrius describes the *nous* as ‘a thing easily set in motion and difficult to check in its tendencies towards unlawful fantasies (εὐκίνητον γὰρ τι πρᾶγμα ὁ νοῦς καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀνόμους φαντασίας δυσκάθεκτον).²¹⁴ So what exactly does he mean by this? Clearly he means that the *nous* is easily destabilised, since he is referring in particular to its ‘tendency towards unlawful fantasies’. But should we take this to mean that the natural state of the *nous* is stillness? Given that stillness was, along with incorporeality, the prelapsarian condition of the *logikoi*, the answer is clearly yes. What about the *nous* in corporeal creation? Can it ever experience stillness? I think the answer again is yes: that when, during prayer, it attains to knowledge of God, it enjoys stillness, along with effective incorporeality,²¹⁵ but as soon as it begins to descend it is once more identical with the *logistikon* and so, as part of corporeal creation, in motion, although insofar as it remains *apathēs* that motion will be stable.²¹⁶

1.2.1.4 Summary

The mutability and passibility of the *nous* are central to Evagrius’ anthropology. The receptivity of the *nous* spans the entire cognitive spectrum from God to the sensible world. The image of God consists in its receptivity to knowledge of God.

Cognition of objects external to the *nous* involves the reception by it of *noēmata* of those objects. *Noēmata* of sensible objects imprint the *nous* but those of intelligibles do not. Whether or not imprinting occurs is agent-dependent: if scriptural passages that use sensible imagery to convey spiritual truths are understood in terms of their literal meaning then the *noēmata* of that imagery will imprint the *nous*, but if they are understood in terms of their spiritual meaning then the *nous* will not be imprinted. Similarly, if perception of sensible objects focuses upon the objects themselves then their *noēmata* will imprint the *nous*, but if the focus is upon the objects’ *logoi* – that is, if it is contemplative – then the *nous* will not be imprinted. Evagrius refers to this as ‘spiritual sensation’ and a prerequisite of it is *apatheia*.

²¹³ See above, 1.1.2.

²¹⁴ *Prakt.* 48.7-8.

²¹⁵ See below, 3.3.

²¹⁶ *Apatheia* is normally experienced as a temporary condition; see below, 3.4.

Just as the epistemic changeability of the *nous* is rooted in its receptivity to knowledge of God, so its metaphysical changeability is rooted in its power of self-determination, an exercise of which is a movement of the *nous*. If that movement is away from God it is unstable, if toward him, stable, since stability comes from God. In turning away from God the *logikoi* introduced instability to the created order, and God responded by re-introducing stability by means of corporeal creation. The furnishing of the *noes* with souls and bodies was the actualisation of a potential already present within them. It contains but does not eliminate the instability of the *noes*. As humans we experience that instability in the plasticity of the *nous* in relation to the sensible world and in our related vulnerability to *pathos*. Acquiring *apatheia* stabilises the *nous* and enables it to shift its cognitive focus from sensible objects to their spiritual significance. Like *pathos*, the practice of contemplation or spiritual sensation changes the *nous* (including the soul and body) but whereas the changes effected by *pathos* increase its sickliness, those effected by contemplation restore it to health.

Attainment of *apatheia* is the starting point for the restoration of the *nous* to its true nature of formlessness, incorporeality and stillness but it is not sufficient for it. The *apathēs nous* has lost its susceptibility to imprinting by *noēmata* of sensible objects but remains subject to multiplicity, which, although now of intelligibles rather than sensibles is nonetheless, *qua* multiplicity, ‘far from God’. To be receptive to God as essential knowledge rather than as mediated through corporeal creation it must transcend the corporeal worlds, becoming naked of body and soul and also of all *noēmata*. As it does so, ‘putting off the old self and putting on the one born of grace’, it will become aware of its light and of itself as the ‘place of God’.

1.2.2 The soul

Evagrius uses the word ‘soul’ even more frequently than the word *nous*.²¹⁷ The reason, I suspect, lies in the therapeutic focus of his writings, for while the *nous* is the agent and

²¹⁷ According to the *TLG* and including the *Epistula Fidei* there are four-hundred and ninety-one occurrences of the word ‘soul’ in Evagrius’ Greek corpus.

subject of redemption, the soul is the form it assumes as a result of the Fall and in which it must act to achieve redemption.

To begin with, a point of clarification. Evagrius sometimes speaks as if the soul comprised only the *thumos* and *epithumêtikon*, so implying the identity of *nous* and *logistikon*.²¹⁸ His doing so follows naturally from his tendency to assimilate the *logistikon* to the *nous* and preference for speaking in terms of the latter. Accordingly it should be borne in mind that just as the term *nous* can refer either to the triune entity or the rational part of the soul, so ‘soul’ might denote either the fallen entity in its entirety or its *pathêtikon* part alone.

This section will focus upon the nature of the three parts of the soul, and this can best be gleaned from Evagrius’ assignment of virtues to them. But first, from a modern perspective the fact that a discussion of the virtues should fall within a chapter on anthropology rather than ethics bears a word of explanation. Whereas we think of ethics and psychology as necessarily distinct, the one prescriptive, the other descriptive, in antiquity the assumption was rather of their connectedness and mutual coherence. As Brennan notes, ancient theories of ethics are rooted in naturalism; that is, they start from considerations of what is natural for a human being. Consequently, unlike modern theories they ‘tend to begin their ethical theorizing along with their psychology, not prior to it’,²¹⁹ and to suppose that ‘the perfectly representative human psyche belongs to the perfectly ethical human agent. Violations of ethical standards always reflect lapses in psychological hygiene.’²²⁰ Evagrius’ anthropology fits this pattern exactly, being premised upon our creation in God’s image and loss of it through our own choice. For Evagrius the perfectly virtuous human agent would indeed have the perfectly healthy soul, and the purpose of *praktikê* is to regain and, as far as possible, preserve that health. To the objection that a person cannot be obliged to do anything that she is unable to do, that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, Evagrius would reply that any gap between what we can do and what we ought to do is itself a result of poor psychological health and, as such, something that in principle we can, with God’s help, remedy.

²¹⁸ Cf., e.g., Sch. 2 on Ps. 107:3, Sch. 230 on Prov. 21:23, Sch. 258 on Prov. 23:22.

²¹⁹ Brennan, at Inwood (2003: 258).

²²⁰ Brennan, at Inwood (2003: 259).

Evagrius distinguishes between the ‘practical’ and the ‘contemplative’ virtues. The former are constitutive of *apatheia* and are cultivated by means of *praktikē*, while the latter are the preserve of the *gnostikos* and are cultivated following attainment of *apatheia*. Concise descriptions of the virtuous, and so *apathēs*, soul are given in both the *Praktikos* and the *Kephalaia Gnostika*. *Praktikos* 86 reads:

Κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργεῖ ψυχὴ λογικὴ ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμητικὸν αὐτῆς μέρος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφίεται, τὸ δὲ θυμικὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ἀγωνίζεται, τὸ δὲ λογιστικὸν ἐπιβάλλει τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν γεγονότων.²²¹

The rational soul acts according to nature when the epithumetic part of it longs for virtue, the *thumos* struggles on (the soul’s) behalf, and the *logistikon* attains the contemplation of beings.

Kephalaia Gnostika 4.73 describes the virtuous – and so *apathēs* - person as

one in whom the *nous* always attends to the Lord, in whom the *thumikos* is full of humility following the memory of God, and in whom *epithumia* is completely oriented toward the Lord.²²²

While both of these chapters assume the ability, bestowed by *apatheia*, to practise contemplation, the fact that *Praktikos* 86 focuses upon the role of the *thumos* in the ‘warfare of the *pathē*’,²²³ while in *Kephalaia Gnostika* 4.73 all three parts of the soul are directly attentive to God, reveals that they deal with less and more advanced levels of spiritual attainment respectively. We see this too in the degree of unity that each attributes to the soul: in the *Praktikos* her three parts are operating in harmony with one another but their respective functions are quite distinct, whereas in the *Kephalaia Gnostika*, although the differentiation remains they are unified not just by mutual concord but by direct orientation toward God.²²⁴ The contrasting functions that these two chapters assign to the *thumos* will be considered below.

²²¹ *Prakt.* 86; cf. *Disc.* 96.

²²² *KG* 4.73.

²²³ Cf. *Prakt.* 83.

²²⁴ Cf. Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31. It is worth noting the contrast with Plotinus’ understanding of the ‘civic’ and ‘purificatory’ virtues. For Plotinus, the civic virtues involve all three parts of the soul and bestow *metriopatheia*, while *apatheia* is acquired by means of the purificatory virtues, which concern the separation of the rational part of the soul from the body and do not involve the *epithumētikon* or *thumos*; cf. *Enn.* 1.2; also Baltzly (2004: 301-3). For Evagrius, both the practical and the contemplative virtues in-

Praktikos 89 comprises a more detailed assignment of virtues to the parts of the soul:

Since the rational soul is tripartite according to our wise teacher,²²⁵ when virtue (ἀρετή) arises in the *logistikon* it is called prudence (φρόνησις), understanding (σύνεσις), and wisdom (σοφία); when in the *epithumētikon* it is called temperance (σωφροσύνη), love (ἀγάπη), and self-control (ἐγκράτεια);²²⁶ when in the *thumos* it is called courage (ἀνδρεία) and perseverance (ὑπομονή); and when in the entire soul it is called justice (δικαιοσύνη).²²⁷ The work (ἔργον) of prudence is to lead in the war against the opposing powers (τὸ στρατηγεῖν πρὸς τὰς ἀντικειμένας δυνάμεις) and to defend the virtues (τῶν ἀρετῶν ὑπερασπίζειν) and to draw the battle lines against the vices (πρὸς τὰς κακίας παρατάττεσθαι) and to manage indifferent matters according to the circumstances (τὰ μέσα πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς διοικεῖν). The work of understanding involves the harmonious arrangement of all things that contribute to the attainment of our goal (τὸ πάντα τὰ συντελοῦντα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν ἀρμοδίως οἰκονομεῖν). The work of wisdom is contemplation of the *logoi* of bodies and incorporeals (τὸ θεωρεῖν λόγους σωμάτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων). The work of temperance is to look without *pathos* upon objects that set in motion its irrational fantasies (βλέπειν ἀπαθῶς τὰ πράγματα τὰ κινουῦντα ἐν ἡμῖν φαντασίας ἀλόγους). The work of love is to conduct itself towards every image of God in much the same way as it would towards the archetype (τὸ πάσῃ εἰκόνι τοῦ Θεοῦ τοιαύτην ἑαυτὴν ἐμπαρέχειν οἶαν καὶ τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ σχεδόν), even when the demons attempt to defile it (μιαίνειν αὐτὰς ἐπιχειρῶσιν οἱ δαίμονες). The work of self-control is to throw off joyfully every pleasure of the gullet (τὸ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν τοῦ φάρυγγος μετὰ χαρᾶς ἀποσεῖεσθαι). It belongs to perseverance and courage to be unafraid of enemies (μὴ δεδιέναι δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους) and to hold out valiantly in the midst of dangers

volve all three parts of the soul, but it is the former that, by ‘separating soul from body’ (cf. *Prakt.* 52) constitute *apatheia*. The cultivation of *metriopatheia* is, for Evagrius as for Plotinus, a precursor to that of *apatheia*, but again he differs from Plotinus in that it does not involve different virtues; see below, 3.4.

²²⁵ Guillaumont (1971: 683) notes that the expression ‘our wise teacher’, which Evagrius has substituted for the name of Plato, designates Gregory of Nazianzus. Likewise, Sinkewicz (2003: 260, n.91) notes that ‘the teacher in question is most likely Gregory Nazianzen’.

²²⁶ Guillaumont and Sinkewicz translate ἐγκράτεια as ‘abstinence’, but while I agree that abstinence is the form that ἐγκράτεια takes as regards the *epithumētikon*, I prefer the translation ‘self-control’ because in addition to being a more literal rendering of ἐγκράτεια, it more clearly suggests the cognitive aspect of abstinence in its Evagrian sense and therefore makes more explicit its link with the inner watchfulness that is so central to *praktikē* (for discussion of inner watchfulness, see below, 3.4).

²²⁷ In speaking of virtue as a single entity that assumes different forms Evagrius evokes the doctrine, Stoic in origin, of the unity of the virtues. Cf., e.g., Plutarch, *On Moral Virtue* 440e, *LS* 61B: ‘Menedemus of Eretria eliminated the plurality and differentiation of the virtues, holding that there is a single one, called by many names; for it is the same thing that is called moderation and courage and justice ... Aristo of Chios also made virtue essentially one thing, which he called “health”.’ Cf. also *Prakt.* 98, quoted below, this section.

(προθύμως ἐγκαρτερεῖν τοῖς δεινοῖς). The role of justice is to cultivate concord and harmony between the parts of the soul (τὸ συμφωνίαν τινὰ καὶ ἁρμονίαν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν κατεργάζεσθαι).²²⁸

These virtues are a mixture of the practical and the contemplative: prudence and understanding are primarily practical, while wisdom is certainly a contemplative virtue. That Evagrius speaks of it rather than knowledge in relation to the *logistikon* is worth remarking. Since wisdom relates to corporeal creation and knowledge to God himself,²²⁹ it reflects the status of the *logistikon* as the ensouled *nous*; that is, the *nous* in relation to corporeal creation. In turn it makes more noteworthy Evagrius' references to knowledge of God being attainable by the *nous* during human life since it highlights the ability of the embodied *nous* to transcend the corporeal worlds. Self-control is a practical virtue, but temperance as described here is contemplative, and we know from the Prologue to the *Praktikos* that love (*agapē*) only truly becomes possible with the attainment of *apatheia*,²³⁰ making it, too, a contemplative virtue. On the other hand, the virtues here ascribed to the *thumos*, perseverance and courage, are above all practical. The role assigned to justice, which we can take to be both practical and contemplative, recalls that assigned to it in Plato's *Republic*, where it is the condition of the soul in all of whose parts virtue has been realised,²³¹ but whereas for Plato it emerges from the correct operation of the parts of the soul,²³² Evagrius makes it active in the cultivation of 'concord and harmony' between them.²³³

Praktikos 86 and 89, on the one hand, and *Kephalaia Gnostika* 4.73 on the other, assign very different functions to the *thumos*, the former that of struggling on behalf of the

²²⁸ As Sinkewicz (2003: 260, n.91) notes, Evagrius here draws upon a school text such as the anonymous *On the Virtues and the Vices* 1-2, which names Plato as the source of the teaching, but adapts it to his own teaching and adds virtues with strong scriptural associations: understanding and wisdom (cf. Col. 1:9); charity and self-control (cf. I Tim. 2:15; 2 Pet. 1:6), and perseverance (e.g. Rom. 5:23). Cf. also Guillaumont (1971: 681 ff).

²²⁹ See above, n.35.

²³⁰ Cf. *Prakt.* Prol. 49-50; also *Prakt.* 81, 84.

²³¹ Cf. *Rep.* 441d ff.

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ If he was working from *On the Virtues and the Vices* (see above, n.187), this is one of the respects in which he departs from it, since it defines justice as 'the virtue of the soul that distributes proportionately', a view associated with Aristotle and the Stoics as opposed to Plato. Evagrius himself evokes the latter sense of justice in his description of the contemplative virtues at *Gnost.* 44 (quoted above in part 2 of the Introduction). Cf. *Disc.* 7, quoted below, 3.3, at n.258.

soul; the latter, observation of humility in memory of God. Unlike the other parts of the soul, the *thumos* is the source of two contrasting sets of virtues, detailed by Evagrius in the following passage from the *Eulogios*:

The usage of *thumos* lies in this, namely, in fighting against the serpent with enmity,²³⁴ but with gentleness and mildness exercising patience with love (κατὰ τὸ πρῶον καὶ ἐπιεικὲς κατὰ τὴν ἀγάπην μακροθυμεῖν) toward one's brother while doing battle with the *logismos*. Let the gentle person then be a fighter (ὁ πραῖος οὖν ἔστω μαχητής), with his gentleness divorced from murderous *logismoi*, just as his fighting is separated from those of his natural kindred (τῆς μάχης ἐκ τῶν τῆς φύσεως ὁμογενῶν). Do not turn the usage of *thumos* instead to one that is contrary to nature (μὴ ἀντιστρέψῃς τοῦ θυμοῦ τὴν χρῆσιν εἰς τὴν παρὰ φύσιν), so as to use *thumos* with your brother by becoming like the serpent on the one hand and on the other hand to form a friendship with the serpent by consenting to *logismoi*. The gentle person, even if he suffers terrible things, does not abandon love, for it is because of this that he exercises patience and forbearance, kindness and perseverance (κἂν πάσῃ τὰ δεινὰ, τῆς ἀγάπης οὐκ ἐξίσταται, ἔνεκεν γὰρ ταύτης μακροθυμεῖ καὶ στέγει, χρηστεύεται τε καὶ ὑπομένει).²³⁵ If indeed the exercise of patience belongs to love (τῆς ἀγάπης τὸ μακροθυμεῖν), contention arising from the *thumos* has nothing to do with love, for *thumos* rouses hatred, jealousy and wrath (μῖσος καὶ φθόνον καὶ μῆνιν ἐγείρει), but love hates the three of them (ἀγάπη δὲ τὰ τρία μισεῖ). If you have a firm foundation in love, pay more attention to this than to the person who trips you up (Ἐἰ παγίαν ἔχεις ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ τὴν βάσιν, μᾶλλον πρόσεχε ταύτῃ, ἢπερ τῷ πταίοντί σε).²³⁶

As this description makes clear, the *thumos* is the source not only of the virtues relating to aggression, such as anger towards the demons and courage in the face of demonic attack, but of the virtues opposed to it, for example patience, perseverance, gentleness and mildness; it is, accordingly, the psychic locus of restraint, tolerance and empathy as well as of combativeness.

It will have been noticed that this passage appears to assign love in the sense of *agapē* to the *thumos*,²³⁷ whereas *Praktikos* 89 assigned it to the *epithumētikon*. The latter would appear to be the exception. To begin with, *Praktikos* 38, although not explicitly assigning it to the *thumos*, is most naturally read as doing so:

²³⁴ Cf. Gen. 3:15.

²³⁵ Cf. I Cor. 13:3-7.

²³⁶ *Eul.* 11.10.

²³⁷ At *Eul.* 13.12 *agapē* is again linked with perseverance and patience.

Ἐπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάθη· καὶ παρούσης μὲν ἀγάπης καὶ ἐγκρατείας οὐ κινηθήσεται, ἀπούσης δὲ κινηθήσεται· πλειόνων δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὁ θυμὸς δεῖται φαρμάκων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεγάλη λέγεται ἡ ἀγάπη ὅτι χαλινὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ.²³⁸

The *pathē* are naturally set in motion by the senses. When love and self-control are present they will not be set in motion; when they are absent, they will be set in motion. The *thumos* requires more remedies than the *epithumētikon*, and for this reason love is said to be great, for it is the bridle of anger.

The *Kephalaia Gnostika* also implies the derivation of *agapē* from the *thumos*:

Knowledge and ignorance are united in the *nous*, while *epithumia* is receptive of self-control and luxury and love and hate normally occur to *thumos*.²³⁹

Knowledge heals the *nous*, love *thumos* and chastity *epithumia*.²⁴⁰

We have, then, one explicit assignment of *agapē* to the *epithumētikon* (*Praktikos* 89); one very strongly implied assignment of it to the *thumos* (*Eulogios* 11.10), and three strongly implied assignments of it to the *thumos*, one of which is in the *Praktikos*. It is difficult to know what to make of this apparent inconsistency, but it seems clear that for the most part Evagrius associates *agapē* with the *thumos* rather than the *epithumētikon*, as would make sense given that *agapē* does not involve desire.²⁴¹

Conversely, there can be no doubt that *erôs* in its spiritual as well as its physical sense derives, like desire in general, from the *epithumētikon*. *Erôs* is not a word Evagrius uses often: whereas *agapē* and its cognates occur one hundred and four times in his Greek corpus, *erôs* occurs only seven times. Of these, two, both in the *Eulogios*, are negative in tone. In one, Evagrius speaks of the person who has a desire (ὄρεξις) for, and is in

²³⁸ *Prakt.* 1-5.

²³⁹ *KG* 1.84. My assumption that the love in question here is *agapē* is based upon Frankenberg's Greek retroversion of the Syriac manuscript S1.

²⁴⁰ *KG* 3.35. In this case a Greek fragment survives that confirms the use of *agapē*.

²⁴¹ Were it not for this consideration, which seems to me decisive, *Rfl.* 37 - 'Desire (*epithumia*) is a power of the soul that is destructive of anger' – could be taken as additional grounds for attributing *agapē* to the *epithumētikon*, given that *agapē* heals anger.

love with (ἐρῶν), honour.²⁴² In the other he declares that the person who slanders and the person who listens to slander are ‘in love with one another for the ruin of the heart’ (ἐρῶσιν ἀλλήλων εἰς λύμην καρδίας).²⁴³

His other five positive uses of *erōs* are all in the *Chapters on Prayer*; the first two in the Prologue. Evagrius tells his correspondent:²⁴⁴

θαυμάζω δέ σε, καὶ λίαν ζηλῶ τῆς ἀρίστης προθέσεως τῶν περὶ προσευχῆς ἐρῶντα κεφαλαίων. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς τούτων ἐρῶς τῶν ὑπὸ χειρῶν, καὶ ἐν χάρτῃ διὰ μέλανος τὸ εἶναι ἐχόντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν νῶ ἰδρυμένων δι’ ἀγάπης καὶ ἀμνησικακίας.²⁴⁵

I hold you in admiration and envy greatly your excellent intention expressed in your desire for the chapters on prayer. For you desire to have them not only in hand and in ink upon the page, but established in your *nous* through love and freedom from resentment.

This shows how Evagrius distinguishes between *erōs* and *agapē*, and also exemplifies some of the virtues of the *pathētikon* part of the soul in action: desire – specifically characterised as loving – for the good, on the part of the *epithumētikon*; on that of the *thumos*, love and freedom from resentment. It is also a thumbnail sketch of the *apathēs* soul or *nous*, not only because the virtuous soul is *apathēs* by definition but because Evagrius acknowledges his correspondent as having not only received Leah – that is, completed the work of *praktikē* – but performed his seven years’ further service for Rachel, who for Evagrius symbolises the fruits of contemplation.²⁴⁶

The other three references to *erōs* are in the treatise itself: Evagrius speaks of the Holy Spirit urging the *nous* on to love for spiritual prayer (προτρεπόμενον [τὸν νοῦν] εἰς ἔρων πνευματικῆς προσευχῆς),²⁴⁷ and of the person who loves (ἐρῶν) true prayer,²⁴⁸ and, at *Prayer 52*, expresses even more directly than in the Prologue the compatibility

²⁴² Cf. *Eul.* 3.3.

²⁴³ *Eul.* 16.16.

²⁴⁴ Probably Rufinus; cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 184).

²⁴⁵ *Pry.* Prol. 23-27.

²⁴⁶ Cf. *Pry.* Prol. 1-16; Gen. 29:20-30; Sinkewicz (2003: 184).

²⁴⁷ *Pry.* 62, according to the text used by Sinkewicz (that of the *Philokalia*, supplemented by other manuscripts) and Stewart (2001: 192); Migne has ἔργα instead of ἔρων.

²⁴⁸ *Pry.* 64.

of spiritual *erôs* with *apatheia*, recalling Plato's definition of Eros as a *daimôn* who mediates between the divine and the human.²⁴⁹

Κατάστασις ἐστὶ προσευχῆς ἕξις ἀπαθῆς, ἔρωτι ἀκροτάτῳ εἰς ὕψος νοητὸν ἀρπάζουσα τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ πνευματικὸν νοῦν.²⁵⁰

The state of prayer is an *apathēs* habit, which by means of a supreme love carries off to the intelligible height the *nous* which loves wisdom and is spiritual.

Finally, it was noted above that although all three parts of the soul were in this sense latent in the pre-lapsarian *nous*, what became the *thumos* and *epithumêtikon* only took that form as a result of it, and that Evagrius understands this as the *nous* renouncing the image of God and willingly becoming the image of animals',²⁵¹ and as the *thumos* and *epithumêtikon* being 'yoked' (συζεύξας) to the human person.²⁵² It is now possible to clarify how these two parts of the soul can be aspects of the fallen *nous* and so, ultimately, of the image of God, and at the same time 'powers that we and the beasts have in common' that 'belong to corporeal nature' and therefore were evidently not 'created with the rational nature before the movement.'²⁵³ In the soul of the *praktikos*, the *epithumêtikon* 'longs for virtue', the *thumos* 'struggles on the soul's behalf' and the *logistikon* 'perceives the contemplation of beings',²⁵⁴ (this state of affairs being constitutive of *apatheia*), while *Kephalaia Gnostika* 4.73 describes the soul of the contemplative as that in which the *nous* 'always attends to the Lord', the *thumos* is 'full of humility following the memory of God' and *epithumia* is 'completely oriented toward the Lord.' Thus there is a progression in the unity of function among the three parts of the soul from the level of the *praktikos* to that of the contemplative. In the unified *nous* virtue will itself be unitary:

μίαν μὲν εἶναι τῇ φύσει τὴν ἀρετὴν, εἰδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ γὰρ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἡλιακὸν ἀσχημάτιστον μὲν ἐστὶ...ταῖς δὲ δι' ὧν εἰσβάλλει θυρίσι συσχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν.²⁵⁵

²⁴⁹ Cf. *Symp.* 202d ff.

²⁵⁰ *Pry.* 52.

²⁵¹ See above, 1.1.2.

²⁵² Cf. *Th.* 17.4; see above, 1.1.2.

²⁵³ Cf. *KG* 6.85.

²⁵⁴ Cf. *Prakt.* 86.

²⁵⁵ *Prakt.* 98.7-10.

Virtue is by nature unitary, but it takes specific forms in the powers of the soul, for the light of the sun...is without form but naturally takes the form of the windows through which it enters.

Nonetheless, that which becomes the *thumos* will contain the seeds of ‘humility following the memory of God’ and ‘struggling on the soul’s behalf’, and that which becomes the *epithumētikon*, the seeds of ‘complete orientation toward the Lord’ and ‘longing for virtue’.²⁵⁶ These are the movements of these aspects of the soul toward God, but if they move away from him the longing for virtue becomes simply a longing for the sustenance, furtherance and pleasure of the entity experienced as isolated from God and therefore unable to draw them from him. Likewise, the impetus to struggle on the soul’s behalf becomes aggression in relation to other creatures of its kind.²⁵⁷ These are ‘the powers that we and the beasts have in common’ that, ‘belonging to corporeal nature’, were not created with rational nature before the movement.’

In sum, the *logistikon* is the locus of the soul’s rational functions: on the one hand contemplation, and on the other, the management of practical affairs so as to facilitate it. The *thumos* is the source of anger to be used against the demons and of the martial virtues of courage and perseverance, as well virtues such as love, patience, gentleness, mildness and humility. The *epithumētikon* is the source of desire, including spiritual *erôs*. It is assigned control of the bodily appetites through the practical virtues of self-control and chastity, and, in temperance, the preservation of *apatheia* in the face of objects that would otherwise move the soul to irrational fantasies and *pathos*. Insofar as the virtues are manifested, they indicate the presence of *apatheia*.²⁵⁸

1.2.3 The body

The body is the most fallen, thickened part of the *nous* and in humans is constituted primarily of earth. The part of the soul most closely associated with it in humans is the *epithumētikon*, meaning that we experience the body above all as a source of desires.

²⁵⁶ Since according to *KG* 1.39 ‘we had the seeds of virtue [within us] when we were made’.

²⁵⁷ E.g. *Eul.* 11.10; see above, 1.2.2.

²⁵⁸ Attainment of *apatheia* is gradual; see below, 3.4.

The *epithumētikon* is also the dominant part of our soul, meaning that we experience ourselves primarily as embodied, desiring beings.

Despite Evagrius' belief that the body is a fallen condition of the *nous*, a condition that is not part of our true nature and will not survive the *apokatastasis*, he has a high estimation of its value and is clear that it is not evil:

Τῇ πρακτικῇ ὑπόκειται ὕλαι πράγματα πέντε, σῶμα, ἄνθρωποι, βρώματα, χρήματα, κτήματα· πάντων δὲ τιμιώτατον τὸ σῶμα· διὸ καὶ οἱ τούτου καταφρονήσαντες μάρτυρες εἰσιν. Ἔλεγεν οὖν ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο ὁ διάβολος καὶ οἱ κατ' αὐτὸν ὑποβάλλουσι πονηροὺς λογισμοὺς ἡμῖν καὶ κινουῦσιν ἡμᾶς πρὸς γαστριμαργίαν καὶ πορνείαν, ἵνα ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ τιμιωτάτῳ δοθέντι ἡμῖν παρὰ θεοῦ μιανθῶμεν.²⁵⁹

Five objects serve as the material substratum of *praktikê*: the body, men, food, riches, goods, but the body is the most precious of all; this is why those who have despised it are martyrs. [Evagrius] said that the devil and those under him suggest evil thoughts to us and move us toward gluttony and fornication so that we might be defiled in the first and most precious of God's gifts to us.

Whoever has become receptive of the knowledge of God [but] honours ignorance more than this knowledge – he is said to be evil. Now there is no corporeal nature receptive of knowledge. None of the bodies can, therefore, properly be said to be bad.²⁶⁰

The body plays an essential role in the healing of the fallen *nous*. During this process the constitution of the body is progressively refined such that it becomes less 'thick':

Ὡσπερ τῷ πάσχοντι ὀφθαλμὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ τὸ κολλύριον <μᾶλλον> ἢπερ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι οὕτως τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα· αἱ δ' ἐν τῇ τῆς μονάδος οὐσαι ὑγεία ταύτης τῆς ὑλώδους παχύτητος οὐ χρεΐαν ἔχουσιν.²⁶¹

Just as for someone who suffers in the eyes an eye-salve is more natural than for a healthy person, so the body is natural for the soul, but [the souls] who are in the health of unity have no need of this thick material.

²⁵⁹ *Disc.* 15.

²⁶⁰ *KG* 3.53.

²⁶¹ *Disc.* 8.

The soul for which the body is ‘natural’ is the fallen, fragmented soul: just as, on the cosmic scale, corporeal creation is the remedy for the Fall, so for each *nous* its body is the means by which it can, with God’s help, remedy its spiritual sickness. ‘The souls in the health of unity’ are those that have attained *apatheia*.

The therapeutic utility of the body has three aspects. First the body is required for certain sorts of contemplation; a requirement that is, however, eventually transcended:

It is necessary for the *nous* to be instructed concerning incorporeal [beings], concerning bodies, or even simply to see objects: for there, indeed, is its life. But it will not see incorporeal [beings] if it be impure in its will, nor bodies, if it should be deprived of the *organon* that shows it sensible things. What, then, will they give to the dead soul for contemplation, those who despise the Creator and also malign our body here?²⁶²

It is not said to all, *Flee from prison, my soul*,²⁶³ but to those empowered by purity of soul to give themselves over, apart from this body, to the contemplation of what has come to be.²⁶⁴

Second, the body can serve as a refuge from the demons:

To those who blaspheme against the Creator and speak badly of this body of our soul, who will show the grace which they have received, although they are passible, in having been joined to such an *organon*? They bear witness in favour of my words, those who in the hallucinations of dreams are terrified by the demons and escape to wakefulness as though to the side of the angels when the body awakens suddenly.²⁶⁵

²⁶² *KG* 4.62.

²⁶³ Ps. 141:8.

²⁶⁴ *KG* 4.70.

²⁶⁵ *KG* 4.60. Cf. *KG* 4.73: ‘One in whom the *nous* always attends to the Lord, in whom the *thumikos* is full of humility following the memory of God, and in whom *epithumia* is completely oriented toward the Lord – is it appropriate for him not to fear our adversaries who circle outside our bodies?’ Also *KG* 4.82: ‘The *refuge* (cf. Joshua 20:2-3) is the *praktikê* body of the passible soul, which delivers her from the demons who surround her.’

The ‘thickness’ associated with corporeality can, then, work to our advantage by shielding us from troubling spiritual phenomena.²⁶⁶ Here we see in action the stabilising effect of corporeal creation: terror, as a *pathos*, is an unstable movement of the *nous*, while a return to awareness of the body gives a sense of restored stability.

Related to the body’s stabilising effect upon the *nous* is the third aspect of its therapeutic utility, namely its role in healing the soul of *pathos*, a process to which it is fundamental:

ἐκεῖνα μὲν τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπεύοντα καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν εἰς τὴν ἐργασίαν προσδεῖται.²⁶⁷

Those things which heal the *pathêtikon* part of the soul require also our body to put them into practice.

One who is passible and prays to quickly depart [the body] resembles a sick man who asks the carpenter to quickly break up his bed.²⁶⁸

The key to the therapeutic value of the body resides in the fact that *pathos* has a physiological basis. At the beginning of the treatise addressed to him Evagrius enjoins the monk Eulogios as follows:

τῇ τῶν ὑπερτάτων λαμπηδόνι τὴν νοερὰν οὐσίαν ἐκτρεφόμενος, ταῖς συναγωγαῖς τῶν λογισμῶν τὸν ὄγκον τῶν σαρκῶν ἀπόδυσαι, εἰδὼς ὅτι ὕλη σαρκῶν τροφή λογισμῶν καθίσταται.²⁶⁹

in nourishing your intelligible substance on the brilliance of the supreme realities, strip off the weight of the flesh by collecting your *logismoi*, for you know that the matter of the flesh constitutes the nourishment of *logismoi*.²⁷⁰

When Evagrius speaks of ‘stripping off the weight of the flesh’ he will expect Eulogios to think of Paul’s reference at Col. 3:9 to ‘stripping off (ἀπεκδυσάμενοι) the old self

²⁶⁶ It is however abundantly clear from elsewhere in Evagrius’ writings - most obviously the fifth chapter of the *Antirrhētikos* with its catalogue of physical traumas inflicted by the demons – that this is not always the case.

²⁶⁷ *Prakt.* 49.3-5.

²⁶⁸ *KG* 4.76.

²⁶⁹ *Eul.* 1.1.

²⁷⁰ Evagrius’ understanding of the *logismoi* is discussed in section 2.1 below.

with its practices’, and at 1 Cor. 15: 43-4 to the *sōma psuchikon* which, sown in dishonour and weakness, is raised in glory and power.²⁷¹ The idea of ‘stripping off the weight of the flesh’ also evokes the athlete who strips before a contest in order not to be ‘hindered by his tunic and easily dragged about’;²⁷² the ‘contest’ here being that of *praktikē* itself - the contest against the demons and the *logismoī*. But the importance of this ‘stripping off’ does not reside merely in its metaphorical associations; when Evagrius says that the ‘matter of the flesh constitutes the nourishment of the *logismoī*’ he means it literally. Peter Brown explains:

The ascetics of late antiquity tended to view the human body as an ‘autarkic’ system. In ideal conditions, it was thought capable of running on its own ‘heat’; it would need only enough nourishment to keep that heat alive. In its ‘natural’ state – a state with which the ascetics tended to identify the bodies of Adam and Eve – the body had acted like a finely tuned engine, capable of ‘idling’ indefinitely. It was only the twisted will of fallen men that had crammed the body with unnecessary food, thereby generating in it the dire surplus of energy that showed itself in physical appetite, in anger, and in the sexual urge. In reducing the intake to which he had become accustomed, the ascetic slowly remade his body...Its drastic physical changes, after years of ascetic discipline, registered with satisfying precision the essential, preliminary stages of the long return of the human person, body and soul together, to an original, natural and uncorrupted state.²⁷³

This, I believe, accurately describes Evagrius’ understanding of the body and its relation to *pathos*. Consider first the following:

Μέτρον αὐταρκες ἐπλήρωσεν ἀγγελῖον, γαστήρ δὲ ῥηγνυμένη οὐ λέγει, Ἄρκει.²⁷⁴

A sufficient measure fills a vessel; a full stomach²⁷⁵ does not say ‘Enough!’

This assumes that the appetite for food, expressed through the body but deriving from the *epithumêtikon*, is inherently insatiable.²⁷⁶ But this can only be true of the unhealthy

²⁷¹ See below, 3.2, 3.

²⁷² *Th.* 6.28-9.

²⁷³ Brown (1988: 223).

²⁷⁴ *8Th.* 1.28.

²⁷⁵ Sinkewicz (2003: 244, n.15) notes that some manuscripts read ‘a bursting stomach’.

²⁷⁶ The idea that the *epithumêtikon* is inherently insatiable can be traced at least to the Myth of the Water-carriers in Plato’s *Gorgias* (493a2-c3), where Socrates, in recounting the Myth, refers to ‘the part of the soul where the appetites are’ (τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ) as ‘intemperate and insatiable’

epithumêtikon since when the *epithumêtikon* acts according to nature it longs for virtue²⁷⁷ and is characterised by temperance and self-control.²⁷⁸ And if the appetites of the healthy *epithumêtikon* are not insatiable, it must follow that the body associated with it is ‘filled by a sufficient measure.’ This does not yet tell us that such a body would function as an ‘autarkic system’. But now consider the following:

Εύλα πολλὰ μεγάλην ἐγείρει φλόγα, πλῆθος δὲ βρωμάτων τρέφει ἐπιθυμίαν.²⁷⁹

A lot of wood raises a large flame; an abundance of food nourishes *epithumia*.

Φλόξ ἀμαυροῦται ἐπιλειπούσης ὕλης, καὶ βρωμάτων ἔνδεια μαραίνει ἐπιθυμίαν.²⁸⁰

A flame grows dim when matter is wanting; a lack of food extinguishes *epithumia*.

Ἐὰν δῶς σεαυτὸν ἐπιθυμία βρωμάτων, οὐδὲν ἀρκέσει πρὸς τὸ πληρῶσαι τὴν ἡδονήν· πῦρ γάρ ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία βρωμάτων, αἰεὶ δεχομένη, καὶ αἰεὶ φλεγόμενη.²⁸¹

If you give yourself over to the *epithumia* for food, nothing will ever suffice to fulfil your pleasure, for the *epithumia* for food is a fire that ever takes in and is ever in flames.

Μαρανθεῖσα φλόξ ἀναλάμπει ἐπιλαβομένη φρυγάνων, καὶ ἡδονὴ σβεσθεῖσα ἀναζωπυροῦται ἐν κόρῳ βρωμάτων.²⁸²

(ἀκόλαστον ... καὶ οὐ στεγανόν). It is generally accepted that the *Gorgias* predates the *Republic*, meaning that ‘the part of the soul where the appetites are’ anticipates, rather than equates with, the *epithumêtikon* of the tripartite soul. According to the Myth, in foolish people this part of the soul is like a leaking jar because it can’t be filled; however, because the Myth states that it is intemperate and insatiable in non-foolish as well as foolish people, the implication is that the leakiness derives not from its insatiability but from the attempts of the foolish to fill it. Plato has Socrates say that he was told the story by ‘a subtle man, perhaps some Sicilian or Italian’; Dodds (1959: 296-8) provides a detailed discussion of the extensive scholarship devoted to both the source of this myth and its original meaning. Cf. also *Rep.* 442a6-7 where, having declared the *epithumêtikon* to form the greater part of the human soul (see above, n.100), Plato adds that it is naturally insatiable (φύσει ἀπληστότατον).

²⁷⁷ Cf. *Prakt.* 86.

²⁷⁸ Cf. *Prakt.* 89.

²⁷⁹ *8Th.* 1.5.

²⁸⁰ *8Th.* 1.6.

²⁸¹ *8Th.* 1.27. Cf. also, e.g., *8Th.* 1.4, 5, 6, 31, 33; *Prakt.* 15.

²⁸² *8Th.* 1.33.

An extinguished flame lights again if it is given firewood; and a pleasure that has been extinguished is rekindled in a satiety of food.

Μὴ δῶς βρώματα πολλὰ τῷ σώματί σου, καὶ οὐ μὴ ἴδῃς καθ' ὕπνους φαντασίας κακάς. ὄν τρόπον γὰρ φλόξ καταναλίσκει δρυμόν, οὕτω φαντασίας αἰσχρὰς σβέννυσι πεῖνα.²⁸³

Do not give much food to your body and you will not see bad visions in your sleep. For in the way that a flame destroys a forest so does hunger quench shameful visions.

The above compare *epithumia* to fire. Evagrius also uses metaphors of fire to describe sexual arousal, most notably at *Eulogios* 21.22 and 13.12.²⁸⁴ I think these comparisons are significant. The final chapter of Gregory of Nyssa's *De opificio hominis* is devoted to a discussion of human physiology which appears to assume autarky as the ideal state of the body. Intended as a sequel to the *Hexaëmeron* of Basil of Caesarea,²⁸⁵ it was probably written in the period following Basil's death in 373.²⁸⁶ Given Evagrius' interest in medical theory he might well have read it,²⁸⁷ and in any case there is no reason to suppose that the view it expresses would have been unusual among educated Christians of the time. It assumes the physiological theory whereby the element of fire in the form of the vital heat is one of the necessary constituents of life,²⁸⁸ with its source in the heart.²⁸⁹ As Gregory explains, 'some nourishment must needs ... be provided by nature for the element of heat – for it is not possible that fire should last by itself, without being nourished by its proper food.'²⁹⁰ The vital heat is nourished by blood from the liver,²⁹¹ which in turn is nourished by the food a person eats.²⁹² He continues:

²⁸³ AM 11. Bob Sharples has pointed out to me that σβέννυμι is the *vox propria* for putting out a fire.

²⁸⁴ Both quoted below, 2.2.4.

²⁸⁵ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Opf.*, introduction.

²⁸⁶ Cf. Kannengiesser, at McGinn and Meyendorff (1986: 71).

²⁸⁷ See above, 1.1.3, n.137.

²⁸⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *DA* 416a10-14: 'By some the element of fire is held to be the cause of nutrition and growth, for it alone of the bodies or elements is observed to feed and increase itself. Hence the suggestion that in both plants and animals it is it which is the operative force. A concurrent cause in a sense it certainly is, but not without the principal cause; that is rather the soul'. Also Gregory of Nyssa, *De Opf.* 30.11.

²⁸⁹ Cf. *De Opf.* 30.17.

²⁹⁰ *De Opf.* 30.12. Cf. Aristotle, *GC* 335a17-18.

²⁹¹ *De Opf.* 30.12.

²⁹² *De Opf.* 30.14.

Now the fiery element is naturally inclined to seek for the material which serves as fuel, and this necessarily happens with regard to the receptacle of nourishment; for the more it becomes penetrated by fire through the neighbouring warmth, the more it draws to itself what nourishes the heat. And this sort of impulse we call appetite (ὄρεξις). But if the organ which contains the food should obtain sufficient material, not even so does the activity of the fire become quiescent: but it produces a sort of melting of the material just as in a foundry, and, dissolving the solids, pours them out and transfers them, as it were from a funnel, to the neighbouring passages: then separating the coarser from the pure substance, it passes the fine part through certain channels to the entrance of the liver, and expels the sedimentary matter of the food to the wider passages of the bowels, and by turning it over in their manifold windings retains the food for a time in the intestines, lest if it were easily got rid of by a straight passage it might at once excite the animal again to appetite (πρὸς ὄρεξιν), and man, like the race of irrational animals (κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων φύσιν), might never cease from this sort of occupation.²⁹³

The fiery element within the body, then, shares the natural insatiability of its external counterpart, and since its need for fuel is what gives rise to appetite, it imparts its insatiability to the latter. Like ordinary fire, physiological fire does not simply calm down when it has sufficient fuel. Instead, it continues to act upon the ingested food, separating the purer part of it from the coarser and sending the former to the liver to further sustain itself and the latter to the bowel for excretion. Consequently the presence of excrement is an indication that an excess of food has been ingested,²⁹⁴ as are seminal emissions.²⁹⁵ Assuming, as I think we can, that Evagrius subscribes to something like this theory, to restrict one's intake of food is not only to train the *epithumêtikon* via the body but in addition to act directly on the body's vital heat, reducing the fuel available to the fire that burns in the heart and therefore reducing that fire and *ipso facto* winding down the various physiological and psychological functions that turn powers. Conversely, to allow one's eating to accord with appetite is to feed and so augment the fire that burns in

²⁹³ *De Opf.* 30.20-21.

²⁹⁴ Brown (1988: 223, n.36) notes that 'excrement was always linked with luxury: it was the clear measure of overeating – e.g. John Chrysostom, *Hom. 13 in 1 Tim.*' He also notes that Clement of Alexandria cites with approval Valentinus' assumption that since Christ's body was in a state of perfect equilibrium, he did not defecate (cf. *Strom.* 3.7.59); since we know that Evagrius read Clement, it is likely that he was familiar with this.

²⁹⁵ Cf. Cassian, *Conf.* 2.23; see also Brakke (1995). In the case of women the aim of cessation of sexual function connects with that of transcending female nature altogether in order to become a 'female man of God'; cf. *HL* 9.1. For a comprehensive treatment of the ascetic understanding of diet and sexuality see Shaw (1998). See also Cloke (1995); Elm (1994).

the heart since, like elemental fire, the more fuel that is added to it, the bigger it will get, the fiercer it will burn and so the more fuel it will in turn demand. Moreover, insatiability is instability, so in virtue of their inherent insatiability the movement of both external, ‘literal’ fire and physiological fire is inherently unstable. Because of the insatiability of physiological fire, to eat in accordance with appetite will necessarily result in an excess of vital heat, a surplus over and above what is needed to maintain the body’s vital functions. That surplus of the unstable physiological element of fire will in turn express itself as the unstable movement of the soul that is *pathos*, hence

Ὁ κρατῶν γαστροῦς, ἐλαττοῖ πάθη, ἠττώμενος δὲ βρώμασιν αὖξει τὰς ἡδονάς.²⁹⁶

He who controls the stomach diminishes the *pathē*; he who is overcome by food gives increase to pleasures.²⁹⁷

It follows that the healthy *epithumêtikon* has as its correlate a body whose vital heat has been reduced to a level where there is no longer any excess over and above that needed to keep the body alive. Such a body will not be healthy in Hippocratic terms; on the contrary it will be weak and will look sickly:

Μὴ ἐλεήσης σῶμα ἀτονίαν ἀποδυρόμενον, μηδὲ πιάνης αὐτὸ πολυτελείᾳ βρωμάτων· ἐὰν γὰρ ἰσχύση, ἐπαναστήσεται σοι, καὶ πόλεμον ἄσπονδον κινήσει κατὰ σοῦ, ἕως ἂν αἰχμαλωτεύσῃ σὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ δούλον παραδώσει σε τῷ τῆς πορνείας πάθει.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ 8Th. 1.2.

²⁹⁷ Such a view was evidently common currency among the desert monks. Cf., e.g., *The Bohairic Life of Pachomius*, 89: ‘One day our father Pachomius...questioned Theodore on the faith of those who lived as anchorites in Alexandria, and about their *ascesis*. He replied, “Thanks to your holy prayers, my lord father, they are quite firm in the orthodox faith of the holy catholic Church of Christ...As regards their food, there are plenty of good things on their table, they eat and drink well, walking in accordance with what is written, *These things God has provided for the faithful that they might partake of them with thanksgiving* (1 Tim. 4:4).” Then our father Pachomius said, “Is it possible for them to eat and drink without measure and for all that still keep their purity?” Theodore replied, “In everything their purity is great, and their knowledge is a match for anyone.” Our father Pachomius had in his hand at the moment a small stick. He struck the ground with it twice, saying, “If this ground is watered and if it is manured, will it not produce plants? It is the same with the body; if we gladden it with an abundance of dishes, of drinks, and of rest, it will not be possible for it to keep its purity. For, holy Scripture says, *Those who are of Jesus the Christ have crucified their flesh with its passions and desires* (cf. Gal. 5:24).’

²⁹⁸ 8Th. 1.34.

Do not pity a body that laments its debility, nor fatten it up with rich foods, for if it gains strength it will rebel against you and wage unrelenting war upon you, until it takes your soul captive and delivers you as a slave to the *pathos* of fornication.

Ἡ οἰκτεῖρουσα πελιδνουμένους τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τηκομένας τὰς σάρκας αὐτῆς, οὐκ εὐφρανθήσεται ἐπὶ ἀπαθείᾳ ψυχῆς.²⁹⁹

She who pities her blackened eyes and languished flesh will not rejoice in *apatheia* of soul.

On the other hand, the following suggests that Evagrius was not altogether reckless of physical health:

Ἔλεγε δὲ ὁ ἅγιος καὶ πρακτικώτατος ἡμῶν διδάσκαλος· οὕτω δεῖ αἰεὶ παρασκευάζεσθαι τὸν μοναχὸν ὡς αὔριον τεθνηξόμενον, καὶ οὕτω πάλιν τῷ σώματι κεχρησθαι ὡς ἐν πολλοῖς ἔτεσι συζησόμενον. Τὸ μὲν γάρ, φησί, τοὺς τῆς ἀκηδίας λογισμοὺς περικόπτει καὶ σπουδαιότερον παρασκευάζει τὸν μοναχόν· τὸ δὲ σῶον διαφυλάττει τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἴσην αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ συντηρεῖ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν.³⁰⁰

Our saintly teacher³⁰¹ with his great experience in the practical life used to say: The monk must ever hold himself ready as though he were to die tomorrow, and in turn must treat the body as though he would have to live with it for many years. The first practice, he would say, cuts off the thoughts of acedia and makes the monk more zealous; the latter keeps the body healthy and always maintains its self-control in balance.

What I suggest is that he recognised two indices of bodily health, one profane, as exemplified by medical science, and one spiritual.³⁰² While he would have believed that, as Dysinger notes, ‘medical science provides valuable metaphors and insights for *phusikê*, the contemplation of God in nature’,³⁰³ he would have believed that it failed in not addressing the insatiability that the *epithumêtikon* derives from the unchecked fire of the body and in valuing the apparent wellbeing of the body more than the health of the soul

²⁹⁹ AV 51.

³⁰⁰ *Prakt.* 29.

³⁰¹ According to Guillaumont (1971: 566 ff), Makarios the Egyptian.

³⁰² This is a slightly different point from that of Dysinger (2005: 123, see above, n.272) in that where Dysinger imputes to Evagrius a distinction between physical health as understood from a Hippocratic perspective and the (spiritual) health of the whole person, I am suggesting that Evagrius equates the latter with true physical health as opposed to the Hippocratic doctors’ false understanding of it.

³⁰³ Dysinger (2005: 122).

and salvation of the *nous*. I say ‘apparent wellbeing’ because I think it unlikely that, given the value that Evagrius assigned to the body, he would have believed it to lack its own form of health, concomitant with that of the soul and *nous*. What is more probable is that he believed true physical health to be the state of the body that accompanies a healthy *epithumêtikon*. To have supposed otherwise would have been to suppose the health of the body to be based upon excess and also to be excluded from the health of the person as a whole, neither of which is plausible.³⁰⁴

As proof that a body maintained on such minimal levels of vital heat could be considered healthy in any meaningful sense, he would have had Athanasius’ description of Antony’s physical condition on emerging from twenty years’ solitude:

Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν, ὡς εἶδον, ἐθαύμαζον ὀρώντες αὐτοῦ τό τε σῶμα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξιν ἔχον, καὶ μήτε πιανθὲν, ὡς ἀγύμναστον, μήτε ἰσχνωθὲν ὡς ἀπὸ νηστειῶν καὶ μάχης δαιμόνων· τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἦν, οἶον καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως ἤδειςαν αὐτόν.³⁰⁵

And they, when they saw him, wondered at the sight, for he had the same habit of body as before, and was neither fat, like a man without exercise, nor lean from fasting and striving with the demons, but he was just the same as they had known him before his retirement.

Antony reputedly lived to be over a hundred.³⁰⁶ Closer to home Evagrius had the examples of Makarios of Alexandria, his ‘instructor in asceticism’,³⁰⁷ who became a centenarian³⁰⁸ ‘eating his bread by weight’ and ‘drinking his water by measure’,³⁰⁹ and Makarios the Egyptian, his ‘spiritual father’,³¹⁰ who lived to around ninety.³¹¹ There would have been others too among the ‘old men’ whose constitutions enabled them to live long lives of extreme physical privation. So Evagrius would have had ample reason to believe that

³⁰⁴ Thus it is the profane understanding of physical health that Evagrius has in mind when he says, at *8Th.* 6.1, that ‘what is food to a well-conditioned body constitutes a temptation for the noble soul (ὅπερ γὰρ ἐστι τροφή εὐδεκτοῦντι σώματι, τοῦτό ἐστι πειρασμός γενναία ψυχῆ).

³⁰⁵ VA 14.

³⁰⁶ From *c.*251-356; cf. Chitty (1977: 208-9).

³⁰⁷ Cf. O’Laughlin (1987: 51).

³⁰⁸ Cf. Chitty (1977: 208-10).

³⁰⁹ Cf. *Prakt.* 94, quoted below, this section, at n.328.

³¹⁰ Cf. O’Laughlin (1987: 51).

³¹¹ Chitty (1977: 208-10) gives his dates as *c.*300-*c.*390.

in principle a healthy soul would find expression in a body that was truly healthy because its health depended on that of the soul:

The body ascends from its nature through the health and strength of the soul.³¹²

To live according to the nature of the body would mean enslavement to its unending appetite for food, in reality the insatiable demand of the vital heat for fuel. But if, through the health of the soul in desiring virtue and its strength in struggling to attain it,³¹³ the vital heat were to be regulated, the body would be raised above its own nature³¹⁴ to the acquisition of a health derivative from that of the soul. Only this would truly constitute its health, not that apparent physical health which, taking its lead from the nature of the body, would be predicated upon excess and enslavement to insatiability.³¹⁵ Moreover, I suspect that for Evagrius the restoration of the body, by means of dietary discipline, to ‘an original, natural and uncorrupted state’³¹⁶ would involve the alteration of its *krasis*, such that, as the *epithumētikon* was brought under control and its fire cooled, the amount of the ‘thick’ earthy element in the body would be reduced, and the monk’s increasing practice of contemplation would be reflected in an increasingly rarefied physical constitution,³¹⁷ Rubenson notes that Antony, ‘like Origen...thought of ascesis as a matter of refining and transforming the body, ultimately making it less material and more spiri-

³¹² *Gt.Let.* 49.

³¹³ Cf. *Prakt.* 86.

³¹⁴ Cf. *Gt.Let.* 47.

³¹⁵ Thus I believe that Dysinger (2005: 122-3) is only partly correct when he rejects the possibility that Evagrius believed the physical changes wrought by rigorous asceticism to have been anything but destructive. While it is true that Evagrius does not claim that the demons who suggest worries such as those described at *Praktikos* 7 ‘are presenting a false picture’; that ‘he vividly anticipates the recriminations which will naturally result when the devout monk compares his own physical state with that which Hippocratic medicine considered to be “in accordance with nature”’; that he ‘was aware of scepticism concerning the physiological effects of vigorous asceticism, and that he does not claim that the respective philosophies of medicine and monastic ascesis are wholly compatible’, I believe that he recognised an alternative, spiritual index of bodily health whose exemplars were men such as Antony and his own teachers in the desert, Makarios the Alexandrian and Makarios the Egyptian. Therefore, while Dysinger is correct to say that ‘it is not hippocratic theory which guides the monastic superior or the *gnostikos*’, it does not follow that there is a conflict between ‘physical healing ...and the restoration of the whole person to union with God’, only between a profane understanding (and so our understanding!) of physical healing and such restoration. Although the body is eventually superseded, it is not in the meantime excluded from the person’s health.

³¹⁶ Cf. Brown (1988: 223), quoted above.

³¹⁷ That is, a *krasis* beginning to resemble that of the angels’ bodies of *nous* and fire; see above, 1.1.2.

tual',³¹⁸ so it is highly likely that Evagrius shared this view and would have seen it as entailing transformation of bodily *krasis*.

The fact that physical health would be achievable only through the acquisition of virtue would mean that any temptation to seek it by means of a direct focus upon the body would be clearly identifiable as demonic. Evagrius would have realised that this sort of physical health was not achievable by everyone, but would have attributed this to the intrinsic weakness of the body, a weakness deriving from its being the most fallen aspect of the person:

ἐκεῖνα μὲν τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπεύοντα...τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν εἰς τὴν ἐργασίαν προσδεῖται, ὅπερ δι' οἰκείαν ἀσθένειαν πρὸς τοὺς πόνους οὐκ ἐπαρκεῖ.³¹⁹

Those things which heal the *pathêtikon* part of the soul require...the body to put them into practice, and the latter because of its weakness is not sufficient for these labours.³²⁰

Consider now the following:

Οἱ τὴν σάρκα κακῶς διατρέφοντες καὶ πρόνοιαν αὐτῆς εἰς ἐπιθυμίας ποιούμενοι, ἑαυτοὺς μὴ ταύτην καταμεμφέσθωσαν· ἴσασι γὰρ τὴν χάριν τοῦ Δημιουργοῦ οἱ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπάθειαν διὰ τοῦ σώματος τούτου κτησάμενοι καὶ τῇ τῶν ὄντων θεωρίᾳ ποσῶς ἐπιβάλλοντες.³²¹

Those who in their wickedness nourish the flesh and 'make provision for it to gratify its desires'³²² – let them blame themselves and not the flesh. For they know the grace of the Creator, those who have attained *apatheia* of the soul through this body and apply themselves to some extent to the contemplation of beings.

It can now be seen that the injunction against 'nourishing the flesh' is not simply making a metaphorical point about valuing the body more than the soul. Rather, it is talking spe-

³¹⁸ Rubenson (1995: 71).

³¹⁹ *Prakt.* 49.3-6.

³²⁰ On the weakness of the body, cf. *Th.* 35.9-10.

³²¹ *Prakt.* 53.

³²² Rom. 13:14.

cifically about allowing an excess of vital heat to obtain in the body. It suggests that doing so results not just in a susceptibility to *pathos* but in a body that is nourished according to a profane understanding, that is nourished beyond the level required to keep it alive; the sort of body, in other words, considered healthy by profane medicine. Putting these together, the implication is that a body which in virtue of its nourishment is considered healthy by profane medicine is, from a spiritual viewpoint, unhealthy because of its susceptibility to *pathos*. Likewise, the force of the injunction against ‘making provision for [the flesh] to gratify its desires’ can now be appreciated. The desire of the flesh for food is dictated by the natural insatiability of the vital heat, while its other desires are expressions of the excess of vital heat that results from eating in accordance with that desire. So to ‘make provision for it to satisfy its desires’ is to embroil oneself in the futile endeavour to satisfy the insatiable.³²³ It is also to seek the health of the body via the body rather than via the true source of physical health, the soul, and as such a fundamentally flawed undertaking; the quest for an illusion - the apparent health of the body – whose pursuit, again, leads only to the futile bid to satisfy the insatiable. On the other hand, the body has a key role to play in the attainment of *apatheia* because to reduce the vital heat to the level at which there is no excess to find expression in *pathos* is to establish a physical foundation for *apatheia*. This will be reflected in the *epithumêtikon*’s no longer being directed toward the objects of *pathos* but instead ‘completely oriented toward the Lord’.³²⁴

The disciplining of the *epithumêtikon* via the body therefore constitutes the first stage of *praktikê* and the foundation for all subsequent spiritual progress, hence Evagrius’ reference to the human body as a *praktikê* body.³²⁵ This has significant consequences for Evagrius’ view of how the body should be treated:

‘Ο δουλαγωγῶν σάρκασ ἀυτοῦ ἀπαθῆσ ἔσται, ὁ δὲ ἐκτρέφων ἀυτὰσ ὀδυνηθήσεται ἐπ’ ἀυταῖσ.³²⁶

³²³ And thereby emulate the foolish people in the Myth of the Watercarriers, whose attempts to satisfy the insatiable causes ‘the part of the soul where the appetite are ... the intemperate and insatiable of it’ (*Gorg.* 493b1-2) to resemble a leaky jar; see above, n.276.

³²⁴ *KG* 4.73.

³²⁵ Cf. *KG* 3.50; Sch. Ps. 1:5.

³²⁶ *AM* 6.

The one who enslaves his flesh, *apathês* shall he be; the one who feeds it, on account of it will he be pained.

Ἴππος εὐήνιος, ἐνδεὲς σῶμα, καὶ οὐ μὴ καταβαλεῖ τὸν ἀναβάτην ποτὲ, ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἶκει ἀγχόμενος χαλινῶ, καὶ τῇ χειρὶ πείθεται τοῦ ἡνιόχου, σῶμα δὲ δαμάζεται ἐν λιμῶ, καὶ ἀγρυπνία, καὶ οὐκ ἀποσκιρτᾷ τοῦ ἐπιβατοῦντος λογισμοῦ, οὐδὲ χρεμετίσει κινούμενον ὑπὸ ὀρμῆς ἐμπαθοῦς.³²⁷

A docile horse, lean in body, never throws its rider, for being throttled it yields to the bit and obeys the hand of the one holding the reins; the body is subdued with hunger and vigil and does not jump when a *logismos* mounts upon it, nor does it snort when it is moved by an *empathês* impulse.

Our relationship to the body, then, should be that of a master to his slave or a rider to his horse, and the body itself can be likened to a horse: in its undisciplined state it is volatile, turbulent, unyielding and disobedient. On the other hand, the disciplined body is like a well-trained horse: docile, yielding and obedient. Such a body, lean and subdued, is not easily aroused to *pathos*. Whether or not Evagrius was familiar with the simile of the Charioteer in Plato's *Phaedrus*, his description of the disciplined body and implied description of the undisciplined one certainly bear some resemblance to its descriptions of the good and bad horses,³²⁸ and although he warns of the dangers of excessive asceticism,³²⁹ his 'moderate' asceticism was not far, in its physical depredations, from the treatment meted out by Plato's charioteer to the bad horse. In the *Praktikos* he relates the following anecdote:

Παρέβαλον κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν σταθερὰν μεσημβρίαν τῷ ἀγίῳ πατρὶ Μακαρίῳ καὶ λίαν ὑπὸ τῆς δίψης φλεγόμενος ἦτουν ὕδωρ πιεῖν· ὁ δὲ φησιν· ἀρκέσθητι τῇ σκιῇ· πολλοὶ γὰρ νῦν ὀδοιποροῦντες ἢ πλέοντες καὶ ταύτης ἐστέρηνται. Εἶτα λόγους μου πρὸς αὐτὸν περὶ ἐγκρατείας γυμνάζοντες· θάρσει, φησίν, ὦ τέκνον, ἐν ὅλοις ἔτεσιν εἴκοσι οὔτε ἄρτου, οὔτε ὕδατος, οὔτε ὕπνου κόρον εἴληφα· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἄρτον μου ἦσθιον σταθμῶ, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἔπινον μέτρῳ, τοῖς τοίχοις δὲ ἑμαυτὸν παρακλίνων μικρόν τι τοῦ ὕπνου μέρος ἀφήρπαζον.³³⁰

³²⁷ 8Th. 1.35.

³²⁸ Cf. *Phdr.* 253d1 ff.

³²⁹ Cf., e.g., *Prakt.* 15, 29; *Th.* 35.

³³⁰ *Prakt.* 94.

I went to visit the holy father Makarios³³¹ at full midday and I asked for water to drink because I was burning with extreme thirst. But he said: Be satisfied with the shade, for many are at this moment travelling or sailing and are without even this. Then as I was discoursing with him about self-control he said: Take courage, my child! For all of twenty years I have not taken my fill of either bread or water or sleep. I ate my bread by weight, drank water by measure, and I have snatched some little portion of sleep by leaning against the wall.

Such a regime accustomed the body to minimal levels of food, water and sleep, and thereby enforced continence upon the *epithumêtikon*:

Ὅπηνίκα διαφόρων βρωμάτων ἐφίεται ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῆ, τὸ τηρικαῦτα ἐν ἄρτῳ στενοῦσθω καὶ ὕδατι ἴν' εὐχάριστος γένηται καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ψιλῷ τῷ ψωμῷ· κόρος γὰρ ποικίλων ἐδεσμάτων ἐπιθυμεῖ, λιμὸς δὲ τὸν κόρον τοῦ ἄρτου μακαριότητα εἶναι νομίζει.³³²

When our soul yearns for a variety of foods, then let it reduce its ration of bread and water that it may be grateful for even a small morsel. For satiety desires foods of all sorts, while hunger thinks of satiety of bread as beauty.

The body was to be maintained on a frugal and measly diet (τροφῶν βραχέων ἀντέχου καὶ εὐκαταφρονήτων)³³³ punctuated by fasts in order to kill the 'pleasure of *epithumia*' (ἡδονὴν ἐπιθυμίας).³³⁴ Evagrius' own adherence to this advice probably shortened his life considerably. Palladius quotes him as follows:

Ἄφ' οὗ κατέλαβον τὴν ἔρημον οὐ θριδακίου ἡψάμην, οὐχ ἑτέρου λαχάνου τινὸς χλωροῦ, οὐκ ὀπώρας, οὐ σταφυλῆς, οὐ κρεῶν.³³⁵

From the time that I took to the desert, I have not touched lettuce nor any other green vegetable, nor any fruit, nor grapes, nor meat.³³⁶

The *History* continues:

³³¹ Probably Makarios of Alexandria, Priest at Kellia; cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 261, n.96); Guillaumont (1970: 699-700).

³³² *Prakt.* 16.

³³³ *Found.* 3.

³³⁴ *8Th.* 1.31.

³³⁵ *HL* 38.12.

³³⁶ Trans. Lowther Clarke.

Ἐς ὕστερον δὲ τῷ ἐξκαιδεκάτῳ ἔτει τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἄνευ ἐψημάτος, χρειάν ἐχούσης αὐτοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ στομάχου τοῦ μεταλαμβάβειν διὰ πυρός, ἄρτου μὲν ἤψατο οὐκετι, λαχάνων δὲ μεταλαμβάνων ἢ ππισάνης ἢ ὀσπριδίων ἐπὶ δύο ἔτη ἐν αὐτοῖς τελευτᾷ, κοινωνήσας εἰς τὰ Ἐπιφάνια εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. Ἀφηγεῖτο οὖν [ἡμῖν] περὶ τὸν θάνατον ὅτι «Τρίτον ἔτος ἔχω μὴ ὀχλούμενος ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας σαρκικῆς, μετὰ τοσοῦτον βίον καὶ κόπον καὶ πόνον καὶ προσευχὴν ἀδιάλειπτον».³³⁷

And later, in the sixteenth year of his life without cooked food, his flesh felt a need, owing to the weakness of the stomach, to partake of (something that had been) on the fire; he did not however take bread even now, but having fed on herbs or gruel or pulse for two years, in this regime he died, after communicating in church at Epiphany. Shortly before his death he told us:³³⁸ ‘For three years I have not been troubled by fleshly desire, after so long a life and toil and labour and ceaseless prayer.’³³⁹

This discussion of the body can now be summarised as follows: for Evagrius the purpose of the human body is to be devoted to asceticism, hence he refers to it as a *praktikê* body. It is like a horse that must be ‘subdued with hunger and vigil’ to render it docile. The root physiological cause of the unruliness which otherwise characterises it is the inherent insatiability of the element of fire, which in the form of the vital heat continues to seek fuel even when it has sufficient to keep the body alive. It is this continual, insatiable quest of the vital heat to augment itself that we experience as the appetite for food over and above what is necessary to the body’s survival. The excess of vital heat that results from gratifying that appetite finds expression in the unstable movements of the soul that are the *pathē*, movements whose instability reflect that of fire itself. True physical health derives from a healthy soul and is characterised by the body’s having no excess of vital heat. Thus the first step toward healing the soul of *pathos* is to resist succumbing to the body’s appetite for food, instead restricting intake of food to the amount needed to maintain the vital heat at the level necessary to keep the body alive. The consequence of this understanding of the body is that any appetite for food over and above this subsistence level counts as *pathos*. Concomitantly, *apatheia* will include freedom from any such appetite.

³³⁷ *HL* 38.13.

³³⁸ Lowther Clarke notes that Palladius was present at Evagrius’ death, at Kellia in 399 or 400, and that while there are variants to the text at this point, ἡμῖν is ‘reasonably well attested’.

³³⁹ Trans. Lowther Clarke.

1.2.4 The heart

Another anthropological term of which Evagrius makes frequent use is ‘heart’.³⁴⁰ The meaning of this term, both in general and in Evagrius, is much harder to pin down than that of either *nous* or ‘soul’. Evagrius defines it in two places. Commenting on Prov. 25:26, he includes ‘heart’ among the ‘many names that Scripture applies to the soul and her *noēmata*’ (πολλὰ...ὀνόματα τίθησιν ἢ γραφή κατά τε τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν νοημάτων αὐτῆς),³⁴¹ and commenting on Ps. 15:9 he notes that ‘it is a habit of the divine Scripture to say “heart” in place of *nous*’ (ἔθος γὰρ τῇ θεῖᾳ Γραφῇ ἀντὶ τοῦ νοῦ τὴν καρδίαν λαμβάνειν).³⁴² The fact that ‘soul’ and *nous* are not synonymous for him suggests that ‘heart’ must mean something distinct from either yet common to both. To get a sense of what that might be it would be instructive to look briefly at the use of the word in classical and biblical tradition.

Raasch notes that although the metaphorical use of the word ‘heart’ (*kardia*) is rare in classical Greek, ‘the theoretical importance assigned to the heart by the Stoics and by a school of Greek medicine...while not reflected in the ordinary use of language, had some influence on the monastic concept of purity of heart.’³⁴³ For the Stoics the heart is the seat of the ruling faculty of the soul, the *hēgemonikon* (a term sometimes used by Evagrius to denote the *nous*) and as such the spiritual centre of the human being, and they developed a notion of ‘custody of the heart’ by means of which the soul might attain *apatheia*³⁴⁴ that was ‘strikingly similar to the monastic concept’.³⁴⁵ Evagrius would certainly have been familiar with this aspect of Stoic thought, but it clear from the way he uses the word ‘heart’ that his primary influence was the Bible. Raasch summarises biblical tradition regarding the heart as follows:

³⁴⁰ According to the *TLG* and including the *Epistula Fidei*, there are two hundred and twenty occurrences of the word ‘heart’ in Evagrius’ Greek corpus.

³⁴¹ Sch. 317.8-11 on Prov. 25:26.

³⁴² Sch. 1 on Ps. 15:9.

³⁴³ Cf. Raasch (1966: 9). She does not name the school of medicine but describes it as having arisen in Sicily in the third century BC and, like the Stoics, locating the soul’s ruling faculty in the heart.

³⁴⁴ Raasch (1966: 10) describes this ‘custody of the heart’ as consisting in ‘carefully scrutinising each *phantasia* or *ennoia* before accepting it and in combating false thoughts and imaginings by sound thinking and reflection’.

³⁴⁵ Raasch (1966: 10).

‘With closest custody guard your heart’, warns the Wise Man, ‘for in it are the sources of life’ (Prov. 4:23). [The heart] was not only, as for us, the centre of the emotions, which were said to arise from the bowels, kidneys, or liver as well, but also of the will. It was the source of direction: ‘The heart of a man disposes his way...’ (Prov. 16:9). Primarily and especially, it was the source of the mental activities of thinking, planning and remembering, which God alone can see. It was, in fact, “the source of the whole personal life, in which thought, volition, feelings merge as one”; the centre of personal life, and also of the interior life, the inner man.³⁴⁶

Purity of heart thus symbolised moral purity; interior cleanliness as opposed to the mere absence of ritual or legal defilement. Raasch notes that ‘it was especially the mission of the prophets to call for [this] deeper notion of purity’;³⁴⁷ so, for example, Jeremiah: ‘Cleanse your heart of evil, O Jerusalem, that you may be saved.’³⁴⁸

It is this idea of the heart as the inner self that Jesus invokes when, in response to Pharisaic questioning as to why his disciples failed to observe the tradition of washing their hands before eating, he declares that it is not what goes into a person’s mouth that defiles him, but what comes out of his heart:

ἐκ γὰρ τῆς καρδίας ἐξέρχονται διαλογισμοὶ πονηροί, φόνοι, μοιχεῖαι, πορνεῖαι, κλοπαί, ψευδομαρτυρίαι, βλασφημίαι...³⁴⁹

for out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, theft, false witness, blasphemies...

By thus disregarding the laws of ritual cleanliness in favour of purity of heart Jesus goes even further than the prophets in the importance he attaches to the latter;³⁵⁰ ‘blessed’, he declares, ‘are the pure in heart, for they will see God (μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν θεὸν ὄψονται).’³⁵¹

³⁴⁶ Raasch (1966: 13).

³⁴⁷ Raasch (1966: 12).

³⁴⁸ Jer. 4:14; cf. Raasch, *ibid.*

³⁴⁹ Matt. 15:19; cf. Mark 7:21.

³⁵⁰ Cf. Raasch (1966: 17).

³⁵¹ Matth. 5:8.

Jesus characterises impurity of the heart in terms of evil thoughts [*dia*]*logismoi*, and the association of the *logismoi* with the heart is a recurrent theme in Evagrius. For example, he speaks of a battle of *logismoi* in your heart (μάχην λογισμῶν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου)³⁵² and of ‘the sons and daughters born in the heart, that is, *logismoi* and desires of the flesh (τῶν ἐν καρδίᾳ αὐτῶν γεννωμένων υἱῶν καὶ θυγατέρων, τουτέστι σαρκικῶν λογισμῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν)’;³⁵³ since the demons are the ultimate source of the *logismoi*,³⁵⁴ the latter should be understood as referring to secondary *logismoi* that we devise on the basis of initial ones suggested by them. Again, Evagrius warns that ‘*logismoi* trouble the hearts of the negligent (ἀμελοῦντος δὲ καρδίαν ἐκταράσσουσι λογισμοί)’;³⁵⁵ here we can see an allusion to the connection between the cosmic Fall and particular falls into *pathos*. An example of such negligence would be eating to satiety - ‘fornication is a conception of gluttony, that which softens the heart in advance (πορνεία, λαιμαργίας κῆμα, προμαλακτῆρ καρδίας)’³⁵⁶ – as would any relaxation of vigilance.³⁵⁷

τῷ δὲ τῆς ἐγκρατείας χαυνωθέντι κολακεία ἡδονῶν τὸ κατ’ ὀλίγον ἐπιβουλεύει [ὁ τῆς ἀσελγείας δαίμων] συνομιλεῖν τῇ καρδίᾳ, ἵν’ ἐξαφθεῖσα ταῖς κακίας διαλογαῖς αἰχμαλωτισθῆ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀμαρτίας μῖσος εἰς πέρας ἀγάγη.³⁵⁸

little by little the [demon of lust] plots against the person who has relaxed his vigilance due to the flattery of pleasures, in order to become the familiar of his heart, so that once ignited by converse with vice it may be captured and its hatred of sin come to an end.

In some of these cases the word *nous* or ‘soul’ could be substituted for ‘heart’; for example either could be said to be the arena in which the ‘warfare in thought’³⁵⁹ is waged, and Evagrius states several times that *logismoi* arise from the *pathētikon* part of the soul.³⁶⁰ Again, one could coherently speak of the demons troubling the *nous* or soul of the negligent person, and of the *nous* or soul having a hatred for sin. But such a substitu-

³⁵² *Eul.* 5.5.

³⁵³ *Found.* 1. Cf. *AM* 59: ‘Do not fail to kill the offspring of serpents, and you will not go into labour with the *logismoi* of their heart.’

³⁵⁴ See below, 2.1.

³⁵⁵ *AM* 37.

³⁵⁶ *Vices* 2.

³⁵⁷ See below, 3.4.

³⁵⁸ *Eul.* 21.22.

³⁵⁹ Cf. *Prakt.* 48.

³⁶⁰ See below, 2.1.4.1, 2.2.4.

tion would change the sense of what Evagrius is saying, making it more impersonal, less intimate. In other cases substitution would be less coherent – it does not really make sense to speak of the *nous* or soul being softened and thereby rendered vulnerable to vice, or of the demons seeking familiarity with the *nous* or soul. Again, when Evagrius describes sadness as ‘a worm in the heart (σκώληξ ἐστὶ καρδίας λύπη)’³⁶¹ or declares that ‘the *logismoi* of the irascible person...consume the heart that gave them birth (λογισμοὶ θυμώδους ...κατεσθίουσι τὴν τεκοῦσαν καρδίαν)’³⁶² or that ‘temptations test the heart of a monk (καρδίαν μοναχοῦ [δοκιμάζουσιν] πειρασμοί)’³⁶³ it is clearly not simply the *nous* or soul that is being referred to. Rather, in all these cases the referent of ‘heart’ is the person’s deepest sense of herself as a person, as ‘me’. It is this inner self that is purified by ‘*anachôrēsis* in love’ (ἀναχώρησις ἐν ἀγάπῃ καθαίρει καρδίαν);³⁶⁴ that in the holy, will be filled with knowledge (καρδία δὲ ὁσίων πληρωθήσονται γνώσεως);³⁶⁵ that is adorned by knowledge of God (κόσμος... καρδίας γνῶσις θεοῦ)³⁶⁶ and that, when gentle, is a resting place for wisdom (ἐν καρδίᾳ πραεῖα ἀναπαύσεται σοφία).³⁶⁷ The idea of keeping watch over one’s heart³⁶⁸ has an especially direct and personal feel to it. Again, it would make no sense to speak of the *nous* or soul being expanded by contemplations; yet when Evagrius says that ‘contemplations of the world expand the heart; the *logoi* of providence and judgement exalt it (κόσμων θεωρίαί πλατύνουσι καρδίαν, λόγοι δὲ προνοίας καὶ κρίσεως ὑψοῦσιν αὐτήν)’³⁶⁹ we can understand that it is the person himself, his inner being, that is transformed and uplifted.

These examples give some indication of the meaning and scope of the word ‘heart’ for Evagrius. Driscoll notes that while Evagrius’ ‘philosophical framework allows him to penetrate the biblical text more deeply...the biblical language is itself decisive, enabling

³⁶¹ *8Th.* 5.3.

³⁶² *8Th.* 4.16.

³⁶³ *AM* 60.

³⁶⁴ *AM* 8.

³⁶⁵ *AM* 24.

³⁶⁶ *AM* 27.

³⁶⁷ *AM* 31.

³⁶⁸ E.g. *Eul.* 32.34; *Th.* 36; Cf. Prov. 4:23.

³⁶⁹ *AM* 135.

him to make connections and shape insights that would not be possible to him if left to the philosophical tradition alone.³⁷⁰ He continues,

[Evagrius] does not use [the word ‘heart’] as a simple biblical code word for one or another part of the soul, as this is conceived by Greek philosophy. Instead, we shall find him using it across all three parts and beyond. With this term he is able to show the dynamic and inextricable interconnections that exist between the various dimensions of the inner life...[It allows him] to move fluidly across various dimensions of the inner life. With it he sometimes refers to [the *epithumêtikon* and *thumos*], at other times to all three parts [of the soul], then to one part only, but also to the mind, or the mind as it is united with the soul. Heart is certainly the object of purification in the work of *praktikê*, but it is also the instrument of contemplation.³⁷¹

The word ‘heart’ allows Evagrius to show the interconnections between, and to ‘move fluidly across the various dimensions of the human life’ because for him the heart is not simply the seat of the soul’s ruling faculty; it is, rather, ‘the centre of the personal life and of the interior life’; that which the person feels to be ‘me’, and it is this sense of ‘me’ that constitutes those interconnections and unites those dimensions. When he

³⁷⁰ Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999: 146).

³⁷¹ Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999: 157). We must, however, be careful in our understanding of this distinction between ‘philosophical’ and ‘biblical’ language. It is certainly the case that they comprise two different idioms. Driscoll further explains (1999: 145-6): ‘When the language is taken from the philosophical tradition, it allows for a clear and precise articulation of the various dimensions of the spiritual journey. In Evagrius and most others who function in similar theological traditions, this philosophical language does not contaminate the Christian content but makes it possible to think about it more profoundly. Thus, the distinction of the rational, irascible, and concupiscible parts of the soul, together with *apatheia* as a term describing health in the latter two parts, all enable a clear understanding of particular issues that must be dealt with in order to reach the ultimate goal of contemplative knowledge of the Holy Trinity.’ But while there is a real and substantive difference in idiom between philosophical and biblical tradition we should beware of regarding the two discourses as essentially different in kind since to do so would be anachronistic. On the one hand, Greek philosophy had, ever since Plato, tended to acquire a theological hue, whether in the form of Platonism itself, Aristotle’s ‘first philosophy’ or the Zeus of the Stoics; even the Epicureans, despite their notoriety as atheists among both pagans and Christians, accepted the existence of the gods - and, as Bob Sharples has reminded me, regarded them as examples to us of the best form of (tranquil) life - merely denying their interest in or relevance to human affairs; only in Scepticism is the element of philosophical religion absent. On the other hand, there was by Evagrius’ time a well-established tradition of regarding Christianity as the ‘true philosophy’. Thus Driscoll (1999: 15) notes that the naturalness with which Evagrius moves from ‘what may first seem a more philosophical term, “mind” (νοῦς) to what may seem the more biblical term, “heart”...only shows that the sharp distinction between philosophical and biblical is not made by Evagrius. It tends to be more our problem, not that of these ancients.’ Cf. Jaeger (1961: 31); also, e.g., Long (1986: 100-101); Dihle (1994: 278); Sharples (1996: 56); Clement, *Strom.* 1.1.1.2; Ruether (1969: 169). Ruether notes, *ibid.*, n.1, that the designation of the Christian as the ‘true philosopher’ is first found in Justin Martyr, *Dialogue with Trypho*, 8.

speaks of the *nous* or ‘soul’ he is discussing the human person objectively, as one rational being among others, but when he speaks of the ‘heart’ he is referring to, and addressing himself to, the person in terms of their subjectivity; their inner sense of selfhood. In doing so he is evoking that special intimacy upon which the force of Christ being *kardiognōstês*³⁷² relies, as also that of the injunction to keep watch over the heart. The *nous* is the metaphysical core of personhood; the heart its phenomenological core.

Two final points remain to be noted. First, as Guillaumont point out, Evagrius is mindful of stylistic issues when he writes. In particular, when, as is often the case, he uses parallelism, he tends to employ the rhetorical device of *variatio* whereby repetition of a word is avoided by replacing its second occurrence with a synonym.³⁷³ Some of his uses of ‘heart’ certainly seem to fall into this category.³⁷⁴ However, I think he is too aware of linguistic subtlety to regard apparent synonyms as no more than that, and that instead he would see such occasions as opportunities to reinforce or otherwise inflect his meaning. Second, at least some of Evagrius’ uses of ‘heart’ are clearly intended to call to mind specific scriptural passages; thus for example Driscoll shows how *Ad Monachos* 31, which begins, ‘In the gentle heart, wisdom will rest’, draws for both its vocabulary and the idea it expresses upon Jesus’ words at Matt. 11:28-29.³⁷⁵ This Christological reference is, accordingly, part of the proverb’s intended meaning: ‘The monk will learn to have a gentle heart by learning from the Lord.’³⁷⁶

1.2.5 Summary

The human estate is intermediate between the angelic and the demonic. The health of the human soul and the natural condition for human beings is *apatheia*, the means to achieving which is *praktikē*, asceticism.

³⁷² Cf. Acts 1:24, 15:8; *Th.* 37.2-3; *AM* 104; also *Prakt.* 47.

³⁷³ Cf. Guillaumont (1970: 436). He is referring specifically to the *Praktikos*, but his remarks apply equally to many of Evagrius’ writings.

³⁷⁴ E.g. *AM* 31, 44.

³⁷⁵ Cf. Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999: 150); see below, 3.2, for discussion of this aphorism.

³⁷⁶ Driscoll (2003: 255).

Like the other rational beings, the human being is in reality a triune *nous*, fragmented as a result of the Fall into *nous*, soul and body. The soul is in turn tripartite, comprising *logistikon*, *thumos* and *epithumētikon*. The latter predominates in humans. Strictly speaking the word *nous* encompasses the human being in her entirety, but in practice Evagrius also uses it as a synonym for *logistikon*.

Central to Evagrius' anthropology is the idea of the *nous* as subject to change in both epistemic and metaphysical terms. The image of God consists in the receptivity of the *nous* to knowledge of God, but the *nous* is also receptive to objects of contemplation and of the senses. In addition, its power of self-determination is a form of receptivity, and it was this, in the form of receptivity to that which is other than God, that occasioned the primordial movement and Fall. The epistemic receptivity of the *nous* is reflected in metaphysical passibility in virtue of which the *nous* is changed by whatever it receives. In relation to God this means a return to its true nature of simplicity, incorporeality and stillness, and in relation to contemplation, progress toward these. In relation to sense-perception, it means the imprinting of the *nous* by the *noēmata* it receives. However, such imprinting is agent-dependent, only taking place if cognition is of the objects *qua* sensibles; if instead the focus of the *nous* is upon their *logoi* or spiritual significance then the *noēmata* concerned will not imprint the *nous*; Evagrius refers to this as 'spiritual sensation'. The metaphysical changeability of the *nous* is rooted in its power of self-determination in that a choice or decision is a movement of the *nous*. This movement can be either stable or unstable; if it is stable it is toward God and tends ultimately toward stillness; if unstable it is away from God and tends to ever-increasing instability. Corporeal creation contains, but does not eliminate, the instability of the *nous*, which the human being experiences as *empathēia*. *Apatheia* is the stabilisation of the *nous* that enables contemplation and thereby the transformations of the *nous* (including both soul and body) whereby it re-ascends to God.

The true nature of the *nous* is to be without form, matter or movement, a condition realised only in union with God. A *nous* thus naked is 'the place of God.' The *nous* has a light associated with it which becomes visible upon attainment of *apatheia*.

Just as the term *nous* can refer either to the person in her entirety or to the rational part of the soul, so the word ‘soul’ can refer either to the fallen entity in its entirety or to its *pathētikon* part alone. The nature of the three parts of the soul is best understood by reference to the virtues that define its healthy state. Evagrius recognises both practical and contemplative virtues, the former constitutive of *apatheia*, the latter its fruit. At the practical level the healthy condition of the soul can be summarised as the *epithumētikon* longing for virtue, the *thumos* struggling on behalf of the soul and the *logistikon* managing practical affairs so as to facilitate contemplation and perceiving the contemplation of beings, and at the contemplative level, as the *epithumētikon* being completely oriented toward God, the *thumos* humble in memory of him and the *logistikon* always attending to him.

In humans the body, the most fallen part of the *nous*, is constituted primarily of earth, and the part of the soul most closely associated with it is the *epithumētikon*. The body is valuable and good, but its value is purely instrumental: it is necessary for certain sorts of contemplation, can serve as a refuge from troubling spiritual phenomena and is essential to the process of healing the soul of its vulnerability to *pathos*.

The necessity of the body to the attainment of *apatheia* is due to the fact that *pathos* has a physiological basis in an excess of vital heat. Such excess is the result of the *epithumētikon* being unhealthy since in this case its desires, including the appetite for food, the source of the vital heat, are insatiable. If the *epithumētikon* is healthy then, since it is directed toward virtue, its desires are not insatiable and it does not crave more food than that needed to maintain just enough vital heat to keep the body alive.

A body maintained on such minimal levels of vital heat would not be considered healthy in Hippocratic terms but I have argued that Evagrius recognised two indices of bodily health, one profane and the other spiritual, with the latter representing the true health of the body and involving the refinement of the body’s *krasis*. In spiritual terms the health of the body depends upon that of the soul, meaning that physical health can only be achieved through the pursuit of virtue, and its ‘own’ desires – that is, those of the unhealthy *epithumētikon* – are to be disregarded. Consequently the body must be subjected

to rigorous discipline and ‘subdued by hunger and vigil’, and *apatheia* will include freedom from any desire for food over and above that needed to keep the body alive.

Evagrius’ use of the word ‘heart’ is biblical rather than Greek in its inspiration. The heart is the centre of the personal life and of the interior life; it is the person’s sense of themselves as a ‘me’. As such it is not identical with the *nous* or with any part of the soul but can refer to any of these since, as the person’s deepest sense of themselves, it both moves across and unites the various dimensions of the inner life. It is both the object of purification and the instrument of contemplation. It is the phenomenological core of personhood as opposed to the metaphysical core.

Chapter 2

Empatheia

The focus of this chapter is upon the psychology and phenomenology of *empatheia*, the sickly condition of the soul which, according to Evagrius, is our lot until, by means of *askēsis*, we restore it to *apatheia*, its health and our natural state. In the *Praktikos* he asserts a direct connection between *pathos* and the *logismoi* in that it is through allowing a *logismos* to linger that *pathos* is aroused. Accordingly this chapter looks at both, starting with the *logismoi*. It concludes with a description of *empatheia* as it is experienced.

2.1 The *logismoi*

The human being is a fallen *nous* and the human state a temporary one, ultimately to be superseded by a return to the union with God which was the first condition of the *logikoi*. The return is via a contemplative ascent whose foundation is *apatheia*, which, constituted by the practical virtues,¹ is cultivated by exercising our self-determination in favour of virtue.

The primary domain of moral choice differs according to whether a person is a secular or a monk. For secular people it is the external world, their moral choices being exercised above all in relation to things and circumstances outside of themselves. Evagrius refers to these as *pragmata*, ‘objects’. The external focus of such people’s moral choice reflects that of their attention and both are signs of their relative immersion in the external world and, correspondingly, in the thickness of corporeality. In the case of monks, however, the emphasis has shifted to the internal, a shift both initiated and marked symbolically by their renunciation of the world. Consequently their moral choices are exercised primarily in relation not to things outside of themselves but to the contents of their own minds; in particular, what Evagrius calls the *logismoi*:

¹ Cf. Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31.

Τοῖς μὲν κοσμικοῖς οἱ δαίμονες διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων μᾶλλον παλαίουσι, τοῖς δὲ μοναχοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον διὰ τῶν λογισμῶν· πραγμάτων γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἔρημίαν ἐστέρηνται· καὶ ὅσον εὐκολώτερον τὸ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἁμαρτάνειν τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, τοσοῦτον χαλεπώτερος καὶ ὁ κατὰ διάνοιαν πόλεμος τοῦ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων συνισταμένου· εὐκίνητον γάρ τι πρᾶγμα ὁ νοῦς καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀνόμους φαντασίας δυσκάθεκτον.²

The demons war with seculars more through objects, but with monks they do so especially through *logismoi*, for they are deprived of objects because of the solitude. Further, to the extent that it is easier to sin *kata dianoian* than in action, so is the warfare *kata dianoian* more difficult than that which is conducted through objects. For the *nous* is a thing easily set in motion and difficult to check in its tendency towards unlawful fantasies.³

The monk seeking *apatheia* must bring the unruly *nous* that is his true essence under control, and this means mastering his responses to the *logismoi*.

The idea that evil thoughts are deployed by the demons against monks did not originate with Evagrius. It is to be found in the *Vita Antonii*:

Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ἐὰν ἴδωσι καὶ πάντας μὲν Χριστιανούς, μάλιστα δὲ μοναχοὺς, φιλοπονοῦντας καὶ προκόπτοντας, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιχειροῦσι καὶ πειράζουσιν, ἐχόμενα τρίβου τιθέντες σκάνδαλα· σκάνδαλα δὲ αὐτῶν εἰσιν οἱ πονηροὶ λογισμοί.⁴

When [the demons] see all Christians, but especially monks, labouring diligently and making progress, first they attack them and tempt them, placing stumbling blocks in their path, and their snares are the evil *logismoi*.⁵

The devil, seeking to entice Antony away from his *askêsis*, suggests impure (ῥυπαρούς) *logismoi* to him,⁶ and accordingly Antony enjoins his disciples above all to guard (φυλάττειν,⁷ τηρεῖν⁸) themselves⁹ or their soul¹⁰ against such *logismoi*. Although in

² *Prakt.* 48.

³ See above, 1.2.1.3.

⁴ VA 23; Guillaumont (1971: 57).

⁵ Trans. mine.

⁶ VA 5.

⁷ VA 20; 55, 89.

⁸ VA 55.

⁹ VA 20, 55.

¹⁰ VA 89.

these examples the word *logismos* is qualified by an adjective making explicit its pejorative sense, it also appears five times in the *Vita* with pejorative sense but minus adjective.¹¹

Evagrius' understanding of the *logismoi* concurs with that of the *Vita*, with which he was certainly familiar, and also with that of Origen,¹² for whom

Πηγή οὖν καὶ ἀρχὴ πάσης ἀμαρτίας διαλογισμοὶ πονηροὶ· μὴ γὰρ ἐπικρατησάντων τούτων, οὔτε φόνοι οὔτε μοιχεῖαι οὔτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἔσσονται...τὸ πηγὴν εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων τοὺς πονηροὺς διαλογισμοὺς, δυναμένους μολῶναι καὶ τά, εἰ χωρὶς αὐτῶν πράττειντο, δικαιώσαντα ἂν τὸν ποιήσαντα.¹³

The spring and source, then, of every sin are evil thoughts; for, unless these gained the mastery, neither murders nor adulteries nor any other such thing would exist...Evil thoughts are the spring of all sins, and can pollute even those actions which, if they were done apart from evil thoughts, would have justified the man who did them.¹⁴

However, despite the moral and spiritual significance that both Origen and the *Vita* assign to evil thoughts, it is Evagrius who undertakes the first systematic treatment of the subject.

2.1.1 What is a *logismos*?

For Evagrius, the demons suggest *logismoi* to the monks in the hope of inciting them to sin *kata dianoian*. The word *logismos* means 'thought', 'reasoning' or 'calculation'. In the Septuagint and New Testament, however, it is used in a broader sense, as is its cognate *dialogismos*:

¹¹ Cf. VA 5, 6, 23, 87, 88; Guillaumont (1971: 58). The idea of evil thoughts that beset the monk is also to be found in the Life of Pachomius; cf., e.g., *The Bohairic Life of Pachomius* 91, 94, 101.

¹² Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 58). However, since many of Origen's writings survive only in Rufinus' Latin translation, there is no way of knowing whether any particular instance of the noun *cogitatio* translates διαλογισμός, λογισμός or some other term.

¹³ *C.Matt.* 11:15.12-51.

¹⁴ See below, 3.4.7, for the latter theme in Evagrius.

‘To think (*hashab*) is to devise, to conceive, to bring something into being in the heart’.¹⁵ Although there is a conceptual element in the biblical use of the word ‘thoughts’, the term includes the meaning of impulses, dispositions and plans as well.¹⁶

As we shall see, Evagrius’ use of the word *logismos* belongs, in virtue of the breadth of meaning with which he endows it, to biblical rather than Greek tradition.

Strictly speaking, *logismoi* can, for Evagrius, include within their scope thoughts of angelic and human provenance as well as those that come from demons. In this he takes up a theme from Origen’s *De Principiis*:

We find that the ‘thoughts which proceed out of the heart’ (*‘cogitationes’, quae ‘de corde nostro procedunt’*),¹⁷ whether they are a memory of deeds we have done or a contemplation of any things or causes whatsoever, proceed sometimes from ourselves, sometimes are aroused by the opposing powers, and occasionally also are implanted in us by God or the holy angels.¹⁸

In Chapter 8 of *On Thoughts* Evagrius describes the three types of *logismos*:

Τῶν λογισμῶν τῶν ἀγγελικῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν ἐκ δαιμόνων, ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν μετὰ πολλῆς τῆς παρατηρήσεως ἐγνώκαμεν εἶναι, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν οἱ ἀγγελικοὶ τὰς φύσεις τῶν πραγμάτων περιεργάζονται καὶ τοὺς πνευματικοὺς αὐτῶν ἐξιχνιάζουσι λόγους, οἷον· τίνας χάριν γεγένηται ὁ χρυσὸς καὶ διὰ τί ψαμμώδης κάτω ποῦ τοῖς μορίοις τῆς γῆς ἐγκατέσπαρται καὶ μετὰ πολλοῦ καμάτου καὶ πόνου εὐρίσκεται· πῶς δὲ εὐρεθεὶς ὕδατι πλύνεται καὶ πυρὶ παραδίδοται καὶ οὕτως εἰς τεχνιτῶν ἐμβάλλεται χεῖρας τῶν ποιούντων τῆς σκηνῆς τὴν λυχνίαν καὶ τὸ θυμιατήριον καὶ τὰς θυσίσκας καὶ τὰς φιάλας, ἐν αἷς οὐκέτι νῦν πίνει διὰ τὴν χάριν τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν ὁ Βαβυλώνιος βασιλεὺς, Κλεώπας δὲ <ὸς> φέρει καρδίαν καιομένην ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν μυστηρίων. Ὁ δὲ δαιμονιώδης λογισμὸς ταῦτα οὔτε οἶδεν οὔτε ἐπίσταται· μόνην δὲ τὴν κτήσιν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ χρυσίου ἀναιδῶς ὑποβάλλει καὶ τὴν ἐκ τούτου τρυφήν τε καὶ δόξαν ἐσομένην προλέγει. Ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπινος λογισμὸς οὐδε τὴν κτήσιν ἐπιζητεῖ οὐδὲ τίνας ἐστὶ περιεργάζεται σύμβολον ὁ χρυσός, ἀλλὰ μόνον εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ χρυσοῦ τὴν μορφήν εἰσφέρει ψιλὴν, πάθους πλεονεξίας κεχωρισμένην. Ὁ δὲ

¹⁵ B Vawter, *The Ways of Gods*, “The Way”, IV (1964), p.170, quoted by Raasch.

¹⁶ Raasch (1966: 14).

¹⁷ Cf. Matt. 15:19; Mark 7:21.

¹⁸ *DP* 3:2.4 (R).

αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πραγμάτων ῥηθήσεται κατὰ τὸν κανόνα τοῦτον μυστικῶς γυμναζόμενος.

After lengthy observation we have learned to recognize the difference between angelic and human *logismoi*, and those that come from the demons. Firstly, angelic [*logismoi*] are concerned with the investigation of the natures of things and search out their spiritual principles. For example, the reason why gold was made and why it is sand-like and scattered through the lower regions of the earth, and is discovered with much labour and toil; how when it is discovered it is washed and delivered to the fire and then placed in the hands of the artisans who make the lampstand of the tabernacle, the incense burner, the censers and the vessels¹⁹ from which by the grace of the Saviour the king of Babylon no longer drinks,²⁰ but it is Cleopas who brings a heart burning with these mysteries.²¹ The demonic *logismos* neither knows nor understands these things, but without shame it suggests only the acquisition of sensible gold and predicts the enjoyment and esteem that will come from this. The human *logismos* neither seeks the acquisition of gold nor is concerned with investigating what gold symbolises; rather, it merely introduces in the intellect the simple form of gold separate from any *pathos* of greed. The same principle can be applied to other matters by mystically engaging the exercise of this rule.

Whereas Origen clearly states that some thoughts are implanted in us by angels, Evagrius speaks simply of ‘angelic *logismoi*’, a formulation which in view of his understanding of contemplative ascent could be understood as denoting not just thoughts inspired by angels but also thoughts characteristic of angels but enjoyed by humans. There can be no doubt that the latter denotation is intended, but is the former? It is: some thoughts, he tells us, are inspired in us (ἡμῖν ἐμβαλλομένοις) by angels,²² and angels fill us with spiritual contemplation (πνευματικῆς θεωρίας ἡμᾶς πληροῦσιν).²³ So the train of thought regarding the spiritual significance of gold might arise in a person’s *nous* in virtue of their success in the practice of contemplation or it might be inspired by an angel. In its details we see an example of the type of contemplation which, taking its starting point from the cognition, via the physical body, of sensible objects, investigates the *logoi* of those objects; an example, that is, of how to read the ‘letter from God’ that

¹⁹ Cf. Exod. 25:29, 31; 27:1-3.

²⁰ Cf. Dan. 5:1-30.

²¹ Luke 24:32.

²² *Prakt.* 80.

²³ *Prakt.* 76.

is corporeal creation. In addition, this investigation of the spiritual significance of gold has, for Evagrius, a further, more profound level of meaning, as Sinkewicz notes:

The gold scattered through the earth and subsequently rediscovered, refined, and refashioned for a holy purpose is for Evagrius a symbol of the fall of the intellects from the realm of the pre-existence and their dispersal through different worlds along with their joining to souls and bodies; subsequently, by the practice of the virtues, they are purified and delivered from the captivity of the devil ('the king of Babylon'), ultimately regaining spiritual knowledge and restoration to their original state.²⁴

When gold is thought about in this way, its *noêma* will not imprint the *nous*,²⁵ and so although this contemplation is rooted in the body as 'the *organon* that shows (the *nous*) sensible things',²⁶ it ascends from the corporeal to the intelligible and so brings the *nous* closer to God.

By contrast, the *logismos* which comes from the demons sees only the sensible gold and its worldly significance. Failing to look beyond these to what gold symbolises in spiritual terms and thereby to use the *noêma* of sensible gold as a stepping-stone to the acquisition of wisdom, such *logismoi* instead arouse *pathē* associated with that worldly significance, such as the desire to acquire gold and to enjoy the goods and esteem afforded by its possession. Because the *nous* is focused upon the sensible gold, it is imprinted by their *noêmata*. And, as we shall see, the aroused *pathē* then 'bind' the *nous* to these and associated *noêmata*, leading the *nous* to become increasingly fixated upon their objects, which in turn exacerbates the *pathē*. In this way demonic *logismoi* embroil the *nous* in a vicious circle of immersion in the sensible world.

While the angelic *logismos* elevates the *nous* from the sensible to the intelligible and the demonic *logismos* immerses it in the sensible, the human *logismos* is characterised by neutrality: it involves no *pathos* in relation to the gold but nor does it look beyond it for its spiritual significance. This neutrality reflects the position of humans, situated be-

²⁴ Sinkewicz (2003: 268, n.16).

²⁵ See above, 1.2.1.1.

²⁶ *KG* 4.62. Cf. *KG* 2.61: 'The contemplation of the incorporeals which we knew in the beginning without matter, we now know linked to matter, but that which concerns bodies we have never seen without bodies.'

tween the angels and the demons. It is noteworthy that although the human constitution has a predominance of *epithumia*, Evagrius considers *logismoι* involving a desire for gold to be of demonic rather than human origin. This suggests that he identifies the truly human not with our pathological state but with our healthy state - that is, *apatheia*. This is confirmed in the *Chapters of the Disciples*, which states directly that the human *logismos* is *apathês*.²⁷ Being *apathês*, it is the starting point for the cultivation of angelic *logismoι*.

For Evagrius, then, *logismoι* can in principle come to us from the angels, from ourselves or from the demons. However, he most often uses the term in the latter sense such that, as Guillaumont notes, even in the absence of any qualifying adjective such as *πονηρός* or *δαιμονιώδης*, the word *logismos* itself suffices to denote an evil thought.²⁸ And what is distinctive of such thoughts is that, as Chapter 8 of *On Thoughts* makes plain ‘[they present] reality to us simply in terms of its desirability in order to gain pleasure or power’,²⁹ thereby absorbing the actual world ‘into the self’s desire for pleasure or control’³⁰ and leading us to see and relate to the material world and other people solely in terms of our own narrowly-understood self-interest.

Evagrius offers three definitions of *logismos*. The first two are almost identical:

Definition 1:

Λογισμὸς γὰρ δαιμονιώδης ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἀνθρώπου συνισταμένη κατὰ διάνοιαν, ἀτελής, μεθ’ ἧς ὁ νοῦς κινούμενος ἐμπαθῶς λέγει τι ἢ πράττει ἀνόμως ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ πρὸς τὸ μορφούμενον ἐκ διαδοχῆς εἴδωλον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ.³¹

²⁷ Cf. *Disc.* 140.1; also *Disc.* 139: ‘All the things that the *nous* thinks by itself (ὅσα ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ λογιζεταὶ ὁ νοῦς) are called *apathê*; all those that it thinks when it is being troubled by the body (ἐνοχλούμενος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος) are called *empathê* in respect of the *nous* (ὡς πρὸς τὸν νοῦν), and all those that do not contribute to the *sustasis* of the body (ὅσα δὲ μὴ συντελοῦντα πρὸς σύστασιν τοῦ σώματος) are called *empathê* and vices of the *nous*, in which the demons are sometimes also involved (ἔσθ’ ὅτε καὶ προστιθεμένων τῶν δαιμόνων).’.

²⁸ Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 56). He notes (1971: 57-8) that the pejorative use of the word *logismos* to denote thoughts suggested by demons is already to be found in the *Vita Antonii*; Cf. *VA* 5, Migne *PG* 26, 848A; 6, 849A; 23, 877B; 87, 88, 965B.

²⁹ Williams, R, ‘“Tempted as we are”: Christology and the Analysis of the Passion’, p.4.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.5.

³¹ *Th.* 25.52-6.

Demonic *logismos* is an image of the sensible person constituted *kata dianoian*, incomplete, with which the *nous*, moved by *pathos*, speaks or acts unlawfully in secret with regard to the phantoms it forms in turn.

Definition 2:

Λογισμὸς δαιμονιώδης ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἀνθρώπου, συνισταμένη κατὰ διάνοιαν, μεθ' ἧς ὁ νοῦς κινούμενος ἐμπαθῶς, λέγει τι ἢ πράττει ἀνόμως, ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ, πρὸς τὸ παρεμπεσὸν εἶδωλον ἐκ διαδοχῆς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.³²

Demonic *logismos* is an image of the sensible person constituted *kata dianoian*, with which the *nous*, moved by *pathos*, speaks or acts unlawfully, in secret, with regard to the idol that has in turn crept in.

The differences between Definitions 1 and 2 are of emphasis rather than substance. Definition 1 appears in Chapter 25 of *On Thoughts*, at the end of an extended discussion of the psychological processes involved in the experience of the *logismoi*. Evagrius explains how the *nous* receives *noēmata* of sensible objects, then continues:

Ὡσπερ οὖν πάντων ὁ νοῦς τῶν αἰσθητῶν πραγμάτων δέχεται τὰ νοήματα, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου ὀργάνου - αἰσθητὸν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο - χωρὶς δὲ πάντως τῆς ὕψεως· ταύτην γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ μορφῶσαι ἀδυνατεῖ, μηδέποτε θεασάμενος. Καὶ μετὰ τούτου λοιπὸν ἔνδον τοῦ σχήματος ὁ νοῦς ἡμῶν πάντα πράττει καὶ καθέζεται καὶ βαδίζει καὶ δίδωσι καὶ λαμβάνει κατὰ διάνοιαν· καὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖ καὶ λέγει ὅσα καὶ βούλεται τῷ τάχει τῶν νοημάτων, ποτὲ μὲν τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος ἀναλαμβάνων τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν χεῖρα ἐκτείνων ἐπὶ τὸ δέξασθαι τι τῶν διδομένων, ποτὲ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀποβαλὼν τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν τοῦ πλησίον ἐν τάχει μορφὴν ἐνδυσάμενος ὡς ἂν διδούς τι ταῖς ἰδίαις χερσίν ... Δεῖ οὖν τὸν ἀναχωροῦντα τηρεῖν τὸν ἴδιον νοῦν κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῶν πειρασμῶν· μέλλει γὰρ ἀρπάζειν εὐθύς ἐπίσταντος τοῦ δαίμονος σώματος τοῦ ἰδίου τὸ σχῆμα καὶ συμπλέκειν ἔνδον πρὸς μάχην τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἢ ἄπτεσθαι γυναικός...χωρὶς δὲ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος οὐκ ἂν νοῦς μοιχεύσοι ποτέ, ἀσώματος ὢν καὶ ἄνευ τοιούτων νοημάτων ἐγγίσει πράγματι αἰσθητῷ μὴ δυνάμενος· καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ παραπτώματα.³³

So just as the *nous* receives the *noēmata* of all sensible objects, in this way it receives also that of its own organism – for this too is sensible – but of course with the exception of one's face, for it is incapable of creating a form of this within itself since it has never seen itself. With this figure then our *nous* does everything

³² *Rfl.* 13.

³³ *Th.* 25.14-38.

interiorly – it sits and walks, gives and receives *kata dianoian*. It does and says all that it wishes due to the quickness of its *noēmata*: sometimes it assumes the figure of its own body and extends its hand to receive something it is given, sometimes after casting off this figure it quickly puts on the form of its neighbour as if it were giving something with its own hands...The anchorite must therefore keep watch over his own *nous* in the time of temptations, for he will seize the figure of his own body, as soon as the demon presents himself, and engage interiorly in a fight with a brother or join with a woman...But without this form a *dianoia* could never commit adultery, since it is incorporeal and incapable of approaching a sensible object without such *noēmata*: and this constitutes the transgression.

Evagrius is here analysing the process of what we would call doing something in one's imagination. When a person experiences a *logismos*, his *nous* creates *kata dianoian*, on the basis of its store of remembered *noēmata* of sensible objects, an image or 'form' of his body. Evagrius refers to this as the *nous* 'creating a form [of its own organism]', 'assuming the figure of its own body' or 'seizing the figure of his body'. With this created form, or assumed or seized figure, the person then performs, *kata dianoian*, whatever the *logismos* enjoins. So if the *logismos* is tempting him to fight with a brother then with this form or figure he will fight with that brother *kata dianoian*; we would say that he imagines himself fighting with him or that he fights with him in his imagination. It is not only his own body that he can 'put on' in this way; he can also 'assume the figure' of someone else in order to act *kata dianoian* as that person. So he could, for example, assume the figure of the brother in question in order to speak, in his person, in his – the brother's - defence. If it is the figure of his own body that he assumes, then, Evagrius says, it will lack a face because he has never seen his own face.³⁴

Definition 1 concludes this analysis. 'Motivated by this contemplation,' continues Evagrius, 'we have presented the rationale of impure *logismos* (ἐκ ταύτης δὲ τῆς θεωρίας κινηθέντες, καὶ τὸν τοῦ ἀκαθάρτου λογισμοῦ παρεθήκαμεν λόγον)'.³⁵ The *logismos* is the "image of the sensible person", which in turn is the created form, or assumed or

³⁴ This would seem to suggest that when he imagines himself acting he does so in the third rather than the first person; that is, rather than imagining himself acting 'from the inside', he visualises himself acting. If he were imagining himself acting in the first person – from the inside – then he would not see his face (unless of course he were imagining himself looking at his reflection), just as I do not see my face when I act in the flesh.

³⁵ *Th.* 25.50-1.

seized figure, of the person's body. The image is incomplete because it lacks a face. The involvement of *pathos* has not been stated explicitly but is implicit in the examples Evagrius has given, since both fighting with a brother and joining with a woman result from *pathos* – anger and fornication respectively. The speech or action are secret because internal to the agent. The reference to “the phantoms [the *nous*] forms in turn” acknowledges the fact, again not explicitly stated, that the form of its own body is not the only form that the *nous* creates *kata dianoian* in the process of experiencing a *logismos* since it must also create those of whoever or whatever else the *logismos* involves.

Williams, in discussing *Thoughts 25*, draws attention to the fact that in the scenario that Evagrius describes, the *nous*, in ‘seizing upon material images of possible actions, [creates] a fictional world and fictional relationships’.³⁶ The *logismoi*, as well as leading us to construe the world solely in terms of our own desires, induce us to construct, on the basis of our desires, fictional counterparts of the world, populated by phantoms, in which those desires can be satisfied. In short, on the basis of our desires for pleasure or control the *logismoi* deflect us from the real world into a false world of our own construction.

Definition 2, which appears in *Reflections*, differs from Definition 1 in two respects. First, it omits to mention that the image of the sensible person is incomplete. This, I suggest, is in keeping with its presentation as an aphorism rather than as the conclusion of an extended analysis. As an aphorism it is intended to stand alone for the purposes of memorisation and meditation, and since the reason for the incompleteness is not obvious without reference to other material it would be inappropriate to include it. The second difference is the substitution of the expression ‘idol that has ... crept in’ for ‘phantoms [the *nous*] forms’. What Evagrius is doing is substituting an ethical description for a metaphysical one. In metaphysical terms the ‘phantoms’ are, like the image of the person's own body, forms created by the *nous* on the basis of remembered *noēmata*, whereas in ethical terms, as *empathē noēmata* they fall within the scope of the Second

³⁶ Williams (2007: 5).

Commandment.³⁷ Consequently a phantom formed by the *nous* is at the same time an idol that has crept in.

The third of Evagrius' definitions of *logismos*, from the *Chapters of the Disciples*, is rather simpler:

Definition 3:

Λογισμὸς ... ἐστὶ νόημα ἐμπαθέξ.³⁸

A logismos is an empathēs noēma.

This definition makes explicit two features of the *logismoi* that are not explicit in Definitions 1 and 2 but it obscures two others. The first of the features that it makes explicit is the involvement of *pathos* with the *logismoi*: as we shall see, an *empathēs noēma* is a *noēma* of a sensible object that is charged with *pathos* due to the person having been in a state of *pathos* in respect of its object when the *noēma* imprinted his *nous*.³⁹ The relation between *pathos* and the *logismoi* is rooted in the orientation toward sensible objects that the latter express. Sensible objects, it will be recalled, are susceptible of spiritual interpretation in terms of their *logoi*, and the first stage of the re-ascent to God consists in discerning these.⁴⁰ This means engaging with such objects solely in terms of their *logoi*. By contrast, the *logismoi* betray an attachment to the external world and so to sensible objects *qua* sensible. The medium of this attachment is *pathos* and so the *logismoi* will always involve *empathē noēmata*.⁴¹ The second feature of the *logismoi* that Definition 3 makes explicit follows from the definition of an *empathēs noēma* and is that they always involve *noēmata* of sensible objects⁴² (Definitions 1 and 2, it will be recalled, specify only 'the sensible person'.)

The features of the *logismoi* that Definition 3 obscures are, firstly, their *de facto* possession of agency, and, secondly, their fictional and therefore delusory nature. The former,

³⁷ See above, 1.2.1.1, n.167.

³⁸ *Disc.* 65.2.

³⁹ See below, 2.2.3.

⁴⁰ See above, 1.2.1.1.

⁴¹ Cf. *Disc.* 138.1: 'Every *empathēs logismos* is demonic (Πᾶς ἐμπαθέξ λογισμὸς δαιμονιώδης ἐστὶ)'.

⁴² Cf., e.g., *Th.* 2.1-2.

but not the latter, in fact needs modifying in the light of Definition 3 such that, rather than defining all *logismoi* as exercising agency it should now be noted that although many do, some do not – an example being the *noēma* of ‘the face of a person who has done me harm or dishonoured me’ mentioned at *Th.* 2.6-7, although this *noēma* will, if allowed to, give rise to *logismoi* which do possess agency, namely fantasies of revenge. So what determines whether or not a *logismos* possesses agency is, as we would expect, whether or not the *nous* has assumed agency within it.

As this consideration about agency suggests, to define a *logismos* as an *empathēs noēma* is to speak in very simplified terms. That Evagrius is deliberately doing so is clear from the context since this is one of several equally schematic definitions in the first sentence of a short chapter on the virtues that heal the *thumos* and *epithumêtikon*:

Πάθος ἐστὶ θυμός, ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς, νόημα δὲ ἐστὶ μνήμη ψιλὴ, λογισμὸς δὲ ἐστὶ νόημα ἐπαθές.⁴³

Pathos is *thumos*, *epithumia* and so forth; a *noēma* is a simple memory, and a *logismos* is an *empathēs noēma*.

These are in fact approximations rather than definitions: they serve only to convey a general impression. In the case of the *logismoi*, while a *logismos* might indeed happen to consist of a single *empathēs noēma*, it will more often be complex and is likely to involve verbal content. Nonetheless, the terms *logismos* and *empathēs noēma*, can, if both are understood in a simplified way, be coherently understood as equivalent.

So far we have considered what a *logismos* is by means of Evagrius’ definitions, but the best evidence for how, in practical, everyday terms, he construes the *logismoi* is the *Antirrhêtikos*. His presentation therein of the content of *logismoi* can be divided into two types: direct statement of the form ‘the *logismos* that says *x*’, where *x* is a proposition or imperative, and, far more frequently, indirect statement of the form ‘the *logismos* that *x*’, where *x* is a verb phrase. For example:

⁴³ *Disc.* 65.1-2.

Against the *logismos* that says to me, ‘Do not torment your soul with a lot of fasting that gains you nothing and does not purify your *nous*.’⁴⁴

Against the *logismos* that says to me, ‘The command to fast is burdensome.’⁴⁵

Against the thoughts that seek without the labour of fasting to cultivate the rational land.⁴⁶

Against the *logismos* that compels me to eat at the ninth hour.⁴⁷

Both types involve the assignment of agency to the *logismoi* themselves. It might be supposed that this is no more than an accident of grammar, or is at most metaphor, but although I do believe there to be a metaphorical sense at play, Definitions 1 and 2 suggest that there is also something more going on. Both define a *logismos* as an image of the sensible person which is constructed *kata dianoian* by the *nous*, with which the person acts *kata dianoian*. Both, in other words, define the *logismos* as having agency *kata dianoian*. So taking them at face value, which, although there might well be additional levels to Evagrius’ meaning, there is no reason not to, the agent that tells the monk not to torment his soul with so much fasting that gains him nothing and does not purify his *nous*, or that the command to fast is burdensome, or that seeks without the labour of fasting to cultivate the rational land, or that compels him to eat at the ninth hour, is the part of him that activates the image of his body that his *nous* has created *kata dianoian* and in virtue of which that image is said to exercise agency – to give and receive, fight with a brother or join with a woman, and so forth. In such cases the *nous* effectively splits into two parts, one of which animates the image and through it exercises agency while the other remains detached, an observer and agent of resistance. That Evagrius would see it this way is indicated by his advice to combat the demon of acedia by dividing the soul so that one part offers consolation and the other receives it.⁴⁸

This is the literal interpretation of Evagrius’ assignment of agency to the *logismoi*. But I believe it is also susceptible of a metaphorical reading according to which it emphasises the fact that although we allow ourselves to act out *logismoi* in the sense described

⁴⁴ *Ant.* 1.2.

⁴⁵ *Ant.* 1.5.

⁴⁶ *Ant.* 1.1.

⁴⁷ *Ant.* 1.7.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Prakt.* 27.

above, they do not originate with us and are fundamentally alien to us. Because we were created with the seeds of virtue but not of vice,⁴⁹ human nature is essentially good and it is only through misuse of our self-determination that we become capable of vice:

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς φύσεως οὐδεὶς ἐξέρχεται λογισμὸς πονηρός· οὐ γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς γεγόναμεν πονηροί, εἴπερ καλὸν σπέρμα ἔσπειρεν ὁ κύριος ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ ἀγρῷ.⁵⁰

No evil *logismos* derives from our nature, for we were not created evil from the beginning, if indeed the Lord sowed a good seed in his field.⁵¹

It is from demons rather than from us that the *logismoι* originate, and for Evagrius the line between the *logismos* and the demon that suggests it is for practical purposes so close that, as Guillaumont notes, he refers indifferently to ‘the demon’ or ‘the *logismos*’ of a given vice, using one or the other terms as shorthand for the complete expression, ‘the *logismos* suggested by the demon’ of that vice.⁵² When he speaks of a *logismos* as though it were an agent he is, therefore, emphasising its otherness; the fact that it does not originate in the person who thinks it and is therefore alien to his true nature. In the case of the *logismos* that ‘compels [the monk] to eat at the ninth hour’ the metaphorical agency of the *logismos* is to all intents and purposes identical with the actual agency of the demon: the demon compels the monk to eat by means of a *logismos* that compels him to do so. Likewise, the metaphorical voice of the *logismos* that says ‘Do not torment your soul with a lot of fasting that gains you nothing and does not purify your *nous*’ or ‘The command to fast is burdensome’ or that the rational land can be cultivated without the labour of fasting, is the vehicle for the non-metaphorical voice of the demon. So although the monk will be thinking these thoughts, and although they might correspond with the contra-natural desires of his *epithumêtikon*, they are not his, and it is this fundamental independence of *logismos* from thinker that Evagrius affirms through the ascription of metaphorical agency to the *logismoι*. Sometimes though a metaphorical reading seems strained:

⁴⁹ Cf. *KG* 1.39; see above, 1.4.

⁵⁰ *Th.* 31.9-11.

⁵¹ Cf. Luke 16: 19-31.

⁵² Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 57).

Against the *logismos* of *acedia* that is eager to find another cell for its dwelling place on the pretext that the first one that it had was very foul and full of moisture so that it got all kinds of diseases from it.⁵³

This makes sense if the agent is understood to be an aspect of the *nous* and therefore of the person himself since then it is the person who got the diseases. In this case the attribution of concern to the *logismos* indicates that it is suggesting a false understanding of these circumstances (although what it is saying might be true from a profane point of view); presumably they are either spiritually irrelevant or ordeals to be endured. This *logismos* can however also be understood in another way, according to which the diseases are not real, but as we would say ‘all in the mind’. In this case it is telling the monk that he gets diseases that in reality he does not get, from properties of the cell that perhaps it does not possess, and the whole story is a pretext to induce him to vacate the cell. On this reading, since no-one really gets the diseases the agency of the *logismos* can, after all, be understood metaphorically.

The example of the *logismoi* that seek without the labour of fasting to cultivate the rational land suggests that *logismoi* can consist as much in sequences of thoughts and ways of thinking as in individual *logismoi*, and indeed Evagrius sometimes speaks in terms of ‘thinking’ rather than specifying a *logismos* or *logismoi*, for example:

Against the thinking that is diligent about food and neglects compassion for the needy.⁵⁴

That an Evagrian *logismos* can be a sequence of thoughts related more or less closely to one another is plain from examples such as the following:

Against the *logismos* that, in the absence of serious illness, coaxes us to drink wine and prophesies to us about pain in the stomach and the entire digestive system.⁵⁵

Against the *logismos* that arouses compassion in us, persuades us to give to the poor, and afterwards makes us sad and annoyed about what we gave.⁵⁶

⁵³ *Ant.* 6.26.

⁵⁴ *Ant.* 1.66.

⁵⁵ *Ant.* 1.26.

The first in particular also reveals a further aspect of the ascription to the *logismoi* of metaphorical agency, one that concerns the workings of temptation. The *logismos* is tempting the monk to drink wine, but it does not do so simply by, for example, presenting him with a *noēma* of wine and a corresponding imperative ‘Drink wine!’, to which he might either give or withhold assent from a position of affective neutrality. Rather, it uses complex tactics that involve the arousal of both desire and fear. The second example, rather than employing two component *logismoi* roughly simultaneously, employs a sequence of them such that one paves the way for the next. In both cases the different elements work together to secure the monk’s assent.

The relation between the *logismoi* and *pathos* will be discussed more fully in section 2.2.4. Meanwhile, the word *logismos* in Evagrius’ usage can be defined as follows:

A *logismos* is the cognitive cause, correlate or result of a *pathos*. It can be an image of the person’s body, created by the *nous kata dianoian* and animated by an aspect of it, with which it speaks and acts unlawfully *kata dianoian* in relation to other images it creates *kata dianoian*, or it can be a single *empathês noēma* or thought, sequence of thoughts or way of thinking. *Logismoi* frequently possess agency and always involve *noēmata* of sensible objects.

2.1.2 The ‘matter’ of the *logismoi*

Evagrius speaks of the *logismoi* having ‘matter’ (*hulê*). In other contexts where he refers to the ‘matter’ of something he means that which fuels it; for example,

Ὑλη πυρὸς ξύλα, ὕλη δὲ γαστρὸς βρώματα.⁵⁷

Wood is the matter used by fire, and food is the matter used by gluttony.

Likewise, the matter of the *logismoi* is what inspires and feeds them. For example,

⁵⁶ *Ant.* 1.58.

⁵⁷ *8Th.* 1.4.

Μόνος τῶν λογισμῶν ὁ τῆς κενοδοξίας ἐστὶ πολὺύλος καὶ ὅλην σχεδὸν περιλαμβάνων τὴν οἰκουμένην καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς δαίμοσιν ὑπανοίγων τὰς θύρας, ὥσπερ τις προδότης πονηρὸς γενόμενος πόλεως· διὸ καὶ πάνυ ταπεινοὶ τοῦ ἀναχωροῦντος τὸν νοῦν πολλῶν λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων αὐτὸν πληρῶν...⁵⁸

Alone among the *logismoι* that of vainglory has an abundance of matter; embracing nearly the whole inhabited world, it opens the gates to all the demons, like some evil betrayer of a city. That is why it greatly humiliates the *nous* of the anchorite, filling it with numerous words and objects...

The reason why the *logismos* of vainglory has ‘an abundance of matter’ is that any success, large or small, spiritual or otherwise, can arouse it, and this is why, too, ‘it opens the gates to all the demons’ and ‘fills the *nous* with numerous words and objects.’ In other words, there are a great many things that can occasion and augment it. But while *logismoι* of vainglory are especially well-provided for in terms of possible matter, all *logismoι* find much to feed upon in our dealings with one another and in the world at large:

Οἱ μὲν ἀκάθαρτοι λογισμοὶ πολλὰς εἰς αὔξησιν ὕλας προσδέχονται καὶ πολλοῖς συμπαρεκτείνονται πράγμασι.⁵⁹

Impure thoughts receive for their increase numerous materials and extend themselves to many objects.

Whereas *logismoι* with an abundance of matter will flourish, those with a paucity of it will lack staying power and accordingly be easy to banish:

Ὅταν τινὲς τῶν ἀκαθάρτων λογισμῶν ταχέως φυγαδευθῶσι, ζητήσωμεν τὴν αἰτίαν, πόθεν τοῦτο συμβέβηκε, πότερον διὰ τὴν σπάνιν τοῦ πράγματος, τὸ δυσπόριστον εἶναι τὴν ὕλην, ἢ διὰ τὴν προσοῦσαν ἡμῖν ἀπάθειαν οὐκ ἴσχυσε καθ’ ἡμῶν ὁ ἐχθρὸς, οἷον· εἴ τις τῶν ἀναχωρούντων ἐνθυμηθεῖ ὑπὸ δαίμονος ἐνοχλούμενος τῆς πρώτης πόλεως πνευματικὴν κυβέρνησιν πιστευθῆναι, οὗτος δηλονότι οὐ χρονίζει τοῦτον τὸν λογισμὸν φανταζόμενος...εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ πάσης πόλεως καὶ τῆς τυχούσης γίνεται καὶ ὁμοίως λογίζεται, οὗτος μακάριος τῆς ἀπαθείας ἐστίν.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ *Th.* 14.1-6.

⁵⁹ *Th.* 36.1-2.

⁶⁰ *Th.* 20.1-11.

Whenever certain impure *logismoi* are chased away quickly, let us search out the cause. Whence has this occurred? Is it for want of the object, the matter being hard to acquire, or because of the *apatheia* present in us did the enemy have no strength against us? For example, if an anchorite who is tormented by a demon imagines himself being entrusted with the spiritual governance of the First City, he clearly does not dwell for long on imagining this *logismos* ... But if it is a case of just any city taken at random and he works it out in the same way, he is blessed with *apatheia*.

In sum, the matter of the *logismoi* comprises anything that they can derive inspiration and plausibility from and so feed upon, or, to put it another way, it is what invigorates the fictional worlds that we create on the basis of our desires.

2.1.3 The eightfold classification of most generic *logismoi*

Evagrius divides all demonic *logismoi* into eight categories, a schema which in the hands of subsequent thinkers went on to form the basis for the doctrine of the seven cardinal sins. He introduces it at the beginning of the *Praktikos*:

Ὅκτώ εἰσι πάντες οἱ γενικώτατοι λογισμοὶ ἐν οἷς περιέχεται πᾶς λογισμός. Πρῶτος ὁ γαστριμαργίας, καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν ὁ τῆς πορνείας· τρίτος ὁ τῆς φιλαργυρίας· τέταρτος ὁ τῆς λύπης· πέμπτος ὁ τῆς ὀργῆς· ἕκτος ὁ τῆς ἀκηδίας· ἕβδομος ὁ τῆς κενοδοξίας· ὄγδοος ὁ τῆς ὑπερηφανίας.⁶¹

Eight are all the most generic *logismoi* in which are encompassed every *logismos*. First that of gluttony, and after it that of fornication; third, that of avarice; fourth, that of distress; fifth, that of anger; sixth, that of acedia; seventh, that of vainglory; eighth, that of pride.

The entire struggle of the monks, according to Evagrius, takes place through these eight *logismoi*.⁶² This section will consider each in turn. First though it can be noted that the eightfold classification is not the only system employed by Evagrius, nor is it fully comprehensive, omitting self-love (φιλαυτία) which in *Reflections* he declares to be

⁶¹ *Prakt.* 6.

⁶² *Ant. Prol.* 6. Evagrius' source for the eightfold classification remains uncertain; cf. Guillaumont (1971: 63-84).

‘first of all [the *logismoi*],’⁶³ wandering (πλάνος) and insensitivity (άναισθησία), both of which have chapters to themselves in *On Thoughts*,⁶⁴ and jealousy (φθόνος), which appears in *Vices*. That said, it is the principal one and the most familiar, as well as the one that provides the structure for several of his works, most notably the *Praktikos*, *Antirrhētikos*, and *Eight Thoughts*. Second, it is not only the terms ‘*logismos*’ and ‘demon’ that Evagrius uses interchangeably, but along with them the terms *pathos* and ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα). So, for example, in the *Praktikos* he speaks of the thought of gluttony (ὁ τῆς γαστριμαργίας λογισμὸς),⁶⁵ the demon of fornication (ὁ τῆς πορνείας δαίμων)⁶⁶ and the *pathos* of anger (ἡ ὀργὴ πάθος),⁶⁷ as well as simply using the name of the generic *logismos*, for example ἡ φιλαργυρία γῆρας μακρὸν ὑποβάλλει,⁶⁸ while in *On Thoughts* he refers to the spirit of fornication (τὸ πνεῦμα πορνείας).⁶⁹ Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Evagrius considers the *logismos*, the *pathos* and the demon or spirit to be distinct entities.

In discussing the eight generic *logismoi* I shall focus not upon Evagrius’ justly famous descriptions of them in the *Praktikos* but upon the *Antirrhētikos* listings for them, since my purpose to convey not so much the particular character of each type of *logismos* as a sense of the mental and emotional turmoil that the *logismoi* betoken.

2.1.3.1 Gluttony

The *Praktikos* definition of gluttony appears to focus not upon an excessive desire for food but upon worries about the physical consequences of asceticism. In fact, though, these worries arise out of an excessive desire for food, namely the desire to accord one’s eating to the insatiable demand of the body’s vital heat for fuel. At the same time they invite the monk to privilege the profane understanding of physical health over the spiritual understanding of it and accordingly to sacrifice the true health of the body for what is only its apparent health. But the significance of gluttony extends far beyond the body.

⁶³ *Rfl.* 53.

⁶⁴ Chapters 9 and 11 respectively.

⁶⁵ Cf. *Prakt.* 7.

⁶⁶ Cf. *Prakt.* 8.

⁶⁷ Cf. *Prakt.* 11.

⁶⁸ Cf. *Prakt.* 9.

⁶⁹ Cf. *Th.* 1.7, Guillaumont (1971: 57).

This demon is, along with those of avarice and vainglory, one of those ranged first in battle (πρῶτοι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον συνίστανται)⁷⁰ against those engaged in *praktikē*, hence Christ's temptation by these three vices.⁷¹ If gluttony is succumbed to then other temptations follow in its stead, first and foremost that to fornication,⁷² but ultimately all the other *pathē* too. This is partly due to a 'surplus' of physical vitality, but partly too because 'the direct absorption of matter in order to please the stomach' is, along with avarice and vainglory, one of the most fundamental ways of construing the world in terms of our own desires.⁷³ But the significance of gluttony for Evagrius also reflects the body's integral role in the process of redemption. As we have seen, he declares that to control the stomach is to diminish the *pathē*,⁷⁴ and I have argued that this is because he believes that any vital heat over and above that needed to keep the body alive finds expression in *pathos*, and that accordingly his many references to fire in relation to *epithumia*, pleasure and so forth are not simply metaphors. It follows that the importance that he assigns to dietary restraint is due not just to its intrinsic value but to its consequences. In the first place, it establishes a foundation for *apatheia* in the body itself. This is reflected in the *epithumêtikon*'s no longer being directed toward the objects of *pathos* but instead longing for virtue.⁷⁵ Again, if a person ceases to care for food then one of the causes for disturbance of the *thumos* is removed, as is a cause for distress.⁷⁶ More generally, a fixation upon food is distracting and undermining,⁷⁷ and excessive consumption of food dulls the mind.⁷⁸ For all these reasons a correct approach to food is fundamental and reflects the interconnectedness of the spiritual and the corporeal:

Ἐπιθυμία βρώσεως ἔτεκε παρακοήν, καὶ γεῦσις ἡδεῖα ἐξέβαλε παραδείσου.⁷⁹

Desire for food gave birth to disobedience and a sweet taste expelled from paradise.⁸⁰

⁷⁰ *Th.* 1.1-6.

⁷¹ Cf. Luke 4: 1-13, Matt. 4: 1-11; *Letter* 6.

⁷² See below, 2.1.3.2.

⁷³ Cf. Williams (2007: 4).

⁷⁴ Cf. *8Th.* 1.2; see above, 1.2.3.

⁷⁵ Cf. *Prakt.* 86.

⁷⁶ Cf. *Th.* 1.8-10.

⁷⁷ E.g. *8Th.* 1.12, 20.

⁷⁸ *8Th.* 1.1, 17,

⁷⁹ *8Th.* 1.10.

⁸⁰ Cf. Gen. 3:6, 23.

Eve's desire for the apple led her to disobey God and so to expulsion from the Garden. Likewise, a desire for food is a desire for something other than God. It is an orientation toward the sensible and away from the spiritual, and a preference for pleasure over the good. The 'sweet taste' of food 'expels from paradise' for at least three reasons. First, a focus upon food distracts the *nous* from the pursuit of knowledge. Second, it leads to a privileging of the profane understanding of health over the spiritual understanding of it, and thereby threatens to undermine the very foundation of the ascent to God. Third, to succumb to gluttony, whether from desire for the food itself or out of misplaced concern about the body's health, is to induce in both soul and body a state inimical to the practice of contemplation and prayer. All of these are ways in which it cuts the person off from spiritual joy; that is, from paradise.

The *Antirrhêtikos* entries for gluttony include: the thoughts that seek without the labour of fasting to cultivate the rational land;⁸¹ the thought that says to me, "Do not torment your soul with a lot of fasting that gains you nothing and does not purify your intellect".⁸² The thought that suggests to me, "Keeping vigil does not benefit you at all; rather, it gathers many thoughts against you".⁸³ The thoughts that hinder us from our way of life by instilling fear in us and saying, "A miserable death results from austere fasting".⁸⁴ The thought that recalls delicacies of the past and remembers pleasant wines and the cups that we would hold in our hands when we used to recline at table and drink.⁸⁵ The demon that persuades me through its flattery and says to me with promises, "You will no longer suffer any harm from food and drink because your body is weak and dry from prolonged fasting".⁸⁶ The thought that travels to its corporeal kinfolk and finds a table filled with all kinds of foods.⁸⁷ The thoughts that entice us to be comforted with a little treat of vegetables;⁸⁸ the thought that at harvest time casts into us the desire for fruits.⁸⁹ The thought that says that the monastic discipline is difficult and extremely

⁸¹ Cf. *Ant.* 1.1; cf. also 1.9.

⁸² Cf. *Ant.* 1.2; cf. 1.1, 4, 6, 9.

⁸³ Cf. *Ant.* 1.17; cf. 1.20.

⁸⁴ Cf. *Ant.* 1.19.

⁸⁵ Cf. *Ant.* 1.30; also 1.36, 38.

⁸⁶ Cf. *Ant.* 1.33.

⁸⁷ Cf. *Ant.* 1.39; also 1.41,

⁸⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 1.53; also 1.45.

⁸⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 1.54.

burdensome, that through affliction it cruelly lays waste to our body, and that it does not profit the soul.⁹⁰

2.1.3.2 Fornication

The demon of fornication, Evagrius tells us in the *Praktikos*, ‘compels one to desire various bodies’ (σωμάτων καταναγκάζει διαφόρων ἐπιθυμείν).⁹¹ The principal characteristics of its *logismoi* are the vivid fantasies that they involve, both in waking consciousness and in dreams.⁹² This demon endeavours to persuade the monk that he lacks the strength to overcome his bodily nature.⁹³ It is one of the swiftest (ὀξύτατος), suddenly hurling its filth⁹⁴ and able almost to overtake the movement of the *nous* (σχεδὸν τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ νοῦς ἡμῶν παρατρέχοντας);⁹⁵ that is, to overwhelm the *nous* before it realises it is under attack so that it has no opportunity to defend itself;⁹⁶ in reality, the demon cannot overwhelm the *nous*; as we shall see, Evagrius maintains that even in the throes of *pathos* it is possible to refrain from sin.⁹⁷

Eulogios 21.22 includes an eloquent description of temptation by *logismoi* of fornication.⁹⁸ Allusions to fire are central to it, and as in the case of *logismoi* of gluttony, these allusions and others like them⁹⁹ are, I suggest, not simply metaphors but references to the body’s vital heat. The monk experiences a surplus of this as ‘the fire of his nature’,¹⁰⁰ a ‘fire’ which finds expression in the *pathos* of sexual desire, of which this passage identifies three components: a general sensation of pleasurable warmth; the ‘burning’ which is ‘ignited in the flesh’ – that is, the specific physical expressions of sexual arousal, and ‘burning images of error’ – that is, mental images charged with the

⁹⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 1.66.

⁹¹ *Prakt.* 8.1-2.

⁹² Cf. *Th.* 29. For Evagrius’ attribution of agency to us in dreams, see below, 3.1.

⁹³ Cf. *Eul.* 21.22.

⁹⁴ Cf. *Eul.* 21.22.

⁹⁵ Cf. *Prakt.* 51. For other references to the ‘quickness’ of the demon of fornication, *Pry.* 90:

⁹⁶ Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 256, n.58).

⁹⁷ See below, 2.2.4.

⁹⁸ Quoted below, 2.2.4.

⁹⁹ E.g. *Ant.* 2.14: ‘To the angel of the Lord that suddenly appeared in my intellect, cooled the thought of fornication, and drove out from it (my intellect) all the thoughts that besieged it’; *Ant.* 2.47: ‘For the soul that does not know from where these burning thoughts are sent against us’.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *Eul.* 21.22.

pathos. The demon of fornication exploits the body's nature, specifically any surplus of vital heat. Sometimes it suggests *logismoi*, sometimes it touches the body directly,¹⁰¹ and sometimes it exploits an inclination toward sexual pleasure. If the monk allows the *logismoi* and feelings of arousal to linger¹⁰² then it suggests secondary *logismoi* which justify his continuing to do so. It also uses its ability to tempt the monk as ammunition against him, endeavouring to persuade him of the futility of trying to remain chaste - and it should be recalled that Evagrius' understanding of chastity encompassed all expressions of sexual function.¹⁰³ It is easy to see then why, given the theory of physiology that I have imputed to him, he considers dietary self-control to be a precondition of chastity:

Ὁ πληρῶν γαστέρα, καὶ ἐπαγγελόμενος σωφρονεῖν, ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ λέγοντι, χαλινοῦν πυρὸς ἐνέργειαν ἐν καλάμῃ. Ὅν τρόπον γὰρ πυρὸς ῥοπὴν ἐν καλάμῃ τρέχουσαν ἀδύνατον ἐπισχεῖν, οὕτως ὄρμηθ' ἀκόλαστον φλεγόμενην ἐν κόρῳ παῦσαι ἀδύνατον.¹⁰⁴

The one who fills his stomach and then announces that he is chaste is like one who says he can hold in check the action of fire in a reed. In the same way that it is impossible to restrain the momentum of a fire rushing through a reed, so it is impossible to stop the licentious impulse that is fired by satiety.

The *Antirrhêtikos* entries for fornication include: the thoughts that compel us to linger in conversation with a married woman on the pretext that she has visited us frequently or that she will benefit spiritually from us.¹⁰⁵ The demon of fornication that imitates the form of a beautiful naked woman, luxurious in her gait, her entire body obscenely dissipated, (a woman) who seizes the intellect of many persons and makes them forget the better things.¹⁰⁶ The demons of fornication that take for themselves pretexts from the Scriptures and from the topics that are written in them.¹⁰⁷ The thought of sadness that arises in us due to the many temptations of fornication that come upon us and cut off

¹⁰¹ Cf., e.g., *Th.* 16.12-14; *Ant.* 2.45; *Disc.* 152.

¹⁰² Cf. *Eul.* 21.22; see below, 2.2.4.

¹⁰³ See above, 1.2.3.

¹⁰⁴ E.g. *8Th.* 2.11. Cf. *Th.* 1.6-8.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *Ant.* 2.35; cf. also 2.1, 36.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *Ant.* 2.32.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. *Ant.* 2.50.

our hope by saying to us, “What beautiful thing do you expect after all this labour?”¹⁰⁸ The thought that says, “Youth is neither guilty nor culpable if it fornicates or if it gladly receives unclean thoughts”.¹⁰⁹ The thought of the soul that is oppressed by thoughts of fornication, which divide the evil passion of fornication into diverse images, collect impure thoughts, put them in rotation, (then) cleave to one of these enslaving thoughts and make it persist upon the weak soul.¹¹⁰ The thought that reminds us of the house in which we gave many fruits to Satan.¹¹¹ The demon that advised me in my intellect that I should marry a woman and become the father of sons and so not resist with hunger the thoughts of fornication.¹¹²

2.1.3.3 Avarice

Logismoi of avarice consist partly in worries about a future shaped by the privations of asceticism, but also encompass more general attachments, for example to material comforts or the prestige associated with wealth. To worry about such basic necessities as clothes or food is to defy Jesus’ injunction against anxiety about such things¹¹³ and, since ‘two sparrows sold for a penny’ are under the administration of the holy angels’,¹¹⁴ to lack faith in Providence. Finally, avarice is a species of idolatry:

Ἐπικατάρατος ὁ ποιῶν εἶδωλον, καὶ τιθεὶς ἐν ἀποκρύφῳ, ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ ἔχων φιλαργυρίας πάθος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ προσκυνεῖ κίβδηλον ἀνωφελεές, ὁ δὲ ἀγαλματοφορεῖ φαντασίαν πλούτου.¹¹⁵

‘Cursed be the one who makes an image and puts it in hiding.’¹¹⁶ The same is true for one who has the *pathos* of avarice, for the former worships a useless piece of base metal; the latter carries around in his *nous* the fantasy of wealth.¹¹⁷

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 2.1; also 2.31, 64.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 2.5; also 2.4.

¹¹⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 2.9; also 2.11, 12, 21, 24, 54, 56..

¹¹¹ Cf. *Ant.* 2.40.

¹¹² Cf. *Ant.* 2.49.

¹¹³ Cf. Matt. 6:25, 31.

¹¹⁴ *Th.* 6.1-10; cf. Matt. 10:29.

¹¹⁵ *8Th.* 3.14.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Deut. 27:15. At Col. 3:5 Paul declares that greed (πλεονεξία) is idolatry.

¹¹⁷ Cf. *Ant.* 3.51.

The *Antirrhêtikos* entries for avarice can be roughly summarised as the desire to acquire money;¹¹⁸ the desire to retain money;¹¹⁹ the desire to retain money and yet attain the death of Jesus;¹²⁰ the desire to spend money how one wants;¹²¹ meditating upon riches and giving no thought to the pain of wealth;¹²² anxiety about poverty;¹²³ resentment at not being given money;¹²⁴ the desire to keep resources for oneself;¹²⁵ the desire to rely on charity;¹²⁶ meanness;¹²⁷ lack of compassion;¹²⁸ the desire to file a lawsuit;¹²⁹ making a brother work hard for the sake of money rather than do something of greater spiritual value;¹³⁰ demanding too much manual labour from a brother;¹³¹ regret about having given money to the poor;¹³² self-satisfaction at giving up inheritance;¹³³ regret about renouncing money;¹³⁴ doubt about vocation;¹³⁵ the desire to acquire resources or possessions;¹³⁶ the desire to preserve resources or possessions;¹³⁷ the desire to take advantage of others;¹³⁸ the tendency to judge for the sake of temporal goods;¹³⁹ self-pity over one's neediness;¹⁴⁰ desire for the worldly esteem attendant upon wealth;¹⁴¹ desire for worldly possessions;¹⁴² nostalgia for past comforts;¹⁴³ admiration for wealth;¹⁴⁴ justifications for love of money.¹⁴⁵

¹¹⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 3:1, 11, 23, 29, 41, 42, 55.

¹¹⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 3:13.

¹²⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 3:30.

¹²¹ Cf. *Ant.* 3:15, 19.

¹²² Cf. *Ant.* 3:21.

¹²³ Cf. *Ant.* 3:2, 26, 36, 56.

¹²⁴ Cf. *Ant.* 3:3.

¹²⁵ Cf. *Ant.* 3:5, 10, 37.

¹²⁶ Cf. *Ant.* 3:43.

¹²⁷ Cf. *Ant.* 3:9, 10, 14, 28, 40, 43, 44, 47, 57.

¹²⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 3:5, 7, 27, 31, 37, 38, 48.

¹²⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 3:39.

¹³⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 3:6.

¹³¹ Cf. *Ant.* 3:4, 8.

¹³² Cf. *Ant.* 3:12, 33.

¹³³ Cf. *Ant.* 3:16.

¹³⁴ Cf. *Ant.* 3:24.

¹³⁵ Cf. *Ant.* 3:24.

¹³⁶ Cf. *Ant.* 3:35, 37, 49, 50, 52, 53.

¹³⁷ Cf. *Ant.* 3:24, 35, 49.

¹³⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 3:25.

¹³⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 3:25.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 3:17.

¹⁴¹ Cf. *Ant.* 3:18, 32.

¹⁴² Cf. *Ant.* 3: 20.

¹⁴³ Cf. *Ant.* 3:21, 34, 50.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. *Ant.* 3:46.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *Ant.* 3:50, 51, 54.

2.1.3.4 Distress

Distress, according to the *Praktikos* definition, ‘sometimes occurs through the frustration of one’s desires [or sometimes] follows closely upon anger’ (ἡ λύπη ποτὲ μὲν ἐπισυμβαίνει κατὰ στέρησιν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ παρέπεται τῇ ὀργῇ).¹⁴⁶ This demon cuts off and dries up every pleasure of the soul (πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν τῆς ψυχῆς περικόπτων καὶ ξηραίνων).¹⁴⁷ Its *Antirrhêtikos* entries include feelings of despair and abandonment by God or the angels in the face of trials,¹⁴⁸ fear of the demons,¹⁴⁹ nocturnal attacks by demons,¹⁵⁰ physical attacks by demons,¹⁵¹ and vivid and frightening hallucinations.¹⁵² They also include ignorance of the role of the demons in the spiritual life¹⁵³ or of how the demons operate,¹⁵⁴ or attempts by the demons to persuade the monk of the futility of his struggle¹⁵⁵ or to make him fearful of the rigours of the monastic life.¹⁵⁶ Some *logismoi* of distress threaten him with shame or dishonour,¹⁵⁷ some try to induce distress by evoking memories of one’s past sins¹⁵⁸ and some afflict the *nous* with distress concerning transitory affairs.¹⁵⁹ One threatens him with madness¹⁶⁰ and one entry warns of the demon who ‘alters the *nous* and impresses it with a single concept that is filled with severe grief—this is an indication of great madness.’¹⁶¹

¹⁴⁶ *Prakt.* 10.1-2.

¹⁴⁷ *Th.* 4-5. Cf. *Disc.* 69.5-6: ‘Only the *logismos* of distress does not involve pleasure.’

¹⁴⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 4.1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 16, 27, 44, 51.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 4.8, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 28, 38, 39, 53, 54, 62, 65, 70, 71, 76.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 4.8, 11, 18, 19, 21, 29, 31, 33, 38, 53.

¹⁵¹ Cf. *Ant.* 4.15, 18, 22, 33, 35, 36, 41, 49, 52, 53, 56, 65.

¹⁵² Cf. *Ant.* 4.13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26, 29, 32, 34, 38, 45, 47, 48, 53, 58, 62, 63.

¹⁵³ Cf. *Ant.* 4.3, 7, 17, 52.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. *Ant.* 4.6, 46, 66.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. *Ant.* 4.12, 30.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. *Ant.* 4.50, 69, 70, 71.

¹⁵⁷ *Ant.* 4.25 has a particularly personal ring in relation to Evagrius: ‘Against the demon that threatens me with curses and said, “I will make you an object of laughter and reproach among all the monks because you have investigated and made known all the kinds of all the unclean thoughts.”’. Cf. also *Ant.* 4.43, 64, 68.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 4.55, 73.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 4.74.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 4.43,

¹⁶¹ Cf. *Ant.* 4.37.

2.1.3.5 Anger

The *Praktikos* defines anger, in terms borrowed from Aristotle, as ‘a boiling over of the *thumos* and a movement directed against one who has done injury or is thought to have done so’ (θυμοῦ...ζέσις καὶ κίνησις κατὰ τοῦ ἡδίκηκότος ἢ δοκοῦντος ἡδικηκέναι).¹⁶² Evagrius notes that it ‘renders the soul furious all day long, but especially during prayers it seizes the *nous* and represents to it the face of one who has distressed it’ (πανημέριον μὲν ἐξαγριοῖ τὴν ψυχὴν, μάλιστα δὲ ἐν ταῖς προσευχαῖς συναρπάζει τὸν νοῦν, τὸ τοῦ λεληπηκότος πρόσωπον ἔσοπτρίζουσα),¹⁶³ and that ‘sometimes when this goes on for a while and turns into resentment, it provokes disturbances at night accompanied by wasting and pallor of the body, as well as the attacks of venomous wild beasts’ (ὅτε χρονίζουσα καὶ μεταβαλλομένη εἰς μὴνιν, ταραχὰς νύκτωρ παρέχει, τήξιν τε τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὠχρότητα, καὶ θηρίων ἰοβόλων ἐπιδρομάς).¹⁶⁴ He also notes that these ‘four signs that follow upon resentment’ can be found accompanying (παρακολουθοῦντα) numerous *logismoi*.¹⁶⁵

The *Antirrhetikos* entries for anger include the thought that advised us to love angry people and words of wrath;¹⁶⁶ desire for vengeance.¹⁶⁷ The thought that is quickly enflamed with anger and swiftly embittered against the brothers.¹⁶⁸ The thoughts that cast us into grief over brothers’ failings.¹⁶⁹ Thinking that perfect humility is beyond human nature;¹⁷⁰ not accepting chastisement with humility.¹⁷¹ Not understanding that being reviled by other people is a test sanctioned by God.¹⁷² Resentment.¹⁷³ Agitation due to

¹⁶² *Prakt.* 11.1-2. Cf. *DA* 403a29-b1: ‘A physician would define an affection of the soul differently from a dialectician: the latter would define e.g. anger as the desire (ὄρεξις) for returning distress for distress (ἀντιλυπήσεως), or something like that, while the former would define it as a boiling of the blood or warm substance around the heart.’

¹⁶³ *Prakt.* 11.3-5.

¹⁶⁴ *Prakt.* 11.5-7.

¹⁶⁵ *Prakt.* 11.8-9.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. *Ant.* 5.26.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. *Ant.* 5.27, 32, 42, 53, 61.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 5.29, 46.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 5.47.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 5.7.

¹⁷¹ Cf. *Ant.* 5.23.

¹⁷² Cf. *Ant.* 5.8.

¹⁷³ Cf. *Ant.* 5.21, 49.

acedia.¹⁷⁴ The thoughts that provoke us to hate and curse our enemies;¹⁷⁵ that advise us to take advantage and to defraud;¹⁷⁶ that are embittered against love;¹⁷⁷ the thought that depicted in the intellect a brother who in hatred said something wicked or listened to something hateful;¹⁷⁸ that is set in motion by the slander of the brothers and that obscures the soul with a cloud of rage;¹⁷⁹ that thinks up treachery against a brother;¹⁸⁰ that provokes us to strife with the brothers and prevents us from cutting off arguments.¹⁸¹ Wanting to repay evil for evil or abuse for abuse and not wanting, through blessings, to forget abusive and slanderous thoughts.¹⁸²

2.1.3.6 Acedia

The *logismos* of acedia is especially pernicious and complex, being able to include within itself other *logismoi*.¹⁸³ Lengthy though the *Praktikos* definition is, it merits quoting in full:

The demon of acedia, also called the noonday demon,¹⁸⁴ is the most oppressive of all the demons. He attacks the monk about the fourth hour,¹⁸⁵ and besieges the soul until the eighth hour. First of all, he makes it appear that the sun moves slowly or not at all, and that the day seems to be fifty hours long. Then he compels the monk to look constantly towards the windows, to leap out of the cell, to watch the sun to see how far it is from the ninth hour, to look this way and that in case one of the brothers....¹⁸⁶

¹⁷⁴ Cf. *Ant.* 5.35.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. *Ant.* 5.37.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. *Ant.* 5.43.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. *Ant.* 5.40.

¹⁷⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 5.6.

¹⁷⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 5.11.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 5.20.

¹⁸¹ Cf. *Ant.* 5.24.

¹⁸² Cf. *Ant.* 5.61.

¹⁸³ Cf. Sch. 1 on Ps. 139:3, PG 12.1664B.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Ps. 90: 6; Sinkewicz (2003: 99).

¹⁸⁵ According to Sinkewicz (2003: 99), this would have been 10am.

¹⁸⁶ *Prakt.* 12.1-9.

Guillaumont points out that Evagrius deliberately leaves this last phrase dangling, to indicate that, whoever the brother and whatever his business, the distraction would be welcome.¹⁸⁷ The definition continues:

And further, he instils in him a dislike for the place and for his state of life itself, for manual labour, and also the idea that love has disappeared from among the brothers and there is no one to console him. And should there be someone during those days who has offended the monk, this too the demon uses to add further to his dislike. He leads him on to a desire (ἄγει δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν) for other places where he can easily find the wherewithal to meet his needs and pursue a trade that is easier and more productive; he adds that pleasing the Lord is not a question of being in a particular place: for scripture says that the divinity can be worshipped everywhere.¹⁸⁸ He joins to these suggestions the memory of his close relations and of his former life; he depicts for him the long course of his lifetime, while bringing the burdens of asceticism (τοὺς τῆς ἀσκήσεως πόνους) before his eyes; and, as the saying has it, he deploys every device in order to have the monk leave his cell and flee the stadium. No other demon follows immediately after this one: a state of peace and ineffable joy ensues in the soul after this struggle.¹⁸⁹

The *Antirrhêtikos* entries for acedia include the thought of the demon of acedia that hates the manual labour of the skill it knows and wants to learn another by which one will be better supported and which will not be so arduous.¹⁹⁰ The thought that complains about the brothers on the pretext that there is no love in them and they do not want to console those who are sad and weary.¹⁹¹ Impatiently expecting to be filled with the fruits of knowledge of truth.¹⁹² Loving the world and its affairs.¹⁹³ The thought that deprives us of reading and instruction in spiritual words, leading us astray as it says, “Look, such-and-such holy old man knew only twelve Psalms, and he pleased God’.¹⁹⁴ The thought that wants its family and the people of its household and thinks, “The demon of acedia is stronger than we are, and I cannot defeat the thoughts that come forth from it and oppose me.”¹⁹⁵ The thought that is eager to find another cell for its dwelling

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 440-1).

¹⁸⁸ Cf. John 4: 21-4.

¹⁸⁹ *Prakt.* 12.9-25.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 6.1.

¹⁹¹ Cf. *Ant.* 6.30.

¹⁹² Cf. *Ant.* 6.3.

¹⁹³ Cf. *Ant.* 6.4; cf. also 6.23, 35.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. *Ant.* 6.5; cf. 6.8.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. *Ant.* 6.7, 39, 43, 44, 45, 53.

place on the pretext that the first one that it had was very foul and full of moisture so that it got all kinds of diseases from it.¹⁹⁶ The soul's thoughts that have been set in motion by acedia and want to abandon the holy path of the illustrious ones and its dwelling place.¹⁹⁷ Thoughts that reject manual labour and lean the body in sleep against the wall.¹⁹⁸ The thought that said that a person can acquire purity and stability apart from the monastic life;¹⁹⁹ The thoughts of acedia that are in us on the pretext, "Look, our relatives are saying about us that it is not on account of God that we have left the world and embraced monasticism, but on account of our sins or our weakness, because we could not excel in the affairs of the world."²⁰⁰

2.1.3.7 Vainglory

Vainglory consists, in essence, in valuing human esteem and has the ability to attach itself to and thereby corrupt virtuous actions,²⁰¹ making it particularly tenacious:

Χαλεπὸν διαφυγεῖν τὸν τῆς κενοδοξίας λογισμόν· ὃ γὰρ ποιεῖς εἰς καθαίρεσιν αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀρχὴ σοι κενοδοξίας ἑτέρας καθίσταται.²⁰²

It is difficult to escape the *logismos* of vainglory, for what you do to rid yourself of it becomes for you a new source of vainglory.

The *Antirrhetikos* entries for vainglory include the desire for the priesthood without awareness of the danger it brings;²⁰³ the thought that arouses in me jealousy toward the brothers who have received from the Lord the gift of knowledge;²⁰⁴ performing righteousness for the sake of human esteem.²⁰⁵ The thought that incites us to teach the broth-

¹⁹⁶ Cf. *Ant.* 6.26; cf. also 6.15, 24, 33, 39, 44, 52, 53.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. *Ant.* 6.52.

¹⁹⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 6.28.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 6.41.

²⁰⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 6.46.

²⁰¹ E.g. *8Th.* 7.1-7, 16, 17; *Th.* 3, 30.

²⁰² *Prakt.* 30.1-3. Cf. *Prakt.* 31: 'I have noticed that the demon of vainglory is pursued by almost all the demons and with the fall of its pursuers it shamelessly comes forward and displays for the monk the grandeur of his virtues.'

²⁰³ Cf. *Ant.* 7.3; cf. 7.8, 26, 36, 40.

²⁰⁴ Cf. *Ant.* 7.2.

²⁰⁵ Cf. *Ant.* 7.4; cf. 7.24, 30, 43..

ers and the worldly people when we have not yet acquired health of the soul.²⁰⁶ The thought that compels us to talk a lot about superfluous things;²⁰⁷ that advises me sternly to withdraw from the brotherhood and cloister myself from the brothers, supposing that they lead me astray.²⁰⁸ The temptation to tell the secrets of the monastic life to worldly people.²⁰⁹ The thoughts that entice us to go into the world in order to benefit those who see us.²¹⁰ The demon that says, “you are proficient with the gift of healing that you have received”;²¹¹ the vainglorious desire to learn the wisdom of the Greeks;²¹² The thought that encourages us to persuade our relatives that if we live justly in the monastic life we will be worthy of the soul’s health and knowledge of the truth.²¹³ The thoughts that request gifts of healing or knowledge of God;²¹⁴ the thoughts that endeavour through a sad appearance to reveal our fasting, as if the *nous* had been set free and released from thoughts of gluttony, in order that it may be bound and held captive by the thought of vainglory.²¹⁵

2.1.3.8 *Pride*

Whereas vainglory consists in valuing and desiring the esteem of other people, pride consists in an excess of self-esteem, which at its most extreme leads to the denial of God.²¹⁶ Presumably because of its reliance upon empty self-esteem and its association with the denial of God, pride – evidently alone among the *logismoi* – has no matter.²¹⁷

The *Antirrhêtikos* entries under pride include the following: the thought that says to me, “Look, you have become a perfect monk”;²¹⁸ the blasphemous thought that denies God and rejects the angel that assists me;²¹⁹ the thought that glorifies me on the pretext that

²⁰⁶ Cf. *Ant.* 7.9; cf. 7.1, 13, 29, 41..

²⁰⁷ Cf. *Ant.* 7.12; cf. 7.33

²⁰⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 7.11.

²⁰⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 7.17.

²¹⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 7.18; cf. 7.20.

²¹¹ Cf. *Ant.* 7.35

²¹² Cf. *Ant.* 7.37.

²¹³ Cf. *Ant.* 7.39.

²¹⁴ Cf. *Ant.* 7.42.

²¹⁵ Cf. *Ant.* 7.32; cf. 7.38.

²¹⁶ E.g. *Disc.* 210.

²¹⁷ Cf. *Disc.* 33.

²¹⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 8.39; also 8.1, 35, 45, 58, 59.

²¹⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 8.3; also 8.5, 7, 9, 10, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29, 35, 41, 47, 49, 49a, 49d.

by my great strength I have cast down demons;²²⁰ the thought that advises scorn of the holy fathers on the pretext that they have not laboured in their way of life any more than we have.²²¹ The demon that said to me that all people bless me and that I am the progenitor of sages.²²² The blasphemous thought that denied the free will that is in us and said that we sin and are justified not by our own will and therefore condemnation is not decreed justly;²²³ the thought that denied God's grace.²²⁴ The demon that promises to interpret the Scriptures for us.²²⁵ The thought of pride that glorifies me on the pretext that I edify souls with a stable way of life and knowledge of God;²²⁶ the thought that at a time of severe and prolonged temptation prevents me from entreating the Lord through the brothers.²²⁷ The thoughts that are puffed up against the brothers because of our fleshly birth and suppose that it is glorious.²²⁸ The demons that 'heal' the mature person of humility (and bring it) to the pride of the sick.²²⁹ The thought that despises a brother who does not eat and considers him to be weak on the pretext, "He is not able to stand in the battle when eating, and therefore he has given himself to fasting";²³⁰ the thought that passed judgment on the one who eats on the pretext, "It is because he cannot control himself";²³¹ the thought that glorifies me on the pretext, "I am able not only not to be enslaved to the belly, but also to conquer anger";²³² the thought that exalts me on the pretext that I have attained perfection in the service of the commandments.²³³

2.1.3.9 Summary

The foregoing consideration of how the eight generic *logismoi* manifest has, in addition to revealing much about the way in which Evagrius construes the *logismoi*, made two

²²⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 8.6, 13, 14, 22, 25, 48.

²²¹ Cf. *Ant.* 8.8.

²²² Cf. *Ant.* 8.15.

²²³ Cf. *Ant.* 8.16.

²²⁴ Cf. *Ant.* 8.18.

²²⁵ Cf. *Ant.* 8.26.

²²⁶ Cf. *Ant.* 8.30.

²²⁷ Cf. *Ant.* 8.34.

²²⁸ Cf. *Ant.* 8.37.

²²⁹ Cf. *Ant.* 8.40.

²³⁰ Cf. *Ant.* 8.53.

²³¹ Cf. *Ant.* 8.54.

²³² Cf. *Ant.* 8.55.

²³³ Cf. *Ant.* 8.58; cf. also 8.59.

things plain. The first is that, as already noted,²³⁴ to experience a *logismos* is to experience *pathos*. Second and relatedly, the *logismoi* destabilise the movements of the *nous* and soul. This destabilisation is the psychological correlate of the instability of fire and the psychological expression of an excess of vital heat.

2.1.4 The sequence of the eightfold classification of most generic *logismoi*

The eightfold classification of generic *logismoi* appears in the foregoing sequence in the *Praktikos*, *Antirrhêtikos* and *Vices*, although in the latter jealousy is inserted between vainglory and pride. In *Eight Thoughts*, the positions of anger and distress are reversed but otherwise the sequence remains the same. So what is its rationale? Does it relate to the derivation of the *logismoi* from the parts of the soul or to the way in which the *logismoi* are experienced? Evagrius does not tell us, but his disciple, John Cassian,²³⁵ lists the eight principal vices in terms which are simply a translation, with glosses, of *Praktikos* 6,²³⁶ then later in the same work relates a similar, although more extensive, list of vices to the three parts of the soul.²³⁷ In itself this might constitute grounds for attributing a similar view to Evagrius.²³⁸ However, the evidence reveals that while there might be some connection between the sequence and both the derivation of the *logismoi* from the parts of the soul and the way in which the *logismoi* are experienced, in both cases the connection is somewhat flexible.

2.1.4.1 The derivation of the *logismoi* from the parts of the soul

For reasons which will become clearer in section 2.2.4, all *logismoi* would seem basically to derive from the *pathêtikon* part of the soul. However, Evagrius is unclear about their specific attributions. The following list, which is not intended to be exhaustive, conveys a general sense of what he says on this subject:

²³⁴ See above, 2.1.1.

²³⁵ For discussion of the influence exercised by Evagrius upon Cassian see Marsili, S, "Giovanni Cassiano ed Evagrio Pontico", *Studia Anselmiana* 5, Rome 1936.

²³⁶ Cf. *Conf.* 5:2.

²³⁷ *Conf.* 24: 15.

²³⁸ Ware, at Lubheid and Russell (1982: 63), citing Cassian, *Conf.* 24: 15, takes it to do so.

- (i) Gluttony derives from the *epithumêtikon*;²³⁹
- (ii) Fornication derives from the *epithumêtikon*;²⁴⁰
- (iii) Fornication does not derive from the *epithumêtikon*;²⁴¹
- (iv) Avarice derives from the *epithumêtikon*;²⁴²
- (v) Distress derives from the *thumos*;²⁴³
- (vi) Distress affects only rational beings;²⁴⁴
- (vii) Anger derives from the *thumos*;²⁴⁵
- (viii) Acedia derives from the *epithumêtikon* and *thumos*;²⁴⁶
- (ix) Acedia affects only rational beings;²⁴⁷
- (x) Vainglory derives from the *epithumêtikon*;²⁴⁸
- (xi) Vainglory affects only rational beings;²⁴⁹
- (xii) Pride affects only rational beings;²⁵⁰
- (xiii) All *logismoi* derive from the *pathêtikon* part of the soul;²⁵¹
- (xiv) Almost all *logismoi* derive from the *pathêtikon* part of the soul.²⁵²

Propositions (i), (ii) and (iv) are what we would expect, but (iii) is not, and contradicts (ii). It comes from *Disciples* 69:

Τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ γενικώτατοι λογισμοὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ γινόμενοι, γαστριμαργίας καὶ φιλαργυρίας καὶ κενοδοξίας· ἢ γὰρ βρώματα ἢ χρήματα ἢ δόξαν τις ἐπιθυμεῖ.²⁵³

²³⁹ Cf. *Disc.* 69, 130.

²⁴⁰ Cf. *Disc.* 130, *Th.* 16.

²⁴¹ Implied by *Disc.* 69.

²⁴² Cf. *Disc.* 69, 130.

²⁴³ Cf. *Disc.* 166.

²⁴⁴ Cf. *Rfl.* 40.

²⁴⁵ Cf., e.g., *Prakt* 11; *Disc.* 96.1-2.

²⁴⁶ Cf. Sch. 13 on Ps. 118.28, *Let.* 27; see above, 3.2.6.

²⁴⁷ Cf. *Disc.* 177.

²⁴⁸ Cf. *Disc.* 69, 130.

²⁴⁹ Cf. *Rfl.* 40; *Th.* 18, 28; *Disc.* 177.

²⁵⁰ Cf. *Th.* 18; *Disc.* 177.

²⁵¹ Implied by *KG* 6.53, 55, 83.

²⁵² Cf. *Th.* 3.

²⁵³ *Disc.* 69.1-4. Cf. *Disc.* 57.1-5: ‘The monk must despise (καταφρονῆσαι) gluttony, avarice and vain-glory, love of pleasure (φιληδονία), and self-love (φιλαυτία), the mother of all, and also the enemy (ἔχθρα) of the soul, namely the flesh (σάρξ), for these are the *logismoi* in the forefront (οἱ προηγούμενοι λογισμοί).’ Cf. Rom. 8:7: ‘[The] mind (φρόνημα) that is set on the flesh is hostile (ἔχθρα) to God; it does not submit to God's law, indeed it cannot’.

The most generic *logismoi* that come from the *epithumêtikon* are three: gluttony, avarice and vainglory, for one desires food and money and esteem.

These three *logismoi* are those whose demons stand in the front line against the *praktikoi*.²⁵⁴ Thus the omission of fornication need not be taken as a denial of its epithumetic origin but as an affirmation of its dependence upon gluttony.²⁵⁵ Proposition (v) is again what we would expect, but seems to be contradicted by (vi). This, however, assumes that the parts of the soul that we share with animals take the same form in them as in us, and we have already seen that this is not the case since in humans the *thumos* and *epithumêtikon* are rational whereas in animals they are not.²⁵⁶ This means that there is no difficulty with either (vi) or (viii). So far there has appeared to be a straightforward correspondence between the sequence of the *logismoi* and the parts of the soul, but (x) dispels this impression. It does however make sense, given that vainglory is in essence the desire for esteem. Again, granting that in humans the *pathêtikon* part of the soul is rational, there is no difficulty with (xi). What about (xii)? Alone among the *logismoi* pride is nowhere assigned by Evagrius to a part of the soul. I believe however that its natural home is the *logistikon*, first because it does not seem to involve, at least in any direct way, either *epithumia* or *thumos*, and second, because it seems reducible to delusion (about one's own abilities and one's dependence upon God), which in turn seems naturally to connect it with the 'contemplative vice' of false knowledge.²⁵⁷

It would seem, then, that gluttony, fornication, avarice, and vainglory derive from the *epithumêtikon*; distress and anger from the *thumos*; acedia from both *epithumêtikon* and *thumos* and pride from the *logistikon*. But there are passages that cast doubt on this scheme, or at least upon its rigidity. Consider first the following:

Τῶν λογισμῶν οἱ μὲν, ὡς ζώοις ἡμῖν ἐπισυμβαίνουσιν· οἱ δὲ ὡς ἀνθρώποις· καὶ ὡς ζώοις μὲν, ὅσοι ἀπὸ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶ καὶ θυμοῦ· ὡς ἀνθρώποις δὲ, ὅσοι ἀπὸ

²⁵⁴ Cf. *Th.* 1.1-6; these are the *logismoi* with which the devil tempted Jesus in the desert; cf. Luke 4:2-13; Matt. 4:3-11.

²⁵⁵ E.g. *Th.* 1.6-7.

²⁵⁶ See above, 2.2.1.

²⁵⁷ *AM* 43, 124-6, 134.

λύπης εἰσὶ καὶ κενοδοξίας καὶ ὑπερηφανίας· οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀκηδίας, καὶ ὡς ζώοις καὶ ὡς ἀνθρώποις μικτοὶ ὄντες.²⁵⁸

Among *logismoi*, some come to us as animals, others as human beings. [Those that come] as animals are all those that derive from *epithumia* and *thumos*; [those that come to us] as human beings are all those that derive from distress, vainglory and pride; those that derive from acedia are mixed, coming to us both as animals and as human beings.

This implies that distress does not derive from the *thumos* nor vainglory from the *epithumêtikon*. *Disciples* 177 confirms the derivation from the rational part of the soul of acedia, vainglory and pride, but omits distress:

Τριττὸν εἶδος λογισμῶν ἐκ τοῦ λογικοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τουτέστιν ἀκηδία, κενοδοξία καὶ ὑπερηφανία· ἐπισυμβαίνουν δὲ ἐπ' αὐτὸν τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ νικήσει τις λογισμούς.²⁵⁹

Three kinds of *logismoi* come from rational man, namely acedia, vainglory and pride, and they supervene when he has triumphed over the *logismoi* that come from *epithumia* or the *thumos*.

According to *On Thoughts* 18 it is vainglory, pride, envy and censoriousness that affect humans alone:

Among the impure demons some tempt the human person as a human being; others trouble the human person as an irrational animal. The first, when they visit us, instil within us *noēmata* of vainglory or pride or envy or censoriousness – these do not touch (ἄπτεται) any irrational beings. When the second class of demons draws near (προσεγγίζοντες), they move (κινουσι) our *thumos* or *epithumia* in a manner contrary to nature (παρὰ φύσιν). These are the *pathē* which we have in common with irrational animals (κοινὰ ἡμῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων).²⁶⁰

On Thoughts 28 confirms the association of vainglory with the *logistikon*:

Ὅταν θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν νύκτωρ συνταράξαι μὴ δυνηθῶσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τὸ τηλικαῦτα κενοδοξίας ἐνόπνια πλάττουσι.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ *Rfl.* 40.

²⁵⁹ *Disc.* 177.

²⁶⁰ *Th.* 18.1-8.

²⁶¹ *Th.* 28.1-3.

When the demons have not been able to trouble the *thumos* or *epithumêtikon* at night, they then fabricate dreams of vainglory.

On the other hand, *Disciples* 130 associates vainglory with the *epithumêtikon*, but with some uncertainty:

Vainglory, if it is from the *epithumêtikon*, is at least the last of the [*pathē*] of the *epithumêtikon*, but the cause of *epithumia* in general – gluttony and fornication, avarice and vainglory, and the like – is an excess of the natural attachment God has given the soul for the body (ὁ πλεονασμός ἐστι τοῦ φυσικοῦ φίλτρου οὗ ἔδωκεν ὁ θεὸς τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα); and through not enduring want and suffering according to nature, but greatly loving oneself, love of pleasure ensues (διὰ τὸ μὴ καρτερεῖν ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἐνδείᾳ καὶ πόνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ φιλαυτεῖν, ἔπεται καὶ τὸ φιληδονεῖν).²⁶²

It would seem then that Evagrius was uncertain regarding the source of some of the *logismoi*. There is no doubt that he associates gluttony and fornication with the *epithumêtikon* and anger with the *thumos* and that all three affect both humans and animals. Avarice is associated with the *epithumêtikon* and distress with the *thumos*, but both affect only humans. Acedia involves the *epithumêtikon* and *thumos* and perhaps the *logistikon* too, and again affects humans alone. Vainglory and pride also affect humans alone. Evagrius says nothing about the source of pride and seems uncertain as to whether or not vainglory derives from the *epithumêtikon*. Finally, the following suggest that all *logismoi* derive from the *pathêtikon* part of the soul:

Πειρασμός ἐστι μοναχοῦ λογισμὸς διὰ τοῦ παθητικοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναβὰς καὶ σκοτίζων τὸν νοῦν.²⁶³

The temptation of a monk is a *logismos* that rises through the *pathêtikon* part of the soul and darkens the *nous*.

Ἐπόκειται τὸ πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐξ οὗ γεννᾶται ὁ ἐμπαθῆς λογισμὸς.²⁶⁴

Pathos lies below in the soul and from it comes the *empathês logismos*.

²⁶² *Disc.* 130; cf. *Disc.* 41: ‘The one who has put away (ἀποθέμενος) *pathos* for the body, that is, that of self-love, will easily put away the other *pathē* as well, such as anger, sadness and so forth.’

²⁶³ *Prakt.* 75.

²⁶⁴ *Disc.* 49.3-4. See below, 4.5.

The intelligible arrow is the evil *logismos*, which is constituted by the *pathētikon* part of the soul.²⁶⁵

It is when the *nous* approaches the intelligible that it is no longer united to the *logismos* that comes from the *pathētikon* part of the soul.²⁶⁶

It is said that the *nous* sees things that it knows and that it does not see things that it does not know; and because of this it is not all thoughts that the knowledge of God forbids it, but those which assail it from *thumos* and *epithumia* and those which are against nature.²⁶⁷

But chapter 3 of *On Thoughts* suggests otherwise with its use of ‘almost’ (σχεδόν):

Ἐκ γὰρ τῶν δύο τούτων παθῶν πάντες οἱ δαιμονιώδεις σχεδὸν συνίστανται λογισμοὶ οἱ τὸν νοῦν ἐμβάλλοντες «εἰς ὄλεθρον καὶ ἀπώλειαν».²⁶⁸

From [the *epithumētikon* and *thumos*] are constituted almost all the demonic *logismoi* that cast the *nous* ‘into ruin and destruction.’²⁶⁹

In sum, it would seem that although Evagrius generally imputes the *logismoi* to the *pathētikon* part of the soul, some – the possible candidates being avarice, distress, acedia, vainglory and pride - derive either wholly or partly from the *logistikon*. The inconsistencies in Evagrius’ associations of the *logismoi* with the parts of the soul perhaps represent inconsistencies or developments in his thought. But it is possible too that they reflect the nature of the subject-matter as he sees it, in particular the lack of any clear boundary between the cognitive and the affective in his psychology given that the three parts of the soul are but progressively more fallen aspects of the *nous*, such that he is seeking only the degree of precision that discourse about the *logismoi* admits of. Also, while he clearly values rigour and consistency, his final appeal is always to experience.²⁷⁰ Consequently his use of classificatory schemata retains a degree of flexibility,

²⁶⁵ *KG* 6.53; cf. *KG* 4.32: ‘The lobe of the liver (Ex. 29:13) is the first thought that is constituted by the concupiscent part of the soul’.

²⁶⁶ *KG* 6.55.

²⁶⁷ *KG* 6.83.

²⁶⁸ *Th.* 3.5-7.

²⁶⁹ 1 Tim. 6:9.

²⁷⁰ Cf. *Th.* 25.3-4.

such that while he will have reason to assign a given *logismos* to a given part of the soul, his doing so should not be taken as either fixed or exclusive.

2.1.4.2 *The relation between the sequence of the eightfold classification of most generic logismoi and how they are experienced*

Broadly speaking, there are two timescales over which a person will experience the *logismoi*: the local one of his daily experience and the global one of his lifetime. Evagrius' focus is upon the former; that is, upon the causal relations between the *logismoi* as experienced day to day. He follows the account of Jesus' temptation in the desert in assigning priority to three:

Among the demons who set themselves in opposition to *praktikê*, the ones ranged first in battle are those entrusted with the appetites of gluttony, those who make suggestions of avarice to us and those who entice us to seek human esteem (τῶν ἀντικειμένων δαιμόνων τῇ πρακτικῇ, πρῶτοι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον συνίστανται οἱ τὰς γαστριμαργίας ὀρέξεις πεπιστευμένοι καὶ οἱ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν ἡμῖν ὑποβάλλοντες καὶ οἱ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαλούμενοι). All the other demons march along behind these and in their turn take up the people wounded by them (οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι πάντες κατόπιν τούτων βαδίζουσιν τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων τιτρωσκομένους διαδεχόμενοι). For example, it is not possible to fall into the hands of the spirit of fornication unless one has fallen under the influence of gluttony; nor is it possible to trouble (ταράξαι) the *thumos*, unless one is fighting for food or wealth or esteem.²⁷¹ And it is not possible to escape the demon of distress, if one is deprived of all these things, or is unable to attain them. Nor will one escape pride...if one has not banished avarice, the root of all evils²⁷² ...To put it briefly, no one can fall into a demon's power, unless he has first been wounded by those in the front line.²⁷³

On the causal priority of gluttony, avarice and vainglory, Williams notes that

[these three passions] are the three fundamental ways in which we can misjudge our relation with the material world, three forms of seeing physical reality in terms of pleasure or power – the direct absorption of matter in order to please the stomach, the accumulation of wealth of whatever kind to create false security, re-

²⁷¹ Cf. *Disc.* 97.

²⁷² 1 Tim. 6:10.

²⁷³ *Th.* 1.1-17.

liance on worldly rather than heavenly strength, and the use of other people's opinions to guarantee our own sense of worth.²⁷⁴

Some of these causal dependences that Evagrius here specifies are familiar: to succumb to *logismoi* of gluttony is to invite those of fornication.²⁷⁵ *Logismoi* of distress often result from the frustration of desires, including those related to anger. Others are new: anger – a troubled *thumos* – relates to the desire for food, wealth or esteem,²⁷⁶ while pride has roots in avarice.²⁷⁷ And some connections are omitted, for example the fact that *logismoi* of distress can lead to those of acedia,²⁷⁸ those of avarice to those of vainglory and the latter to those of pride,²⁷⁹ distress or fornication.

The causal relations among the *logismoi* are also the subject of a chain of three aphorisms in *Reflections*; that these refer to the everyday experience of the *logismoi* is indicated by the quotation from the Book of Proverbs in the third:

Τῶν λογισμῶν οἱ μὲν ἡγοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ἔπονται· καὶ ἡγοῦνται μὲν οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας,²⁸⁰ ἔπονται δὲ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ θυμοῦ.²⁸¹

Among *logismoi*, there are some that lead and there are some that follow: those that derive from *epithumia* are in the lead and those that derive from *thumos* follow after.

²⁷⁴ Williams (2007: 4).

²⁷⁵ See above, 2.4; 3.4.1, 2.

²⁷⁶ Cf. *Pry.* 27: 'Desire provides material for anger, and the latter in turn troubles the intellectual eye, spoiling the state of prayer'. Also *Disc.* 166: '*Logismoi* that derive from *epithumia* are in the forefront, those that derive from the *thumos* follow after. And so all *logismoi* that produce in us love of the world and the things in it (cf. 1 John 2:15) derive from *epithumia*, but with the privation of these things [the *logismoi*] from the *thumos* naturally supervene, so that if we neither loved nor desired [the things in the world] we would never become angry through being deprived of them. If therefore you see someone angry or resentful or distressed or jealous, find out by which of the *pathē* of *epithumia* he has previously been overpowered.' (Οἱ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας λογισμοὶ προηγούμενοί εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ θυμικοῦ ἐπόμενοι. Ὅσοι οὖν λογισμοὶ ἀγάπην ἐμποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶ· κατὰ στέρησιν δὲ τούτων πεφύκασιν οἱ τοῦ θυμικοῦ ἐπισυμβαίνειν, ὥστε εἰ οὐδὲν ἡγαπῶμεν ἢ ἐπεθυμοῦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ὠργιζόμεθά ποτε, στερισκόμενοι τούτων. Ἐὰν οὖν ἴδῃς τινὰ ὀργιζόμενον ἢ μνησικακοῦντα ἢ λυπούμενον ἢ φθονοῦντα, γίνωσκε ποίου τῶν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παθῶν προητηθή.)

²⁷⁷ Cf. *Th.* 21.12-22, quoted below.

²⁷⁸ See above, 3.4.4. Interestingly, acedia is not mentioned in *On Thoughts*.

²⁷⁹ Cf. *Th.* 21.

²⁸⁰ Some manuscripts read ὑπερηφανίας, but the reading ἐπιθυμίας is supported by two Greek manuscripts and the Syriac version, and I agree with Sinkewicz as to its greater plausibility; cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 278, n.26; 304).

²⁸¹ *Rfl.* 41.

Τῶν ἡγουμένων λογισμῶν οἱ μὲν πάλιν προηγούνται, οἱ δὲ ἔπονται· καὶ προηγούνται μὲν, οἱ ἐκ τῆς γαστριμαργίας, ἔπονται δὲ οἱ τῆς πορνείας.²⁸²

Among the *logismoi* that lead, some in turn are in the forefront, while others follow on: those in the forefront come from gluttony and those that follow derive from fornication.

Τῶν ἐπομένων λογισμῶν τοῖς πρώτοις οἱ μὲν ἡγούνται, οἱ δὲ ἔπονται· καὶ ἡγούνται μὲν οἱ τῆς λύπης, ἔπονται δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς· εἶγε, κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, λόγος λυπηρὸς ἐγείρει ὀργάς.²⁸³

Among the *logismoi* that follow the first, some lead and some follow: those of distress lead and those of anger follow, according to the Proverb, ‘A hurtful word rouses anger’.²⁸⁴

The second aphorism’s subdivision of the *logismoi* that lead into those in the forefront and those that follow on is new, as is the idea of *logismoi* that derive from fornication. Both appear to be unique to it. The third is inconsistent with Evagrius’ claim that distress is constituted from *logismoi* of anger and results from the frustration of a desire for revenge,²⁸⁵ although consistent with the sequence of the *logismoi* in the *Praktikos*, *Vices* and *Antirrhêtikos*. All three confirm the causal priority of epithumetic *logismoi* over those deriving from the *thumos*.

Just as gluttony forms the natural beginning of the sequence in experiential terms, so vainglory and pride form its natural conclusion:

Μόνοι τῶν λογισμῶν οἱ τῆς κενοδοξίας καὶ ὑπερηφανίας μετὰ τὴν ἥτταν τῶν λοιπῶν λογισμῶν, ἐπυσυμβαίνουσι λογισμοί.²⁸⁶

Alone among the *logismoi*, the *logismoi* of vainglory and pride supervene upon the defeat of the remaining *logismoi*.

²⁸² *Rfl.* 42.

²⁸³ *Rfl.* 43.

²⁸⁴ Prov. 15.1.

²⁸⁵ Cf. *8Th.* 5.1.

²⁸⁶ *Rfl.* 57.

Chapter 21 of *On Thoughts* gives an example of how one *logismos* can lead to another, in this case avarice into vainglory and the latter into pride. In doing so it underlines the independence of such trains of thought from the eightfold sequence.

It appears to me that the demon of avarice is the most varied and ingenious in deceit (πάνυ ποικίλος...πρὸς ἀπάτην εὐμήχανος). Often constrained by the most severe renunciation, he immediately pretends to be the administrator and the friend of the poor; he generously receives guests who are not yet there; he sends assistance to others who are in need; he visits the city's prisons and he buys those who are being sold; he attaches himself (κολλᾶται) to wealthy women and indicates to them who should be treated well; and those who have acquired an ample purse he advises to renounce it. And deceiving the soul little by little in this way, he encompasses it (αὐτὴν...περιβάλλει) with the *logismoi* of avarice and hands it over (παραδίδωσι) to the demon of vainglory. This demon introduces a crowd of people who glorify the Lord for these arrangements and certain people who gradually speak among themselves about the priesthood; he then predicts the death of the incumbent priest and adds that he should not flee after accomplishing so many things. In this way, the wretched *nous*, now bound (ἐνδεθεῖς) by these *logismoi* attacks those people opposed (to his priesthood), but those offering acceptance he readily lavishes with gifts and approves their good sense; but those who are rivals he hands over to the magistrates and demands that they be expelled from the city.²⁸⁷

Here Evagrius exposes the hidden motivations behind apparently philanthropic fantasies. What we would call self-deception is in the first instance, the demons' deception of us; only if we fail to recognise it do we then fall prey to self-deception. Here they exploit the monk's philanthropic concerns to seduce him into daydreams in which he begins by acting upon them and thereby benefits their objects but ends up in daydreams of self-aggrandizement and skulduggery. Nor is this the end of it:

Then as these *logismoi* are present and churning around within (ἔνδον ὄντων...καὶ στρεφομένων), immediately the demon of pride appears, forming continual lightning flashes in the air of the cell and sending forth winged dragons, and finally provoking the loss of reason (στέρησιν φρενῶν).²⁸⁸

In terms of how the *logismoi* are experienced day to day, then, gluttony is the most fundamental in that succumbing to it causes vulnerability to all the other *logismoi*: to con-

²⁸⁷ *Th.* 21.1-12.

²⁸⁸ *Th.* 21.22-26.

trol the stomach is to diminish the *pathē* whereas to accede to its demands is to give increase to pleasures.²⁸⁹ At the other end of the sequence, defeat of the preceding *logismoi* paves the way for vainglory and pride. So there are certain predictable causal connections among the *logismoi* but they do not always correspond to the sequence of the eightfold classification. In particular the priority of gluttony, avarice and vainglory bears no obvious relation to it.

What about the way in which the *logismoi* are experienced over a lifetime? Will a person have to begin by overcoming those of gluttony, then deal with those of fornication, then avarice, and so forth, until finally he is confronted with pride? Both Guillaumont and Ware note that the sequence of the eightfold classification reflects in a general way the monk's spiritual development. As Ware puts it, 'beginners contend against the grosser and more materialistic sins...those in the middle of the journey are confronted by the more inward temptations of discouragement and irritability...the more advanced, already initiated into contemplation, still need to guard themselves against the most subtle and "spiritual" of the vices, vainglory and pride.'²⁹⁰ Both however stress the generality of this schema, Guillaumont noting that although the sequence has to some extent an empirical basis it is also largely a matter of convention since for Evagrius the reality is ultimately not susceptible of such systematic representation.²⁹¹ Both of these interpretations are, in my view, correct, as is Williams' observation that for Evagrius as for Casian, 'the *logismoi*...are not a disconnected assemblage of regrettable tendencies, but a complex pattern of moral vulnerability. The list of the eight passions or thoughts is less of a catalogue than a genealogy, beginning from the most elementary impulse to misuse the material world we inhabit, and traced through to the most sophisticated of self-delusions.'²⁹²

²⁸⁹ Cf. *8Th.* 1.2.

²⁹⁰ Ware (1982: 62-3). Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 93);

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² Williams (2007: 7).

2.1.5 Summary

What Evagrius calls the *logismoi* play a key role in his anthropology and psychology. This section has sought to reconstruct and explain the theory implicit in his use of the term. It began by noting that *apatheia*, being constituted by the practical virtues,²⁹³ is cultivated by choosing virtue in preference to vice and that for a monk this means mastering his responses to the *logismoi*. It then examined Evagrius' use of the term *logismos*. It noted that, following Origen, he recognises that *logismoi* can be of angelic or human provenance as well as demonic, but that in practice he reserves the term for the latter type. It was noted that (demonic) *logismoi* are always associated with *pathos*, always involve *noēmata* of sensible objects, frequently exercise *de facto* agency, and induce us to construct on the basis of our desires fictional worlds, populated by phantoms, in which those desires can be satisfied. Evagrius' concept of the 'matter' of *logismoi* was discussed and identified as that which inspires and gives plausibility to the *logismoi* and thereby invigorates the fictional worlds that they lead us to construct. Then his eightfold classification of generic *logismoi* was examined, including consideration of its immediate precedents and of the individual *logismoi*. Because of the close association between the *logismoi* and *pathos*, this revealed the sort of phenomena that Evagrius regards as *pathē* and how the *logismoi* destabilise the movements of the *nous* and soul, this destabilisation being the psychological expression of excessive vital heat. Finally, the rationale for the eightfold classification of generic *logismoi* was discussed, first in terms of the derivation of the *logismoi* from the parts of the soul, it being concluded that for the most part there is no straightforward relation between them and that this reflects the lack of a clear-cut boundary between the cognitive and the affective in Evagrius' psychology;²⁹⁴ and, second, in terms of the relation between the sequence and the way in which the *logismoi* are experienced, both day-to-day and across a person's lifetime. It was noted that while the sequence is largely a matter of convention, it is also a genealogy that maps the progression from the most primitive ways of erring in our interaction with the external world to the most sophisticated.

²⁹³ Cf. Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31.

²⁹⁴ See below, 2.2.4.

2.2 *Pathos*

Pathos involves the directedness of the *nous* toward the sensible world and so away from God. Each time a person succumbs to it he mirrors the primordial fall of the *logikos* that is his essence. The cognitive instigators and correlates of *pathos* are the *logismoi*, consideration of which has, accordingly, comprehensively illustrated the sort of phenomena that Evagrius regards as *pathē*. This section looks at how *pathos* was understood by some earlier thinkers before considering how Evagrius construes it in theoretical terms. Then the association between *pathos* and *noēmata* is examined. The section concludes with an analysis of how *pathos* is aroused.

2.2.1 A preliminary understanding of *pathos*

The sense of the term *pathos* assumed in pagan philosophical discussions of *apatheia* and *metriopatheia* tends to be treated by modern commentators as roughly coextensive with that of our ‘emotion’ or ‘passion’. But in fact *pathos* has a far wider range of connotations and the fit between it and these modern terms is poor. Long and Sedley draw attention to this in the case of the Stoics, noting that for them *pathos* is ‘an unhealthy state of mind, not synonymous with emotion in ordinary language.’²⁹⁵ This is equally true of Evagrius, for whom, as we have seen, the *pathē* include not just occurrent emotions such as anger, sadness and anxiety, but moods such as boredom and listlessness; dispositions such as irascibility; all desires associated with food, sex and money, and vices such as avarice and spiritual pride.

So what did the term *pathos* mean to the ancient Greeks? As Konstan notes, the word *pathos* derives from the verb *paschō*, meaning “to suffer” or “to experience”, and, like the Latin *patior*, to which it is related, derives from a prehistoric stem **pa* which has the basic sense of “suffer”. Via *patior* it is related to the English words “passion” and “passive.”²⁹⁶ Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen note that

²⁹⁵ Long & Sedley (1987: 420).

²⁹⁶ Konstan (2006: 3).

The basic meaning of the term *pathos* is not ‘emotion’; *pathos* stands for a much more general notion which covers all accidental and contingent changes that happen to somebody in contrast to what he or she actively does. The broad sense of *pathos*, familiar from Aristotle’s *Categories* and *Metaphysics*, comes out in translations such as ‘affection’, ‘experience’, ‘undergoing’ or ‘attribute’ as opposed to ‘emotion’ or even ‘passion’.²⁹⁷

But in addition it can, as Aristotle makes clear, have a distinctively negative timbre: the third of the four definitions of it that he offers in the *Metaphysics* reads, ‘especially, injurious alterations and movements, and, above all, painful injuries’ (ἔτι τούτων μᾶλλον αἱ βλαβεραὶ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ κινήσεις, καὶ μάλιστα αἱ λυπηραὶ βλάβαι).²⁹⁸ Konstan summarises its meaning as follows:

In classical Greek, *pathos* may refer more generally to what befalls a person, often in the negative sense of an accident or misfortune, although it may also bear the neutral significance of a condition or state of affairs. In philosophical language *pathos* sometimes signifies a secondary quality as opposed to the essence of a thing (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1022b15-21; Urmson 1990: 126-7).²⁹⁹ Psychologically, it may denote a mental activity or phenomenon such as remembering (Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscencia*, 449b4-7; cf. 449b24-5 for memory as the *pathos* of formerly perceived or contemplated things).³⁰⁰

So *pathos* carries connotations of passivity and suffering; of being a contingent or accidental state which arises in reaction to an external stimulus toward which it is consequently directed and which is likely to be injurious to the person concerned, and which is something that befalls him rather than something he actually does. And this in essence is how philosophers construe it in relation to *apatheia* and *metriopatheia*. Regardless of which of these they consider the proper goal for man, and regardless too of the other issues which became embroiled in the associated controversies, it would seem that these basic characteristics of *pathos* are agreed upon.

There is however one key point at which this philosophical understanding of *pathos* departs from its more general cluster of meanings: as evidenced by the fact that philoso-

²⁹⁷ Sihvola & Engberg-Pedersen (1998: viii).

²⁹⁸ *Met.* 1022b18-19, trans. W D Ross.

²⁹⁹ Urmson, J O, *The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary*, London 1990.

³⁰⁰ Konstan (2006: 3-4).

phers debated whether man's goal should be *apatheia* or *metriopatheia*, they maintained that our susceptibility to *pathos* could be modified and denied that it is something that simply befalls us as opposed to something that we do. The philosophical view, although variously developed, is that the *pathē* are in principle, if not always in practice, under our control. The bridge between what is actually possible and what is possible in theory is formed by the training of the soul, of which more below.³⁰¹ This being the case, the association of *pathos* with passivity needs to be qualified: the soul can be trained not to succumb to *pathos* and a soul thus trained can avoid passivity in respect of it. So although *pathos* in this context retains its connotations of passivity and suffering; of being a contingent or accidental state which arises in reaction to an external stimulus toward which it is consequently directed, and of likely being injurious to the person concerned, the proposition that it is something that befalls a person as opposed to something he does is rejected.

All of these features of *pathos* are to be found in Evagrius' understanding of it. A brief consideration of its principal antecedents - the views of the Stoics, Clement of Alexandria and Origen - will set it in context.

According to Stobaeus,

πάθος δ' εἶναι φασιν ὀρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῆ τῷ αἰροῦντι λόγῳ ἢ κίνησιν ψυχῆς <ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν (εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς).³⁰²

[The Stoics] say that *pathos* is impulse which is excessive and disobedient to the dictates of reason, or a movement of the soul which is irrational and contrary to nature; and that all *pathē* belong to the soul's *hêgemonikon*.³⁰³

What does this mean? For the Stoics a *pathos* is a movement of the soul in virtue of being an impulse. It is characterised by excess. As an impulse it is generated by assent to a proposition and can therefore be identified with a judgement ascribing a truth value to it. In this sense, a *pathos* is a value judgement. It is however a false one since it ascribes positive or negative value to things whose value is indifferent. As false judgements

³⁰¹ See below, 4.6.

³⁰² Stobaeus 2:88, SVF 3.378; LS 65A (trans. theirs).

³⁰³ By 'the Stoics' here and below is meant 'orthodox Stoics'.

pathē are irrational in the sense of being disobedient to right reason,³⁰⁴ and are contrary to nature because it is natural for man, as a rational animal, to follow right reason.³⁰⁵

The association of *pathos* with excess is closely connected with its irrationality. Galen reports the following elucidation by Chrysippus of what is meant by saying that the impulse constituting a *pathos* is excessive:

οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πορεύεσθαι καθ' ὀρμὴν οὐ πλεονάζει ἢ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις ἀλλὰ συναπαρτίζει τι τῇ ὀρμῇ ὥστε καὶ στῆναι, ὅταν ἐθέλη, καὶ μεταβάλλειν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τρεχόντων καθ' ὀρμὴν οὐκέτι τοιοῦτον γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλεονάζει παρὰ τὴν ὀρμὴν ἢ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις ὥστε ἐκφέρεσθαι καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εὐπειθῶς οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐναρξασμένων. αἷς οἶμαί τι παραπλήσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρμῶν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν κατὰ λόγον ὑπερβαίνειν συμμετρίαν, ὥσθ' ὅταν ὀρμῆ μὴ εὐπειθῶς ἔχειν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ δρόμου τοῦ πλεονασμοῦ παρὰ τὴν ὀρμὴν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ὀρμῆς παρὰ τὸν λόγον. συμμετρία γὰρ ἐστὶ φυσικῆς ὀρμῆς ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ ἕως τοσοῦτου <οὐ> [καὶ ἕως] αὐτὸς ἀξιοῖ.³⁰⁶

When someone walks in accordance with his impulse, the movement of his legs is not excessive but commensurate with the impulse, so that he can stop or change whenever he wants to. But when people run in accordance with their impulse, this sort of thing no longer happens. The movement of their legs exceeds their impulse, so that they are carried away and unable to change obediently, as soon as they have started to do so. Something similar, I think, takes place with impulses, owing to their going beyond the rational proportion. The result is that when someone has the impulse he is not obedient to reason. The excess in running is called ‘contrary to the impulse’, but the excess in the impulse is called ‘contrary to reason’. For the proportion of a natural impulse is what accords with reason and goes only so far as reason itself thinks right.³⁰⁷

Impulses have a ‘proper and natural proportion’ (καθ' αὐτοῦς καὶ φυσικὴν τῶν ὀρμῶν συμμετρίαν).³⁰⁸ An impulse that accords with this will be perfectly obedient to reason whereas one that exceeds it will not. Chrysippus illustrates this with reference to the actions of walking and running. When a person walks, the movement of his body is fully under his control. But when he runs his control over his movement is compromised such that there will be an interval between his decision to stop running and his actually doing so. An impulse of ‘proper and natural proportion’ is like the

³⁰⁴ Cf. Inwood (1985: 157).

³⁰⁵ Cf. Galen, *PHP* 4:2.10ff, *SVF* 3: 462, *LS* 65J.

³⁰⁶ *PHP* 4:2.10-18, *SVF* 3.463, part; *LS* 65J.

³⁰⁷ Trans. Long and Sedley.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

action of walking, wholly and immediately obedient to reason, whereas an excessive impulse is like the action of running, beyond the agent's immediate control.

Proneness to *pathē* arises from poor condition of the soul; specifically, poor pneumatic tension of the *hegemonikon*.³⁰⁹ This, together with the irrationality and excessiveness of the impulses which constitute *pathē* is why they are regarded as ailments (ἄρρωστήματα). Chrysippus cites in this connection the case of Menelaus who had resolved that it would be correct to kill Helen when he confronted her at Troy, but when the time came was overcome by her beauty so that he failed to act in accordance with his resolve.³¹⁰ “Menelaus acted on what he saw to be a bad reason because his whole character was weak; an impulse was excessive in him which a stronger character might have resisted.”³¹¹ The false opinion that possessions, for example, are a good is not yet an ailment, but it becomes so when it becomes love of property (φιλοχρηματία) and money (φιλαργυρία), that is, when it acquires an affective charge,³¹² people with unhealthy souls being disposed to this happening. Thus Galen reports Chrysippus as comparing the souls of inferior men with bodies which are especially prone to illness.³¹³

The Stoic understanding of *pathos* is taken up by both Clement of Alexandria and Origen. Clement defines it as follows:

ὄρμη μὲν οὖν φορὰ διανοίας ἐπί τι ἢ ἀπό του· πάθος δὲ πλεονάζουσα ὄρμη ἢ ὑπερτείνουσα τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον μέτρα, ἢ ὄρμη ἐκφερομένη καὶ ἀπειθής λόγῳ· παρὰ φύσιν οὖν κίνησις ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀπειθειαν τὰ πάθη.³¹⁴

Impulse is the motion of the *dianoia* to or from something. *Pathos* is an excessive impulse that overreaches the measures of reason, or impulse unbridled and disobedient to reason. *Pathê*, then, are a movement of the soul contrary to nature, in disobedience to reason.

Origen commences the third book of the *De Principiis* with an account of the Stoic theory of action, of which their theory of *pathos* is an aspect. So although he does not say

³⁰⁹ Cf. Annas (1992: 106).

³¹⁰ Cf. Annas (1992: 107).

³¹¹ Annas (1992: 107).

³¹² *PHP* 4:5, *SVF* 3.480, part; *LS* 65L.

³¹³ *PHP* 5:2, Posidonius fr. 163, part; *LS* 65R. Cf. Stobaeus 2:93 (*SVF* 3.421); *LS* 65S.

³¹⁴ *Strom.* 2.13.59.6.

so directly, it can be assumed that he too would regard *pathos* as excessive impulse; he certainly associates it with excess. Arguing that even in the absence of demonic influence we are capable of exceeding due measure and moderation in our appetites for food, drink and sex, he notes that

My own opinion is that the same process of reasoning can be applied to the rest of the natural movements (*naturalibus motibus*), such as covetousness, anger, sorrow or any others whatever, which by the fault of intemperance exceed the limits of their natural measure (*per intemperantiae vitium modum mensurae naturalis excedunt*).³¹⁵

He continues:

*Initia quidem et velut quaedam semina peccatorum ab his rebus, quae in usu naturaliter habentur, accipimus; cum vero indulserimus ultra quam satis est et non resisterimus adversum primos intemperantiae motus, tunc primi huius delicti accipiens locum virtus inimica instigat et perurget omni modo studens profusius dilatare peccata, nobis quidem hominibus occasiones et initia praebentibus peccatorum, inimicis autem potestatibus latius ea et longius et si fieri potest absque ullo fine propagantibus. Ita denique in avaritiam lapsus efficitur, cum primo homines parum quid pecuniae desiderant, deinde augescente vitio cupiditas increscit. Post haec iam etiam cum caecitas menti ex passione successerit, inimicis virtutibus suggerentibus ac perurgentibus, pecunia iam non desideratur, sed rapitur et vi aut etiam sanguinis humani profusione conquiritur.*³¹⁶

We derive the beginnings and what we may call the seeds of sin from those desires which are given to us naturally for our own use. But when we indulge these to excess and offer no resistance to the first movements towards intemperance, then the hostile power, seizing the opportunity of this first offence, incites and urges us on in every way, striving to extend the sins over a larger field; so that while we men supply the occasions and beginnings of our sins, the hostile powers spread them far and wide and if possible endlessly. It is thus that the fall into avarice at last takes place, men first longing for a little money and then increasing in greed as the vice grows. Afterwards their *pathos* is succeeded by a mental blindness and, with the hostile powers stimulating and urging them on, money is now not merely longed for but even seized by force or acquired through the shedding of human blood.

³¹⁵ DP 3.2.2 (R).

³¹⁶ Ibid.

It can be noted that here Origen uses Seneca's term for the first stage in the arousal of anger, namely 'first movements' (*primi motus*).³¹⁷

2.2.2 Evagrius' understanding of *pathos*

Prima facie Evagrius' understanding of *pathos* would seem to have much in common with that of the Stoics. He would agree that a *pathos* is excessive and disobedient to reason, irrational and contrary to nature, and that in a sense all *pathē* belong to the *hêgemonikon*. Like the Stoics he regards a *pathos* as a movement of the soul; indeed, for him the association of *pathos* with movement is fundamental, firstly because each episode of *pathos* mirrors the primordial fall of the *logikoi* from God, and secondly because *pathos* is intrinsically destabilising in respect of the *nous*. Unlike them, however, he does not speak of *pathos* as an impulse.³¹⁸ Nor does he speak of it as generated by an assent to a proposition or as a judgement, although he might agree that it could in principle be analysed in this way due to his belief that the *pathêtikon* part of the soul is simply thickened *nous*, meaning that for him as for the Stoics the human soul is – in principle at least - entirely rational. Like the Stoics, Evagrius believes the quality of human rationality to be variable; for them this is due to the *tonos* of the *pneuma*; for him, to the 'thickening' of the *nous*. Evagrius would certainly agree that the judgement giving rise to a *pathos* represents a false evaluation, but he would understand this as a tacit preference for the sensible world over God. Because he holds the three parts of the soul to be aspects of the *nous*, and because he identifies the *hêgemonikon* with the *nous*, he could agree that all *pathē* belong to the *hêgemonikon*. Both Evagrius and the Stoics view human irrationality as a change to rationality rather than its absence, although, unlike Evagrius, orthodox Stoicism rejects the theory of psychic partition, and both regard human irrationality, and therefore *pathos*, as contrary to nature and as a malady of the soul.³¹⁹

³¹⁷ *De Ira* 2.4.1.

³¹⁸ The word *hormê* occurs only five times in his Greek corpus: in the expressions 'impassioned impulse' (ὄρμηξ ἐμπαθοῦς; *8Th.* 1.35) and 'licentious impulse' (ὄρμηξ ἀκόλαστον; *8Th.* 2.11); to denote the onrush of fire (ὄρμηξ πυρός; *AV.* 37); assaults by the demons (τὰς τῶν δαιμόνων ὀρμάς; *Prakt.* 77.1) and attacks by the impious (ὀρμάς ἀσεβῶν ἐπερχομένας; *Th.* 27.31).

³¹⁹ E.g. *PHP* 4.5.21-5 (*SVF* 3.480, part); *LS* 65L.

Evagrius nowhere defines *pathos* but attention to his writings reveals that for him it retains its traditional associations with excess, passivity and changeability in respect of an external influence, directedness to a causative external stimulus and injuriousness to the agent, and for him too the agent is responsible for his *pathê*. The passivity and changeability in respect of an external influence characteristic of *pathos* are properties of the *empathês nous* in relation to the sensible world. *Pathos* renders the *nous* passive and changeable in relation to the external world by ‘binding’ it to it.³²⁰ *Disciples* 112 reports the following teaching:

Οὐ τὸ ἔχειν πράγματα βλάπτει ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμπαθῶς ἔχειν· πλεονάσασα γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἀγροῦ μέριμνα καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα ἀγάπη ἀλλοτρίους τῆς γνώσεως ἡμᾶς ποιεῖ. Οἱ οὖν ἅγιοι γυναῖκας ἔχοντες καὶ πλοῦτον οὐδὲν ἐβλάβησαν, καὶ γὰρ ὁ Ἰὼβ τὰ τέκνα ἀπολέσας ἐφιλοσόφει καὶ τοὺς φίλους διωρθοῦτο, ἅτε πάθη μὴ ἔχων.³²¹

It is not the possession of objects that harms us, but their impassioned possession, because when the worry of a farmer³²² or love for a wife³²³ have become excessive, they render us strangers to knowledge. The saints who had wives and wealth did not suffer any harm, so Job, when he had lost his children, philosophized and corrected his friends since he did not have *pathê*.

This echoes the Stoic view according to which virtue is good, vice is evil and all else is indifferent. Things themselves do not have the capacity to harm us; what causes the damage is our attitude toward them.³²⁴ The ‘worry of a farmer’ and ‘love for a wife’ allude to the Parable of the Banquet at Luke 14:16-24. The first guest invited to the banquet declines the invitation because he has to go to his field, the second because of his oxen and the third because of his wife. The banquet symbolises the Kingdom of God,³²⁵ and the point being made is that in order to follow Jesus a person must be prepared to renounce all else.³²⁶ Evagrius’ point is that a person’s feelings for a thing become a *pathos* when that thing takes precedence for him over the Kingdom of God; that is, when those feelings have become excessive. The Kingdom of God, for him, is

³²⁰ Cf. *Thoughts* 40.3-5; *Rfl.* 23; see below, 2.2.3.

³²¹ *Disc.* 112.

³²² Cf. Luke 14:18.

³²³ Cf. Luke 14:20.

³²⁴ Cf., e.g., Epictetus, *Ench.* 5: ‘It is not things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about them.’

³²⁵ Cf. Luke 14:15.

³²⁶ Cf. Luke 14: 26-33.

knowledge of the Holy Trinity,³²⁷ hence the *pathē* ‘render us strangers to knowledge.’ He invokes the example of Job to illustrate the correct attitude, one that finds echoes in both Epictetus and Origen.³²⁸ It should however be noted that, given his emphasis on the warfare *kata dianoian*,³²⁹ the excessiveness of *pathos* finds expression not only in the decision, say, to go to the theatre instead of to church, or in a person’s loss of faith in the face of adversity. It is at play in every instance of temptation. Given the necessity of *apatheia* to the practice of contemplation and, ultimately, to redemption, the very fact that a person has to struggle to resist the temptation to eat when hungry, or the temptation to allow *logismoi* of fornication to linger, shows that his love for God must compete for his attention with the pleasures of food and sex.

While *Disciples* 112 defines *pathos* in terms of excess, *Disciples* 130 locates its origin in excess:

Τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τῆς καθόλου ἐπιθυμίας, γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ πορνείας, φιλαργυρίας τε καὶ κενοδοξίας, καὶ τῶν ἐξῆς, ὁ πλεονασμὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ φίλτρου οὗ ἔδωκεν ὁ θεὸς τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα.³³⁰

The cause of *epithumia* in general – gluttony and fornication, avarice and vain-glory and so forth – is an excess of the natural love that God has given the soul for the body.³³¹

Like the *logismoi*, *pathos* has its physiological source in an excess of the body’s vital heat, the result of conforming one’s intake of food to the body’s insatiable desire for

³²⁷ Cf. *Prakt.* 3.

³²⁸ Cf. Epictetus, *Ench.* 3: ‘If you kiss your own child or wife, say to yourself that you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be disturbed (οὐ παραχθήσῃ)’. At *C.Matt.* 10:24.1-26 Origen, discussing sicknesses of the soul (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρρωστήματα), interprets Paul’s reference to the ‘sickly’ (ἀρρωστοί) at 1 Cor. 11:30 as meaning those who ‘instead of loving God "with all their soul and all their heart and all their mind," love money, or a little glory, or wife, or children’ (ἀντὶ τοῦ τὸν θεὸν ἀγαπᾶν, ἀγαπῶντες ἀργύρια ἢ δοξάρια ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ παῖδας). He alludes to the Parable of the Banquet at *Ex.Mart.* 37 in urging Ambrose and Protoctetus not to shrink from martyrdom.

³²⁹ Cf. *Prakt.* 48; see above, 3.0.

³³⁰ *Disc.* 130.2-6.

³³¹ At *Disc.* 41 Evagrius identifies ὁ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα πάθος with self-love (φιλαυτία). If ‘an excess of the natural love that God has given the soul for the body’ is self-love then this passage echoes *Reflections* 53: ‘First of all [the *logismoi*] is the *logismos* of self-love, after which come the eight.’ However, at *Disc.* 57 Evagrius distinguishes between self-love as ‘the mother of all [the *logismoi*]’ and ‘the enemy of the soul, the flesh (τῆς ἐχθρᾶς τῇ ψυχῇ, τουτέστι τῆς σαρκός)’; cf. Rom. 8:7.

food.³³² So Evagrius could mean one or both of two things here. He could be saying that an excessive love for the body makes us want to conform our eating to its desire for food, blinding us to the fact that the body's true welfare lies in the health of the soul and leading us to fuel the *epithumêtikon*. Or he could be making the more general point that an excessive love for the body spills over into an excessive attachment to external things, making them seem more important than God. In both cases *pathos* retains its traditional association with excess.³³³

For Evagrius, then, *pathos* involves an attachment to corporeal creation which amounts to a *de facto* preference for it over God and which is therefore excessive. This attachment can be seen as the distorted image of the natural love of the *nous* for God. Likewise, the passivity of the *empathês nous* in relation to the sensible world can be seen as the distorted image of its natural receptivity to God. The changeability in relation to the sensible world that *pathos* represents for the *nous* is, like the passivity, a consequence of the attachment to corporeal creation that it constitutes, since that attachment subjects the *nous* to corporeal creation's changeability. And the attachment of the *nous* to the sensible world, along with its passivity and changeability in relation to it, comprises the directedness to a causative external stimulus characteristic of *pathos*. This directedness is reflected at the psychological level by the facts that the *pathê* are naturally set in motion by the senses (ὕπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάθη)³³⁴ and that a desire is joined to every *pathos* (ὄρεξις δὲ παντὶ πάθει συνέζευκται),³³⁵ and in general by the close association of *pathos* with sensation, desire and pleasure:

Πάσης μὲν ἡδονῆς ἐπιθυμία κατάρχει, ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ τίκτει αἴσθησις· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθήσεως ἄμοιρον καὶ πάθους ἐλεύθερον.³³⁶

Desire is the source of every pleasure, and sensation gives birth to appetite. For that which has no part in sensation is also free from *pathos*.

³³² See above, section 2.4, 3.4.1.

³³³ However, it is only in the two chapters of *Disciples* quoted above that he speaks of excess (πλεονάσσα, πλεονασμός) in relation to the *pathê* in general, his uses of the word *pleonexia*, both in his own writings and elsewhere in *Disciples*, relating to greed in the context of avarice. Cf. *Prakt.* Prol. 41; *Th.* 4.20-1, 8.21, 17.21, 22.6, 30.11; Sch. 157.3 on Prov. 17:9; Sch. 38.8 on Eccl. 5:7-11; *Disc.* 42.5, 69.4, 82.1.

³³⁴ *Prakt.* 38. However, the *pathê* can also be set in motion by memory or by the demons; cf. *Rfl.* 59.

³³⁵ *8Th.* 5.10.

³³⁶ *Prakt.* 4.2-4.

Τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ πάθη ἐκ τῶν φυσικῶν τῆς σαρκὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν λαμβάνει, καθ' ὧν καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τὰ δὲ ψυχικὰ ἐκ τῶν ψυχικῶν τὴν κύησιν ἔχει, καθ' ὧν καὶ ἡ ἀγάπη.³³⁷

The *pathē* of the body take their origin from the natural [desires] of the flesh, against which self-control [is effective]; the *pathē* of the soul have their conception from the [desires] of the soul, against which love [is effective].

Τὰ μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχει τὰς ἀφορμάς· τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος· καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῦ σώματος πάθη περικόπτει ἐγκράτεια, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγάπη πνευματική.³³⁸

The *pathē* of the soul have their origin in human beings; those of the body have their origin in the body. Self-control cuts away the *pathē* of the body; spiritual love cuts away those of the soul.

The injuriousness to the agent that characterises *pathos* arises from its distancing him from God, as a result of which the person in thrall to *pathos* is 'sickly' (ἄρρωστος).³³⁹ Finally, our responsibility for our *pathē* is stated in *Praktikos* 6,³⁴⁰ and again in *Disciples*:

Κακία οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ νοῦς οὐδὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐδὲ τὸ νόημα τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ τὸ πάθος τὸ συνεζευγμένον τῷ νοήματι· ἐγὼ δὲ αἴτιος τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῆς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως αὐτῆς.³⁴¹

Vice is not the *nous* nor the object nor the *noēma* of the object, but the *pathos* that is yoked together with the object,³⁴² and I am the cause of its existence, since also of its destruction.

We are responsible for our *pathē* both in the cosmological sense, in that *pathos* came into existence through our choosing to turn away from God, and in the moral and psychological sense, in that each time we succumb to *pathos* we do so by choice. This reflection of the cosmological by the moral and psychological is the reason why whenever

³³⁷ *Eul.* 21.23.

³³⁸ *Prakt.* 35.

³³⁹ *Disc.* 203.7; cf. Origen, *C.Matt.* 10:24. At *Prakt.* 54.5-6 Evagrius associates our becoming sick (νοσοῦμεν) in a given part of the soul with the *pathē* of that part growing in strength (ισχύει).

³⁴⁰ Cf. *Prakt.* 6.7-8; see above, 3.4.

³⁴¹ *Disc.* 165.

³⁴² The meaning of this will be discussed in the following section.

we allow ourselves to succumb to *pathos* we effectively repeat our primordial deflection from God and consequent fall into corporeality.

It might be supposed that, because we are responsible for our *pathē*, to succumb to an episode of *pathos* counts as a sin, but this is not the case. Although *pathos* is something we choose, it is not, according to *Disciples* 157, yet a sin but only its herald:

Πρὶν ἢ τὴν κατὰ διάνοιαν τελεσθῆναι ἁμαρτίαν, δύο ἔλεγεν εἶναι τεκμήρια καὶ οἰονεὶ προοίμια· αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτὸ λογισμοί.³⁴³

Before the accomplishment of a sin *kata dianoian*, [Evagrius] said, there are two signs and two as it were preliminaries: the *pathos* itself and the *logismoι* around it.

In maintaining that to succumb to *pathos* is not yet to sin, Evagrius extends the range of both our self-control and our moral responsibility. Even though a person might be in the throes of *pathos*, it is still possible for him to extricate himself rather than allow himself to be carried to sin *kata dianoian* or *kat' energeian*.³⁴⁴ How this might work in practice is discussed in Section 2.2.4.

It has been stated that *pathos* involves an attachment to the sensible world, but given the range of phenomena that Evagrius regards as *pathē* this might seem rather strange. Certainly there is nothing problematic about the idea of a desire for gold or human esteem involving such attachment, nor many cases of distress, anger and so forth. But how can hunger or thirst *per se*, or the fatigue characteristic of acedia, be said to involve such an attachment? The answer lies in Evagrius' anthropology. Since the *nous* is by nature contemplative, any activity or state other than that of contemplation is unnatural to it. The prerequisite for contemplation is *apatheia*. Since any awareness of physical affectivity distracts the *nous* from contemplation, this must include *apatheia* in respect of the body:

³⁴³ *Disc.* 157.1-3.

³⁴⁴ An example of how *pathos* can lead to sin *kat' energeian* occurs at *Th.* 24.26-29. There Evagrius warns that if the *nous* refuses to move on (μὴ μεταβαίνει) from the *noēma* of an object for which it has a *pathos* – that is, if it clings (περιεχόμενος) to that *noēma* as its immediate focus of awareness – then it is submerged in the *pathos* (τῷ πάθει βεβάπτισται) and in danger of making its way towards sin in act (κινδυνεύει πρὸς τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἁμαρτίαν ὁδεύων).

‘Όσα ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ λογίζεται ὁ νοῦς, ταῦτα ἀπαθῆ λέγονται· ὅσα δὲ ἐνοχλούμενος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, ταῦτα ἐμπαθῆ λέγονται ὡς πρὸς τὸν νοῦν.³⁴⁵

Whatever things the *nous* thinks by itself are called *apathê*; whatever things it thinks when being troubled by the body are called *empathê* in relation to the *nous*.

Any awareness of hunger, thirst or other physical affects is symptomatic of the continuing immersion of the *nous* in the thickness of corporeality and its corresponding distance from God. Concomitantly, since the role of the sensible world is to serve as the starting point for the contemplation of spiritual reality, any mode of awareness that focuses on it for its own sake represents its *de facto* prioritization over the love of God and pursuit of knowledge. ‘What good is there besides God?’ (τί ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλ’ ἢ Θεός;).³⁴⁶ Evagrius speaks of avarice as a kind of idolatry³⁴⁷ but he could speak of all *pathos* in these terms since it is an attachment to something other than God.

To summarise, *pathos*, for Evagrius, is an unstable movement of the *nous* and soul that is the psychological expression of an excess of vital heat. It involves an attachment to the sensible world that is excessive and therefore idolatrous. It makes the *nous* passive in relation to the sensible world, meaning that the sensible world is a causative external stimulus in relation to the *nous* and that the *empathês nous* is subject to the diversity and changeability of corporeal creation. The fact that *pathos* distances a person from God means that it is injurious to him. *Pathos* falls within the scope of our self-determination, meaning that we are responsible for our *pathê*. Evagrius regards a very wide range of phenomena as *pathê*. Since the healthy *epithumêtikon* is defined as longing for virtue³⁴⁸ any desire for anything other than virtue itself is a *pathos*; this includes hunger and thirst as well as all expressions of the body’s sexual nature.³⁴⁹ Most of what we would recognise as emotions count as *pathê* but with notable exceptions that include love,³⁵⁰ godly joy,³⁵¹ spiritual pleasure,³⁵² godly distress³⁵³ and anger against the demons.³⁵⁴ *Pa-*

³⁴⁵ *Disc.* 139.1-3.

³⁴⁶ *Pry* 33.

³⁴⁷ Cf. *8Th.* 3.14; see above, 2.1.3.3.

³⁴⁸ Cf. *Prakt.* 86.

³⁴⁹ In this Evagrius echoes the Stoic principle that virtue alone is intrinsically good.

³⁵⁰ For *agapê* cf., e.g., *Prakt.* Prol. 50; for (spiritual) *erôs*, *Pry.* 52; see above, 1.2.2.

³⁵¹ Cf., e.g., *Eul.* 6.6-7, 7.6-7.

³⁵² Cf., e.g., *Prakt.* 24.

thos also encompasses phenomena such as fatigue, drowsiness, lethargy, weakness, anxiety, irritability, agitation, boredom, listlessness, self-satisfaction and what we would regard as depression.

2.2.3 *Empathê noêmata*

Although *pathos* always involves the body – through the vital heat if not directly – for Evagrius it also involves the *nous*, to which it finds ingress through its association with *noêmata*, the basic components of our mental content. Evagrius characterises this association terms of ‘yoking together’³⁵⁵ and refers to *noêmata* that have *pathos* ‘yoked together with’ (συνεζευγμένα) them³⁵⁶ as *empathê noêmata*.³⁵⁷ The closest he comes to directly explaining their origin is the following:

Ὅταν τὰς μνήμας ἔχομεν ἐμπαθεῖς, τούτων καὶ τὰ πράγματα πρότερον μετὰ πάθους ὑπεδεξάμεθα· καὶ ὅσα τῶν πραγμάτων πάλιν μετὰ πάθους ὑπεδεχόμεθα, τούτων καὶ τὰς μνήμας ἔξομεν ἐμπαθεῖς.³⁵⁸

When we have *empathēis* memories, it is because we previously ὑπεδεξάμεθα the objects with *pathē*; and again, in so far as we ὑπεδεχόμεθα objects with *πάθη*, we will have *empathēis* memories of them.

To ὑποδέχεσθαι an object with *pathos* results in the formation of an *empathēs* memory, that is, a memory composed of *empathê noêmata*. But what is it to ὑποδέχεσθαι an object with *pathos*? In speaking of how the *nous* acquires *noêmata* Evagrius normally uses either δέχομαι³⁵⁹ or λαμβάνω.³⁶⁰ The meaning of ὑποδέχομαι is similar to that of these verbs used in this way, but the prefix ὑπό adds emphasis, indicating that the reception is somehow more forceful. This sense of extra force is perhaps best captured

³⁵³ Cf., e.g., *Eul.* 7.6-7.

³⁵⁴ Cf., e.g., *Prakt.* 24.

³⁵⁵ Cf. *Disc.* 64.2. Cf. *Disc.* 165.1-2; see below.

³⁵⁶ *Disc.* 64.2. Cf. *Disc.* 165.1-2.

³⁵⁷ Cf. *Pry.* 4, 53, 54, 71; *Rfl.* 7; Sch. 93 on Prov. 7:12, 166 on Prov. 17:23, 344 on Prov. 28:7; Sch. 2 on Ps. 145:8.

³⁵⁸ *Prakt.* 34.1-4.

³⁵⁹ Cf. *Th.* 24, 25; *Sch.* 263 on Prov. 23:33.

³⁶⁰ Cf. *Rfl.* 16, 17; Sch. 166 on Prov. 17:23; Sch. 35 on Eccl. 5:1-2.

by translations such as ‘to take up’, ‘to welcome’ or ‘to entertain’.³⁶¹ The fact that ὑποδέχομαι is qualified by μετὰ πάθους makes it clear that this extra force derives from the involvement of *pathos*, and the fact that Evagrius speaks of the νοῦς taking up πράγματα rather than *noēmata* emphasises that the *pathos* is directed toward an external object.

An *empathês noêma*, then, is a *noêma* that the *nous* has taken up with *pathos*. An example of such a *noêma* would be ‘the face of someone who has caused me loss or someone who has dishonoured me’ referred to at *Thoughts* 2.5-6.³⁶² Reflection upon it provides further clarification of the nature of *empathê noēmata* and how they harm the *nous*. If someone injures me and I respond with resentment, I will ‘take up their face with resentment’; that is, internalise an image of their face suffused with the *pathos* I am feeling. As a result, the *pathos* will be associated with the image and I will have formed an *empathês noêma*. This ‘resentful *noêma*’ will then be stored as an *empathês* memory and recollection of the person’s face will include recollection of the resentment. In addition, the extra force with which *pathos* imbues the ‘taking up’ of a *noêma* will carry over into its imprinting of the *nous* and storage in memory: if I harbour a strong emotion in respect of something or someone, my memory and *noêma* of them will be characterised by a special vividness and tenacity. This can make both memory and image especially liable to intrude into consciousness and reawaken in me the *pathos* concerned – in this case the emotion of resentment – something which can happen whether I am awake or, via dreams, while I sleep.³⁶³ All of these things – the particular vividness, tenacity and intrusiveness of such *noēmata* – are aspects of the thickening of the *nous* – that is, its immersion in corporeality.

³⁶¹ Sinkewicz translates ὑποδέχεσθαι as ‘to entertain’, but to me this suggests a temporal dimension that need not be involved in the formation of *empathês*, or indeed any, memories. Although, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, one of the meanings of ‘entertain’ is ‘admit to consideration; receive (an idea)’, most of its meanings involve a temporal dimension, and it can also mean to ‘keep or maintain in the mind; harbour, cherish, experience (a feeling)’. Consequently, although it perhaps need not imply a temporal dimension, it can easily be read as meaning that the formation of an *empathês* memory requires, in addition to the *empathês* reception of the *noêma* of the object of the *pathos*, that the *noêma* in question be held in mind over a period of time. In fact, though, it surely does not, our formation of memories of perceived events being, in general, simultaneous with the perception..

³⁶² Quoted above, 3.1.

³⁶³ Cf. *Th.* 4.

Like all *noēmata* of sensible objects, *empathê noēmata* can be taken up not only from the senses or from memory but from the *krasis* of the body:³⁶⁴

ὅταν μὴ τὴν μνήμην κινήσαι ἐν τῇ προσευχῇ ὁ φθονερός δαίμων, τότε τὴν κρᾶσιν τοῦ σώματος ἐκβιάζεται εἰς τὸ ποιῆσαι ξένην τινὰ φαντασίαν τῷ νῷ, καὶ μορφῶσαι αὐτόν.³⁶⁵

Whenever the jealous demon is unable to move the *nous* by means of the memory in prayer, he then forces the *krasis* of the body to produce some strange fantasy in the *nous* and endow [the *nous*] with form.

Evagrius cites as an example the demonic suggestion of an image that purports to represent God. This induces the *nous* to think that it has attained the goal of prayer, and according to ‘a man experienced in the gnostic life’³⁶⁶

ὑπὸ τοῦ τῆς κενοδοξίας πάθους γίνεσθαι, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ δαίμονος τοῦ ἀπτομένου τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον τόπου, καὶ φλεψὶ πάλλοντος.³⁶⁷

happens under the influence of the *pathos* of vainglory and that of the demon who touches a place in the brain and causes palpitations in the blood vessels.³⁶⁸

The fact that demons can cause fantasies to arise by manipulating the *krasis* of the body shows that they can be responsible for the production of *noēmata* that, although involving sensible objects and therefore being ultimately grounded in sense perception, do not themselves have a sensory origin. This mechanism perhaps explains the origin of all *empathê noēmata* that are not the direct product of the senses or of memory, and hence the origin of all fantasies and hallucinations associated with the *logismoi*. Those associated with *logismoi* of fornication would certainly seem to involve manipulation of the *krasis* of the body, since the demon of fornication sometimes touches the body di-

³⁶⁴ See above, 1.2.1.1.

³⁶⁵ *Pry.* 68.

³⁶⁶ Sinkewicz (2003: 281, n.52) notes, ‘The MSS tradition is evenly divided between the two readings ‘practical’ and ‘gnostic’. Hausherr, [*Les leçons d’un contemplatif. Le Traité de l’Oraison d’Évagre le Pontique*, Paris 1960], 106, has suggested that the individual in question may be John of Lykopolis.’

³⁶⁷ *Pry.* 72.

³⁶⁸ Cf. *Pry.* 72.

rectly,³⁶⁹ but since all *pathē*, and hence all the *logismoi*, have a physiological basis in excess vital heat, this explanation would seem to extend naturally to them as well.

It has been stated that *empathē noēmata* harm the *nous* by immersing it in corporeality and thereby thickening it, and that they do so because the *pathos* ‘yoked together with’ them makes them particularly vivid, tenacious and intrusive. Evagrius refers to this as *pathos* ‘binding the *nous*, through *noēmata*, to sensible objects’ (τὰ πάθη ... τὰ συνδεσμοῦντα [τὸν νοῦν] διὰ τῶν νοημάτων τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς):³⁷⁰

Οὔτε τὰ πράγματα δεσμοῖ τὸν νοῦν, οὔτε τὰ τούτων νοήματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐμπαθῆ τῶν πραγμάτων νοήματα. Καὶ γὰρ τὸν χρυσὸν ὁ Κύριος ἔκτισε, καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν γυναῖκα ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν γεγονότων ὑπὸ Θεοῦ ἐναντιοῦται τῇ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ’ ἡ πορνεία καὶ ἡ πλεονεξία δεσμοῦσι τὸν νοῦν, ἀναγκάζουσι χρονίζειν τὰ νοήματα τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν καρδίᾳ. Ἴστησι γὰρ τὸν νοῦν τὰ πράγματα διὰ τῶν ἐν πάθει νοημάτων, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ τὸν διψῶντα διὰ τῆς δίψης, καὶ τὸν πεινῶντα ὁ ἄρτος διὰ τῆς πείνης.³⁷¹

Neither do objects bind the *nous* nor do their *noēmata*, but rather the *empathē noēmata* of objects. For the Lord created gold and he made woman, but none of the beings created by God are opposed to people’s salvation, but rather fornication and greed bind the *nous* and force the *noēmata* of objects to linger in the heart. For objects hold the *nous* in check by means of *empathē noēmata*, just as water holds the thirsty person by means of thirst, and bread the hungry person by means of hunger.³⁷²

In the absence of *pathos* the *nous*, being naturally contemplative, would not linger upon sensible objects:

³⁶⁹ See above, 2.1.3.2.

³⁷⁰ *Th.* 40.3-5. Cf. *Rfl.* 23: The *nous* will not transcend all the *noēmata* associated with objects ‘if it has not put off the *pathē* that bind it to sensible objects through *noēmata* (τὰ πάθη ... τὰ συνδεσμοῦντα [τὸν νοῦν] διὰ τῶν νοημάτων τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς)’.

³⁷¹ Sch. 2 on Ps. 145:8.

³⁷² Cf. *Th.* 22.1-8: ‘Just as the *noēma* of bread lingers within the hungry person on account of the hunger, and the *noēma* of water in the thirsty person because of the thirst, so too the *noēmata* of wealth and possessions linger on account of greed and the *noēmata* of food and shameful *logismoi* begotten by food linger with us because of the *pathē* (ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ νόημα τοῦ ἄρτου χρονίζει ἐν τῷ πεινῶντι διὰ τὴν πείναν καὶ τὸ νόημα τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν τῷ διψῶντι διὰ τὴν δίψαν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ νοήματα τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων χρονίζει διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ τὰ νοήματα τῶν βρωμάτων καὶ τῶν τικτομένων αἰσχροῶν λογισμῶν ἐκ τῶν βρωμάτων χρονίζει διὰ τὰ πάθη)’. Cf. also *Let.* 39.2.

Ἀδύνατον τὸν νοῦν χρονίσαι <ἐν> πράγματι εἰ μὴ πάθος ἔχει πρὸς αὐτό, οἷον ἐπιθυμίας ἢ οργῆς ἢ κενοδοξίας ἢ λύπης.³⁷³

It is impossible for the *nous* to linger on an object if it doesn't have *pathos* for it, for example that of *epithumia* or anger or vainglory or distress.

But *pathos* compels it to dwell upon them:

Ἐν οἷς πράγμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν ἔχει πάθος ὁ νοῦς, ἐν τούτοις περικαθέζεται· ἐκ δὲ τούτων δυσέκσπαστός ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ ἐχρόνισεν.³⁷⁴

The *nous* installs itself among objects or *noēmata* for which it has a *pathos*, and it is difficult to withdraw it when it lingers.³⁷⁵

When *pathos* is implicated in the reception of *noēmata* it reinforces their imprinting of the *nous* and also the corresponding memory formation. The resulting memories are particularly vivid and tenacious, and liable to intrude into both waking consciousness and dreams. As the *pathos* associated with a memory fades so too will the memory and its intrusiveness, but while it endures it binds the *nous* through the *noēma* to the sensible object it represents.³⁷⁶

³⁷³ *Disc.* 39.1-3.

³⁷⁴ *Disc.* 162.

³⁷⁵ Cf. *Rfl.* 36: 'The impure *nous* is one that dallies among sensible objects with blameworthy *pathos* (νοῦς ἀκάθαρτός ἐστιν, ὁ ἐγχρονίζων μετὰ πάθους ψεκτοῦ τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς).'

³⁷⁶ For Evagrius *pathos* intensifies the memory of any object with which it is associated. But Aristotle takes a very different view of the effect of *pathos* upon memory formation. At *De Memoria* 450a30-b3 he notes that 'The movement which occurs stamps a sort of imprint of the percept, just like the people who make impressions with seals. This is why, in those subject to great movement through πάθος or through time of life, no memory is created, just as if the movement of the seal were to fall into running water' (ἡ γὰρ γιγνομένη κίνησις ἐνσημαίνεται οἷον τύπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς δακτυλίοις. διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐν κινήσει πολλῇ διὰ πάθος ἢ δι' ἡλικίαν οὐδὲν οὐ γίνεται μνήμη, καθάπερ ἂν εἰς ὕδωρ ῥέον ἐμπιπτούσης τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς σφραγίδος; Trans. mine, based on Beare, in Barnes, 1984). Unlike Evagrius, Aristotle speaks of the formation of memories as a kind of imprinting, and he claims that extremes of *pathos* put the soul into a state of flux so that the imprints effectively get washed away. This directly contradicts Evagrius' view of *pathos* as a binding force in relation to *noēmata* and memories. So how might the disparity between their respective observations be explained? A provisional answer, supported by what is now known about traumatic memory, might be that in some cases extremes of *pathos* result in amnesia of the event concerned, while in others they severely disrupt the memory of it; cf., e.g., Shay (1995: 172). Neither phenomenon would contradict what Evagrius says about the effect of *pathos* on memory: amnesia, because he is only interested in cases where *pathos* reinforces a memory, and disruption of memory, because his concern is not with the accuracy of the memory but with its intensity, tenacity and intrusiveness.

To summarise: if the *nous* has a *pathos* in respect of an object, then every *noêma* of that object that it receives has the *pathos* in question ‘yoked together with’ it. In so far as a person is subject to *pathos*, his *nous* is continually being populated with these *empathê noêmata*. Through them, *pathos* binds the *nous* to sensible objects, keeping it anchored in the thickness of corporeality.

2.2.4 The arousal of *pathos*

According to *Praktikos* 6, it is when a *logismos* is allowed to linger that *pathos* is aroused:

παρενοχλεῖν μὲν τῇ ψυχῇ ἢ μὴ παρενοχλεῖν [οἱ λογισμοὶ], τῶν οὐχ ἔφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ χρονίζειν αὐτοῦς ἢ μὴ χρονίζειν, ἢ πάθη κινεῖν ἢ μὴ κινεῖν, τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.³⁷⁷

Whether [the *logismoi*] trouble the soul or do not trouble it is not one of the things that are up to us, but whether they linger or do not linger, arouse *pathē* or do not arouse them, is one of the things that are up to us.³⁷⁸

It seems clear from this that *logismoi* occur before, and cause, *pathos*. Yet we saw from our consideration of the *logismoi* that in fact they always have *pathos* built into them. We have also seen that Evagrius almost always locates the origin of the *logismoi* in the *pathētikon* part of the soul and that, in particular, *Disciples* 49 reports him as teaching that the *empathēs logismos* comes from *pathos*.³⁷⁹ So in fact the *logismoi* both cause *pathos* and have their source in it. What is at issue here is the distinction between dispositional and occurrent *pathos*, but before turning to this, a point of clarification.

³⁷⁷ *Prakt.* 6.

³⁷⁸ Trans. mine. The question of whether or not we are responsible either for the stimuli we experience or for our reactions to them had been long debated. Gorgias, in his *Defence of Helen*, had argued that she was not culpable for her actions because the force of the stimuli, which she could neither control nor resist, was such as to compel them. Aristotle refers to a view that men have no control over *phantasiai*, which appear to each in a form answering to his character, and rejects it on the grounds that man is responsible for his character and consequently for the *phantasiai* (*EN* 1114a32). In other words, he holds the agent responsible for the way in which he sees things. The Stoics hold a person responsible for the way in which he responds to *phantasiai*, that is, whether or not he assents to them, and they assign his character a determining role in this; cf. Inwood (1985: 58). See below, 2.2.4, for discussion of the scope of our self-determination in relation to temptation.

³⁷⁹ See above, 2.1.4.1.

It was noted above that although Evagrius thinks in terms of the Platonic tripartition of the soul, and, by extension, contrasts her *pathētikon* part with her rational part, he regards all three parts of the soul as essentially rational, all being aspects of the fallen triune *nous*. Accordingly he understands *pathos* not as something other than reason but as a compromised version of it.³⁸⁰ It follows that the line dividing *logismoi* from *pathē* is at best a blurred one, and not only do *logismoi* always involve *empathē noēmata* but Evagrius frequently defines *logismoi* in affective terms. In terms of their psychic origin I suggest, therefore, that both the affective aspects of a *logismos* and certain of its cognitive aspects - mental pictures, fantasies and so forth - derive from the *pathētikon* part of the soul, and that the point at which the rational part becomes involved is, in the first instance, when it assents – explicitly or implicitly – to the *logismos* by allowing it to linger and, ultimately, when it animates, and thereby endows with agency, an image of the person’s body ‘with which it speaks and acts unlawfully *kata dianoian* in relation to other images it creates *kata dianoian*’. So when *Praktikos* 6 speaks of its being up to us whether or not *logismoi* linger and arouse *pathos* it is referring specifically to the engagement of the rational part of the soul with the *logismoi* and the consequent arousal of fresh *pathos*. The *logismoi* themselves will, however, originate in the *pathētikon* part of the soul and include both affective and cognitive aspects. Likewise, although temptation (*peirasmos*) as described by *Praktikos* 6 is experienced as a contest between desire and reason, to characterise it as such would be metaphysically inaccurate; the contestants are, rather, the relatively fallen and compromised reason constitutive of the *pathētikon* part of the soul on the one hand, and, on the other, the relatively unfallen and uncompromised reason constitutive of her rational part.

The distinction between dispositional and occurrent *pathos* is succinctly described at *Disciples* 49, and with it, the psychological dynamics of *empathēia*:

Ἐπόκειται τὸ πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐξ οὗ γεννᾶται ὁ ἐμπαθῆς λογισμὸς· πρὸ δὲ τούτου συνίστανται οἱ λογισμοὶ ἵνα κατὰ διάνοιαν ἀμάρτη· ὁμοίως καὶ πρὸ τῆς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἀμαρτίας συνίστανται πολλὰ πράγματα· ἐπὶ δὲ τελεσθῆ ἢ ἀμαρτία, τὰ μέσα ἀφίστανται, μόνον δὲ τὸ εἶδωλον τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἐμμένει ἐν τῷ νῷ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ πάθος τὸ γεννῶν τὸν λογισμόν.³⁸¹

³⁸⁰ See above, 1.2.

³⁸¹ *Disc.* 49.3-10. For the ‘image of the sin’ (τὸ εἶδωλον τῆς ἀμαρτίας), cf. *Th.* 36.17.

Pathos lies below in the soul and from it comes the *empathês logismos*. Before (the *pathos* manifests) the *logismoi* coalesce so that there might be sin *kata dianoian*. Likewise, before a sin *kat' energeian* (is committed) many objects coalesce. But once a sin has been committed, the intermediaries disappear and only the image of the sin remains in the *nous* of the soul, and the *pathos* that engendered the *logismos*.

I understand this as follows: a disposition to *pathos* subsists in the soul. This disposition comprises the physiological ‘matter’ of the *logismoi* in the form of excess vital heat, and the psychological ‘matter’ of the *logismoi* in the form of the ‘natural desires of the flesh’ and the ‘desires of the soul’,³⁸² and *empathês* memories.³⁸³ In response to circumstances – demonic suggestion or other internal or external stimuli – these give rise to the *logismoi*; since the *logismoi* always involve *pathos* the qualifier *empathês* emphasises this rather than defining a subset of *logismoi*. In saying that before the *pathos* manifests the *logismoi* coalesce, Evagrius distinguishes between dispositional *pathos* and the fresh episode of occurrent *pathos* that the *logismoi* arising from dispositional *pathos* arouse if allowed to linger in conscious awareness. The coalescing is that of the *logismoi* understood as discrete entities into sequences, and it happens before the *pathos* manifests ‘so that there might be sin *kata dianoian*’. The occurrent *pathos* that the *logismoi* arouse is to be distinguished not only from the underlying dispositional *pathos* but from the sin itself since the *pathos*, like the *logismos* is merely the ‘sign and, as it were, preliminary’ (τεκμήρια καὶ οἶον ἐὶ προοίμια)³⁸⁴ of sin. Although Evagrius specifies sin *kata dianoian*, there is in this context no relevant distinction between it and sin *kat' energeian*, his focus upon the former simply reflecting his greater interest in the warfare *kata dianoian*.³⁸⁵ The description of *logismoi*, objects and sin as intermediaries emphasises the spiritual significance of dispositional *pathos* on the one hand, and the ‘image of the sin’ on the other. According to *Disciples* 49, then, the following cycle is enacted:

dispositional *pathos* => *logismoi* => occurrent *pathos* => sin *kata dianoian* or *kat' energeian* => dispositional *pathos*

³⁸² *Eul.* 21.23; see above, 3.2.

³⁸³ Cf. *Prakt.* 34; see above, 3.3.

³⁸⁴ *Disc.* 157.2; see above.

³⁸⁵ Cf. *Prakt.* 48; see above.

Two aspects of dispositional *pathos* can now be identified. The first is the general sickness of the soul, and the second, the *pathos* associated with particular memories. As we have seen, the latter makes such memories especially liable to intrude into awareness, and this intrusion, I suggest, is part of what Evagrius has in mind when he says that from the *pathos* that lies below in the soul comes the *empathês logismos*. But part too will be *logismoi* that have a somatic origin, for example thoughts of food triggered by hunger or sexual fantasies triggered by physical arousal, both hunger and sexual desire being part of our disposition to *pathos*.

At *Eulogios* 13.12 Evagrius describes in detail the process by which *logismoi* engender *pathos*:

Ὁ τῆς ἀσελγείας δαίμων, πῆ μὲν τῷ παρθένῳ κατὰ διάνοιαν τὰς ἀκολάστους συμπλοκὰς ὑπείσφerei, πῆ δὲ τοῦτον νεάνισιν δι' ὄνειράτων συμπλέκεσθαι φαντάζει, ὅπως εἰ μὲν τῇ μνήμῃ τοῦ φαντασθέντος κλίνοιτο πρὸς ἡδονήν, τοῖς λογισμοῖς χρήσοιτο πρὸς πόλεμον· εἰ δὲ οὐ κλίνοιτο ἀλλ' ἀνταγωνίζοιτο, κὰν τῆς αἴσθηται τὸ πάθος τῇ φύσει μεμενηκός, οὐ πρότερον συγκροτοῦσι πόλεμον οἱ τῆς αἰσχύνης λογισμοί, πρὶν ἢ χώραν ἔξουσι τοῦ τῇ ψυχῇ συνομιλεῖν· οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν κινηθεῖη πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν ἢ ψυχή, πρὶν ἢ μάθη ἀντιπαρατάττεσθαι τοῖς ἀντιπάλοις λογισμοῖς. ὅταν οἱ δαίμονες τὴν ἔννοιαν τὰς αἰσχίστοις ἡδοναῖς πειρῶνται σαλεύειν, τότε καὶ τὸν τῆς λαιμαργίας πόλεμον προσάγουσιν, ὅπως ταῖς ὕλαις τὴν γαστέρα προπυρώσαντες, ἀκοπωτέως τὴν ψυχὴν τῇ ἀσελγείᾳ βαρᾶθρόσωσιν. ἐν τῇ ῥαθυμίᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς περιδράσσονται ἡμῶν οἱ δαίμονες τοῦ λογιστικοῦ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμοῖς ἀπερεύγονται τὰς τῆς κακίας ἡδονάς.³⁸⁶

The demon of lust sometimes smuggles in *kata dianoian* licentious intertwinings with a virgin, and sometimes through dreams it depicts him being intertwined with young girls, so that if one should incline towards pleasure at the memory of what was fantasized, the demon could make use of the *logismoi* for warfare; but if one should not so incline but rather fight back, even when one feels the *pathos* which has remained in one's nature, the *logismoi* of shame cannot join battle before they gain a place to converse with the soul; nor in turn would the soul be moved to engage in warfare before it learns that it is ranging itself against the opposing *logismoi*. Whenever the demons try to destabilise one's thinking [or intent, good sense or better judgment; ἔννοια can mean all of these] with shameful pleasures, then they lead in the warfare of gluttony, so that once they have fired the matters of the stomach beforehand they can the more effortlessly cast the soul

³⁸⁶ *Eul.* 13.12. Sinkewicz (2003: 239, n.28) notes that this paragraph is unique to recension B of *To Eulogios*, as found in the MSS *Lavra Γ* 93.

into the pit of lust. In the laziness of the soul the demons are able to grasp our *logistikon* and in the *logismoi* they disgorge the pleasures of vice.

In the situation described here the disposition to *pathos* is exploited by the demon of fornication who causes the monk to recall sexual fantasies and dreams that it had suggested to him previously. Evagrius warns him not to incline towards pleasure but instead to fight back. Both aspects of dispositional *pathos* are at play here, one in the *pathos* associated with the memories; the other - the general sickness of his soul - in his inclination toward pleasure. But I think a third aspect can also be identified, that which Evagrius calls ‘the *pathos* which has remained in one’s nature’ and which I take to be the *pathos* specific to the situation – in this case, sexual desire. To the extent that the monk inclines toward pleasure the demon can make use of the *logismoi* for warfare - I take these to be both the remembered fantasies and further *logismoi* that the demons will suggest. If, on the other hand, he fights back then the *logismoi* will be unable to ‘join battle’ since their ability to do so depends upon his allowing them a ‘place to converse’ with his soul. Fighting back consists in mustering the *logistikon* to resist the inclination of the *pathētikon* part of the soul to pleasure, but in order for the monk to do so he must first recognise his situation as one of temptation, since ‘the soul will not be moved to engage in warfare before it learns that it is ranging itself against the opposing *logismoi*.’ How quickly he does so will depend upon how vigilant he is, the demon of fornication in particular being able to seem swifter than the movement and vigilance of the *nous* (ὄξύτερος ... τῆς κινήσεως καὶ νήψεως τοῦ νοός),³⁸⁷ meaning that arousal can be so sudden that he feels powerless to resist.³⁸⁸ Evagrius affirms the role of gluttony in temptation by the demon of fornication, then reminds his readers of the perils of laziness – this will mean laziness both in succumbing to gluttony and in failing in vigilance. He concludes by stating that sometimes the *logismoi* attract the *pathē* and sometimes the *pathē* the *logismoi* but that either way it is through the *pathē* that the *logismoi* ‘make war upon the soul.’ Since *logismoi* are always wholly or partly constituted by *empathē noēmata* the *pathos* he is referring to here must be other than that already built into the *logismos*. So what does he mean? The key is to be found in a closer look at both the disposition to, and arousal of, *pathos*.

³⁸⁷ Cf. *Pry.* 90.

³⁸⁸ Cf. *Prakt.* 51; *8Th.* 2.11. The demon associated with blasphemy is also particularly swift in its attacks; cf. *Prakt.* 43, 51.

Three aspects of the disposition to *pathos* have now been identified:

- D1 The fire of one's nature; that is, the general sickliness of the soul.
- D2 The *pathos* which has remained in one's nature; that is, the *pathos* specific to the present situation.
- D3 The *pathos* associated with particular *noēmata* and memories.

These three aspects correspond to levels of increasing differentiation. The first, D1, is the most fundamental and general. At the level of D2 it differentiates into the dispositions to particular *pathē*, and at the level of D3 these further differentiate into the dispositions to particular manifestations of a *pathos* via the *pathē* associated with particular *noēmata* or *logismoi*. The arising of a *logismos* involves all three aspects: D1 is the underlying condition which makes it possible; D2 determines which particular *pathos* a given movement of the soul instantiates, and D3 gives that *pathos* its specific manifestation and is therefore the point at which the *logismos* takes form.

Now consider the following passage from *Eulogios* 21.22, which again describes temptation by the demon of fornication. In it Evagrius tracks each stage of the cycle identified in *Disciples* 49, leading from dispositional *pathos* through the arising of the *logismoi* and fresh *pathos* to the committing of sin and consequent strengthening of dispositional *pathos*:

Χαλεπώτατόν ἐστι συνηθεία ἡδονῶν συνάπτεσθαι τὴν καρδίαν καὶ πολλῶν χρεῖα κόπων τὴν νομὴν κακῶν εἰς ἄκρον ἐκκόψαι. Μὴ οὖν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τῶν λογισμῶν συνομιλεῖν ἐθίσης· ἐν γὰρ συλλόγῳ κακῶν ἐκκαίεται πῦρ. Οὕτω γὰρ ἐκθερμαίνοντές σε, λογίζεσθαι ποιῶσι κόπον εἶναι τὴν πυρὰν τῆς φύσεως κρατῆσαι, καὶ ὅτι πολὺς ὁ τῆς καρτερίας χρόνος καὶ βαρὺς ὁ τῆς ἐγκρατείας βίος· ἀναφέρουσι δέ σοι καὶ μνήμας ὧν σε νύκτωρ φαντάζουσιν αἰσχρῶν, μορφάζοντές σοι πυρωτικὰ τῆς πλάνης εἶδωλα. Εἶτα καὶ σφοδρότερον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἐξάπαντες τὸν πυρετόν, τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἀμαρτίας γνωμοδοτοῦσί σοι ἔνδον, ὅτι ὅσον οὐκ ἰσχύεις κατασχεῖν τὴν τῆς φύσεως βίαν, κἂν σήμερον ἀμαρτήσης δι' ἀνάγκην, ἀλλ' αὔριον μετανοήσεις διὰ τὴν ἐντολήν· φιλόανθρωπος γὰρ ὁ

νόμος καὶ συγχωρῶν ἀνομίας τοῖς μετανοοῦσι... ὅπως τῇ ἀντιστρόφῳ μετανοία ψυχὴν ἀνακλάσαντες τὸν ναδὸν τῆς σωφροσύνης πορνεῖον ποιήσωσιν.³⁸⁹

It is a very serious matter for the heart to be tied to a habit of pleasures, and much effort is needed to cut off completely the spread of evils. Therefore, do not become accustomed to associating with the pleasures of the *logismoi*, for in the assemblage of evils there burns a fire. Giving you warmth in this way, they have you reckon that it is an effort to master the fire of one's own nature, and the time of perseverance is lengthy and the life of self-control burdensome; and they bring back to you memories of the shameful fantasies that they suggested during the night, forming before you burning images of error. Then, having ignited in your flesh an even more intense burning, they introduce within you by means of the law of sin the notion that so far as you do not have the strength to restrain the force of your nature, even if you sin today by necessity, tomorrow you will repent for the sake of the commandment,³⁹⁰ for the law is humanitarian and forgives the iniquities of those who repent... Thus, after restoring³⁹¹ the soul by a reverse repentance, they make the temple of chastity into a place of fornication.

Since all of the *logismoi* involve pleasure, the arousal of *pathos* always involves an inclination toward pleasure: either a pleasure directly promised by the *logismoi* or – as is the case with distress – one whose unavailability is their focus. Consequently, for the heart to be ‘tied to a habit of pleasures’ is to be disposed to the arousal of *pathos*.

Whereas *Eulogios* 13.12 emphasises the cognitive aspect of the *logismoi*, in the form of remembered fantasies, as the first term in the process of temptation, this passage emphasises their affective aspect: the initial object of awareness is not a mental image but a sensation of pleasurable warmth. This sensation is part of the ‘pleasures of the *logismoi*’. These pleasures have two aspects. The first is any pleasure already associated with a *logismos* through association with its constituent *noēma* or *noēmata*, and is therefore part of the disposition to *pathos*. This pleasure is experienced prior to the engagement of the rational part of the soul, and when it is engaged incline it to allow the *logismoi* to linger. In the case of *Eulogios* 13.12 it is the pleasure associated with the remembered fantasies and is recalled, and therefore passively relived, as part of recalling the fantasies. The second aspect of the pleasures of the *logismoi* is the new,

³⁸⁹ *Eul.* 21.22.

³⁹⁰ Cf. Rom. 7: 23-5.

³⁹¹ The literal meanings of ἀνακλίνω are ‘to lie’, ‘lean back’, ‘recline’, ‘bend back’, and so forth. ‘Restore’, which is Sinkewicz’ translation, would thus be an ironic as well as metaphorical reading, but I think Evagrius would intend both its literal and ironic senses.

occurrent pleasure that entertaining them affords. In the case of *logismoi* involving memories of pleasant experiences this will arise straightforwardly out of the pleasure attaching to those memories and will involve reliving the experience and fantasising about repeating it. In other cases it might be less obvious. For example, the pleasure associated with *logismoi* of gluttony could be that of imagined eating, but it could also be that of allowing oneself to indulge in worries about one's health. The pleasure associated with resentment might include that of indulgence in self-pity at the memory of what precipitated the resentment and of imagining ways of avenging oneself, but in addition anger can of itself be 'sweeter...than the dripping of honey'.³⁹² The pleasure involved in acedia might be that of allowing oneself to give up trying to read and instead to fall asleep³⁹³ or of imagining the approach of a visitor.³⁹⁴ In their second aspect, then, the pleasures of the *logismoi* are those of allowing them to linger and anticipating the further pleasures to be afforded by succumbing to the *pathos* and perhaps committing the sin to which they relate. The *logismoi* and their pleasures are the 'assemblage of evils', and the 'fire' that burns in them, like all of the references to fire in this passage, can be understood in two senses, both metaphorical: the physiological 'fire' of excessive vital heat and the psychological 'fire' of passion.

In this example *logismoi* of fornication arise from the disposition to *pathos*. Intrinsic to them is the first aspect of the pleasures of the *logismoi*, part of that disposition. In virtue of their having arisen the person cannot help but experience this pleasure, but at first he does so only passively, as part of becoming aware of the *logismoi*. If he is sufficiently vigilant and self-disciplined he will banish them immediately, but if not, he will start actively to enjoy them. This active enjoyment is the second aspect of the pleasure of the *logismoi*, the beginnings of occurrent *pathos*, and the first taste of the 'fire' that burns within them. The stronger his disposition to *pathos* – the more his heart is 'tied to a habit of pleasures' – the stronger will be his temptation to allow the *logismoi* to linger. And every moment that he does so sees the increase of the *pathos* and of its destabilising effect upon his thinking, intent, good sense and better judgement. Progressively more influenced by, and reluctant to relinquish, the pleasure and warmth he is feeling – the 'fire burning' in the 'assemblage of evils' – he starts putting less

³⁹² Cf. *Iliad*. 18.109-10.

³⁹³ Cf. *8Th*. 6.15.

³⁹⁴ Cf. *Prakt*. 12.

effort into resisting and more effort into thinking of excuses not to. In the language of *Disciples* 49 this thinking is part of the coalescing of the *logismoi*. As *pathos* and destabilisation continue to grow he recalls the pleasurable fantasies he experienced the previous night and begins to think of reasons to allow himself to succumb. The *pathos* that began with the first small stirrings of enjoyment of the initial *logismoi* is now full-blown. But even at this point sin is not a *fait accompli*, as Evagrius is at pains to make clear:

Μὴ προφάσει πάλιν μετανοίας δελεάζου ἐλπίσιν ἀδήλοις, πολλοὶ γὰρ πεσόντες εὐθὺς ἀνηπάσθησαν, ἕτεροι δὲ ἀναστῆναι οὐκ ἴσχυσαν τῇ τῶν ἡδονῶν συνηθείᾳ ὡς ὑπὸ νόμον δεθέντες.³⁹⁵

Do not get hooked on the bait of uncertain hopes under the pretext of a new repentance, for many have fallen and were immediately snatched away, and others were unable to recover, for they were bound by the habit of pleasures as though they were under a law.

Although now fully in the throes of *pathos*, he could still muster his self-control and refrain from sinning. But if, unwilling to ‘extinguish the feverish mind of the flesh’,³⁹⁶ he fails to do so then afterwards the *pathos* will subside and the *logismoi* vanish, leaving him with only the ‘image of the sin’ – that is, the *empathês* memory of it - and his disposition to *pathos* reinforced through indulgence.

So far we have seen how the *logismoi* arise out of the disposition to *pathos* and how the initial object of awareness in an episode of temptation might be either the cognitive aspect of a *logismos* or its affective aspect. Now some further clarification is needed. According to *Praktikos* 6 it is up to us whether or not the *logismoi* linger and, as a result of the engagement with them of the rational part of the soul, arouse fresh *pathos*. But what about cases where, as with *Eulogios* 21.22, temptation begins with a *pathos* that, experienced prior to the involvement of the rational part of the soul, inclines it to engage with the *logismoi*? Does this not pose a serious problem for the attainment of *apatheia* since the ability to resist *pathos* is itself undermined by *pathos*? A brief consideration of what

³⁹⁵ *Eul.* 21.23.

³⁹⁶ *Eul.* 21.23; cf. Rom. 8:6.

the Stoics and Origen had to say about the arousal of *pathos* will give a clearer sense of Evagrius' solution to this problem.

Orthodox Stoicism regards a *pathos* as a species of action, meaning that it depends upon the agent's assent and is therefore under his control. But this has the effect of excluding a set of phenomena which, while apparently *pathē*, cannot be said to result from either explicit or implicit assent, namely the involuntary arousals which occur in response to stimuli prior to the engagement of the rational mind. Later Stoics addressed this problem, denoting these arousals *propathēiai*³⁹⁷ or 'first movements'.³⁹⁸ Seneca notes that the impression of having received an injury is followed by a mental shock (*ictus animi ... qui nos post opinionem iniuriae movet*).³⁹⁹ But while this shock might appear to be anger it is not, since it occurs prior to assent and is something the mind suffers rather than causes (*patitur magis animus quam facit*).⁴⁰⁰ He distinguishes between the involuntary prompting that is a preparation for anger, anger itself, and the brutishness that originates from anger but pursues cruelty for its own sake.⁴⁰¹ Epictetus acknowledges the existence of *phantasiai* which jolt the human mind at the first appearance of a thing, which 'do not belong to the will and are not chosen', but rather 'infiltrate themselves by a certain force of their own'. Given, for example 'the sudden announcement of some danger ... it is inevitable that for a brief time even the mind of the sage is moved and contracts and grows pale (*sapientis quoque animum paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere necessum est*)', not because he believes that something bad is happening but due to 'certain rapid and unsolicited movements (*motus*) which pre-empt the functions of the mind and reason.'⁴⁰² Both Seneca and Epictetus, then, maintain a clear distinction between the initial shock that follows an *opinio* or *phantasia* but precedes assent, and the *pathos* that it heralds.

³⁹⁷ According to Inwood (1985: 180 and 308, n.256), although the term may originate with Posidonius, the doctrine does not; cf. Inwood.

³⁹⁸ The term originates with Seneca, *De Ira* 2:4.1.

³⁹⁹ *De Ira* 2:2.2-3.

⁴⁰⁰ *De Ira* 2:3.1.

⁴⁰¹ *De Ira* 2:4-5, trans. Basore; cf. Graver (2007: 125-32).

⁴⁰² From the fifth book of Epictetus' *Discourses*, paraphrased by Gellius *Noctes Atticae* 19:1, trans. Sorabji at (2000: 376).

Origen uses the expression ‘first movements’ at *De Principiis* 3.2.2,⁴⁰³ although it is not clear whether he intends it to be understood in its strict Senecan sense. Earlier he discusses the arousal of *pathos* in the course of defining the scope of the *autexousion*:

Εἰ δέ τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἕξωθεν λέγοι εἶναι τοιόνδε, ὥστε ἀδυνάτως ἔχειν ἀντιβλέψαι αὐτῷ τοιῷδε γενομένῳ, οὗτος ἐπιστησάτω τοῖς ἰδίῳις πάθεσι καὶ κινήμασιν, εἰ μὴ εὐδόκησις γίνεται καὶ συγκατάθεσις καὶ ῥοπή τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπὶ τόδε τι διὰ τάσδε πιθανότητας. ἢ γυνὴ τῷ κρίναντι ἐγκρατεύεσθαι καὶ ἀνέχειν ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ μίξεων, ἐπιφανεῖσα καὶ προκαλεσαμένη ἐπὶ τὸ ποιῆσαί τι παρὰ πρόθεσιν, αὐτοτελῆς αἰτία γίνεται⁴⁰⁴ τοῦ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἀθετῆσαι· πάντως γὰρ εὐδοκήσας τῷ γαργαλισμῷ καὶ τῷ λείῳ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἀντιβλέψαι αὐτῷ μὴ βεβουλημένος μηδὲ τὸ κεκριμένον κυρῶσαι, πράττει τὸ ἀκόλαστον. ὁ δέ τις ἔμπαλιν, τῶν αὐτῶν συμβεβηκότων τῷ πλείονα μαθήματα ἀνειληφότι καὶ ἡσκηκότι· οἱ μὲν γαργαλισμοὶ καὶ οἱ ἐρεθισμοὶ συμβαίνουσιν, ὁ λόγος δέ, ἅτε ἐπὶ πλείον ἰσχυροποιηθεὶς καὶ τραφεὶς τῇ μελέτῃ καὶ βεβαιωθεὶς τοῖς δόγμασι πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἢ ἐγγύς γε τοῦ βεβαιωθῆναι γεγεννημένος, ἀνακρούει τοὺς ἐρεθισμοὺς καὶ ὑπεκλύει τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.⁴⁰⁵

But if anyone should say that [an] impression from without is of such a sort that it is impossible to resist it whatever it may be, let him turn his attention to his own *pathē* and movements, whether there is not an approval, assent and inclination of the *hêgemonikon* towards a particular action on account of some specious attractions. For instance, when a woman shows herself to a man who has resolved to remain chaste and to abstain from sexual intercourse and invites him to act contrary to his purpose, she does not become the complete cause of the abandonment of that purpose. For he is wholly delighted at the titillation and the smoothness of the pleasure and wishes neither to resist it nor to confirm his resolution, and then he commits the licentious act. On the other hand, the same things might happen to a man who has undergone more instruction and training, and while the titillations and arousals are present, his reason, having been further strengthened and cultivated by diligence and confirmed by right doctrines towards the good, or being near to such confirmation, repels the arousals and weakens the force of the *epithumia*.⁴⁰⁶

According to the Stoic theory of action a *pathos* is a movement of the *hêgemonikon*, so it can be presumed that by ‘inclination of the *hêgemonikon*’ Origen means *pathos*. But

⁴⁰³ Quoted above, 2.2.1.

⁴⁰⁴ It is clear from the context that there should be a negative here, but it is missing from the text (that of Görgemanns and Karpp).

⁴⁰⁵ *DP* 3:1.4.

⁴⁰⁶ Trans. mine.

it is unclear whether by ‘movements’ he intends us to understand ‘first movements’ in the Senecan sense, or, rather, the *pathos* itself. So while his overall meaning is clear, he effectively downplays the distinction between Senecan first movements and *pathos* proper by not clearly distinguishing between them. The reason for this becomes apparent in what follows. The man experiences titillation, smooth pleasure⁴⁰⁷ and delight that undermine his resolve. All are first movements because all precede his decision whether or not to confirm it. Accordingly, Origen does not confine first movements to the initial shocks characteristic of arousal to anger or fear but recognises them as potentially more complex and even able to include second-order affects – in this case, delight at the first-order affects of titillation and smooth pleasure. Rather than there being a clearly defined point at which the man is able to resist the *phantasiai* giving rise to a first movement, the erosion of his resolve is gradual. With every moment that he allows himself to delight in the titillations and pleasure his resolve weakens. Delight gives way to approval and approval to assent. Consequently there is no longer a clear distinction between first movements, assent and *pathos*, but instead a gradual progression from the first stirrings of *pathos* to its full manifestation.

The similarity to the situation of the person in *Eulogios* 21.22 is clear. Unlike Seneca and Epictetus, Origen allows considerable affective complexity to precede assent, and viewing his example through an Evagrian lens it becomes plain that the man’s *pathē* (or first movements) both start from a *logismos* - an *empathēs noēma* of the woman – and constitute matter for further *logismoi*, meaning that instead of a simple picture in which the cognitive precedes the affective, a more complicated view emerges in which the two are interwoven and causally effective in respect of one another. The cognitive and the affective start to look less like two distinct things and more like two aspects of a single thing. And this of course is how Evagrius sees it. His notion of a *logismos* subverts the distinction between cognition and affectivity, a subversion reflected in his anthropology by the fact that the three parts of the soul are but the fallen expression of the triune *nous*. *Logismoi* arise from the *pathētikon* part of the soul but have cognitive as well as affective aspects. The cognitive aspect of a *logismos* consists in mental images that themselves derive from the *pathētikon* part of the soul. Its affective aspect comprises both the dispositional *pathos* associated with it and any fresh, occurrent *pathos* to which it con-

⁴⁰⁷ I understand this to be the pleasure of anticipation rather than commission.

tributes. The initial object of awareness might be either the cognitive aspect of a *logismos* or the affective aspect. Hence,

Πότερον ἢ ἔννοια τὰ πάθη κινεῖ, ἢ τὰ πάθη τὴν ἔννοιαν προσεκτέον.⁴⁰⁸

One should attend to whether it is the representation that arouses the *pathē* or the *pathē* that arouse the representation.

This picture has the advantage over that of the Stoics in being truer to the messiness of real life: however much we might like to suppose that things are as clear cut as Seneca and Epictetus affirm, sooner or later attention to our own experience will disabuse us. And although Origen presents a more complex analysis he too locates the inception of *pathos* in a cognitive event. It is left to Evagrius to address the fact that some *pathē* begin with the physical – the promptings of hunger or thirst or the touch of the demon of fornication upon the body. But this surely makes the question of how *pathos* can be resisted even more urgent: how can I resist the *pathē* that originate in my body? Evagrius has an answer – one in fact already alluded to by Origen in the passage discussed above. The way to resist such *pathē* is ultimately through training the soul in virtue while reducing the body's susceptibility to *pathos* through a program of physical practices including dietary restriction. For Evagrius, episodes of temptation never occur in a vacuum but are embedded in the monk's life and ascetic practice. In particular cases the

⁴⁰⁸ *Prakt.* 37. It continues, 'Some people have held the first opinion, others the second' (τισὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔδοξε τὸ πρότερον, τισὶ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον). Guillaumont (1971: 584 ff) notes that the first view would appear to be that of the Stoics but that it is harder to attribute the second; he suggests it refers to Aristotle's observation at *DA* 403a19-23, that 'while sometimes on the occasion of violent and striking occurrences there is no excitement or fear felt, on others faint and feeble stimulations produce these emotions, viz. when the body is already in a state of tension resembling its condition when we are angry' (ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνίστε δ' ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργῆ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχη ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται, trans. Nussbaum). However, *DM* 702a16-19, like the Stoics, assigns causal priority to cognition: 'For the *pathē* suitably prepare the organic parts, desire the *pathē*, and *phantasia* the desire; and *phantasia* comes about either through thought or through sense-perception' (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως τὰ πάθη, ἢ δ' ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δ' ὄρεξιν ἢ φαντασία· αὕτη δὲ γίνεται ἢ διὰ νοήσεως ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως). Guillaumont also draws attention to Plotinus' discussion at *Enn.* 3.6.4 of the respective causal priority of *pathē* and opinions: 'Some of the *pathē* arise as the result of opinions, as when someone, being of the opinion that he will die, feels fear, or, thinking that some good is going to come to him, is pleased...but some of them are of a sort to take the lead and, without any act of choice, to produce the opinion in the part of the soul whose natural function it is to have opinions' (Τῶν δὲ παθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ δόξαις συνίσταται, ὡς ὅταν δοξάσας τις μέλλειν τελευτᾶν ἴσχη φόβον, ἢ οἰηθεὶς ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ τι ἔσσεσθαι ἡσθῆ...τὰ δὲ ἔστιν ὡς ἡγησάμενα αὐτὰ ἀπροαιρέτως ἐμποιεῖν ἐν τῷ πεφυκότι δοξάζειν τὴν δόξαν). Plotinus, however, sees this issue in terms of a radically different anthropology from that of Evagrius.

close interconnection of the cognitive and the affective means that it makes no real difference which aspect of a *logismos* is experienced first since the other is certain to follow close behind, and either way it is likely that *pathos* will make itself felt before the decision is made whether or not to allow it to linger and will accordingly exert its influence upon that decision. What then of *Praktikos* 6 with its clear assertion that it is up to us whether or not a *logismos* lingers and arouses *pathos*? The fact that *pathos* can make itself felt in an episode of temptation prior to the involvement of the rational part of the soul in no way diminishes the power of the latter to resist *pathos*, even though it might feel to the agent as if it does. This is clear from *Eulogios* 21.22 where Evagrius treats him as capable of holding back from sin even in the throes of fresh *pathos*. Thus the assertion in *Praktikos* 6 of our power to resist the progression from *logismoi* to *pathos* is to be understood not as an aetiology of *pathos* analogous to that of the Stoics whereby a cognitive stimulus is followed by assent and only then by *pathos*, but instead as a reminder to the rational part of the soul that however beleaguered by *pathos* it might be, it still has the power to arrest the further augmentation of that *pathos* and its progression to sin.

Eulogios 13.12 and 21.22 reveal the close interaction between the cognitive and the affective in temptation by *logismoi* of fornication, but how do they relate in other kinds of temptation? Consider now the example from *Thoughts* 2 referred to in section 2.2.3 above:

εἰ τοῦ ζημιώσαντός με ἢ ἀτιμάσαντος ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ μου τὸ πρόσωπον γένοιτο, ἐλεγχθήσεται ὁ τῆς μνησικακίας παραβαλὼν λογισμὸς.⁴⁰⁹

If the face of a person who has caused me loss or dishonoured me should arise in my *dianoia* this will be proof of the approach of the *logismos* of resentment.

The face in question is an *empathês noêma* constituting an *empathês* memory of an event, the subsequent recollection of which will tempt me to succumb to fresh resentment in a process that can be schematised as follows:

⁴⁰⁹ *Th.* 2.5-7.

(1a) The *empathês noêma/logismos* of the person's face arises into my awareness from my disposition to *pathos* and as it does so I begin to feel stirrings of resentment.

or

(1b) I begin to feel stirrings of resentment and then the *empathês noêma/logismos* of the person's face arises into my awareness from my disposition to *pathos*

(2) Whether or not I am aware of these stirrings they start influencing my current mental and emotional state by inclining me to dwell anew on the injury she did to me.

(3) Although the originating event – her injuring me – was not pleasant, there was a certain pleasure associated with resentment I felt and so that pleasure is part of the *pathos* associated with the *noêma* of her face.

(4) That pleasure draws my attention toward itself and the *noêma* and my attention amplifies the pleasure and the resentment.

(5) At first the only pleasure I feel is that associated with the *noêma*, which I experience passively as part of it. But as soon as my attention inclines toward that passively experienced pleasure I start actively to enjoy that re-experiencing. This active enjoyment is the beginning of new, occurrent pleasure: the 'pleasure of the *logismoi*'.

(6) This new pleasure is part of the fresh *pathos* that I am now experiencing. The other part is fresh resentment.

(7) The arousal of fresh *pathos* is accompanied by the arising of fresh *logismoi* (or additional aspects of the overarching *logismos* of resentment), some of which might be further memories of the originating event. These in turn augment the

pathos, resulting in more *logismoi* which further augment the *pathos*, and so forth.

- (8) I imagine myself somehow acting out my resentment. This imaginary acting out is the sin *kata dianoian* referred to at *Disciples* 49.
- (9) By allowing myself to succumb to a fresh episode of resentment, and additionally by acting out that resentment in my imagination, I have strengthened my disposition to *pathos* in general and resentment in particular, making this cycle of events more liable to repetition.

It can be seen from this that temptation involving resentment follows the same pattern as that involving fornication, and it can, I suggest, safely be inferred that the same applies to temptation involving other *logismoi*. One caveat must, however, be noted. Evagrius notes that two of the demons can be especially swift in their attacks, the demon of fornication and the demon ‘that snatches us away into blasphemy.’⁴¹⁰ In cases of such rapid assaults the process of temptation described in steps 1-9 and at *Eulogios* 13.12 and 21.22 will be accelerated, or even perhaps overridden, by an onrush of *pathos*. But Evagrius maintains that even under such circumstances the agent has the power to resist; this is evident not only from his treatment, at *Eulogios* 21.22, of agent responsibility in the throes of *pathos*, but from *Praktikos* 51, where he notes that a swift attack by the demon of fornication poses no hindrance to the knowledge of God unless it should set the *logismoi* in motion with *pathos*.

2.2.5 Summary

This section began by looking at the philosophical understanding of *pathos* and then at Evagrius’ view of it. We saw that for Evagrius *pathos* involves an attachment to the sensible world that is excessive and idolatrous; makes the *nous* passive in relation to the sensible world; is injurious because it distances us from God, and falls within the scope of our self-determination. Most of what we would consider emotions count as Evagrian

⁴¹⁰ Cf. *Prakt.* 51; also *Pry.* 90.

pathē, as do various moods and other physical and psychological affects. Although for Evagrius *pathos* always involves the body, it is also present in the *nous* through association with *noēmata* of sensible objects. Through these *empathē noēmata* it binds the *nous* to the sensible world. It was noted that *logismoi* originate in the *pathētikon* part of the soul and include both affective and cognitive aspects. The distinction between dispositional and occurrent *pathos* was discussed and three aspects of dispositional *pathos* were seen to be identifiable in Evagrius' writings. The process of temptation was examined in detail in relation first to *logismoi* of fornication and then to *logismoi* of resentment. It emerged that the *logismoi* always involve pleasure which is experienced before the rational part of the soul becomes involved in an episode of temptation and which makes it harder to resist them, but that even when a person is in the throes of fresh *pathos* the rational part of her soul retains the power to prevent it from increasing further or progressing to sin.

2.3 The *empathēs nous*

This chapter has examined the psychological components of *empathēia*, namely the *logismoi* and *pathos*. The *logismoi* have been seen to comprise both cognitive and affective aspects. The former can be of two types: first, mental images arising from the compromised rationality of the *pathētikon* part of the soul, and, second, agency deriving from the involvement of the rational part of the soul. The affective aspects of the *logismoi* include both dispositional and occurrent *pathos*. Now it remains to summarise the experiential effects of *empathēia* upon a person. How do the excess, the directedness toward the external world and consequent passivity and changeability in respect of it, and the injuriousness to the agent characteristic of *pathos* find expression in our lives? The excess, it will be recalled, consists in our allowing external things to command more of our attention than God and what conduces to knowledge of him, and this in turn is what the directedness toward the external world amounts to. So if my desire to eat competes for my allegiance with my desire to obey the dietary restrictions that I know to be in the interests of virtue then my desire to eat is excessive and therefore a *pathos*. It is in this deflection of the agent from the good that the injuriousness to her of *pathos* consists.

The combined effects of all these things in a person's life, along with the passivity and changeability in respect of the external world that they involve, are instability and epistemic distortion. In binding the *nous* to the external world *pathos* binds it to its multiplicity and mutability, and this is reflected in *pathos* itself being a kind of movement. The understanding of *pathos* in terms of movement was by Evagrius' time traditional. Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, as we saw, includes as a definition of it 'injurious alterations and movements' (αἱ βλαβεραὶ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ κινήσεις),⁴¹¹ and the *De Anima* defines becoming angry as 'a certain mode of movement of such and such a body' (τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησις τις τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος).⁴¹² *Pathos* is defined as a movement of the soul by the Stoics,⁴¹³ and, following them, Clement of Alexandria,⁴¹⁴ and understood as such by Origen.⁴¹⁵ Evagrius himself consistently speaks of *pathos* in terms of *kinēsis*⁴¹⁶ and for him its association with movement underscores its connection with the Fall, the vulnerability of the *nous* to *pathos* being both the direct consequence of its primordial deflection from God, and, in everyday terms, the ongoing consequence and cause of its inability to sustain a continual focus upon him.

Now, though, some clarification is necessary: it is not so much movement *per se* that specifically characterises *pathos* but, rather, chaotic and disorderly movement. A particularly eloquent source for this idea, and one with which Evagrius would have been familiar, is Plato's metaphor, at *Phaedrus* 246a ff, of the soul as a winged team of horses and their charioteer. Following on from an affirmation of the intrinsic mobility and immortality of the soul,⁴¹⁷ it includes descriptions of the type of movement characteristic of the gods on the one hand and mortals on the other. The gods travel easily through the heavens and the region above, their chariots being 'well-balanced and easily controlled' (ἰσορρόπως εὐήνια ὄντα ῥαδίως πορεύεται)⁴¹⁸ since their horses are good

⁴¹¹ *Met.* 1022b18-19, trans. W D Ross.

⁴¹² *DA* 403a26, trans. J A Smith.

⁴¹³ Cf. Stobaeus 2:88, *SVF* 3.378; *LS* 65A; see above, 2.2.1.

⁴¹⁴ Cf. *Strom.* 2.13.59.6; see above, 2.2.1.

⁴¹⁵ I take this to be implied by the allusion at *DP* 3:1.4 to '*pathē* and movements'; see above, 2.2.4.

⁴¹⁶ E.g. at *Prakt.* 6, 37, 38 and 47. For a discussion of Evagrius' association of *pathos* with movement and, consequently, of *apatheia* with immobility, see Rasmussen (2005: 153-5).

⁴¹⁷ *Phdr.* 245c8-9: 'All soul is immortal. For that which is always in movement is immortal' (ψυχή πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεκίνητον ἀθάνατον). This and the following translations are those of Rowe.

⁴¹⁸ *Phdr.* 247b2.

and of good stock (καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων).⁴¹⁹ In the case of mortals, however, one horse is good but the other bad, making driving difficult and troublesome (χαλεπή...καὶ δύσκολος)⁴²⁰ and confining them to the region below the heavens. These souls follow after the gods,⁴²¹

ἅπασαι τοῦ ἄνω ἔπονται, ἀδυνατοῦσαι...συμπεριφέρονται, πατοῦσαι ἀλλήλας καὶ ἐπιβάλλουσαι, ἑτέρα πρὸ τῆς ἑτέρας πειρωμένη γενέσθαι. θόρυβος οὖν καὶ ἄμιλλα καὶ ἰδρὸς ἔσχατος γίγνεται, οὗ δὴ κακία ἠνιόχων πολλὰ μὲν χωλεύονται, πολλὰ δὲ πολλὰ πτερὰ θραύονται.⁴²²

all of them eager to rise up, but unable to do, and are carried round together... trampling and jostling one another, each trying to overtake the next. So there ensues the greatest confusion, competition and sweated exertion, in which through incompetent driving many souls are maimed, and many have their wings all broken.

A soul unable to follow in the train of a god and thereby glimpse ‘part of what is true’ (τι τῶν ἀληθῶν)⁴²³ becomes

λήθης τε καὶ κακίας πλησθεῖσα βαρυνθῆ, βαρυνθεῖσα δὲ πτερορρυήση τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέση...⁴²⁴

weighed down by being filled with forgetfulness and incompetence, and because of the weight loses its wings and falls to the earth...

This description is strongly redolent of Evagrius’ vision of the fall of the *logikoi*, due to inattentiveness,⁴²⁵ negligence⁴²⁶ or carelessness,⁴²⁷ into the thickness of corporeality and bondage by *pathos* to the sensible world, and the resulting plight of the *nous*, whereby it is ‘entangled in material things and agitated by continuous concerns (πράγμασι συμπλεκόμενος ὑλικοῖς, καὶ φροντίσι συνεχέσι δονούμενος):⁴²⁸

⁴¹⁹ *Phdr.* 246b2-3.

⁴²⁰ Cf. *Phdr.* 246c ff.

⁴²¹ More precisely, after the soul ‘which follows a god best and has come to resemble him most’ – 248a2.

⁴²² *Phdr.* 248a7-b4.

⁴²³ *Phdr.* 248c2-3.

⁴²⁴ *Phdr.* 248c7-8.

⁴²⁵ Cf. *KG* 1.49.

⁴²⁶ Cf. *KG* 3.28; also *DP* 1.5.5 (R); 1.3.8 (R).

⁴²⁷ Cf. *KG* 3.28.

⁴²⁸ *Pry.* 70; cf. 2 *Tim.* 2:4.

Κυκλεύει γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἐμπαθῆς ὧν καὶ δυσκάθεκτος γίνεται τὰς ποιητικὰς τῶν ἡδονῶν ὕλας ἐπισκεπτόμενος.⁴²⁹

The *nous* goes round and round when it is caught in the *pathē* and is hard to restrain when it visits matter conducive to pleasures.

Οὐ δύναται δεδεμένος δραμεῖν, οὐδὲ νοῦς πάθεισι δουλεύων προσευχῆς πνευματικῆς τόπον ἰδεῖν· ἔλκεται γὰρ, καὶ περιφέρεται ἐκ τοῦ ἐμπαθοῦς νοήματος, καὶ οὐχ ἴσταται ἀκλόνητος.⁴³⁰

It is not possible to run while tied up, nor can a mind that is a slave to the *pathē* behold the place of spiritual prayer, for it is dragged and spun round by *empathēs noēma* and it cannot achieve a stable state.

The *empathēs nous*, at the mercy of externals, can be seized by anger,⁴³¹ dragged about by thoughts of worry,⁴³² strangled by the noonday demon⁴³³ or carried away into blasphemy.⁴³⁴ It is subject to wandering⁴³⁵ and easily moved, having difficulty checking forbidden fantasies.⁴³⁶ It is darkened by *logismoi* rising through the *pathētikon* part of the soul,⁴³⁷ by our being dragged towards worldly desires and by our *thumos* being compelled contrary to nature.⁴³⁸ It is defiled by *logismoi* of anger or fornication⁴³⁹ and thickened by the company of secular people.⁴⁴⁰ It has a strong tendency to be plundered by memory at the time of prayer.⁴⁴¹ In short, it is prey to all the turbulence, physical as well as psychological, associated with the *logismoi* and the *pathē* they arouse - and it should be remembered that this means not only particular episodes of mental and emotional turmoil and physical suffering but the ongoing process of cycling through the *logismoi* and their attendant *pathē* in one sequence or another as we ricochet through the

⁴²⁹ *Th.* 26.13-15.

⁴³⁰ *Pry.* 71.

⁴³¹ *Prakt.* 11.

⁴³² *Th.* 6.

⁴³³ Cf. *Prakt.* 36. The 'noonday demon' is that of *akēdia*; cf. *Prakt.* 12.1.

⁴³⁴ *Prakt.* 43, 46.

⁴³⁵ *Prakt.* 15

⁴³⁶ *Prakt.* 48.

⁴³⁷ *Prakt.* 74.

⁴³⁸ *Prakt.* 24.

⁴³⁹ *Prakt.* 23.

⁴⁴⁰ *Prakt.* 41.

⁴⁴¹ *Pry.* 44.

‘complex pattern of moral vulnerability’⁴⁴² that Evagrius’ eightfold classification of generic *logismoi* represents.

For the soul that, due to the thoughts of sloth and *acedia* that have persisted in it, has become weak, has been brought low, and has dissipated in the miseries of its soul; whose strength has been consumed by its great fatigue; whose hope has nearly been destroyed by this demon’s force; that has become mad and childish with passionate and doleful tears; and that has no relief from anywhere.⁴⁴³

Now consider the following:

Τί βούλεται τοῖς δαίμοσι ἐνεργεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν γαστριμαργίαν, πορνείαν, φιλαργυρίαν, ὀργήν τε καὶ μνησικακίαν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάθη; ἵνα παχυνθεῖς ὁ νοῦς ἐξ αὐτῶν, μὴ δυναθῆ ὡς δεῖ προσεύξασθαι· τὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους πάθη ἄρξαντα οὐκ ἐῶ αὐτὸν λογικῶς κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν Θεοῦ Λόγον ἐπιζητεῖν.⁴⁴⁴

Why do the demons want to produce in us gluttony, fornication, avarice, anger, and resentment, and the other *pathē*? So that the *nous* becomes thickened by them and unable to pray as it ought; for when the *pathē* of the irrational part have arisen, they do not allow it to be moved rationally and to seek the Word of God.

This reminds us that although the *pathē* have their origin in the human body and soul - in our senses, appetites and desires⁴⁴⁵ - the *logismoi* do not originate with us but with the demons; as we have seen, Evagrius regards the *logismoi* as fundamentally alien to us since human nature is essentially good.⁴⁴⁶ Thus *empathēia* is not the natural human condition⁴⁴⁷ but a state of collusion with the demons into which we enter by allowing ourselves to be seduced by pleasure into letting the *logismoi* linger and arouse (further) *pathos* in us. The attractiveness to us of pleasure can be traced to the predominance of *epithumia* in the human constitution,⁴⁴⁸ since the satisfaction of appetite always involves pleasure and so in a sense all appetite is directed toward pleasure. Therefore in suggesting the *logismoi* – which, it will be recalled, always involve pleasure⁴⁴⁹ - the

⁴⁴² Williams (2007:7); see above, 2.1.4.2.

⁴⁴³ *Ant.* 6.38.

⁴⁴⁴ *Pry.* 50.

⁴⁴⁵ E.g. *Prakt.* 4, 35; *Eul.* 21.23; see above, 2.2.2.

⁴⁴⁶ See above, 2.1.1.

⁴⁴⁷ Cf. *Th.* 8; see above, 2.1.1.

⁴⁴⁸ *KG* 1.68; see above, 1.2.

⁴⁴⁹ See above, 2.2.4.

demons are playing to the particular weakness of human beings, and just as *apatheia* is the natural human condition,⁴⁵⁰ *empatheia* is our especial pathology. *Pathos* thickens the *nous* by binding it to the sensible world and in so doing prevents it from being moved rationally; that is, in a stable and orderly manner. And so to look ahead, *apatheia* will be characterised not by immovability on the part of the soul but by its rational movement;⁴⁵¹ that is, a kind of movement appropriate to contemplation.

This idea of stable and orderly movement replacing the chaotic and disorderly movement characteristic of *pathos* connects the instability of *empatheia* with the epistemic distortion noted to be its second defining feature. The fundamental reason for that distortion is simple: since God is both the source of knowledge and its only true object the fall from union with him was a fall from knowledge into ignorance.⁴⁵² This is reflected in the fact that *empatheia*, mediated through the *logismoi*, leads us to construe the world solely in terms of our desires and to construct on their basis fictional counterparts of it, populated by phantoms, in which they can be satisfied. Thus in so far as we are prey to it the world of which we are aware and in which we act is not the real world peopled by real human beings but a false one of our own making in which real human beings are reduced to being ‘matter’ for our fantasies.⁴⁵³ The instigator of this desire-based fictional world is the *pathētikon* part of the soul, the impaired rationality of which is directed not toward truth, the proper object of reason, but what we desire to be true. But it is when the rational part of the soul assents to, and assumes agency within it that it derives from us such reality as we can give it. And so we isolate ourselves in subjective worlds of our own creation, cut off not only from God but from other human beings and the rest of creation, and in so doing perpetuate the instability and fragmentation of the Fall. In this condition we are unable to read the ‘letter from God’ that is corporeal creation. Instead of being able to appreciate the spiritual significance of created things or even engage with them neutrally, we are trapped in a self-referential perspective in which nothing has meaning except in terms of its utility in respect of what we mistakenly suppose to be our self-interest. And, as we go about our lives in this *pathos*-driven way, the *noēmata* that the *nous* takes up will have *pathos* ‘yoked together’ with them

⁴⁵⁰ Cf. *Th.* 8; see above, 2.1.1.

⁴⁵¹ *Pace* Rasmussen (2005: 153-55), whose discussion of movement and immovability in relation to *pathos* and *apatheia* does not distinguish between soul and *nous* in terms of the effects of *apatheia*.

⁴⁵² See above, 1.1.

⁴⁵³ See above, 2.1.1.

and so imprint the *nous*, further thickening it and, by forming *empathēs* memories, augmenting our disposition to *pathos* and perpetuating our predicament.

So much for the pathology of the human soul; now to its health.

Chapter 3

Apatheia

The essence of the human being is a formless and incorporeal *nous*, the ‘place of God’,¹ created to exist in the stillness and ‘unspeakable peace’² of union with him. The *nous* is, however, capable of movement because it has the power of self-determination. Since the first condition of the *nous* was union with God, its first exercise of self-determination was a deflection from him, and since God is unmoving, this meant a transition into movement and, consequently, changeability. Because the movement was away from God, it was unstable and, as such, precipitated the Fall. God’s response was to undertake corporeal creation to reintroduce stability to the created order and provide the *noes* with a way of re-ascending to him. The foundation for this ascent is *apatheia*, the ‘health of the soul’ (ὕγεία ψυχῆς).³

Before proceeding it would be appropriate to clarify which part of the human person is the proper subject of *apatheia*, since Evagrius variously predicates it of the *nous*,⁴ the soul,⁵ the *pathētikon* part of the soul,⁶ the *epithumētikon*⁷ and the heart.⁸ The answer is in principle simple: the *nous* is the proper subject of *apatheia*, where *nous* is understood not as effectively synonymous with *logistikon* but as denoting the whole entity. But despite this, and the fact that, as we have seen, Evagrius often speaks of the *nous* rather than the soul in order to maintain a focus upon our true nature, prior to, above and beyond our present, ensouled condition,⁹ he also associates *apatheia* with the soul in contrast to the *nous*, as in the following:

δῶξα καὶ φῶς τοῦ νοός ἐστὶν ἡ πνευματικὴ γνῶσις· δῶξα καὶ φῶς τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ ἀπάθεια.¹⁰

¹ See above, 1.2.1.3.

² Cf. *KG* 1.65.

³ *Prakt.* 56.3.

⁴ E.g. *Prakt.* 83; *Th.* 15, 26.

⁵ E.g. *Prakt.* 2, 56, 60, 67; *Rfl.* 3; *Th.* 22.

⁶ *Gnost.* 2.

⁷ *Th.* 16.

⁸ *Th.* 43.

⁹ See above, 1.2.1.

¹⁰ *KG* 1.81.

The glory and light of the *nous* is spiritual knowledge; the glory and light of the soul is *apatheia*.

Here Evagrius is speaking of the *nous* as synonymous with the *logistikon* and ‘soul’ as denoting the *pathētikon* part of the soul and so associating *apatheia* with the latter. In any case, to speak of *apatheia* as pertaining to the *nous*, if the latter is understood to encompass the body, would be misleading inasmuch as *apatheia* does not, properly speaking, attach to the body since its affections derive not from itself but from the soul, specifically its *pathētikon* part. For both these reasons it would seem more correct to say that *apatheia* attaches to the latter. But although the *pathētikon* part of the soul is certainly the principal locus of *pathos* in the soul, there is reason to believe that the *logistikon* is also vulnerable to *pathos* in its own right and not just *via* the *thumos* or *epithumētikon*. In the first place there is Evagrius’ reference to *apatheia* of the *pathētikon* part of the soul to account for. In it he defines the *praktikos* as ‘he who has only acquired *apatheia* of the *pathētikon* part of the soul’ (ὁ τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς μόνον ἀπαθὲς κεκτημένος).¹¹ If, as this implies, there can be, in addition to an *apatheia* of the *pathētikon* part of the soul, an *apatheia* of the rational part, there must be *pathē* of the rational part. We have already seen that, despite Evagrius’ usual attribution of the *logismoi* to the *pathētikon* part of the soul, several apparently derive at least in part from the *logistikon*.¹² We have also seen that in practice the boundary between *logismoi* and *pathē* is blurred since *logismoi* always have dispositional *pathos* associated with them.¹³ In addition, the three parts of the soul are not, it will be recalled, absolutely distinct entities but successive stages in the descent of the *nous*.¹⁴ Finally, we have seen that the entire *nous*, even in its pre-lapsarian state, is intrinsically passible.¹⁵ For all these reasons it seems likely that the *logistikon* has its own *pathē*; indeed, this seems far more plausible than its being somehow immune to the passibility of the other parts of the soul and of the *nous* as a whole. But this raises the question of why the *pathētikon* part of the soul, if it is not the only source of *pathos*, should be singled out as *pathētikon* at all.¹⁶ A twofold answer presents itself. First, it is the primary and most fundamental source of

¹¹ *Gnost.* 2.

¹² See above, 2.1.4.1.

¹³ See above, 2.1.1, 2.2.4.

¹⁴ See above, 1.1.2.

¹⁵ See above, 1.2.1.

¹⁶ Cf., e.g., *Prakt.* 49; 74; 78; 84.

pathos, being more closely associated with the body and the external world than the rational part of the soul. In particular, it is the source of the appetite for food, in turn the source of vulnerability to all the other *pathē*.¹⁷ Second, the capacity to resist *pathos* is intrinsic to, and resides in, the *logistikon* alone. Consequently the *pathētikon* part of the soul depends upon something other than, and outside of, itself to free it from *pathos*.¹⁸ Therefore it can be concluded that although the *pathētikon* part of the soul is the primary and most fundamental intra-psychoic source of *pathos*, the *logistikon* too is possible, and, accordingly, the entire soul is the proper subject of *apatheia*.

What, then, are we to make of Evagrius' references to *apatheia* of the *pathētikon* part of the soul, the *epithumētikon* and the heart? The former two can now be explained easily: both refer to a specific kind of *apatheia*, 'imperfect *apatheia*', discussed below in Section 3.4. Evagrius' reference to *apatheia* of the heart requires slightly more explanation. The heart, as we have seen, is the centre of a person's interior life; that which they experience as 'me'.¹⁹ To speak of *apatheia* of the heart, therefore, is to shift the focus onto this uniquely intimate domain; to raise the question of *apatheia* in relation to my most personal and immediate sense of myself. I suggested above that when Evagrius speaks of the *nous* or 'soul' he is discussing the human person objectively but when he speaks of the 'heart' he is invoking their subjectivity,²⁰ and I think the extreme infrequency with which he predicates *apatheia* of the heart – I am only aware of the instance cited above – testifies to his sensitivity to the two different vocabularies he uses. When he uses the term *apatheia* he does so in conjunction with other philosophical terms whereas when he wants to speak of *apatheia* in relation to the heart he does so by reference to purity, or, more often, by allusion.²¹

In sum, Evagrius speaks of *apatheia* in relation to the *nous*, the soul, the *pathētikon* part of the soul, the *epithumētikon* and the heart, but its proper object is the soul understood as the entire tripartite entity, or, speaking in a different sense, the heart. The assignment of *apatheia* to the soul needs to be qualified in that, while it is true in the case of the fallen *nous* (that is, the soul) that the soul is the subject of *apatheia*, the pre-lapsarian

¹⁷ See above, 1.2.3, 2.1.3.1.

¹⁸ Cf. *Prakt.* 86.

¹⁹ See above, 1.2.4.

²⁰ See above, 1.2.4.

²¹ See below, 3.2.

nous would also have been *apathēs*, as will the post-restoration *nous*. However, since Evagrius' discussions of *apatheia* always concern the incarnate *nous* (that is, the soul), I shall from now on speak of the soul as the subject of *apatheia* unless the context requires use of another term.

3.1 *Apatheia* as stability

The pre-lapsarian *nous* in discarnate union with God existed in stillness, but the fallen *nous*, although capable under certain circumstances of experiencing stillness, is highly mobile: Evagrius speaks of it wandering (*πλανώμενον*),²² describes it as easily moved (*εὐκίνητον*)²³ and likens it to a potter's wheel in the very great rapidity of its movement (*ὀξύτατος...κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἡμῶν ὁ νοῦς*).²⁴ The more distant from God the *nous* is, the more unstable its movement is; the closer to him, the more stable. *Apatheia*, as freedom from the turbulence of the *pathē* is the stable condition of the *nous* that enables its return to God. We can see an allusion to the stability afforded by *apatheia*, to the reward of attaining it and to Evagrius' association with it in the following entry from the *Antirrhētikos*:

[Against] the thought of pride that glorifies me on the pretext that I edify souls with a stable way of life and knowledge of God;²⁵

Since *pathos* is the unstable movement of the *nous*, *apatheia* is by definition its stable movement. Or is it? Rasmussen has argued that Evagrius associates *apatheia* with immovability:

If movement characterises the passions, the opposite is the case regarding *apatheia*. *Apatheia* is a condition which is characterised by peacefulness (*Prakt.* 12 and 57), where the mind is calm and still (*Prakt.* 64) and untroubled (*Prakt.* 67). This condition is identical with the original state of the rational beings before the fall, which, we remember, was characterised by movement... Perhaps it is possi-

²² Cf. *Prakt.* 15.1; also *KG* 1.85: 'The *nous* wanders when impassioned and is uncontrolled when it attains the elements of its desire.'

²³ *Prakt.* 48.6.

²⁴ *Th.* 24.6-7.

²⁵ Cf. *Ant.* 8.30; see above, 2.1.3.8.

ble to say that the monastic struggle against thoughts, demons and passions is really about the struggle for immovability.²⁶

To begin with, there is a double ambiguity to be unpacked from the notion of ‘immovability’. The first ambiguity is semantic and is that immovability can be either absolute or relative. That is, to say ‘*x* is immovable’ can either mean ‘*x* is immobile’, in the sense of ‘*x* is not moving at all’²⁷ or it can mean ‘*x* is immovable in relation to *y*’, as in, ‘*x* cannot be moved from *y*’, where *y* could, for example, be a state of stable movement. That Rasmussen understands immovability as immobility is clear from her identification of it with the pre-lapsarian state of the *logikoi* (an identification which is misplaced since although the pre-lapsarian *logikoi* were immobile they were not immovable). The second ambiguity is logical and concerns the distinction between the metaphysical and the phenomenological; that is between, (a), my *nous* being actually – that is, metaphysically - immovable, and, (b), my experiencing my *nous* as immovable. It would be possible for (a) but not (b) to be the case; for (b) but not (a) to be the case, or for both or neither (a) and (b) to be the case. Rasmussen does not acknowledge either of these ambiguities but her claim appears to be that *apatheia* is characterised by immobility that is both metaphysical and phenomenological, both actual and experienced. My claim, by contrast, is that *apatheia* is characterised by actual - that is, metaphysical - movement that is experienced as stillness. So far the only support I have adduced for it is the Platonic association of movement with soul, since although I have also inferred from the premiss that *pathos* is unstable movement to the conclusion that *apatheia* is stable movement, it would be equally valid to infer from it, as Rasmussen seems to have, that *apatheia* is immobility. I shall now explain (i) why metaphysical immovability can never be a property of the Evagrian *nous*; (ii) under what circumstances the *nous* can be (metaphysically) immobile, and, (iii), when (metaphysical) movement can be experienced as stillness.

The reason for (i) is simple: metaphysical immovability can never be a property of the *nous* as far as Evagrius is concerned because movability is inseparable from the power of self-determination, an exercise of which is, as we have seen, a movement of the

²⁶ Rasmussen (2005: 154).

²⁷ Although ‘immobile’ can also be synonymous with ‘immovable’, I shall not intend it to be understood in that sense here.

nous.²⁸ Again, with (ii) things are straightforward: God is immobile but movement is intrinsic to corporeal creation, so the *nous* is immobile when, and only when, it is in discarnate union with God. The *nous* was immobile - although not of course immovable - in its pre-lapsarian existence, and will again be immobile, although not immovable, following the *apokatastasis*. The incarnate *nous* can never be immobile because movement is intrinsic to corporeal creation. With (iii) things become more complicated. With the unstable movement of the soul or *nous* – that is, *pathos* - the phenomenological is a reliable guide to the metaphysical since *pathos* will always be experienced as unstable movement. To see this, we need only think back to Evagrius’ descriptions of the *logismoi* and their associated *pathē*: to be tempted by a *logismos*, which means already to be experiencing its built-in *pathos*, is to experience a mental and emotional instability that impels us toward the even greater instability of a fresh episode of *pathos*. The stable movement of the soul or *nous* can, however, be experienced as stillness. This can happen in two ways. The first relates to the *nous* which, although *apathēs* and perhaps contemplating, is not yet enjoying the experiential union with God that is pure prayer. In this case, its experience will be one of concurrent stillness and movement, the movement being its orientation toward God, and the stillness, the serenity that enables it. Evagrius’ account at *On Thoughts* 8 of investigating the spiritual *logoi* of gold describes a series of movements of the *apathēs nous*: from the question of ‘why gold was made’, to ‘why it is sand-like and scattered through through the lower regions of the earth, to why it is ‘discovered with much labour and toil’, and so forth.²⁹ Again, the following describes a stable movement of the *nous*, the experience of which would involve both movement and stillness:

Ὅταν ὁ νοῦς σου τῷ πολλῷ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν πόθῳ κατὰ μικρὸν οἶον ὑπαναχωρεῖ τῆς σαρκὸς, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐξ αἰσθήσεως ἢ μνήμης ἢ κράσεως νοήματα ἀποστρέφεται, εὐλαβείας ὁμοῦ καὶ χαρᾶς ἔμπλεως γενόμενος, τότε νόμιζε ἡγγικέναι ὄροις προσευχῆς.³⁰

When the *nous* out of a great longing for God gradually withdraws, as it were, from the flesh and turns aside all *noēmata* deriving from the senses or from

²⁸ Cf. Sch. 10.1-2 on Eccl. 2:11; Sch. 23.1 on Prov. 2:17; see above, 1.1.1.

²⁹ Cf. *Th.* 8.5-14; see above, 2.1.1.

³⁰ *Pry.* 61.

memory or from *krasis*, being filled with both reverence and joy, then consider yourself to be near the frontiers of prayer.

‘Great longing’, ‘gradually withdrawing’, ‘turning aside’, ‘being filled with reverence and joy’ – all are movements of the *nous* that would be experienced as such. But they are predicated upon *apatheia*: we know the *nous* here described is *apathēs* from the fact that its *epithumētikon* is acting according to nature in longing for God³¹ and from its ability to ‘withdraw from the flesh’ and ‘turn aside all *noēmata* deriving from the senses or memory or *krasis*’. This *apatheia* would be experienced as the serenity and detachment underlying and enabling these movements toward ‘the frontiers of prayer’. When, however, the *nous* reaches and crosses those frontiers it will no longer experience any movement, but will instead feel itself caught up in the stillness of union with God. Now phenomenology comes apart from metaphysics because while the *nous* will experience only stillness it will remain subject to the movements intrinsic to corporeality – the flows of blood and breath in the body; the continuing orientation of the three parts of the soul towards God, and also the existence of body and soul in time, existence in time being itself a form of movement since it entails change. So while *apatheia* is always experienced as stillness, it is constituted by the stable movement of the *nous*, and, except in the union with God that is pure prayer, will be accompanied by the experience of that movement.

That said, although I have argued that the *apathēs nous* is in motion I have not yet adduced any direct evidence for this being Evagrius’ view. So does such evidence exist? It does. For example, at *Kephalaia Gnostika* 6.46 he speaks of ‘the *praktikē* soul moved by the commandments of Christ’. Here as elsewhere he uses the adjective *praktikē* as a synonym for *apathēs*: the soul that is moved by the commandments of Christ is the *apathēs* soul, in contrast to the soul which is moved by *pathos*. Again, in *On Prayer* 50 he declares that when the *pathē* of the irrational part of the soul have arisen, they do not allow the *nous* to ‘be moved in a rational manner (*λογικῶς κινεῖσθαι*) and to seek the word of God’,³² from which it follows that when the soul is *apathēs* the *nous* can be ‘moved in a rational manner.’ The ‘rational movement’ of the *nous* is of course contemplation, hence for example Evagrius speaks of ‘the pure *nous* which is moved by spiri-

³¹ Cf. *KG* 4.73; *Prakt.* 86; see above, 1.2.2.

³² *Pry.* 50.5-6.

tual knowledge’,³³ of the *nous* ‘eagerly [hastening] on towards immaterial and formless knowledge (πρὸς ἄυλον καὶ ἀνείδεον γνῶσιν ἐπειγόμενος)³⁴ and of the angel of God ‘[moving] the light of the *nous* to an unerring activity’ (κινεῖ τὸ φῶς τοῦ νοῦ ἀπλανῶς ἐνεργεῖν).³⁵

Because *apatheia* is the natural state of the human soul,³⁶ Evagrius refers to it as ‘our own state’ (τῆς οἰκείας καταστάσεως).³⁷ Insofar as the *nous* possesses *apatheia* it is emancipated from the turbulence associated with the *logismoi*. It is no longer bound by *pathos* to sensible objects,³⁸ is free of entanglement in material things and of agitation by continuous concerns³⁹ and is no longer ‘dragged and spun round by *empathē noēmata* and unable to achieve a stable state’:⁴⁰

Ἀπάθειά ἐστι κατάστασις ἡρέμεα ψυχῆς λογικῆς, ἐκ πραύτητος καὶ σωφροσύνης συνισταμένη.⁴¹

Apatheia is the tranquil state of the rational soul,⁴² constituted by gentleness and chastity.

Rasmussen suggests that allusions to the immovability that she associates with *apatheia* should be read into Evagrius’ uses in the *Praktikos* of cognates of the verb *histēmi*, ‘to stand’, such that references to standing, whether metaphorical or literal,⁴³ should be understood as implicit allusions to *apatheia*, and that in particular a symbolic connection obtains between the monastic practice of standing while praying and ‘the ideal, transcendent “stand” before God.’⁴⁴ In other words, when Evagrius speaks of the *nous*

³³ *KG* 6.48. At *KG* 3.42 Evagrius defines contemplation as spiritual knowledge; see below, 1.1.3

³⁴ *Pry.* 68.

³⁵ *Pry.* 74.

³⁶ Cf. *Th.* 8, *Disc.* 140; see above, 1.2, 2.2.1.

³⁷ *Prakt.* 43.8.

³⁸ Cf. *Th.* 40-3-5; *Rfl.* 23; Sch. 2 on Ps. 145:8; also *Th.* 22.1-8. See above, 2.2.3.

³⁹ Cf. *Pry.* 70; see above, 2.3.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Pry.* 71; see above, 2.3.

⁴¹ *Rfl.* 3.

⁴² Cf. Sch. Ps. 36:11: ‘an abundance of peace is *apatheia* of the soul with true knowledge of beings’ (πλήθος δὲ εἰρήνης ἐστὶν ἀπάθεια ψυχῆς μετὰ γνώσεως τῶν ὄντων ἀληθοῦς).

⁴³ She cites as examples *Prakt.* 15, ‘When the *nous* wanders, reading, vigils and prayer bring it to a standstill’ (νοῦν μὲν πλανώμενον ἴστησιν...) and *Prakt.* 46, ‘This demon’s goal is to stop us from praying so that we may not stand (μὴ στῶμεν) before God’.

⁴⁴ Rasmussen (2005: 154-55).

standing before God he is evoking both the monk’s physical posture during prayer and the stability and experiential stillness of *apatheia*, the former being in turn a symbol of the latter. With the foregoing caveats about ‘immovability’, I think this is often correct,⁴⁵ and in particular we shall see in the following section that the ‘stand of the *nous* before God’ is indeed symbolic of *apatheia*. Meanwhile it can be noted how, in the second part of this aphorism, Evagrius uses the verb *sunistamai*, a cognate of *histēmi* and also of *sustasis*, to implicitly reinforce the association of *apatheia* with stability that is made explicit in the first part of it. Again,

καθαρθείσα ψυχὴ τῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν πληρότητος ἀκλόνητον τὴν τάξιν τοῦ νοῦ κατασκευάζει, δεκτικὸν αὐτὸν ποιῶσα τῆς ζητουμένης καταστάσεως.⁴⁶

When the soul has been purified by the full complement of the virtues, it stabilises⁴⁷ the attitude of the *nous* and prepares it to receive the desired state.

The soul that has been ‘purified by the full complement of the virtues’ is the *apathēs* soul, and the ‘desired state’ that it prepares the soul to receive is that of pure prayer.⁴⁸

Commenting on Prov. 18:16, ‘A man’s gift enlarges him, and seats him among princes’, Evagrius understands a ‘man’s gift’ to be the right life (βίος ὀρθός) that enlarges him and makes him worthy of the fullness of God,⁴⁹ and the verb ‘seats’ as referring to ‘the seat of the *nous*...the excellent state which keeps that which is sitting there difficult to move or immovable’⁵⁰ (νοῦ γὰρ καθέδρα ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀρίστη δυσκίνητον ἢ ἀκίνητον

⁴⁵ An obvious exception being his use of the word *katastasis*, ‘state’. The meaning of this word is simply too broad for it to be associated only with stability, and Evagrius uses it of both stable and unstable states, as, for example, in the following: Sch. 23 on Prov. 2:17: ‘the former (πρότερα) *katastasis* [of the *logikoi*]’; Sch. 91.1-2 on Prov. 7:6-10, ‘the impure (ἀκάθαρτος) *katastasis* of the soul’; Sch. 153.4-6 on Prov. 17:2, ‘he gives to each brother knowledge according to his *katastasis*’; Sch. 240.1 on Prov. 22:10, ‘the worst (χειρόστη) *katastasis*’; *Prakt.* 80.3-5, ‘A peaceful (εἰρηνική) *katastasis* follows upon the former *logismoi*, but a troubled (τεταραγμένη) one follows upon the latter.’

⁴⁶ *Pry.* 2.

⁴⁷ Rasmussen (2005: 155) translates *aklonētos* as ‘immovable’ and interprets this chapter as clear evidence for the connection between *apatheia* and immovability that she proposes. ‘Stabilises’ is Sinkewicz’ translation. Liddell and Scott give the meanings of *aklonētos* as ‘unshaken, unmoved.’

⁴⁸ *Pace* Rasmussen, who takes the ‘desired state’ to be *apatheia* itself.

⁴⁹ Cf. Eph. 3:19.

⁵⁰ Sinkewicz translates *akinēton* here as ‘immobile’, but because of the ambiguity of this term – see above, n.26 – it is unclear how he intends it to be understood. Liddell and Scott give both ‘immobile’ and ‘immovable’ as meanings of *akinēton*, but I feel that the latter is, in the context, a more suitable translation since it is unambiguous and in the sense of ‘immovable’ logically related to the predicate ‘difficult to

διατηροῦσα τὸν καθεζόμενον),⁵¹ that is, *apatheia*. ‘Difficult to move’ means ‘difficult to dislodge from stable movement’ and should be understood both metaphysically and phenomenologically. For the reasons given above, however, ‘immovable’ must be understood in phenomenological terms alone; that is, as meaning that the *nous* feels immovable. The following makes the same point, bearing in mind that *apatheia* is synonymous with the establishment of virtue in the soul:⁵²

Virtue is that state of the reasoning soul in which it is difficult to move it towards evil.⁵³

In his gentleness, tranquility and stability the Evagrian *apathēs* resembles the Stoic sage, described by Stobaeus as follow:

[λέγουσι] τὸν σπουδαῖον...εἶναι δὲ καὶ πρᾶον, τῆς πραότητος οὔσης ἕξωως καθ' ἣν πρᾶως ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἐν πᾶσι καὶ μὴ ἐκφέρεσθαι εἰς ὀργὴν ἐν μηδενί. καὶ ἡσύχιον δὲ καὶ κόσμιον εἶναι, τῆς κοσμιότητος οὔσης ἐπιστήμης κινήσεων πρεπουσῶν, ἡσύχιότητος δὲ εὐταξίας περὶ τὰς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεις καὶ μονὰς ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος.⁵⁴

[They say that] the good man...is gentle, his gentleness being a state by which he brings gentleness to bear upon acting appropriately in everything and never being carried away to anger against anyone. He is also tranquil and orderly, his orderliness being knowledge of fitting movements and his tranquility the good discipline of the natural movements and rests of his soul and body.⁵⁵

For Evagrius, the tranquillity afforded by *apatheia* derives in large part from the neutrality it affords in relation to our thoughts and occurrent sense-perception. We have seen that ‘the human [that is, *apathēs*] *logismos* neither seeks the acquisition of gold nor is concerned with investigating what gold symbolises; rather, it merely introduces in the intellect the simple form of gold separate from any *pathos* of greed’,⁵⁶ and this neutrality also characterises sense perception, meaning that although the *noēmata* of sensible

move’, whereas ‘immobile’ is not. To put it another way, *x* could not be both ‘difficult to move’ and ‘immovable’, but it could be both ‘difficult to move’ and ‘immobile’ in the sense of ‘still’.

⁵¹ Sch. 184.3-5 on Prov. 18:16.

⁵² See above, 1.2.2.

⁵³ *KG* 6.21.

⁵⁴ Stobaeus 2:115.5-17, *SVF* 3:564, 632; *LS* 65W.

⁵⁵ Translation mine.

⁵⁶ *Th.* 8.18-21; see above, 2.1.1.

objects will imprint the *nous* insofar as we focus upon the objects themselves rather than their *logoi*, the imprinting will not have the force that it would were *pathos* involved. But it is not only to our thoughts and perceptions of objects that *apatheia* brings tranquility, but to our memories of them:

ἀπάθειαν ἔχει ψυχὴ, οὐχ ἢ μὴ πάσχουσα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλ' ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰς μνήμας αὐτῶν ἀτάραχος διαμένουσα.⁵⁷

The soul possesses *apatheia*, not by virtue of its experiencing no *pathos* with respect to objects, but because it remains untroubled even with regard to memories of them.

Evagrius also includes our dream life within the domain of *apatheia*:

ἀπαθείας τεκμήριον, νοῦς ἀρξάμενος τὸ οἰκεῖον φέγγος ὄραν, καὶ πρὸς τὰ καθ' ὕπνον φάσματα διαμένων ἴσυχος, καὶ λειῶς βλέπων τὰ πράγματα.⁵⁸

It is a proof of *apatheia* when the *nous* has begun to see its own light⁵⁹ and remains still before the phantasms occurring during sleep and looks upon objects with serenity.

It is probable that in extending *apatheia* to our dream life Evagrius is not simply treating the latter as an adjunct of our waking life, the character of which reflects the overall health of the soul, but as morally and spiritually relevant in a more substantive and direct way. His departure from Constantinople⁶⁰ was precipitated, so Palladius tells us, by his swearing an oath in a dream to ‘leave this city and care for [his] soul’ (ἀναχωρεῖς τῆς πόλεως ταύτης καὶ φροντίζεις σου τῆς ψυχῆς);⁶¹ upon waking he questioned the validity of such an oath, but reasoned, ‘even if the oath was in a trance, nevertheless I did take it’ (εἰ καὶ ἐν ἐκστάσει γέγονεν ὁ ὄρκος ἀλλ' ὅμως ὤμοσα).⁶² It would seem, then, that he regards us as capable in principle of full agency in our dreams, a belief which, in

⁵⁷ *Prakt.* 67.

⁵⁸ *Prakt.* 64.

⁵⁹ At *Gnost.* 45 Evagrius attributes to Basil of Caesarea the view that the *nous* has a light of its own that is only visible to those who have attained *apatheia*.

⁶⁰ Prior to settling in the desert Evagrius had been in Constantinople, first in the retinue of Gregory Nazianzus and then in that of his successor as bishop, Nektarios. He left the city in order to extricate himself from a potentially disastrous romantic entanglement; cf. *HL* 38.2-7.

⁶¹ *HL* 38.6.

⁶² *HL* 38.7.

assigning agency to us under circumstances to which it might be supposed not to extend, would accord with his imputing to the person in the throes of *pathos* the ability nonetheless to refrain from sin.⁶³

In this section I have explained how Evagrius can speak of *apatheia* both as being characterised by stillness and associated with movement. It has been noted that *apatheia* bestows stillness (that is, stable movement experienced as stillness) not only in respect of our thoughts and occurrent sense-perception but in respect of our memories, and not only in our waking life but in our dreams. From the latter it has been further noted that Evagrius imputes full agency to the *nous* not only in the throes of *pathos* but in the dream state. Finally, it has been noted that Evagrius' references to the *nous* standing before God allude to *apatheia* as well as to the physical stand of the monk in prayer.

3.2 *Apatheia* as death and resurrection

Apatheia is the purified state of the soul, and for Evagrius its attainment amounts to a kind of death:

σῶμα μὲν χωρίσαι ψυχῆς, μόνου ἐστὶ τοῦ συνδήσαντος· ψυχὴν δὲ ἀπὸ σώματος, καὶ τοῦ ἐφιεμένου τῆς ἀρετῆς. τὴν γὰρ ἀναχώρησιν μελέτην θανάτου καὶ φυγὴν τοῦ σώματος οἱ Πατέρες ἡμῶν ὀνομάζουσιν.⁶⁴

Separating body from soul belongs solely to the one who joined them together; but separating soul from body belongs also to one who longs for virtue. Our Fathers called anachoresis a meditation on death and a flight from the body.

Although Evagrius attributes this teaching to 'the Fathers', its *locus classicus* is Plato's *Phaedo*,⁶⁵ where Plato has Socrates define 'purification' (κάθαρσις) as 'the separation of the soul from the body as far as possible' (τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος

⁶³ Cf. *Eul.* 21.23; see above, 2.2.4.

⁶⁴ *Prakt.* 52.

⁶⁵ Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 256, n.59) who notes that 'the meditation on death had become a common notion by the end of the fourth century' and points to its presence at, e.g., VA 19. It is also, of course, a Pauline theme; e.g. 1 Cor. 15:31, 'I die daily' (καθ' ἡμέραν ἀποθνῆσκω).

τὴν ψυχὴν)⁶⁶ and the correct practice of philosophy as consisting in ‘a release and separation of soul from body’ (λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος).⁶⁷ But while the theme of purification as death has pagan origins, Paul gives it an added dimension by construing that death in terms of sharing in the death of Christ in order to share in his resurrection,⁶⁸ and it is in this sense that Evagrius’ adoption of it is to be understood.⁶⁹ Explaining, in the Prologue to the *Praktikos*, the symbolism of the habit worn by the Egyptian monks, he declares,

τὴν δὲ μηλωτὴν ἔχουσιν οἱ πάντοτε τὴν νέκρωσιν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι περιφέροντες καὶ φιμοῦντες μὲν πάντα τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἄλογα πάθη, τὰς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίας μετουσίᾳ τοῦ καλοῦ περικόπτοντες.⁷⁰

They wear the sheepskin who ‘always carry in the body the death of Jesus’ in muzzling all the irrational *pathē* of the body and in cutting off the evils of the soul by participation in the good.

The *praktikos* ‘always carries in his body the death of Jesus so that the life of Jesus may also be manifested in [his] body (ἵνα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν φανερωθῆ)’⁷¹ - the reader is left to complete the quote for herself – and, as Driscoll notes, Evagrius consistently ‘understands death to apply to *praktikē* and resurrection to knowledge’.⁷² *Praktikē* is a kind of death because it involves dying to the world by renouncing all our attachments to it. But the real death suffered by the *nous* is not that in which it turns away from the external world, but that in which it turned away from God, and its ‘death’ to the external world is but the precursor to its ‘resurrection’ in knowledge of God; ‘through *praktikē* the Lord saves one from death’ (διὰ...πρακτικῆς ῥύεται τινα ἀπὸ θανάτου ὁ κύριος):⁷³

φύσιν μὲν λογικὴν ὑπὸ κακίας θανατωθεῖσαν ἐγείρει Χριστὸς διὰ τῆς θεωρίας πάντων τῶν αἰώνων· ὁ δὲ τούτου πατήρ τὴν ἀποθανοῦσαν ψυχὴν τὸν θάνατον τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐγείρει διὰ τῆς γνώσεως τῆς ἑαυτοῦ· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ

⁶⁶ *Phd.* 67c5-7.

⁶⁷ *Phd.* 67d9-10.

⁶⁸ Cf. Phil. 3: 10-11; Col. 3:3; 2 Cor. 4:10; 2 Tim. 2:11.

⁶⁹ Cf. Driscoll (2003: 238).

⁷⁰ *Prakt.* Prol. 6.

⁷¹ 2 Cor. 4:10.

⁷² Driscoll (2003: 238).

⁷³ Sch. 11 on Ps. 32:19.

ἀποστόλου λεγόμενον, τὸ «εἰ συναπεθάνομεν τῷ Χριστῷ, πιστεύομεν ὅτι καὶ συζήσομεν αὐτῷ».⁷⁴

The rational nature that was put to death by evil, Christ raises up through the contemplation of all the ages; the soul that has died the death of Christ, his Father raises up through knowledge of himself. And this is what was said by the Apostle: ‘If we have died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him.’⁷⁵

To ‘die with Christ’ is to ‘die’, by means of *praktikē*, to immersion in *pathos* and the straitened perspective that sees objects solely in terms of their relevance to our desires. To be *empathēs* is to be locked in this narrow perspective, our minds surrendered to the *logismoi* and so to the construction of fictional worlds that cut us off from the real world, the world of objects ‘as they were created’. Thus *Disciples 58*:

ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἕξω ἀνθρώπου ἡ ψυχὴ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐνεργοῦσα ἀμαρτάνει, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἕσω ἄνθρωπος, τουτέστιν ὁ νοῦς, διὰ τῶν νοημάτων τῶν ἐμπαθῶν. καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ ἕξω ἔχει τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς παιδείαν ἵνα γένηται σώφρων, οὕτως καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καθαρῶς ὄρων καὶ ἀπαθῶς ὡς γέγονε τὰ πράγματα, σωφρονεῖ· εἰς τοῦτον λέγει ὁ Παῦλος οἰκεῖν τὸν Χριστόν· ὑπὲρ οὗ καὶ ἠτιμᾶσθαι γέγραπται διὰ τοῦ σταυροῦ. καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ ἕξω ἄνθρωπος ἀποθνήσκων χωρίζεται τοῦ κόσμου, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἕσω ἄνθρωπος ἀποθνήσκων κατὰ διάνοιαν χωρίζεται τῶν νοημάτων.

Just as with the exterior self the soul sins by acting through the body, so the interior self - that is the *nous* - [sins by acting] through the *empathē noēmata*. And just as the exterior self has the virtues for education in order that he might become chaste, so the *nous* becomes chaste when, with purity and *apatheia*, it sees objects as they were created; it is in [such a *nous*] that, according to Paul, Christ dwells,⁷⁶ and for which, it is written, he suffered the shame of the cross.⁷⁷ And just as the exterior self separates himself from the world by dying, so the interior self, by dying *kata dianoian*, separates himself from *noēmata*.

Again we can presume that Evagrius deliberately leaves his reader to complete a quote: according to Heb. 12:2 Jesus endured the shame of the cross ‘for the sake of the joy that was set before him’ (τῆς προκειμένης αὐτῷ χαρᾶς). One dies the death of *praktikē* for the sake of the joy of the ‘resurrection’:

⁷⁴ *Th.* 38.

⁷⁵ *Rom.* 6:8.

⁷⁶ *Cf. Eph.* 3:17.

⁷⁷ *Cf. Heb.* 12:2.

ἐὰν ζηλώσης Χριστόν, γενήσῃ μακαριστός,
τὸν δὲ θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἀποθανεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ σου,
καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐπισπάσῃται ἀπὸ σαρκὸς αὐτῆς κακίαν,
ἀλλ' ἔσται ἡ ἔξοδός σου ὡς ἔξοδος ἀστέρος,
καὶ ἡ ἀναστασίς σου ὥσπερ ὁ ἥλιος ἐκλάμψει.⁷⁸

If you imitate Christ, you will become blessed.
Your soul will die his death,⁷⁹
and it will not derive evil from its flesh.
Instead, your exodus will be like the exodus of a star,
and your resurrection will glow like the sun.

The soul that by means of *praktikē* imitates Christ ‘will not derive evil from its flesh’ because rather than ‘nourishing it and making provision for it to gratify its desires’⁸⁰ it ‘subdues it with hunger and vigil’ so that the body ‘does not jump when a *logismos* mounts upon it nor snort when moved by an *empathēs* impulse’⁸¹ but instead becomes the means by which the soul attains *apatheia*.⁸² Thus *Ad Monachos* 118:

σάρκες Χριστοῦ πρακτικὰ ἀρεταί,
ὁ δὲ ἐσθίων αὐτὰς γενήσεται ἀπαθής.

Flesh of Christ: virtues of *praktikē*;
he who eats it, *apathēs* shall he be.

Driscoll notes that the word ‘exodus’ is used by Evagrius to denote the passage from *praktikē* to knowledge and so ‘describes the death that the monk dies with Christ’,⁸³ while the star symbolises ‘a soul making progress’ and its degree of brightness its degree of progress;⁸⁴ when a person attains *apatheia* of the heart then during prayer they will see their *nous* shine like a star (νοῦν ἀστεροειδῆ).⁸⁵ He also notes that Evagrius’ thinking about resurrection seems in particular to draw upon Paul’s distinction, at I Cor.

⁷⁸ *AM* 21.

⁷⁹ Cf. 2 Cor. 4:10-11; 2 Tim. 2:11.

⁸⁰ Cf. *Prakt.* 53; Rom. 13:14.

⁸¹ Cf. *8Th.* 1.35.

⁸² Cf. *Prakt.* 53; see above, 1.2.3.

⁸³ Driscoll (2003: 241); cf. Sch. 12 on Prov. 1:20-21: ‘Here he calls “exodus” the soul’s exit from evil and ignorance’ (ἐξοδὸν νοῦν ὀνομάζει τὴν ἐξεληθοῦσαν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ κακίας καὶ ἀγνωσίας).

⁸⁴ Driscoll (2003: 242); cf. *KG* 3.84: ‘The whole of second natural contemplation bears the sign of the stars, and the stars are those to whom it has been entrusted to illuminate those who are in the night.’

⁸⁵ *Th.* 43.

15:44, between a *sōma psuchikon* and a *sōma pneumatikon*, and that Evagrius uses the Pauline expression ‘spiritual body’, along with ‘resurrection’, to describe ‘a return to original unity of those elements into which the mind “disintegrated” (i.e. into soul, into a body) in falling from essential knowledge.’⁸⁶ It is, accordingly, instructive to look at what Paul says about the ‘spiritual body’:

σὺ ὅ σπείρεις, οὐ ζῶοποιεῖται ἐὰν μὴ ἀποθάνῃ...σπείρεται ἐν φθορᾷ, ἐγείρεται ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ· σπείρεται ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ, ἐγείρεται ἐν δόξῃ· σπείρεται ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ, ἐγείρεται ἐν δυνάμει· σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν. εἰ ἔστιν σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἔστιν καὶ πνευματικόν...σαρξ καὶ αἷμα βασιλείαν θεοῦ κληρονομήσαι οὐ δύναται οὐδὲ ἡ φθορὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν κληρονομεῖ... σαλπίσει γὰρ καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ἐγερθήσονται ἄφθαρτοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀλλαγησόμεθα. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσασθαι ἀφθαρσίαν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσασθαι ἀθανασίαν. ὅταν δὲ τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσῃται ἀφθαρσίαν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσῃται ἀθανασίαν, τότε γενήσεται ὁ λόγος ὁ γεγραμμένος, «κατεπόθη ὁ θάνατος εἰς νίκος».⁸⁷

What you sow does not come to life unless it dies...What is sown is corruptible, what is raised is incorruptible. It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. It is sown an animal body, it is raised a spiritual body. If there is an animal body, there is also a spiritual body...Flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, nor does the corruptible inherit the incorruptible...The [last] trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised incorruptible, and we will all be changed. For this corruptible body must put in incorruptibility, and this mortal body must put on immortality. When this corruptible body puts on incorruptibility, and this mortal body puts on immortality, then the saying that is written will be fulfilled: ‘Death has been swallowed up in victory.’

It is clear that Evagrius understands ‘animal body’ (σῶμα ψυχικόν) as referring to what, in the *Great Letter*, he calls the body’s nature or attributes⁸⁸ – that is, the nature and attributes it shares with corporeal creation. In the *Great Letter* he discusses the possibility of our rising above ‘the movements we have in common with the wild animals’. The movements he cites are ‘hunger, sleep, lust, rage, fear, distress, enmity, sloth, disquiet, cunning, savagery, pride, mournfulness, lamentation and wickedness’, and their ‘opposite movements’, namely ‘satisfaction, vigilance, loathing, serenity, fortitude, gladness,

⁸⁶ Driscoll (2003: 245).

⁸⁷ I Cor. 15:36-54.

⁸⁸ Cf. *Gt.Let.* 46.

love, diligence, quiet, simplicity, meekness, humility, joy, consolation and goodness.⁸⁹ He also lists the senses – ‘seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and feeling.’ Of all of these, ‘and whatever else may be like them that has not been noted’, he says:

In accordance with...the body’s subjugation to the soul (since the latter is able to do everything like God, in whose image it is), it might be thought that even while the body lives certain of the movements we mentioned can be renounced. Again, it might be thought...that if it were perfectly in the likeness of God as it was created, it could even elevate itself above all the movements; but since it renounced being the image of God and willingly became the image of animals, it is subjugated to all those movements of the body which it has in common with the beasts and wild animals. When it is beneath its nature by its actions, it is not possible for it to make its body above its nature by its movements. Fire cannot extinguish a fire, nor can water dry water; likewise, the soul that is in the body by its works...cannot liberate the body from its own attributes.

We partake of corporeal nature because we chose to renounce the image of God and assume the image of animals:

διότι γνόντες τὸν θεὸν οὐχ ὡς θεὸν ἐδόξασαν ἢ ηὐχαρίστησαν, ἀλλ’ ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία. φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμωράνθησαν καὶ ἥλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνοσ φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πετεινῶν καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ ἔρπετῶν. διὸ παρέδωκεν αὐτοῦς ὁ θεὸς ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν καρδιῶν αὐτῶν εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν.⁹⁰

Though they knew God, they did not honour him as God or give thanks to him, but they became vain in their thoughts and their uncomprehending heart was darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools; and they exchanged the glory of the incorruptible God for an image in the likeness of a corruptible human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles. Therefore God gave them up in the desires of their hearts to impurity.

The pre-lapsarian *logikoi* knew God, but in turning away from him failed to honour or give thanks to him. Likewise human beings, since we are essentially *noes* created in the

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Rom. 1:21-4. In using the expression ‘an image in the likeness’ (ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνοσ) Paul alludes to Genesis 1:26: “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness...” (ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ’ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν); both passages use the same word, *eikōn*, for ‘image’, and the word Paul uses for ‘likeness’, *homoiōma*, is a close cognate of *homoiōsis*.

image of God and therefore receptive to knowledge of God, can be said to know him, but we too fail to honour or thank him. Instead, like the guests invited to the banquet, we care more for our possessions, relationships and so forth,⁹¹ not realising that all that is good comes from God.⁹² Because our thoughts – our *[dia]logismoi* – are not directed toward God they are vain, and because our hearts are full of such thoughts there is no room in them for God, meaning that they are darkened and their desires impure. In this condition we repeatedly choose to ‘exchange the glory of the incorruptible God’ for the image of that which is corruptible, a choice that both arises from and reinforces the ‘impurity of the desires of our hearts.’ This impurity is manifest in the *pathētikon* part of the soul being given over to the movements that we ‘have in common with the wild animals.’⁹³ All of these things are part of the ‘dishonour’ that Paul speaks of in relation to the *sōma psuchikon*.

The ‘attributes of the body’ are, properly speaking, those of the *pathētikon* part of the soul, but ‘the things that heal the *pathētikon* part of the soul require the body to put them into practice’ (ἐκεῖνα μὲν τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπεύοντα... τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν εἰς τὴν ἐργασίαν προσδεῖται), a task for which ‘the latter, because of its weakness, is not sufficient’ (ὅπερ δι’ οἰκείαν ἀσθένειαν πρὸς τοὺς πόνους οὐκ ἐπαρκεῖ).⁹⁴ This is the ‘weakness’ of the *sōma psuchikon* to which Paul refers at 1 Cor. 15:43, and because of it the body must ‘ascend from its nature through the health and strength of the soul’,⁹⁵ this of course being *apatheia*. That the soul can, although not ‘perfectly in the likeness of God as it was created’, nonetheless effect this purification derives from the efficacy that the image of God, although damaged, yet retains: ‘the soul ascends through the strength and wisdom of God according to his nature.’⁹⁶

⁹¹ Cf. Luke 14:16-24; see above, 2.2.2.

⁹² Cf. *Pry.* 33: ‘What good is there besides God? Therefore, let us give back to him all that is ours and it will go well for us. For the one who is good is certainly also the provider of good gifts’ (Τί ἄλλο ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἢ Θεός; Οὐκοῦν αὐτῷ ἀποδῶμεν πάντα τὰ καθ’ ἡμᾶς, καὶ εἰ ἡμῖν ἔσται ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς πάντως, καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ παροχευὸς δωρεῶν); also *8Th.* 8:12: ‘You have nothing good which you have not received from God’ (οὐδὲν ἔχεις, ὃ μὴ παρὰ Θεοῦ ἔλαβες); cf. 1 Cor. 4:7: ‘What do you have that you did not receive?’

⁹³ *Gt.Let.* 41.

⁹⁴ *Prakt.* 49.3-6; cf. *Th.* 35.9-10.

⁹⁵ *Gt.Let.* 49.

⁹⁶ *Gt.Let.* 49.

What exactly it means in practice for the soul to raise itself and the body above the movements they share with corporeal nature – that is, for the *nous* to attain *apatheia* – can be appreciated by reference to the previous chapter’s discussion of the *logismoi* and of *pathos* and its arousal. In the first place it means that the monk will feel neither hunger or thirst. He will, without any effort of self-discipline, conform his intake of food and liquid to the level required to keep his body alive, and will experience no desire to eat or drink in excess of this, either in terms of quantity or variety:

ὁ τέλειος οὐκ ἐγκρατεύεται, καὶ ὁ ἀπαθῆς οὐχ ὑπομένει, εἴπερ τοῦ πάσχοντος ἡ ὑπομονή, καὶ τοῦ ὀχλουμένου ἡ ἐγκράτεια.⁹⁷

The one who is perfect does not practise self-control and the one who is *apathēs* does not practise perseverance, since perseverance is for the person subject to the *pathē* and self-control for the person who is troubled.

On the other hand, although he will experience no desire to vary his dietary regime, he will be content to do so when appropriate, for example for the sake of hospitality or because of physical sickness.⁹⁸ Since he will avoid eating or drinking to excess his *apatheia* will have a firm foundation in his body, there being no surplus of vital heat to manifest as *pathos*. Nor will there be any surplus of food or drink to be excreted as waste products. He will not be distracted by dreams or fantasies about food and drink, nor by worries about the effect of his regime upon his health. His thinking will be vigilant (νηφάλιον φρόνημα),⁹⁹ his prayer ‘like a young eagle soaring upwards’ (νεοσσὸς ἀετοῦ ἀνιπτάμενος)¹⁰⁰ and his *nous* ‘like a radiant star in the clear night air’ (ἀστὴρ ἐν αἰθρίᾳ λαμπρός).¹⁰¹ He will not experience sexual desire, movements, fantasies or dreams; the above passage from *Great Letter* 46 continues by noting that when the movements of the body occur ‘in a natural and orderly way, they are a sign of some small portion of health for the soul; but when there are none, it is a sign of perfection.’¹⁰² The sight of a woman will move him not to pleasure but to offer glory to God

⁹⁷ *Prakt.* 68.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *8Th.* 1.13. Νηφάλιος is one of a family of terms whose primary meaning relates to an absence of wine, hence its sense of ‘vigilant’ derives from ‘sober, self-controlled, wary.’

¹⁰⁰ *8Th.* 1.14.

¹⁰¹ *8Th.* 1.15.

¹⁰² *Gt.Let.* 47. Cf. *Prakt.* 55: ‘When the natural movements of the body during sleep are free of images, they reveal that the soul is healthy to a certain extent. The formation of images is an indication of ill-

(κινεῖ πρὸς δοξολογίαν Θεοῦ);¹⁰³ thus even when exposed to the ‘matter’ of *logismoi* he will remain *apathēs*.¹⁰⁴ Not hankering after possessions, he will be a well-prepared traveller who finds shelter in any place (ὁδοιπόρος εὐσταλῆς, καὶ ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ εὐρίσκων κατάλυμα),¹⁰⁵ and like an athlete who cannot be thrown and a light runner who speedily attains ‘the prize of his higher calling’ (ἀθλητῆς ἀμεσολάβητος, καὶ δρομεὺς κοῦφος, ταχέως φθάνων ἐπὶ τὸ βραβεῖον τῆς ἄνω κλήσεως).¹⁰⁶ He will no more be wounded by distress (τιτρώσκειται ἀπὸ λύπης) than a person wearing armour is affected by an arrow (ὁ τεθωρακισμένος οὐ δέχεται βέλος).¹⁰⁷ He will be gentle and patient with his fellows and humble before God, reserving his anger for the demons alone.¹⁰⁸ He will not fall prey to *acedia*, will be careless of human esteem and will never lose sight of his dependence upon God.

All this does not mean that he will no longer have the experience of *logismoi* being suggested to him; Evagrius states that it is not in our power whether or not the *logismoi* trouble the soul, only whether or not they linger and arouse fresh *pathos* in us.¹⁰⁹ The difference between him and the person who is *empathēs*, rather, is that the *apathēs* will not find the *logismoi* tempting:

Αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὐ τὰς τῶν δαιμόνων ὀρμὰς ἀνακόπτουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἡμᾶς ἀθῶους διαφυλάττουσιν.¹¹⁰

The virtues do not check the assaults of the demons, but they preserve us unharmed.

He will look upon objects with serenity (λεῖος βλέπων τὰ πράγματα) and will remain untroubled by memories of them (πρὸς τὰς μνήμας αὐτῶν ἀτάραχος διαμένουσα) and

health. If it is a matter of indistinct faces, consider this a sign of an old *pathos*; if the faces are distinct, it is a sign of a current wound’ (αἱ ἀνείδωλοι ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις τοῦ σώματος φυσικαὶ κινήσεις ὑγιαίνειν ποσῶς μνηνοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν· πῆξις δὲ εἰδώλων ἀρρωστίας γνώρισμα· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀόριστα πρόσωπα τοῦ παλαιοῦ πάθους, τὰ δὲ ὀρισμένα τῆς παραυτίκα πληγῆς σύμβολον νόμιζε).

¹⁰³ *8Th.* 2.17.

¹⁰⁴ See above, 2.1.2.

¹⁰⁵ *8Th.* 3.4.

¹⁰⁶ *8Th.* 3.10; cf. *Phil.* 3:14.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. *8Th.* 5.12.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *Eul.* 11.10; see above, 1.2.2.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *Prakt.* 6; see above, 2.2.4.

¹¹⁰ *Prakt.* 77.

still before the apparitions occurring during sleep (πρὸς τὰ καθ' ὕπνον φάσματα διαμένων ἡσυχος).¹¹¹ In short, he lives in tranquillity without fear of any evil *logismos* (ὁ ἀπαθὴς ἡσυχάζει ἀφόβως ἀπὸ παντὸς κακοῦ λογισμοῦ);¹¹² Evagrius affirms the protective nature of *apatheia* in the following scholia:

ἄκρον...τεῖχος αὐτῆς τὴν ἄκρον ἀπάθειαν λέγει, εἴπερ «οἱ ἀγαπῶντες τὸν νόμον περιβάλλουσιν ἑαυτοῖς τεῖχος»¹¹³

He calls the summit of *apatheia* the summit of a wall, since ‘those who love the law fortify themselves with a wall.’

φραγμός ἐστὶν ἀπάθεια ψυχῆς λογικῆς ἐκ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν συνεστῶσα.¹¹⁴

The ‘fence’ is *apatheia* of the rational soul constituted by the practical virtues.

πᾶς ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν νόμον ποιεῖ τὸν νόμον· πᾶς δὲ ὁ ποιῶν τὸν νόμον ἀπάθειαν κτᾶται (*sic*) καὶ γνῶσιν θεοῦ. εἰ δὲ «οἱ ἀγαπῶντες τὸν νόμον περιβάλλουσιν ἑαυτοῖς τεῖχος»,¹¹⁵ νῦν τὸ τεῖχος τὴν ἀπάθειαν σημαίνει καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἅπερ μόνον πέφυκε φυλάσσειν τὴν φύσιν τὴν λογικὴν.¹¹⁶

Whoever loves the law practises the law, and whoever practises the law acquires *apatheia* and knowledge of God. And if “those who love the law fortify themselves with a wall”, now the wall designates *apatheia* and knowledge of God, which alone naturally protect rational nature.

So far we have seen that the purification of the soul that is the attainment of *apatheia* amounts to a kind of death, in that it involves ‘dying’ to our attachments to the external world. These attachments are the result of our choice to exchange the image of God for the ‘image of animals’. Their media are the movements of the *pathētikon* part of the soul, movements that ‘we have in common with the beasts and wild animals.’ They make our thoughts vain, our hearts dark and our desires impure. For Evagrius the mem-

¹¹¹ Cf. *Prakt.* 64, 67; see above, 3.1.

¹¹² Sch. 17 on Prov. 1:33: ‘He that hearkens to me shall dwell in confidence and shall rest securely from all evil.’

¹¹³ Sch. 12 on Prov. 1:20-21: ‘Wisdom sings aloud in passages, and in the broad places speaks boldly. And she makes proclamation on the top of the walls, and sits by the gates of princes’; cf. Prov. 28:4.

¹¹⁴ Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31: ‘If thou let him alone, he will altogether remain barren and covered with weeds; and he becomes destitute and his stone walls are broken down.’

¹¹⁵ Prov. 28:4.

¹¹⁶ Sch. 343 on Prov. 28:4: ‘They that forsake the law practise ungodliness; but they that love the law fortify themselves with a wall.’

bers of this triad are intimately connected with one another and find expression in the *logismoi* which, as we have seen, have *pathos* built into them. The body is too weak to purify itself, but it can be raised from its nature through the health and strength of the soul – that is, through *apatheia*; although the image of God is damaged it retains sufficient efficacy to heal the soul, and through it, the body. For the soul to raise the body above its nature and itself above its vicious movements is for the monk to become immune to temptation by the *logismoi*, although *logismoi* will still be suggested to him. Consequently *apatheia* is like a protective wall or fence. His thoughts will no longer be vain since they will no longer be directed away from God. Likewise, his heart will not be darkened nor his desires impure. Hence *apatheia*, as ‘death’ to our attachment to corporeal nature, is the purity and chastity of the soul.

It will by now have become apparent that Evagrius uses different ways of talking about the same thing to clarify different aspects of it and, by doing so, to describe as fully as possible the thing itself. In doing so he is following what he understands to be the example of Scripture in using ‘many names to name’ (πολλοις ὀνόμασιν ὀνομάζειν), among other things, virtue and knowledge.¹¹⁷ Before returning to Evagrius’ use of the Pauline idea of the ‘spiritual body’, therefore, I want to mention two other ways in which he talks about the *apatheia* in its sense of being purity and chastity of the soul and, as such, a kind of death. The first of these is *apatheia* as purity of heart.¹¹⁸ In his scholion on Prov. 19:17 Evagrius explicitly equates the two:

Δόμα νῦν τὴν καθαρότητα τῆς καρδίας ὀνόμασεν· κατ’ ἀναλογίαν γὰρ τῆς ἀπαθείας καταξιούμεθα γνώσεως.¹¹⁹

Here he calls ‘gift’ purity of heart, for it is in proportion to our *apatheia* that we are judged worthy of knowledge.

More usually, though, their equivalence is implicit rather than explicit. For example, at *Letter 56* Evagrius, discussing the beatitude ‘blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall

¹¹⁷ Sch. 7.4 on Prov. 1:9; cf. Sch. 317 on Prov. 25:26.

¹¹⁸ For discussion of Evagrius’ use of the expression ‘purity of heart’ as an alternative to *apatheia*, see Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999), pp. 141-159.

¹¹⁹ Sch. 199 on Prov. 19:17: ‘He that has pity on the poor lends to the Lord; and he will recompense him according to his gift.’

see God',¹²⁰ states that 'purity is *apatheia* of the reasonable soul'.¹²¹ Consider now the following proverb, *Ad Monachos* 31:

Ἐν καρδίᾳ πραεῖα ἀναπαύσεται σοφία,
θρόνος δὲ ἀπαθείας ψυχῆ πρακτικῆ.¹²²

In the gentle heart, wisdom will rest;
a throne of *apatheia*, a soul accomplished in *praktikē*.

As Driscoll points out, both its vocabulary and the general idea it expresses are derived from Jesus' words at Matt. 11:28-29:

Δεῦτε πρός με πάντες οἱ κοπιῶντες καὶ πεφορτισμένοι, καὶ γὰρ ἀναπαύσω ὑμᾶς.
ἆρατε τὸν ζυγόν μου ἐφ' ὑμᾶς καὶ μάθετε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ, ὅτι πραῦς εἰμι καὶ ταπεινὸς
τῇ καρδίᾳ, καὶ εὐρήσετε ἀνάπαυσιν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑμῶν.

Come to me, all you that are weary and heavy-laden, and I will give you rest.
Take my yoke upon you, and learn from me; for I am gentle and humble in heart,
and you will find rest for your souls.

It is also replete with Evagrian associations. We have already seen that *apatheia* is associated with gentleness, being 'the tranquil state of the rational soul, constituted by gentleness and chastity' (ἐκ πραύτητος καὶ σωφροσύνης συνισταμένη),¹²³ so the gentle heart is the *apathēs* heart. By speaking of *apatheia* as a 'throne' Evagrius alludes to the stability it bestows, and also, for those familiar with his scholion on Proverbs 18:16, to his exegesis of the verb 'seats' as referring to *apatheia* as 'the seat (καθέδρα) of the *nous*...the excellent state which keeps that which is sitting there difficult to move or immovable'.¹²⁴ *Apatheia* is the flower (ἄνθος) of *praktikē*,¹²⁵ and rest is yoked together with wisdom (ἀνάπαυσις μὲν τῇ σοφίᾳ...συνέζευκται).¹²⁶ We also know that for Evagrius Christ is associated with wisdom,¹²⁷ that *apatheia* is a necessary condition for

¹²⁰ Matt. 5:8.

¹²¹ *Let.* 56.2, trans. Driscoll, at Luckman and Kulzer (1999: 157).

¹²² *AM* 31.

¹²³ *Rfl.* 3; see above, 3.1.

¹²⁴ *Sch.* 184.3-5 on Prov. 18:16; see above, 3.1.

¹²⁵ *Prakt.* 81.1-2.

¹²⁶ *Prakt.* 73.1. Evagrius also uses the verb συζευγνύω to denote the relation between the *pathos* and the *noēma* in an *empathēs noēma*; cf. *Disc.* 64.1; 165.1-2; see above, 2.2.3.

¹²⁷ See above, 1.1.2, n.34.

the contemplation that bestows wisdom, and that Evagrius associates *praktikē* with dying with Christ and resurrection with knowledge.

With all this in mind we can begin with a straightforward reading of the proverb. As noted above, when Evagrius uses parallelism he tends to do so in conjunction with the rhetorical device of *variatio* whereby repetition of a word is avoided by replacing its second occurrence with a synonym.¹²⁸ In this case the ‘gentle heart in which wisdom will rest’ is the ‘throne of *apatheia*, the soul accomplished in *praktikē*.’ So the proverb is referring to *apatheia* in two different ways, each alluding to the stability it bestows, the first by the word ‘rest’, the second by the word ‘throne’. Second, the implied reference to Matt. 11:28-29 means that the proverb is an invitation to the ‘weary and heavy-laden’ to come to Christ, who will give them rest; to take his yoke upon them and learn from him. The way to do so is to imitate him by ‘dying with him’ in becoming ‘accomplished in *praktikē*’. The person who does so will be resurrected with him, *apathēs*, and, like him, gentle and humble and therefore able to learn from him; thus the heart becomes a resting place for wisdom, that is, for Christ. For those familiar with Evagrius’ use of the verb συζευγνύσθαι at *Praktikos* 73 to refer to the association between wisdom and rest, and at *Disciples* 64 and 165 to refer to the association between *pathos* and *noēmata* (and doubtless used in the same ways in his oral teachings) there will also be the message that to die the death of Christ and be resurrected with him is to exchange the yoking of *pathos* to the contents of one’s mind, with all the instability and turmoil it brings, for the yoking of wisdom with rest. Here again Evagrius would have expected his reader to complete the scriptural passage for herself; in this case she would therefore know that unlike the yoke involving *pathos*, ‘my yoke is easy, and my burden is light (ὁ γὰρ ζυγός μου χρηστὸς καὶ τὸ φορτίον μου ἕλαφρόν ἐστιν)¹²⁹ – that is, the yoking of wisdom with rest that those resurrected with Christ will enjoy. Finally, the expressly subjective and personal associations of the word ‘heart’ should be recalled, in view of which the movement between the two lines of the proverb is a movement from the state of the interior self – one of gentleness in which wisdom can rest – to the condition of the soul that makes it possible, namely the stability of *apatheia*.

¹²⁸ Cf. Guillaumont (1970: 436); see above, 1.2.4.

¹²⁹ Matt. 11:30.

The other way in which Evagrius talks about *apatheia* that I want to mention before returning to the ‘spiritual body’ relates to his exegesis, in chapter 22 of *On Thoughts*, of the Parable of the Wedding Banquet at Matthew 22:1-14:

Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ νοῦν πιγόμενον ὑπο τῶν τοιούτων νοημάτων παραστῆναι θεῷ καὶ τὸν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἀναδήσασθαι στέφανον. Ἐκ τούτων γὰρ τῶν λογισμῶν κατασπόμενος καὶ ἐν τοῖς Εὐαγγελίοις ἐκεῖνος ὁ τρισάθλιος νοῦς τὸ τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ ἄριστον παρητήσατο· καὶ πάλιν ὁ δεσμούμενος χεῖρας καὶ πόδας καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐξώτερον σκότος βαλλόμενος ἐκ τούτων τῶν λογισμῶν εἶχε καθυφασμένον τὸ ἔνδυμα, ὅνπερ οὐκ ἄξιον τῶν τοιούτων γάμων ὁ καλέσας ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι· διὸ ἔνδυμά ἐστι γαμικὸν ἀπάθεια ψυχῆς λογικῆς κοσμικὰς ἀρνησαμένης ἐπιθυμίας.¹³⁰

It is not possible for the *nous* strangled by such [*sc. empathē*] *noēmata* to stand before God and wear the crown of righteousness.¹³¹ Dragged down by these *logismoi* that thrice-wretched *nous* mentioned in the Gospels refused the feast of the knowledge of God;¹³² or again the one who was cast into the outer darkness, bound hand and foot, had a garment woven of these *logismoi*, and the one who invited him declared he was not worthy to attend such a wedding.¹³³ Wherefore, the wedding garment is the *apatheia* of the rational soul that has renounced worldly desires.¹³⁴

In the previous chapter we saw how Evagrius uses the Parable of the Banquet at Luke 14:16-24 to illustrate the nature of *pathos*. It is not, he is reported as teaching, the possession of objects that harms us but their impassioned possession, and he cites as examples the concern of the farmer for his land and the love of the husband for his wife that leads them to decline their invitations to the banquet.¹³⁵ The banquet symbolises the Kingdom of God, to gain entry to which a person must be prepared to sacrifice all else. Anything that she is not prepared to sacrifice is revealed thereby to be an object of *pathos*, excessive attachment. To put it another way, anything that she values more highly than God is an object of idolatry. Here his focus is not directly upon the person’s attachments but upon their correlate, the *empathē noēmata* that crowd his *nous*. The attitude toward God of someone thus preoccupied is like that of the guests who make light

¹³⁰ *Th.* 22.10-20.

¹³¹ 2 *Tim.* 4:8.

¹³² Cf. *Matt.* 22:2-7.

¹³³ Cf. *Matt.* 22:11-13.

¹³⁴ Cf. *Titus* 2:12.

¹³⁵ Cf. *Disc.* 112; see above, 2.2.2.

of or simply ignore their invitation or who seize and kill the host's slaves, or like that of the guest who presumes to attend the banquet inappropriately dressed. Evagrius' point is that if, as we would put it, a person's head is full of other concerns – or as we and Evagrius could both put it, their heart is full of other concerns - then they have no room for God; their *nous* cannot function as the 'place of God' because it is otherwise occupied. In order for the *nous* to be able to approach God it must first orientate itself toward him, and it is this orientation toward God that Evagrius calls 'standing before God'. As this passage makes clear, it consists in *apatheia*. Nonetheless *apatheia* is not a sufficient condition for knowledge of God since, as noted above, it is possible to 'be among simple *noēmata* and be distracted by the information they provide and so be far from God.¹³⁶ It is, however, a necessary condition for knowledge of God, and clearly a sufficient condition for the *nous* to be able to 'stand before God' since Evagrius equates it with the 'wedding garment'. It follows that the 'stand', like the 'wedding garment', is symbolic of *apatheia*. The 'stand of the *nous* before God' requires that the *nous* be free of what Evagrius here refers to as *empathē noēmata*, which are equivalent to the *logismoi*¹³⁷ and therefore equate with both the 'vain thoughts' of Rom. 1:21 and the 'impure desires' of Rom. 1:24. Freedom from them is, accordingly, both purity and chastity of the soul/*nous* and 'death' to the values and preoccupations that they express.

Back now to the 'spiritual' or 'resurrection' body. According to Paul this 'body' is characterised by 'incorruptibility', along with 'immortality'. So what is it for a thing to be incorruptible? Essentially of course it is for it to be unchanging, which means for it to be *apathēs*. But this does not mean that *apatheia* can, without further remark, be equated with incorruptibility. In the first place, *apatheia* can be imperfect and temporary,¹³⁸ meaning that the *apathēs* is only incorruptible insofar as she remains *apathēs*. Second, while the *nous* or soul might become incorruptible, the body cannot. The latter, however, needs qualifying, since the 'liberation' of the body from its 'attributes' and the refinement of its *krasis*¹³⁹ would certainly have been seen as reducing its corruptibility, meaning that the body's intrinsic corruptibility would have been regarded not as some-

¹³⁶ *Pry.* 55; see above, 1.2.1.3.

¹³⁷ See above, 2.1.1.

¹³⁸ See below, 3.4.

¹³⁹ See above, 1.2.3.

thing simply to be accepted but as something to be overcome as far as possible.¹⁴⁰ In other words, that the body could never be wholly incorruptible would not prevent it from participating to some degree in incorruptibility. Moreover, there were profoundly important reasons for it to do so. First, given that the body is effectively an aspect of the *nous*, the extension to it of at least partial incorruptibility would have been part of the restoration of the *nous per se* to a condition of incorruptibility. Second, and more specifically, the body's being the most fallen aspect of the *nous* would have given its participation in incorruptibility particular significance since even the most fallen aspect of the *nous* would be showing signs of the ascent of the whole. In Brown's words, the body's 'drastic physical changes, after years of ascetic discipline, registered with satisfying precision the essential, preliminary stages of the long return of the human person, body and soul together, to an original, natural and uncorrupted state.'¹⁴¹

Something of Evagrius' understanding of incorruptibility, along with immortality, the other property that Paul associates with the spiritual body, can be gleaned from *Kephalaia Gnostika* 3.33:

The name of 'immortality' makes known the natural unity of the *nous* and the fact that it is eternal makes known its 'incorruptibility'. The first name - the knowledge of the Trinity accompanies it; and the second - the first contemplation of nature.¹⁴²

While Evagrius is not altogether clear in the terminology he uses to describe the different levels of contemplation, the 'first contemplation of nature' seems to be an intermediate stage between second natural contemplation and knowledge of God.¹⁴³

Virtues cause the *nous* to see second natural contemplation; and the latter causes it to see first [natural contemplation]; and the first in its turn [makes it see] the Blessed Unity.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ See above, 1.2.3, n.291-2.

¹⁴¹ Brown (1988: 223).

¹⁴² *KG* 3.33.

¹⁴³ Cf. Dysinger (2005: 41).

¹⁴⁴ *KG* 3.61.

So Evagrius associates incorruptibility with the transition from contemplation of corporeal creation to knowledge of God, and immortality with knowledge of God, in which the unity of the *nous* is restored. But that the incorruptible *nous*, has, as we would expect, also transcended corporeality even though not yet in unity is indicated by its association with eternity, which, according to the *Timaeus*, cannot be part of the created order.¹⁴⁵ For Evagrius, then, both immortality and incorruptibility involve the transcendence of corporeal nature. Incorruptibility can perhaps be achieved to some extent by means of the refinement of the body's *krasis* through fasting, but in any case both it and immortality can be achieved experientially by the incarnate *nous* through *apatheia*, hence the *praktikos* is 'the servant of separation':¹⁴⁶

Ψυχὴ δὲ ἢ τὴν πρακτικὴν σὺν Θεῷ κατορθώσασα καὶ λυθείσα τοῦ σώματος, ἐν ἐκείνοις γίνεται τοῖς τῆς γνώσεως τόποις, ἐν οἷς αὐτὴν τὸ τῆς ἀπαθείας πτερὸν καταπαύσει.¹⁴⁷

The soul which with God has triumphed in *praktikē* and been loosened from the body will be in the regions of knowledge where the wings of *apatheia* will set it down.

Even though the incarnate *nous* does not become fully, metaphysically incorporeal, it nonetheless becomes incorporeal in terms of its awareness, and because of the interconnectedness of the epistemic and the metaphysical this must after all mean that in some sense it really does become incorporeal, despite the fact that part of it yet remains joined to 'thickened body.'¹⁴⁸ That the incarnate *nous* can become functionally incorruptible – sufficiently incorruptible, that is, to become, albeit temporarily, the 'place of God' – underlines this. Again,

When the *noes* will have received the contemplation that concerns them, then also the entire nature of the body will be withdrawn; and thus the contemplation that concerns it will become immaterial.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *Tim.* 37d.

¹⁴⁶ *KG* 5.65.

¹⁴⁷ *KG* 2.6.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. *KG* 3.68.

¹⁴⁹ *KG* 3.62.

In other words, *apatheia* and contemplation work together to enable the *nous* to be ‘carried off to the intelligible height’;¹⁵⁰ *apatheia* makes contemplation possible, then contemplation in turn further ‘loosens’ the *nous* from the body, given that the contemplating *nous* is transformed by the participation in the realities perceived.¹⁵¹

The second and third chapters of the *Praktikos* shed further light on the relation between *apatheia* and incorruptibility:

Βασιλεία οὐρανῶν ἐστὶν ἀπάθεια ψυχῆς μετὰ γνώσεως τῶν ὄντων ἀληθοῦς.¹⁵²

Apatheia of the soul, accompanied by true knowledge of beings, is the kingdom of heaven.¹⁵³

Βασιλεία Θεοῦ ἐστὶ γνώσις τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος συμπαρεκτεινομένη τῇ συστάσει τοῦ νοός, καὶ ὑπερβάλλουσα τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν αὐτοῦ.¹⁵⁴

The kingdom of God is knowledge of the Holy Trinity co-extensive with the *sustasis* of the *nous* and surpassing its incorruptibility.¹⁵⁵

Apatheia enables the *nous* to contemplate created natures, such contemplation being the ‘kingdom of heaven’ and in turn enabling the *nous* to ascend to knowledge of the Holy Trinity, the ‘kingdom of God.’ By affirming the latter to be co-extensive with the *sustasis* of the *nous* Evagrius affirms it to be the most complete knowledge of which the *nous* is capable, able to involve the whole of its being because in virtue of being the image of God the pure *nous* is entirely receptive to God. In saying that knowledge of the Holy Trinity surpasses the incorruptibility of the *nous* he affirms that although the *nous* that is pure enough to enjoy such knowledge must therefore be incorruptible, it must always retain the potential for corruptibility in virtue of its self-determination.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. *Pry.* 52.

¹⁵¹ See above, 1.1.3.

¹⁵² *Prakt.* 2.

¹⁵³ Cf. Sch. Ps. 1:2: ‘Blessedness is *apatheia* of the soul together with true knowledge of beings’ (μακαριότης δὲ, ψυχῆς ἀπάθεια μετὰ γνώσεως τῶν ὄντων ἀληθοῦς).

¹⁵⁴ *Prakt.* 3.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. *KG* 4.49: ‘Among all pleasures, there is one co-extensive with the *sustasis* of the *nous*, namely the [pleasure] accompanying knowledge, for all will pass away in the world to come’.

Before leaving the topic of incorruptibility, it will be recalled that at *Great Letter* 46 Evagrius gives two lists of movements which we share with corporeal nature and which, accordingly, the soul might raise itself above. The transcending of those in the first list corresponds to the attainment of *apatheia*, but what of the second list, namely ‘satisfaction, vigilance, loathing, serenity, fortitude, gladness, love, diligence, quiet, simplicity, meekness, humility, joy, consolation and goodness’? Clearly these are the virtues or stable movements corresponding to the vices or ‘unstable movements’ of the first list, but some of its entries are especially surprising. Vigilance, loathing and fortitude are plainly only necessary at the level of *praktikē*, but what of serenity and diligence, quiet, simplicity, meekness and humility and joy – all, surely, contemplative virtues?¹⁵⁶ Or love, ‘the progeny of *apatheia*’ (ἀπαθείας ἔγγονον),¹⁵⁷ or, most surprising of all, ‘goodness’? That Evagrius includes all of these among the movements that we share with the wild animals is surprising and perhaps simply reflects their source in the *pathētikon* part of the soul. Apparently even more surprising is that they are to be transcended, along with hunger, sleep, lust and so forth; after all, in the *Praktikos* Evagrius declares that ‘the virtues both purify the soul and remain with it once it has been purified’ (αἱ...ἀρεταὶ ὁμοῦ τε καθαίρουσι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ καθαρθεῖσθαι συμπαραμένουσιν).¹⁵⁸ The reason for their inclusion is, however, straightforward: as movements they are all part of corporeal creation, to be transcended along with it in the process of restoring the *nous* to incorruptibility.¹⁵⁹ The ‘world to come’ is clearly to be identified with the ‘kingdom of God’ since all that remains in it is knowledge and the pleasure accompanying it. Lest this ‘passing away of all pleasures’, with even joy, love and goodness being transcended, seem to paint a bleak picture, it should be remembered that this transcendence is not a matter of moving beyond these things *per se*, but of moving beyond them as individually differentiated; the virtues regain their unity as the *nous* regains its unity in becoming progressively re-unified with God.¹⁶⁰ Therefore the transcendence is not one

¹⁵⁶ E.g. at *Rfl.* 3 *apatheia* is said to be a state of tranquility (*katastasis hēreia*); according to *KG* 4.73 the contemplative virtue of the *thumos* is humility; *Eul.* 6.6 speaks of the ‘joy (*chara*) that enlightens the eye of the *dianoia* for the contemplation of the superior goods’.

¹⁵⁷ *Prakt.* 81.

¹⁵⁸ *Prakt.* 85.

¹⁵⁹ Cf., e.g., *KG* 4.49, quoted above, n.155.

¹⁶⁰ *Prakt.* 98.7-10; see above, 1.2.2.

of exclusion but of inclusion; as Evagrius might have said, it is like the transcendence of the individual colours of the rainbow in the pure light that contains them all.¹⁶¹

It should by now be clear that Evagrius equates the Pauline *sôma psuchikon* with the *nous* that chose to exchange the image of God for the image of animals and became in consequence ‘vain in its thinking, darkened in its heart and impure in its desires’. This is the ‘flesh’ from which the ‘soul derives evil’; the *empathēs nous* that, continually beset by *logismoi* and ‘entangled in material concerns’, finds them more interesting than the ‘banquet’ that is knowledge of God; the corruptible, ‘flesh and blood’ *nous* that cannot inherit the Kingdom of God. For it to be able to do so it must die with Christ through *praktikē*, that it might be resurrected with him. In being resurrected it will be ‘raised a spiritual body (*sôma pneumatikon*)’, having ‘put on incorruptibility’, and the ‘death’ of *praktikē* will have been ‘swallowed up in victory.’ So now what is the ‘spiritual body’? It is the re-unified *nous*, in which ‘body’ and ‘soul’ have been ‘raised to the order of the *nous*.’¹⁶² For the incarnate *nous* this happens in three clearly identifiable stages.¹⁶³ The first is the attainment of *apatheia*, which bestows the first level of unity upon the soul, constituted by each of her three parts acting according to nature as described at *Praktikos* 86. The second is achieved by means of the further transformation of the *nous* effected by the interplay of *apatheia* and contemplation and results in the further unification of the soul described at *Kephalalaia Gnostika* 4.73.¹⁶⁴ The third is the return to the fuller unity that, transcending corporeal nature, bestows incorruptibility.

Returning now to the concluding line of *Ad Monachos* 21, ‘your resurrection will glow like the sun’, it has already been noted that ‘resurrection’ is associated by Evagrius with knowledge, specifically the knowledge to which the ‘death’ of *praktikē* makes the *nous*

¹⁶¹ Bob Sharples has pointed out to me that this image appears in stanza 52 of Shelley’s *Adonais* (Shelley having been a pagan Platonist), and that in *Meteorology* 3.4 Aristotle attributes the colours of the rainbow to differential reflection (not refraction) and is aware that sprinkling water in a semi-darkened room can have the same effect as Newton’s prism.

¹⁶² Cf. Driscoll (2003: 245).

¹⁶³ According to *KG* 2.4 there are more than three: ‘While the transformations are numerous, we have received knowledge of only four: the first, the second, the last and that which precedes it. The first, it is said, is the passage from vice to virtue; the second is that from *apatheia* to second natural contemplation; the third is from the former to the knowledge that concerns the *logikoi*, and the fourth is the passage of all to knowledge of the Blessed Trinity.’

¹⁶⁴ For discussion of these two levels of psychological unity, see above, 1.2.2.

receptive. That knowledge is, of course, of God. Consider the following chain of aphorisms from the *Kephalaia Gnostika*:

The resurrection of the body is the passage from the bad quality to the superior quality.¹⁶⁵

The resurrection of the soul is the return from the order of *empathēia* to the *apathēs* state.¹⁶⁶

The resurrection of the *nous* is the passage from ignorance to true knowledge.¹⁶⁷

These three aphorisms can be interpreted with reference both to the final restoration of the *nous* to unity – in other words, the realisation of the ‘spiritual body’ - and to the foretastes of it experienced by the incarnate *nous* in prayer. In both of these contexts ‘the names and numbers of “body”, “soul” and “mind”...pass away’ as they are ‘raised to the order of the mind’, and in both contexts each of the three undergoes ‘death’ and ‘resurrection’ in its own way, jointly constituting the ‘death’ and ‘resurrection’ of the whole person. It is unclear what the resurrection of the body might mean in eschatological terms,¹⁶⁸ but the ‘death’ and ‘resurrection’ of the living, earthly body consist in its passage to ‘health’ understood in spiritual terms and reflected in a refinement of its *kra-sis*.¹⁶⁹ This change ‘from the bad quality to the superior quality’ being an anticipation of its eschatological transformation. In both eschatological terms and for the living person the ‘death’ and ‘resurrection’ of soul and *nous* take the same form, namely the passage from *empathēia* to *apatheia* and from ignorance to knowledge, respectively.

Now, though, it must be remembered that although in one sense the *nous* is equivalent to the *logistikon*, and so the rational part of the person in contrast with the *pathētikon* part of the soul on the one hand and the body on the other, it is also much more than this. In its fuller sense, the *nous* is the entire person, including *thumos*, *epithumētikon* and body. So the resurrection of the *nous* must be understood in both these senses. In the first it is the same kind of logical entity as ‘body’ and ‘soul’, meaning that these

¹⁶⁵ *KG* 5.19.

¹⁶⁶ *KG* 5.22.

¹⁶⁷ *KG* 5.25.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. *KG* 6.58, quoted at 1.1.3, 1.38.

¹⁶⁹ See above, 1.2.3.

three aphorisms can be read sequentially as above. But in the second sense of *nous* the third aphorism is not simply the third member of a linear sequence but includes the other two. In other words, the transformation of the body and soul are not only preconditions for the passage from ignorance to knowledge; they are themselves part of that transition. Knowledge and ignorance do not pertain to the *logistikon* alone, but to the body and the *pathētikon* part of the soul as well: knowledge is embodied and ensouled and consequently is a property of body and soul as well as of *nous*. So the passage of the body ‘from the bad quality to the superior quality’ is the passage of the body from ignorance to knowledge, and the return of the soul ‘from the order of *empathēia* to the *apathēs* state’ is the return of the soul from ignorance to knowledge. Both are partly constitutive of the passage of the *nous* ‘from ignorance to true knowledge’, and both are completed when body and soul are ‘raised to the order of mind.’ Just as the whole person is a *nous*, so knowledge involves the whole person.

To imitate Christ by dying his death is to exodus ‘like a star’ the life of *empathēia*, ignorance, impurity and sin and be resurrected ‘glowing like the sun’. The ‘sun’ is Christ, the ‘sun of righteousness’.¹⁷⁰ But also, ‘the intelligible sun is the rational nature which contains in itself the first and blessed light’,¹⁷¹ so for the resurrected *nous* to ‘glow like the sun’ is for its ‘own light’¹⁷² to be revealed, this being the light that, by my analogy, contains all the ‘colours’ of the virtues.

3.3 *Apatheia* as love and knowledge

The ‘spiritual body’ comes into being through the resurrections of body, soul and *nous*. Another way in which Evagrius describes this is with reference to the ‘bond of peace’ of Eph. 4:3:

¹⁷⁰ Mal. 3:20. Cf. Sch. Ps. 18:5: ‘In the sun he has set his tabernacle’: ‘Our Lord is the Sun of Justice in whom the Father dwells, as he said, “I am in the Father and the Father is in me” (John 14:10). And again, “The Father who dwells in me does his works” (John 14:10). And the Apostle, “God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself” (2 Cor. 5:19).’ Also Sch. Ps. 26:4: ‘For in the day of mine afflictions he hid me in his tabernacle: he sheltered me in the secret of his tabernacle; he set me up on a rock’: ‘Christ is a tabernacle in whom God dwells. For he said, “In the sun he placed his tabernacle” (Ps. 18:5). And the Sun of Justice is the Lord’; trans. Driscoll. Cf. Driscoll (2003: 247); Sinkewicz (2003: 262, n.4).

¹⁷¹ *KG* 3.44.

¹⁷² Cf. *Prakt.* 64.1-2. On the light of the *nous*, see above, 1.2.1.3.

Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπῳ μόνον ζητητέος ὁ τῆς εἰρήνης σύνδεσμος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ σώματί σου καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματί σου καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. ὅταν γὰρ τῆς σῆς τριάδος τὸν σύνδεσμον ἐνώσης τῇ εἰρήνῃ, τότε ὡς τῆς θείας τριάδος ἐντολῇ ἐνωθεὶς ἀκούσεις: «Μακάριοι οἱ εἰρηνοποιοί, ὅτι αὐτοὶ υἱοὶ θεοῦ κληθήσονται».¹⁷³

But it is not only among people that the bond of peace¹⁷⁴ is to be sought, but also in your body and in your spirit and in your soul. When you unify the bond of this trinity of yours by means of peace, then, unified by the commandment of the divine Trinity, you will hear: 'Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called sons of God'.¹⁷⁵

For the *noes* the Fall was from a state of peace into one of inner turmoil as the rupture of the Unity and consequent fragmentation of the created order was reflected within their own experience:

In the knowledge of those who are second by their creation various worlds are constituted and indescribable battles take place. But in the Unity nothing like this occurs: it is unspeakable peace, and there are only the naked *noes* that constantly quench their insatiability.¹⁷⁶

The 'various worlds constituted within the knowledge' of the fallen *noes* I take to be the subjective worlds, based upon the external world, that we construct and act within, as referred to by Evagrius in the following:

Ἄναχωρητῆς ἐστίν, ὁ ἐν τῷ κατὰ διάνοιαν κόσμῳ συνισταμένῳ, εὐσεβῶς καὶ δικαίως ἀναστρεφόμενος.¹⁷⁷

An anchorite is one who conducts himself piously and justly in the world constituted by his *dianoia*.

To conduct oneself piously and justly within these inner worlds is to engage with external objects, and therefore their internal correlates, without *pathos*. In this case peace will obtain within them, a reflection of its establishment within the body, soul and spirit and

¹⁷³ *Eul.* 6.5-6.

¹⁷⁴ *Eph.* 4:3.

¹⁷⁵ *Matt.* 5:9.

¹⁷⁶ *KG* 1.65; *John* 5:22.

¹⁷⁷ *Rfl.* 14; cf. *Rfl.* 38, 39, *KG* 5.12, quoted below, 3.3.

an anticipation of the peace to be enjoyed when our unity with God is restored. Conversely, insofar as we are subject to *pathos* our inner worlds are those of the *logismoi*, constructed in obedience to the imperatives of the *pathētikon* part of the soul and characterised by conflict and turbulence. Some of the ‘indescribable battles’ that take place will be with demons, some between different parts of the soul, and some will be imaginary conflicts with other human beings, as when the *nous*, ‘seizes the figure of its own body...[and gets] involved interiorly in a fight with a brother.’¹⁷⁸

That the ‘bond of peace’ is to be sought in the body (ἐν τῷ σώματι), in the spirit (ἐν τῷ πνεύματι) and in the soul (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) as well as among all three testifies, as does Evagrius’ notion of the three resurrections, to the necessity of the integrity of each to that of the whole, a necessity deriving from all three being, equally, the constituent aspects of the *nous* that is the image of the triune God. To ‘unify the bond’ of the anthropological trinity is, therefore, to establish unity within each of its members, and this is to establish virtue within each. The body will, if allowed to gain strength, ‘rebel and wage unrelenting war’ upon the soul, so to seek the ‘bond of peace’ in the body is to render it ‘docile’ such that it ‘yields to the bit and is compelled by the hand of the one holding the reins’.¹⁷⁹ The ‘soul’ here should be understood as her *pathētikon* part, since ‘spirit’ must be understood as synonymous with *nous* in the latter’s sense of *logistikon*. While the *epithumētikon* wages its warfare through the body, the *thumos* does so through inciting us to direct its aggression toward our ‘natural kindred’, meaning that to seek the ‘bond of peace’ in it is to ‘fight against the serpent...but with gentleness and mildness exercise patience with love toward one’s brother.’¹⁸⁰ Finally, the warfare of the *logistikon* or ‘spirit’ is waged through ignorance, so here the ‘bond of peace’ is to be found in knowledge. In sum, to ‘unify the bond’ of the anthropological trinity is to establish virtue in the soul, which means to cultivate the ‘spiritual body’ through the respective resurrections of its three aspects, which means to attain *apatheia*.

Just as Evagrius’ use of συζευγνῶναι at *Praktikos* 73 in relation to the ‘yoking together’ of wisdom and rest, and at *Disciples* 64 and 165 in relation to the ‘yoking together’ of

¹⁷⁸ Cf. *Th.* 25.30-32; see above, 2.1.1.

¹⁷⁹ *8Th.* 1.34, 35; see above, 1.2.3.

¹⁸⁰ *Eul.* 11.10; see above, 1.2.2.

pathos and *noēmata*, allows implicit reference to the yoke (ζυγός) of Jesus,¹⁸¹ so it now becomes apparent that his use of συνδεσμεύω at *On Thoughts* 40 and *Reflections* 23 and of δεσμεύω in his second scholion on Ps. 145:8 to refer to the binding of the *nous*, through *noēmata*, to sensible objects’, allows reference to Paul’s ‘bond of peace’ (ὁ τῆς εἰρήνης σύνδεσμος). In both cases our attention is drawn to a stark contrast - the yoking of *pathos* to our mental content as opposed to the yoke of Jesus, and our bondage to the world as opposed to the bond of our internal unity and, accordingly, unity with God – and the two are closely connected. It is through the yoking of *pathos* to *noēmata* that it is able, through them, to bind us to their objects and thus to the sensible world.¹⁸² It is with these *noēmata* that we are ‘heavy-laden’ and therefore because of them that we are weary. The result of this bondage is continual fragmentation, instability and the ‘in-describable battles’ that are waged both within and among us. Conversely, those who, ‘weary and heavy-laden’, seek the rest to be found in the yoke of Jesus, will find the ‘bond of peace’ and ‘will hear, “Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called sons of God”’.¹⁸³

In the third chapter of *On Thoughts* Evagrius describes the attainment of *apatheia* in terms of Pauline universalism:

ὁ ἰατρὸς τῶν ψυχῶν...διὰ μὲν τῆς ἐλεημοσύνης τὸν θυμὸν θεραπεύει, διὰ δὲ τῆς προσευχῆς τὸν νοῦν καθαρίζει, καὶ πάλιν διὰ τῆς νηστείας τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καταμαραίνει, ἐξ ὧν συνίσταται ὁ νέος ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀνακαινούμενος «κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν», ἐν ᾧ «οὐκ ἔνι» διὰ τὴν ἀγίαν ἀπάθειαν «ἄρσεν καὶ θήλυ», οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν μίαν πίστιν καὶ ἀγάπην «Ἕλληνα καὶ Ἰουδαῖον, περιτομὴ καὶ ἀκροβυστία, βάρβαρος, Σκύθης, δοῦλος καὶ ἐλεύθερος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐν πᾶσι Χριστός.»¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ Cf. Matt. 11:28-29; see above, 3.2.

¹⁸² See above, 2.2.3.

¹⁸³ Matt. 5:9. Evagrius provides further material for meditation on ‘bonds’ in his third scholion on Ps. 149:8, ‘to bind their kings (τοῦ δησαι τοὺς βασιλεῖς αὐτῶν) with fetters, and their nobles with manacles of iron’: ‘The noetic bond is *apatheia* of the rational soul. The noetic bond is fear of the Lord turning from evil. The noetic bond is spiritual teaching not allowing the *nous* to go to evil. The noetic bond is spiritual love honouring nothing before knowledge of God. The noetic bond is desire’ (δεσμός ἐστι νοητὸς ἀπάθεια λογικῆς ψυχῆς. δεσμός ἐστι νοητὸς φόβος Κυρίου ἐκκλίνων ἀπὸ κακίας. δεσμός ἐστι νοητὸς διδασκαλία πνευματικὴ μὴ συγχωροῦσα τὸν νοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν κακίαν ὁδεύειν. δεσμός ἐστι νοητὸς ἀγάπη πνευματικὴ μηδὲν προτιμῶσα τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ. δεσμός ἐστι νοητὸς ἐπιθυμία). The last of these clearly refers to the *epithumētikon* acting according to nature, the bond being noetic.

¹⁸⁴ *Th.* 3.35-40.

The physician of souls¹⁸⁵ heals the *thumos* through almsgiving, purifies the *nous* through prayer and in turn withers the *epithumia* through fasting. In this way the new self is constituted, renewed ‘according to the image of its Creator’,¹⁸⁶ in whom, on account of the holy *apatheia*, ‘there is no male and female’; in whom, on account of the one faith and love, there is ‘neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian nor Scythian, slave nor freeman, but Christ is all in all.’¹⁸⁷

Again we see the triple resurrection, now characterised as the healing of the three parts of the soul under the auspices of Christ, giving rise to the ‘spiritual body’. This is now identified with the ‘new self’ and the latter with the *apathēs*. The ‘new self’ is brought into being by the healing of the soul, *apatheia* being ‘the health of the soul.’¹⁸⁸ Evagrius’ use of συνίσταται, ‘constituted’, can be noted: συνίσταμαι is cognate with *histēmi* and so has its connotations of stability, and it is also the word that Evagrius uses to describe the constitution of *apatheia* from gentleness and chastity.¹⁸⁹ The ‘new self’ is said to be renewed ‘according to the image of its Creator’; Evagrius will expect his readers to be familiar with the Pauline text to which he is alluding, Col. 3:9-11:

ἀπεκδυσάμενοι τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον σὺν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι τὸν νέον τὸν ἀνακαινούμενον εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν, ὅπου οὐκ ἔστι Ἕλληνας καὶ Ἰουδαῖος...

you have stripped off the old self with its practices and have clothed yourselves with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of its Creator. In that renewal there is neither Greek and Jew...

The ‘stripping off of the old self’ is to be equated with *praktikē*, the means by which the ‘physician of souls’ heals us. To be ‘clothed in the new self’ is to become *apathēs*, and *apatheia* enables the *nous* to engage in contemplation. This, it will be recalled, is defined by Evagrius as ‘spiritual knowledge of things...which causes the *nous* to ascend to its first rank’ and consists in the progressive re-acquisition of knowledge of God, leading the *nous* ultimately back to union with him by means of successive transforma-

¹⁸⁵ I.e. Christ.

¹⁸⁶ Cf. Col. 3: 10.

¹⁸⁷ Col. 3:11; Gal. 3:28. Cf. *Th.* 39 – ‘When the *nous* has put off the old self and shall put on the one born of grace’ – quoted in full above, 1.2.1.3.

¹⁸⁸ *Prakt.* 56.3.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. *Rfl.* 3; see above, 3.1.

tions resulting from participation in the realities perceived.¹⁹⁰ Thus *apatheia* enables the *nous* to be ‘renewed in knowledge’. The ‘renewal in knowledge’ is ‘according to the image of its creator’ because the receptivity of the *nous* to knowledge of God is the image of God, and just as the image, although damaged, retains sufficient efficacy to enable the soul to attain *apatheia*, so it retains sufficient efficacy to enable the *apathēs nous* to re-acquire knowledge of God and by the same token continue the healing of the image begun with the attainment of *apatheia*; in other words, ‘according to’ means both ‘through the efficacy of’ and ‘following the pattern of’. Evagrius would also expect his readers to think of Rom. 12:2:

μὴ συσχηματίζεσθε τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοῦς.

Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your *nous*.

Likewise, Eph. 4:22-24, which speaks of putting away the old self, ‘which is being corrupted according to its treacherous desires’ (τὸν φθειρόμενον κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἀπάτης) in order to be ‘renewed in the spirit (ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ τῷ πνεύματι) of your *nous*, and to clothe yourselves with the new self, created by God’s will¹⁹¹ in true righteousness and holiness (κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθείας). The desires of the sickly *epithumētikon* are treacherous because they seek the sustenance, furtherance and pleasure of the entity from somewhere other than God whereas in reality they can only come from him. Also to be recalled is chapter 39 of *On Thoughts*, where Evagrius declares that ‘when the *nous* has put off the old self and shall put on the new one born of grace’, it will at the time of prayer experience itself as the ‘place of God’.¹⁹² That it can do so is a consequence of its ‘renewal in knowledge according to the image of its Creator’, since its being the ‘place of God’ is due to its being in his image, but requires that the image be - to some extent at least - renewed.

According to *On Thoughts* 3, the ‘new self’ comes into being both ‘on account of the holy *apatheia*’ and ‘on account of the one faith and love.’ So how do the ‘one faith and

¹⁹⁰ See above, 1.1.3.

¹⁹¹ Literally ‘created according to God.’

¹⁹² See above, 1.2.1.3.

love' relate to the 'holy *apatheia*'? In the Prologue to the *Praktikos* Evagrius describes the stages of humanity's return to God as follows:

τὴν πίστιν...βεβαιοῖ ὁ φόβος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ τοῦτον πάλιν ἐγκράτεια, ταύτην δὲ ἀκλινῆ ποιούσιν ὑπομονὴ καὶ ἐλπίς, ἀφ' ὧν τίκτεται ἀπάθεια, ἧς ἔγγονον ἡ ἀγάπη, ἀγάπη δὲ θύρα γνώσεως φυσικῆς ἣν διαδέχεται θεολογία καὶ ἡ ἐσχάτη μακαριότης.¹⁹³

The fear of God...strengthens faith, and self-control in turn strengthens fear of God, and perseverance and hope render self-control unwavering, and from these is born *apatheia* the offspring of which is love; love is the door to natural knowledge, which is followed by theology and ultimate blessedness.

And towards the end of the *Praktikos* Evagrius describes the stages of *praktikē*:

Ἀπαθείας ἔγγονον ἀγάπη· ἀπάθεια δὲ ἐστὶν ἄνθος τῆς πρακτικῆς· πρακτικὴν δὲ συνίστησιν ἡ τήρησις τῶν ἐντολῶν· τούτων δὲ φύλαξ ὁ φόβος τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὅστις γέννημα τῆς ὀρθῆς ἐστὶ πίστεως· πίστις δὲ ἐστὶν ἐνδιάθετον ἀγαθόν, ἧτις ἐνυπάρχειν πέφυκε καὶ τοῖς μηδέπω πεπιστευκόσι Θεῷ.¹⁹⁴

Love is the offspring of *apatheia*, and *apatheia* is the flower of *praktikē*. The observance of the commandments establishes *praktikē*; and their guardian is the fear of God, which is a product of upright faith; and faith is an inherent good, which exists naturally in those who do not yet believe in God.

Faith, then, is the initial term in the recovery by the *nous* of knowledge of God. By 'those who do not yet believe in God' Evagrius means pagans, since in having some form of religious belief they show themselves to have the concept of God even though they yet to find its true object. Faith exists in such people inherently or implicitly (*ἐνδιάθετος*), in contrast to Christians, whose faith in God, since they believe in the true God, is explicit.¹⁹⁵ A similar definition is found at *Kephalaia Gnostika* 3.83:

¹⁹³ *Prakt.* Prol. 8.

¹⁹⁴ *Prakt.* 81.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Guillaumont (1971: 671), who notes that the equivalent of 'explicit' would be *προφορικός*, the contrast between it and *ἐνδιάθετος* being part of Stoic terminology. If by 'those who do not yet believe in God' Evagrius means pagans rather than atheists or agnostics then, given Evagrius' evident belief in universal salvation (e.g., *KG* 1.40, quoted above, 1.1.3, n.129) the question arises as to how such people might come to a belief in God and so to salvation. In other words, is there some 'inherent good' that exists in the soul prior to faith and can develop into it, just as 'implicit faith' develops into 'explicit faith'? The *Oxford Classical Dictionary* notes (1999: 201) that 'radical atheism is hard to detect [in the

Faith is an inherent¹⁹⁶ good which guides us towards the blessedness to come.

Evagrius' scholion on Ps. 115:10 gives a different definition: 'faith is the rational assent of the self-determining soul' (πίστις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς αὐτεξουσίου λογικῆ συγκατάθεσις).¹⁹⁷ I take this to mean that faith is assent to the proposition that God exists, such assent being 'rational' in the sense of 'according to right reason', in which case what this definition adds to that of *Praktikos* 81 is the emphasis on faith being an exercise of right reason by the soul whose very existence as such derives from its primordial misuse of its self-determination. Faith 'guides us towards the blessedness to come' because it potentially contains knowledge of God (ἢ...γνώσις τοῦ θεοῦ [κατὰ δύνάμιν] ἐν τῇ πίστει ἐστίν),¹⁹⁸ and is the first step toward the restoration of the *nous* to its pre-lapsarian condition:

Πίστεως δεῖται ὁ νοῦς ἵνα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ἀγαθῆ τὸν θεῖον δέξηται νόμον εἰς κάθαρσιν τελείαν τῆς ἐναρέτου πολιτείας, ὅπως καταλάβῃ τὴν πρὸ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν, ἐν ἧ διὰ τῆς τελείας ἀγάπης ἐνωθήσεται τῷ ἀρχετύπῳ <ἐν> ἀγίῳ πνεύματι, ὅπου συνάφεια ὑποστάσεων καὶ ἐξαλοφῆ ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἀποδρασμὸς τροπῆς καὶ παῦσις ἐναντιώσεως καὶ <...> μειώσεως καὶ πλήρωμα προκοπῆς τῶν παίδων καὶ ἀγίας τριάδος ἐν δυνάμει γνώσις καὶ ἀγίας μονάδος αὐτῆς ἀπολέμητος καὶ εἰρηνικῆ βασιλεία.¹⁹⁹

The *nous* needs faith in order to receive with good hope the divine law for the complete purification of its virtuous constitution, that it might recover its original

ancient world] and was never an influential position', so Evagrius would have had reason not to address this question directly. But I think his answer would be that even those who lack any sort of faith have an inherent sense of good and evil and right and wrong, along with an inclination towards, and disposition to assent to, good/right, and an inclination away from, and disposition to reject, evil/wrong, and that this is the 'seed' out of which faith arises. His belief that everyone has good in them is underlined by his exegesis of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus; see above, 1.1.3, n.129.

¹⁹⁶ The Syriac word is *ḥebyānāitā*, 'voluntary', but Guillaumont (1971: 670) takes it as translating ἐνδιάθετος.

¹⁹⁷ Sch. Ps. 115:1: 'I believed (ἐπιστεύσα), wherefore I have spoken; but I was greatly afflicted.' Cf. *Strom.* 5.13.86.1: 'Faith, if it is the voluntary assent of the soul, is still the doer of good things, the foundation of right conduct' (ἤδη δὲ ἡ πίστις εἰ καὶ ἐκούσιος τῆς ψυχῆς συγκατάθεσις, ἀλλὰ ἐργάτις ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαιοπραγίας θεμέλιος).

¹⁹⁸ *Disc.* 18. Cf. *Strom.* 7.10.55.2-3: 'Faith is a certain inherent good, which, without searching for God, confesses that he exists and glorifies him for existing. And after the believer increases in faith by the grace of God, he must ascend to grasp the knowledge of God, insofar as this is possible'

(πίστις...ἐνδιάθετον τί ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ζητεῖν τὸν θεὸν ὁμολογοῦσα εἶναι τοῦτον καὶ δοξάζουσα ὡς ὄντα. ὅθεν χρή, ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀναγόμενον τῆς πίστεως καὶ αὐξηθέντα ἐν αὐτῇ χάριτι τοῦ θεοῦ, τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ κομίσασθαι ὡς οἶόν τε ἐστὶν γνῶσιν).

¹⁹⁹ *Disc.* 198.

state prior to the movement, in which, through perfect love,²⁰⁰ it will be united with its archetype in the Holy Spirit, in which there is a union of hypostases, suppression of numbers, escape from change, cessation of opposition and deficiency, completion of the progress of children and knowledge of the Holy Trinity in power and the reign of the holy Unity itself, without war, in peace.

Since faith enables even non-Christians to come to a belief in (the true) God, and so, perhaps, to knowledge of him, it is clearly one of the ‘seeds of virtue’ implanted in us at our creation.²⁰¹ And since it potentially contains knowledge of God it must potentially contain love, love being a prerequisite for the knowledge of God. The following proverb, *Ad Monachos* 3, confirms this to be the case:

Πίστις ἀρχὴ ἀγάπης,
τέλος δὲ ἀγάπης γνῶσις θεοῦ.²⁰²

Faith is the beginning of love.
The end of love: knowledge of God.

The position of this proverb at the beginning of the *Ad Monachos*, a treatise whose overall structure reflects that of the return journey of the *nous* to knowledge of the Holy Trinity,²⁰³ reaffirms the role of faith as the starting point of that journey. In addition, as Driscoll notes,

The first line of this proverb describes the whole of the life of *praktikē*, whose beginning is faith and whose goal is love. The second line describes the whole of

²⁰⁰ Cf. 1 John 4:18.

²⁰¹ Cf. *KG* 1.39; see above, 1.1.3. It is as part of this process that faith gives rise to, and is in turn strengthened by, fear of God; cf. *Prakt.* 81: ‘Fear of God is a product of upright faith’; *AM* 69: ‘Faith in Christ bestows the fear of God’; as with *apatheia* and contemplation, dynamic interaction takes place between the two and furthers each. In the context of *praktikē* faith finds a symbol in the monk’s habit in the form of the *analabos*, according to Sinkewicz (2003: 248, n.4), ‘a band of woollen cloth worn round the neck and crossing at the chest. Its purpose was to keep the tunic out of the way and leave the arms to move freely. According to *Prakt.* Prol. 4: ‘The *analabos*, which is in the form of a cross and is folded over their shoulders is a symbol of faith in Christ which upholds the gentle (cf. Ps. 146:6) and ever restrains what hinders them and provides them with an activity that is free of obstacles.’ Faith is not, however, an infallible guide to ‘the blessedness to come’ since Evagrius refers at *Eul.* 31.34 to ‘those who having received the faith missed the mark regarding the truth and became mentally deranged’ (ὄν τινες τὴν πίστιν δεξάμενοι περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἡστόχησαν καὶ φρενοβλαβεῖς ἐγενήθησαν)

²⁰² *AM* 3.

²⁰³ See Driscoll (2003). As Driscoll points out (2003: 220), it is the actual beginning of the whole text since the preceding proverbs are introductory.

knowledge, whose beginning is love and whose goal is the knowledge of God himself.²⁰⁴

So it is not only love that faith potentially contains as a consequence of potentially containing knowledge of God, but all the virtues, *apatheia* and the various levels of contemplation; in other words, the whole of the ascent to God.

Faith, then, relates to ‘the holy *apatheia*’ by being the beginning of the journey that leads to it. What about love? As we have seen, in the Prologue to the *Praktikos* Evagrius describes love as the offspring of *apatheia*; in other words, *apatheia* is a prerequisite for love. The reason for the dependence of love upon *apatheia* is well described by Linge:

The free reign of the passions...cuts one off from both God and one’s fellow human beings, thus making disinterested love – *agapē* – impossible. In Evagrius’ teaching *apatheia* is precisely the capacity to experience things *as they are* and not simply as they affect us by advancing or thwarting our desires and interests. Thus *apatheia* leads the ascetic *towards* love...The purpose of ascetic discipline and the modes of reflection that are peculiar to it must be understood as the transcendence of the ego and the partiality of perspective out of which the ego experiences and acts so that one can become genuinely open to others.²⁰⁵

What Linge describes here in terms of the ‘ego’ is what Evagrius characterises in terms of bondage to *pathos* and the *logismoi*; a self-referential perspective in which the only meaning we see in things is their utility to our supposed self-interest and in which, consequently, we are isolated from both God and the rest of creation. It is the superseding of this blinkered outlook – as Linge puts it, ‘the transcendence of the ego’ - that enables the universalism that Paul identifies with the new creation and Evagrius with *apatheia*, in which categories such as ‘male or female, Greek or Jew, circumcision or uncircumcision, barbarian or Scythian, slave or freeman’ dissolve, along with all the other ways in which we erect barriers between ourselves and others and thereby obscure or

²⁰⁴ Driscoll (2003: 219-20). Cf. *Prakt.* 84.1-2: ‘The end of *praktikē* is love, of knowledge theology; they have their respective beginnings in faith and natural contemplation’; *AM* 67: ‘In front of love, *apatheia* marches; in front of knowledge, love’ (πρὸ ἀγάπης ἡγεῖται ἀπάθεια πρὸ δὲ γνώσεως ἀγάπη).

²⁰⁵ Linge (2000: 564-5); italics in text his. It should, however, be noted that *agapē* is not the only form of disinterested love. Spiritual *erōs* as Evagrius understands it (see above, 1.2.2) is also ‘disinterested’ in that it presupposes *apatheia*, and Osborne (1994) argues that Platonic *erōs* is disinterested.

deny our common humanity. Evagrius expresses this even more directly in the following teaching from *Disciples* 163:

οὐ...εἰ ἐπὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πράγματος οὐκ ὠργίσθης οὐδὲ ἐλυπήθης οὐδὲ ἐκενοδόξησας, ἤδη ἀόργητος καὶ ἄλυπος καὶ ἄδοξος γέγονας, οὐδὲ εἰ πρὸς τόδε καὶ τόδε ἢ πρὸς τήνδε καὶ τήνδε ἐπιθυμίαν οὐκ ἔσχες, ἤδη καὶ πάσης ἐπιθυμίας γέγονας ὑπεράνω, ἀλλ' ὅταν πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὡς ἀγγέλους θεοῦ βλέπῃς καὶ ὡς σεαυτὸν ἀγαπᾷς, τότε ὑπεράνω πάντων τῶν παθῶν γέγονας.²⁰⁶

It is not when you do not become angry or sad or vain about some object that you have become free from anger or distress or vainglory, nor is it when you do not desire such and such an object or such and such a woman that you have risen above all desire, but it is when you see all people as messengers of God²⁰⁷ and love them like yourself²⁰⁸ that you have overcome all the *pathē*.

As this makes clear, *apatheia* has not truly been attained until it finds expression in love; thus Raasch is correct in saying that *agapē* is the ‘positive aspect’ of ‘*apatheia*.²⁰⁹ So when Evagrius affirms universalism ‘on account of the holy *apatheia*’ and ‘on account of the one faith and love’ he is affirming the effective synonymy of *apatheia* and love and the roots of both in faith.

The *apathēs*, then, is a ‘peacemaker’ twice over – first, in transcending the causes of conflict both within the soul and in our relations with others, and second, in thereby becoming free to love others as herself. The ‘bond of peace’ is love; *apatheia* is what allows it to come into being within us. And here, as elsewhere, Evagrius would have expected his readers’ knowledge of the scriptures first to suggest, and then to reaffirm, this to them. Paul’s reference to the ‘bond of peace’ comes at Eph. 4:3. Just a few verses before, at Eph. 3:17-19, he says

κατοικήσαι τὸν Χριστὸν διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν, ἐν ἀγάπῃ ἐρριζωμένοι καὶ τεθεμελιωμένοι, ἵνα ἐξισχύσητε καταλαβέσθαι σὺν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἁγίοις τὸ πλάτος καὶ μήκος καὶ ὕψος καὶ βάθος, γινῶναι τε τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν τῆς γνώσεως ἀγάπην τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα πληρωθῆτε εἰς πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ θεοῦ.

²⁰⁶ *Disc.* 163.3-10.

²⁰⁷ Cf. Gal. 4:14.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Lev. 19:18; Matt. 19:19.

²⁰⁹ Raasch (1970: 32).

(17) [I pray] that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith, as you are being rooted and grounded in love. (18) I pray that you may have the power to comprehend, with all the saints, what is the breadth and length and height and depth, (19) and to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge, so that you may be filled with the fullness of God.²¹⁰

On an Evagrius reading this amounts to an expansion of *Ad Monachos* 3 – ‘faith is the beginning of love. The end of love: knowledge of God’ – since Evagrius would have understood verses 18 and 19 as referring to successive levels of contemplation. He refers to verse 18 in his scholion on Prov. 3:19-20:

(ὁ θεὸς τῇ σοφίᾳ ἐθεμελίωσεν τὴν γῆν· ἠτοίμασεν δὲ οὐράνους ἐν φρονήσει· ἐν αἰσθήσει ἄβυσσοι ἐρράγησαν· νέφη δὲ ἐρρύησαν δρόσους.

God by wisdom founded the earth, and by prudence he prepared the heavens. By perception were the abysses broken up, and the clouds dropped water.)

Ἦν ἐνταῦθα γῆν εἶπεν, Παῦλος ὁ ἅγιος πλάτος ὠνόμασεν καὶ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα οὐρανούς λεγομένους ὕψος ἐκεῖνος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἐφεσίους καλεῖ καὶ τὰς λεγομένας τροπικῶς ἄβυσσους ὀνομάζει βάθος καὶ τὰ δεδρωσώμενα νέφη μήκος καλεῖ. Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα λογικῶν ἐστὶ φύσεων σύμβολα διαιρουμένων κόσμοις καὶ σώμασι κατ’ ἀναλογίαν τῆς καταστάσεως.²¹¹

That which here he has called ‘earth’, the holy Paul names ‘breadth’, and what are here called the ‘heavens’, that (writer) in his letter to the Ephesians calls ‘height’ and that which he figuratively calls ‘abysses’ (Paul) names ‘depth’ and the ‘clouds dropping water’ he calls ‘length’. All these symbolise the rational natures distributed in worlds and bodies according to their state.

The principles underlying the ‘distribution of rational natures in worlds and bodies according to their state’ are what Evagrius calls ‘the *logoi* of judgment’,²¹² so when he wrote this scholion that is what he took Paul to be referring to. Without knowing the relative dating of the treatise to Eulogios and the scholia on Proverbs there is, of course, no way of knowing whether this was Evagrius’ interpretation of Eph. 3:18 at the time that he composed the *Eulogios*, but in any case it exemplifies the sort of contemplative

²¹⁰ The words ‘I pray’ are not in the Greek, this passage falling within the scope of the phrase ‘I bow my knees before the Father’ (κάμπτω τὰ γόνατά μου πρὸς τὸν πατέρα) at Eph. 3:14.

²¹¹ Sch. 33 on Prov. 3:19-20.

²¹² Cf. *Gnost.* 48, ‘you will discover the *logoi* of judgment in the diversity of worlds and bodies’ (τοὺς μὲν περὶ κρίσεως λόγους ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν κόσμων εὐρήσεις); see above, 1.1.3.

insight to which attainment of *apatheia* and hence of love, the ‘door to natural knowledge’, could be expected to make Eulogios receptive. Likewise there is no way of knowing how, at the time Evagrius wrote the *Eulogios*, he construed the relations between the different levels of contemplation. In the *Kephalaia Gnostika*, however, he lists them as follows:

Five are the principal contemplations under which all contemplation is placed. It is said that the first is contemplation of the adorable and holy Trinity; the second and third are the contemplations of incorporeal beings and bodies; the fourth and fifth are the contemplation of judgment and of providence.²¹³

Clearly the third term of Paul’s ‘contemplative progression’, ‘being filled with the fullness of God’, corresponds to ‘contemplation of the adorable and holy Trinity’, or, in terms of the stages of the graded ascent as stated in the Prologue to the *Praktikos*, to ‘theology and ultimate blessedness’. This leaves the second term, ‘knowing the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge’ to correspond somehow with the contemplations of incorporeals, bodies and providence, and indeed it does so in an unproblematic way. Since love is the ‘door to natural knowledge’, which pertains to the corporeal worlds, which in turn were created through the mediation of Christ through his ‘manifold wisdom’,²¹⁴ and since ‘Christ leads the reasoning nature by [means of] varied worlds to the union of the Holy Unity’,²¹⁵ to know the love of Christ is to be vouchsafed the contemplations corresponding to the corporeal worlds. These would encompass ‘incorporeals’ – taken to refer to beings, such as angels, with more refined bodies than ours;²¹⁶ bodies and providence, the contemplation of providence being prior to that of bodies since providence is the underlying rationale of corporeal creation; according to *Kephalaia Gnostika* 6.75 the ‘movement of freedom’ was followed by the ‘beneficial providence and the non-abandonment (that is, corporeal creation)’, and only then by the judgment.²¹⁷ Again,

²¹³ *KG* 1.27.

²¹⁴ See above, 1.1.2, n.35.

²¹⁵ *KG* 4.89.

²¹⁶ See above, 1.1.2.

²¹⁷ Quoted in full above, 1.2.3.

The *logoi* which concern judgment are secondary...in relation to the *logoi* that concern the movement and providence.²¹⁸

So far, then, the attentive reader of the *Eulogios* passage concerning the ‘bond of peace’ will have found in three verses of Paul’s letter to the Ephesians closely preceding his reference to it a concise overview of the entire ascent to God, beginning with faith and proceeding, through love (and so *apatheia*), to being led by Christ through successive levels of contemplation to knowledge of God. He then finds, in the ‘bond of peace’ passage itself, a description of *apatheia* itself, the goal of the first part of the ascent and foundation for the second:

παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ ὁ δέσμιος ἐν κυρίῳ ἀξίως περιπατήσαι τῆς κλήσεως ἧς ἐκλήθητε, μετὰ πάσης ταπεινοφροσύνης καὶ πραύτητος, μετὰ μακροθυμίας, ἀνεχόμενοι ἀλλήλων ἐν ἀγάπῃ, σπουδάζοντες τηρεῖν τὴν ἐνότητα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τῷ συνδέσμῳ τῆς εἰρήνης.²¹⁹

And so I, a prisoner (in bonds) in the Lord,²²⁰ beg you to lead a life worthy of the calling to which you have been called, with all humility and gentleness, with patience, bearing with one another in love, making every effort to preserve the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.

Paul’s description of himself as a ‘prisoner (in bonds) in the Lord’, as well as referring to his literal imprisonment, affirms his participation in the ‘bond of peace’ and, reinforces, from an Evagrian standpoint, the contrast between this ‘spiritual bondage’ and the bondage to the world effected by *pathos* and mediated by *empathē noēmata*; *apatheia* is a condition of being ‘in bonds to the Lord’, and is characterised by humility, gentleness, patience, love and unity. It also reinforces the parallel between this passage and Matt. 11:28-29, where Jesus invites the ‘weary and heavy-laden’ to ‘take his yoke upon them’, and, by extension, it references *Ad Monachos* 31. Taken together, then, these passages supply a whole list of descriptors for *apatheia* which in identifying different aspects of it jointly comprise a far more complete definition than any single term ever could. To be a ‘throne of *apatheia*’ is to be ‘a soul accomplished in *praktikē*, which is to be ‘bonded to the Lord’, which is to ‘bear the yoke of Jesus’, which is to

²¹⁸ *KG* 5.24.

²¹⁹ Eph. 4:1-3.

²²⁰ There is in fact an ambiguity of scope – I presume deliberate – at play here, in that ἐν κυρίῳ can also go with παρακαλῶ, thus ‘I beg you in the Lord’.

have humility and gentleness, which is to be ‘rooted and grounded in love’, which is to be a peacemaker, which is to ‘unify the bond of one’s own trinity’ of body, soul and spirit, which is to be able to be led by Christ ‘by means of varied worlds’ to ‘the union of the Holy Unity’. To this list could be added that to attain *apatheia* is to have been healed by the ‘physician of souls’ and so enabled to ‘put off the old self’ and ‘put on the ‘new self’, ‘renewed according to the image of its Creator’, in whom there is ‘no male and female’, ‘neither Greek nor Jew’. It is to be cultivating the ‘spiritual body’,²²¹ to have a pure heart²²² and a *nous* which is chaste, in which ‘Christ dwells’ and ‘for which he suffered the shame of the cross’²²³ ‘for the sake of the joy that was set before him.’ It is to ‘see all people as angels of God and love them like oneself’,²²⁴ and to have ‘imitated Christ’ by ‘dying his death, having an exodus like a star and a resurrection that glows like the sun.’²²⁵ *Apatheia* is the ‘wedding garment’ of the ‘rational soul that has renounced worldly desires’ and so become worthy of the knowledge of God.²²⁶

Eph. 4:3 makes a further addition to this list in virtue of Paul’s use of the verb τηρεῖν. Here it means ‘to preserve’, but it is also the verb used in Prov. 4:23: ‘Keep watch over your heart with all vigilance’ (πάσῃ φυλακῇ τηρεῖν τὴν καρδίαν), an injunction dear to Evagrius²²⁷ and, as we shall see in the following section, highly significant in terms of *praktikē* since it is by keeping watch over the heart that *apatheia* is first attained and then preserved. So from an Evagrian standpoint Paul’s use of τηρεῖν in this passage gives it an added dimension in that as well as describing *apatheia* it alludes to the conditions for its attainment and maintenance.

Paul speaks of the *apathēs* (as Evagrius would understand him) as being ‘rooted and grounded in love’, and the importance of love in Evagrius’ spirituality cannot be overstated, although it has often been understated; thus Gendle notes that ‘the frequent dismissal of Evagrius as a mere “noetic” for whom the ascent to knowledge of God is ‘a merely intellectual process’ must be qualified by recognition of the fact that for Eva-

²²¹ Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 ff.

²²² E.g. Sch. 199 on Prov. 19:17.

²²³ *Disc.* 58.

²²⁴ Cf. *Disc.* 163.

²²⁵ *AM* 31.

²²⁶ Cf. *Th.* 22.18-20; *Matt.* 22:1-14.

²²⁷ Cf. *Th.* 27.24, 36.11; *KG* 6:52.

grius love is the *sine qua non* of knowledge of God.²²⁸ In terms that echo Eph. 4:3, Evagrius describes the role of love as follows:

Ἡ ἀγάπη ἀπαθείας ἐστὶ συνάφεια, παθῶν δὲ ἀπαλειφή, τὴν μακροθυμίαν προφέρουσα καὶ τὸν ζέοντα θυμὸν κακαψύχουσα, τὴν ταπεινῶσιν προβάλλουσα καὶ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν καταφέρουσα. ἡ ἀγάπη ἔχει μὲν ἴδιον οὐδὲν πλὴν τοῦ θεοῦ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ θεός.²²⁹

Love is the unifying of *apatheia* and the expunging of the *pathē*; it brings patience to the fore and it has a cooling effect on boiling *thumos*; it promotes humility and topples pride. Love possesses nothing of its own apart from God, for God is love itself.²³⁰

The final sentence of this passage states directly why love is the *sine qua non* of knowledge of God: it is because God is love, so to love is to know God and to know God is to love, hence *Disciples* 198, quoted above, describes the pre-lapsarian state of the *nous* as one of unity, ‘through perfect love, with its archetype in the Holy Spirit’. As 1 John 4:8, quoted in full, expresses it (and recalling that Evagrius would have expected his readers to complete the quote for themselves),

ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν οὐκ ἔγνω τὸν θεόν, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν.

Whoever does not love does not know God, for God is love.

Consequently, to suppose that because the ultimate term in Evagrius’ spirituality is knowledge rather than love, and that accordingly he values knowledge more highly than love,²³¹ is to overlook the fact that the knowledge in question is of a God who is love,²³² and is therefore knowledge of love; that is, it is love consciously recognised, acknowledged and embraced. It is love that, by way of *apatheia*, the disentangling of the *nous*

²²⁸ Gendle (1985: 376).

²²⁹ *Eul.* 21.23.

²³⁰ 1 John 4:8.

²³¹ So, for example, McGinn (1991: 156); Chitty (1966: 50). While not explicitly stating that Evagrius values knowledge more highly than love, both Balthasar (1965: 193) and Konstantinovsky (2009) also exemplify this tendency, Balthasar likening Evagrius’ ‘mystical teaching’ to the ‘subtle idealism of Mahayana Buddhism [according to which] knowledge is the highest aim of life’, and Konstantinovsky only mentioning the word ‘love’ once in her monograph on Evagrius’ spirituality (in order to note, on p.31, that ‘love crowns the life of *praxis* and opens the door to contemplative knowledge of the universe’).

²³² Cf. Driscoll (2003: 222-3).

from the external world, unifies the three parts of the soul and, accordingly, the anthropological triad and, in so doing, restores the image of God such that the *nous* can once more become what it was created to be: ‘the place of God.’²³³ Linge continues:

With *apatheia*... comes the love that dispels our separation from other creatures and the knowledge that dispels our ignorance of ourselves and of the finite world. Beyond this restored relation to world and self, *apatheia* opens the way to the life of pure prayer, which dispels our separation from God.²³⁴

Since God is love and the *nous* is the image of God, love is integral to the *nous*. To be precise, as we saw above, it derives as *agapē* from the healthy *thumos* and as spiritual *erōs* – an integral part of pure prayer²³⁵ - from the healthy *epithumētikon*.²³⁶ Thus,

Love is the excellent state of the reasoning soul, for in it one cannot love anything among corruptible things more than the knowledge of God.²³⁷

There is a good love that is eternal, namely that which true knowledge chooses for itself and which is said to be inseparable from the *nous*.²³⁸

Love, then, is for Evagrius integral both to the *nous* and to knowledge – where there is love there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge, love – and this must be borne in mind when considering what he has to say about contemplation and knowledge, in terms both of their nature and content:

He who has to see written things has need of the light; and he who has to learn the wisdom of beings has need of spiritual love.²³⁹

So, for example, his cosmological teachings such as the assignment of the fallen *noes* to bodies and worlds ‘according to their state’ (κατ’ ἀναλογίαν τῆς καταστάσεως)²⁴⁰ must be understood not as the products of abstract intellectual speculation but as insights born

²³³ *Th.* 39.4; 40.9; *Rfl.* 25; *Let.* 39; see above, 1.2.1; 1.2.1.3.

²³⁴ Linge (2000: 565).

²³⁵ Cf. *Pry.* 52, quoted above, 1.2.2, n.249.

²³⁶ See above, 1.2.2; it will however be recalled that in one place – *Prakt.* 89 – Evagrius assigns *agapē* to the *epithumētikon*.

²³⁷ *KG* 1.86.

²³⁸ *KG* 4.50.

²³⁹ *KG* 3.58.

²⁴⁰ E.g. Sch. 33 on Prov. 3:19-20.

of spiritual love from the context of a life of devotion and prayer, and from ‘the grace of God’:

Τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ στύλος ὁ καππαδόκης Βασίλειος· τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων, φησίν, ἐπισυμβαίνουσιν γνῶσιν, προσεχῆς μελέτη καὶ γυμνασία κρατύνει· τὴν δὲ ἐκ Θεοῦ χάριτος ἐγγινομένην, δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀοργησία καὶ ἔλεος· καὶ τὴν μὲν προτέραν, δυνατὸν καὶ τοὺς ἐμπαθεῖς ὑποδέξασθαι· τῆς δὲ δευτέρας οἱ ἀπαθεῖς μόνον εἰσὶ δεκτικοί· οἱ καὶ παρὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς προσευχῆς τὸ οἰκεῖον φέγγος τοῦ νοῦ περιλάμπον αὐτοὺς θεωροῦσιν.²⁴¹

The pillar of truth, Basil the Cappadocian, said that while the understanding which comes from men strengthens through study and assiduous exercise, that which comes from the grace of God strengthens through justice, freedom from anger, and mercy. And while it is possible for the *empathes* to receive the first, only the *apatheis* can receive the second, those who at the time of prayer contemplate the *nous*’ own light which illumines them.²⁴²

To put it another way, knowledge, as we saw in relation to the ‘three resurrections’, is not the sole prerogative of the *logistikon* but involves the entire anthropological triad; it is not simply believed intellectually but is embodied in a way of life and presupposes *apatheia* - virtue and love – and this is part of Evagrius’ meaning when he speaks of things ‘being clear to those who have embarked upon the same trail.’²⁴³

This holistic knowledge that arises from *apatheia*, as well as involving spiritual insights, is immensely practical, as *Praktikos* 70 shows:

Ὅ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐν ἑαυτῷ καθιδρῦσας, καὶ ταύταις ὅλος ἀνακραθείς, οὐκ ἔτι μέμνηται νόμου ἢ ἐντολῶν ἢ κολάσεως, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει ὅποσα ἢ ἀρίστη ἕξις ὑπαγορεύει.²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ *Gnost.* 45.

²⁴² Cf. *Gnost.* 4: ‘The knowledge which comes to us from outside tries to reveal matters by way of their *logoi*. But that which is born of the grace of God presents objects to the eye of thought, and the *nous*, gazing upon them, approaches their *logoi*. To the first is opposed error, to the second, anger and *thumos* and those things which follow along with them.’ (Ἡ μὲν ἕξωθεν ἡμῖν συμβαίνουσα γνῶσις, διὰ τῶν λόγων ὑποδεικνύειν πειράται τὰς ὕλας· ἡ δὲ ἐκ Θεοῦ χάριτος ἐγγινομένη, αὐτοψοῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ παρίστησι τὰ πράγματα, πρὸς ἃ βλέπων ὁ νοῦς, τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους προσίεται· ἀντίκειται δὲ τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ <ἢ πλάνῃ· τῇ δὲ δευτέρᾳ> ὀργῇ καὶ θυμῷ· <καὶ τὰ τούτοις παρακολουθοῦντα>.

²⁴³ See above, Introduction.

²⁴⁴ *Prakt.* 70.

The person who has established the virtues within himself and has become wholly mixed with them no longer remembers the law or the commandments or punishment, but says and does those things which this excellent state dictates to him.

First, a couple of points about language. The participle καθιδρύσας comes from the verb καθίδρυω, the causal of καθέζομαι, ‘to make to sit down’, so in meaning ‘to establish’, it does so with strong connotations of ‘seating’ something ‘in’, and so establishing it in a particularly thoroughgoing and stable way. This use of it echoes Evagrius’ description of ‘a soul accomplished in *praktikē*’ as a ‘throne of *apatheia*’,²⁴⁵ and his reading of the verb ‘seats’ in Prov. 18:16 as ‘the seat (καθέδρα) of the *nous*...the excellent state which keeps that which is sitting there difficult to move or immovable’.²⁴⁶ The participle ἀνακραθείς comes from ἀνακεράννυμι and is therefore cognate with the verb κεράννυμι, source of the noun *krasis*, so bearing in mind Evagrius’ project of refining the physical *krasis* of the body I think the idea of becoming ‘wholly mixed with the virtues’ has a literal dimension in addition to its more obvious metaphorical sense, since the person who has achieved this ‘mixing’ has done so partly through having weaned her *epithumētikon* away from its attachments to food, drink and so forth such that its sole desire is for the good, with the consequence that her body has become less ‘thick’ and ‘earthy’; the virtuous soul has as its correlate a body that is itself becoming progressively more ‘spiritualised’ by becoming progressively ‘less corporeal’.

When Evagrius says that this person, the *apathēs*, ‘no longer remembers the law or the commandments or punishment, but says and does those things which this excellent state dictates to him’ echoes can be detected of the Stoic sage, described by Long, on the basis of Cicero’s *De Finibus* 3.20-1, as follows:

The good man is ‘in complete agreement with Nature’...Virtue [is defined by] a pattern of behaviour that follows necessarily from a disposition perfectly in tune with Nature’s rationality...The right thing to do is that which accords with virtue, and this is equivalent to saying that it accords with the nature of a perfectly rational being.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁵ Cf. *AM* 31; see above, 3.2.

²⁴⁶ See above, 3.1.

²⁴⁷ Long (1986: 192).

Evagrius equates observance of the commandments with the cultivation of virtue:

Ὁ παρὰ φύσιν βιῶν, οὐ τηρεῖ ἐντολὰς Θεοῦ.²⁴⁸

One who lives contrary to nature does not keep the commandments of God.

Apatheia is constituted by the practical virtues (ἐκ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν συνεστῶσα),²⁴⁹ and observance of the commandments constitutes *praktikē* (πρακτικὴν δὲ συνίστησιν ἢ τήρησις τῶν ἐντολῶν).²⁵⁰ It follows that observance of the commandments is essential to the attainment of *apatheia*; *apatheia*, ‘is potentially in the commandments’ (κατὰ δύναμιν <ἐν ταῖς> ἐντολαῖς),²⁵¹ and in the process of attaining it a person will have thoroughly internalised the commandments; in other words, he will have ‘established them within his soul and become wholly mixed with them’. He does not need to remember them because they have become part of him and will, accordingly, determine his behaviour without any conscious effort on his part. Such a person is ‘in complete agreement with Nature’ because his soul is acting according to nature, which, for Evagrius as for the Stoics, means ‘according to rational nature’. But here Evagrius’ view diverges radically from that of the Stoics since for him the rational nature in question is that of the pre-lapsarian incorporeal *nous* created in the image of God. And as will already have become apparent, whatever superficial similarities might obtain between the Evagrian *apathēs* and the Stoic *apathēs* or sage, Evagrius’ understanding of *apatheia* is first and foremost Pauline, and it is his reading of Paul that above all underlies *Praktikos* 70, in particular, I think, Rom. 7:4-6 and Gal. 3:23-9:

ὕμεῖς ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς ἑτέρῳ, τῷ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἐγερθέντι, ἵνα καρποφορήσωμεν τῷ θεῷ. ὅτε γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου ἐνηργεῖτο ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν, εἰς τὸ καρποφορήσαι τῷ θανάτῳ· νυνὶ δὲ κατηγορήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἀποθανόντες ἐν ᾧ κατειχόμεθα, ὥστε δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς ἐν καινότητι πνεύματος καὶ οὐ παλαιότητι γράμματος.²⁵²

²⁴⁸ *Exh.* 2.37.

²⁴⁹ Cf. Sch. 293 on Prov. 24:31.

²⁵⁰ *Prakt.* 81.2. Regarding the role of the ‘law’ in the attainment of *apatheia*, cf. Sch. 12 on Prov. 1:20-21 and Sch. 343 on Prov. 28:4, both quoted above, 3.2, n.113 and 116 respectively.

²⁵¹ *Disc.* 18.1.

²⁵² Rom. 7:4-6.

You have died to the law through the body of Christ, so that you may belong to another, to him who has been raised from the dead in order that we may bear fruit for God. While we were living in the flesh, our sinful affections, aroused by the law, were at work in our members to bear fruit for death. But now we are awakened, dead to the law which held us captive, so that we are slaves not to the old written code but in the new life of the spirit.

πρὸ τοῦ δὲ ἔλθειν τὴν πίστιν ὑπὸ νόμον ἐφρουρούμεθα συγκλειόμενοι εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πίστιν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι, ὥστε ὁ νόμος παιδαγωγὸς ἡμῶν γέγονεν εἰς Χριστόν, ἵνα ἐκ πίστεως δικαιωθῶμεν· ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς πίστεως οὐκέτι ὑπὸ παιδαγωγὸν ἔσμεν. πάντες γὰρ υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐστε διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ· ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε. οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην... πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἰς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.²⁵³

Now before faith came, we were imprisoned and guarded under the law until faith would be revealed. Therefore the law was our instructor until Christ came, so that we might be justified by faith. But now that faith has come, we are no longer subject to an instructor, for in Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith. As many of you as were baptised into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is not longer Jew nor Greek...for you are all one in Christ Jesus.

Both of these passages relate the ‘law’ to what Paul elsewhere calls the ‘old self’²⁵⁴ and associates with life in the *sōma psuchikon*,²⁵⁵ and what Evagrius calls the life of thralldom to *pathos*; in his scholion on Prov. 25:10a²⁵⁶ Evagrius quotes Gal. 3:13, ‘Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law’ (Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς ἠλευθέρωσεν ἐκ τῆς κατάρας τοῦ νόμου).²⁵⁷ In ‘dying with Christ’ to the life of *empathēia* and being resurrected with him into ‘the new life of the spirit’ the *apathēs* has in effect outgrown the law.’ This is made explicit in the *Chapters of the Disciples*:

Τὴν δικαιοσύνην οἱ ἔξω περιεκτικὴν πασῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν προέκριναν· ἀπονεμητικὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν κατ’ ἀξίαν, τὸ συμφορότερον παιδεύουσα· τὰς γὰρ

²⁵³ Gal. 3:23-8.9.

²⁵⁴ Col. 3:9;

²⁵⁵ Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 ff; see above, 3.2.

²⁵⁶ ‘Favour and friendship set a man free, which do thou keep for thyself, lest thou be made liable to reproach; but take heed to thy ways peaceably’ (χάρις καὶ φιλία ἐλευθεροῖ, ἃς τήρησον σεαυτῷ, ἵνα μὴ ἐπονείδιστος γένη, ἀλλὰ φύλαξον τὰς ὁδοὺς σου εὐσυναλλάκτως).

²⁵⁷ This is how Evagrius quotes Gal. 3:13; my edition of the Greek New Testament has ἐξηγόρασεν instead of ἠλευθέρωσεν.

κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀμαρτίας περιαιρεῖ, ταύτην καὶ ὁ νόμος προστάσσει. Κατὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ διδασκαλίαν ἡ ἀγάπη πασῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐστὶ περιεκτική· καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον καθαρίζει, τὰς κατὰ διάνοιαν ἀμαρτίας ἐκκόπτουσα.²⁵⁸

The pagans put justice first as embracing all the virtues, for it is the distribution to each according to worth, teaching what is more expedient. This eliminates sins *kat' energeian* and is what the law prescribes. But according to the teachings of Christ it is love that embraces all the virtues and purifies the inner self in cutting out sins *kata dianoian*.

Evagrius, then, understands the Pauline sense of 'law' to concern the regulation of our conduct in the world, and *apatheia* as going beyond this by ensuring inner purity:²⁵⁹

Πρακτικός ἐστίν, ὁ ἐν τῷ κατὰ διάνοιαν κόσμῳ συνισταμένῳ, εὐσεβῶς καὶ δικαίως πολιτευόμενος.²⁶⁰

The *praktikos* is one who conducts himself piously and justly in the world constituted *kata dianoian*.

Θεωρητικός ἐστίν, ὁ πλάττων τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον κατὰ διάνοιαν τῆς αὐτοῦ μόνον γνώσεως ἕνεκεν.²⁶¹

The contemplative is one who forms the sensible world *kata dianoian* solely for the sake of knowledge of it.

The *apathēs* has internalised the prescriptions of the commandments and law, whose purpose is to prevent sin *kat' energeian*, and in doing purified her actions in both the external world and in the worlds she constitutes *kata dianoian*. Freed from 'domestic disturbance' (ἡ...ταραχὴ τῶν οἰκείων) her *nous* is able to 'make that noble emigration

²⁵⁸ *Disc.* 7. Evagrius would equate the 'cutting out' of sins *kata dianoian* with the 'circumcision of the heart' (περιτομὴ καρδίας) of Rom. 2:29.

²⁵⁹ Cf. Sch. 27 on Prov. 3:1: "My son, forget not my laws; but let thine heart keep my words" (οὐδέ, ἐμῶν νομίμων μὴ ἐπιλανθάνου· τὰ δὲ ῥήματά μου τηρεῖτω σὴ καρδία): "If a person who does not live by the law forgets the law, a person who remembers the law lives by it. And if the one who performs them observes the words of God, the one who does not wish to practise them loses them, for it is said, 'for it is not the hearers of the law who are righteous in God's sight, but the doers of the law who will be justified' (Rom. 2:13).

²⁶⁰ *Rfl.* 38.

²⁶¹ *Rfl.* 39.

and arrive in the land of the incorporeals’ (ἀποδημήσει τὴν καλὴν ἐκείνην ἀποδημίαν, καὶ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γένοιτο τῶν ἀσωμάτων).²⁶²

Νοῦς σὺν Θεῷ πρακτικὴν κατορθώσας καὶ προσπελασας τῇ γνώσει ὀλίγον ἢ οὐδ’ ὅλως τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπαισθάνεται, τῆς γνώσεως αὐτὸν ἀρπαζούσης μετάρσιον καὶ χωριζούσης τῶν αἰσθητῶν.²⁶³

The *nous* that has completed the work of *praktikē* with the help of God and has approached knowledge possesses little or no awareness of the irrational part of the soul, for knowledge has carried it off to the heights and separated it from sensible things.

This separation of the *nous* from the world of the senses and from the physical body is, as we have seen the aim of *praktikē*: ‘separating soul from body belongs to one who longs for virtue’,²⁶⁴ ‘for that which has no part in sensation is also free from *pathos*’,²⁶⁵ hence the *praktikos* is ‘the servant of separation’²⁶⁶ and the *praktikē* soul becomes ‘loosened from the body’ and carried on the ‘wings of *apatheia*’ to the ‘regions of knowledge’.²⁶⁷

The *nous* that is divested of the *pathē* and sees the *logoi* of beings does not henceforth truly receive the *eidola* that (arrive) through the senses; but it is as if another world is created by its knowledge, attracting to it its thought and rejecting far from it the sensible world.²⁶⁸

This separation is a metaphorical ‘death’ in which ‘the entire nature of the body is withdrawn’,²⁶⁹ Evagrius, it will be recalled, enjoins Eulogios to ‘strip off the weight of the flesh (τὸν ὄγκον τῶν σαρκῶν ἀπόδυσαι),²⁷⁰ thus calling to mind Paul’s reference at Col. 3:9 to ‘stripping off (ἀπεκδυσάμενοι) the old self with its practices’, and at 1 Cor. 15: 43-4 to the *sōma psuchikon* which, sown in dishonour and weakness, is raised in glory

²⁶² *Prakt.* 61; cf. Sch. 377 on Prov. 31:21.

²⁶³ *Prakt.* 66.

²⁶⁴ *Prakt.* 52; see above, 3.2.

²⁶⁵ *Prakt.* 4.3-4; see above, 3.2.

²⁶⁶ *KG* 5.65; see above, 3.2.

²⁶⁷ *KG* 2.6; see above, 3.2.

²⁶⁸ *KG* 5.12.

²⁶⁹ *KG* 3.62; see above, 3.2.

²⁷⁰ *Eul.* 1.1; see above, 1.2.3.

and power.²⁷¹ As a result the *nous*, although still incarnate, can experience itself as incorporeal and thereby effectively become so, able to participate, through ‘immaterial contemplation’,²⁷² in the incorporeal worlds.

The stripping off by the *nous* of corporeality is, as we have seen, a return to its true nature,²⁷³ in the process of which it becomes ever more aware of its own light:

Προκόπτων ὁ νοῦς ἐν τῇ πρακτικῇ, κοῦφα ἔχει τὰ νοήματα τῶν αἰσθητῶν· προκόπτων δὲ ἐν τῇ γνώσει, ποικίλα ἔξει τὰ θεωρήματα· προκόπτων δὲ ἐν τῇ προσευχῇ, λαμπρότερον καὶ φαιδρότερον ὕψεται τὸ ἴδιον φῶς.²⁷⁴

As the *nous* progresses in *praktikê*, its *noēmata* of sensible objects become insubstantial; when it is progressing in knowledge its contemplations will be diverse; when it is progressing in prayer, it will see its own light become brighter and more radiant.²⁷⁵

The *nous* that is divested of the *pathē* becomes completely like light because it is illuminated by the contemplation of beings.²⁷⁶

The progressive detachment from the sensible world for the sake of which the labours of *praktikē* are endured and *apatheia* attained is succinctly described in terms of its ultimate purpose in the following:

Οὐκ ἂν ἴδοι ὁ νοῦς τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ τόπον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, μὴ πάντων τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν <νοημάτων> ὑψηλότερος γεγονώς· οὐ γενήσεται δὲ ὑψηλότερος, μὴ τὰ πάθη ἀπεκδυσάμενος τὰ συνδεσμοῦντα αὐτὸν διὰ τῶν νοημάτων τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. Καὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη ἀποθήσεται διὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν, τοὺς δὲ ψιλούς λογισμούς διὰ τῆς πνευματικῆς θεωρίας, καὶ ταύτην πάλιν ἐπιφανέντος αὐτῷ φωτὸς ἐκείνου τοῦ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς προσευχῆς ἐκτυποῦντος τὸν τόπον τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ.²⁷⁷

²⁷¹ See above, 3.2.

²⁷² *KG* 3.62; see above, this section and 3.2 respectively.

²⁷³ See above, 1.2.1.3.

²⁷⁴ *Disc.* 78.

²⁷⁵ Cf. *KG* 1.74: ‘The light of the *nous* is divided into three: knowledge of the adorable and holy Trinity, of the incorporeal nature that has been created by it, and of the contemplation of beings’.

²⁷⁶ *KG* 5.15.

²⁷⁷ *Th.* 40.

The *nous* could not see the place of God within itself, unless it has transcended all the *noēmata* associated with objects. Nor will it transcend them, if it has not put off the *pathē* that bind it to sensible objects through *noēmata*. And it will lay aside the *pathē* through the virtues, and simple thoughts through spiritual contemplation; and this in turn it will lay aside when there appears to it that light which at the time of prayer leaves an impress of the place of God.

Apatheia, then, is the means by which the *nous* is enabled to experience itself as incorporeal while it is still incarnate, and, accordingly, an anticipation of its eschatological return to metaphysical incorporeality. This is an understanding of humanity's spiritual goal which has roots in Plato's *Theaetetus*:

Ἄλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε· ὑπεναντίον γὰρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη· οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἰδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.²⁷⁸

It is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth. Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible.²⁷⁹

Evagrius would not agree that evils cannot be done away with, although evil will only cease to exist, along with the corporeal worlds, at the *apokatastasis*, when the *noes* are fully restored to union with God. Nor would he associate all evils with proximity to the earth; as we have seen, while humans are characterised by *epithumia* and earth, demons, who are further from God than we are, are characterised by *thumos* and air.²⁸⁰ He does, however, associate evil with distance from God, and he certainly believes that it is only by escaping from the earth that we can regain our knowledge of God, and that doing so means regaining the image of God and in this sense becoming like God, although it is a likeness based upon reflection as opposed to natural kinship.

²⁷⁸ *Theaet.* 176a6-b2.

²⁷⁹ Trans. Fowler. Both Armstrong (2004) and Russell (2004) argue, in my view convincingly, against an other-worldly interpretation of Plato's ὁμοίωσις θεῷ.

²⁸⁰ See above, 1.1.2.

But Evagrian *apatheia* is more than just experiential detachment from the physical body and the world of the senses; it is also love, understood not simply in relational terms but as a state of being that is the natural condition of the *nous* as the image of a God who is love. According to *Kephalaia Gnostika* 5:14,

Just as, when the sun rises, things which are elevated a little from the ground cast a shadow, so also to the *nous* which begins to approach the *logoi* of beings, objects appear obscurely.²⁸¹

This describes the experience of the *nous*, as it becomes progressively more detached from the sensible world, in epistemic terms. Spiritual knowledge is like the light of the sun, so as the epistemic receptivity of the *nous* becomes gradually re-oriented away from the sensible world and back toward God – as, that is, the *nous* gradually recovers his image – so knowledge of him, at first in the form of the *logoi* of beings, begins to shed its light, like the rays of the rising sun, and in so doing makes sensible objects appear as shadows in relation to spiritual reality. But since love is inseparable from knowledge this aphorism can, and should, be read equally in terms of love. The rising sun of spiritual knowledge is the rising sun of love, the door to natural knowledge, knowledge of God and ultimate blessedness.²⁸²

3.4 Becoming *apathēs*

Apatheia is the health of the soul, the natural state of the human being and the spiritual foundation for the recovery by the *nous* of knowledge of God, culminating in its eschatological restoration to union with him. It is constituted by the practical virtues and characterised by stability and love, enables the *nous* to become receptive to spiritual knowledge and bestows an inner purity that regulates our conduct in the ‘worlds constituted *kata dianoian*’ as well as in the external world. In order to complete this picture it remains to discuss how *apatheia* is attained.

²⁸¹ *KG* 5.14.

²⁸² Cf. *Prakt.* Prol. 8.

At the heart of the quest for *apatheia* is the struggle against the *logismoι*.²⁸³ Our susceptibility to these resides in the disposition to *pathos*, and accordingly the disciplines of *praktikē* aim to reduce, and eventually eliminate, this disposition by healing all three parts of the soul:

Νοῦν μὲν πλανώμενον ἴστησιν ἀνάγνωσις καὶ ἀγρυπνία καὶ προσευχή· ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ ἐκφλογομένην μαραίνει πείνα καὶ κόπος καὶ ἀναχώρησις· θυμὸν δὲ καταπαύει κυκώμενον ψαλμωδία καὶ μακροθυμία καὶ ἔλεος.²⁸⁴

When the *nous* wanders, reading, vigils and prayer bring it to a standstill. When desire bursts into flame, hunger, toil and anachoresis extinguish it. When the *thumos* becomes agitated, psalmody, patience and mercy calm it.

τὰ μὲν τοῦ σώματος πάθη περικόπτει ἐγκράτεια, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγάπη πνευματική.²⁸⁵

Self-control cuts away the *pathē* of the body; spiritual love cuts away those of the soul.

As we saw,²⁸⁶ the disposition to *pathos* comprises the physiological ‘matter’ of the *logismoι* in the form of excess vital heat, and their psychological ‘matter’ in the form of the ‘natural desires of the flesh’, the ‘desires of the soul’,²⁸⁷ and *empathis* memories.²⁸⁸ By cultivating, for example, patience, mercy, compassion and gentleness to heal the disposition to anger;²⁸⁹ self-control to heal the disposition to gluttony and fornication²⁹⁰ and perseverance to heal the disposition to acedia,²⁹¹ the monk gradually brings his soul to health. *Praktikē*, then, comprises the cultivation of the practical virtues, along with manual labour, the keeping of vigils, the reading of scripture and the practice of psalmody and prayer, all of which are indispensable to the attainment of *apatheia*. Dietary self-control has already been discussed at length in relation to Evagrius’ understanding of the body, and the nature of the virtues has been discussed in relation to the nature of

²⁸³ See above, 2.1.

²⁸⁴ *Prakt.* 15.

²⁸⁵ *Prakt.* 35; see above, 3.2.

²⁸⁶ See above, 3.4.

²⁸⁷ *Eul.* 21.23; see above, 3.2.

²⁸⁸ Cf. *Prakt.* 34; see above, 3.3.

²⁸⁹ Cf., e.g., *Prakt.* 15, 20.

²⁹⁰ Cf., e.g., *Prakt.* 15; *8Th.* 1.4, 6, 33; 2.1.

²⁹¹ Cf., e.g., *Prakt.* 28.

the tripartite soul.²⁹² The nature of prayer, as Evagrius understands it, has to some extent been implicit in discussion of the contemplative ascent,²⁹³ the true nature of the *nous*²⁹⁴ and *apatheia* as love and knowledge,²⁹⁵ and is also the subject, along with Evagrius' understanding of psalmody, of an excellent recent monograph by Luke Dysinger.²⁹⁶ The following, however, is particularly worth noting here:

Ἐργάζεσθαι μὲν διὰ παντὸς καὶ ἀγρυπνεῖν καὶ νηστεύειν οὐ προστετάγμεθα, προσεύχεσθαι δὲ ἡμῖν ἀδιαλείπτως νενομοθέτεται· διότι ἐκεῖνα μὲν τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπεύοντα καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν εἰς τὴν ἐργασίαν προσδεῖται, ὅπερ δι' οἰκείαν ἀσθένειαν πρὸς τοὺς πόνους οὐκ ἐπαρκεῖ· ἡ δὲ προσευχὴ τὸν νοῦν ἐρρωμένον καὶ καθαρὸν πρὸς τὴν πάλιν παρασκευάζει, πεφυκότα προσεύχεσθαι καὶ δίχα τούτου τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὑπὲρ πασῶν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων τοῖς δαίμοσι μάχεσθαι.²⁹⁷

We have not been commanded to work, to keep vigil, and to fast at all times, but the law of unceasing prayer²⁹⁸ has been handed down to us. In fact, those things which heal the *pathētikon* part of the soul require also the body to put them into practice, and the latter because of its weakness is not sufficient for these labours.²⁹⁹ Prayer, on the other hand, invigorates and purifies the *nous* for the struggle, since it is naturally constituted for prayer, even without this body, and for fighting the demons on behalf of all the powers of the soul.

In this passage Evagrius affirms the primacy of prayer within *praktikē*: important as the various ascetic labours are, prayer is more so – more important, even, than the dietary self-control that keeps the vital heat at bay and in doing so deprives the *pathē* of their physiological matter.³⁰⁰ Prayer nourishes the *nous* by answering directly to its true nature, and also - although Evagrius does not spell this out here - increases the receptivity of the *nous* to grace, without which all of its labours would be in vain.³⁰¹

²⁹² See above, 1.2.2.

²⁹³ See above, 1.1.3.

²⁹⁴ See above, 1.2.1.3.

²⁹⁵ See above, 3.3.

²⁹⁶ Dysinger (2005).

²⁹⁷ *Prakt.* 49.

²⁹⁸ 1 Thess. 5:17.

²⁹⁹ See above, 1.2.3.

³⁰⁰ Cf. *Eul.* 1.1; see above, 1.2.3.

³⁰¹ E.g. *Eul.* 8.8, 14.15, 27.29, 28.39, 29.31; *Vices* Prol.; *8Th.* 8.12; *Prakt.* Prol. 2; 53; *Epil.*; *AV* 25; *Th.* 8, 26, 39; *Pry.* Prol.; 75.

There remains one element of *praktikē* which, although it is of central importance to the attainment and preservation of *apatheia*, and, as such, partly constitutive of it, I have not yet mentioned directly, and upon which, I shall, accordingly, now focus. Virtues such as self-control, patience, mercy, compassion and gentleness correspond to the *pathētikon* part of the soul, but integral to their cultivation are the more purely rational disciplines of vigilance and discernment. The importance within Evagrius' spirituality of an attitude of continual introspective watchfulness cannot be overstated and informs all of his writings; as Rich notes, 'the discernment of spirits, *logismoi* and of spiritual and practical matters is at the centre of [Evagrius'] teaching'.³⁰² Just as the exercise by the *nous* of its self-determination in order to return to God makes good the primal misuse of it by which it fell, so the cultivation of inner watchfulness is the means by which it remedies the tendency to negligence, inattentiveness or carelessness due to which it first turned from God. This watchfulness consists largely in the development of ever deeper degrees of a self-awareness, but also involves becoming familiar with the demons, learning to recognise different types of thought, and monitoring, analysing and exercising care in respect of one's mental content. It is, in other words, the application of reason to the cultivation and preservation of purity of heart. Before looking at it in more detail, however, a word is in order about the sort of self-awareness it involves.

Sometime during the final years of Evagrius' life, Augustine of Hippo wrote his *Confessions*.³⁰³ From his understanding of the will and of its centrality to our being it follows that our motivations are constitutive of our spiritual condition, any action not ultimately rooted in love of God being therefore sinful. The confession of sin comes, accordingly, to involve a relentless quest to uncover one's motivations,³⁰⁴ and, in the process, gives rise to self-knowledge as the 'fruit' of 'an activity that centrally involves the drawing forth of [the] past through memory'.³⁰⁵ It is this understanding that underlies the *Confessions*:

[In aula ingenti memoriae meae] caelum et terra et mare praesto sunt cum omnibus quae in eis sentire potui, praeter illa quae oblitus sum. Ibi mihi et ipse oc-

³⁰² Rich (2007: 41).

³⁰³ Chadwick (1991), dates the *Confessions* to the years 397-400.

³⁰⁴ Cf. *Confess.* 2.9 ff.

³⁰⁵ Nussbaum, at Matthews (1999: 68).

*curro meque recolo, quid, quando et ubi egerim quoque modo, cum agerem, affectus fuerim.*³⁰⁶

[In the vast hall of my memory] sky, land, and sea are available to me together with all the sensations I have been able to experience in them, except for those which I have forgotten. There also I meet myself and recall what I am, what I have done, and when and where and how I was affected when I did it.

Evagrius would agree that any action not ultimately rooted in love of God is therefore sinful, and, as we have seen, he understands a *pathos* to be any affection that comes between us and our love of God. He would certainly agree with Augustine that, as Nussbaum puts it, ‘one can never correct oneself fully enough, watch one’s impulses carefully enough.’³⁰⁷ But whereas for Augustine these propositions lead to a focus on the person as a particular, unique creature, an ‘I’ in intimate dialogue with God, for Evagrius they lead in the opposite direction; away from the uniquely personal, which for him is solely a source of attachments to things other than God; away, even, from the human, to awareness of the ‘self’ as a pure *nous*. Consequently, although Evagrius’ writings are full of rich personal detail, much of which can only be autobiographical, and of searingly honest reports of personal experience, none is owned; Evagrius is unwavering in his self-effacement. And while some of his writings are far more ‘personal’ than the *Confessions* in terms of the experiences that they lay bare, those experiences are presented not as constitutive of their subject, but, on the contrary, as detached from him; objects to be observed, examined, learned from and then transcended as obstacles to the union of the *nous* with God. So for Evagrius ‘self-awareness’, is not awareness of a particular individual with a particular history who, as such, engages with God, but, rather, a means of diagnosing the current condition and needs of the fragmented *nous*.

Although discernment is integral to the inner watchfulness prescribed by Evagrius, he rarely, as Rich notes, ‘uses the *διάκρισις* word group’.³⁰⁸ Instead, his preferred way of referring to that watchfulness is by the verb *τήρειν*, the use of which, as noted above, recalls not only Prov. 4:23, ‘keep watch over thine heart with all vigilance’ (*πάση φυλακῇ τήρει σὴν καρδίαν*), but Eph. 4:3.³⁰⁹ The following passage, which concludes

³⁰⁶ *Conf.* 10.14.

³⁰⁷ Nussbaum, at Matthews (1999: 66).

³⁰⁸ Rich (2007: 41).

³⁰⁹ See above, 3.3.

the treatise *To Eulogios*, plays on its different meanings and on its association, as in Prov. 4:23, with the verb φυλάσσω, as well as giving one example of why such watchfulness is a necessary component of asceticism:

Σὺ οὖν, ὦ ἁγίας τριάδος ἱκέτα, εἰδὼς ταῦτα ἐν οἷς φιλοπονοῖς, πάση φυλακῇ τήρει σὴν καρδίαν, μήπως τοῖς ἕξωθεν πόνοις προσέχων, τοῖς ἕσωθεν δελέασι βροχισθῆς. οἱ ἐμοὶ λόγοι εἴρηγται πρὸς σέ, τὰ δὲ ῥήματά μου τηρεῖτω σὴ καρδία· μέμνησο Χριστοῦ τοῦ φυλάξαντος σε καὶ μὴ ἐπιλάθῃ τῆς προσκυνητῆς καὶ ἁγίας τριάδος.³¹⁰

As for you then, suppliant of the Holy Trinity, as you know these matters for which you make painstaking efforts, keep watch over your heart with all vigilance for fear that in attending to outward ascetic efforts alone you may choke on interior baits. My words were therefore addressed to you, and may your heart preserve what I said. Remember Christ who has kept guard over you and do not forget the worshipful and Holy Trinity.

The following, again from the *Eulogios*, describes one sort of ‘interior bait’:

Μὴ στόμα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ καρδία τηρεῖσθω. τότε γὰρ ἀμαυροῦται τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ὄμμα τῷ τῆς ἀρεσκείας πνεύματι, τοῦ νοῦ πασσομένου.³¹¹

Let not only the mouth but also the heart maintain its guard. For the eye of the soul is blinded by the spirit of complaisance at the moment when the *nous* is sprinkled with dust.

As Burton-Christie notes, the desert monks were acutely aware of the power of words,³¹² the *Apophthegmata Patrum* report Makarios the Great as saying that ‘one evil word makes even the good evil, while one good word makes even the evil good’,³¹³ while at Matt: 12:36 we are told that on the day of judgment we will have to give account for every careless word we utter (πᾶν ῥῆμα ἀργὸν ὃ λαλήσουσιν...ἀποδώσουσιν).³¹⁴ Thus inner watchfulness includes guarding the tongue and so the mouth. But in addition, Evagrius notes in his scholion on Prov. 25:26 that the

³¹⁰ *Eul.* 32.34.

³¹¹ *Eul.* 18.19.

³¹² Cf. Burton-Christie (1993: 134 ff).

³¹³ Makarios the Great 39, at Ward (1975: 137).

³¹⁴ Cf. also James 3:5 ff.

word ‘tongue’ is used by Scripture to mean ‘soul’,³¹⁵ meaning that, as Driscoll notes, a reference to guarding the tongue ‘can suggest to the monk familiar with this use of biblical language that the whole soul is to be guarded.’³¹⁶ So Evagrius’ warning to Eulogios is amplified by this secondary meaning of ‘mouth’: the literal mouth is to be guarded lest a careless word ‘make the good evil’, and in addition the heart and the soul are to be guarded lest the ‘eye’ of the latter be blinded. By ‘dust’ Evagrius means the *logismoi*, which, thrown in the ‘eye of the soul’, obscure its ‘vision’;³¹⁷ his reference is to the capacity of the *pathos* associated with the *logismoi* to undermine our watchfulness, discernment and resolve. A particularly clear example is the temptation by *logismoi* of fornication described at *Eul.* 21.22 and discussed above,³¹⁸ which begins by warning that ‘it is a very serious matter for the heart to be tied to a habit of pleasures’ and then proceeds to detail how the pleasures in question enlist the monk’s reason to justify their indulgence; this is precisely the sort of undermining of reason by *pathos* that Evagrius has in mind in speaking of the *nous* being ‘sprinkled with dust.’ He attributes the capacity of pleasure to erode our resolve to ‘the spirit of complaisance’, but it is ourselves and the demons that we choose to please rather than God, and in choosing thus we repeat the primordial choice of the *nous* to turn away from God, and reinforce our disposition to *pathos* and immersion in corporeality.

While lapses in watchfulness imperil the heart, soul and *nous*, its maintenance conduces to spiritual advancement:

‘Ο φυλάσσων γλῶσσαν αὐτοῦ ὀρθοτομεῖ τὰς ὁδοὺς αὐτοῦ,
καὶ ὁ τηρῶν καρδίαν αὐτοῦ πλησθήσεται γνώσεως.³¹⁹

He who guards his tongue cuts his ways rightly,
And he who keeps watch over his heart will be filled with knowledge.

The following describes another sort of ‘interior bait’ upon which one might ‘choke’:

³¹⁵ Sch. 317.8-14 on Prov. 24:26.

³¹⁶ Driscoll (2003: 118-9).

³¹⁷ Cf. Sinkewicz (2003: 240, n.31).

³¹⁸ See above, 2.2.4.

³¹⁹ *AM* 94.

Many *pathē* are hidden in our souls, which are revealed by the sharpness of the temptations when these *pathē* slip out of us. So, it is necessary ‘to keep watch over the heart with all vigilance’ lest when the object [for which we have *pathos*] appears, we be won over to the *pathos*, carried off suddenly by demons and do something abhorrent to God.³²⁰

What Evagrius is referring to here is the level of dispositional *pathos* that I denoted D3; that is, the *pathos* associated with particular *noēmata* and memories. Everyone has a general disposition to *pathos* – the level that I denoted D1, and, at the level that I denoted D2, the dispositions to particular *pathē* such as hunger, sexual desire, anger or distress.³²¹ But each of us differs in our innate vulnerability to particular *pathē*, and, in addition, each of us, as we go through life, becomes primed by our experiences to respond to stimuli in particular ways. Something happens to us and, as Evagrius would put it, we form an *empathēs* memory of it, which is then stored in our *nous*, waiting to be recalled to our awareness by some new circumstance. That recollection might simply take the form of the resurfacing of the memory, but the stronger the *pathos* associated with it, the more likely it is that the recollection will take the form of an arousal of a fresh episode of that *pathos*, together, as likely as not, with an acting out of it. So to go back to the example discussed in section 2.2.3, if someone injures me and I respond with resentment then I will form an *empathēs* memory of their face. Supposing I don’t see them again for a long time, I might forget all about both them and the injury. But then suppose I do see them again: before I know what is happening - perhaps before I’ve even consciously recognised them, let alone remembered the nature of our past dealings – resentment surges up within me, flooding my awareness and overwhelming my thought processes. At this point my *nous* has been ‘sprinkled with the dust’ of the *logismoi*, but the *pathos* has yet to win me over, meaning that I can still refrain from acting it out; it will be recalled in relation to *Eulogios* 21.22-3,³²² that even when a person is in the throes of fresh *pathos* she still has the power to refrain from sinning. But should the ‘spirit of complaisance blind the eye of my soul’ I will proceed to sin, if not *kat’ energeian* then at least *kata dianoian*; having allowed myself to be ‘carried off by the demons to do something

³²⁰ *KG* 6.52, based on Driscoll’s translation (2003: 119) from the Greek in Hausherr, “Nouveaux fragments grecs d’Évagre le Pontique”, *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 30 (1933), pp.164-75.

³²¹ See above, 2.2.4.

³²² See above, 3.4.

abhorrent to God' I have, again, turned away from God and reinforced my disposition to *pathos*.

The *praktikos*, then, must continually monitor his responses, both cognitive and affective, to the circumstances in which he finds himself. He must be constantly on the lookout for unexpected thoughts or images appearing in his mind, however fleetingly; and for the smallest twinges of unexpected emotion, especially if it seems unwarranted. This is what it is needed to guard against the '*pathē* that are hidden in his soul' from 'slipping out' in response to 'the sharpness of temptation.' The *pathē* in question, as noted above, are those specific to him personally, corresponding to D3, the most differentiated level of his disposition to *pathos*, and they arise in response to cognitive triggers. But we can also find ourselves suddenly overwhelmed by *pathē* from D2, which are less personally specific. The following is an example:

Κὰν μετὰ Θεοῦ δοκῆς εἶναι, φυλάττου τῆς πορνείας δαίμονα. Λίαν γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπατεῶν, καὶ φθονερώτατος, καὶ βούλεται ὀξύτερος εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως καὶ νήψεως τοῦ νοός σου, καὶ ἀπὸ Θεοῦ ἀποσπᾶν αὐτὸν παρεστῶτα αὐτῷ μετ' εὐλαβείας καὶ φόβου.³²³

Even when you seem to be with God, keep guard against the demon of fornication, for he is very deceitful and most jealous. He pretends to be swifter than the sobriety and movement of your *nous* so as to distance it from God while it is standing before him with reverence and fear.

The 'deceitfulness' of this demon consists, as noted above, in its pretence of being able to overwhelm the *nous* before it realises that it is under attack,³²⁴ while in saying that it is 'jealous' Evagrius presumably means that it has a tendency to attack the monk regardless of what he is doing. In this case inner watchfulness means maintaining a continual awareness that this demon could attack at any time, and, as a result of this awareness, being ready to intercept and banish it as soon as it does. It also means continually monitoring one's state, as different factors can make one more or less susceptible to the demons. For example, the *thumos* is very rapidly tempted when it has been troubled the night before, and the *epithumētikon* readily welcomes thoughts of fornication when it

³²³ Prg. 90.

³²⁴ See above, 2.1.3.2.

has been agitated in the fantasies of sleep.³²⁵ The monk must never abandon his cell during times of temptation since fleeing and circumventing such struggles teaches the *nous* to be unskilled, cowardly and evasive,³²⁶ meaning that in future he would be even less able to cope.

The sort of watchfulness described above is a special case of a more general approach that Evagrius describes at *Praktikos* 50:

Εἴ τις βούλοιο τῶν μοναχῶν ἀγρίων πειραθῆναι δαιμόνων καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν τέχνης ἕξιν λαβεῖν, τηρεῖτω τοὺς λογισμοὺς, καὶ τὰς ἐπιτάσεις σημειούσθω τούτων, καὶ τὰς ἀνέσεις, καὶ τὰς μετεμπλοκάς, καὶ τοὺς χρόνους, καὶ τίνες τῶν δαιμόνων οἱ τοῦτο ποιῶντες, καὶ ποῖος ποῖῳ δαίμονι ἀκολουθεῖ, καὶ τίς τίνι οὐχ ἔπεται· καὶ ζητεῖτω παρὰ Χριστοῦ τούτων τοὺς λόγους.³²⁷

If one of the monks should wish to acquire experience with the cruel demons and become familiar with their skill, let him observe the *logismoi* and note their intensity and their relaxation, their inter-relationships, their occasions, which of the demons do this or that particular thing, what sort of demon follows upon another and which does not follow upon another; and let him seek from Christ the reason for these things.

Evagrius gives a detailed example of this kind of observation in chapter 9 of *On Thoughts*, in relation to the demon of wandering (πλάνος) who, as the name suggests, induces the *nous* to wander at length and thereby ‘distances it little by little from the knowledge of God and from virtue while it forgets even its profession’ (μακρὰν γινόμενον κατ’ ὀλίγον τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τοῦ ἐπαγγέλματος λήθην λαμβάνοντα).³²⁸ Evagrius advises:

Δεῖ οὖν τὸν ἀναχωροῦντα τοῦτον τηρεῖν πόθεν τε ἄρχεται καὶ ποῦ καταλήγει· οὐ γὰρ εἰκῆ οὐδὲ ὡς ἔτυχε τὸν μακρὸν ἐκεῖνον κύκλον ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τὴν κατάστασιν τοῦ ἀναχωροῦντος διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενος ταῦτα ποιεῖ... Ἄλλ’ ἡμεῖς, εἴπερ ἔχομεν σκοπὸν τοῦ γνῶναι σαφῶς τὴν τούτου πανουργίαν, μὴ ταχέως φλεγεζώμεθα πρὸς αὐτὸν μηδὲ μηνύσωμεν τὰ γινόμενα... ἀλλὰ ἄλλην μίαν ἡμέραν ἢ καὶ δευτέραν συγχωρήσωμεν αὐτῷ τελειῶσαι τὸ δρᾶμα, ἵνα ἀκριβῶς

³²⁵ Cf. *Th.* 27.

³²⁶ Cf. *Prakt.* 28.

³²⁷ *Prakt.* 50.1-7.

³²⁸ *Th.* 9.7-9.

μαθόντες αὐτοῦ τὸ σκευώρημα λόγῳ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλέγχοντες αὐτὸν φυγαδεύσωμεν.³²⁹

The anchorite must observe this demon, where he starts from and where he ends up, for he does not make this long circuit by chance or at random, but rather it is with the intention of destroying the anchorite's state that he does this...But if we make it our goal to know clearly the cunning of this demon, let us not be quick to speak to him or make known what is happening...Rather, let us allow him, for another day or two, to bring his game to completion, so that having learned about his deceitfulness in detail, we may put him to flight by exposing him with a word.

Rather than simply banish the demon as quickly as possible, Evagrius recommends allowing it to linger in order to learn about it,³³⁰ although clearly this strategy will only be available to those who are capable of maintaining, at least to some extent, their observation of the demon while being tempted by it, and Evagrius acknowledges that there will be limits to their ability to do so:

Ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ πειρασμοῦ συμβαίνει τεθολωμένον ὄντα τὸν νοῦν μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἰδεῖν τὰ γινόμενα, μετὰ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῦ δαίμονος τοῦτο γινέσθω· καθεσθεῖς μνημόνευσον κατὰ σεαυτὸν τῶν συμβεβκότων σοι πραγμάτων...ταῦτα κατάμαθε καὶ παράδος τῇ μνήμῃ ἵν' ἔχῃς ἐλέγχειν αὐτὸν προσιόντα.³³¹

But since in time of temptation the *nous* may happen to be muddled and not see accurately what is happening, one should do the following after the withdrawal of the demon. Sit down and recall for yourself the things that happened to you...Examine these events carefully and commit them to memory so that you may be able to expose him when he approaches.

The mental and emotional stability that allow the monk to observe a demon while being tempted by it is *apatheia*; to be precise, a monk in this situation has attained what Evagrius calls 'imperfect *apatheia*'. The fact that he can possess sufficient *apatheia* to be able to allow a demon to linger in order to observe it, but that he might nonetheless find that his *nous* becomes muddled such that he needs to reflect upon his experiences afterwards, reveals much about Evagrius' understanding of *apatheia*, as will be dis-

³²⁹ *Th.* 9.9-26.

³³⁰ Cf. Linge (2000: 556).

³³¹ *Th.* 9.26-34.

cussed below. The epistemic clarity that *apatheia* bestows in relation to the warfare with the demons is summarised at *Praktikos* 83:

Ὁ νοῦς τὸν ἐμπαθῆ πόλεμον πολεμῶν οὐ θεωρήσει τοὺς λόγους τοῦ πολέμου· τῷ γὰρ ἐν νυκτὶ μαχομένῳ ἔοικεν· ἀπάθειαν δὲ κτησάμενος, ῥαδίως ἐπιγνώσεται τὰς μεθοδεΐας τῶν πολεμίων.³³²

When the *nous* is engaged in the warfare of the *pathē* it cannot contemplate the *logoi* of the warfare, for it is like one who fights in the night. But when it has acquired *apatheia*, it will easily recognise the artifices of the enemy.³³³

The treatise *On Thoughts* consists almost entirely of extended discussions of different applications of observation and inner watchfulness. Several examples have already been discussed: Chapter 1, which describes the relationship between the demons;³³⁴ Chapter 8, which describes how to distinguish between thoughts of angelic, human and demonic provenance;³³⁵ Chapter 21, which describes how one sort of *logismos* can lead to another;³³⁶ Chapter 25, which describes how the *nous* receives *noēmata* and how it assumes agency within the *logismoi*,³³⁷ and Chapter 41, which discusses the imprinting of the *nous* by *noēmata* and describes how to discern the spiritual significance of biblical imagery.³³⁸ In the latter, as elsewhere, Evagrius makes explicit his reader's role as a fellow investigator:

ζητήσεις εἴτερ ὡς ἔχει ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν· καὶ ἄλλως μὲν τυπωθήσεται ὁ νοῦς ὁρῶν νοῦν, καὶ ἄλλως διατεθήσεται ὁρῶν τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ.³³⁹

you shall investigate whether it is indeed the same for incorporeals and their *logoi* as it is for bodies and their *logoi*, and whether the *nous* will receive impres-

³³² *Prakt.* 83.

³³³ Cf. Eph. 6:11; Sch. 372 on Prov. 31:11, 'such a one shall stand in no need of fine spoils': 'When we have vanquished the opposing power we 'despoil' her in learning her *logoi*' (νικήσαντες τὴν ἀντικειμένην δύναμιν σκυλεύομεν αὐτὴν τοὺς περὶ αὐτῆς λόγους μαθάνοντες).

³³⁴ See above, 2.1.4.1, 2.

³³⁵ See above, 2.1.1.

³³⁶ See above, 2.1.4.2.

³³⁷ See above, 2.1.1.

³³⁸ See above, 1.2.1.1.

³³⁹ *Th.* 41. 20-4; cf., e.g., *Th.* 25.3-5: 'My own proof in most cases is the heart of my reader, especially if it possesses understanding and experience in the monastic life' (ἐμῆ...ἀπόδειξις ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν ἢ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκοντός ἐστι καρδία, καὶ τοῦτο εἰ συνετὴ εἶη καὶ τοῦ μοναδικοῦ βίου πεπειραμένη).

sions in one way when it sees a *nous* and whether it will be disposed in another way when it sees its *logos*.

Chapter 19 of *On Thoughts* includes a detailed description of the cultivation and application of discernment in relation to experiences of *logismoi*:

Ὅταν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τρώσῃ σέ τις παραβαλὼν καὶ βούλει τὴν ῥομφαίαν αὐτοῦ στρέψαι κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν αὐτοῦ, ποιήσον οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν. Δίελε κατὰ σαυτὸν τὸν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ βληθέντα σοι λογισμόν, ὅστις ποτέ ἐστι καὶ ἐκ πόσων πραγμάτων συνέστηκε καὶ ποῖον τούτων ἐστὶ μάλιστα τὸ θλίβον τὸν νοῦν. Ὁ δὲ λέγω τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· ἔστω πεμφθεὶς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ὁ τῆς φιλαργυρίας λογισμός, τοῦτον δίελε εἷς τε τὸν ὑποδεξάμενον αὐτὸν νοῦν καὶ εἰς τὸ νόημα τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν χρυσὸν καὶ εἰς τὸ φιλάργυρον πάθος· λοιπὸν ἐρώτα τί τούτων ἐστὶν ἁμαρτία· πότερον ὁ νοῦς καὶ πῶς; εἰκὼν ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ νόημα τοῦ χρυσοῦ; καὶ τοῦτο τίς ἂν εἴποι νοῦν ἔχων ποτέ; ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ὁ χρυσὸς ἐστὶν ἁμαρτία; καὶ τίνος χάριν γεγένηται; ἔπεται τοίνυν τῆς ἁμαρτίας αἴτιον εἶναι τὸ τέταρτον, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι πρᾶγμα ὑφ’ ἑστέος κατ’ οὐσίαν οὐδὲ νόημα πράγματος οὐδὲ νοῦς πάλιν ἀσώματος, ἀλλ’ ἡδονὴ τις μισάνθρωπος ἐκ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου τικτομένη καὶ κακῶς κεχρησθαι τοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ κτίσματι τὸν νοῦν ἀναγκάζουσα, ἥνπερ περιτέμνειν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ νόμος πεπίστευται. Καὶ ταῦτά σου διερευνωμένου, φθαρήσεται μὲν ὁ λογισμὸς εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν ἀναλυόμενος θεωρίαν, φεύξεται δὲ ἀπὸ σοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον, τῆς διανοίας σου ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς γνώσεως εἰς ὕψος ἀρθείσης.³⁴⁰

When one of the enemies approaches and wounds you and you want to ‘turn his own sword back against his heart’, according to the scripture text, then do as we tell you. Distinguish within yourself the *logismos* that he has launched against you, as to what it is, how many elements it consists of, and among these what sort of thing it is that most affects the *nous*. This is an example of what I am talking about. Suppose the *logismos* of avarice is sent by him; distinguish within this *logismos* the *nous* that received it, the *noēma* of gold, the gold itself, and the *pathos* of avarice; then ask which of these elements is a sin. Is it the *nous*? But how? It is the image of God. But how can it be the *noēma* of gold? And who in his right mind would ever say this? Does the gold itself constitute a sin? Then for what purpose was it created? It follows therefore that the fourth element is the cause of the sin, namely, that which is not an object with substantial subsistence, nor the *noēma* of an object, nor even the incorporeal *nous*, but a pleasure hostile to humanity, born of self-determination, and compelling the *nous* to make improper use of the creatures of God: it is the law of God that has been entrusted with circumcising this pleasure. As you engage in this careful examination, the

³⁴⁰ *Th.* 19.1-23.

logismos will be destroyed and dissipate in its own consideration, and the demon will flee from you when your *dianoia* has been raised to the heights by this knowledge.

This passage comprises a set of clear, step-by-step instructions by which a temptation can be dissolved through using reason to deconstruct its constituent *logismoi*. Instructions like this can make it possible, even when the *nous* is ‘sprinkled with dust’, to muster the resources of the *logistikon* to drive back the encroaching *pathos*. The monk to whom this passage is addressed will, again, already have some experience in dealing with the *logismoi*, and, realising that he is being tempted by a *logismos* of avarice, will wish not merely to banish it but to dissolve it altogether by disentangling its different elements and thereby isolating its affective component and revealing it for what it is – an illusion, an ‘object without substantial subsistence’ – that depends for its appearance of reality upon his collaboration; specifically, upon his assent to the pleasure that it evokes in him. If this promise of pleasure is subtracted from the *logismos* then, the *logismos* having been defused, the remaining elements – the *nous*, the *noēma* of gold and gold itself – freed from its obfuscating effects, can, as objects of *apathēs* cognition, be seen for what they are. As Linge explains,

The purpose of discernment is to recognise the temptations and weaken their influence by means of an analytical understanding of what is happening to one...detached observation of one’s mental processes enables one to remain tranquil and focused, so that the passions are no longer aroused and one is no longer “drawn into” one’s thoughts as they arise. The ascetic who cultivates the art of discernment is thus learning to break the affective power of his mental content.³⁴¹

The examples considered so far have focused upon the application of watchfulness and discernment to situations of actual or potential temptation, but basing himself upon John 10:1-18 he also recommends that we assume the role of shepherd in relation to our *noēmata* in general:

Τὰ νοήματα τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου ὁ κύριος καθάπερ πρόβατά τινα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ποιμένι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ παρέδωκε ... συζεύξας αὐτῷ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν πρὸς βοήθειαν, ἵνα διὰ μὲν τοῦ θυμοῦ φυγαδεύῃ τὰ τῶν λύκων νοήματα, διὰ δὲ τῆς

³⁴¹ Linge (2000: 556).

ἐπιθυμίας στέργη τὰ πρόβατα, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ὑετῶν καὶ ἀνέμων πολλακίς βαλλόμενος· ἔδωκε πρὸς τούτοις καὶ νομόν, ὅπως ποιμαίνῃ τὰ πρόβατα, καὶ τόπον χλόης καὶ ὕδωρ ἀναπαύσεως καὶ ψαλτήριον καὶ κιθάραν καὶ ράβδον καὶ βακτηρίαν, ἵν' ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ποιμνῆς καὶ τραφῇ καὶ ἐνδύσῃται καὶ χορτον ὀρεινὸν συναγάγῃ· «Τίς γάρ, φησί, ποιμαίνει ποιμνὴν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ γάλακτος αὐτῆς οὐκ ἐσθίει;» Δεῖ οὖν τὸν ἀναχωροῦντα φυλάττειν νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν τοῦτο τὸ ποιμνιον, μὴ τι τῶν νοημάτων γένηται θηριάλωτον ἢ λησταῖς περιπέση, εἰ δὲ ἄρα τι τοιοῦτον συμβαίῃ κατὰ τὴν νάπην, εὐθὺς ἐξαρπάζειν ἐκ τοῦ στόματος τοῦ λέοντος καὶ τῆς ἄρκτου.³⁴²

The Lord has confided to the human person the *noēmata* of this age, like sheep to a good shepherd³⁴³ ...For assistance he has yoked to him *thumos* and *epithumia* so that through the *thumos* he may put to flight the *noēmata* that are the wolves and through the *epithumia* he may love the sheep, even if he is often cast about by the rains and the winds. In addition to these things he has also given him 'a pasturage' so that he may pasture the sheep, and 'a verdant place and water for refreshment',³⁴⁴ 'a harp and a lyre',³⁴⁵ and 'a rod and staff'³⁴⁶ in order that from this flock he may have nourishment and clothing and that 'he may gather the mountain grass',³⁴⁷ for scripture says, 'Who pastures a flock and does not feed on its milk?'³⁴⁸ Therefore the anchorite must guard this little flock night and day, lest any of the *noēmata* be taken by a wild beast or fall prey to thieves; and if ever something like this should happen in the wooded glen, he must immediately snatch it from the mouth of the lion and the bear.³⁴⁹

Recalling the distinctions of *On Thoughts* 8, the *noēmata* that are 'sheep' will comprise, firstly, 'angelic' *noēmata* – namely *noēmata* of *logoi*, and, secondly, 'human' *noēmata* – namely, *noēmata* of objects that, being free of *pathos*, can form the basis for spiritual investigation. The 'wolves' correspond to 'demonic' *noēmata*, meaning that they are *empathê*,³⁵⁰ having *pathos* 'yoked together with' (συνεζευγμένα) them.³⁵¹ We are to assume active responsibility for our 'flock' – that is, for our mental content – using discernment to identify different *noēmata* and then treating them accordingly. Those that are 'sheep' can provide us with nourishment, whether directly, as with angelic *noēmata*,

³⁴² *Th.* 17.4-17.

³⁴³ Cf. John 10:1-18.

³⁴⁴ Cf. Ps. 22:2.

³⁴⁵ Cf. Ps. 56:9, 107:2.

³⁴⁶ Cf. Ps. 22:4.

³⁴⁷ Cf. Prov. 27:25.

³⁴⁸ 1 Cor. 9:7.

³⁴⁹ Cf. 1 Kings. 17:34-7.

³⁵⁰ See above, 2.2.3.

³⁵¹ *Disc.* 64.2. Cf. *Disc.* 165.1-2.

or indirectly, as the basis for spiritual investigation, as with human *noēmata*. By means of *epithumia* we are to love the ‘sheep’, and by means of *thumos*, to drive away the ‘wolves’. But while this will be the action according to nature of these parts of the soul, they will not always maintain it but will sometimes slip back into *pathos* and so become sources of ‘rains and winds’. The ‘grass and water’ symbolise *praktikē* and knowledge,³⁵² the ‘food’ for the ‘sheep’. The lyre again symbolises *praktikē*, and the harp, ‘the pure *nous* moved by spiritual knowledge.’³⁵³ The ‘rod and staff’ are ‘the chastisements that guide the sinner back to goodness’,³⁵⁴ and the mountain grass ‘knowledge of the holy powers that correspond to the irrational state of souls’ (ἀρμόζουσα τῇ ἀλογωτέρα τῶν ψυχῶν καταστάσει).³⁵⁵ This ‘flock’ will nourish the monk, but in return he must ‘guard (φυλάττειν) it night and day’.

This discussion has revealed the centrality to, and ubiquity within, Evagrius’ spirituality of inner watchfulness, and in particular, its relation to *apatheia*: as noted above, and for reasons which should now be clear, continual vigilance is essential to both the attainment and the preservation of *apatheia*.

It was noted in connection with Evagrius’ advice regarding the demon of wandering that the mental and emotional stability that allow someone to observe a demon while being tempted by it is *apatheia*. So far so good – we know from *Praktikos* 6 that it is not up to us (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) whether or not the *logismoi* trouble the soul but only whether or not they linger and arouse *pathos*. The monk who feels able to allow a demon to linger in order to observe it must have some confidence in his ability to resist the arousal of *pathos*, from which it follows that he has to some extent attained *apatheia*. But the fact that his *nous* might become ‘muddled’ under the influence of the demon, such that he is unable to ‘see accurately what is happening’ reveals that to some extent he remains vulnerable to *pathos*. I stated above that this shows that he has attained what Evagrius calls ‘imperfect *apatheia*’. This is something he only refers to once, in Chapter 60 of the *Praktikos*:

³⁵² Cf. Sch. 1 on Ps.22:1-2; Sinkewicz (2003: 269, n.24).

³⁵³ Cf. Sch. 2 on Ps. 32:2; Sch. 2 on Ps. 91:4; Sinkewicz (2003: 269, n.24). Note that the pure – that is, *apathēs nous* – is said to be ‘moved’; see above, 1.1.2; 3.1.

³⁵⁴ Cf. Sch. 3 on Ps. 22:4; Sinkewicz (2003: 269, n.24).

³⁵⁵ Sch. 341 on Prov. 27:25.

Ἡ μὲν τελεία τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπάθεια μετὰ τὴν νίκην τὴν κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀντικειμένων τῇ πρακτικῇ δαιμόνων ἐγγίνεται· ἡ δὲ ἀτελής ἀπάθεια ὡς πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τέως τοῦ παλαίοντος αὐτῇ λέγεται δαίμονος.³⁵⁶

Perfect *apatheia* emerges in the soul after the victory over all the demons that oppose *praktikē*. Imperfect *apatheia* refers to the relative strength of the demon still fighting against it.

To be imperfectly *apathēs*, then, is to have a degree of *apatheia*, measurable by the extent to which one remains vulnerable to *pathos*. If one recalls that *apatheia* involves not just emotional stability, cognitive acuity and complete freedom from sexual desire, but also freedom from the desire for food or drink, it becomes clear that perfect *apatheia* will, normally at least, be more or less short-lived,³⁵⁷ and that accordingly talk about *apatheia* in a dispositional rather than occurrent sense will tend to be about imperfect or partial *apatheia*.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁶ *Prakt.* 60.

³⁵⁷ This will, however, be at least partially dependent upon the physiology of fasting.

³⁵⁸ Evagrius occasionally uses the term *metriopatheia*; to be precise, it occurs five times in his writings: four in the *Scholia on Psalms* (*Sch.* 4 on Ps. 2:12; 8 on Ps. 49:17; 5 on Ps. 93:12; 29 on Ps. 118:65-6) and one in the *Scholia on Proverbs* (*Sch.* 3 on Prov. 1:2); cf. Géhin (1987: 93). The evidence suggests that he associates it with the process of training the soul to become *apathēs*. To begin with, in each of his uses of the term *metriopatheia* it is modified by *pathōn* and the resulting expression, *metriopatheia pathōn*, equated with instruction, παιδεία, or to instruct, παιδεύειν; Géhin (1987: 93), supposes the association of *metriopatheia* with παιδεία, which is also found at *Strom.* 2:8.39.4-5, to have been traditional. This formula is also implied by his sole use of the verb μετριοπαθεῖν, where it is associated with παιδεύειν; cf. *Sch.* 3 on Ps. 22:4. The modification of *metriopatheia* by *pathōn* implies its co-existence with *pathos*; meaning that to be *metriopathēs* must be still to have *pathē*. In addition, the process of training the soul to become *apathēs* consists in the gradual acquisition of control over the *pathē*. This means that it is a process of modifying them under the influence of reason: in other words, of acquiring *metriopatheia pathōn*. There are, therefore, *a priori* grounds for supposing that for Evagrius *metriopatheia* is the incomplete mastery of the *pathē* that constitutes an interim stage on the way to attaining *apatheia*; cf. Géhin (1987: 93). That Evagrius regards *metriopatheia* and *apatheia* as distinct concepts - *pace* Suzuki (2009: 605) - is clear from the fact that in two places he refers to them both, namely *Sch.* 5 on Ps. 93:12 and 29 on Ps. 118:65-6. Both are most naturally read as indicating that *metriopatheia pathōn* relates to the process that leads to *apatheia*. *Sch.* 5 on Ps. 93:12 reads: ‘Whoever the Lord loves, he instructs, says the Apostle; and if whoever he instructs, he blesses, every person instructed by him will become *apathēs*, for the Lord loves him, for *metriopatheia pathōn* is instruction.’ («Ὁν ἀγαπᾷ Κύριος, παιδεύει, » φησὶν ὁ Ἀπόστολος: εἰ δὲ ὃν παιδεύει, μακαρίζει, πᾶς ὁ παιδευόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀπαθὴς γενήσεται· τοῦτον γὰρ ἀγαπᾷ Κύριος· παιδεία γάρ ἐστι μετριοπάθεια παθῶν.) *Sch.* 29 on Ps. 118:65-6 reads: ‘Taste is *apatheia* of the rational soul, accrued through the spiritual law; goodness is (the) true taste of what has come into being under God; instruction is *metriopatheia pathōn*; knowledge is contemplation of the Trinity’ (Γεῦσις δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπάθεια ψυχῆς λογικῆς, διὰ τοῦ πνευματικοῦ νόμου προσγινομένη· χρηστότης δὲ ἐστὶν γεῦσις ἀληθῆς τῶν γεγονότων ὑπὸ Θεοῦ· παιδεία δὲ μετριοπάθεια παθῶν· γνῶσις δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ θεωρία τῆς Τριάδος). At *Sch.* 8 on Ps. 49:17 we read simply, ‘But you hated instruction... instruction is *metriopatheia pathōn* (Σὺ δὲ ἐμίσησας παιδείαν, κ. τ. ε. Παιδεία ἐστὶ μετριοπάθεια παθῶν), and at *Sch.* 4 on Ps. 2:12: ‘*Paideia* is

Attainment of *apatheia*, then, is a gradual process, and this makes sense if we recall that it consists in replacing the disposition to *pathos* with the disposition to be free from *pathos*. This replacement will be cumulative, in that the stronger the disposition to *apatheia* becomes, the less likely the person will be to succumb to fresh *pathos*, meaning that the disposition to *apatheia* will in turn be further strengthened. During this process, *apatheia* will be attained and lost again countless times, hence Evagrius warns that ‘those who have been deemed worthy of *apatheia*’ remain vulnerable to the ‘spite of the devil’³⁵⁹ whereby they can fall.³⁶⁰ This explains his reference in relation to our ‘shepherding’ of our *noēmata* to our using our *epithumia* and *thumos* to love the ‘sheep’ and drive away the ‘wolves’ respectively, but their also being often a source of ‘rains and winds’. When they are loving the ‘sheep’ and driving away the ‘wolves’, they are acting according to nature, meaning that the soul is *apathēs*, but when they are a source of ‘rains and winds’ then it has fallen back into *empathēia*.

From the fact that *apatheia* is for all intents and purposes usually imperfect – in other words, that *apatheia* admits of degrees – it follows that the various conditions that are in

metriopatheia, which tends naturally to result from the *praktikē*. For the *praktikē* is spiritual teaching purifying the *pathētikon* part of the soul’ (Παιδεία ἐστὶ μετριοπάθεια παθῶν ὅπερ συμβαίνειν πέφυκεν ἐκ τῆς πρακτικῆς ἢ γε πρακτικῆ ἐστὶ διδασκαλία πνευματικῆ, τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρουσα). Finally, at Sch. 3 on Prov. 1:2 we read: ‘And wisdom is knowledge of corporeals and incorporeals and the contemplation in them of judgment and providence; instruction is *metriopatheia pathōn* seen around the *pathētikon* and irrational part of the soul. (Καὶ σοφία μὲν ἐστὶν γινῶσις σωματίων καὶ ἄσωμάτιων καὶ τῆς ἐν τούτοις θεωρουμένης κρίσεως καὶ προνοίας· παιδεία ἐστὶν μετριοπάθεια παθῶν περὶ τὸ παθητικὸν ἢ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος θεωρουμένη). Although the latter two (indeed, three) could be understood as making *metriopatheia* synonymous with *apatheia*, they can also be read as supporting the two-stage picture. Therefore the most plausible interpretation of the evidence is that for Evagrius as for Philo, and also Plotinus, *metriopatheia* is an interim stage on the way to *apatheia*, wherein the tendency to *pathos* is being brought under control but has yet to be fully overcome; cf. Philo of Alexandria, *Allegorical Interpretation* 3.129-44, ed. L. Cohn, *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt*, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1896); Clement, *Strom.* 2:8.39.4-5; 6:9.74.2-5; Plotinus, *Enn.* 1.2.2-6, ed. P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer, *Plotini opera*, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1951). In this case *metriopatheia* is, for Evagrius, the same thing as ‘imperfect *apatheia*’. However, his reason for preferring the term *apatheia* to *metriopatheia* becomes clear if we recall that the latter term was used by the Platonists and Peripatetics (cf. Diogenes Laertius 5.31; Albinus, *Isagoge*, p.184, 24) with the sense that ‘at least some of the *pathē*...are natural and appropriate’ (Frede, 1986: 93), such that the aim of the wise man was to ‘moderate his *pathē*’ so that he had only those that it was reasonable to have; in other words, to become *metriopathēs*. As we have seen, Evagrius regards all *pathē* as symptoms of the soul’s fallen estate and distance from God and therefore as unnatural and inappropriate by definition, hence a term which could be taken to imply something less would have been unacceptable to him.

³⁵⁹ Cf. Wis. 2:24.

³⁶⁰ Sch. 46 on Eccl. 6:1-6.

dependency relations to it, for example *empathēia*, psychological health, virtue and love – also admit of degrees. So just as a person can be more or less *apathēs*, she can be more or less *empathēs*, psychologically healthy, virtuous and in a condition of love. In turn, it follows that she will be more or less capable of contemplation and knowledge of God. On a good day she will be more *apathēs*, with everything that follows from that, and on a bad day, less so. *Apatheia* and *empathēia* are, accordingly, best understood as termini of a continuum of affectivity, along which one's position can change, perhaps on a daily basis, perhaps on an hourly one, perhaps less, perhaps more. We can imagine a middle point on that continuum, to one side of which are the many degrees of *apatheia*, starting with the most imperfect and leading to the most perfect, and, on the other side, the corresponding degrees of *empathēia*. That there is a point at which *apatheia* and *empathēia* merge into one another, that both are matters of degree and that we can move between them any number of times, are all expressions of the mutability and movement that characterise corporeal creation. In particular, since *apatheia* and *empathēia* are properties of the soul, their fluidity in relation to one another, and the fluidity of our experience of them, reflects the fact that movement and change are intrinsic to soul.

So can perfect *apatheia* ever be attained during earthly life; that is, can a person ever find herself right at the *apatheia* end of the continuum of affectivity? I see no reason to suppose that it cannot,³⁶¹ nor, *pace* Rasmussen, that in earthly life it can only be attained during prayer.³⁶² Nor is there any logical reason why it cannot become permanent during earthly life. There is, however, overwhelming metaphysical reason, in that sooner or later the body is bound to recall our attention.³⁶³ In any case, it could never be assumed that a state of *apatheia* currently being enjoyed would endure permanently. At the *apokatastasis*, however, perfect *apatheia* will be permanent, because for the *pathē* there will one day be complete destruction.³⁶⁴ It follows that imperfect *apatheia* can never be permanent.³⁶⁵

³⁶¹ Hence I am in agreement with Bunge (1986: 125); Linge (2000: 563), and Rasmussen (2005: 159), *pace* Guillaumont (1989: 27).

³⁶² Cf. Rasmussen (2005: 160).

³⁶³ Although again this would depend upon the physiology of fasting.

³⁶⁴ Cf. *Prakt.* 87.

³⁶⁵ *Pace* Rasmussen (2005: 159).

There remains one last aspect to discuss of the gradual nature of the attainment of *apatheia*. We have seen that in both the Prologue to the *Praktikos* and at *Praktikos* 81 Evagrius describes love as the ‘offspring’ of *apatheia*. Yet elsewhere he speaks of love as preceding *apatheia*:

Ἀναχώρησις ἐν ἀγάπῃ καθαίρει καρδίαν,
ἀναχώρησις δὲ μετὰ μίσους ἐκταράσσει αὐτήν.³⁶⁶

Anachoresis in love purifies the heart;
anachoresis in hate agitates it.

Since purity of heart is *apatheia*, if love purifies the heart then love must come before *apatheia*, so how can it also be its ‘offspring’? The answer should by now be clear. As *apatheia* is gradually attained, so too is love, and just as the attainment of *apatheia* is cumulative, so too is that of love. So the more the anchorite progresses in *apatheia*, the more his anachoresis will be informed by love, which in turn will help him progress further in *apatheia* – in other words, a virtuous circle will operate. The question of whether love or *apatheia* ultimately comes first in the chronology of the spiritual ascent is moot, and they are probably best thought of as going hand in hand:

The following passage summarises the relation of love to the virtues and to *apatheia* and reminds us that joy as well as love is intrinsic to Evagrian *apatheia*. The ‘intelligible sun’, it will be recalled, is ‘the rational nature which contains in itself the first and blessed light³⁶⁷ in which are encompassed knowledge, love and all of the virtues, while the sun is also a symbol of Christ, the ‘sun of righteousness’.³⁶⁸ The ‘light that shines into the heavens’ is that of the pure *nous*, the image of God:

Πιστοὶ οὖν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σπουδάσωμεν, ἵνα καὶ εἰς τὴν μητρόπολιν τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀγάπην προκόπτωμεν, ὡς ἥλιος ταῖς χρυσαυγέσιν ἀκτίσιν ἀπάσῃ προσμειδιᾷ τῇ γῆ, οὕτως ἀγάπη ταῖς φωταυγέσι πράξεσιν ἀπάσῃ προσχαίρει ψυχῇ ἥνπερ ἐὰν κατὰσχωμεν, τὰ πάθη ἐσβέσαμεν καὶ εἰς οὐρανοὺς ἐλάμψωμεν.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁶ *AM* 8.

³⁶⁷ *KG* 3.44; see above, 3.2.

³⁶⁸ *Mal.* 3:20; see above, 3.2.

³⁶⁹ *Eul.* 30.32.

Let us hasten then to be faithful in the truth that we may advance to love, the metropolis of the virtues. As the sun smiles upon the entire earth with its gleaming golden rays, so love with its luminescent actions gives joy to the entire soul. If we have indeed acquired love, we have extinguished the *pathē* and have let our light shine into the heavens.

3.5 Summary: *apatheia* in the teachings of Evagrius Ponticus

This chapter began by establishing that, strictly speaking, the subject of *apatheia* is the tripartite soul considered as a whole. Section 3.1 then argued for the proposition, first noted in Chapter One, that *apatheia* is the stable movement of the soul,³⁷⁰ that is, its movement toward God, and also noted several proofs of *apatheia* mentioned by Evagrius.

Section 3.2 considered *apatheia* as ‘death and resurrection.’ As virtue and purity of soul *apatheia* is the ‘death’ of the ‘old self’ with its immersion in sensible reality and impure desires. Since the purification of the soul involves rising above the body’s ‘nature’, ‘movements’ and ‘attributes’ *apatheia* is also the ‘death’ of the ‘corruptible body’, the *sōma psuchikon*. As the ‘death’ of the ‘old self’ and ‘corruptible body’ *apatheia* functions as a fortification by protecting its possessor from the assaults of the *logismoi*, since although she will still experience them, insofar as she is *apathēs* she will be immune to their potential attractions; in other words, the soul of the *apathēs* will ‘derive no evil from its flesh.’ As the ‘death’ of the ‘corruptible body’ *apatheia* is the basis for its ‘resurrection’ in the form of the ‘spiritual body’, the *sōma pneumatikon*, and so of incorruptibility. This ‘resurrection’ is jointly constituted by the ‘resurrections’ of the body, the soul and the *nous* as ‘body and soul are raised to the order of the *nous*’ and the *nous* is thereby re-unified. The re-unified *nous* or ‘spiritual body’ ‘glows like the sun’ since it ‘contains in itself the first and blessed light.’

Section 3.3 began by noting Evagrius’ characterisation of this ‘triple resurrection’ with reference to the ‘bond of peace’ which is *apatheia* in the form of its ‘positive aspect’, love. The *apathēs* was seen to be the ‘new self’ in whom the healing of the internal di-

³⁷⁰ See above, 1.1.2.

visions of the *nous* by the ‘physician of souls’ is matched by the healing of external divisions, and that accordingly true *apatheia* consists not in the absence of desire but in seeing all people as ‘messengers of God’ and loving them like oneself. It was then noted that through love *apatheia* makes knowledge possible, not only that of transcendent realities but also practical moral knowledge, the exercise of which extends to our interior worlds such that, no longer seeing the world solely in terms of her desires and on their basis constituting *kata dianoian* fictional worlds in which they can be satisfied, the *apathēs* conducts herself virtuously within as well as without. This means that her *nous* becomes freed from ‘domestic disturbance’ and so enabled to ascend, by means of contemplation and prayer, the ‘ladder’ of corporeal creation back to union with God, in which process it becomes ‘completely like light.’

To this description of *apatheia* can now be added the findings of Section 1.2.2 regarding the action according to nature of the three parts of the soul, which, it was noted at the time, amounted to a description of the *apathēs* soul. In the *apathēs* – that is, healthy – soul, the function of the rational part was seen to be contemplation, along with the management of practical affairs so as to facilitate it, which can now be seen to include the practical moral knowledge bestowed by *apatheia*, and also inner watchfulness and the ‘shepherding’ of the *noēmata*. The *thumos* likewise has a dual function: on the one hand to struggle on the soul’s behalf against the demons using anger along with virtues such as courage and perseverance, and on the other hand, to be a source of love, gentleness, patience, mildness and humility. The preserve of the *epithumētikon* was seen to be spiritual desire, together with temperance, self-control and chastity.

Section 3.4 completed the picture of *apatheia* by summarising how it is attained, noting that some aspects of this had already been covered in the course of previous discussions, while others would be passed over. It then focused on the cultivation of inner watchfulness and discernment, which was seen to be essential both to the attainment of *apatheia* and to its preservation. It noted that this consists not only in various forms of vigilance in respect of demonic attack or predispositions to particular *pathē*, but also in the need for the rational part of the soul to assume the role of the ‘good shepherd’ in respect of the *noēmata*, aided by the *epithumētikon* and *thumos*. After this Evagrius’ distinction between ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ *apatheia* was discussed and it was noted that perfect

apatheia will tend to be relatively short-lived and that consequently talk about *apatheia* in a dispositional rather than occurrent sense will normally be about imperfect *apatheia*. Then the gradual and cumulative nature of attainment of *apatheia* was discussed. Finally it was noted that as well as being a consequence and proof of the attainment of *apatheia*, love is also essential to the process of attaining it, a dual role that reflects the gradual nature of that process.

In sum, Evagrian *apatheia* is, in spiritual terms, the orientation of the soul toward God, and in psychological terms, stability. It endows its possessor with peace, spiritual pleasure and joy; is constituted by the virtues, and is manifested above all as spiritual love and knowledge.

Conclusion

The concept of *apatheia* is central to the teachings of Evagrius Ponticus. This thesis has examined that concept by situating it within its cosmological context as well as by analysing it in anthropological, psychological and spiritual terms.

The first section focused upon Evagrius' cosmology. It began by outlining his vision of the creation and fall of the *logikoi* and of the hierarchical structure and therapeutic nature of corporeal creation. The centrality of movement to his schema was remarked, stable movement being movement toward God, and unstable movement, movement away from him, and it was noted that he construes *apatheia* as the stable movement of the soul. His understanding of corporeal creation as a 'ladder' upon which the fallen *noes* can, by means of transformative contemplation, ascend back to union with God, was described, along with his likening of corporeal creation to a 'letter' from God to the fallen *noes*, which is 'read' by means of contemplation. It was noted that *apatheia* is the stable movement of the soul, and the foundation for, and a necessary condition of, the contemplative ascent. The anthropology section began by focusing on the *nous*. It discussed the origin and scope of its passibility, seeing how this is manifested in both epistemic and metaphysical contexts, the causal interdependence of which were noted, and also the true nature of the *nous* as the incorporeal image of the incorporeal God. The following section described the three parts of the soul in terms of their action according to nature and thereby comprised a *de facto* description of the *apathēs* soul. Next Evagrius' understanding of the body was examined and it was argued that he believes *pathos* to have a physical foundation in the form of excessive vital heat, and that accordingly the elimination of this by dietary restriction constitutes the physical foundation of *apatheia* and also the means by which the *krasis* of the body, and so the body itself, is transformed, a transformation which is both the foundation for and the correlate of the contemplative transformation of the soul. It was remarked that because of the effects of this upon the body a distinction between 'spiritual' and 'profane' understandings of physical health is implicit in Evagrius' thought. The chapter concluded by considering what Evagrius means by the term 'heart', since 'purity of heart' is one of his characterisations of *apatheia*.

Chapter Two focused upon the psychology and phenomenology of *empathēia*, the sickly condition of the soul which, on Evagrius' analysis, is our lot until we restore it to *apatheia*, its health and our natural state. It began by looking at the *logismoi*, asking what Evagrius means by this term, noting the broad scope with which he endows it but that *logismoi* always have *pathos* embedded in them, and proposing a definition of the term *logismos* in his usage, before explaining Evagrius' concept of the 'matter' of the *logismoi*. Next came a consideration of his eightfold classification of 'most generic *logismoi*'. First each *logismos* was considered in turn, and a number of examples cited from the *Antirrhētikos*. This revealed the sort of phenomena that Evagrius regards as *pathē* and, and also how the *logismoi* destabilise the movements of the soul, this destabilisation being the psychological expression of excessive vital heat. Then Evagrius' rationale for the sequence of the eightfold classification was examined, first in terms of the derivation of the *logismoi* from the parts of the soul, it being concluded that for the most part there is no straightforward relation between them and that this reflects the lack of a clear boundary between the cognitive and the affective in Evagrius' psychology; and, second, in terms of the way in which the *logismoi* are experienced, both day-to-day and through a person's lifetime, it being concluded that although the sequence is largely conventional, it also maps the progression from the most primitive ways of erring in our interaction with the external world to the most sophisticated. The second part of the chapter focused upon *pathos*. It began with an overview of how *pathos* was understood within Greek philosophy, in particular orthodox Stoicism, and also by Origen, before turning to Evagrius' understanding of it. It was seen that for him *pathos* is the psychological expression of an excess of vital heat. It involves an attachment to the external world that is excessive and therefore idolatrous and makes the *nous* prey to the multiplicity and changeability of the external world, in consequence of which it is the unstable movement of the soul. It is injurious because it distances us from God, but falls within the scope of our self-determination, hence the possibility of our attaining *apatheia*. The wide range of desires, emotions, moods and other phenomena that Evagrius considers to be *pathē* was noted. It then turned to the cognitive 'building blocks' of the *logismoi*, the *empathē noēmata*, examining what they are, how they are formed and how they 'bind' the *nous* to the sensible world. The following section focused upon Evagrius' analysis of the arousal of *pathos*. It was noted that the *logismoi* arise from a disposition to *pathos*, of which three levels were identified, and that the longer a person

allows a *logismos* to linger in his awareness the more likely it is to arouse a fresh episode of *pathos*, but that even if it does so he still retains the capacity to abstain from acting it out; that is, from sin, whether *kata dianoian* or *kat' energeian*. The final section of Chapter Two described the *empathēs nous* from an experiential standpoint, noting the affective and cognitive instability and epistemic distortion that characterise *empathēia*.

The first two chapters having established the cosmological, anthropological and psychological contexts of *apatheia*, Chapter Three focused upon *apatheia* itself. It began by establishing that, strictly speaking, the subject of *apatheia* is the tripartite soul considered in its entirety. It then established that, as noted in the first chapter, *apatheia* is the stable movement of the *nous* and as such is characterised by gentleness and tranquillity. It also noted some of the proofs of *apatheia* mentioned by Evagrius. The second section then considered *apatheia* as 'death' and 'resurrection', starting from its consisting in the separation of the soul from the body. For Evagrius this means the soul's raising itself and the body above the attributes of the latter, such that the person 'dies' in respect of the corruptible *sōma psuchikon* - her attachments to the external world and the 'impure desires' arising from them; accordingly, *apatheia* is 'purity of heart'. *Apatheia* was seen to protect its possessor from the *logismoi*, not because she no longer experiences them but because they no longer hold any attraction for her. It was also seen to be the starting point for the cultivation of the 'spiritual body'; since this is the re-unified *nous* this is in fact another way of saying that it is the foundation of the contemplative ascent. *Apatheia* was also seen to bestow phenomenological incorruptibility and immortality – that is, detachment from the body – and perhaps also a measure of physical incorruptibility through the alteration of the body's *krasis* by means of fasting. Finally, it was noted that for Evagrius the cultivation of the 'spiritual body' is constituted by a 'triple resurrection', namely that of the body, the soul and the *nous* itself. The third section of Chapter Three considered *apatheia* as love and knowledge. It began by noting that another way in which Evagrius characterises the re-unification of the *nous* is with reference to the 'bond of peace' of Eph. 4:3, that bond being love, the 'positive aspect' of *apatheia*. As a consequence of love the *apathēs* was seen to be the 'new self' who no longer sees other people in terms of social categorisations but as 'angels of God' whom she 'loves as herself'. The role of faith in the attainment of *apatheia* was noted. *Via* love, *apatheia* was seen to endow its possessor both with knowledge of transcendent realities and with

practical moral knowledge. The holistic nature of spiritual knowledge as understood by Evagrius was emphasised, a holism consisting partly in love's being intrinsic to it and partly in its profoundly embodied nature, given that Evagrius' talk of detaching the soul from the body refers not to the physical body *per se* but to its corruptible form. The final section of the chapter focused on how *apatheia* is attained, and in particular on the cultivation of inner watchfulness and discernment. These were seen to be necessary not only in relation to resisting temptation and warding off demonic attack but also in the 'shepherding' of the contents of the *nous*. Then Evagrius' distinction between 'perfect' and 'imperfect' *apatheia* was discussed and the gradual nature of the acquisition of *apatheia* noted. Finally, it was noted that as well as being an expression of *apatheia*, love is essential to its attainment.

In sum, Evagrian *apatheia* involves the whole person - body, soul and *nous* - in a process of transformation in which psychological and spiritual instability, fragmentation and isolation are replaced by stability and unity, effected by, and manifesting in, love, which in turn both enables, and is partly constitutive of, spiritual knowledge. Despite the deprivations Evagrian *askēsis* inflicts upon the physical body, he does not devalue the latter; he does, though, construe it in terms of a Platonising metaphysics and anthropology according to which incorporeality is superior to corporeality, and because of this he aims to make the body less 'corporeal'. However, since what is essential to Evagrian *apatheia* in respect of the body is the latter's 'spiritualisation' through 'purification' rather than the specific form of that purification, it should in principle be possible to re-interpret Evagrian *apatheia* in terms of a more benign anthropology and a different account of the relation between physiology and psychology without sacrificing anything essential to it. Finally, the profound optimism of Evagrius' anthropology, given that he believes *apatheia* to be the natural state of the human being and to be in principle attainable – with God's help – by anyone, is worthy of note.

Abbreviations

Works by Evagrius

<i>8Th.</i>	<i>On the Eight Thoughts</i>
<i>33Ch.</i>	<i>Thirty-Three Ordered Chapters</i>
<i>AM</i>	<i>To Monks in Monasteries and Communities (Ad Monachos)</i>
<i>AV</i>	<i>Exhortation to a Virgin (Ad Virginem)</i>
<i>Ant.</i>	<i>Antirrhêtikos</i>
<i>Disc.</i>	<i>The Chapters of the Disciples of Evagrius</i>
<i>Ep.Fid.</i>	<i>Epistula Fidei</i>
<i>Eul.</i>	<i>To Eulogios: On the Confession of Thoughts and Counsel in their Regard</i>
<i>Exh.</i>	<i>Exhortations to Monks</i>
<i>Found.</i>	<i>Foundations of the Monastic Life: A Presentation of the Practice of Stillness</i>
<i>Gnost.</i>	<i>Gnostikos</i>
<i>Gt.Let.</i>	<i>Great Letter (Letter to Melania)</i>
<i>KG</i>	<i>Kephalaia Gnostika</i>
<i>Let.</i>	<i>Letters 1-64</i>
<i>Prakt.</i>	<i>Praktikos</i>
<i>Pry.</i>	<i>Chapters on Prayer</i>
<i>Rfl.</i>	<i>Reflections</i>
<i>Sch. n on Eccl. n:n</i>	<i>Scholion (number in Géhin) on Ecclesiastes (chapter: verse)</i>
<i>Sch. n on Prov. n:n</i>	<i>Scholion (number in Géhin) on Proverbs (chapter: verse)</i>
<i>Sch. n on Ps. n:n</i>	<i>Scholion (number) on Psalms (chapter: verse)</i>
<i>Th.</i>	<i>On Thoughts</i>
<i>Vices</i>	<i>[To Eulogios] On the Vices opposed to the Virtues</i>

Other Abbreviations

<i>C.Cant.</i>	<i>Origen, Commentary on the Song of Songs (Commentarium in Cant. Canticorum)</i>
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<i>C.Matt.</i>	Origen, <i>Commentary on Matthew (Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei)</i>
<i>Conf.</i>	Cassian, <i>Conferences</i>
<i>Confess.</i>	Augustine, <i>Confessions</i>
<i>DA</i>	Aristotle, <i>De Anima</i>
<i>DM</i>	Aristotle, <i>On the Movement of Animals (De Motu Animalium)</i>
<i>DP</i>	Origen, <i>On First Principles (De Principiis)</i>
<i>De Opf.</i>	Gregory of Nyssa, <i>De opificio hominis</i>
<i>EN</i>	Aristotle, <i>Nicomachean Ethics (Ethica Nicomachea)</i>
<i>Ench.</i>	Epictetus, <i>Enchiridion</i>
<i>Enn.</i>	Plotinus, <i>Enneads 1-9</i>
<i>Gorg.</i>	Plato, <i>Gorgias</i>
<i>HL</i>	Palladius, <i>Historia Lausiaca</i>
<i>LS</i>	Long & Sedley, <i>The Hellenistic Philosophers</i>
<i>Met.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Metaphysics</i>
<i>Phd.</i>	Plato, <i>Phaedo</i>
<i>Phdr.</i>	Plato, <i>Phaedrus</i>
<i>PHP</i>	Galen, <i>On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis)</i>
<i>Rep.</i>	Plato, <i>Republic</i>
<i>Strom.</i>	Clement of Alexandria, <i>Stromateis</i>
<i>SVF</i>	H von Arnim, <i>Stoicorum veterum fragmenta</i>
<i>Symp.</i>	Plato, <i>Symposium</i>
<i>Theaet.</i>	Plato, <i>Theaetetus</i>
<i>Tim.</i>	Plato, <i>Timaeus</i>
<i>TLG</i>	<i>Thesaurus Linguae Graecae</i>
<i>VA</i>	Athanasius, <i>Life of Antony (Vita Antonii)</i>

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