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On transparency in organizations

Jehiel, P.; (2010) On transparency in organizations. (ELSE Working Papers 371). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access

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Non-transparency both in the form of incomplete information disclosure and in the form of coarse feedback disclosure is optimal in virtual all organizational arrangements of interest. Speci�cally, in moral hazard interactions, some form of non-transparency is always desirable, as soon as the dimensionality of the problem exceeds the dimensionality of the action spaces of the various agents.

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: On transparency in organizations
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2010
Language: English
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/19477
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