UCL Discovery
UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

Endogenous political institutions

Aghion, P.; Alesina, A.; Trebbi, F.; (2004) Endogenous political institutions. Quarterly Journal of Economics , 119 (2) pp. 565-611. 10.1162/0033553041382148. Green open access

[thumbnail of 17704.pdf]
Preview
PDF
17704.pdf

Download (169kB)

Abstract

A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice, we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyze both “optimal” constitutional design and “positive” aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.

Type: Article
Title: Endogenous political institutions
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1162/0033553041382148
Publisher version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/0033553041382148
Language: English
Additional information: © 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Please see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/17789/ for the working paper version
Keywords: Political
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/17704
Downloads since deposit
1,279Downloads
Download activity - last month
Download activity - last 12 months
Downloads by country - last 12 months

Archive Staff Only

View Item View Item