Armstrong, M.;
Vickers, J.;
Zhou, J.;
(2009)
Consumer protection and the incentive to become informed.
Journal of the European Economic Association
, 7
(2-3)
pp. 399-410.
10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.399.
![[thumbnail of 17509.pdf]](https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) Preview |
PDF
17509.pdf Download (655kB) |
Abstract
We discuss the impact of consumer protection policies on consumers' incentives to become informed of the best deals available in the market. In a market with costly information acquisition, we find that imposing a cap on suppliers' prices reduces the incentive to become informed of market conditions, with the result that prices paid by consumers (both informed and uninformed) may rise. In a related model where consumers have the ability to refuse to receive marketing, we find that this ability softens price competition and can make all consumers worse off.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Consumer protection and the incentive to become informed |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.399 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.399 |
| Language: | English |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/17509 |
Loading...
Loading...Loading...Loading...Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
