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Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game

Spiegler, R; (2004) Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game. GAME ECON BEHAV , 47 (1) 200 - 220. 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00180-5. Green open access

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Abstract

I explore the idea of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion in games. A pair of strategies in finite-automata representation (s(1), s(2)) is a Simple Nash Equilibrium (SINE) if: (1) s(j) is a best-reply to s(i); (2) every automaton for player j, which generates the same path as s(j) (given s(i)), has at least as many states as s(j). I apply SINE to a bilateral concession game and show that it captures an aspect of bargaining behavior: players employ delay tactics in order to justify their concessions. Delay tactics are mutually reinforcing, and this may prevent players from reaching an interior agreement. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Type: Article
Title: Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00180-5
Keywords: Nash equilibrium, complexity, justifiability, bargaining, delay, FINITE AUTOMATA PLAY, EQUILIBRIUM, COMPLEXITY
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/17306
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