UCL Discovery
UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions

Jehiel, P; Moldovanu, B; (2001) A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions. Economics Bulletin , 3 (1) Green open access

[img]
Preview
PDF
16653.pdf

Download (153kB)

Abstract

Combining the result of Palfrey (1983) about the role of bundling and the revenue equivalence theorem, this note shows that there is a conflict between revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions even with symmetric bidders.

Type: Article
Title: A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of SandHS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/16653
Downloads since deposit
420Downloads
Download activity - last month
Download activity - last 12 months
Downloads by country - last 12 months

Archive Staff Only

View Item View Item