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Reputation and commitment in two-person repeated games without discounting

Cripps, M.W.; Thomas, J.; (1995) Reputation and commitment in two-person repeated games without discounting. Econometrica , 63 (6) pp. 1401-1419. Green open access

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Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the players. If there is a possibility that a player is an automaton committed to a particular pure or mixed stage-game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analyzed the restricted class of conflicting interest games.

Type: Article
Title: Reputation and commitment in two-person repeated games without discounting
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2171775
Language: English
Additional information: The copyright to this article is held by the Econometric Society, http://www.econometricsociety.org. It may be downloaded, printed and reproduced only for personal or classroom use. Absolutely no downloading or copying may be done for, or on behalf of, any for-profit commercial firm or other commercial purpose without the explicit permission of the Econometric Society. For this purpose, contact Claire Sashi, General Manager, at sashi@econometricsociety.org. This article is available via subscription at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2171775
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/16389
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