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Abstract:
This article examines the relationship between gender, state-building and military reform after the Mexican Revolution. It argues that military reform was one of the most visible and politically significant attempts by the new regime to dictate gender in the interests of national development and uphold sexual differences— that is, to modernize patriarchy. The article identifies the main phases in policies aimed at reshaping military habits, comportment, sociability, physique, and family life. Reform reflected broader trends in Mexican politics and social policy, and faced abundant obstacles: the army was powerful, secretive, riven by factional, generational and ethnic divisions, and officers and soldiers clung to their own ideas about work, family life and leisure. Nevertheless, by the 1950s, military reform had successfully reshaped gender roles in military families, moderated officers’ public behavior, and produced a more disciplined and physically fitter soldiery. These changes helped to reshape the army’s public image in lasting ways.
In 1937, Colonel Adrián Cravioto published an etiquette manual for the officers of Mexico’s postrevolutionary army. Military men were to abstain from excessive drinking or smoking, shun gambling and the brothel, avoid slouching and eating food in the street, and hone their physical strength through exercise. They were to avoid corporal punishment where possible and foster an internalized self-discipline based on a sense of patriotic duty. Personal ties were also to be carefully managed; friendships, ties of fictive kinship – *compadrazgo* – and gift-giving across ranks were to be avoided since they undermined military discipline and fostered personalism; once married, military men should foster an orderly, harmonious family life by recognizing their wife’s authority in domestic matters and insulating the home from the strains and “rude and vulgar language” of military life. Cravioto believed that all men were driven by “indomitable” aggressive instincts- “the animal that we all carry around inside of us”- but that such practices could foster the necessary self-discipline and forge a cohesive institution which Cravioto likened to a “great family of brothers” with a “common father called duty” and a “loving but energetic mother called discipline.” However, officers must also be careful that the domestication of aggression did not lead to decadence. To use aftershave while in uniform, or wear “small chains as anklets, to curl one’s hair, remove body hair...and do other things currently considered stylish, reveals a feminization that is in conflict with manliness...above all, with that of a military man.” ¹

Mexico’s revolutionary leaders, like those elsewhere, aspired to create new men and women, and military officers were no exception. Cravioto’s manual was unusually detailed and had its quirks: body-wax and aftershave were not conspicuous concerns in other manuals.
of the time. However, Cravioto was hardly a marginal figure; he taught cadet officers in Mexico’s Military College, wrote dozens of articles in military magazines, was entrusted with quelling political dissent in the army in the tense 1940 presidential election, and he shared his general objectives with a diverse group of postrevolutionary military reformers. Above all, these reformers wanted a loyal army immune to Mexico’s tradition of barracks revolts and coups. In the mid-1930s, military officials briefly sought to foment an overtly political identity in the military, based explicitly on notions of class consciousness and solidarity with the masses. However, as we can see in Cravioto’s manual, they also aimed for cultural changes to habits, comportment, sociability, physique and family life which are not reducible to class or a disinclination to revolt. At the time, reformers usually conceptualized this effort as a pursuit of moralization or, as above, “manliness.” We can helpfully conceptualize these aspects of policy as attempts to reshape gender, using the two-part definition popularized by Joan Scott. Reformers clearly aimed to impose normative roles for men and women, and the definitions of masculinity and femininity that underpinned them. Moreover, in doing so they occasionally used gendered language in Scott’s second sense, as a way of signifying other “relations of power” between and among ranks in the army. Military reformers’ general aims (self-discipline, patriotism, fitness, sobriety, male-headed families) and many specific policies and techniques (schooling, sports, radio) echoed those historians have identified in various civilian agencies. Mexican teachers, doctors and welfare officials were similarly engaged in efforts to reform gender roles in the interests of national integration and development while upholding sexual difference and inequality— that is, to “modernize patriarchy.”

How did the military attempt to reshape gender across the ranks and over time? How successful was this project? To answer these questions, this article examines how reformers pursued their general objectives in practise, tracing the main phases in military policies and
institutions, before offering an assessment of overall impact by the 1950s - a decade usually seen as the culmination of military reform. Military policies shifted in response to the wider context of Mexican politics and social policy, along with the abundant obstacles reformers met: the army was powerful, secretive, riven by factional, generational and ethnic divisions, and officers and soldiers clung to their own ideas about work, family life and leisure. Nevertheless, by the 1950s, military reform had successfully reshaped gender roles in military families, moderated officers’ public behavior, and produced a more disciplined and physically fitter soldiery. For all its unevenness, military reform was one of the most visible and politically important efforts to modernize patriarchy conducted by Mexico’s postrevolutionary state.

This article bridges and contributes to two historiographies which rarely intersect. Scholarship on the military has long been dominated by the postrevolutionary government’s most obvious achievement: the avoidance of coups or serious military rebellions after 1929. An older literature argued that the government achieved this by gradually implementing a long-sighted effort to professionalize the army and move it out of politics. More recent analyses have emphasized policy variations, the army’s multifaceted role in the political system – in the cabinet, in the provinces, as a police force- and the uneven, pacted nature of civilian dominance after 1946. A deeper look at the internal life of the military builds on these analyses and puts sub rosa political dynamics further into relief: officers’ autonomy, and various administrations’ attempts to placate and control military factions, were one of the most important obstacles to cultural reform. A military perspective also enhances our understanding of the modernization of patriarchy, studies of which have so far focused on public education, labor and welfare. It corrects exaggerated notions of the military’s power over soldiers’ families found in the few accounts we have on the topic, and contributes to recent efforts to explore competing notions of masculinity- present even within one of the
state’s apparently most monolithic institutions. Finally, it also suggests that one of the most important legacies of the modernization of patriarchy was its effect on the image and legitimacy of state institutions themselves, thus showing how gender history contributes to our understanding of perhaps the dominant theme in scholarship on postrevolutionary Mexico.

The history of life in the postrevolutionary military remains difficult to access. Until recently secondary studies have tended to focus on officers’ role in presidential politics, and the social history of enlisted life was “neglected altogether.” Military vice and corruption were (and are) sensitive topics, and the kind of disciplinary records social historians have put to good use in other contexts are only available in fragments. US diplomatic sources provide a helpful source of information on internal military factions, gossip, and the personal behavior of officers. However, such accounts were sometimes transparently racist or simply ill-informed, and can hardly be taken at face value. (In the 1940s, US ambassador George Messersmith criticized the quality of US military intelligence on Mexico.9) To address these problems, this article draws on an eclectic range of other sources. Often it is necessary to infer ideas about gender from practices. For example, statistics on military discipline and desertions provide one crude but useful way of measuring how people responded to military social engineering. More glimpses of practises and discourse can be gleaned from petitions sent to the Secretary of War and the presidency, reports by Mexican intelligence services, underused collections of memoirs and anecdotes, and complaints which occasionally appear in officers’ service files.10 The reliability of complaints is hard to discern, but the military was a powerful institution which did not welcome (and often actively suppressed) public criticism; in this context, it seems unlikely that complaints, particularly signed ones, were generally undertaken lightly or frivolously. Where these records proved uninformative, the article also draws on national press coverage. By triangulating between these sources, it is
possible to establish a rough narrative of military reform and responses to it. Rather than a definitive account, this article aims to open up the topic to further research, and suggest the benefits of further integrating military and gender histories in a Latin American context.

**Military Reform Under the Sonorans (1920-1934)**

During the 1910s and 1920s, foreign observers produced countless unflattering accounts of Mexico’s revolutionary army. Vice-ridden, disloyal, corrupt, gun-happy, uncouth and filthy officers and soldiers populate press accounts, Hollywood films, and diplomatic reports. In 1927, the US military attaché, searching for analogies, described the manners of the typical Mexican officer as roughly equivalent to those of “a tough New York truck driver,” while the “primitive” soldier “lacks self-control in gambling as well as in the use of intoxicants.” Of course, these images owed a good deal to predictable racial prejudice and political antagonism, but captured something of the dominant codes of masculinity in the revolutionary army. Amelio Robles, a transgender Zapatista colonel, earned recognition in the military precisely because he performed the role of hard-drinking, gun-toting and womanizing military man with aplomb.12

Mexico’s postrevolutionary government protested against denigrating portrayals of the army, but many leaders in the new regime shared similar views. The Sonoran faction who took control of the national government in 1920 viewed the revolutionary army - a diverse coalition of armed peasants, ranchers, middle-class professionals, caudillos, former federal soldiers, cowboys, miners, and smattering of urban workers - with ambivalence. On the one hand, it had defeated the old regime, installed the new one and produced most of the new regime's political leaders. On the other, it was 200,000 strong in 1920, consumed 50% of the federal budget, spawned revolts against the government in 1923-4, 1927 and 1929, and was
riddled with embarrassing vices which new regime aimed to address. For all its achievements, the revolution had “unleashed many primitive men” who indulged in “abuses…and manifestations of abnormality with which all armies arising from revolutions have to contend.”

Most of Cravioto’s ideas about an ideal military man- self-disciplined, fit, sober, and possessed of a stable family life- were articulated in some form or other early on, visible in the flaws the government found in the army, and the institutions they began to create. As Secretary of Defense (1925-1925), General Joaquín Amaro reopened the Military College, the first in a new network of professional officer schools, and launched a very public campaign of military moralization; he also drafted codes on military discipline and promotions, and used these to dismiss those who obviously transgressed appropriate norms: women who had fought in the revolution and claimed military rank, and men who slept with other men or whose effeminacy was widely thought to indicate homosexuality. Under Amaro, the military massively expanded its illustrated magazines and- from the 1930s- radio programs to disseminate military education around the country. Like public school teachers, the Sonoran military elite were convinced that team sports like football, baseball, and basketball could act as civilizing influences on Mexico's lower classes, inculcating self-discipline and team-work, and sought to spread sports beyond the traditional preserve of the officer corps. In 1925, President Calles himself posed for the press and kicked off a football match for enlisted men. In the early 1930s, as a national temperance campaign gathered steam, military lectures and magazines likewise emphasized the dangers of alcohol.

However, the new regime’s capacity to mould military life was very limited. Buffeted by repeated military and popular rebellions, the state enjoyed little authority or institutional capacity, and cultural reform was secondary to achieving basic political stability. With some justification, many condemned Amaro’s dismissals from the army as driven by political
favouritism or a need to slim the payroll, rather than any moral consistency.\textsuperscript{19} As among state employees as a whole, new benefits and incentives like pensions focused at first on a narrow group of professionals: officers.\textsuperscript{20} An even smaller proportion of officers were exposed to new education facilities. The experiences and voices of enlisted men are difficult to recover, still less exactly what they thought about military notions of masculinity, but many rendered an eloquent verdict simply by deserting: desertion rates were as high as 50\% during the Cristero War of 1926-9, although they steadily declined to 16\% by 1935 as the military likely benefitted from the end of Cristero War and a contracting labour market.\textsuperscript{21} Military publications may have advocated self-discipline but, in response to fragile state authority, many officers relied on harsh punishments. Amaro himself oversaw the massacre of unarmed rebel officers in 1927 at Huitzilac, and earned a reputation as a brutal disciplinarian.\textsuperscript{22}

On top of these difficulties, those officers concerned with reforming the military were a heterogeneous group, and tensions exited among them. The Sonorans initially relied heavily on officers trained under the old regime- so-called ex-federals- because they “knew a lot about numbers, correspondence, and paperwork,” who were increasingly joined by upwardly-mobile revolutionary autodidacts, chief among them Amaro.\textsuperscript{23} The son of Zacatecas peons, by the late 1920s Amaro had mastered polo, absorbed military doctrine and administrative techniques, and could discuss both topics in fluent French.\textsuperscript{24} Amaro also sent younger officers on brief forays abroad to observe European and Latin American armies, although they were wary of imitating foreign models. Rubén García, an attaché close to Amaro, admired the Chilean army but found it rigid and overly “teutonic”: “Everything here is German, they even want to think like Germans.” In Cuba, he was suspicious of heavy US influence, but nevertheless admired the country’s shooting clubs and claimed that “one never sees a drunk soldier.”\textsuperscript{25} One early conflict among reformers concerned the kind of historical identity to be taught to officers. While some revolutionary officers wanted a total break with
the older institution which they deemed elitist, ex-federal officers successfully argued that cadets should see themselves as continuing in the best traditions of the old college.\textsuperscript{26} The disciplinary excesses of Amaro and others also sowed unease among reformers, including a young Colonel Cravioto.\textsuperscript{27} At the same time, out in the provinces independent commanders began to improvise their own \textit{ad hoc} reforms- new barracks buildings, training and sports facilities, schools - some of which became national policy in the 1930s.

The case of the \textit{soldaderas}- female camp-followers- offers a good illustration of some of the disagreements among reformers, and the obstacles to remaking the men (and women) who sustained enlisted service. Soldiers lived in dirty, disease-ridden improvised barracks alongside thousands of soldaderas who cooked, secured supplies, nursed the wounded, sold sexual services, buried the dead, scavenged for food, built makeshift shelters, entered common-law marriages with soldiers, and generally worked as a \textit{de facto} quartermaster corp. According to General Gustavo Salas, some (unnamed) revolutionary officers defended the soldadera “system” and considered it an “excellent” and cheap way of provisioning the army and upholding morale.\textsuperscript{28} However, like modernizing Porfirian officers before them, most of the Sonoran military elite considered soldaderas an embarrassing problem embodying the backwardness of the army; they condemned soldaderas for resisting discipline, impeding rapid movement, spreading disease, fostering brawls between jealous men, introducing alcohol and marijuana into the barracks, and spending their husbands’ pay frivolously on unhealthy “cheap sweets.” Soldaderas also alienated respectable society with their promiscuity and “extremely vulgar vocabulary.” \textsuperscript{29} (The revolutionary boss Gonzalo N. Santos boasted that he was able to concoct insults “that would make even the most marijuana-addled of soldaderas blush.” \textsuperscript{30}) Language aside, soldaderas disrupted entrenched notions of respectable femininity and public and private space; they performed traditional domestic tasks (buying food, cooking, sewing, and raising children) but did these roving
wherever necessary—on trains, in plazas, in communal barracks quarters—occupying no clearly demarcated domestic space. (Salas likened them to a “plague of locusts.”) Many regarded them simply as a kind of prostitute, despite being obviously indispensable for the patriotic work of the military. Indeed, underpinning soldaderas’ notorious lack of deference was the relative power they enjoyed as the military’s only means of feeding and maintaining its troops.

Amaro’s initial policy was draconian and echoed the long-standing assumption that soldiering in the federal army was for those single men unwilling or unable to support legitimate families. In 1925, he simply banned soldaderas from the barracks, and withheld military recognition from the common-law unions which dominated enlisted life. However, contrary to some accounts, without a functioning quartermaster corps or a massive influx of new recruits the ban largely proved a dead letter; many regional commanders simply ignored it, and soldaderas still accompanied soldiers around the country on major military deployments.

After the military announced its moralization drive, Amaro was inundated with hundreds of petitions which vividly illustrate the hopes reform raised and the military’s inability or unwillingness to adequately address them. One mother urged Amaro to send her son—now a drunk and gambler after 17 years service—to a sanatorium so he could return as “a good servant to the Patria and to his mother.” Jesusa S. Vda. de Alvarez praised Amaro’s efforts to “moralize the entire army,” and urged him to force her abusive military lodger to pay rent. Others complained of rape, homicide, or of sons and brothers recruited underage or against their will.

Most complaints came from women and children condemning officers’ infidelity and their failure to support families, encouraged by Amaro’s promise that the “National Army and each of its members should be a model of order.” Maria Antonia Fornes complained that
her husband Colonel Rafael López abandoned her and stole her property in Mérida- including machinery for a sewing workshop, 26 acres of land, and 47 head of cattle- while the “regular authorities seem to be scared of his military rank.” 38 Like many others, Maria F. de Acosta appealed to Amaro as a kind of benevolent patriarch, drawing on Mexico's well-established “patriarchal voice of republican motherhood”: “I know you are a just man… and very devoted to your hearth and your own children, and I hope that due to the love you have for them you can do something for me.” 39 At the same time, single women carefully tried to deflect common stereotypes of immorality or irresponsibility. Beatriz Nava de Cardona admitted she had been foolish not demand a civil marriage in addition to a religious ceremony, “which most women in our ignorance consider most important.” Magdalena Cordero insisted she supported the two children fathered by an officer in “an honorable way, by working.” 40 Amaro occasionally appeared responsive; he invited Elisa Arce- “not a fallen woman, simply an unfortunate one”- to a personal audience to discuss her officer husband's refusal to recognize his child. 41 However, most requests seem to have been routinely dismissed as private family matters. 42 Miguel Arrieta asked Amaro to force his father General Domingo Arrieta- a duranguense revolutionary and father of around 50 children- to send money, but was provided only with a street address. 43 On occasion, officers simply laughed petitioning women out of the Ministry of War. 44

**Cardenismo (1934-40)**

After 1935, reformist president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) marginalized the old Sonoran clique, but built on many of their military policies. The major change introduced by Cárdenas concerned the military’s short-lived encouragement of class identity and solidarity, rather than those themes we are conceptualizing under gender per se. Continuities are clear in the
military’s continuing concern with vice, and particularly in Cárdenas’s enthusiasm for sports. In 1934, Cárdenas made teams sports mandatory in the army, along with more traditional calisthenics, organized a military fronton tournament in 1936, and in 1937 created a new medal for military sporting achievement. Through the 1930s provincial commanders steadily increased the number of soccer and baseball pitches, gyms, and basketball courts on military bases, while the Ministry of Defense standardized physical fitness routines and coordinated team sports competitions. Officers were often rumored to take a cut from the construction of sports facilities, but sport was also one of the more appealing aspects of enlisted life, breaking up the monotony of drills and dull lectures. By the end of Cardenás’s term, wherever basketball courts and baseball pitches existed they were “used very enthusiastically by all.” Soldiers’ improving physical condition came to dominate the military’s public image. Again, this began under Amaro, who celebrated the end of the Cristero War in 1929 with a huge sports display at the Balbuena military base in Mexico City. The new Revolution Day, held on November 20 each year, began as a traditional parade of different military units; through the 1930s it morphed into a huge demonstration of the sporting prowess of Mexico’s young men and women, in which soldiers participated alongside civilians. By the late 1930s, military commanders were expected to encourage the local populations in their zones to take up team sports, offering the public training and use of facilities.

However, Cardenista social politics did have some important implications for how the army approached gender among enlisted men. Cárdenas’s policies spreading social benefits and welfare down into the enlisted ranks are usually interpreted as an effort to gain military support and marginalize hostile cliques of officers allied with the Sonorans. For our purposes, just as significant is how they expanded the military’s techniques of socialization, and implicitly shifted the official definition of masculinity for soldiers. Rather than seeking to expel soldaderas and restrict enlisted service to single young men, Cárdenas aimed to
promote loyalty and discipline by stabilizing (and molding) family life. To this end, he built a
network of primary schools in the barracks for soldiers’ children, and founded a system of
social insurance for soldiers. Cárdenas also praised the efforts of some provincial
commanders to build domestic quarters for non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted
families. General Juan Andreu Almazán, Nuevo León’s powerful and independent
commander, had pioneered this approach. Beginning in the late 1920s he designed and built a
new “military city” in Monterrey, which included modest housing for non-commissioned
officers' families and for some selected enlisted men. 48 Rather than living “like nomads” or
in “filthy shacks,” soldiers’ families “now live hygienically: they cook with gas, iron their
clothes and light the room with electricity, and entertain themselves with their own radio set.”
Soldaderas also had their own laundry facilities, and a consumer cooperative for purchasing
food. 49

As with sports, this new concern for enlisted families enjoyed selective support from
below. Leading revolutionary generals were jealous of Almazán’s feted new facilities
because he skimmed the construction contracts, but also because they made him popular
among troops and soldaderas, strengthening his hand in the game of national politics. 50 Some
soldaderas found the transition to unpaid, respectable domesticity difficult, and soldier
families successfully resisted some of the more intrusive, condescending aspects of social
policy. Cárdenas’s schools for soldiers’ children combined primary and vocational education
with lectures on personal hygiene, morality, sports, and class consciousness. In the late-
1930s, the government toned down the social radicalism and anticlericalism in the curriculum
after protests from officers and groups of soldaderas. 51 Most striking, soldier families
successfully defended the legitimacy of longstanding traditions of common-law marriage. In
the 1930s, soldaderas used the women's branch of the revolutionary party's military sector to
demand official recognition of common-law unions for the purpose of military benefits, and in 1939 the government broadened the definition of marriage.\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{The Second World War and the Experiment with Conscription}

The Second World War saw another major shift in the military’s approach to soldiers. Starting in 1942, conscription represented the postrevolutionary state’s single most ambitious attempt to refashion army life and the kind of men it contained and produced. The government used the wartime emergency to justify the policy, which filled roughly a third of the army’s enlisted ranks with 18-year-olds chosen by lottery to serve for a year. However, discussion in military circles of conscription’s possible benefits predated the 1940s, and the objectives were largely domestic. On the one hand conscription would help to inculcate self-discipline and patriotism among young men and heal the social and political divisions of the 1930s. It was also hoped that it could propel ethnic integration in the army and in the nation as a whole. The intersection of military attitudes to gender and race would repay more research. Most officers hailed from the north, identified as white or \textit{mestizo}, and on the whole their attitudes seem to have reflected a general pattern within the new regime. Whereas Porfirian officers had once dusted their faces with whitening powders and sought out pale-skinned cadets for elite units, overt racism and fawning Europhilia fell out of favor.\textsuperscript{53} We find scattered evidence of a rough-hewn military variant of \textit{indigenismo}, as some white and mestizo officers praised the endurance and “warrior spirit” of certain indigenous troops, and indigenous officers burnished the martial credentials of their communities, received medals and public plaudits, and portrayed themselves as indispensable cultural mediators with the national state.\textsuperscript{54} However, scattered notes recognizing indigenous martial virtues were submerged in the dominant theme of assimilation and \textit{mestizaje}, exemplified in
Finally, conscription represented yet another concerted effort to remove the soldaderas; conscript units were supposed to be male-only, and only 18-year-olds who did not support dependents were eligible for lotteries. Indeed, some officers had never reconciled themselves with the new support for soldier families; these included Major Candelario Castillo Romero, a military sports instructor, who wrote to the national press in 1937 to complain about the degrading spectacle presented by soldaderas and urge the introduction of conscription; General Francisco Urquizo (Subsecretary and Secretary of National Defence, 1940-45, 1945-46) also saw the elimination of soldaderas as a key benefit of conscription.

In introducing conscription, the government confronted a suspicious and sometimes openly hostile populace. The policy triggered sporadic rebellions at first, and then widespread civil disobedience. Many people complained that lotteries were corrupt and unfair; others argued that it was intrusive, unnecessary, and an affront to liberal and revolutionary traditions of local autonomy; some argued that military vice and corruption made the army precisely the wrong instrument with which to turn young men into respectable and productive Mexicans. Aware of public hostility, the government scrambled to provide conscripts with more modern facilities and medical services, while remaining volunteers got “whatever quarters happen to be handy.” The military still needed a group of older NCOs to drill conscripts, and it carefully selected and retrained several hundred in more humane disciplinary techniques. These efforts were not entirely in vain, and some conscripts remembered their time in the barracks positively. Some NCOs took new training to heart and even addressed conscripts with the formal “usted.” Gregorio Pérez García remembered that once everyone donned uniforms, “the snappy-dressing posers (pachuco) lost their long hair” and training began, “class divisions disappeared.” Training mirrored that of regular troops: mornings were spent in military drills and field training exercises; the afternoon allowed for classes in literacy, arithmetic, history, and geography. Some learned “self-respect”, “discipline,” and
national history by memorizing names on statues lining Mexico City's Paseo de la Reforma. After their service, a few conscripts claimed to have been transformed by their experience, and wrote to the government to ask for help finding employment commensurate with the skills and self-discipline they had acquired.

Despite their relatively privileged position within the military, conscript barracks remained distinctly unreliable laboratories of military masculinity. The continuing independence of commanding officers produced varying experiences. In Guadalajara, General Jenaro Amezcua reportedly secured excellent food and facilities, soft-pedaled training and—perhaps aware of being ensconced in a Catholic stronghold—even allowed conscripts to attend mass in uniform. One conscript wrote to relatives praising Amezcua's humane command; he claimed to be leading the “life of a millionaire,” and spent each morning and mid-afternoon taking naps. Outside of Guadalajara, many conscripts found military life harsh and distinctly unreformed. Nicolás Soto Oliver wrote an unusually detailed memoir of his time in the barracks in Cuernavaca, where “arbitrariness was the norm”; training did not so much temper aggressive “machismo” as instill it as “the supreme individual value”; officers encouraged bullying and looked on happily as conscripts attacked, stripped and doused one unpopular recruit in motor oil, before humiliating him and “perpetrating all manner of injuries to his testicles.” NCOs remained a mixed bag, but included one outright “sadist.” In Cuernavaca, mestizos mocked and bullied the “flea-ridden,” “illiterate,” and barefoot indigenous conscripts who arrived, and a Lieutenant Colonel Basurto had to step in to act as their “protector.” Tellingly the army decided to put more ambitious plans for national integration on hold. In 1944, it moved indigenous troops from Michoacán to their own battalion in Mexico City, and housed Zapotec conscripts from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in a separate barracks in Oaxaca. Desertion rates picked up again during the Second World War; the military blamed wartime inflation, hostility to
conscription, and labor contractors who reportedly targeted disgruntled, geographically-mobile soldiers as ideal agricultural workers.\textsuperscript{70} (For his part, soldier Luis Quintero blamed his desire to desert and migrate to the United States on older officers who “treated men like slaves” and still tried to impose discipline through “brute force.”) Military officers were careful to hide the details, but it is clear desertions also included “considerable” numbers of conscripts.\textsuperscript{72}

Nor were conscript units insulated from vice and graft. In Cuernavaca, those conscripts who remained learned “some quickly, most slowly, that to be a man here meant to be macho, to drink alcohol, to enjoy prostitution…to be deceitful.” \textsuperscript{73} In Mexico City, conscripts looked on as regular troops and their own NCOs procured marijuana, liquor, and “every other kind of drug” from the poor neighborhood that backed onto the military base, which conscripts nicknamed the “Lost City.” \textsuperscript{74} In Mexico City, sergeants invented spurious debts and tried to overcharge conscripts for cashing cheques. (After several conscripts refused to pay, officers concluded that such ploys would not work on Spanish-speaking, mestizo recruits from Nuevo León- “hombres, not cabrones”- and targeted indigenous southerners instead.) \textsuperscript{75} Some conscripts learned ways to resist or relieve themselves from drills and exercises. In Cuernavaca one became an acknowledged specialist in bribing superior officers; another became an expert in sneaking out of the barracks at night to enjoy the Cuernavaca nightlife; another built up “the biggest trading business in the battalion.” \textsuperscript{76}

Still, overall conscription produced few devotees of army life: in 1944, officers lined conscripts up in Mexico City and asked if they wanted to continue in the ranks and “the unanimous answer was no.” \textsuperscript{77}

During conscription, we can see how the military’s difficulty in recruiting and retaining soldiers demanded a flexible approach to moral shortfalls. Catholic groups urged conscripts to stay away from brothels and seedy cabarets, and set up alternative centers in
which conscripts could socialize, although only about 10 percent attended. The army also stepped up its own propaganda against vice, although it was notable for its pragmatic, even relaxed tone. El Soldado, intended for enlisted men, condemned brothels, but also sought to put any lapses in perspective: all over the world in wartime “these are not exactly forbidden places,” and even the heroes of the revolution “did not intoxicate themselves only with glory.” The magazine urged respect for families, elders and women, but cajoled light-heartedly, indulging in the same jokes and smutty imagery it criticized. In one cartoon, two soldiers ogle a large-breasted, slim-waisted, high-heeled woman walking down the street arm-in-arm with a hobbling elderly man; one soldier calls out “look after her for me grandad!” After all the care gone into portraying the joke, the caption- “Do not do this”- comes across as an afterthought.

In 1948, the military abandoned conscription into the army and returned to wholly voluntary recruitment, although the experiment produced some lasting changes. First, it allowed the military to remove many unwanted soldiers from the ranks. The military hierarchy did not trumpet their disdain for many soldiers from the rooftops, but it comes across clearly in confidential correspondence and memoirs from the period; in the mid-1930s, officials at the Secretariat of Defense estimated that while 15% of officers still drank to excess or smoked marijuana, for soldiers the rate was as high as 50%; Captain Arturo Geraldo remembered the “soldiering rabble (soldadesca)” of the early 1940s as a haven for “delinquents of every kind,” drunks, marijuana addicts, and murderers fleeing justice, although there were “some good people” to “even things out”; the military pondered “feeding conscripts into regular units,” but decided that “mixing average citizens with the regular army class of enlisted men” would result in strong “social and political reactions.” In 1944, the army moved thousands of soldiers considered “physically unsound” or morally dubious into second line “regional guards,” from which they were permitted to “resign” with a minimum
of paperwork. Soon these units were running at 50-60% strength, and the military hierarchy was happy to turn a blind eye to this “exodus.”82 The effects of this change on soldiers’ appetite for vice is unclear, but it ensured a generally younger and healthier group of soldiers—a boon to the makers of propaganda films, who amplified the effect by foregrounding soldiers “with the biggest muscles.” 83 Second, conscription was replaced by a much less onerous system of military training, which further consolidated army’s public association with sports. After 1948, thousands of 18-year-olds spent a year meeting on Sunday afternoons to do military drills, community service, or sports; the overwhelming majority chose sports, and thousands participated in annual parades and competitions.84

Conscription also allowed the military to remove soldaderas from at least some of the army’s units. To do this the army improved barracks facilities and finally created a reliable quartermaster system within conscript units. Due to their unmanly domestic tasks, quartermasters suffered “a certain devaluing in the eyes of ordinary soldiers, and they insulted them with generic nicknames,” but by 1948 they allowed the army’s best-equipped and trained units – about one third of the total - to operate without soldaderas.85 However, soldaderas remained integral to the remaining regular units, and even within conscript units the army was forced to concede to NCOs’ demands that they cohabit with their “soldadera” partners in new facilities.86 In the late 1940s, soldaderas could still be seen fulfilling familiar roles; they followed infantry and cavalry units around on deployment, carried food, bedding, and children, and lived and worked alongside soldiers in crumbling old provincial barracks. 87 Indeed, some soldaderas continued to press for the improved benefits. In 1944, soldaderas crowded in the old communal Ciudadela barracks in Mexico City showed journalists their tiny shared quarters, decorated with “many religious objects” and images of the president “tacked to the wall with glue.” They demanded better houses and barracks –“even if they are just made of wood”- military schools so that children could “grow up to work in factories or
other honorable professions,” and condemned their exclusion from new medical services: “It is for the officers and whoever they recommend…A soldier and his family? They'd hit us if we went!” 88

**An Institutionalized and Civilian Revolution (1946-1960)**

The administration of Miguel Alemán (1946-1952)- Mexico’s first civilian postrevolutionary president- was a watershed in Mexican politics and civil-military relations. Alemán consolidated the official party- now named the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI)- curtailed remaining vestiges of 1930s radicalism, shifted politics rightwards, and oversaw the rise of a new generation of civilian bureaucrats. Under Alemán, the importance of military credentials and experiences to political discourse and citizenship claims, once so central, faded decisively and the regime consolidated a new civilian political image and style- a major shift in what Olcott terms “political masculinity.” 89 In this context, official speeches and publications began to discuss military reform in the past tense; it was not an ongoing process, but something essentially complete, the most obvious proof of which was the military’s apparent acceptance of civilian presidential authority. 90

In reality, the image of a fully reformed officer corps remained fragile. In the 1940s and 1950s, the officer corps remained heterogeneous and divided, and consensus on the precise attributes of ideal military masculinity was elusive. Old tensions between left and right-leaning officers- broadly loyal to Cárdenas and Ávila Camacho respectively- lingered, but were increasingly cross-cut by generational and professional tensions. Older veterans of the revolution still monopolized the rank of general, but younger graduates of military schools were gradually populating the lower ranks; by 1943 they made up about 30% of the military’s mayors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. 91 There was general agreement that
military men ought to possess some combination of experience and training, but the optimal blend was unclear. In private, younger officers grumbled that they were more technically prepared than the revolutionary veterans who dominated the hierarchy and blocked promotions. Cadets at the Military College made jokes about the ignorant and picturesque revolutionary-era officers they encountered; a favorite concerned General Saturnino López, who looked over his regimental paysheets and demanded to know “who is this 'Total', who earns more than me?” They also noted the poor eye-sight, expanding waistline, and physical weakness of many old generals; indeed, such jokes were common in and outside the army since at least the 1930s.

Older officers emphasized the debt the government owed them for past service, and argued that young graduates of military schools were unduly theoretical and naïve, lacked deep knowledge of the provinces, small-scale guerilla warfare and counterinsurgency, and simply had little appetite for combat. At times these arguments were couched in the terms of manliness. A veteran captain who served in the hills and villages of Morelos in 1943 remembered taunting a recent graduate of the Military College who was hesitant to confront armed rebels: “It is one thing being in the Military College, and another being out here. In the College you just do drills in the little plaza…I told the lieutenant: ‘Out here you have to become a man, because otherwise out here you are useless.’”

Moreover, the PRI’s own methods of controlling the military limited and distorted cultural reform. In return for national submission, governments allowed some old regional commanders to remain in place for years, resist retirement, meddle in regional politics, build or maintain business interests, and take a cut on military procurements. Miguel Alemán only weathered a squall of plots by dissident officers by making recourse to these old methods, and by selling promotions on a massive scale to cultivate new military allies. The Alemán administration also clipped the professional wings of younger highly-educated officers; it
disbanded the military’s elite but politically restive General Staff—founded and staffed by Alemán’s arch-rival Cárdenas in 1945—shifted power to a hand-picked Presidential General Staff, and downgraded the quality of education imparted at the Military College, angering some military reformers like Cravioto.\(^97\)

Consequently, in the 1950s the military still retained some strikingly unreformed (and well-connected) commanders. Residents of Mexico City’s Colonia Reforma Social complained about systematic extortion by a Mayor Manuel Gutiérrez Silis who “gets drunk every two or three days… shoots off bullets, and causes a scandal with some of the women he likes, usually nurses from the military hospital or clerks from the military headquarters.” \(^98\) In 1954, some younger officers formed a “union” to complain about incompetent, corrupt, or immoral officers who had wrongfully been promoted; these included General Guadalupe Fernández de León who was posted to Zacatecas and “outraged society with his polygamy, public drunkenness, and extortion of civilians.” \(^99\) Moreover, officers’ enduring role in secretive political repression gave them a great deal of informal political power, regardless of their other qualities. The corrupt and brutal General Alejandro Mange clung on to his Veracruz command, probably in part due to “knowing (perhaps literally) where the bodies were buried.” \(^100\)

The military’s pragmatic approach to moral foibles was all the more visible with officers, particularly those engaged in crucial tasks. Military laws only forbade military men from entering brothels when in uniform or if it led to a “public” scandal, and the definition was not expansive. In 1948, President Alemán sent Colonel Salvador Martínez Cairo to impose political control on a restive electoral district in the state of Puebla, sparking a host of complaints about repression, drunkenness and womanizing. In March 1950, military agents exonerated the colonel after the press reported a scandalous row with a prostitute in a Puebla
City hotel; while audible across the hotel, the row had taken place within the colonel’s room while he was in a dressing gown, and so could not be considered “public.” 101

Despite these obstacles, by the mid-1950s officers’ behaviour on the whole had moved closer to the official ideal. The kind of outright public fiascos which still bedeviled the military’s image in the 1930s- when the head of the Commission of Military Studies broadcast a speech on the dangers of alcohol while audibly drunk- were now rare, at least within the core institutions in Mexico City. 102 Complaints of officers’ moral infractions- drinking, prostitution, sexual predation- persisted, but they were not on the scale of the 1920s, and normally concerned older revolutionary veterans.103 Such practices implied the endurance of alternative- hard-drinking, transgressive, promiscuous- models of military masculinity; but officers who overtly and publicly defended such models were few and far between.104 Moreover, petitions often presented immoral officers as baffling, isolated anachronisms. An anonymous complaint about General Anacleto López, Zacatecas’s powerful and well-connected zone commander from 1955-1969, provides an example:

“We are dealing with a good-for-nothing. I assure you that as a general in command of troops, he is useless. However, he is very good at disgracing young girls of 12, 14 and 16 years old (since he does not like older ones)...It is degrading for a general to attend to functions, before the eyes of society, as if he was a fifteen-year-old, with a young girl on each arm- young women that he forces to live with him...Please send us a properly trained officer, educated in modern military things, because now what matters is not how many soldiers you have, but training, now that wars are made by knowledgeable people using modern methods. Satellites, long-range intercontinental missiles: all this cannot be operated by a generalito like López.” 105
Many other older officers had moderated their habits. The leading revolutionary generals offered a model of acceptable behaviour. Amaro, Ávila Camacho, and Cárdenas were abstemious in their personal habits (or had long since become so), and married into respectable provincial families. (In the 1940s, Tampiqueños gossiped that the same madam who procured prostitutes for their current zone commander – General Anacleto Guerrero – had once done the same for Cárdenas way back in the 1920s; after a scandal in which one of Guerrero’s mistresses was accused of being an Axis spy, even he decided to find a mistress “from a respectable family.”) The US military attaché’s informants reported other lesser generals who had followed a similar path: General Benecio López was “a rough, uneducated person, whose only polish has been acquired through the influence of his wife.” As president, Ávila Camacho accelerated the careers of officers like Colonel Alfonso Corona del Rosal: a man who, according to spies sent to vet him, “neither contracts debts nor drinks alcohol, repudiates gambling, does not smoke and, according to those who know him well, dedicates his free time to study…he is of middle-class origin, and his political creeds are the Constitution of the Republic and, in a very measured way, Catholicism.” In the 1940s, the military expressed a new official confidence in officers’ domestic arrangements; to bolster the military’s association with respectable family life, it began inviting officers’ wives to military functions. At the same time, professional schools churned out more socially polished and physically impressive officers. By the mid-1960s, the old revolutionary veterans still clung on to the military hierarchy, but about 90% of the officer corps had passed through the Military College. The educational requirements for officer school gradually urbanized officer recruitment and consolidated younger officers’ image as professional and culturally mestizo. (When he retired in 1961, the Nahua general Demetrio Barrios noted ruefully: “Gone are the days of the Indian soldier. Nowadays they expect you to take exams and speak foreign languages.”)
Enlisted life also seems to have edged closer to the official image. The state’s abandonment of conscription in 1948 represented a diminution of state-building ambition, but it also helped the military to consolidate more modest changes to enlisted service. Mexico’s population growth and pursuit of Fordist industrialization now produced a steady pool of poor, young men in the countryside willing to try soldiering to secure steady pay, literacy, geographical (and possibly social) mobility.112 This context underpinned improved discipline. By the mid-1950s, desertions were declining once more- from 14% in 1955, 11% in 1960, to 8% in 1961.113 The number of men sentenced in military courts for crimes against discipline also fell. 114 In the 1950s, the president’s office rejected proposals to build more military prison facilities, citing “declining” numbers of military delinquents. 115 Officers had a long tradition of punishing soldiers informally by sending them to unpleasant assignments, forcing them to stand to attention for hours on end - so-called plantones- docking pay or, in cases of drunkenness, dunking soldiers in freezing baths. 116 However, given the simultaneous decline in desertions, it is unlikely that arbitrary, informal punishments were simply taking up the disciplinary slack. Voluntary recruitment also offered compensatory symbolic advantages for the state. Despite government efforts to portray conscription lotteries as modern and fair, they reminded many of the old Porfirian press gang- a quintessential ancien regime abuse the revolution had supposedly eradicated.117 The return to voluntary recruitment removed this dissonance, and replaced the overt coercion of the state with the subtler coercion of the labor market. Military propagandists performed an abrupt volte-face and now pointed to voluntary recruitment as evidence that the postrevolutionary army was indeed a thoroughly transformed institution, freely recruited among and rooted in the people.118

Gradually improving service conditions also aided discipline, and included further support for soldiers and their families. Indeed, by the mid-1950s soldaderas’ roles more closely approximated those of the type of domestic wife promoted by the military; the “vast
majority” of Mexico’s roughly 40,000 soldiers were still married “in one form or another,” but the quartermaster services consolidated during the war spread across the remainder of the army, effectively removing the need for soldaderas during military deployments; by the early 1960s, the military had rebuilt even the most isolated barracks to include separate domestic quarters for families. Moreover, the military provided a range of benefits to officer and solider-headed households: access to free military healthcare, cheap commercial and housing loans from the army bank, and a network of subsidized grocery and pharmacy stores. Secretary of Defense General Matías Ramos (1952-1958) encouraged officers’ wives to play a leading role in new efforts to stabilize enlisted families. He ordered the first military census of soldier families, provided 2,000 free breakfasts to soldiers’ children, and placed a new welfare initiative in the hands of his wife, who in turn recruited groups of middle-class officers' wives as volunteers to tend to “the great family of the army.” These women planned social events for soldiers’ wives and distributed gifts on holidays, created consumer cooperatives, organized literacy classes, taught nutrition and sewing techniques, and provided advice on accessing military benefits and credit. They also carried out a “campaign of persuasion in favor of civil marriage,” although technically military laws continued to recognize common-law marriage. This initiative followed a familiar pattern across the hemisphere, as male political leaders gave responsibility for supposedly feminine welfare to their wives, and middle-class women used their authority in domestic matters to carve out new roles in welfare and social work. A 1957 petition from the Aguascalientes barracks provides a rare glimpse of how some women responded; a group of women who referred to themselves as “soldiers’ wives” praised the general principles of military welfare, but condemned corrupt and imperfect implementation. Whereas in the past “our men ate their tortillas nice and warm by our sides, by the hearth along with their children,” officers now skimmed the mess hall budget and produced “absolutely awful food”; during Sunday dances,
some captains became “profiteers” and overcharged for beers; the new medical service was laudable but “we would like you to post a doctor who actually cares for soldiers, not a man who thinks of them as the trash of Mexico.”

Over time, reform helped to shift how some Mexicans viewed the military. In the 1950s, diplomats reported newly warm applause for the military sections of parades, at least compared to the police. Since the first opinion polls began in Mexico in the early 1960s, the military has emerged as a relatively trusted institution associated with order and discipline. Various factors probably contributed to change. The military benefited from the general improvement in Church-state relations; Catholic provincial elites never considered the military a particularly desirable or respectable career, but by the 1940s some were willing to consider officers as suitable godparents. By the early 1940s, even the inhabitants of the conservative and staunchly Catholic town of San José de Gracia “had come to look to the village's military detachment for the maintenance of law and order…Having been antimilitarists, they had begun to like soldiers.” Support for the military surely reflected support for specific activities, including support for medical campaigns and disaster relief. To be sure, old ideas of corruption, brutality and vice endured, particularly where military engaged repeatedly in targeted repression and counterinsurgency. However, as a new Cold War historiography is uncovering, military repression and policing could also enjoy substantial political support, and was underpinned by an image of military as an institution and the kind of men it contained and produced. In 1968 hundreds of Mexicans, including Catholic dissidents, unionists, and self-appointed regular citizens wrote to President Diaz Ordaz to congratulate him for imposing order on Mexico's supposedly radical, unpatriotic, immoral, irresponsible, disruptive students, and for choosing the military as the correct instrument to do it. Recent years have seen important institutional and discursive changes—women were admitted to officer school in 2007— but much of the old discourse remains. The
military’s interest in supporting family formation to bolster discipline and improve its public image has endured; amid growing public criticism and desertions, the military recently sponsored “collective weddings” for soldiers as a way to formalize common-law marriages and ease access to military benefits. The most common justifications for the military’s deepening involvement in policing and drug prohibition- that the military is disciplined and effective, relatively uncorrupt compared to the police, has a tradition of unity and loyalty, and is composed of volunteers recruited from and rooted in the interests of the masses- all suggest the government’s lasting success in reshaping its image.

CONCLUSION

The story of military reform helps clarify the scope, limitations and effects of the postrevolutionary state’s efforts to modernize patriarchy. These efforts were directed not only at industrial workers and peasants but core state institutions like the army. When Mexico’s postrevolutionary leaders thought about the kinds of new men and women they wished to create, the revolutionary army- rebellious, expensive, disreputable, embarrassing - was at the forefront of their minds. In broad terms, military policies echoed better-studied educational and welfare initiatives, and moved broadly in parallel with the development of social policies for the wider population. Like teachers, doctors and welfare officials, military reformers aimed to produce self-disciplined, fit, and patriotic men domesticated in orderly male-headed families; they built selectively on earlier republican and liberal ideas, but adopted a more ambitious range of techniques- welfare, mass media- and, after the 1930s, a more socially inclusive approach. As elsewhere, military reform faced resistance, and remained by necessity flexible and pragmatic. Soldiers and their families rejected some aspects of reform, particularly efforts to tie benefits to civil marriage, and the changes to enlisted service which
made most headway – sports, family welfare, housing- enjoyed a measure of support from below. While echoing findings of historians of education and welfare, the military story also highlights distinctive political dynamics and obstacles less visible from other institutional angles. The military’s approach to enlisted family-formation had its own distinctive non-linear trajectory: it oscillated for decades between discouragement and support, shaped by popular responses, older military traditions associating soldiers with single men, and the experiment with conscription triggered by the Second World War. Policies toward officers also illustrate obstacles posed by fundamental political tensions and contradictions within the state itself: the balance the federal government had to strike between reforming military behaviour, and placating officers to ensure their loyalty. Factional and generational divisions riddling the officer corps may have ultimately made it an easier political nut for the ruling party to crack, as it carefully rewarded military cliques and balanced them against each other, but they threatened to undermine the image of the officer corps as a reformed monolith.

Most important, military reform suggests that, for all its uneveness, the effort to modernize patriarchy had important effects on the state’s public image and legitimacy. By the 1950s the regime could plausibly claim to have produced an army substantially different from its ancien regime precursor: manned by volunteers from the popular classes, with improved discipline and fitness, and whose institutional roles for men and women approximated normative ideas about gender rather than undermined them. These changes helped the new regime distinguish itself from the old, narrowed the gap between military discourse and practice, and reshaped public views of the military in lasting ways. Combined with a large measure of secrecy and censorship, these institutional changes laid the cultural bases for the widespread public perception of the Mexican military as an orderly, reliable, effective, and respectable national
institution- an image which has proven surprisingly and stubbornly resilient in the face of criticism by social movements, journalists, NGOs and historians since the 1960s.

1 Colonel Adrian Cravioto, *Urbanidad y Cortesía Militares* (Mexico City, 1937), 16, 54, 150, 245
8 Roderic Camp, *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico* (Oxford, 1992), 266. A path-breaking analysis of enlisted men based on recruitment records can be found in

Messersmith, Mexico City, to Dean Acheson, Washington DC, January 11, 1946, Box 16, F116, Messersmith Papers, University of Delaware, Special Collections, Digitized Collection.

This article draws on correspondence send to the Minister of War from 1925-1934, and from a database of 113 complaints culled from presidential, intelligence and military archives sent from the state of Puebla between 1937 and 1958, analyzed in more detail in Rath, *Myths*. To minimize regional bias, it is also based on a review of dozens of complaints send to the president’s office from 1940-1958 from other regions, and from a review of the service files of 25 officers identified as zone commanders between 1934 and 1952.


“Military Establishment-General,” MA to G-2, March 25, 1930, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC, Record Group 165, Military Intelligence Division Regional Files: Mexico (hereafter MIDRF), 2555, 6010.


Pattin to G-2, April 29, 1935, USMIR, Reel 8, 42-3.


Rubén García, Santiago de Chile, to Amaro, January 22, 1926; Rubén García, Havana, to Amaro, December 4, 1925, AJA, series 0304, exp. 22.

Cravioto, *Historia documental*, vol. 3, 94.


General Gustavo Salas, *El servicio militar obligatorio. Apuntes sobre la reorganización del ejército* (Guadalajara, 1922), 47.

30 Gonzalo N. Santos, *Memorias: una vida azarosa, novelesca y tormentosa* (Mexico City, 1984), 690.

31 Salas, *El servicio*, 50.


33 Elizabeth Salas, *Soldaderas in the Mexican Military: Myth and History* (Austin, 1990), 49-50; *Anales gráficos de la historia militar de México* (Mexico City, 1973), 550-9. For the argument that soldaderas were “gone from army life” after the mid-1920s, see Edwin Lieuwen, *Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army* (Albuquerque, 1968), 94.

34 Celia Ramón de Berumen, DF, to Amaro, c. 1926, Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca, Archivo Joaquín Amaro (hereafter AJA), 03/05, leg. 5.

35 Jesusa S. Vda. De Alvarez, Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, July 18, 1931, AJA, 03/05, leg. 2.

36 On rape, see complaint about Major Bernardino Aguirre “who likes girls that cost him nothing”- from Formasia Beiza, Iguala, Guerrero, to Amaro, February 20, 1928, AJA, 03/05, leg. 4. On recruitment: Carmen D. Vda. de Brizuela, to Amaro, July 20, 1928, DF; Teodora Aguilar, DF, to Amaro, April 6, date illegible, DF, both in AJA, 03/05, leg. 1. For homicide, see Hilaria Ramírez, Tecpan Galeana, Guerrero, to Amaro, March 12, 1926, AJA 03/05, leg. 4.

37 Sara G. de Berumen, DF, c.1928, to Amaro, AJA, 03/05, leg. 5. Other complaints about lack of familial support: Natalia Rocha de Ávila, Torreón, Coahuila, to Amaro, July 8, 1931, AJA, 03/05, leg. 1; Caterina C. de Aburto, DF, to Amaro, April 29, 1926, AJA 03/05, leg. 1.

38 María Antonia Fornés, Mérida, Yucatán, October 10, 1931, AJA, 03/05, leg. 15.


40 Beatriz Nava de Cardona, DF, to Amaro, May 14, 1925, AJA 03/05, leg. 6; Magdalena Cordero, Villa Cuauhtémoc, Veracruz, to Amaro, May 14, 1930, AJA 03/05, leg. 8.

41 Elisa Arce, DF, to Amaro, June 15, 1925, and Amaro to Arce, DF, June 22, 1925, AJA, 03/05 leg.1.

42 Amaro to Caterina C. de Aburto, DF, May 1926, AJA 03/05, leg. 1; various correspondence, Maria Vda. de Durazgo, April 1929-July 1930, AJA 03/05, leg. 10.

43 Secretaría de Guerra to Miguel Arrieta, Monterrey, February 27, 1931, AJA 03/05, leg. 3; Santos, *Memorias*, 673.

44 Maria Vda. De Espinosa, DF, to Amaro, August 12, 1927, AJA 03/05, leg.6.


48 Marshburn, to G-2, June 19, 1934, USMIR, reel 5, No. 5374.

49 *La cooperativa militar de Monterrey* (Mexico City, 1936), 99.

50 Attaché to G-2, January 4, 1935, USMIR, reel 8, 805.

Vicente Peredo y Saavedra, *Quiénes deben recibir beneficios por la muerte de un militar* (Mexico City, 1937); Various correspondence, Sección Femenil del Partido Revolucionario Mexicano, to Cárdenas, 1939, AGN, Ramo Presidentes, Cárdenas, 151.2/1301; *Ley de pensiones y retiros militares del Ejército y Armada Nacionales* (Mexico City, 1940); “Ley del Instituto de Seguridad Social para las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas,” *Diario Oficial*, July 9, 2003.


Asst. military attaché, June 16, 1943, MIDRF, 2551, MA Reports.

Report on conscript battalions, June 14, 1943, USMIR, 2551, MA Reports.


Rath, “*Que el cielo,*” 527.


Soto, *Entre soldados*, 12, 57, 98. There is no evidence that the concept of machismo was used within the army at the time. On the invention of the concept in the late 1940s and 1950s,

74 Garza, *Los conscriptos*. 133. Soto Oliver remembered that marijuana was smoked “almost exclusively” by older troops, although a few conscripts also took it up. Soto Oliver, *Entre soldados*.


76 Soto Oliver, *Entre soldados*, 102.


78 *El Soldado*, December 1943, No. 11, 9-10; Inspectors P.S. 1, 2 and 19, DF, to DGIPS, 24 August 1944, AGN, DGIPS, C.89, E. 2-1/131/726.


80 *El Soldado*, Nov. 1945.


92 MA to G-2, March 27, 1944, MIDRF, 2553, “March- April.”


95 Renato Ravelo Lecuona, *Los jaramillistas: la gesta de Rubén Jaramillo narrada por sus compañeros* (Cuernavaca, 2007), 65.


97 Cravioto, *Historia documental*, vol.3, 422; *La Prensa*, October 22, 1948, and memo, February 1949, AGN, Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (hereafter DGIPS), c. 24, exp. 3.

98 Antonio M. Solís, Jesús Mendoza, Refugio Coronado, to Ruiz Cortines, April 17, 1956, AGN, Ramo Presidentes, Ruiz Cortines, 509/761.


100 Gillingham, “Military Caciquismo,” 228.
A database of 113 complaints from the state of Puebla from 1937-1958 shows a decline in the same period: 50 in 1940-46; 43 in 1946-1952; 20 in 1952-1958. Only 5% of these complaints concerned officers' personal moral failings (extortion, harassment of young women) and only one of these concerned a non-veteran officer. These complaints are analyzed in more detail in Rath, Myths, 115-143. In the service files of the 10 and 16 officers who commanded the zones of Puebla and Guerrero respectively from 1935 to 1952, complaints about sexual predation, homicide and debts heavily cluster in the 1920s and early 1930s, particularly during the Cristero Wars.

Boisterous political boss Colonel Gonzalo N. Santos is a rare example, although he had little contact with the military as an institution after the 1920s. Santos, Memorias.

Anonymous, Jerez, Zacatecas, c.1966, AHSDN, II-III-1-8, 4535. On López’s long service fighting bandits and Catholic rebels for the central government, see Consul, Durango, to State Department, February 1935, MIDRF, 2512, combat digests.

M. Ríos Thivol, September 8, 1950, AGN, DGIPS, C. 84, exp. 2. Corona del Rosal became a key national political figure and “served as a significant bridge between civilian and military leaderships.” Camp, Generals, 47.

Monterrey consulate to State Department, various correspondence, March and August 1944, National Archives and Records Administration, RG59, General Records: Mexico, Monterrey Consular Reports, Box 70.


On the poor and increasingly rural background of soldiers, and relatively high rates of literacy and geographical mobility in the army, see López, Measuring Up, 92-6.


In the 1950s, the military published figures for total “sentences” in military courts, but the Spanish term is (perhaps deliberately) ambiguous, and could refer to overall verdicts or convictions. Even if we assume that all “sentences” reported by the military in the 1950s were convictions, by 1957 these had still declined by 50% since 1935, and the total continued to fall into the early 1960s. Ibid.


Geraldo, Sobre las armas; Garza, Los Conscriptos, 127, 165.


Francisco Urquizo, Charlas cuarteleras (Mexico City, 1955), 21, 51.