Yee, Julius Sher Xern; (2017) An Economic Analysis of the Liability of Credit Rating Agencies: A Positive Inquiry from a Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency Perspective. UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence , 6 (1) , Article 1. 10.14324/111.2052-1871.077.

Preview

Text 1. Yee FINAL.pdf Download (732kB) | Preview

Abstract

The liability of credit rating agencies (‘CRAs’) has been subject to critical debate since the global financial crisis of 2008. It has been well documented and argued that the rules governing such impositions have been traditionally framed by reactionary, post-crisis driven reforms which do not necessarily reflect, or capture, in economic terms, the consequentialist aspects of whether they are beneficial to the welfare of wider market participants. This article attempts to highlight, through economic analysis, some of these wider market repercussions, and will aim to do so by providing an analysis of liability rules from a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency perspective. It is hoped that this analysis will add further insight to the question of liability and regulation, chiefly in aiding our ability of determining whether current regulatory reforms on credit rating agencies, principally within the European Union, are sufficiently robust in addressing the problem of poor regulatory incentives.

Download activity - last month

Export as XMLCSVJSON

Download activity - last 12 months

Export as CSVXMLJSON

Downloads by country - last 12 months

Export as JSONCSVXML

Archive Staff Only

View Item