Geroski, PA;
Mazzucato, M;
(2002)
Myopic Selection.
Metroeconomica
, 53
(2)
pp. 181-199.
10.1111/1467-999X.00139.
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Abstract
The severity of selection mechanisms and the myopia of selection are explored through a duopoly model where one firm tries to move down a learning curve in which costs are initially higher than its rival's but ultimately much lower. A trade-off is found between catch-up time and asymptotic market share: the more severe are selection pressures, the less likely is it that the learning technology will survive; however, if it does survive, the learning technology will in the limit be more competitive the more severe are selection pressures. We explore the dynamics of the model under unit cost and strategic pricing and find that the optimal pricing rule depends on the parameters governing firm learning and market selection.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Myopic Selection |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/1467-999X.00139 |
| Publisher version: | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-999X.00139 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002. This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of the Built Environment UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of the Built Environment > Inst for Innovation and Public Purpose |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1553097 |
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