Korpeoglu, CG;
(2017)
Allocation of an indivisible object on the full preference domain: Axiomatic characterizations.
Economic Theory
, 6
(1)
pp. 41-53.
10.1007/s40505-017-0122-7.
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Abstract
We study the problem of allocating an indivisible object to one of several agents on the full preference domain when monetary transfers are not allowed. Our main requirement is strategy-proofness. The other properties we seek are Pareto optimality, non-dictatorship, and non-bossiness. We provide characterizations of strategy-proof rules that satisfy Pareto optimality and non-bossiness, non-dictatorship and non-bossiness, and Pareto optimality and non-dictatorship. As a consequence of these characterizations, we show that a strategy-proof rule cannot satisfy Pareto optimality, non-dictatorship, and non-bossiness simultaneously.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Allocation of an indivisible object on the full preference domain: Axiomatic characterizations |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s40505-017-0122-7 |
| Publisher version: | http://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-017-0122-7 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | © The Author(s) 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. |
| Keywords: | Matching; Indivisible object; Strategy-proofness; Pareto optimality; Full preference domain |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > UCL School of Management |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1551637 |
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