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Allocation of an indivisible object on the full preference domain: Axiomatic characterizations

Korpeoglu, CG; (2017) Allocation of an indivisible object on the full preference domain: Axiomatic characterizations. Economic Theory , 6 (1) pp. 41-53. 10.1007/s40505-017-0122-7. Green open access

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Abstract

We study the problem of allocating an indivisible object to one of several agents on the full preference domain when monetary transfers are not allowed. Our main requirement is strategy-proofness. The other properties we seek are Pareto optimality, non-dictatorship, and non-bossiness. We provide characterizations of strategy-proof rules that satisfy Pareto optimality and non-bossiness, non-dictatorship and non-bossiness, and Pareto optimality and non-dictatorship. As a consequence of these characterizations, we show that a strategy-proof rule cannot satisfy Pareto optimality, non-dictatorship, and non-bossiness simultaneously.

Type: Article
Title: Allocation of an indivisible object on the full preference domain: Axiomatic characterizations
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1007/s40505-017-0122-7
Publisher version: http://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-017-0122-7
Language: English
Additional information: © The Author(s) 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Keywords: Matching; Indivisible object; Strategy-proofness; Pareto optimality; Full preference domain
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > UCL School of Management
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1551637
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