British Educational Research Journal
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Date: February 09, 2017
Contributor name: GUY ROBERTS-HOLMES
Contributor address:
Manuscript number: CBER-2016-0233.R1

Re: ***Manuscript entitled Primary Schools and Network Governance: A Policy Analysis of Reception Baseline***

Assessment (the "Contribution")
for publication in British Educational Research Journal (the "Journal")
published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd ("Wiley")

British Educational Research Journal

Primary Schools and Network Governance: A Policy Analysis of Reception Baseline Assessment

Authors: Guy Roberts-Holmes, ALICE BRADBURY

DOI:10.1002/berj.3285

Publication status

Article accepted on 9 January, 2017

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Primary Schools and Network Governance: A Policy Analysis of Reception Baseline Assessment

Dr. Guy Roberts-Holmes and Dr. Alice Bradbury, UCL IoE.
g.roberts-holmes@ucl.ac.uk
Department of Learning and Leadership, Institute of Education, University College London, 20 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AL.

Keywords:
Early years; assessment; governance; baseline; primary schools
Sponsorship of the research
National Union of Teachers (NUT) and Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL).

Abstract
Primary school Reception baseline assessment was designed to produce a single 'baseline' data figure on the basis of which young children's progress across primary school could be measured and accounted. The article suggests that within the context of punitive performativity, head teachers might be considered 'irresponsible' if not engaging with the new accountability measure in its voluntary year. Using DfE accredited baseline assessment providers blurred the distinctions between not-for-profit social enterprises, digital policy innovation labs, edu-business and the state. It is argued that through a process of networked governance, these cross-sectorial organisations successfully inticed some primary schools of the 'moral economy' in using baseline assessment. It is argued that baseline's simplistic reductionism allowed for the economization of early years education assessment and for its commercialization of comparison. This article reports on a sample of five head teachers, taken from a much larger study that used a mixed methods approach involving a nationwide survey (n=1,131) and in-depth interviews with Reception staff and head teachers in five geographically disparate primary schools. Baseline assessment was 'withdrawn' by the DfE in April 2016 quite possibly because of campaigns from early years organisations, the Government's own report showing that the three separate baseline datasets were incompatible, and the national research funded by the teachers' unions, a small part of which is reported upon here.

Introduction

Early years baseline assessment was designed to produce a 'baseline' data figure on the basis of which young children's progress across the primary years could be digitally measured, and was to form a key part of how schools were to be held to account in the future. Baseline assessment proved to be a highly controversial policy initiative as the accountability measure is conducted with four year old children in their first few weeks of formal schooling. Baseline resulted in a single digital data score for each child: when they reach Year 6, and were eleven years old, each child in the cohort would have been measured against their Reception Baseline score, from age four, in order to judge the progress they had made while attending primary school. Baseline, therefore, represented a further shift towards the datafication of accountability in primary education, which involved the early years phase more than ever before (Roberts-Holmes, 2015: Roberts-Holmes and Bradbury, 2016). The initial accuracy and validity of collecting data from

four year olds and then digitally tracking and measuring this data across seven years of primary schooling has been a concern for campaigns against baseline from teachers' unions and early years educational organisations (ATL, 2015; NUT, 2015; Reclaiming Schools, 2015; TACTYC, 2015). In a national report on the introduction of baseline assessment, Bradbury and Roberts-Holmes (2016) found that less than 8% of teachers believed baseline assessment to be a 'fair and accurate measure' and that 'teachers have major concerns about the negative consequences of baseline assessment on children, teachers and schools'.

Baseline attempts to reduce young children's complex learning to a single number thus representing extreme educational reductionism. Baseline can be understood as 'nothing but a ridiculous simplification of knowledge and a robbing of meaning from individual histories' (Malaguzzi, from Cagliari *et al*., 2016: 378) and therefore stands in contrast to socio-cultural theory which has demonstrated that children learn within and through sets of social relationships (Broadhead, 2006; Fleer, 2010). Within socio-cultural theory, teachers' complex narrative based observations over a long period of time in a range of contexts, makes visible what young children are capable of doing in supportive and collaborative relationships. In contrast, baseline uses simplistic 'yes' or 'no' binary statements which have a tendency towards a negative and deficit measurement of what four year old children can*not* do since all complexity is reduced to a single number. Bradbury & Roberts-Holmes (2016) showed that baseline had the tendency to under-assess and set low expectations for young children's abilities particularly for groups such as English as an Additional Language learners.

Baseline's reductionism facilitates comparison through its potential to hierarchically rank children, schools and local authorities. The use of policy innovation labs to develop such comparative databases has led to a 'commercialization of comparison' (Hogan et al, 2016) in which comparison has become a central element in 'digital educational governance' (Williamson, 2016: 3). The hidden, yet powerful code and algorithms, that generate each child's single baseline metric, effectively 'make up' children into 'data resources to be collected, collated and calculated into comparable governing knowledge' (Williamson, 2014: 220). Here baseline becomes yet another piece of digital data to track and monitor children in a relentless pursuit for school 'improvement' in which children become reduced to data (Hutchings, 2015, Bradbury and Roberts-Holmes, 2016) and schools to 'data platforms' (Williamson, 2015 in Selywn, 2016). Baseline is thus a manifestation of dataveillance, that is the constant surveillance of children through their data which 'makes possible an actual uninterrupted observation of every individual of interest' (Tsapkou, 2015).

Such a hyper-positivist approach towards young children's learning was countered throughout Bradbury's and Roberts-Holmes' (2016) research by teachers and headteachers who noted that "they are children, not robots,not machines". These teachers stressed that young children and their learning lives are complex, diverse and unpredictable and that attempting to generate a single number for a four year old would inevitably be problematic. The possible establishment of a low baseline may then set up low expectations across the child's primary schooling. The potentially damaging effect

of baseline assessment is that for children with low scores ('below typical'), even if they make good progress, it will be seen as acceptable for them to remain low attaining at age 11. This is a problem inherent in any 'value added' measure where the baseline is known and is more likely to affect those groups who are lower attaining within the system in general, such as ethnic minorities, children receiving free school meals, children with SEN and EAL and some summer-born children (Bradbury, 2011). Although schools had not yet been advised to set targets or make predictions based on baseline assessment, the form of the assessment makes this inevitable. Therefore the risk of particular groups of children being systematically under-assessed in baseline assessment is significant for their long-term educational trajectories, as Lupton (2016) makes clear,

'Digital data and the algorithmic analytics that are used to interpret them and to make predictions and inferences about individuals and social groups are beginning to have determining effects on people's lives, influencing their life chances and opportunities' (Lupton, 2016: 44).

This problem of low scoring within a high stakes accountability culture is not unique to baseline assessment; similar tactical responses have been found in relation to the EYFS Profile (Bradbury, 2013). Within a culture of high stakes accountability, baseline assessment, with its primary role being as an accountability measure, is particularly vulnerable to low scoring practices. This undermines the accuracy and credibility of the assessment considerably, particularly as the major national provider showed almost 50% of children had been graded as 'below typical' or 'well below typical' nationally (Bradbury and Roberts-Holmes, 2016).

The Policy Context of Baseline Assessment

The introduction of baseline assessment was part of the policy '*Reforming Assessment and Accountability for Primary Schools'* (DfE, 2014) and was introduced on a voluntary capacity in primary schools in England in September 2015 (DfE, 2014). The policy clearly stated that the primary purpose of the baseline was accountability and not assessment:

The purpose of the reception baseline is for an accountability measure of the relative progress of a cohort of children through primary school…we will use a reception baseline as the starting point from which to measure a school's progress (DfE, 2014: 1).

The policy rationale was predicated upon an assumption that primary schools, including Reception classes, were underperforming in formal assessments and that 'current expectations for primary schools are set too low' (DfE, 2014: 4). The justification for Baseline Assessment, in common with other uses of progress measures such as 'value added', was 'to make sure we take account of: schools with challenging intakes and the important work in reception and key stage 1' (DfE, 2015a). Thus Baseline Assessment is presented as sympathetic to schools with lower attainment on entry, and a recognition of the value of early years education. The policy also made clear that the result of the baseline must be a single figure score:

'The purpose of reception baseline is to support the accountability framework and help assess school effectiveness by providing a score for each child at the start of reception which reflects their attainment against a pre-determined content domain (DfE, 2014: 1).

In terms of content the DfE specified that:

'The clear majority of the content domain must…demonstrate a clear progression towards the key stage 1 (KS1) national curriculum in English and mathematics (DfE, 2014).

Through explicitly linking English and maths progression throughout primary school and between Reception class children, Year 2 children and Year 6 children, baseline constructs children as being 'in preparation' or 'in readiness' for school (Bingham and Whitebread, 2012). Baseline assessment marked a significant change in the use of summative assessment in early years education in primary schools. The current statutory assessment, Early Years Foundation Stage Profile (EYFSP) was conducted at the end of the Reception year and was based on formative observations of children over the school year. Critically, the EYFSP was not formally used in value added measures of children's progress and thus school performance. As a consequence of the national NUT/ATL research (Bradbury and Roberts-Holmes, 2016), the professional campaigns and the Government's own report showing that the three baseline providers were incompatible (DfE, 2016b), baseline assessment was 'withdrawn' in April 2016. However, despite this so-called 'withdrawal' of baseline, the NUT claim that it is only the status of baseline that has changed from being 'virtually mandatory', to that of professional judgment and choice (NUT, 2016). Clarke (2016) has noted her 'suspicions' about the Government's 'withdrawal', highlighting that a new provider was added to the DfE Approved list of providers in May 2016 and that the DfE will continue to pay schools for their baseline provider costs. The DfE has stated 'over the coming months we will be considering options for improving assessment arrangements in reception beyond 2016 to 2017 and will make an announcement in due course' (DfE, 2016). Within the context of the 'terrors' of performativity (Ball, 2003), this lack of policy directive and the absence of an accountability measure fuels teachers' apprehensions and uncertainties.

Cross sectoral 'Policy Innovation Labs'

The DfE put out public notice to tender for baseline 'test' contracts in 2014. This tendering process for contracts to become a DfE accredited provider is part of the neo-liberal 'blurring of boundaries' (Ball, 2007: 83) and distinctions between the state, edu-businesses and third sector not-for-profit research based organisations. Such cross-sectorial organisations are able to 'face both ways'(Newman and Clarke, 2009: 93 in Higham, 2014: 417) that is, operate as socially responsible philanthropic research based organizations *and* as profitable edu-businesses at the same time. Reception baseline assessment encouraged hybrid, cross sectoral organisations that spanned educational research, policy and business interests to participate in controversial policy iniatives with the aim 'of trying things out, getting things done, changing things, and avoiding

established public sector lobbies and interests, in an attempt to 'routinise innovation' and incubate creative possibilities' (Ball, 2012: 105). Williamson (2015: 252) refers to such hyrbridised organisations as 'policy innovation labs' that straddle the public and the private sectors. The use of such policy innovation labs for accountability was unprecedented in primary and early years education and six companies were initially selected and formed an 'approved DfE list'. The primary schools were then required to select one provider from the list and after a specified time those providers with less than 10% of market share were removed from the list. Within this competitive selection process, schools were encouraged to act like businesses and as enterprising purchasers in a market place of accountability products. By August 2015, nearly 15,000 primary schools had adopted one of the three DfE accredited baseline assessment providers at an estimated cost of between £3.5-to-£4.5 million excluding teacher supply cover costs (ATL, 2016). The three DfE accredited providers were Early Excellence, the Centre for Evaluation and Monitoring, Durham University (CEM) and the National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER). These organisations variously portrayed themselves as 'inspiring learning' and providing 'an expert view on policy and practice for the reception year' (Early Excellence); as university based research assessment specialists (Centre for Evaluation and Monitoring at Durham University) and as national not-for-profit charitable independent foundations for education research (NFER). The most successful of these three providers rapidly captured 70% of market share by presenting itself as offering "child centred observational assessment" that focused upon "well-being and the characteristics of effective learning". Such early years specialist branding helped to present the provider as a legitimate and 'responsible' actor whilst at the same time ensuring its market dominance (Hogan et al, 2016). By presenting itself as child-centred, it effectively 'moralized' the baseline to the early years community. On their web pages all three policy innovation labs can be seen as having softened the hard bureaucratic power of centralized government policy through 'the techniques of attraction, seduction, persuasion and the cultivation of support and shared interest' (Ozga and Segerholm, 2015: 220). This 'economisation of morality' (Hogan et al, 2016) not only engendered early years consensus building but also limited the emergence of refusal or resistance to the controversial policy. At the same time the early years rhetoric helped to obfuscate the reductionist single numerical score that was needed by the DfE to track children across primary school.

DfE financial encouragement for schools to buy accredited provider's baseline assessments was given impetus by making reception classes compulsory EYFS Profile non-statutory and optional in baseline's trial year in which this research was carried out (2015-2016) The DfE thus ensured that the policy innovation labs were given 'maximum entrepeneurial freedoms… and unencumbered markets' (Harvey, 2007: 22). Not only did making the EYFS Profile non-mandatory strengthen the importance of baseline, but it also had the effect of undermining and marginalizing the central role of Local Authority (LA) early years data Profile management and organization. Baseline thus represents a further move from hierarchical government to heterarchical governance (Ball and Juneman, 2012; 142). The detailed interviews with head teachers reported in this research were carried out in the context of both specific changes such as the datafication of teacher's pedagogy and within the more generalised neo-liberal marketization of their

work. Within the interviews the head teachers reported how they struggled with the demands of the increasingly comparable, competitive, fragmented and economized early years and primary education system.

The Study

The head teacher interviews and survey responses reported upon in this study were sampled from the nationally funded NUT/ATL research that was carried out in the autumn term of 2015, using a mixed methods approach involving a nationwide survey (n=1,131 teachers) and five primary schools for in-depth interviews (Bradbury and Roberts-Holmes, 2016). The national study firstly involved an online survey which was distributed via the NUT and ATL e-mail databases using the Bristol Online Survey service, and was completed by 1,131 teachers. 57% of respondents were Reception teachers, 38% were EYFS or Phase Leaders, 7% Senior Leaders and the remainder were support staff or 'other'. Eighty-nine per-cent of respondents were very experienced teachers who had gone through significant policy changes regarding the early years curriculum and assessment during their careers. The majority of respondents (80%) worked in state funded non-academy schools and 16% worked in Academies. Most worked in schools graded by OfSTED as 'good' (63%) or 'outstanding' (21%). The baseline provider used by survey respondents reflected the proportions nationally: 76% used Early Excellence, 10% CEM and 11% NFER. Results were analysed with this demographic data to see if there were differences in responses due to differences in school situations, roles, length of service and baseline provider. The survey involved a number of questions for teachers and school leaders on their views and experiences of baseline. Secondly, purposive geographical sampling was used to identify five primary schools. Standard interview schedules were used to carry out indepth interviewing with Reception teachers, EYFS co-ordinators, headteachers and other school leaders, and parents. Interviews were recorded and transcribed professionally for analysis. Qualitative data was analysed using the themes generated by the research questions. A total of 35 people were interviewed, comprising of five headteachers; two assistant headteachers or EYFS coordinators; 13 Reception teachers; and 15 parents.

Findings

The '*Reforming Assessment and Accountability for Primary Schools'* (DfE, 2014) policy shift of abolishing national primary curriculum levels, introducing baseline and making the established EYFSP non-mandatory left some of the headteachers feeling anxious, confused and apprehensive. Within the high stakes accountability context there was a heightened sense of potential risk and worry for school leaders. Baseline was yet another part of an assemblage of policy change which left the headteachers feeling uncertain, vulnerable and perplexed. The following emotive language from the headteachers revealed the problematic affective impact of the assessment policy changes. The headteachers variously stated that they felt "punished", "under the cosh", "bound down and broken", "at sea" and "in an assessment pit" and one headteacher referred to baseline as "giving us enough rope to hang ourselves". Another headteacher reported that when

she initially heard about baseline her initial thought was "this has got to be an April Fool's joke!".

> *I don't think I have ever come across a situation where Heads feel so at sea….nobody really knows what they are doing…If I am sitting here as a Head Teacher with over 20 years' experience saying I don't really know what to do, even I am vulnerable for somebody to come in and say, 'I can solve this problem for you…There is a lot of money sloshing around and you know as whenever that happens you have got some very reputable and very capable people but you have also got some people who just see the pounds signs first and don't have educational value at the top of their list. So it is worrying times. I think it creates even more scope for people to actually make a buck out of this whole thing if I'm honest (Head, School D).*

> *I feel extremely concerned about the increased use of private companies in the entire education world, but also within assessment at the moment. I feel that by removing and taking away all the known assessments and I am not saying they were great, but taking away all of those, what has happened is we have been opened up to a completely free market and we are being bombarded with sales pitches. And actually that is very hard when what you are trying to do is focus in on what you are doing for children. […] I think that the companies at the moment can really capitalise on the fear factor in schools and with head teachers and it is not healthy really. (Head, School C)*

These school leaders were inured to the problems caused by continual changes to assessment systems but were uncomfortable with the ever increasing marketization of educational policy reform which demanded 'a new type of individual…formed within the logic of competition' (Ball, 2013: 88). Over 70% of primary schools did buy baseline assessment in its optional so-called 'voluntary' year, demonstrating the effectiveness of 'the privatization of policy' (Ball, 2012; 94) in getting difficult policy done. Within the headteachers context of the '*fear factor in schools'* of high stakes accountability, refusal to engage with baseline might have been perceived as 'irresponsible' and hence not a risk worth taking. The marketization of the different baseline systems and the accountability implications meant that for the headteachers, damage limitation and minimization of impact upon teacher time were more important.

> *So I guess I went into headteacher defence mode and said we will do the quickest system that tells the least so then whoever is here in seven years will be least punished by it. […] (Head, School D)*

> *It was click on a few buttons, it was very oral, quick and quite simple and it had been devised by Speech and Language Therapists for young children. It wasn't going to damage anyone and it was going to be fairly quick and fun to do. I thought let's 'let's do it in the easiest, least onerous, cost effective, way of doing it' (Head, School A)*

These headteachers responses to baseline demonstrated compliance within a cynical critique, but not outright refusal. However, some 4,000 primary school headteachers and their early years staff did refuse to engage with baseline and did not implement it. In this daring act of 'caring for themselves' (and for the young children in their care) they were refusing to engage with the data driven reductionist baseline. Whilst remaining highly critical and cynical of baseline, other headteachers did engage with it but 'cared for themselves' through more informal means,

> *I can tell you, we head teachers just sighed, we just kind of had a group hug at the meeting, rolled our eyes, and thought here we go again. (Head, School A)*

The removal of the local authorities' trusted advice and expertise and at the same time the increased use of policy innovation labs was unsettling for these head teachers. Their uncertainties about the future was exacerbated and compounded because the local authority's traditional support and advice had been reduced, leaving individual schools to find solutions on their own. In the following interview the headteacher describes how he attempted to stay as an 'ordinary old fashioned school' within the strictures, demands and agonies of the market place that left him feeling 'vulnerable' and 'exploited'.

> *Once upon a time something new like this would have come in and the Local Authority would have solved the problem for us and they would have got us all together and said 'This is what –'. Because they had the staff, they had the personnel, they had the expertise. They would have solved that problem for us and said 'This is what we are going to do as a Local Authority. It doesn't matter what the one next door is going to do; this is what we are going to do'. That doesn't happen now because the Local Authority has been so cut back that there isn't the level of expertise or people with the time to actually solve these problems so it is down to us…. And of course in our Authority we have got a high number of academies anyway that are all parts of different chains, so you have got chain A solving it one way, chain B solving it another way and may be they have got people to help a smaller group of schools and then the rest of us are just left to our own devices, which does make schools vulnerable in so many ways, in terms of Ofsted, in terms of exploitation and it terms of actually doing your job properly…. I mean with the breakdown of the education system, your academisation, your free schools, and then ordinary old fashioned schools like us (Head, School D).*

Within this ontological crisis, this headteacher was suspicious of the motives of the DfE accredited providers but nevertheless felt the fear and threat of academisation if he made the incorrect 'market' decisions in trying to remain an ordinary old fashioned school. The removal of the local education authority advice provides an example of the 'reluctant state' in which the headteacher was struggling with a 're-grounding of social relations in the economic rationality of the market' (Ball, 2012b: 101). Baseline assessment attempted to bypass the Local Authority and the EYFS Profile whilst ensuring that the DfE accredited provider was able to analyse the data. Here the state (expensively)

produced the data, but then was removed from its subsequent analysis, in favour of the policy innovation labs.

As one head teacher succinctly put it

> *'You are paying the private sector for the joy of delivering your own assessment' (Head, School A)*

Headteachers commented on the extra costs involved in baseline, beyond what was provided by the DfE, mainly relating to training and cover to allow teachers to moderate and input data.

> *Yes I think we have spent £420 on a one day training course for our Early Years Lead teacher. I literally couldn't afford to send all three. So she has been on the course and rolled it out and I think there is another training event for head teachers and coordinators to go along - that will have a cost and then the actual materials. (Head, School A)*

> *It has taken a ridiculous amount of time to complete - and also has cost the school a lot of money in terms of getting supply teachers to cover classes whilst the Baseline assessment was undertaken. This is not value for money for schools - even if the government paid for the test itself. (Survey respondent)*

The cost of training appeared to be a particular issue, which resulted in many Reception teachers receiving training only from the one teacher who had attended the course, leading to further confusion over how to assess the children. There were also concerns about the costs of additional materials, and the fact that those who went on training were only allowed one manual, which they were instructed not to photocopy. One deputy head teacher stated that the early years teachers were about to 'explode' with the increase in their workload caused by baseline so employed four supply teachers to help in the process of managing the baseline collection. These problems of cost seemed to be a particular issue at a time when budgets are being reduced in general at school and local authority levels. Again, the issue of usefulness was a key part of value for money.

> *'This Baseline assessment has told us no more than the profile and our own assessment systems. So, a waste of money' (Survey respondent).*

This perception that baseline is a 'waste of money' was an important part of the devaluing of the policy among school staff and made baseline particularly unacceptable to teachers and school leaders when other budgets were being being reduced. Teachers felt frustrated, disrespected and undermined as they 'lost control' of the data they collected as it was submitted online to the providers. They were unsure about what would happen to their baseline judgements, how they would be analysed and what they were expected to do next.

It does feel a bit odd that you have given something away having no idea of how it is to be used. (Head, School C)
There are so many unanswered questions about what is going to happen, what it is going to look like, what it is going to be used for? (Teacher 1, School A)

These early years teachers felt that they had become reduced to data gathers and 'grey technicians', harvesting data to be sent out to the providers to be recycled back to them as governing tools. In this sense they experienced a professional 'democratic deficit' (Ball and Juneman, 2012; Hogan, et al 2016) of their work to the baseline providers.

Discussion

It is argued that getting controversial policy 'done' through policy innovation labs has enabled an extreme reduction of a child to be digitally captured, removed from his or her context, run through a series of algorithms and sent back to the school as a single number for pedagogical intervention. By straddling the spheres of government, R&D edu-business and not for profit social enterprises, the three baseline assessment 'public policy labs' were centrally located between the DfE and primary schools (Ball & Junemann, 2012) (See Figure One). They legitimated and naturalized baseline assessment policy 'narratives' that might otherwise have been previously unthinkable. By becoming kitemarked as DfE Approved Baseline Providers, the baseline public policy labs were given 'institutional force' to address and legitimate DfE 'policy utterances' for the 'treatment of seemingly intractable public policy issues' (Ball and Juneman, 2012; 11).

Figure One: Heterarchical Governance of Baseline Assessment showing network flows between the DfE, public policy labs and Primary school early years.

The policy innovation labs generated and constructed new knowledge about young children that can be understood as part of the knowledge economy of 'soft and knowing capitalism' (Thrift, 2005). This construction of new digital data knowledge 'has positioned the private sector at the centre of how public education is funded, organised and delivered' (Selwyn, 2016: 107). Baseline assessment thus allows data based policy

innovation labs to expand their reach of market-based principles and practises and the 'commercialisation of comparison' (Hogan et al, 2016) above the politics, ethics and pedagogy of early years education. Baseline's reductionist comparison, simplistic algorithms and data mining bring the allure of scientific authority and technical precision to an otherwise imprecise and unpredictable early years complexity. Baseline's measuring and data prediction of four year olds offers an easy policy seduction so that complex social problems such as inequality and poverty can be solved through computation (Kitchen, 2014).

Rather than acknowledging teachers' widespread concerns that baseline itself was educationally and ethically inaccurate, inappropriate and dangerous in setting low expectations (Bradbury and Roberts-Holmes, 2016) the DfE's 'withdrawal' of baseline assessment was based upon its concern with the technical comparability of the three providers. The DfE's focus upon the deficiencies in the instruments and methods used, leaves open the possibility that if the 'right' technical and methodological fix to the baseline design could be found, then a further attempt at its introduction might be possible. Ball and Juneman (2012; 8) note that such policy shifts do not represent 'ruptural change, but rather, small moves and changes that accumulate overtime, with occasional instances of back-tracking'. Although the Government has to date made a 'back-track' with this policy, this may prove to be more of a 'tactful and temporary retreat' rather the wholesale scraping of the policy. In this way network governance does not entail a loss of Government power but rather a considered reassembling of strategy, relationships, and power to be used in future policy interventions. National datasets of baseline assessment have the potential be 'scaled up' and aggregated into 'big' datasets of considerable commercial interest (Kitchin, 2015; Lupton, 2016; Williamson, 2015). For example, England's trial of baseline may be of interest to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) future international comparative testing of five year olds known as the International Early Learning Study (IELS), which will operate as a form of 'mini-PISA'. The IELS is part of the OECD's expansion of PISA by broadening the scope of what is measured to enhance its global governance in education (Sellar and Lingard, 2014). Similarly to baseline, IELS intends to track and compare children's data across their schooling (OECD, 2015). Here we see the further rise of international comparative performance data and the concomitant reduction of early years education to a numerical technocratic exercise.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to all the teachers and head teachers who participated in the study, to the anonymous referees for their comments and to Professor Peter Moss for his critical encouragement.

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