CIRCULATING KNOWLEDGE AND URBAN CHANGE: IDEAS, INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OLYMPIC RIO DE JANEIRO

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Planning Studies

University College London
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November 2016
DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Gabriel Campos-Salles Silvestre confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Gabriel Campos-Salles Silvestre
November 2016
ABSTRACT

This research examines why and how local policy actors engage with globally circulating ideas about urban policies and what are the broader implications of this mobilisation process. Grand visions for the development of cities have long generated interest in urban scholarship and attention has often been paid to identify the practices, models and techniques that travelled across geographical boundaries. There is however, a renewed interest spanning disciplines to critically engage with the way context-specific policies and expertise are abstracted, circulated and adapted into new political settings. This is particularly important at times in which cities are brought together in a context of competition for resources, measured against each other and encouraged to learn from ‘best practices’.

The contemporary development of the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil provides the basis of this study where it is claimed to be currently undergoing a watershed moment due the preparations for the 2016 Olympic Games. The focus is on three policies pursued since the mid-1990s that have had profound impacts on the city’s development trajectory: strategic planning, the attraction of mega-events, and waterfront regeneration. These circulating policies are examined through a socio-constructivist perspective that combines relational thinking to examine urban change and a framework of policy analysys that consider ideas, interests and institutions as mutually constitutive.

In order to analyse the circulation of policy ideas and their situated mobilisation into public policies, this thesis draws on detailed archival research and semi-structured interviews with a range of policymakers, planners, consultants, developers, scholars and activists. It argues that an appreciation of how policies are not just defined ‘in place’, can help us to understand the ways in which development is relationally pursued, and how globally circulating ideas are grounded and institutionalised into local urban policies.
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For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to present its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and present them as the only rational, universally valid ones.

Karl Marx and Friederich Engels (1845, p.68)

… soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.

John Maynard Keynes (1936, p.384)
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Local encounters with globalised ideas

On the morning of Saturday 16 November 2013, I missed what I later realised to be the last bus stop in the port area of Rio de Janeiro. Getting off some distance ahead I hailed a cab to drive me back through the diverted and blocked roads of the docklands. The temporary arrangements had confused drivers and passengers alike and the scene was one of large building sites, piles of rubble, deserted pavements and derelict buildings. During the following weekend, the three-mile elevated express way that bypassed the area was scheduled for demolition. That moment seemed a brief respite at a time of accelerated urban change. I was there for a booked tour of some of the construction sites alongside a presentation of the planned works.

The regeneration programme Porto Maravilha envisions the large-scale transformation of 5 million m² in central Rio and it has been portrayed in the official discourse as the main legacy of the Olympic Games (PCRJ, 2015). Announced in 2009, it had by then taken off with new office towers being built by national and international developers, the excavation of underground tunnels, the renewal of public areas, and the ongoing works of an iconic museum at Pier Mauá designed by celebrated architect Santiago Calatrava in view of becoming a landmark for the area. The 'Trump Towers' project for five 38-storey buildings had been circulated in the media as did the plans of the municipality for a seafront promenade. After decades of studies and proposals the comprehensive redevelopment of the area was finally underway.

My first port of call on that morning was the Visitor Information Centre set up with interactive digital displays that explained the aims of the project to the general public. On arriving at the exhibition space I was introduced to the programme by an institutional text on the walls that claimed that ‘cities are turning back to their port areas’. It explained that ‘cities around the world had awakened to the new paradigm of sustainable development’ in regenerating obsolete urban spaces and explained that the programme for Rio sought to incorporate the key features of successful renewal projects based on experiences in other countries. These included the elaboration of long-term strategic
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planning, the development of mixed-use areas with flagship projects, and the attention to the ‘power and quality of images’.

I was later escorted with a group to a van that would drive us around with a tour guide. Employed by the private partner of the regeneration programme, the young man started his script by stating that ‘the regeneration of waterfront areas is a worldwide trend in major cities and Barcelona is one of the most successful examples’. The global imaginaries of the regeneration programme were thus explicitly institutionalised.

Most interestingly, in these two instances of interface between the general public and the official presentation of a public policy, was the discursive effort to situate the programme within a globalised policy arena in which presumably, some approaches stand as best practices and some places are considered as policy models. In this case, waterfront renewal is presented as a global policy of urban sustainable development predicated on tried-and-tested features legitimated by the achievements of particular places. In following this ‘trend’, the city of Rio de Janeiro – presented in an embodied form – is able to catch up with other places and despite being a latecomer it has the advantage of learning from their experiences.

This short narrative illustrates how circulating ideas and inter-referencing experiences from elsewhere are represented in policy narratives and discourses to justify the approach taken in certain programmes. Although this is not in itself a novel practice, and certainly not in Rio as it will be seen, contemporary urban policymaking has been considered as ‘more intimately and deeply interconnected than ever before’ (Peck & Theodore, 2015, p. xvi) with significant changes in the ‘intensity of that mediation, along with the velocity of policy transfer, learning, and modelling’ (Peck & Theodore, 2015, p. 3).

Over the last 20 years a number of policies developed in Rio de Janeiro have brought together, translated, and implemented policy models mobilised from circulating ideas and knowledge, three of which are the focus of this research: strategic spatial planning; mega-event hosting and waterfront regeneration. Taken together, they allow the examination of a specific period of urban politics in the city where a marked change in local development policies can be observed, that has culminated in the development of ‘Olympic Rio’. Specifically, this research analyses why and how a particular group of policy actors mobilise ideas about urban policies and to what effect for the development politics of the city. In exploring situated engagements with ‘globalised’ ideas, the thesis contributes to contemporary debates on the circulation of policy knowledge and relational processes of policymaking. It addresses the calls for a ‘thick description’ of
the travel of planning ideas (Friedmann, 2010, p. 313) and how the ‘phenomenon’ of globally circulating policies ‘finds its “localised” expression’ (Cochrane, 2007, p. 135).

1.2 Circulating ideas and the policy process

This research is situated within ongoing debates about the conceptualisation of local and global relationships in producing urban change. More specifically, it draws on relational analyses on the ‘making up’ of local policies that pays attention to the networks through which policy knowledge circulates and the situated practices of actors framing policies according to a global imaginary (Cochrane, 2011b; McCann et al, 2013). In this respect, two perspectives have been particularly influential in urban studies.

The policy mobilities approach takes as a starting point the consideration that an important condition of contemporary policymaking is an ever-present search for and an emulation of ‘ideas that work’ (Peck, 2002, p. 349; McCann & Ward, 2011). In this context, the circulation of policy models and best practices have intensified and extended in reach as political domains have become increasingly inter-connected. Therefore, it is argued that the analysis of urban policymaking has to be concerned with ‘tacking back and forth between specificity and generality, relationality and territoriality’ (McCann, 2011, p. 109).

However, despite the ubiquitous presence of circulating ideas it is claimed that their implications have not been adequately examined. McCann (2011) notes, for instance, that ‘intercity, cross-scale circulation of policy knowledge … are long-standing but increasingly important aspects of the production of cities, yet they have not been adequately studied or theorised’ (p. 108). Three core elements are particularly important in the analysis of the circulation of mobile ideas: the involved actors, policy objects and the mobilisation process.

First, adopting a social constructivist approach, analyses are concerned with critically examining the role and behaviour of policy actors. It considers the social processes in which policy problems are defined and solutions promoted, and the engagement between actors in learning. This involves a consideration of wider networks of knowledge circulation including multi-scalar ‘networks of professionals, consultants, global agencies, national and local players searching for ideas’ (Cochrane & Ward, 2012, p. 6).
Circulating Knowledge and Urban Change

Second, it argues that the policy models that acquire greater mobility are those which extend dominant ideologies and consolidate powerful interests (Peck & Theodore, 2010). In this respect, there is an important politics in how experiences are constituted as references. Some models have explicit geographical references, in a way that the cities where particular practices were articulated become the signifier for a certain way of policy-making. Among these are cities whose urban regeneration projects acquired selective international reputations for countering the impacts of post-industrial economic decline, including Baltimore’s redevelopment of the waterfront, the ‘Bilbao effect’ of iconic architecture and the ‘Barcelona model’ of event-led urban transformation – all with an important resonance in Rio de Janeiro, as it will be demonstrated. These are cities whose experience ‘policymakers and practitioners continue to read about, hear about, discuss, perhaps visit, and consider whether to emulate’ (Cook, 2008, p. 775).

Third, as policymakers engage in learning and evaluating the application of a determined policy, they are informed both by their personal values and by the institutional contexts in which they are positioned. In the process, emphasis is given by their suppliers and attention is turned unevenly to selected aspects which are of great interest for both parties. At the time the mobilised policy is grounded in a new context, it has already been transformed (Peck & Theodore, 2010) by the processes of interpretation, selective translation and addition of new features to enable its adaptation in a different locality. In this way, rather than leading to homogeneous political landscapes, the proliferation of models and best-practices evolves unevenly into combinations ultimately conditioned by the new setting.

In turn, the worlding cities approach, although sharing similar concerns with the policy mobilities literature, is positioned with a different perspective. It considers the situated practices of local policy actors who are informed not only by external references but also by imaginaries about being in the world. As Ong (2011) summarises, these practices are ‘constitutive, spatialising, and signifying gestures that variously conjure up worlds beyond current conditions of urban living. They articulate disparate elements from near and far; and symbolically re-situate the city in the world’ (p. 13). Among these are the subtler practices of inter-referencing that are important features of official discourses, especially in the Asian context, that legitimise development agendas claiming to catch up with experiences in places such as Dubai, Singapore or Hong Kong (Ong, 2011; Phelps et al, 2014; Bunnell, 2015).
Chapter 1 - Introduction

The urbanisation experiences of cities of the Global South call into question the presentism that has animated the policy mobilities approach to draw on relational thinking in order to examine contemporary processes. Taking into account their development trajectories it can be argued that relationality has long been a permanent feature of policymaking. If we consider the labels applied during the 20th century to designate the stage of development of the region – such as third world, less industrialised or developing countries – there was always an explicit positioning in relation to more ‘advanced’ states and implicit notions of a ‘state of becoming’. Idealised visions of what a desirable stage of progress looked like – present in post-colonial, modernist or developmental projects – were pursued through an engagement with circulating ideas that have mobilised, among other things, institutional designs, policy models and development projects. Having this in mind, analyses on worlding cities consider contemporary processes such as globalisation or neoliberalism as some among other sets of influences shaping local policymaking (Ong, 2011; Parnell & Robinson, 2012).

Considering the two approaches and how local policymaking is relationally conceptualised, the main difference stands on the degree of influence accorded to the mobilised knowledge. While policy mobilities is concerned with tracing trajectories and examining the *grounding* of circulating ideas in a political setting, the worlding cities approach is motivated by understanding how in such a setting policies are *arrived at*, considering a complex array of influences and imaginaries about how a city is situated in the world (Robinson, 2013). Therefore, ‘grounding’ and ‘arriving at’ involve different analytical viewpoints to examine policymaking. The question is thus to understand which perspective is the most suitable for the task at hand. In the case of the selected policies of Rio de Janeiro, it includes episodes both of conspicuous mobilisation of ideas from a clear point of origin and less defined allusions to a range of references.

However, despite the shared concern for scrutinising the mobilisation and inter-referencing efforts present in urban policies, the very processes of ‘grounding’ and ‘arriving’ are not clearly defined. Less attention has been paid to how circulating ideas become institutionalised, or how once defined they have an impact on existing practices. Staying close to the speed of ideas or extra-territorial claims may run the risk of fetishising policies and views while conferring upon them an intrinsic persuasive power. In methodological terms the thesis will argue that it is just as important to interrogate the way these ideas enter the local policy process, how they reflect wider
political issues and have an impact on existing structures. In order to do so, this study draws on current new institutionalism debates where an ‘ideational turn’ has been observed (Blyth, 2003).

The growing body of research in what has been termed ‘constructivist institutionalism’ considers ideas as the central object of inquiry in public policy analysis (Blyth, 2002; Hay, 2006; Schmidt, 2008; Gofas & Hay, 2010; Béland & Cox, 2011). The approach provides an alternative perspective to prevailing frameworks that privilege the role of material interests (rational choice), institutional (historical institutionalism) or cultural norms (sociological institutionalism) to explain the behaviour of policy actors and policy outcomes. Whereas it is claimed that these approaches are suitable to explain processes of stability (e.g. explain policymaking in the terms of actors pursuing interests or by the influence of historically constructed institutional constraints), the ‘ideational approach’ is formulated toward understanding policy change through an idea-centred form of analysis. If according to Béland and Cox (2011) the ‘muddle of politics is the muddle of ideas’, the analysis of ‘the way ideas are packaged, disseminated, adopted, and embraced’ (pp. 12-13) is central to understanding the policy process.

However, in order not simply to substitute one explanatory emphasis for another, ideas, interests and institutions are seen as mutually constitutive, which directs analysis to the relations between them. Ideas, broadly defined as to denote a continuum ranging from specific programmes to encompassing paradigms – ‘a framework of ideas’ that besides solutions specifies ‘the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing’ (Hall, 1993, p. 279) – are understood as the medium through which interests are identified, reasoned according to one’s world view and to the constraints presented by institutions. In this sense, Hay (2011) recognises that actors’ abilities to ponder what is ‘feasible, legitimate, possible, and desirable’ is influenced both by ‘the institutional environment in which they find themselves and by existing policy paradigms and worldviews’ (p. 69). Institutions then are more than simply the background where interests are articulated and ideas promoted. In this sense, Berman (2013) argues that ideational approaches are concerned with the study of how ideas become embedded in institutions and come to influence future behaviour. Ideas do not enter an ideological vacuum when pressed on institutions, but find historically formed practices that influence their acceptability and challenge.

The thesis will argue that the shared socio-constructivist epistemology, and the emphasis on ideas as objects of inquiry that underpin relational perspectives to urban
policymaking and constructivist institutionalism, offers the opportunity to develop a combinatorial analysis. Therefore, an analytical framework based on the examination of ideas, interests and institutions – the three I’s – is adopted and developed in the empirical analysis. Such approach is primarily concerned with interrogating the influence of ideas in circulation while paying close attention to the social processes through which they are localised, adapted and institutionalised.

1.3 Rio de Janeiro Olympic development 1993-2016

This research provides a grounded study of the effects of circulating policies and worlding practices in local policymaking and urban change. This topic is examined through a case study of the city of Rio de Janeiro and the selection of three policies as ‘subunits’ (Yin, 2009) with the aim of presenting a ‘rich portrayal’ that contributes to ‘add knowledge of a specific topic’ (Simons in May & Perry, 2011, p. 224). A clearly defined period of urban politics was identified, starting with the election of a new mayor to office in 1993 and ending with the hosting of the Olympic Games in 2016. During this time, local politics was dominated by new political actors originating from the same group who commonly engaged with circulating ideas in the definition of the policy agenda. Through the analysis of the selected policies – strategic spatial planning, mega-event hosting, and waterfront renewal – this research presents a narrative of the contemporary urban development of an important megalopolis of the Global South.

Rio de Janeiro has played a central role in the urban history of Brazil, not only due to the fact it was the capital of the country between 1763 and 1960 and thus concentrated important political, economic and cultural institutions, but also for its experience of urbanisation in which the mobilisation of circulating ideas has had important effects on the county’s development trajectories and modernisation (discussed in chapters 3 and 5). Figure 1.1 situates the city and state of Rio de Janeiro. Its urbanisation is illustrative of the experiences of Brazilian cities in general, marked by accelerated growth, intense inward migration, and uneven development. The last census carried out in 2010 indicated a metropolitan population of about 12 million inhabitants living in the 21 cities forming the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro (MRRJ). Considering the Human Development Index (HDI) elaborated by the United Nations Development Programme, which combines education, health and income indicators, the MRRJ is characterised by elevated HDI in the municipalities of Rio de Janeiro and Niterói with decreasing levels in the outlying municipalities (figure 1.2).
An intra-urban analysis of the city of Rio de Janeiro, with an adjusted HDI base level, demonstrates higher indicators in the central, South End (both bottom right) and Barra da Tijuca (bottom centre) areas (figure 1.3). Although there is a similar decreasing pattern as one progresses to the peripheral areas of the North (top centre) and West Ends (top left), very low levels are observed throughout the city, denoting the location of large favelas.
The city of Rio de Janeiro is marked by severe social inequalities and spatial segregation. During the intense urbanisation process of the past century, most of the plans and projects elaborated to orient the development of the city focused on the central and coastal areas. Despite the official discourse arguing that a sea change in the development of the city is taking place with the projects associated with the Olympic Games, the key sites are concentrated in the most developed areas with higher HDI (figure 1.4). The section below introduces the period delimited in the research and the policies selected for analysis that characterise the development of ‘Olympic Rio’.

Figure 1.3. HDI of the districts of the city of Rio de Janeiro (PNUD, 2010)

Figure 1.4. Areas of intervention for the organisation of the 2016 Olympic Games. Retrieved from http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201110112031-0020357
1.3.1 The selected urban policies

The analysis of the selected policies is organised by following a chronological narrative examining each policy at a time. This choice is due to the representation of each policy to the urban politics of a particular sub-period and also for highlighting their entangled trajectories. As it will be seen, one policy has led to the other although not in a linear manner, as each proposal was crystallised by different sets of actors and around contingent dynamics. Nevertheless, taken together these policies exemplify the rationalities underpinning planning practices in the development of ‘Olympic Rio’ in the 1993–2016 period.

The first policy examined is the strategic plan of the city developed between 1993 and 1995. The elaboration of the plan had the assistance of consultants linked with Barcelona city hall who were prospecting Latin American markets in the early 1990s. The study proposed a reflexive and participatory process involving the private sector and civil society to set a vision for the future of the city at times of profound global changes. More than simply a planning instrument, it argued for a reorientation of government logics and policy priorities that entailed a paradigm shift that marked a period of transformation of municipal planning practices.

The second policy relates to the sustained objective to host the Olympic Games. During the period from 1995 to 2009 three Olympic bids were submitted and the instrumental hosting of the regional Pan American Games organised. The idea was born during the elaboration of the strategic plan and also drew from the experience of Barcelona in the planning of the mega-event. Nevertheless, subsequent proposals were radically changed and shaped according to the alleged preferences of the International Olympic Committee in the planning of events, a strategy facilitated by the assistance of international consultants. The objective to host the mega-event became an end on itself and thus symbolises a period of ad hoc planning.

Finally, the last policy refers to the programme of regeneration of the port area of Rio de Janeiro. Over decades, a series of projects elaborated by interested parties and studies carried by the municipality envisioned the transformation of this centrally located area. This ranged from proposals directly inspired by Baltimore’s Inner Harbour, to the Japanese concept of ‘Teleports’ and a frustrated attempt to build a branch of the Guggenheim museum. Considered ‘the main project of the Olympic City’ (PCRJ, 2015), a comprehensive regeneration programme was announced in 2009 and is currently
underway. The ambitious redevelopment of the area was designed according to a complex financial architecture involving the flexibilisation of planning controls and the sale of building rights with the funds directed back to the upgrading of infrastructure. The reliance on real estate capitals, the development of new modes of governance and the institutionalisation of market rationales conforms to a practice of *speculative urbanism* (Goldman, 2011) that characterises the final sub-period analysed.

1.4 Research aims and questions

The aims of this research are to examine how circulating knowledge about urban policies is grounded and/or draws on worlding exercises at the local level and the implications of these processes for urban development politics and practices. The focus is on policymaking processes with an attention to the role of ideas, the alignment of interests, and the institutionalisation of the policy.

In order to address these aims, the research will draw on the following research questions.

1. What are the factors that lead local policy actors to draw on circulating policy ideas and inter-referencing practices?

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to map and interrogate the extended networks established by policymakers from Rio de Janeiro city hall and the content of the ideas for each policy selected. It involves an examination of policy actors, their intentions and practices; the analysis of the ideational realms represented by the mobilised policy; and a historical contextualisation of policy legacies.

2. How are circulating ideas co-constitutive of interests and institutions during the policymaking process?

To address this question it is necessary to examine the dynamic relationship between ideas, interests and institutions. Rather than a passive element in the policy agenda, ideas give meaning to interests while going through a process of ‘institutional fit’. It is thus necessary to analyse how ideas contributed to the identification of new interests and the way they were institutionally embedded.

3. What are the implications for local politics in the mobilisation of circulating ideas and inter-referencing practices?
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The answering of this question entails a widening of scope in order to contextualise the relationship of a given policy to its political context. This includes identifying how the championing of some ideas foreclosed space for other agendas, how it empowers and disempowers particular groups and the implications for democratic discussion and accountability.

In order to answer these questions, this thesis draws on qualitative research methods to track the networks of circulation, evaluate converging interests, and critically interrogate the policymaking process of some of the ideas that have had the largest impact over the recent development of Rio de Janeiro. The collection of data involved the organisation of multi-site fieldwork carried out in the cities of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Barcelona and Lausanne. The methods employed include the identification and analysis of 77 official documents related to the selected policies; the review of newspaper and other media coverage to support the contextualisation of the period, involving the consultation of about 1,700 articles; and the carrying out of 66 semi-structured interviews with politicians, planners, business groups, developers, professionals and consultants. Data was collected and organised in a systematic manner through the use of a hierarchy of thematic codes for each policy analysed, and content analysis was the method used to interpret data. The presentation and discussion of findings is organised by the use of an analytical framework adopted from new institutionalism analysis centred on the dynamic relationships between ideas, interests and institutions.

The thesis makes conceptual, empirical and methodological contributions to relational analyses of policymaking and urban change. First, it documents, describes, and critically interrogates the situated practices of policy actors and the strategic mobilisation of urban policy ideas to leverage political capital, contribute to coalition-building and foreclose political debate. Second, it moves policy mobilities analysis from a predominant focus on the cities of the Global North, while sharing the concern present in worlding cities approaches, to adding complexity to the examination of urban experiences in the Global South beyond that of ‘subaltern agency’ (Ong, 2011). Third, it draws on the ‘ideational turn’ of new institutionalism in order to develop an alternative analytical framework to examine the grounded process of policymaking. The thesis demonstrates the importance of local politics to the outcome of grounded ideas and the implications of policies presented as pragmatic, common-sense modes of intervention in foreclosing debate to alternative agendas of progressive development.
1.5 Thesis structure

The thesis is structured in nine chapters. The overall organisation of the analysis is presented in figure 1.5. It consists of an overview of conceptual literatures in chapters 2 and 3 and an exposition of the theoretical frameworks drawn in the subsequent methodology and analysis. It critically interrogates existing literatures on ideas and policy change and the relationship between circulating ideas and urban change. It is followed by a presentation and discussion of methodology in chapter 4, followed by a detailed contextual overview, in chapter 5, that situates the case study within longer-term historical and contemporary political trajectories. The empirical part is composed of three chapters, 6, 7, and 8, each of which examines one of the selected policies according to the three I’s analytical framework established in the first part. The final chapter presents the conclusion of the research and addresses the questions presented in chapter 1. Each chapter is summarised in more detail below.

Chapter 2 begins by examining the relationships between ideas and policymaking, principally through the analysis of two bodies of literature. The first reviews the different frameworks of public policy analysis that have been developed to account for the role of ideas in the policy process. Each approach employs particular concepts and emphasises different aspects of the policy process. It is argued that these differences are stylised to a certain degree, as there are common research agendas underpinning...
the development of each approach. As a result, a synthetic analysis centred on ideas can thus draw on the terminology and concepts proposed.

However, the emphasis on a process-based analysis still leaves some gaps referring to the actual content of policy ideas and the relevance of institutional frameworks. The discussion thus moves to a review of recent debates in the new institutionalism literature which is argued to have been incurred in an ‘ideational turn’. It conceptualises ideas as operating at different normative and cognitive realms that shape policymaking, ranging from wider structuring paradigms down to frames and specific programmes. This literature prioritises ideas in the analysis as a way to mediate the influence of structural factors and institutional constraints on the one hand, and the interests and agendas of policy actors on the other hand. It calls for a nuanced approach that considers these fundamental dimensions of policymaking as mutually constitutive. As a result, an analytical framework based on ideas, institutions and interests is proposed in order to assess the role of ideas in policymaking.

Having set the framework for an ideas-centred policy analysis, chapter 3 contextualises the wider processes enabling the circulation of policy ideas. It does so by reviewing historical analyses of the circulation of planning ideas, contemporary processes of urban change, and recent discussions on mobile ideas and relational thinking. It starts by examining how ideas on how to develop the urban space have a long trajectory, particularly in relation to the experiences of colonialism and developmentalism. Planning historians have charted the mobility of planners, planning models and techniques, normally resorting to simple binaries such as importing and exporting sites. This historical context is localised in the case of Brazil by reviewing two planning episodes that engaged with travelling planning practices.

The section goes on to contextualise recent urban change according to the processes of economic globalisation and neoliberalisation. It reviews the general tenets of neoliberal policies and the shift to urban entrepreneurial practices. This has enabled the emergence of a new paradigm of local development that normally resorts to particular types of planning policies. This includes strategic spatial planning, the bidding and hosting of mega-events and the redevelopment of brownfield areas such as waterfront spaces, which have circulated widely as common policy responses across a wide spectrum of cities.

If the perceived effects of globalisation have encouraged local governments to pursue policies in relation to extra-local factors (e.g. competitiveness to attract flows of capital, visitors and high-skilled workforce), recent research agendas have sought to open up
the ways in which local policymaking has become ever more globalised. It is from this shared premise that the policy mobilities and worlding cities approaches have examined urban change as being both territorially and relationally produced. In this way the local and global are seen as mutually constitutive. For a certain policy model to circulate globally it has to be fixed in places in order to attest its validity, which in turn is continuously transformed as it gets reproduced. On the other hand, local policymakers increasingly resort to global models to legitimate proposals, which is the perspective taken in this research. But this is not a merely voluntary act, as local policy actors and policy networks have become ever more globalised and extended in reach.

A final reflection on the concepts moving the urban relational agenda is offered in light of the analytical framework proposed in the previous chapter. It argues that the shared socio-constructivist approach underpinning the two distinct bodies of literature offers opportunities to critically evaluate how ideas get to travel, are grounded and inform local policymaking. This is the approach articulated to examine the case study.

Chapter 4 outlines how the analytical framework centred on the exploration and analysis of the three I’s will be operationalised. The research design is described and the choice of methods and the analysis of data are discussed. The chapter also reflects on the benefits of undertaking case study research as a way to contribute theory and the applicability of selecting urban policies of the city of Rio de Janeiro as ‘subunits’ of analysis. Considering the application of qualitative methods, in which the undertaking of semi-structural interviews constituted the main source of data, the chapter reflects on the themes of positionality and reflexivity. It examines the dynamics of interviewing policy elites and the negotiation of power relationships during the research. The way in which data was collected, interpreted and analysed according to the theoretical framework is also reviewed.

Before moving to the empirical part of the thesis, the aim of chapter 5 is to contextualise urban development ideas in Rio de Janeiro within wider political, economic and social processes. In this respect it pays particular attention to the urban politics taking place at the national and local level. In relation to the former, it reviews the emergence and institutionalisation of an ‘urban reform’ agenda that is aimed at transforming legal provision and planning practice in order to promote social and spatial justice. An outcome of this was the repositioning of the instrument of comprehensive master planning – known as planos diretores – at the local level as objects of social struggle. In this respect the analysis moves to the development trajectory of Rio de Janeiro with
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a review of ideas and the production of inequality until the formulation of the 1992 plano diretor. It is from this point that the period under analysis in the case study starts and its phases are briefly outlined.

The empirical analysis is presented in chapters 6 to 8 where findings related to each policy are examined. Chapters 6 analyses the mobilisation of strategic planning knowledge from Barcelona to Rio de Janeiro for the elaboration of the first strategic plan of the city. It situates the circulation of knowledge within overlapping policy networks and examines the motivations of both the demand and supply side. It then assesses the ideational realms operated by strategic planning, how it facilitated the formation of new coalitions and the way in which it legitimised the institutionalisation of new planning frameworks.

Chapter 7 then moves the analysis to the second selected policy, the hosting of mega-events. It traces the origin of the Olympic project to the experience of strategic planning and the failure in adapting the Barcelona model of mega-event-led development in the initial bid. It then analyses how the mega-event strategy was reformed in the following years as a pragmatic attempt to be nominated for the event according to the perceived norms and values established by the International Olympic Committee. As the project evolved, it brought together multiple interests resulting in attempts that aimed to conciliate them in the final proposal that was awarded the hosting rights of the 2016 Olympic Games. The implications for the development of the city are evaluated together with the agendas it helped to promote.

The final empirical chapter (8) examines the programme of regeneration of the port area of Rio. It documents how, since being framed as an obsolete site, it became the object of visioning exercises that aimed at transforming the area by following regeneration models from elsewhere. It examines how contextual political and economic factors finally enabled a window of opportunity in the late 2000s when an experimental model of urban regeneration was articulated. The features of such a model and the interests behind its development are assessed alongside the creation of institutional frameworks that enable closer engagement between public and private actors. A preliminary assessment of the programme after five years since coming into force is then presented.

Finally, chapter 9 presents the conclusions of the research. It reviews the findings of previous chapters against the research questions. It then makes concluding reflections of practice and theoretical matter and indicates directions for future research.
CHAPTER 2

Ideas and Policy Change

2.1. Introduction

Despite arguments for the ‘hollowing out’ of the state, governmental institutions remain vital for the grounding of globally circulated ideas and their translation into policy change. Policy ideas are developed through a process conditioned by existing institutional structures and the interests of the actors present in a given policy subsystem in a mutually evolving relationship. Understanding how ‘new ideas rise to political prominence’, why ‘individuals or groups trade old beliefs for new ones’ and how ‘ideas become embedded’ in institutions (Berman, 2001, p. 233) are some of the key questions that have guided a reappraisal of the relevance of ideas in policy analysis. This chapter reviews these literatures in order to identify the concepts and analytical frames necessary to examine how ideas shape the policy process.

This chapter is organised according to the following sections. The first section reviews frameworks of the policy process that account for the role of ideas to explain policy outcomes. Notwithstanding the differences in their approaches, they provide a rich grammar to conceptualise the process of policy change and their similarities are discussed. The second section examines the literature of new institutionalism that has reconsidered the relationship between ideas and institutional environments. Specifically, it offers a structured conceptualisation of ideational realms that constrain policy activity, being particularly helpful the concept of ‘policy paradigms’. This literature also reappraises the agency of policy actors and their relationship with institutional structures. In view of these two approaches, the third section proposes an analytical framework that can conciliate the grammars and approaches with a constructivist perspective of policy change. It argues that a framework that analyses the inter-relationship between ideas, interests and institutions is capable of accounting for the key dimensions of the policy process while strategically providing flexibility in the research analysis. The final section provides a summary of the chapter and argues for an appreciation of the wider circulation of policy ideas.
2.2. The role of ideas in the public policy process

A common approach in the study of public policy is to employ frameworks for the systemic analysis of the policy process. Analyses have long relied on the conception of a sequence of stages starting from the setting of a policy agenda, to formulation, decision-making, implementation, and finally evaluation, feeding back to the beginning of the process (Hupe & Hill, 2006; Jann & Wegrich, 2007; Howlett & Giest, 2013). Regarded as ‘stages heuristic’, or the ‘textbook approach’, this model started to be challenged during the mid-1980s on the grounds that its over-simplified approach compromised a more critical analysis and that the boundaries between stages were not as clear-cut and sequential as suggested (Hupe & Hill, 2006; Sabatier, 2007; John, 2012). Other critiques were also levied for the approach being ‘more prescriptive and normative rather than descriptive and analytical’ (Jann & Wegrich, 2007, p. 43) while based on the premise that rationality guided the process; for being modelled after major pieces of legislations and top-down decision making; and for ignoring the complex and crowded environment of actors trying to influence policymaking (Sabatier, 2007, p. 7).

As a result, a variety of alternative frameworks were developed, each emphasising different aspects of policymaking but invariably attempting to account for the complexity, messiness and power-laden relations that permeate the process. Among the most influential of these frameworks are those developed to interrogate the process of agenda-setting and the role of ideas (Birkland, 2011; John, 2015). The following subsections review the general propositions of the multiple streams approach, the punctuated equilibrium theory and the advocacy coalition framework. Despite differing in their starting points and methods used, the final subsection discusses how their common elements can contribute to a synthetic approach to examine ideas and the policy process.

2.2.1. The Multiple Streams Approach

The multiple streams approach (MSA) was developed by John Kingdon (1984) to analyse the process of agenda-setting and the specification of policy alternatives. Kingdon’s research agenda was motivated to answer two key questions: why some subjects become prominent on the policy agenda and others do not, and why some alternatives for choice are seriously considered while others are neglected. Kingdon’s depiction of the policy system is dynamic and suggests that decisions are often made under messy and unpredictable conditions. Decision-makers cannot devote attention
to all the problems present in their domain areas so the question of ‘how does an idea’s time come?’ (Kingdon, 1984, p. 1) becomes a critical one.

The model conceives the policy process as underpinned by three ‘streams’ made of problems, policies and politics that run in parallel and come together at critical junctures facilitated by a window of opportunity (figure 2.1). Accordingly, an issue is formally considered when ‘a problem is recognised, a solution is developed in the policy community, a political climate makes it the right time for change, and potential constraints are not severe’ (Kingdon, 1984, p. 165). Problems are issues demanding government attention and action. A central concern of actors involved inside and outside formal government is to frame certain events as problems and lobby for policy response. Problems may be perennial and rise in importance incrementally or lose their appeal. However, there are also sudden events requiring swift responses as in the case of environmental disasters, economic crisis or infrastructural collapse. Policies denote solutions but sometimes their development is not consequential to an identified problem. Kingdon brings attention in this category to the communities of specialists who are constantly testing and circulating their ideas that can suddenly sweep like ‘fads’, endure years being ‘softened up’ or being discredited. Finally, politics is represented as the contextual environment that shapes and influences the production of policies. This category includes the change of administrations, ‘swings in the national mood’ or the turnover of relevant political actors (Kingdon, 1984, pp. 17-18).

Kingdon suggests that each stream follows an independent course and that the critical juncture takes place when a policy entrepreneur is able to couple the streams together and push a policy idea through the ‘policy window’. This is a more agent-centred perspective as it portrays entrepreneurs as advocates who ‘lie in wait in and around government with their solutions at hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their solutions, waiting for a development in the political stream they can use to their advantage’ (Kingdon, 1984, p. 165). Since development at each stream is independent, the ability of a topic to get on the agenda is somewhat fortuitous in relation to timing: if the problem has no salience, or the solution is not available, or there is no political imperative, it is very unlikely that the topic will be considered by decision-makers. If the streams can be aligned through the deployment of policy instruments, then the conditions for getting attention are met.
After analysing the rise and fall of topics on the agenda of the national departments of transportation and health of the US government over the course of four years, Kingdon concluded that the process through which governmental agendas are set is structured by the problems that focus attention; by developments in the political sphere; and by the visible participants in control of the agenda. On the other hand, the specification of the alternatives is defined by the hidden participation of specialists acting within the policy stream who narrow down the range of possible choices for a given problem when a response takes place.

While MSA seems to provide a neat explanation with clear demarcation of the units of analysis, in applying the concept of streams in parallel flows and windows of opportunity, Kingdon provides a more dynamic framework than that of the stages heuristic. Thus MSA can account for how problems may be enduring until elevated in the agenda, the role of interests in lobbying for policy proposals when there may not be a compelling problem that demands them, and the unpredictability of political and external events.

The contribution of MSA to the understanding of the policy process is attested by its wide citation (Zohlnhöfer et al, 2015). Cairney and Jones (2015) argue that MSA
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employs a level of abstraction about universal concepts that allows it to be employed possibly to any case study while Zahariadis (2014) commends it for overcoming the assumption of rationality driving decision-making by integrating policy communities with broader events. However, Mucciaroni (2013) questions the extent to which the streams can be truly regarded as independent and not mutually evolving, the highly contingent dynamic that denies the possibility of predicting the conditions for a topic to get on the agenda and the little consideration for the influence of past legacies or the institutional environment. Nevertheless, Zahariadis (2014) recognises that the merit of MSA lies in addressing the impact of ideas in public policy without denying the importance of self-interests.

2.2.2. The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

The second analytical framework to examine agenda-setting and policy change is that of the punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) developed by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (2009). Sharing similar concerns with MSA, the framework focuses on the causes of both policy stability and change. Drawing on a longitudinal timeframe, the study identified what characterises periods of stability in a given policy subsystem when there are slow incremental adjustments to a policy topic, and those moments of rapid and profound changes that punctuate such equilibrium when policy issues become topical and widely discussed.

The framework deploys a series of concepts with resemblances to both MSA and ACF. Given that many topics dispute the attention of governments that can only deal with a limited range at a time, most issues are delegated to policy subsystems where they are addressed by specialist communities of official and non-official actors, or the ‘policy venues’. The discussions of most policy issues remain in the subsystems out of political spotlight and tend to remain stable. The key feature of such stability is that of policy monopoly, that is, communities of actors able to establish a ‘monopoly on political understandings concerning the policy of interest, and an institutional arrangement that reinforces that understanding’ (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 6). Efforts are made by different groups to create ‘policy images’, defined as a combination of technical information and emotive appeals conveying the manner in which a policy is characterised and understood (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 176). A positive policy image is linked to a specific framing of the problem and how to address it so as to legitimate the monopoly of a group and minimise contestation. In this view, issue definition is central to policymaking and entails the ‘study of agenda control and access’
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(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, pp. 22-23). Change under such circumstances is incremental and reflects the bargaining among interests and adjustments to different circumstances.

These situations are punctuated by moments when policy agendas expand beyond the control of the groups in the subsystem and are elevated onto the macro-political sphere where ‘some issues catch fire, dominate the agenda, and result in changes in one or more subsystems’ (True et al, 1999, p. 99). In this case, what determines the emergence of such episodes is the interaction between changing images and venues of public policy. The specific image of the policy can become contested and the monopoly breaks down, moving the discussion of the policy higher onto the macro-political sphere. This situation usually takes place when new participants become interested in the debate or groups excluded from the monopoly are able to leverage criticism and voice their views in different venues.

The authors summarise the dynamic of their interpretative model by emphasising that ‘subsystem politics is the politics of equilibrium – the politics of policy monopoly, incrementalism, a widely accepted supportive image, and negative feedback’ to depart from established images. On the contrary, ‘macro-politics is the politics of punctuation – the politics of large-scale change, competing policy images, political manipulation, and positive feedback’ that encourage change (True et al, 1999, pp. 101-102).

The main contribution of PET to policy analysis is the interactive examination of events, institutional venues, ideas and policy actors producing change (Boushley, 2013). In relation to other approaches, PET is more attentive to the examination of institutional arrangements (John, 2012). Just as MSA, it focuses on the formation of agendas but it goes beyond by following its consequences and how ideas become institutionalised in a policy system thus producing a new state of partial equilibria. Institutions play an important role in recognising some issues over others, legitimising the participation of some groups and monitoring performance. However, there are admitted limitations to the use of the approach as it was developed to examine particular situations in which political conflict exceeds the boundaries of policy communities to other policymaking venues (True et al, 2007). Another criticism, also shared with the other approaches, is the reliance on events external to the subsystem to account for shifts in policy, which can lead the application of the model to describe processes rather establishing causal mechanisms (John, 2012). Although different in the focus of analysis this issue is partly addressed by the Advocacy Coalition Framework examined next.
2.2.3. Advocacy Coalition Framework

The final framework with extensive application in the analysis of policymaking reviewed here is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith (1993). Concerned with analysing how policy changes over time, the focus is on the interaction within and among competing coalitions of actors with a stake in a given policy subsystem. Advocacy coalitions are understood as ‘people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief system – that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 25). Shared beliefs are portrayed as the principal ‘glue’ that holds coalitions together in any given subsystem.

The structure of the belief system of an advocacy coalition is presented as organised in a hierarchy of three tiers (figure 2.2). First is the deep core that includes basic and normative beliefs shared by the members of the group regarding general values and world views. This includes predispositions, for instance, on issues regarding society, environment or social justice and the susceptibility to change is ‘akin to a religious conversion’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, pp. 121-122). Next is the policy core denoting fundamental positions and strategies specific to the policy subsystem and reflexive of the deep core. This category relates to what is deemed a priority within the policy area, and the possibility of change is still difficult as it is linked to the strategies devised by the competing groups but possible if faced by continuous empirical evidence. Finally, is the set of secondary aspects specific to the subsystem that contain policy instruments, their settings and parameters of evaluation. Changes in this dimension occur more often as a result of policy learning denoting coalitions’ continuous engagement in refining their strategies. Successful policy participants are for Weible and Sabatier (2007) those able ‘to translate their policy core beliefs into actual policy’ (p. 128).

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) state that the presence of coalitions in a subsystem of political salience usually includes between two and four competing groups. Policy learning by the coalitions is the main concept that gives dynamism to the framework as it is claimed that coalitions constantly monitor threats and opportunities to coordinate their values and make adaptations to the secondary aspects of their ideas (figure 2.3). In this view coalitions are constantly engaged in a policy debate to champion ideas that
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further their interest and influence policymaking. Their activities are set within and are affected by broad contexts falling into two categories. First are the ‘relative stable parameters’ that are wider features of the policy system such as rules and constitutional structures and general societal values unlikely to change in the mid-term (Cairney, 2012). Second are external shocks that can affect the power balance of coalitions and are discussed below. The application of the model is suggested by the authors to examine periods of at least a decade when it is possible to trace changes to a policy over time, map coalitions, investigate their influence and the impact of factors external to the subsystem.

Policy change is conceptualised in ACF as minor or major revisions and can be triggered by four factors (Jenkins-Smith et al, 2014). First, minor policy change can occur in the policy subsystem as a result of learning and new information. This takes place more often and is incremental over a long period. Second, a major change can result from events external to the subsystem, such as a regime change, socioeconomic crises or disasters. These events are beyond the control of the coalitions and can cause significant rearrangements to how the problem is perceived and addressed. Third, another major change can be triggered by events internal to the subsystem, that is, under the control of participants and include scandals, fiascos and policy failures. Depending on the impact and the framing of the event it can alter the power balance among coalitions. Finally, major changes can also be the product of a negotiated agreement between the competing coalitions in particular circumstance such as ‘policy stalemates’ when progress is dependent on reaching certain degree of consensus.
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Figure 2.3. Flow diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Weible & Nohrstedt, 2013)

Among the contributions of ACF are the recognition of networks of actors influencing the policy system beyond the ‘iron triangle’ of government, bureaucrats and interest groups to identify shared beliefs across these groups and others such as the media and specialists (John, 2012). It also provides a more sophisticated analysis of the relationship between ideas and interests, demonstrating that dominant groups, rather than controlling the policy system to further their interests, engage in learning, elaboration and promotion of ideas capable of articulating their interests. Cairney (2012, p. 216) recognises that the focus on beliefs rather than interests overcomes the limitations of rational choice literatures in which actors are assumed to be driven by the maximisation of their interests.

The applicability of ACF may be limited if certain features cannot be established. Weible and Sabatier (2007, p. 123) claim that the framework is suitable to situations where there are disputes among groups involving multiple actors. As a consequence, it can be of limited use when there are no clear coalitions or only one dominant group. Finally, even though change is deemed as the focus of analysis, John (2012) contends that ACF is better suited to describe stability, as the reasons for substantial changes are credited to external events and thus it is unable to provide causal explanations. The following section examines the strengths and limitations of the three approaches and highlight
points of convergence and complementarity that can facilitate a synthetic approach to policy analysis.

2.2.4. Elements for a synthetic analysis

Different frameworks to analyse the public policy process have been developed to overcome the limitations of the stages heuristic model. In this section three frameworks that consider the role of ideas in policymaking were reviewed giving attention to their general propositions, contributions and limitations. Each framework put an emphasis on particular aspects of the policy process and proposes the application of specific methods and guiding questions. However, as different authors have noted, these differences are outstripped by their similarities and should not prevent the concerted articulation of their main concepts (Meijerink, 2005; Real-Dato, 2009; Cairney, 2013; Howlett et al, 2016). It is not the intention in this subsection to develop a combinatory framework, rather the aim is to compare the key elements of analysis in order to identify topics of convergence and those needing further elaboration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Content of ideas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Subsystem</td>
<td>Policy entrepreneur, policy communities</td>
<td>Policy windows</td>
<td>Technical feasibility, value acceptability, anticipation of constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PET</td>
<td>Subsystem, macro-political</td>
<td>Policy communities, policy venues</td>
<td>Incremental and large-scale shifts</td>
<td>Policy images</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Subsystem</td>
<td>Advocacy coalitions</td>
<td>Adjustments, shocks and negotiation</td>
<td>Reflexive of belief structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is possible to compare the elements of analysis in MSA, PET and ACF according to how four fundamental dimensions are conceptualised: the delimitation of spaces where policy activity takes place; the agency of policy actors; the dynamics of processes of policy change; and the content of ideas (table 2.1). First, all three frameworks analyse policy activity at the subsystem level. MSA and PET were both developed based on the agenda-setting process of national department areas whereas ACF identifies as subsystem a specialised policy topic that can comprehend more than one jurisdiction both horizontally (multiple departments) and vertically (government levels). All three acknowledge the macro-political environment when an issue gets wider attention. However, PET portrays a more dynamic iteration of a policy moving from the subsystem to the macro-level when discussion exceeds the control of the dominant group.
Second, all frameworks emphasise agency to explain the process of change and depict policy communities that are beyond the boundaries of governmental structures. The policy entrepreneur of MSA plays a central role in aligning politics and problems while providing a persuasive policy solution. In both PET and ACF actors are aggregated in coalitions vying for the monopoly of policy expertise in a particular area. The frameworks consider policy actors in executive, legislative and departmental spaces; the academia and experts; private groups of interest; the media; and public opinion. The contest between coalitions influences the stability or departure over a policy issue.

Third, despite the differences in their conception of the process of policy change, all three frameworks pay great attention to external events to explain major changes (Schlager, 2007). Changes in government administration and crises are conceptualised as shocks that facilitate the opening of policy windows (MSA), attract the attention of actors outside the subsystem and can rearrange power balance among coalitions (PET and ACF). Adjustments and refinement are portrayed by PET and ACF as the regular activity of groups exercising control over a policy agenda.

Fourth, there is a greater variation in the specification of the content of ideas. In MSA, the substance of ideas is discussed in general terms. They are reflexive of windows of opportunities but to succeed they have to be technically feasible, be attentive to values shared by specialists and societies and anticipate constraints such as costs and public support. Kingdon (1984, p. 132-136) makes passing observations about dominant ideologies and ‘national culture’ shaping the content of policies, while Baumgartner and Jones (2009, pp. 25-26) briefly describe ‘policy images’ as the mixture of empirical information and emotive appeals. In this respect, ACF provides a more structured explanation by linking policy content to the normative and cognitive base that shape the beliefs of the coalitions.

The frameworks reviewed here direct the analysis of public policy to the subsystem level; to the role of actors and coalition groups making authoritative claims; and to the interplay between particular and macro-contexts to explain policy change. However, two important dimensions are less specified. First, as John (2012) notes, the institutional dimension is undervalued. There is a tendency of ‘presentism’ in the analysis of change for the shared reliance on external shocks. Minor revisions to a policy incorporate the institutionalisation of the idea to a certain degree. Nevertheless, the legacy of past policies and institutional development shaping
policy content is insufficiently considered. Second, despite being attentive to the role of ideas, new policies are portrayed as the cognitive products of actors in response to events and the nature of ideas is not closely examined. ACF goes further in this point by establishing a belief structure indicative of policy preferences and coordinating activities. However, this constitutes for Grin and Loeber (2007) a positivist epistemology as it establishes interests (based on beliefs) as pre-given and ideas as the translation of such interests. The importance of ideas in policymaking has also been the focus of interest in other policy literature that precisely addresses the relationship between institutions and ideas, the focus of the next section.

2.3. Ideas and institutional analysis

A greater appreciation of the role of ideas in policy analysis has also been the focus of much attention in the new institutionalism literature to the extent that it has been claimed an ‘ideational turn’ in policy studies (Blyth, 2002; Béland & Cox, 2011). This was motivated as a reaction to previous approaches that privileged structuralist and rationalist explanations to the outcomes of policy activity (Mehta, 2011). These premises came at the expense, as Campbell (2002, p. 21) notes, of understanding how ideas, which comprises elements such as ‘theories, conceptual models, norms, world views, frames, principled beliefs’, were also important in shaping policymaking. This has encouraged an alternative ideational approach aiming at explaining ‘action as a result of people interpreting their world through certain ideational elements’ (Parsons, 2007, p. 96).

A consideration of the interplay between ideas and institutions has motivated revisions across the different strands of the new institutionalism literature (Blyth, 1997; 2003; Lieberman, 2002; Schmidt, 2008; Gofas & Hay, 2010). This section reviews those approaches that place ideas at the centre of inquiry, in particular that of constructivist institutionalism, rather than its use as a complementary concept to existing frameworks, as for example in explanations focused on rational choice or the sociological context. The key theoretical proposals embedded in this approach are examined in the following subsections including the conception of ideas and their effects in policymaking; the role of actors in the mobilisation of ideational realms; and the consideration of institutional structures in constraining and being influenced by ideas.
2.3.1. Paradigms and ideational realms

The heuristic focus on the formation and characterisation of recognisable ideas in shaping public policy can be traced back to studies that reappraised the role of the state in defining policy outcomes. As Berman (2013) argues, up to the early 1990s policy analysis was largely influenced by pluralist, behavioural and Marxist approaches that pictured the state as a ‘transmission belt for, or an instrument of, underlying socioeconomic forces’ (p. 218). Works such as Hugh Heclo’s (1974) comparative study on welfare policies in Britain and Sweden were an exception for opening the state ‘black box’ to examine how a range of policy actors shaped the design of social programmes (Baumgartner, 2013). Heclo’s concluding assertion that ‘[g]overnments not only “power” … they also puzzle. Policymaking is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf; it entails both deciding and knowing’ (Heclo in Hall, 1993, pp. 275-276) emphasised the independent relevance of institutions, knowledge, learning and ideas; key concepts that became the focus of the new institutionalist studies that followed.

A keystone in the operationalisation of ideational concepts was Peter Hall’s (1993) analysis of change in macroeconomic policymaking in the United Kingdom. Charting the policy adjustments and reforms carried between 1970 and 1989, he argued that the limited results achieved within the prevailing orientation were mobilised to argue for an alternative paradigm. He argued that the swift replacement of the existing Keynesian economic rationale by the monetary ideas that ensued constituted a ‘paradigm shift’.

He defines policy paradigms as:

A framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole. (Hall 1993, p. 279)

This definition encompasses a three-fold hierarchy of ideational realms that, according to Hall, characterise the policy process. Accordingly, policy in any field is shaped by the overarching goals or paradigms; by techniques or instruments to achieve those goals; and by the settings of these instruments (Hall, 1993, p. 278). He recognised that changes in the settings – which he termed ‘first order changes’ – or in the instruments themselves – ‘second order changes’ – constituted ‘normal policymaking’ aiming to address persisting problems. In contrast, a change, not only of settings and instruments, but the overall goals of a policy area – a third order change – exemplified
the sweep replacement of a paradigm. Those moments mark a radical departure from
the ‘prism’ through which policymakers understand their area of intervention as well as
their own role within it (Hall, 1993, pp. 278-9).

Episodes of paradigm shift are rare and usually take place at moments framed as crisis
when adopted practices are claimed to be inefficient and there is a wider political
contestation. Discussion spills from expert circles to the public debate, with an important
role played by the media, when different groups compete to frame the nature of the
problems and to offer potential solutions. Rather than a process of cumulative
knowledge leading to changes in policy, Hall recognizes that such shifts are more
political in their judgements and consequential of a change in authority and
centralisation of decision-making. Failed attempts by both Labour and Conservative
governments during the 1970s to stimulate growth and employment, while coping with
rates of inflation, were devised within a Keynesian paradigm having unemployment rates
and active fiscal policies to regulate the economy at the heart of state decisions. The
economic crisis that took place at the end of that decade challenged Keynesian
economic policy and opened up space for competing views to which the Conservatives
articulated a monetarist alternative that privileged the control of inflation and fixed rates
of growth. Replacing Keynesianism by a monetarist/neoliberal paradigm represented a
systemic change with a redefinition of objectives and instruments. Without playing down
the importance of other factors, Hall argued that in the election of Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher the articulation of new ideas was ‘as important to the outcome as
was the contest for power’ (p. 289). He concluded by stressing the importance of the
‘flow of ideas’ as ‘an important dimension in which policy is made’ (p. 290) and
encouraged further research to refine the analytical framework of policy paradigms:

Policymaking in virtually all fields takes place within the context of a particular
set of ideas that recognize some social interests as more legitimate than others
and privilege some lines of policy over others. Without denying the impact of
material interests on the policy process, we need to know much more than we
now do about the role that ideas play in policymaking and in the process
whereby policies change. (Hall, 1993, p. 291)

Reflecting on the influence of Hall’s paper twenty years later, policy scholars agreed that
his arguments opened up a series of new venues of research (see Béland & Cox, 2013).
The concept of policy paradigm more specifically became the foundation to studies
that, according to Béland and Cox (2013, p. 195), privilege ‘ideas over rationality or
material interests as the fundamental drives of political action’. Moreover, it facilitated
the understanding on how ideational factors can ‘structure or limit policy debate and
action’ despite the general complex dynamics of policy change (Hogan & Howlett, 2015, p. 5).

However, it was also noted that stressing the importance of paradigms runs the risk of obscuring other important aspects in policy change. First, it can overemphasise paradigm change at the expense of ‘stable policymaking’ that characterises most of policy activity. Baumgartner (2014) recognises that Hall’s agenda was designed precisely to understand such pivotal moments but it neglected the fact that not all policy areas are clearly underpinned by paradigms. In some cases it may be possible to define clear overarching goals in areas such as macro-economic policy, social security or health care. However, in others cases policies may be put together by reflexive and knowledgeable actors in specific contexts, some of which may be contradictory, fallible, and contested, to which linking particular ideas to a paradigm can be inefficient.

Second, Hall examined two contrasting and coherent paradigms that were mutually exclusive, that is, the adoption of one implied in the complete rejection of the proposals of the other. Daigneault (2014) questions how realistically one can define coherence in such an abstract concept while Carstensen (2015) extended the concern to the definition of the boundaries between paradigms as clearly incommensurable. Paradigms articulate general worldviews or core beliefs that are intrinsically open for interpretation to actors in order to facilitate the formation of coalitions, while ideas about policies can be shared between rival theories.

Third, it also failed to account that not always are there alternative paradigms readily available in moments of crisis to challenge prevailing norms (Baumgartner, 2013). The status quo of an existing paradigm can be called into question in face of failure to deal with lasting problems and yet not be rivalled by concurring views. Less general ideas can be applied while the prevailing paradigm loses ground without being entirely replaced.

Elements in Hall’s paradigm thesis hold close resemblance to the policymaking frameworks reviewed in section 2.2. A moment of crisis to existing norms in which debate ‘spills over’ to public debate and leads to rapid changes is what characterises the episodes of punctuation analysed by PET. Moments such as these enable ‘policy windows’ in which entrepreneurs can mobilise ideas articulated in competing policy communities and strategically couple with the heated political debate over alternative solutions. Finally, the threefold characterisation of ideational realms in policymaking, ranging from the more abstract conceptions of paradigm down to the formulation of policy goals and instruments, mirrors ACF conception of coalitions structured around
shared core beliefs, policy orientations and programmes. Notwithstanding each particular focus, the examination of ideas in policy change seems to bear common features across the frameworks.

Nevertheless, ideas remain an elastic concept encompassing a wide spectrum ranging from the generality of paradigms to more specific policy programmes (Berman, 2013). In a structured review of the different ideational realms in policymaking, Campbell (1998) classifies ideas according to their positioning in a given policy debate and to their cognitive and normative dimensions (table 2.2). In the foreground of a policy debate are ideas such as specific programmes and the frames that legitimise them that are more explicitly articulated and routinely contested. On the other hand, lying in the background are taken for granted assumptions that delimit the range of alternatives likely to be considered. Paradigms and public sentiments constitute such conceptual structures insofar that they normally remain unquestioned. Ideas can also be classified according to their cognitive and normative qualities. Both programs and paradigms are at a cognitive level for providing analyses and establishing causal relationships. Programmes are specific prescriptions and strategies to a given policy problem whereas paradigms present assumptions in which programmes are based for establishing relationships at a wider level. In turn, frames and public sentiments operate at normative level by interpreting values, attitudes and identities. Frames can be understood as the discursive exercise that seeks to legitimise programmes by establishing associations with certain values, while public sentiments are interpretations at a more general level of over-arching collectively-shared values.

Table 2.2. Campbell’s typology of ideas and their effects on policymaking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes</th>
<th>Paradigms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive (Outcome oriented)</td>
<td>Ideas as elite prescriptions that enable politicians, corporate leaders, and other decision makers to chart a clear and specific course of action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideas as elite assumptions that constrain the cognitive range of useful programs available to politicians, corporate leaders and other decision makers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative (Non-outcome oriented)</td>
<td>Ideas as symbols and concepts that enable decision makers to legitimise programs to their constituents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideas as public assumptions that constrain the normative range of legitimate programs available to decision makers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: adapted from Campbell, 2004, p. 94.
Campbell’s typology offers a heuristic resource to locate ideas within an ideational continuum present in the discussion of a policy to the extent they can be identified in public discourse and official documents. However, as illustrated in the frameworks examined in section 2.2, ideas cannot be taken in isolation from other mutually constitutive factors affecting policymaking. Policy actors and their interests are such a factor and are examined next.

2.3.2. Ideas and agency

The argument about the relevance of ideas brings an implicit concern with agency. Ideas are above all the product of human cognition and cannot be disassociated from the interests that support them. However, as Cairney notes (2012), there are two approaches in portraying the power of ideas. One examines ideas as the independent variable, that is, the process to be explained. Ideas in such analyses are pictured as a structuring and impersonal force usually linked to the examination of ‘big ideas’ such as capitalism and religions that rise and cause profound change, normally employing metaphors to describe ideas as viruses or tsunamis (Cairney, 2012, pp. 220-221). The second approach treats ideas as the dependent variable, that is, the object to be explained for the phenomenon registered. It places emphasis on the construction, promotion and receptivity to ideas and thus on the identification of groups and individuals and their relationship with political institutions. Such concern serves to avoid accruing to ideas a force on their own and instead pays attention to how they are socially constructed and championed by ‘carriers or entrepreneurs, individuals or groups capable of persuading others to reconsider the ways they think and act’ (Berman, 2011, p. 235).

For an idea to be supported in view of influencing policy change, it needs to appeal to diverse audiences and serve as what Béland and Cox (2016) call ‘coalition magnets’. In this view, a ‘policy entrepreneur’ strategically frames ideas that can attract the support of decision-makers. Béland and Cox (2016) contend that highly ambiguous and polysemic ideas can better serve in the formation of a coalition than narrowly-defined ideas. Polysemic ideas have greater capacity as coalition magnets for their broader appeal that allows diverse actors to identify their interests.

The relationship between ideas and interests is according to John (2012) key for examining the causes of stability and change in public policy. As the author argues, at the same time that interests realise ideas to attain them, ideas are also constitutive of interests. Despite the importance of examining how ideas are expressions of interest
and how actors and groups promote them, Campbell (2004) contends that much of the recent writing on policy-making processes have not been attentive to formulating the issue of agency in ideational analysis. Therefore, he proposes a classification of actors according to the ideational realms they operate (figure 2.4).

The classification follows the typology of ideas examined above and further develops Hall’s insights on the formal and informal actors promoting new policy ideas. At a causal level are the decision-making elites of politicians and top bureaucrats directly involved in the design of programmes and better positioned to translate ideas in policies. Programmes are not simply designed to address existing problems, but also to act on those problems currently held as important. Framers are thus the group positioned between what Campbell calls the ‘carriers’ and ‘gatekeepers’, who are able to frame ideas in ways that it has policy viability. In a more general level are the theorists, in which group Campbell identifies the academia and intellectuals. Although the author recognises that this group is also actively involved in the proposal of programmes, it occasionally articulates new paradigms to make sense of changes in the economy and society and explain the limits of current ones and their consequential replacement. The electorate at large and business elites are the constituent groups who in the expression of their mood transmit signs of potential support or disapproval to the ideas being proposed.

Figure 2.4. Actors and their ideational realms. (Campbell, 2004, p. 101)
Beyond the four-fold typology of ideas, Campbell identifies a fifth group of policy brokers performing the strategic role of linking the different realms. This group resonates with MSA policy entrepreneurs who are capable to couple the different streams and push for a policy package. Campbell sees this group operating at the interstices of the different realms and are able to transport ideas between them. A classic example is the role of media bringing new issues into policy debate for policymakers but it also includes think tanks and policy institutes that, as Campbell argues, are able to connect several ideational realms by simplifying and disseminating research from others into policy briefs aimed to influence policymaking or to appeal to public sentiments through their editorial tone. This category also includes epistemic communities, groups operating at a more clearly visible transnational space and that deserve a more detailed analysis.

According to Peter Haas (1992), who first elaborated the concept, an ‘epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (p. 3). The increasingly complex nature of topics related to financial, macroeconomic, technology, environmental or health issues has been accompanied by the expansion and proliferation of specialist networks responsible for framing problems and advocating responses to them. Akin to ideational analysis approach, Haas is also careful to highlight the social construction of such authoritative claims, stressing that the information provided by such experts can be held as ‘neither guesses nor “raw” data; it is the product of human interpretations of social and physical phenomena’ (pp. 3-4). The depiction of epistemic actors and the reasons that bring them together also parallel the vocabulary examined so far. Haas identifies that experts are brought together in epistemic networks for their shared set of normative and principled beliefs; causal beliefs; notions of validity of knowledge; and a common policy enterprise, in which their competence is directed related.

This conception of experts linked by their knowledge domains is particularly helpful to expand the analysis of ideas and actors beyond that of the state under analysis. Epistemic networks may well demonstrate a transnational reach, adding another layer of complexity in tracing the trajectory of ideas, examine their content and identifying actors. Their ultimate goal, nonetheless, is to convince decision-makers and have their ideas influencing policy responses. Establishing where institutional constraints lie is the final aspect, and a determining one to support the ideational analysis.
2.3.3. Institutional constraints

Earlier sections have examined how new institutionalism has taken on an ideational approach to provide more nuanced accounts of policy change while contextualizing agency. The review of literature so far has not distinguished between the different conceptions of institutional frames that exist and why. However, as Blyth (1997, p. 244) argues, ‘the type of institutional analysis one adopts sets limits to the type of ideas it identifies as important. Conversely, the type of ideas identified as basic causal variables similarly circumscribe one's choice of institutionalist framework’. Thus it is important to examine the differences between the three established currents of new institutionalism – rational choice, sociological and historical – and the manner in which a turn to ideas was conceived. Critics claim that such a resort to ideas only served to fill the gaps in their theoretical weaknesses. In reaction to that a further variant of new institutionalism – constructivist institutionalism – has been developed that builds upon the insights of the established new institutional variants while reserving for ideas a more fundamental explanation.

The study of political institutions – understood as organisations, laws and rules – has been at the core of political science ever since the inception of the discipline and was traditionally oriented toward the description of systems, structures and procedures that govern political life (Lowndes 2009; John, 2012). Consonant with the theoretical reconsideration of the role of the state in policy activity discussed in the previous subsection, the literature on political institutions flourished and developed in different variants, each taking a different perspective on how institutional structures affect behaviour and policy outcomes.

Rational choice institutionalists conceptualise institutions as the outcome of a process to set the most efficient structure to lower transaction costs and to provide equilibrium to decision-making. The structures of institutions are the rules of the game that affect the behaviour of policy actors seen as individuals acting in instrumental ways to further their interests (Shepsle, 2006). Driven by a ‘calculus approach’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 939) actors employ strategic actions to maximize benefits within institutional constraints. The conception of institutions by sociological institutionalists represents for Hall and Taylor (1996) the other extreme of a normative-cognitive spectrum. It considers institutions in a broader sense as to encompass not only those closely associated with political life but also cultural forms, procedures and symbols. Institutional structures and human action are seen to be mutually constituted as actors interpret and respond to
situations by employing institutional scripts and templates that reinforce social conventions. In contrast to the rational choice approach, institutions are seen not simply as the product of a process to define an efficient structure but are rather the product of culturally specific practices assimilated into organizations (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 946). It does not negate that actors behave in instrumental ways but contextualize their motivations as socially constituted and following a logic of ‘appropriateness’. Finally, historical institutionalism sits between the two poles of the spectrum conceding to both the ‘calculus and cultural approaches’ while accounting for a more longitudinal analysis. Traditionally, the approach has been used in comparative political studies to investigate variations in the development of similar political institutions across jurisdictions. The central concept stemming from this analysis is that of path dependence. Accordingly, it considers that decisions and the participations of certain groups are influenced by institutional arrangements produced in the past and their associated policy feedback (Béland, 2005). A new idea to be undertaken thus goes through a process of ‘institutional fit’ that can explain variation across similar policies in different contexts. Hugh Heclo’s and Peter Hall’s work are examples of historical institutionalism approaches.

As mentioned at the beginning of the section the convergence of the new institutionalism literatures to the role of ideas in the policy process has been criticised for being an ad hoc solution to theoretical blind spots (Blyth, 1997; 2003; Lieberman, 2002; Schmidt, 2008; Gofas & Hay, 2010). Historical institutionalists turn to ideas, for instance, to explain how policy actors produce change when this cannot be determined by institutional trajectories and legacies. Rational choice institutionalists on the other hand employ the concept of ideas to explain sub-optimal outcomes to actors’ interests but grounded in shared beliefs (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). In these examples it has been argued that ideas are considered as ‘auxiliary, residual or supplementary variables’ (Gofas & Hay, 2010, p. 47) posed as exogenous factors ‘that do not fundamentally change the original theoretical framework’ (Lieberman, 2002, p. 700). For Schmidt (2008, p. 304) and Gofas and Hay (2010, p. 47) the incorporation of ideas in the established new institutional approaches represents a contradiction to their own theoretical perspectives that privileges institutions in ‘stable equilibria, with fixed rationalist preferences, self-reinforcing historical paths, or all-defining cultural norms’ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 304). Blyth (2003, p. 697) goes further in the criticism of rational institutionalists by arguing that their turn to ideas is implicated in their own undoing of the conceptual foundation of rational choice.
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As a corollary, a further variant of new institutional analysis that accrues a central role to the influence of ideas has been developed (Blyth, 1997, 2002; Hay, 2001, 2006, 2011; Schmidt, 2008, 2010 2011; Gofas & Hay, 2010; Béland & Cox, 2011). Described as constructivist, ideational or discursive institutionalism, the approach has a central ‘concern with the dynamic relationship not only between context and conduct (or structure and agency) but the ideational and the material, the discursive and the political’ (Hay, 2001, p. 196). The perspective takes the critique of stasis and determinism to which it qualifies the other variants of new institutional analysis to propose an approach that puts ‘agency back into institutional change’ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 316) while considering ideas as ‘constantly in flux, being reconsidered and redefined as actors communicate and debate with one another’ (Béland & Cox, 2011, p. 6).

The comments above illustrate three key considerations for the proposal of the constructivist perspective as an alternative approach. First, ideas are considered as the entry point of analysis, which gives a more dynamic approach to examine policy and institutional change. This represents an inversion of analytical procedure in relation to the other three perspectives. The established new institutionalism literatures consider structures such as institutions, interests and culture as given and prior to ideas, and as such provide different explanations to examine continuity in political life. The consequence of this, as critics have noted (e.g. Blyth 2002; Gofas & Hay, 2010), is limited ability of institutionalism to account for short- and long-term change hence the appeal to something exogenous to such structures. In turn, a focus on ideas can examine how they are constitutive of change, how they contest and are contested in institutional environments, how they reaffirm or challenge framings and paradigms, and how they enable actors to further their interests while marginalising others.

Second, the emphasis on ideas is accompanied by a greater concern for agency, which gives a more nuanced approach to examine change. Whereas behaviour in the other perspectives is seen to be determined by rationality, path dependence or cultural norms, the constructivist approach places emphasis on how policy actors articulate ideas, promote them, gather support and challenge the status quo. This does not exclude the possibility to account for actors acting in their self-interest or how ideas are packaged according to an ‘institutional fit’ but contextualises the production of ideas in more contingent ways.

Finally, in underlining the social construction of policymaking, the approach paints a complex world in which ideas are constantly seeking access to political institutions while
policy actors actively search for them. In this sense, ideas can be seen as a banal activity as for each that is championed and manages to influence policymaking, many more are discarded or never get attention. This consideration highlights the importance of communication, how actors articulate ideas that frame problems and possible solutions in ways that resonate with interests and political and institutional viability. Thus ideas do not rise by their intrinsic qualities and gather support on their appeal, an important observation so as to not overestimate their role in the policy process.

The constructivist perspective has not been received without criticism. In a review of the contributions from constructivist authors, Bell (2011, pp. 884-890) argues that in reacting to what is claimed to be over-deterministic in the analyses of the established variants, constructivist institutionalism pushes too far in the other direction by rendering institutions almost without significant roles. He proposes that the concerns of institutional constructivists are to be better realised within a historical institutionalism that accounts for more agency within institutional settings (Bell, 2011, pp. 890-895). The affinities between the two perspectives are not contested and indeed Hay (2006, p. 63) considers that constructivist institutionalism may be understood as a progress from its historic counterpart. Regardless of how to settle the differences between the two perspectives, what is clear in the development of new institutional theories is that analyses of policy change must take into consideration the dialectical relationship between the three main variables of policymaking: ideas, interests and institutions (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, p. 14; Blyth, 2002, p. 270; Palier & Surel, 2005, p. 7; Béland & Cox, 2011, pp. 8-9; Bell, 2011, p. 891). The next section considers how an analytical frame based on these three dimensions can reconcile and operationalise the frameworks and approaches examined.

2.4. Examining policy change through ideas, interests and institutions

Ideas, interests and institutions are, as Hay (2004, pp. 204-205) notes, the conventional independent variables of policy analysis and yet their causal effects on public policy are rarely examined simultaneously (Palier & Surel, 2000; Walsh, 2000). The arguments of the theoretical proposals examined so far do corroborate the concurrent importance of the ‘three I’s’ to examine policy change. As Risse-Kappen (1994, p. 187) stated, ‘ideas do not float in the air’ thus an analysis of policy change has to be equally attentive to
the carriers of ideas as to the institutional environment where these ideas are proposed, articulated and ultimately, embedded (Berman, 2001; Lieberman, 2002).

In this final section an analytical framework based on the ‘three I’s’ is proposed. It has the benefit of bridging across the main concepts of the frameworks and theories discussed in the previous sections and to provide a synthesis of an idea-based approach to examine policy change. It also has methodological gains, as Palier & Surel (2000) argue. It is difficult to known prior to an investigation which variables and factors can better explain a policy outcome. Applying the ‘three I’s’ allows the researcher to mobilise key dimensions and determine in the analysis the explanatory weight of each one.

Undoubtedly, an individual examination runs the risk of undervaluing the mutually evolving relation that each factor has with the others and the wider context. For this reason, the analytical framework proposed below is inherently relational, that is, each dimension is appreciated in relation to other factors in a processual manner.

2.4.1. Ideational realms

The key argument provided in this review of literature is that a focus on ideas provides an analytical tool to mediate the constraints of structures and the agency of interests to influence policymaking. Ideas have the dual quality of presenting cognitive – indicating what to do – and normative – what one ought to do – dimensions (Béland, 2005). Different authors in this review have referred to a hierarchy of ideational realms to locate where normative and cognitive ideas operate. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), Hall (1993) and Campbell (1998) provide a continuum ranging from world views, paradigms and core beliefs, passing through more particular policy orientations down to specific policy design. The notion of paradigm is applicable insofar as it is possible to determine conflicting views in the selected policy area. However, ideas are rarely fully embraced but shaped by coordinating and conflicting activities among groups of actors. As noted, polysemic ideas may have greater appeal and it is in their refinement that one can examine power struggles.

2.4.2. The alignment of interests

As already stressed, ideas do not simply rise on their own but are rather promoted by actors who identify opportunities for their interests. The extent to which it is possible to separate ideas from interests is more a question of analytical choice, as Jacobsen (1995) argues. However, a conception of ideas only in terms of pre-given expressions
of self-interest as in materialist treatments misses the dynamics in which ideas evolve and can shape interests, particularly in moments of uncertainty when actors are not necessarily clear where their interests lie (Blyth, 2002). Again, Campbell’s (2004) classification can assist in the identification of the actors involved and how they carry ideas across the ideational realms. Reflecting the hierarchy of ideational realms, there are those involved in the intellectual activity of shaping a paradigm, as theorists, the academia, and epistemic communities; the ones able to transverse different institutional spaces and promote ideas, as carriers, brokers and policy entrepreneurs; and those in position of defining the final design of a policy such as high-level bureaucrats and elected officials. Ultimately what is important to evaluate is the ability of ideas to facilitate the alignment of interests, that is, how they serve as ‘coalition magnets’ or to support the articulation of existing coalitions.

2.4.3. The institutionalisation process

Finally, policy choices are not made ‘on a tabula rasa’ but are reflexive of the institutional environment where they are taken up (Bell, 2011). ‘New ideas’, as Sikking (cited in Berman, 2001) remarks, ‘do not enter an ideological vacuum. They are inserted into a political space already occupied by historically formed ideologies. Whether or not consolidation occurs often depends on the degree to which the new model fits with existing ideologies’ (p. 236). This observation is illustrative of the conciliation between the constructivist and historical approaches. Institutions are constituted of ideas that become established over time and thus affect the policy decisions that follow. However, new ideas can also challenge existing ones leading to institutional change. Institutions thus provide the space in which the abstraction of ideas are realised into policy action (Muller, 2000). Important in the analysis is to examine the process of institutionalisation of ideas, how they become embedded and come to influence norms, behaviour and decision-making (Radaelli, 1995).

2.5. Conclusion

The relevance of ideas in policy analysis has been reappraised in order to provide more critical and dynamic frameworks of inquiry. In light of the limitations of previous approaches, it allows a strategic entry point for research and analysis that mediates structural and agency processes while extending policy action beyond the boundaries of the state. Several frameworks and concepts have been developed to address the complex dynamics of policymaking. Notwithstanding their methodological differences,
they share a ‘moderate’ constructivist approach (Muller, 2000) that invariably examines ideational, institutional and interests’ dimensions. Therefore, an analytical framework that simultaneously consider the ‘three I’s’ can strategically overcome the difficulty in selecting one among the many concurrent (and similar) approaches while asserting, during the analysis, the weight of each dimension in the explanation of the policy outcome. However, in accordance with the main concern that motivated the elaboration of the ideational approaches, the analysis of the ‘three I’s’ has to be dynamic and examine how each dimension is mutually constituted.

Ideas are thus one of the main currencies of politics. The literature reviewed here portrays a political environment in which ideas are in constant flux in policy subsystems, either being championed from outside or mobilised from within political institutions. This complex array of coexisting communities and advocacy coalitions stretches well beyond the jurisdictional boundaries that have traditionally been the focus of policy analysis. However, despite the consideration of certain transnational actors such as epistemic communities, the new institutionalism literature does not pay enough attention to the wider circulation of ideas and how grounded national (or local) institutions relate to them. If at the core of politics lie, as Béland and Cox (2011) claim, ‘the way ideas are packaged, disseminated, adopted, and embraced’ (pp. 12-13), policy analysis has also to be attentive to the relational character of ideational processes and how prescriptions draw from experiences from elsewhere. Current debates in the urban studies literature can further problematise this perspective.
CHAPTER 3

Ideas and Urban Change

3.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how the circulation of ideas regarding urban development has been examined. Chapter 2 demonstrated that an idea-centred analysis of the policy process can mediate the tension between structural constraints and the relevance of social actors. This chapter will concentrate on the topic of urban policy ideas and argue that recent approaches to examine urban change through a relational analysis present similarities with the institutional constructivism research agenda that allows a complementary analytical framework to be articulated.

This chapter is organised according to the following sections. First, it examines how planning history analyses have long been interested on the topic of the diffusion and travelling of ideas and techniques shaping urban development. Examples are drawn from the experience of two Brazilian cities to demonstrate that this phenomenon has long been associated with the trajectories of urban contexts in the Global South. Second, it analyses how contemporary processes of globalisation and neoliberalisation have arguably intensified and intensively influenced the nature of circulating ideas. It is argued that political and economic changes have entailed a paradigm shift in the central concern of urban policymaking with the naturalisation of an inter-urban competition rationale for flows of capital, labour and visitors. This entrepreneurial approach to urban development is characterised by the ‘serial reproduction’ of iconic and successful urban forms and strategies to which three are examined for their relevance to the analysis of the case study. Third, the recent writings of policy mobility and worlding cities are analysed and their relational approach to study circulating and inter-referencing practices evaluated. These approaches have provided more grounded and socio-constructivist perspectives to urban change in relation to the more abstract and all-encompassing accounts of neoliberalisation. The final section argues that there are shared theoretical concerns across the literatures reviewed in chapters 2 and 3 that enable closer conversations between the research agendas for the articulation of an analytical framework of relational urban policymaking.
3.2. The diffusion of planning ideas and travelling practices

The circulation of planning ideas has, according to King (1980), a longer history than often acknowledged. However, it is with the advent of town planning as a distinct field of knowledge in the early 20th century that Sutcliffe (1981) and Ward (2005) have observed the constitution of active and fertile networks of knowledge exchange.

Studies in planning history normally focus on one or more of the main dimensions supporting the circulation of ideas: the emergence, allure and popularisation of planning ideas; the wider social, political and economic context facilitating the mobility of ideas across different landscapes; and the role of individuals, planning institutions and networks in the spreading of knowledge. Planning ideas encompass both cognitive and normative ideational realms. We can think of these different realms according to the levels of analysis proposed by Hall (1993), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) and Campbell (1998) discussed in chapter 2.

At the micro level, planning ideas include techniques and instruments that specify how to plan and organise the built environment. These relate to a wide range of topics such as land use (e.g. zoning, green belts), traffic (e.g. roundabouts, parkways), housing (e.g. the neighbourhood unit, bungalows, social housing) or mobility (e.g. high speed trains, bus rapid transit) originally developed in particular circumstances and later introduced in a diverse array of cities. Despite the apparent technical content that these ideas entail, they can be creatively appropriated for different uses in new settings. For instance, Hirt (2013) has demonstrated how the application of residential zoning in US cities became strikingly different from the experiences in Germany and the UK that constituted the main references. The designation of areas entirely for residential use – in itself a novelty – also included the detailing of the built form – detached houses – and the use for single-family holding. More than simply detailed guidelines, Hirt argues that in fact this was underpinned by class and race prejudices motivated by enhancing property values and creating socially segregated areas.

At the meso-level are the planning principles, theories and charters linked to broader objectives. These ideas can include the detailed content of programmes and instruments and can also be based on more aspirational values. Nonetheless, they present a clear visual dimension of how the built environment and/or living conditions should look (figures 3.1 and 3.2). Examples of these are planning models (e.g. Garden
Cities, TVA model of regional planning), movements (e.g. City Beautiful) and charters (e.g. CIAM’s Athens Charter, New Urbanism). Similarly, the circulation of the images does not preclude the modification of their content. Planning historian Peter Hall (2002) has argued how the popularity of garden cities in several countries were far more related to their aesthetic qualities than the idealised view of self-governing communities conciliating industrial work and healthy habits.

Figure 3.1. Ebenezzer Howard’s sketch of a Garden City (Howard, 1898)

Figure 3.2. Le Corbusier’s Radiant City model of modernist planning.
At the macro-level we can find more abstract ideas rooted in values and norms shared with other policy areas and that characterise a wider political orientation. In this regard we can include the broad agendas of developmentalism, modernism or neoliberalism that influenced policymaking across policy subsystems including planning. The changing of planning paradigms, as discussed in chapter 2, is rare and normally associated with wider departures in societal values.

Analyses regarding the circulation of planning ideas have also considered socio-political contexts that structured the flow of knowledge. The experience of colonialism is certainly one of the most examined (King, 1980; Home, 1990, 1997; Njoh, 2007). The British and French colonial systems in Africa, Asia and the Americas, for instance, were structured by institutional frameworks through which circulated planning ideas and actors. The colonial landscape was not only the background in which material forms and organisational processes were implemented to facilitate the extraction of wealth and power control, but as Home (1997) contends, was also a laboratory of social experiment. The legacy of some of these ideas is still clearly visible in those cities whose spaces were planned to physically segregate the European quarters from those designated to natives (Nightingale, 2012).

Studies in colonialism are often inclined to the imposition of planning ideas by the authoritarian rule of colonial powers while less attentive to role of ‘agencies or brokers’ that enabled transfers to take place (King, 1980, p. 214). This comes at the expense of the role of local actors in resisting, adapting or innovating planning practices, which more recent postcolonial planning studies have sought to re-examine from the natives’ perspectives (Nasr & Volait, 2003). Partially to address this issue, Ward (1999) developed a diffusion typology of planning practices (figure 3.3). At the extremes of the diffusion continuum lie the imposition by an authoritarian power and the creativity of local actors influenced by references from elsewhere with different degrees of imposition and borrowing situations located in between. The typology has been particularly helpful to guide analyses on the emergence and development of planning cultures (Freestone, 2004; Nedović-Budić and Cavrić, 2006; Ayataç, 2007). However, the underlying binary ‘importer’ and ‘exporter’ dynamic present significant limitations for the study of circulating knowledge when there are intermediaries involved or when a particular planning idea develops gradually over time.
Finally, there is the consideration of agency in planning history that has traditionally focused on the biographies of individuals as carriers of ideas across geographical boundaries. Home (1990, pp. 23-24) talks of circulating planners consisting mainly of three groups: colonial officials such as surveyors and engineers; consultant architects working on specific assignments; and the ‘peripatetic propagandists’ characterised by notable experts who circulated widely in the networks of epistemic communities. While the first group is characteristic of the colonial experience, the second group worked beyond these boundaries and demonstrated a pioneering transnational character in the first half of the last century (Ward, 2005). These experts could be present in private groups hired by governments to undertake a development project for instance, or participate in international competitions for planning proposals. The planners linked with the Paris-based *Musée Social* were particularly active in Latin America. The institution, set up in 1894, was an early version of a think-tank dedicated to the study of social welfare and brought together professionals who studied the effects of industrialisation and urban growth (Horne, 2002). Many of these experts were commissioned with works in the region, ‘a constellation of French urban planners and landscape architects’ (Cody, 2003, p. 93) active between 1910 and 1950 in places like Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Quito, Caracas and Havana (Pechman, 1996).

The third group refers to the few individuals that acquired international prestige and circulated globally giving lectures, taking part at events or providing consulting services. This group includes Swiss architect Le Corbusier, who visited South America on different occasions starting in 1929, not only to verse about the modernist approach to planning but also to prospect potential commissions, such as the rumoured plan to build a new capital for Brazil (Leme, 2009). Important for the structuring of the epistemic communities of planners was the constitution of international organisations, the development of planning courses and the hosting of conferences and exhibitions (King, 1980; Saunier; 2001, 2002; Amati and Freestone, 2014). Sutcliffe (1981), for instance, has argued about the impact of the emerging international architecture congresses at the turn of the 20th century in facilitating knowledge exchange. Participants not only discussed planning models in fashion...
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such as the highly regarded Städtebau formulated by Austrian architect Camillo Sitte, but were also ‘able to visualize an ideal mode of planning, incorporating among other elements British garden suburbs, French monumental grandeur and elegance, and the expansiveness of American park systems’ (Sutcliffe, 1981, pp. 170-171).

Powerful examples of how these key dimensions that structured the flow of planning ideas shaped the development of cities can be found in two planning episodes in Brazil. The first episode of large-scale urban renewal in the country took place in 1910s Rio de Janeiro with the redevelopment of the city centre and the port area. The programme of works can be set against three main contexts. The first was social, rooted in a hygienist discourse of combating the spread of tropical diseases that affected the different classes living in proximity in the densely populated central area. Linked to that was the economy, as competition from other port cities in the region and epidemic episodes affected maritime trade. The third were political and cultural, with intentions of transforming what was arguably an agrarian and archaic society into a forward-looking and urban society that incorporated practices of French and British influence (Needell, 1987; Benchimol, 1992; Almandoz, 2002; Abreu, 2008).

In order to implement an ambitious programme to improve infrastructures, circulation, public spaces and cultural institutions, the federal government appointed the engineer Francisco Pereira Passos as mayor between 1902 and 1906. Born into an elite local family of coffee growers, Passos can be pictured as a policy entrepreneur vying for a window of opportunity for his years lobbying for a wide-ranging plan of improvements devised with the local community of engineers. The ideas and proposals contained in the plan incorporated recently developed techniques, with which the local engineering class was familiar in their travels to Europe, attendance to conferences, and through specialised literature (Needell, 1987; Leme, 2009). Particularly influential was the redevelopment of mid-nineteenth century Paris headed by Baron de Haussmann that a younger Passos witnessed first-hand during his European training (Benchimol, 1992). The ‘Haussmann model’ is discussed by Pinheiro (2011, p. 87) as consisting of an authoritarian intervention to impose a large-scale urban project over a consolidated fabric with aesthetic concerns for monumentalising and embellishing the urban space.

The most emblematic of Passos interventions was thus the construction of Avenida Central, a major boulevard cutting across a dense area, modelled after Parisian roads and dotted with civic buildings such as an opera house, a national library and a school of fine arts. Apart from justifications to improve circulation, the thoroughfare was also
used as an instrument of hygiene intervention as it demolished several tenement houses where the urban poor lived on the grounds of sanitary control (Meade, 1997). As a result of this social displacement, families moved to more distant places lacking infrastructure and to the hills nearby, contributing in the process to the growth of the first slums (Abreu, 2008). Outcomes such as these clearly revealed what Almadoz (2002) argued to be the ‘bourgeoisie’s longing to appropriate the metropolitan myth coming from industrializing Europe. For the Frenchified elites of these cities, the invocation of Second-Empire Paris was thereby supposed to make possible their magic transformation from post-colonial city into real metropolis’ (p. 5).

Figure 3.4. Section of the proposed plan for the construction of Avenida Central (Ferrez, 1982)

Figure 3.5. The concluded works of Avenida Central and the new port area (Kok, 2005)
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The worlding practices of the local elite were not restricted to physical transformation of the city centre, but it also entailed a behavioural and cultural disciplining. Needell (1987) lists a series of practices that were outlawed in central Rio including ‘hawk food on the streets … selling milk from cows trotted door to door, raising pigs within city limits … continuing with the entruudo (wild pranks) and unregulated cordões (boisterous popular processions) of Carnaval, and a host of other “barbaric”, “uncivilized” customs’ (pp. 35-36). The ‘Pereira Passos Reforms’, as the episode came to be known, was in Villaça’s (1999) opinion a unique experience in Brazilian planning, when economic and political elites had complementary objectives and their plans were openly disclosed, debated and fully implemented. Several other ambitious plans were proposed not only for Rio but to other major centres in the country with limited success, until the utopian planning of a new capital city.

The inauguration of Brasília in 1960 as federal capital in the country’s hinterland is also illustrative of the features underpinning circulating planning knowledge discussed here. After the Second World War modernist architecture and urban planning translated to the built environment the paradigm of industrial progress, rationality and technical efficiency that became particularly strong in the developmentalist regimes and fast-growing urban metropolises of Latin America (Almandoz, 2002). A distinct Brazilian modernist school flourished since the 1930s with the visits of Le Corbusier and was responsible for several civic buildings, new town plans and private developments (Leme, 2009). The decision to build a new capital in a sparsely populated plateau in order to foster development in Central Brazil was the election ticket of president Juscelino Kubitschek, who promised a developmental leap of ‘fifty years of progress in five years of government’. A proposal of an airplane-shaped plan for the city put forward by architect Lúcio Costa was chosen for Oscar Niemeyer’s design of governmental and residential buildings. Costa’s plan followed the strict lines of modernist planning enshrined in the Athens Charter with functional zones for residences, commerce, government buildings, leisure, education, and served by express ways. In fact, the city is considered ‘the most complete example ever constructed of the architectural and planning tenets put forward in CIAM manifestos’ (Holston, 1989, p. 31).

However, for all the optimism in establishing a ‘blueprint utopia’, that could serve as an example of progress for the rest of the country, Holston (1989) contends that Brasília degenerated into a caricature of the model it aimed to become. The vision for Brasília was to create an entirely new city, a city of bureaucrats that broke away
from the past and from the urban problems that characterised Brazilian major cities as chaotic and socially and spatially segregated (see figure 3.6). It was not considered that the mass of the 60,000 migrant workers that built the new capital, mostly from impoverished regions, wanted to stay and share the benefits of progress (P. Hall, 2002). Without the entitlement to live in the new residences or to settle within the city limits, informal settlements sprang up around the federal capital. While Brasília has to this day a population that is half the projected capacity of 500,000 inhabitants – with the highest per capita income in the country – the total federal district area currently accounts for 2.6 million people living in poorly planned ‘satellite cities’ (Codeplan, 2012). The result became for Holston (1989, p. 200) ‘an exemplar of social and spatial stratification – one that clearly demonstrates, moreover, the role of government in promoting inequality’.

The two planning episodes briefly reviewed above illustrate the long history of circulating planning ideas influencing the development of cities, and in the case of Brazil, the selective extension of their benefits. At two different moments in the past century it is possible to identify local policy actors as members of international epistemic communities of engineers and architects knowledgeable of advancements in their fields. Their ideas reflected and were constitutive of wider paradigms of civilisation and modernisation that included not only specific programmes and practices but also normative perspectives regarding the use and organisation of the urban space. More recent changes in political and economic contexts entailed another shift in paradigm and influenced the content of planning policies more likely to circulate.
3.3. Urban entrepreneurialism and the paradigm of competitiveness

Starting in the 1970s, globalising economic processes and financial crises significantly challenged the prevailing economic and political arrangements established since the end of the Second World War in developed and developing countries. The Keynesian economic paradigm (also Fordism, developmentalism and Import-Substitution Industrialisation) that prevailed since the post-war period – privileging the intervention of the state to secure the stability of the economy and the welfare of citizens – was framed as insufficient to address inflation, falling profits, stagnating GDP rates and growing social expenditures in a context of industrial relocation and volatile capital markets (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Duménil & Lévy, 2005; Harvey, 2005; Lapavitsas, 2005; Peck & Tickell, 2007). A neoliberal paradigm that reviewed the role of the state in the economy – predicated above all on the desirability of self-regulated markets with minimal government intervention as the most appropriate mechanism for economic development – was articulated as an alternative to recover growth through the restructuring of the relationship between the state, market and labour.

Neoliberalism reviews the classical liberal economic ideas formulated in the 19th century in which markets free of government interference – in respect to regulations, taxes and subsidies – provide the optimal mechanism to organise the economy in capitalist societies (Lapavitsas, 2005). The economic recession of the 1970s, and the ensuing high rates of inflation and unemployment, were thus framed as consequential to the way economic policy was structured and the alternative solution for recovery passed through the withdrawal of state interventions in the economy such as macroeconomic policies aiming for full employment; the privatisation of state companies and services; reduction of government spending and welfare provision; as well as flexibilisation in the regulation of labour contracts.

The template of neoliberal ideas was more clearly expressed in the ten-point list of policy instruments that became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’. Developed as the ‘conventional wisdom’ of the institutions based in that city – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), alongside the US Treasury Department – it was intended to address the macroeconomic problems of the heavily indebted Latin American countries of the 1980s (Williamson, 1993). The instruments included fiscal policy discipline, public spending priorities, tax reform, interest rates determined by the market, liberalisation of imports, abolishing barriers and regulations that constrain the
entry of foreign direct investment and new firms, privatisation of state enterprises and security for property rights. These policies were conditional to the loans offered by the two multilateral institutions to developing countries as prerequisites to the structural adjustment of their economies.

The rise of neoliberal ideas and policies became closely associated with the process of intensified globalisation of the world’s economy, but as Duménil and Lévy (2005) note they refer to different sets of mechanisms. The internationalisation of the economy is a process that can be traced back to many centuries since the organisation of international trade to the present configuration of more intense foreign exchange transactions, mobile capital flows, transnational corporations, and the arbitration of multilateral institutions. Associated with that are recent developments in communication and information technology that have brought economies and societies in closer relationship. Neoliberalism, in contrast, reviews the relationships between state, market and society, and in contemporary economic processes has as an important feature the advocacy of extending neoliberal ideas at a world scale (Duménil & Lévy, 2005).

Peck and Tickell (2002) have examined the process of institutionalisation of neoliberal ideas as a dual movement of dismantling and restructuring of institutional forms. The former, which they term ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ is characterised by the ‘destruction and discreditation’ of existing policies and institutional arrangements, followed by a phase of ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ with the ‘construction and consolidation’ of new state forms (2002, p. 384). To that, Keil (2009) adds a further phase in which the changes have become so institutionally embedded as to constrain policymaking with no reference to previous forms, a phase of ‘roll-with-it neoliberalism’. This general pattern of institutional reform, experimentation and consolidation follows the process of paradigm change discussed in chapter 2. The parallels with Hall’s (1993) and Baumgartner and Jones’s (2009) theory of paradigm change are evident, in which following a moment of punctuation and third order change, there is the complete replacement of programmes and instruments until reaching a state of equilibrium.

Harvey (2005) and Peck (2010) have interrogated the social construction of neoliberal ideas, how they were developed by ‘theorists’ in the academia, brokered by think tanks, trialled in the dictatorial regime of Pinochet’s Chile and had their ‘time’ in the policy window of the elected governments of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US. Relevant for this research is their implication for urban policies.
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The rationale of urban policymaking in this transition, as Cochrane (2007, p. 85) have argued, seemed to have been ‘turned on its head’. The effects of economic decline in Western cities and of the adjustment programmes in Latin American cities were significant: deindustrialisation, unemployment, crime, and deteriorating social indicators. The impacts of neoliberal reforms were particularly intense at the local scale, in fact Brenner and Theodore (2002) argue that cities became important testbeds for policy experiments, institutional reforms and for the realisation of the abstract principles of neoliberalism. The provision of social welfare and public services were argued to have become part of the problem in Western cities experiencing a process of deindustrialisation, as they were left to ‘[pick] up the pieces of economic decline and unemployment’ (Cochrane, 2007, p. 87). In addition, there were cuts in the transfers from central governments’ budgets accompanied by the ‘devolution’ of social programmes. Jessop (1997) has argued about the ‘de-nationalisation’ of statehood, in which national state capacities are reorganised in the territory including an enhanced role of the local state in economic development. In this context, local policies are redefined to prioritise wealth creation drawing on the city’s comparative advantages in relation to other places to become attractive to flows of investment.

The market-driven rationale and the logic of competitiveness was extended to cities and local governments both from the right and left framed responses as one of economic restructuring that required the competitive repositioning of the city in a global market place and the articulation of policies fostering growth and the attraction of capital (Cochrane et al, 1996). This represented a fundamental shift for local authorities, as they assumed characteristics of and increasingly forged partnerships with the private sector, moving from a perspective of urban government to one of entrepreneurial governance (Hall and Hubbard, 1998).

In Harvey’s (1989) classic study of the features and implications of an entrepreneurial approach to urban politics, it is argued that inter-urban competition operated as an ‘external coercive power’ that ultimately led cities to emulate ‘successful’ policies through the redevelopment of the built environment as attractive spaces to mobile capital, labour and visitors. This process was visible in the ‘serial reproduction of similar forms of urban redevelopment’ (Harvey, 1989, p. 10) that included waterfront renewal – particularly the ones modelled after Baltimore’s Inner Harbour that influenced Harvey’s theorisation – shopping malls, cultural and entertainment
centres, sports stadia and convention centres. Tales of ‘municipal turnaround and urban renaissance’ validated these policies as ‘the only game in town’, which Peck and Tickell (2002, p. 393) recognised as a zero-sum game that only reinforced dependency on mobile capital.

According to Hall and Hubbard (1998) the ‘new urban politics’ of entrepreneurialism was distinct from previous forms of governance, even in the case of North American cities where there is a long tradition of cities and towns in the promotion of their resources and attraction of investment (Ward, 1998). A defining feature is the creation of multiple spaces of collaboration between the public and private sectors, turning the boundaries between the two ever more blurred and facilitating the consolidation of coalitions around particular projects. This is particularly the case in speculative projects of urban regeneration with private actors involved in the design and implementation of policies while the public sector underwrites risk, places efforts in its promotion and assumes profit motivations. Consonant with Harvey’s argument, Hall and Hubbard (1998) identify remarkable similarities in some of the key elements in the entrepreneurial urban agenda: city marketing, megaprojects, and ephemeral events such as cultural and sports mega-events. These elements relate directly to the three urban policies examined later in the case study (chapters 6–8): the elaboration of strategic plans, programmes of waterfront renewal and the hosting of the Olympic Games. A brief examination of the common approaches to these policies is important before a discussion of their circulation as policy templates.

3.3.1. Strategic spatial planning

‘As a professional field’, observes Friedmann (2005, p. 29), ‘urban planning is an institutionally embedded practice. It is also a practice that is inevitably interwoven with politics, with ongoing conflicts over the allocation and use of public and private resources’. As examined above, the neoliberal paradigm shift extended beyond macroeconomic policymaking to other areas of public policy such as urban planning. The very notion of planning itself is questioned by neoliberal thinking for the intervention of the state in the definition of the spatial organisation of the economy and society and thus distorting the operation of market forces (Allmendiger, 2009). In this respect, planning scholar Peter Hall’s reflection about the challenges that planners and planning practice faced during this transition is worth reproducing:
Sometime during the 1970s, the city-planning movement began to turn upside down and inside out; during the 1980s, it seems at times almost on the point of self-destruction. Conventional planning, the use of plans and regulations to guide the use of land, seemed more and more discredited. Instead, planning turned from regulating urban growth, to encouraging it by any and every possible means. Cities, the new message rang loud and clear, were machines for wealth creation; the first and chief aim of planning must be to oil the machinery. The planner increasingly identified with his traditional adversary, the developer; the gamekeeper turned poacher. (Hall, 2002, p. 379)

In fact, criticism of comprehensive planning (also known as traditional land-use planning, conventional master planning, or plano diretor in Portuguese) came from a range of groups. A central piece of planning practice during the post-war period, comprehensive planning followed a functional and rational approach for the regulation of development of cities and regions and the implementation of large-scale modernisation projects (Healey, 1997; Albrechts, 2006). This approach came under criticism from an earlier period by residents for its centralised, technocratic, top-down structure that was insensitive to local concerns and also by professionals and the academia to whom the planning instrument was representative of the limitations of the modernist project (Carmona and Burgess, 2001). In countries that experienced dictatorships in the post-war period, master plans were also symbolic of undemocratic practices (Burgess and Carmona, 2009).

Owing to the legacies of contestation since the late 1960s, planning at the city level was discredited during the phase of ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ in favour of project-led planning (Healey, 1997; Albrechts, 2004; Burgess and Carmona, 2009). A more particularised and piecemeal approach was favoured to address inner city areas of declining economic activity in order to become attractive places for inward capital (see discussion on waterfront renewal below). Despite the near ‘self-destruction’ hinted at by Hall above, planning practice was thus reviewed with the incorporation of a new set of ideas influenced by neoliberal and globalisation processes that were particularly oriented to local economic development and to straighten the relationship with the private sector.

The elaboration of strategic plans for cities and regions is illustrative of this process of rolling out new arrangements. The instrument came into fashion in the 1980s as North American cities adapted the practices of corporate-style strategic planning from the private sector (Bryson & Roering, 1987). In its basic features, strategic planning is understood as a management tool for ‘conceiving a desirable future, and for defining the means to get there’ (Ackoff in Forn & Pascual, 1995, p. 13). Bryson and Roering (1987, p. 9) identify as core features of strategic planning: its action-oriented approach;
the consideration of a wide range of stakeholders; the analysis of external opportunities and threats and internal strengths and weaknesses (SWOT analysis); and the attention to actual or potential competitors. The promotion of private management practices and the ‘regulating fiction’ (Robinson, 2003) of a hierarchy of global cities facilitated the transposition of strategic planning to the public realm, with cities framed in a similar environment of competition and governments in need of a coordinating tool. Rather than being the direct ‘provider’ of plans and projects, the role of the state was re-framed as one of ‘enabler’ or ‘facilitator’ of local development to stimulate growth rather than regulate it (Healey, 1997). As a result, the focus of urban planning moved from a centralised plan-led approach to a practice oriented by projects negotiated with the private sector, seen as a more flexible way to adapt to the changes represented by economic restructuring and globalisation.

First adapted in San Francisco, strategic spatial planning was then implemented in other North American cities before gaining traction in European municipalities, particularly in cities experiencing deindustrialization and addressing structural economic reforms such as Barcelona, Birmingham and Milan (Forn and Pascual, 1995). The practice was later adopted and promoted by donor and development agencies, the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme, while new institutions and international consultancy groups started offering the expertise (Carmona and Burgess, 2001; Robinson, 2008). Municipal institutions also proactively sought to promote their experiences with strategic planning. Barcelona provides an important case in point for local policy actors in developing new sorts of networks, especially in Latin America (Pascual, 1999; Steinberg, 2005). The circulation of knowledge from Barcelona to Rio is examined empirically in chapter 6.

Proponents of strategic spatial planning argue that the practice is more inclusive and participatory; it identifies and brings together major public and private actors; enables a variety of interests to air contrasting and potentially critical views of key planning initiatives; is a constructive and creative exercise that fosters innovation; and that for being consensus-driven it only plans what can be achieved (Albrechts, 2004; Healey, 2004; Gaffikin and Sterrett, 2006; Kunzmann, 2013). Above all it helps to ‘re-imagine a city, urban region or wider territory’ (Healey, 2004) and sets a vision for the future of the city based on strong consensus and commitment (Carmona and Burgess, 2001). Rather than the final document, it is argued that the main outcome is the planning
process itself, the reformulation of the mindset of the actors involved and the promotion of a 'strategic culture' (Forn and Pascual, 1995; Albrechts and Balducci, 2013).

A more critical view of strategic spatial plans underlines its political character (Sandercock & Friedmann, 2000). The groups that are brought together hold different power relationships and their ability to influence the process is varied. McCann (2001) calls attention to the subtleties of the profile of consultants hired to coordinate the process as reflexive of the interest of the funding bodies and the dynamics of deliberation in which attention is selectively distributed. The very process of reaching consensus and setting a vision, or a 'spatial imaginary', is pointed by Boudreau (2007) as downplaying internal conflict in favour of normalising certain representations.

On a review of strategic spatial plans in London, Sydney and Singapore, Thornley (2000) noted that private groups stood to benefit more from the imperative of economic development and were in a stronger position to set the priorities for the future vision. He concluded that the paradigm of competition and attraction of investments ‘leads to a certain kind of strategy with particular kinds of plans, policies and land allocations’ (2000, p. 51). Nonetheless, despite the overall similarities in the content of strategic spatial plans, Robinson (2008; 2011) – based on the analyses of the experience of South African cities – argues for a nuanced examination of city visioning processes and the opportunities of different groups to shape some of the outcomes.

3.3.2. Waterfront renewal

If strategic spatial planning was the main instrument for the reconceptualisation of cities from inward-looking and bounded places to less clearly-defined urban centres in a global network of cities, large-scale urban development projects (UDPs) represented the materialisation of this new policy core (Burgess & Carmona, 2009). The redevelopment of areas of declining economic activity and obsolete infrastructure became one of the most visible and ubiquitous strategies for local economic development and together with city marketing are clear expressions of the entrepreneurial practice of urban restructuring (Moulaert et al, 2005). Selected strategic spaces are earmarked for public funding and become the object for ‘re-imagining’ exercises seeking to transform ‘problem places’ into ‘opportunity spaces’ (Raco, 2004, p. 34) and create powerful symbols that match global imaginaries of innovation, creativity and success (Olds, 2001; Moulaert et al, 2005; Vigar et al, 2005).
In a cross-city examination of the experiences of thirteen cities in Europe, Swyngedouw et al. (2002) identified common features in the planning, governance, delivery and impacts of UDPs. First, the straightening of relationships between public and private bodies resulted in the creation of a set of institutional and regulatory bodies and distribution of policymaking power that illustrated the wider shift from government to governance. In line with the propositions of strategic planning this was argued as a more inclusive and participatory approach. Nonetheless, the authors argue that this created ‘shady areas’ of little transparency and accountability lying outside democratic control.

Second, the state’s role as facilitator and an entrepreneurial actor was an important dimension to legitimise the exceptionality of some measures. In relation to planning control, this entailed the ‘freezing of conventional planning tools, bypassing statutory regulations and institutional bodies, the creation of project agencies with special or exceptional powers of intervention and decision-making, and/or a change in national or regional regulations’ (Swyngedouw et al, 2002, p. 543). In the name of enabling private interest it leveraged public funding and conceded subsidies to make investment more attractive. Also, by incorporating the rationale of global finance and real estate, the state undertakes the risk of the project and pro-actively promotes speculative practices to secure the viability of the project. The exceptionality accrued to UPDs was justified by several factors to do with the scale of the project, its strategic importance, need for flexibility among other reasons.

Third, despite the argument for a less interventionist state all the examined experiences demonstrated its central importance in the creation of new institutional spaces and flexibilisation of planning controls. Moreover, it was also more the norm than exception for the state to finance and in cases to be directly involved as a developer in the delivery of the project. Finally, the concern with developing clearly demarcated areas often resulted in a fragmented fabric with new sites sitting in isolation with the rest of the city. Sometimes it led to the creation of exclusive zones that further contributed to social polarisation.

The areas of intervention for UDPs usually target the historical city centre; areas of dilapidated housing; the transport infrastructure; and areas of previous industrial use, railway yards and port areas. In their place are envisioned projects for new financial districts, cultural quarters, residential areas and tourist attractions with the aim of kick-starting a new cycle of economic development. A common approach to claim a distinct
mark on globalised spaces is the creation of iconic landscapes, a strategy that relies on the commission of design of a civic or private building to a renowned architect and the construction of a unique icon of contemporary architecture (Skair, 2005). The most striking example of this approach is the construction of a branch of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao. The distinctive aesthetics of the building is often assumed a central feature in the reversal of the economic fortunes of the former industrial city and its consolidation as a tourist destination (Ponzini, 2012). The ‘Guggenheim effect’ of striking architecture propelling the image of cities globally became another resource of entrepreneurial urbanism followed by a range of cities (Vicario & Martinez Monje, 2003), including a frustrated attempt in Rio de Janeiro as examined in chapter 8.

Particularly emblematic of urban renewal exercises – nonetheless for the appealing imaging effects – is the renovation of waterfront areas. Since the 1960s, the physical structure of port areas worldwide started to be challenged by technological and organisational changes. The introduction of containers for the transportation of goods and commodities implicated a profound re-organisation of shipping operation. Larger ships were built for greater economies of scale in transportation, which demanded wider and deeper shipping channels and larger terminals (P.V. Hall & Clark, 2011). For the unloading of containers, it was necessary to introduce specialised handling equipment and large areas free of buildings for their storage and smoother connections with rail and road transportation (Ward, 2011). The difficulties in adapting old ports, particularly those located in central areas of cities, to these changes led to the construction of new specialised ports in peripheral areas. Although port activity did not cease in the older docks, its significant decline turned buildings and infrastructure obsolete, not to mention the reduction of workforce. Waterfront areas then became prime sites for redevelopment especially for their historic, cultural and locational importance.

The regeneration of waterfronts has proliferated since the 1980s and a host of experiences now stand as templates for future programmes. New projects are attentive to reference their plans in relation to these experiences as a way to indicate the mobilisation of best practice, borrow prestige and legitimise their strategies. The regeneration of the port area of Rio de Janeiro is illustrative of this process and efforts have been made to position itself among the experiences of cities such as Baltimore, Barcelona, Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Hong Kong and Rotterdam (Andreatta, 2010). The ongoing regeneration programme of the port of Rio is the topic examined in chapter 8 and is tied with the organisation of the 2016 Olympic Games.
3.3.3. Mega-events

The hosting of prestigious events is another resource that has been repurposed to attain objectives of urban entrepreneurialism. Particularly dramatic for their large costs, media appeal, draw of visitors numbers and impacts on the built environment and the host population (Müller, 2015), sports and cultural mega-events such as the Olympic Games, the FIFA football World Cup and the Expos (Universal and International Expositions) have become prized strategies of urban development (Hiller, 2000; Andranovich et al, 2001). This ‘mega-event strategy’ (Burbank et al, 2001) incorporates the precepts of place marketing and physical restructuring aimed at creating new images for the city and often involves the coordination of public and private bodies in the delivery of projects (Short, 2008).

In their review of the urban history of the Summer Olympic Games, Chalkley and Essex (1999), Liao and Pitts (2006) and Gold and Gold (2011) identified different phases of related intervention on the built environment, from the modest and temporary facilities at the beginning of the past century to the recent association with large-scale UDPs. If, during the 1960s, the organisation of the Olympic Games in Rome and Tokyo was already linked with programmes of large-scale development, it was not until the 1990s that the mega-event came to be perceived as a strategic urban policy (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). Appreciated as a driver of urban regeneration and development, the majority of contemporary Olympic bids include infrastructural change – re-framed as ‘legacy’ left by the event (see MacAlloon, 2008; Gold and Gold, 2011) – as the predominant motivation for bidding. These may include ‘highway and mass transit development, airport expansion, urban redevelopment and regeneration, expansion of tourist and cultural facilities, and parks and beautification programs’ (Andranovich & Burbank, 2011, p. 825).

The experience of the city of Barcelona with the 1992 Olympic Games became the striking reference to which subsequent candidatures refer to in attributing the potential benefits of hosting the mega-event. So extensive were the effects of the experience that attempts have been made to condensate it in a distinctive policy model (Chalkley and Essex, 1999). The ‘Barcelona model’ (examined in greater detail in chapter seven) has become in the past two decades the prime evidence for the perceived effects not only of the Olympics but also what mega-events in general can produce for cities.

Despite the common goals with UDP programmes, three main inter-related features make the mega-event strategy – and especially the Olympic Games – particularly appealing to political leaders and advocacy coalitions and set them apart from other
urban policies. First is the prestige and symbolic value of mega-events. Sports mega-events can potentially generate popular support with domestic constituencies and provide a platform for the political agendas of those closely related to their organisation. Moreover, the global reach of the event makes it an unparalleled resource for place marketing (Essex & Chalkley, 1998). Mega-events also have an important symbolic geopolitical dimension to the hosting countries. While the implications of the Cold War in the organisation Olympic Games are well known, the contemporary ‘soft power’ of mega-events is used to express the emergency of countries as powerful actors in international geopolitics (Grix & Lee, 2013). Related to this, a second feature is the leveraging of funding that is facilitated by the event. In addition to local funds, the prestige of the event helps to attract national and regional investments to keep on the promise to deliver the programme of works and thus ‘regionalise’ and ‘nationalise’ the gains from Olympic enterprise. Third, the preparations for mega-events are also tied with non-negotiable deadlines that significantly impact upon project design, planning, financing and delivery. Promoters of a city’s Olympic enterprise point to the ability of using the event as a lever to accelerate existing plans and complete projects that otherwise would only be achieved in a longer timeframe (Essex & Chalkley, 1998). Planning controls are altered, streamlined processes of approval are installed, flexible institutional frameworks are created and estimated budgets are constantly reviewed. In fact, in reference to the latter, the budget forecast in bid books is more likely to be a ‘fictitious minimum’. According to a study comparing the estimated and final budgets of 30 Summer and Winter Olympic Games, an average of 156% cost overrun was found, the highest margin of any of type of mega-project (Flyvbjerg et al, 2016).

The hosting of a mega-event is also surrounded by speculative practices in spatial planning and experimental arrangements in project delivery. Typical approaches in the bidding and preparations of the Olympic Games are illustrative of this. The launching of the idea to bid for the Olympic Games is usually initiated by members of the local political and business elites or the national Olympic committee (Cochrane et al 1996; Hiller, 2000). A temporary, private and non-profit bid committee is then established to create an institutional space for an ad hoc advocacy coalition with representatives from different government levels, the private sector, civic groups and sports bodies. The main tasks of this institution are to develop a planning proposal to be submitted to the IOC and, once shortlisted, engage in promotional activities to influence the IOC delegates voting in the final selection.
Fenced-off from the participation of wider sections of the society and from public accountability – justified for the whole set of projects being only a possibility, after all it will only go ahead if the bid is successful – this temporary institutional space is thus engaged in a highly speculative practice of strategic spatial planning. The city is imagined as an ideal speculative setting for the Olympic Games through the selected parts earmarked for the event – strategic locations that speak for the whole city – and through boosterist discourses that overestimate the benefits both to the Olympic sports movement and the local population while underestimating the projected budget and social costs (Hiller, 2000; Gold & Gold, 2011; Flyvbjerg et al, 2016). Existing development projects and studies are selectively incorporated while bid-dependent proposals are drawn. Spatial planning is thus opened up to conform to the real and perceived norms of the IOC regarding what is expected from a host city that include not only technical specifications but also ideal settings for the venues, accommodation and related infrastructure. This knowledge gap between the local and the IOC agendas is brokered by international consultants of an increasingly expanding specialised industry of mega-event bidding (Silvestre, 2012).

Once a candidature is awarded with the hosting rights, the speculative and informal Olympic spatial plan becomes a legally binding document signed by government representatives committing to the delivery of the proposals and restricting alterations to the original project. The post-award phase is then followed by the creation of a governance structure involving international institutions (the IOC); national, regional and local governments; and private companies responsible for the delivery of the projects. Following the guidelines established by the IOC, separate entities concerned with the organisation of the event (the organising committee) and project delivery (the delivery authority) are created, responsible for coordinating multiple parallel projects. Private companies are thus enrolled not only as delivery partners, but as Raco (2012; 2014) has demonstrated, to be deeply involved in the drafting of public contracts, procurement and project management in a complex contractual arrangement that makes the responsibilities between public and private actors increasingly blurred. The experience of organising the Olympic Games, understood as the delivery of a complex UDP, can thus be a laboratory for the development of new models of urban development and governance structures (Raco, 2014).

The hosting of mega-events has traditionally been the preserve of elites in cities and countries in the Global North but it has more recently been organised in new places in
Asia, the Middle-East and Latin America. While initial bidding approaches outlined their motivations with a developmental justification (Hiller, 2000b; Cornelissen, 2010; Silvestre, 2012), more recent narratives argue for the opening of new markets and opportunities. In the Rio de Janeiro bid book for the 2016 Olympic Games, for instance, it is promised an ‘excellent Games that meet the needs of every client and open a gateway to a new, young continent of 400 million people’ (Rio 2016 bid committee, 2009:19), while the failed bid for the Istanbul Games in 2020 argued for a ‘new Games market, first secular Muslim society host nation’ (Istanbul 2020 bid committee, 2013, p. 12). Nevertheless, as argued above, identification of entrepreneurial policies does not necessarily conflate solely to a neoliberal paradigm. Neoliberalism can be one among other relevant influences present in a particular setting (Le Galès, 2016). In fact, Müller (2011) has argued for a different reading of Russia’s engagement with the hosting of mega-events other than global neoliberalism, despite the entrepreneurial approach of the policies followed. Chapter seven examines how the Olympic project in Rio de Janeiro reflects developmental and entrepreneurial approaches and the importance of reputational capital for those involved.

3.4. Mobile policies and worlding cities: localising globally circulating knowledge

As argued in the section above, Harvey (1989) noted a serial reproduction of urban policies across different cities in the transformation of the built environment, the making of plans with private actors and with the hosting of temporary events. Harvey’s analysis has influenced a rich literature on urban entrepreneurialism and neoliberal urbanisation that sought to interrogate the consequences of the shift to a neoliberal paradigm and the new urban policy core and programmes ensued. However, despite the detailed analyses of variegated responses and hybrid policy formations in cities of the Global North and South, some aspects of the public policy process remain understudied. The points raised in chapter 2 indicated that more analysis is needed regarding the processes of agenda-setting, ideas as ‘coalition magnets’ and institutionalisation.

Nonetheless, at the core of this gap between an ideas-based approach to policy analysis and contemporary urban change lies epistemological differences regarding emphases on the contingency of policymaking and the structural conditioning of neoliberalism. More recent lines of inquiry in urban studies have sought to mediate this tension by following a social constructivist approach to examine the circulation of
policy ideas. It is possible to separate these approaches in two groups according to their focus on ideas as the independent variable – the process of circulation as the main dimension to be examined – or the dependent variable – policy responses in relation to circulating ideas.

The former group is constituted by the literature on urban policy mobilities, defined by McCann (2011, p. 109) as ‘socially produced and circulated forms of knowledge addressing how to design and govern cities that develop in, are conditioned by, travel through, connect, and shape various spatial scales, networks, policy communities, and institutional contexts’. To an extent, this literature develops the line of inquiry on urban neoliberalism to examine how the circulation of policy models facilitates the ‘deepening and intensification in the process of neoliberalisation’ (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 398). Neoliberalism is considered as the dominant paradigm shaping policy responses and the type of policy ideas that circulate. It has been suggested as an approach that opens up the ‘black box of neoliberalisation’ (K. Ward, 2006, p. 71) while Brenner et al. (2010) argued that analyses on instances of neoliberalisation need to be attentive both to previous trajectories as well ‘as in relation to the transnational fields of interspatial policy transfer’ where ‘regulatory institutions, policies and experiments’ are circulated (pp. 189-190).

The circulation of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) is considered one of such policy. In their interrogation on the rise and popularity of BIDs, K. Ward (2006) and Cook (2008) examined how this policy for the management of public spaces, in which businesses in a given area pool resources to ensure clean, safe and attractive environments for customers, were introduced to British cities as a way to revitalise town centres. The justification for its creation was framed as a response to the failure of local authorities to address the decay of commercial areas and the need for entrepreneurial measures with the private sector stepping up. Kevin Ward (2006) locates the dialogue between British policymakers and US BID experts within a wider circulation of neoliberal policy exchange linking the two countries during the 1990s, and noted how the introduction of such a policy required both favourable timing and changes in the legal framework. Sustaining these circuits of knowledge circulation, Kevin Ward and Cook identified important ideological inclinations between the actors involved, discursive practices to construct and legitimate ‘successful policies’, and selective readings of experiences to be framed as a favourable model for UK cities.

In another analysis, Peck and Theodore (2001) examined the replication of welfare-to-work programmes in US cities and its mobilisation in the British welfare reforms of 1990s
and early 2000s. The policy, which aims to reduce a ‘welfare culture’ by linking benefits to an active search for jobs by claimants, became the object of interest to policymakers abroad for its apparent effectiveness in reducing social spending. In the authors’ study the majority of US experiences do not conform to the alleged efficacy and in the cases judged successful other important local factors, such as a ready supply of jobs or strong political will, played a determining role. Nevertheless, the policy acquired salience to other political environments for dealing with a topic that became ubiquitous in social policy reforms. Noticeable in this experience is that rather than a comprehensive learning and replication of original policy experiences, more commonplace was the ‘selective transfers of particular administrative practices or techniques, of branding ideas or discursive formulations, and of political lessons concerning the management of the reform process’ (Peck & Theodore, 2001, p. 449, original emphasis). Such attitudes to turn to ‘best practices’ had the implication of accelerating the ‘turnover’ of policymaking, compromising organic and domestic learning in favour of ‘ideas that work’ from elsewhere.

The second group includes the postcolonial literature on worlding cities and comparative urbanism (Robinson, 2006; Roy & Ong, 2011; Parnell and Robinson, 2012). The focus of the analysis is centred on situated practices and contingent urban processes in the cities of the Global South that nonetheless shape and are shaped by globalised imaginaries. The city is viewed as a ‘milieu of experimentation’ in which diverse actors and institutions draw on ‘flows of capital, labour, ideas and visions’ (Roy, 2014, p. 17), constrained as they are by both global and national forces, but that are both ‘provincial as much as they are global’ (Roy, 2011, p. 311). In this view, neoliberalism is thus considered as one among other paradigms and norms constraining the circulation and articulation of policies’ responses (Ong, 2011; Robinson & Parnell, 2011; Söderström, 2014). Approaching contemporary urban change through the exclusive perspective of neoliberalism equates for Ong (2011, pp. 2-3) with ‘economistic and political reductionism’ that ‘tend to view significantly different sites as instantiations of either a singular economic system or the same political form of globalisation’. The solution is, according to Parnell and Robinson (2012, p. 600), to decentre neoliberalism in the analysis of urban politics in order to create space for nuanced approaches that are attentive to more diverse processes.

Influential examples that have informed the theorisation of worlding cities are to be found in the context of urban Asia, especially in the accelerated growth of Chinese cities that
have influenced imaginaries in the region or in the ‘world class’ discourse structuring urban policymaking in India (Roy & Ong, 2011). Ong (2011) notes, for instance, how inter-referencing among Asian cities serves policymakers to justify their strategies for ‘catching up’ with their counterparts or to lever the support of the middle-class for policies aimed to turn their places into ‘world class’ spaces.

In another study, Robinson (2013) examined the production of strategic spatial plans in South African cities and argued for a less encompassing tracing of the trajectories of policy ideas. By interrogating how policymakers composed their ideas in the drafting of the plans, Robinson noticed the importance of myriad traces, ideas already in place, appropriations, unacknowledged inspirations and even inchoate references that can at times come together during the policy process and that cannot be clearly traced to points of origin. She argues instead for a focus on how policies are ‘arrived at’ and how ideas about ‘elsewheres’ make themselves present during the policy process (Robinson, 2013, p. 33). This point shall be returned to in the next section.

Despite the differences on the focus of analysis there is a shared concern to examine urban change as a relational process. This approach is attentive to the relational and territorial dimensions of policymaking, to specificity and generality, that is, it acknowledges the influence and interrogates wider processes such as globalisation and neoliberalism while remaining sensitive to the policy process as fundamentally local, grounded and territorial (McCann & Ward, 2010; McCann, 2011). Binary conceptions between the local and global processes runs the risk of reducing urban change uniquely to wider forces, positing cities as ‘victims of globalisation’ (Massey, 2011, p. 8), or simply the outcome of particular circumstances. Relational thinking thus entails approaching a phenomenon such as globalisation as a two-way process, exploring the ‘ways in which global policy networks are fundamental to the construction of apparently local responses, while, at the same time, apparently global phenomena, globalised policies, only exist in particular, grounded, localised ways’ (Cochrane, 2011a, p. x). In order to explore this local-global dialectic in policymaking, policy mobility authors have referred to Doreen Massey’s (1991) relational conceptualisation of place, one which contextualises places as dynamically unbound and defined by the coming together of social relations and processes that stretch widely across space. Deploying this approach to urban policymaking means for McCann and Ward (2010, p. 182), to pay attention to ‘both its territorial and relational geographies and for an appreciation of how cities are
assembled by the situated practices and imaginations of actors who are continually attracting, managing, promoting, and resisting global flows of policies and programs’.

The following subsections examine how the research agenda on relational urban change has been articulated, paying attention to the ideational conceptualisations of circulating knowledge, the extended roles of agency and the process of mobilising ideas and grounding them in local institutional contexts. In particular, it pays attention to the following questions. Why do particular experiences rise to the status of policy models to be followed? Who are the actors, institutions and interests involved in the circulation of these policies? How are context-specific experiences rationalised, transmitted, negotiated and localised from place to place?

### 3.4.1. Circulating urban policy knowledge

Considering that the circulation of urban policy ideas is not a novel phenomenon, as discussed in section 3.2, what are the present issues motivating a re-examination of mobile knowledge? Common justifications argue that there is a change in the intensity of flows and multiplication of channels (Clarke, 2012; Jacobs, 2012); ever more crowded transnational policy spaces occupied by international institutions, policy brokers and experts (McCann, 2011; Peck 2011); accelerated policy turnover and policy cycles (Peck, 2001; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Clarke, 2012); greater mobility of policymakers themselves (K. Ward, 2006; Cook, 2008; Gonzalez, 2011); more comparative practices such as city indexes and rankings (McCann, 2004); and technological advances that have increased the access to and the reach of policy information, materials and networks (McCann & Ward, 2010; McFarlane, 2011; Robinson, 2011).

Between the policy mobilities and the worlding cities/comparative urbanism approaches, there is a different treatment to the object of circulation. For McCann (2011) the ideas that circulate refer to formally drafted urban policies, models and knowledge aimed for the design of new policies, whereas the latter consider objects beyond the policy realm, including flows of ideas, actions, practices and objects of public, private and third sector actors (Ong, 2011; Roy, 2014; Söderström, 2014). As this research is considered with the role of ideas in urban policymaking, emphasis is given to those that influence the policy process. Nevertheless, by employing the rubric of ideas, sufficient flexibility is given to consider a range of ideational constructs that, while not directly articulated for policy responses, can be incorporated by them. This includes, for
instance, architecture and planning approaches that came to resonate in the policy responses of Rio de Janeiro as we shall see in chapter six.

Best practices and models offer, in Peck’s (2002) view, a convenient ‘policy fix’ for policymakers operating at a time of shortened policy cycles and the need to quickly deliver ‘pragmatic solutions’, thus encouraging the search for and the promotion of ‘policies that work’. The increased perception of competition between cities also facilitates the articulation of ‘best practices’, models and templates. Sorensen (2010, p. 135) argues that their ‘ready-made expert analysis and/or moral authority’ can be instrumentally mobilised by policymakers and policy entrepreneurs to confer credibility and legitimacy to their agendas. Some policies have explicitly geographic references, providing ‘mental maps of “best cities” for policy that informs future strategies’ (McCann & Ward, 2010, p. 175) standing as important references and even ‘policy meccas’ (Cook, 2008; González, 2011). Among these are cities whose regeneration projects acquired international reputation for reverting economic decline, including the aforementioned cases of Baltimore's redevelopment of the waterfront, the ‘Bilbao effect’ of iconic architecture and the ‘Barcelona model’ of event-led urban transformation. These are cities whose experience became widely known to policymakers and practitioners alike and have that have stimulated policy learning and fact-finding trips (Cook, 2008). This engagement can be in the form of explorative learning, opportunistic appropriation or referential positioning, all approaches that have shaped policymaking in Rio de Janeiro examined in the chapters of the empirical study.

3.4.2. Extra-local agency

The question of agency in the mobilisation of policies is one of the topics that can contribute to analyses of the policy process discussed in chapter 2. As seen, there is a tendency in policy analysis to concentrate on those actors nested in political scales – though there are more recent references to consider epistemic communities. While displaying a genealogy of research that comes from neo-Marxist analysis, policy mobility authors incorporate post-structuralism concepts that balance the question of structure and agency. This concern is reflexive of the relational thinking adopted, which is supportive for empirically rich investigations of situated episodes while being careful to relate them to wider contexts and the forces conditioning them. Just as places can be understood as unbounded spaces produced by extensive relations and processes, policymaking is understood to take place in an unbounded environment that challenges prevailing notions of actors operating within contained governmental scales (local,
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regional, national) to acknowledge relations that are produced irrespective of hierarchical levels. This involves a consideration of wider tracks of knowledge circulation including multi-scalar ‘networks of professionals, consultants, global agencies, national and local players searching for ideas’ (Cochrane & Ward, 2012, p. 6).

McCann (2011) identifies three broad categories of actors and institutions in this extended policy environment. First are the local policy actors that include those acting within and outside state structures: policy officials, experts, professionals and civil society groups each with their own institutional and personal networks. Second are the global policy consultants noteworthy for their expert knowledge and intermediation: multinational consultant groups, think tanks, individuals, and policy ‘gurus’. The third group is composed of what the author calls informational infrastructures that facilitate the interpretation, framing, packaging and presentation about best practices: education, professional organizations and multilateral institutions, and the media.

The mapping of these networks is helpful to counter notions of ‘free floating’ knowledge circulation and the rational and causal connections made at the decision to learn elsewhere. Instead, these practices take place within structured, complex and dynamic circuits of knowledge that challenge conventional categories of local and extra-local. Nonetheless these categories should not be considered as rigid separations. A local policy actor, for instance, can also be embedded in global networks as an expert of a policy community or a consultant (Peck & Theodore, 2010). He or she may even act in the academia in some instances. In this case, what is of importance to our analysis is to map and consider policy actors at a certain stance of policymaking, as the process is only a snapshot of urban development in a longer timeframe.

3.4.3. Mobilisation and grounding processes

After mapping the location and travels of policy models, identifying the actors and institutions involved, and unpacking and interrogating the constitutive parts of the model, a consideration for the extended tracks of policymaking needs to take into account the very processes through which mobility takes place. The mobilisation of policy knowledge does not follow a linear trajectory from one place to another but is socially abstracted, mediated and interpreted (Peck and Theodore, 2010). The circuits of policy mobility are thus power laden spaces structured by actors and institutions whose positioning directly influences the travelling and championing policy ideas. Important in this view is to consider the spaces and contexts where
learning and transmission takes place. In the examination of the mobilization of BIDs, Ward (2006) and Cook (2008) paid particular attention to the dynamics of fact-finding trips taken by British policy-makers to the US. They argue that as policy actors engage to evaluate the application of a determined policy, they are informed both by their personal worldviews and values, and by the conditionality of the political landscape where they originate. Their criteria for selecting policy references are often ‘qualitative, informal and ad hoc’ (Cook, 2008, p. 791). In the process, emphasis is given by their hosts and their attention is turned unevenly to selected aspects which are of interest for both parties.

However, for all the success of particular experiences, Peck and Theodore (2010) call attention to interrogate the wider frames that determine what is to be considered successful. They argue that policy models that acquire greater mobility are those ideologically aligned with dominant paradigms and that consolidate powerful interests. In a similar perspective, McCann (2011) highlights the constraints of wider contexts such as ‘policy paradigms, path dependencies, ideologies, and frames of reference or by external forces, like political-economic restructuring’ (p. 109). Although these views from outside may veer toward a structural perspective, Robinson (2011) agrees that external ideas likely to gain purchase are those in which local actors identify benefits for them, even in coercive policies promoted by institutions withholding funding.

The enacted practices of presenting the policy ‘recipes’ and rendering them applicable to the audience’s context is a telling feature of how policy models are constructed and promoted. ‘It takes, after all,’ as McCann (2011, pp. 115-116) has observed, ‘persuasive storytelling, involving strategic namings and framings, inserted into a specific context where actors are predisposed to a certain range of policy options, to convince actors in one city that their place is commensurate with another to the extent that policies formulated and implemented elsewhere might also work at home’. Not only is what travels when a policy travels important, but as Cook (2008) highlights, the silences and what is left behind are also very telling aspects of the dynamic of policy transfer. At the time the mobilised policy is re-embedded into a new context, it has already been transformed or mutated (Peck &Theodore, 2010) by the processes of interpretation, selective translation and addition of new features to enable its application in a different landscape. In this way, rather than leading to homogeneous political landscapes, the proliferation of models and best-
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practices evolves unevenly into combinations ultimately conditioned by the settings of the new policy jurisdiction.

The recent output of the literatures on the relational production of urban policies has motivated a variety of analyses in urban studies. While worlding cities/comparative urbanism has influenced more sensitive approaches to both theoretical applications and analyses of urbanisation processes in the cities of the Global South, the policy mobilities approach has been continuously developed. There have been, however, critiques of presentism in the analyses of contemporary processes (Harris & Moore, 2013; Jacobs & Lees, 2013; Temenos & Baker, 2015) and in the narrowing selection of cases that conform to a predisposed framing of neoliberalisation (McFarlane, 2011; Phelps et al, 2014; Söderström, 2014; Bunnell, 2015). To that it is possible to add a lack of clear frameworks to study the grounding and institutionalisation process of circulating ideas in local policymaking. The next section addresses these points and argues for a framework that bridges over the socio-constructivist approaches of policy analysis and urban policymaking.

3.5. A relational approach to urban policymaking

Surprisingly, ... we still know very little about why some ideas acquire paradigmatic status while other seemingly good ideas fail to gain traction. Or more precisely, we know how some ideas influence policy, but we know little about the ideas themselves that makes one more attractive than another. We need a richer conceptual vocabulary to understand a wider variety of contexts in which ideas work. (Cox & Béland, 2013, p. 308)

Yet, more analysis is needed on how – through what practices, where, when, and by whom – urban policies are produced in global-relational context, are transferred and reproduced from place to place, and are negotiated politically in various locations. (McCann & Ward, 2010, p. 176)

The debates examined in this chapter and in the previous one acknowledge policymaking as a messy, contingent and unpredictable process. In a similar manner, the literatures on institutional constructivism and policy mobilities have recently developed new approaches centred on a social constructivist perspective to address the limitations of existing theoretical framings that emphasise structural or rational choice explanations. Notwithstanding their different research agendas, both approaches have focused on an object of inquiry that mediates the structure and agency tension to examine policy and urban changes. The vocabularies developed in these research agendas present some similarities and shared concerns. Table 3.1 below compares how these have been articulated according to five key aspects of policymaking.
### Table 3.1. Comparative vocabulary of the literatures on policy ideas and urban policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Policy process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideas, paradigms, beliefs, frames, programmes</td>
<td>Dissemination, flow</td>
<td>Institutions, policy subsystems, networks</td>
<td>Policy entrepreneurs, epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions</td>
<td>Policy windows, agenda setting, institutionalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas, models, practices, techniques</td>
<td>Diffusion, travel, flow</td>
<td>Networks, circuits, channels</td>
<td>Experts, consultants, epistemic communities, cultures of practice</td>
<td>Borrowing, innovation, imposition, translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas, policy models, best practice, knowledge</td>
<td>Mobility, mutation, circulation, flow</td>
<td>Networks, circuits, channels</td>
<td>Policy actors, experts, consultants, institutions, info. infrastructures</td>
<td>Mobilisation, inter-referencing, re-territorialisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


First, under different names, the core object of the analyses summarised in the table refer to ideational realms, including paradigms, programmes, policy models, techniques and best practices. In this way, ideas, broadly conceived to include these different registers, provide a common denominator capable of bridging the literatures. In fact, the identification of ideational realms developed by new institutionalists can contribute to more structured approaches in the urban studies. In contrast, given the concern with the spatial dimension that lies at the core of planning and geography studies, policy analysis has much to benefit from a richer conceptualisation of the movement and spatialities of ideas, the second and third key aspects of research.

Approaches that prioritise relatioanalytical situate the policy activity within a wider and complex environment of traversing social, economic and political processes. This concern makes itself present in the fourth category, the analysis of agency. Policy analysts privilege actors and interests close to the governmental institutions where policy activity takes places whereas the other literatures consider a more extended transnational policy space that enables a finer grained tracing of policy ideas. Finally, the grounded policy process is obviously the strength of the political science literatures and contributes to more structured and dynamic frameworks than
otherwise considered in urban studies. Planning historians have traditionally focused on the outcomes of urban change, whereas policy mobility scholars have emphasised the reach and speed of circulation of ideas, leaving the dynamics of what happens during the institutionalisation of grounded ideas somewhat blurred. However, this is a point of particular importance for analyses that consider ideas as the dependent variable, that is, concerned with their effects on local policymaking. If the focus is on ideas as an independent variable, meaning their process of circulation, policy analysis frameworks are less applicable.

This research is positioned in the former group; it is interested in examining the role of circulating knowledge in affecting urban change in the city of Rio de Janeiro. However, it does contend Kingdon’s (1984) and Robinson’s (2013) arguments about the limited theoretical gains of tracing the trajectories of mobilised ideas. For Kingdon (1984, p. 72) it is not the origin of an idea but what made it to ‘take hold and grow’ that is relevant for examining policy change while Robinson (2013) argues that tracing how ideas came from elsewhere can lose sight of the contingent ideational process already in place. Both authors argue that the policy process is a complex combination of multiple factors and that finding the ultimate source of multiple origins can be counter-productive. While these arguments do make valid points and indeed there may be a risk of fetishising the influence of circulating ideas, tracing the circulations of policy ideas can help to understand how global policies are made ‘in place’. By unpacking their trajectories, it is possible to illuminate how they are socially circulated and unravel relevant aspects about the role of transnational actors, epistemic communities and international institutions. This methodological choice takes the policy idea as the entry point through which is examined the constraints of global and local normative structures and the agency of interested parties. Considering the analytical framework presented at the end of the previous chapter, the points below summarise the key concerns of a relational approach to policymaking attentive to ideas, interests and institutions.

*The ideational realms of a mobilised policy*

The main question in assessing the influence of circulating ideas over a local policy response is to understand what exactly moves when a policy idea is mobilised. A policy model or programme may entail specific orientations to a particular policy action but it can also relate to wider ideational realms that challenge or consolidate the current frames and paradigms constraining a policy field. This means critically assessing not only the contents of an idea but also how they relate to the interests supporting them.
Chapter 3 - Ideas and Urban Change

The extended networks of local policymaking

The discussions reviewed in this chapter have made the case that policies are not simply made ‘in place’ or that ideas may come from above. Local actors can occupy multiple spaces of engagement with extended networks of policy communities just as mobile actors transverse these spaces promoting their expertise. Every policy is thus the crystallisation of ideas and agendas of one or more groups that extend beyond the local scale. The important task here is to identify key actors and how circulating ideas gives meaning to and legitimise their interests.

The contingency of the local institutionalisation process

Rather than global processes constraining policy responses, the literatures reviewed in this chapter advocated for a nuanced approach to understand how the global is made local in the purposeful action of policymakers acting within the boundaries of existing institutional spaces. Every policy manifestation of a general idea is inherently variegated as it is reflexive of prevailing norms and policy legacies. Thus, mobilised ideas have to be adapted to local institutional factors just as the latter can be modified to the former. Mobilised ideas can be used to challenge the existing status quo or to further consolidate prevailing norms.

3.6. Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the literatures in urban studies examining the circulation of urban policies, practices and knowledge. It has located the mobilisation of planning and urban policy ideas in a long trajectory of development that puts into perspective the novelty of recent circulations. As it has been demonstrated, urban development processes in the cities of the Global South have a long a genealogy of engagement with circulating planning practices. However, globalisation and neoliberal processes that have characterised recent decades have intensified the circulation and reach of policy ideas by shaping the design of local policies that profoundly changed the paradigm of urban policymaking. Urban entrepreneurialism has entailed a ‘growth first’ approach centred on local economic development and an intra-urban competition drawing on local comparative advantages to attract mobile investment, visitors and skilled labour. Nevertheless, the alleged success of particularised outcomes has been rendered as policy templates that contributed to the serial reproduction of forms of urban development. Among these are policy strategies and development practices such as
strategic spatial planning, waterfront renewal and the hosting of mega-events that have shaped the imaginary of local policy actors as the case of Rio de Janeiro will show.

However, such reading of variegated manifestations of urban neoliberalisation from above misses the ways in which cities are creatively redeveloped by a range of policy actors who tap into circulating ideas to respond to local challenges in unique ways. In fact, the very process of mobilisation is what provides credence to ideas to continue to circulate. The social production of networks through which knowledge circulates and the situated practices of mobilisation and inter-referencing has been the object of productive lines of inquiry in urban studies that provide a more nuanced and dynamic understanding of urban change.

It has been argued that there are shared concerns of these approaches with those dedicated to analyse policy change reviewed in the previous chapter. This enables the articulation of an analytical framework to examine the relational production of urban policies built on the strengths of the different analyses. Drawing on the framework based on ideas, interests and institutions previously established, this chapter has set out the key lines of inquiry that will inform the analysis of the case study. First, it emphasises the need for critically evaluating the ideational realms presented by a mobilised policy and assessing its relationship with wider political agendas. Second, it directs attention to the situated practices of local policy actors in drawing ideas from elsewhere and their positioning in global knowledge networks. Rather than approaching the mobilisation of policy ideas purely in instrumental ways, a relational view of policymaking situates actors in social processes of selective policy learning and contingent formation of interests. Finally, it considers the institutionalisation process in which ideas are grounded and policies designed. Existing institutional frameworks are important constraints to the viability of a proposed policy therefore, analysis has to be attentive to the processes through which an idea is locally adapted and transformed. These lines of inquiry will be applied in the examination of recent urban development policies in Rio de Janeiro after a consideration and discussion of the research methods.
CHAPTER 4

Research Methodology

4.1. Introduction

The aim of this research is to examine how circulating knowledge about urban policies is mobilised and grounded at the local level and the implications of these groundings for urban development politics and practices. The focus is on policymaking processes with an attention to the role of ideas, the alignment of interests, and the institutionalisation of the policy. In order to examine how this process takes place this research employs a specific case study approach to investigate a ‘contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 2009, p. 18). The city of Rio de Janeiro was chosen due to the continuous engagement with circulating planning models and practices in the past two decades that culminated with the hosting of the 2016 Olympic Games. At different moments in time, knowledge and ideas developed elsewhere were mobilised to promote policies of large-scale infrastructural change. Three policies were selected as subunits of the case study in order to examine their individual trajectories, institutionalisation and outcomes. This varied experience was examined through a selection of qualitative methods to collect primary data through semi-structured interviews with policy actors and secondary data through documentary analysis and newspaper coverage.

This chapter details the design, methods and analysis of data used in this research. Firstly, the case study of the city of Rio de Janeiro is presented and justified as a suitable case study to meet the thesis’s objectives and questions. Secondly, the research design and methodology is described and justified with particular attention given to the dynamic of interviewing elite actors and to a reflexive consideration of the position of the researcher in the field and the production of knowledge. Finally, the analysis of data is described before final consideration in the concluding section.
4.2. **Rio de Janeiro as case study**

The selection of the city of Rio de Janeiro as a case study is relevant for the extended policy networks forged and the recurring mobilisation of planning models in recent decades. For instance, in successive bids for the Olympic Games the city's Olympic committee referred to achievements found in other cities to legitimate its candidacy (Silvestre, 2012). Not only was the city of Barcelona held up as an iconic model for how 'to do' regeneration in the modern era, but also policymakers from that city were hired in the past to develop a bid proposal for Rio. As Rio de Janeiro was chosen to host the 2016 Olympic Games, references to other experiences intensified and it announced the hiring of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the former respective Mayors of New York and Barcelona, Rudolph Giuliani and Pasqual Maragall, as paid advisors. The projects announced in relation to the event, such as the implementation of bus rapid transit (BRT) corridors and the regeneration of the port area, were also conspicuous localisations of circulating planning models. The staging of the mega-event seemed to have impressively opened local policymaking to diverse sets of global expertise.

4.2.1. **Research perspective**

Rio de Janeiro has also been described as an exemplar of broader trends in the neoliberalisation of planning policies outlined in chapters 1 and 5 (Vainer, 2000; Oliveira, 2003; Compans, 2004). Since 1993 city government has been under the administration of a small number of actors self-positioned in the right wing and with linked political trajectories. This has facilitated a relatively stable environment in which entrepreneurial policies were developed. However, rather than taking for granted the arrival of conservative actors with a turn to neoliberal policymaking the approach taken in this research was to identify policies that seemed to present a significant departure from previous approaches and then analyse how they came on the agenda, were championed and implemented. Taking this research strategy enabled a focus on policies as ideas that give meaning to the actions of policy actors and provide a focal point to the convergence of interests. The extent to which they are representative of a new paradigm in policymaking is then examined through its impact on institutional frameworks, on the rearrangement of coalitions and discrediting of existing status quo. In further identifying ideas that were translated from circulating policy models, the relevance of best practices in policymaking and the selective process of translation is analysed.
4.2.2. Research focus

Initially, the research proposal was focused only on the policy of mega-event hosting that by the intensity of mobilisation of policy networks and the scale of urban change seemed to warrant research interest. However, as the research progressed, the need for incorporating other significant policy events both prior and posterior to the development of the mega-event strategy became necessary, each also entangled in the flows of circulating policy knowledge. Moreover, each policy seemed to be representative of a sub-period in the contemporary history urban politics of the city. Therefore, the original project evolved to examine three distinct policies that conferred a more robust analysis of relational policymaking and the recent urban politics of Rio:

1) The elaboration of the city’s first strategic plan;

2) the bidding and hosting of mega-events;

3) and the project of waterfront renewal.

All three were linked and developed in succession over time, but rather than a linear progression, each was indicative of changes in governance and planning. The research strategy undertaken was thus one to ‘pull the threads’ of each policy, identify policy legacies and outcomes and examine the connections among themselves and with policies elsewhere.

4.2.3. Theoretical framework

Following Mitchell (1983), the case study approach adopted in this research is of a ‘detailed examination of an event (or a series of related events) which the analyst believes exhibits (or exhibit) the operation of some identified general theoretical principle’ (p.192). Therefore, the awareness of a phenomenon of significance – the mobilisation of knowledge in the context of bidding for mega-events in the city of Rio de Janeiro – motivated a review of the related literature on the circulation of planning ideas and models. At the beginning of this research, the main body of literature in urban studies dedicated to the topic was that of planning historians examining the diffusion of planning practices in the context of colonialism, and the policy mobilities literature was beginning to take shape. While there seemed to be a consensus on the importance of scrutinising contemporary circulation of knowledge most approaches focused on the process of circulation and its normative dimension, namely the spread of neoliberal rationales.
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As argued in chapters 2 and 3 the research took as its starting point a broader concern with the adoption and use of analytical frameworks that were more sensitive to the specificities of local urban politics and the policy process of mobilisation and translation. This led to a turn to the literature of public policy analysis and the role of ideas in the policy process. The use of the term mobile ‘policies’ was taken with care, as initial impressions from the field were that of less coherent forms of knowledge. Ideas seemed a more plausible term to be flexible enough as to encompass a wide range of expertise, from inspirations based on incomplete knowledge of experiences in other places, to tentative strategies and the outward learning of a policy model. The examination of agenda-setting, the behaviour of policy coalitions and the dynamic of change in episodes of punctuated equilibrium were helpful to examine how policy agendas are formed and the influence of interested parties. This theoretical standpoint was complemented as preliminary fieldwork and learned from those directly involved with policymaking about the importance of the institutional dimension. The insight from constructivist institutionalism seemed thus to facilitate the bridging between the policy and urban literatures for the shared perspective of policymaking as a social constructivist process.

4.2.4. Research questions

As a result of the theoretical underpinnings described above, the research questions guiding this research are as follows.

1. What are the factors that lead local policy actors to draw on circulating policy ideas and inter-referencing practices?

2. How are circulating ideas co-constitutive of interests and institutions during the policymaking process?

3. What are the implications for local politics in the mobilisation of circulating ideas and inter-referencing practices?

The questions are focused on a particular phenomenon and the tracing of operational links over times, which Yin (2009) recognises as basic tenets of case studies. Taking Rio de Janeiro as a case study enables the immersion in ‘real-life situations’ as they unfold in practice (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 235) while keeping in perspective the theoretical underpinning of the research. The selection of three policies as subunits of the case characterises what Yin (2009) calls an embedded case study. As explained above, they
were purposively selected for their inter-relations, and their development at different moments in time was also appreciated for the testing of theory.

An objective of the research is also to contribute to theory by bridging different literatures of policy analysis. On the one hand, it seeks to further the literature on the circulation of urban policies by testing an analytical framework centred on the examination of ideas, interests and institutions to examine the grounding of policy knowledge. On the other it looks to furnish public policy analysis with a relational perspective about agenda-setting that is sensitive to ideas drawn far from usual political boundaries.

4.3. Research methods and stages

In order to investigate how urban policies are socially constructed, circulated and implemented, the research followed a set of qualitative methods for the collection of data in successive rounds of fieldwork.

The first phase was a pilot study with exploratory interviews undertaken with five experts to discuss the trajectory of urban policies and the development of the city. It took place in Rio de Janeiro after beginning the theoretical and focused review of literature with the aim of refining the understanding of the local political history.

The second phase was carried out between June and October 2012 and the collection of data was oriented to a historical analysis of the trajectory of strategic planning and the hosting of mega-events. It was a multi-sited fieldwork involving visits to the archives of the International Olympic Committee in Lausanne, Switzerland; interviews and archival research in Barcelona; and interviews and additional visits to the municipal archives of Rio de Janeiro. As a result, 14 interviews were organised mainly with institutional members and consultants.

The third phase of fieldwork took place in the second semester of 2013 during an extended visit to Rio de Janeiro. It consisted of in-depth work on contemporary policymaking processes with a total of 34 interviews arranged with different sets of policy actors and repeated visits to the municipal archives. Contextual events turned some topics to become sensitive and resulted in the scheduling of a final round of fieldwork to complement the data gathered. This took place in January 2015 when a total of 13 interviews were undertaken.

The sub-sections below provide detailed information about how each method was employed and how data was collected.
4.3.1. Media content analysis

The use of newspapers and other media content as a source of information has to be approached with caution (Hoggart et al, 2002). On the one hand, it provides a convenient source of data that can be easily accessed with detailed information (e.g. time records) and considered alongside wider contexts. On the other hand, all media material has to be taken as a biased report that is selective in coverage, is written from a particular position and to a specific audience (Hoggart et al, 2002; Bowen, 2009). They are best employed as auxiliary sources of information to support and be triangulated with other methods such as interviews (Yin, 2009; Flick, 2014).

The main sources of data from the media came from Rio de Janeiro’s two broadsheet papers Jornal do Brasil and O Globo (figure 4.1). The first was established in 1891 and was active until 2010 in print format. Since then, O Globo, established in 1925, became Rio de Janeiro’s main newspaper and one of the most influential nationally. Access to their archives evolved during the research process. Initially, several issues of Jornal do Brasil were available on the internet as scanned copies in the website Google News Archive without searchable tools. The search for relevant content was refined according to dates and each issue of the newspaper during a particular interval was examined.

Figure 4.1. Researching digital archives of newspapers
After 2013 the search of articles in the newspaper improved as all the copies became fully accessible on the website of the Brazilian National Library with the possibility of searching for keywords. The digital archives of O Globo were not available until late 2013. Before that, relevant content was examined in hard copies available for consultation at the National Library in Rio de Janeiro. When the archive became digitally available the search for content became more efficient. These two sources were complemented by additional searches in three other national newspapers – Folha de São Paulo, Estado de São Paulo and Valor Econômico – and in news magazines – Veja, Exame, Época and IstoÉ (table 4.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Type of access</th>
<th>Period covered</th>
<th>Strategic Planning</th>
<th>Mega-events</th>
<th>Waterfront Renewal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Jornal do Brasil</td>
<td>scanned, digital</td>
<td>1980-2010</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- O Globo</td>
<td>hard copy, digital</td>
<td>1980-2016</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Folha S Paulo</td>
<td>digital</td>
<td>1993-2016</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other</td>
<td>digital</td>
<td>2009-2016</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Magazines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Veja</td>
<td>digital</td>
<td>1993-2016</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other</td>
<td>digital</td>
<td>1999-2016</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsletters &amp; Websites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ACRJ magazine</td>
<td>digital</td>
<td>1993-2016</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>488</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from traditional media, specific content was also searched for in institutional newsletters and websites. This included, for instance, the institutional magazines of the Chamber of Commerce of Rio de Janeiro (ACRJ), the Association of Engineering Companies of Rio de Janeiro (AEERJ) and the Association of Directors of Real Estate Market Companies of Rio de Janeiro (ADEMI). Research also included the news archives available on the websites of the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, the Urban Development Company of the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro (CDURP) and the Brazilian Olympic Committee. Media and institutional reports were useful not only for the search of specific data but also to provide contextual data that supported the design and conduction of interviews.

Starting in the first year of the research, the search for relevant content was made by establishing a systematic approach with clear timeframes and important key words that included the type of policy programme (e.g. ‘renewal of the port area’), policy actors and institutions (e.g. name of a consultant, ‘CDURP’), and associated terminology (e.g. ‘Olympic
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legacy', 'Barcelona model'). Each material was associated with one of the policies selected and four types of data were examined. First, it included data for record-keeping, such as dates, name of events and of the policy actors identified. This information was then recorded in a spreadsheet document in order to produce a timeline for each policy. These tables are reproduced at each empirical chapter. Second, it included public statements of policy actors, whose quotes were reproduced in a separate word document. Third, factual information judged relevant for analysis was also highlighted. Fourth, it was considered the more general opinion expressed in the article for verification.

Figure 4.2. Example of newspaper clipping and selection of relevant information

An example of this procedure for data collection and analysis is given in relation to figure 4.2. It represents a news article taken from a newspaper from the internet and reproduced in a Word document. A specific document entitled ‘Clipping Real Estate PM’ was created for pieces regarding the real estate market activity related to the regeneration programme Porto Maravilha. Attention is given to full reference information including title, authorship, date of publication, link of the article and date accessed. In this piece, relevant passages have been selected and highlighted. It includes the name of developers and their spokespersons, their statements on analysis of the market, description of the projects and the author’s claim of a new phase for the programme of works. Although information such as this cannot be taken at face value, it can be used strategically to inform interviews. In this case, relevant information was used for verification with interviewees such as the importance of the oil and gas industry for the
regeneration programme or the impact of the new supply of office space on the consolidated central area. Moreover, it also provided some factual information such as commercial vacancy rates that was confirmed with market statistics.

4.3.2. Archival and document-based research

Official documents also present limitations similar to newspapers in reference to their partial content and selective production. However, it can provide access to information that may not be possible to reach by interviews, particularly if the topic is sensitive or if respondents do not cooperate, while enabling access to ‘behind the scenes’ (Hoggart et al, 2002). This was particularly the case in the access to planning studies, consultancy contracts and evaluation reports. The main advantages are for Bowen (2009, p. 30) the provision of background and contextual information, data that elicit questions to be asked, supplementary data and a way to track change and development of the topic. Nevertheless, information taken from these sources was triangulated, including information retrieved from different sources.

Table 4.2. Archives visited and number of documents consulted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Archives</th>
<th>Strategic Planning</th>
<th>Mega-events</th>
<th>Waterfront renewal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Studies Centre</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona City Hall</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian Olympic Committee</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pereira Passos Institute</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of urbanism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Access also to 216 institutional material of restricted access

Data from official documents was collected during the successive rounds of fieldwork (see appendix A for full list). Table 4.2 presents the main archives visited during the research and the number of documents consulted for each policy analysed. In 2012 the Olympic Studies Centre of the IOC was visited with the support of a research grant awarded by the institution. It facilitated the consultation of bid documents and progress reports related to Rio de Janeiro and Barcelona and also access to institutional material of restricted availability. During the fieldwork undertaken in Barcelona, the General Library of the City Hall was consulted. It was possible to analyse public documents related to the foreign relations office and international consulting services supported by
the city hall. Finally, at Rio de Janeiro three public archives were consulted: the libraries of the Brazilian Olympic Committee, the Pereira Passos Institute of urban studies, and the archives of the Municipal Secretariat of Urbanism. In these places it was possible to consult a considerable number of official documents such as internal publications, studies, reports and plans related to the three policies analysed in this thesis.

Depending on the availability of online catalogues, the identification of relevant documents was made prior to the visit to the archives. Conversely, librarians assisted in the selection of the documents to be analysed. Data collection was organised in a systematic manner according to the related policy and through segmenting and coding (Guest & MacQueen, 2011). Firstly, it consisted of identifying relevant sections of the text according to pre-defined categories. Secondly, it involved reproducing the sections to a repository, which in this case was a Word document, for further coding of the topics selected.

Figure 4.3 provides an example of the analysis of a policy document. It is a screenshot of the submitted bid book of the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic candidature that is digitally available. On the selected page were identified relevant passages for the objectives of the research such as the relationship of the event for city marketing and international status, and with the urban development of the city. Once these sections were reproduced in a separate document, the selection about development was further categorised as relationship with urban planning, proposed interventions and authorship for defining the development agenda. The analysis of data is discussed in section 4.4 below.
4.3.3. Semi-structured interviews with elite actors and policy experts

In total, 66 people were interviewed for this research in the three phases of fieldwork. Table 4.1 lists the categories of interviewees and a description of their composition. It comprises a wide range of policy actors including politicians, civil servants, business and professional groups, scholars, consultants, developers, and representatives of the institutions related to the policies analysed. A detailed list of the interviewees is provided in Appendix B.

Table 4.3 Description of interviewees by categories, occupations and affiliations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>Planners, architects and other municipal staff</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Federal Savings Bank, Olympic organisations (APO, bid committee, BOC), and urban development corporation (CDURP)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Business groups (ACRJ, AEERJ), real estate (developers, ADEMI)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Lecturers, researchers, vice-chancellor</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local gov.</td>
<td>Mayor, deputy mayor, secretaries, councillor</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>Association of architects (IAB/RJ) and private practice</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants</td>
<td>TUBSA, RBC</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Union (SAERJ) and activist</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Semi-structured interviews were defined as the main method for generating primary data and to explore the micro-processes of policymaking. As Peck and Theodore (2015) have argued, interviews provide ‘opportunities to excavate the social and political context of decision-making’ and to ‘probe contending accounts and evaluate proto explanations among a range of knowing interlocutors’ (p. 35). Following this advice, the approach to interviews was one of ‘interactive, dynamic encounters’ (p. 35) rather than a more passive extraction of information. The points below describe and explain the strategies for selecting participants, the conduct of interviews and a reflexive account of the positionality of the researcher.

4.3.3.1. Selection of interviewees

The list of interviewees in table 4.1 presents categories of actors identified as policy experts and the policy elite (Schoenberger, 1991; Cochrane, 1998; Ward & Jones, 1999; Flick, 2014). The contribution of policy experts come from their position as representative...
of a group rather than an individual influencing decision-making (Flick, 2014, p. 227). This group includes the civil servants, academics, urban development professionals, consultants and civil society groups. Following Woods (1998) the conception of police elite is less to do with the idea of established powerful actors and more to do with ‘clusters’ of actors of a transitory nature (Cochrane, 1998) that are able to mobilise resources and influence the design of a given policy. Although the categories identified as such – local government, business groups and developers – reinforces usual ideas of hierarchical power, other groups were also influential according to the context of the policy analysed. For instance, certain institutions were influential only to a given policy while the influence of professional groups varied over time. Therefore, rather than running the risk of conceptualising policies as the result of agendas of elite groups (Cochrane, 1998) the policy idea was taken as a starting point to work out which groups came to align their interests and shape the design of the policy.

In the selection of interviewees two sampling techniques were deployed. Firstly, a purposive sampling was used by identifying individuals with a relation to the policies researched; in this sense they were chosen because ‘they have particular features or characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and understanding of the central themes’ (Ritchie et al, 2003, p. 78). As secondary data was examined from official documents and newspapers the names, occupations and relationship of each individual to the policy in question were recorded in a spreadsheet document to subsidise the design of interviews. The second method was snowball sampling. Interviewees were asked for suggestions of other people also involved with the topics discussed. On other occasions, names were spontaneously suggested by the interviewees themselves who were very attentive to make the introduction to the person in question. This technique is regarded as effective to gain access to certain difficult groups (May, 2011, p. 145), such as the elite policy actors to whom a direct approach was of limited result. As McDowell (1998, p. 2135) notes, ‘luck and chance, connections and networks, and the particular circumstances at the time’ also played an important part as the unknown networks of friends and chance encounters contributed to reach certain interviewees.

The approach taken was to make first contact by sending an email to the person in question a couple of months prior to fieldwork in which the nature of the contact was explained very briefly, the researcher credentials were given and the reason for contacting the person. This generated three outcomes: the person would either agree with the interview; request more information; or ignore the email. Then a follow-up email was sent
explaining the research in more general lines and suggesting some dates to meet. Whenever no responses were gathered, a contact directly over the phone was made. Among the categories of people interviewed for the research, civil servants, scholars, consultants and representatives of professional association were usually keen to grant an interview and to secure a date. Gaining access to politicians required the intermediation of a third person, usually a previous interviewee who suggested the meeting. The most difficult access was to members of the institutions related to the organisation of the 2016 Olympic Games and some private groups in the real estate. Some requests were not successful, leading to replacing the person with another individual with similar knowledge. Doing successive rounds of fieldwork was helpful in rearranging interviews that were previously cancelled or to learn how to gain access to difficult actors. Overall, the number of interviews made was satisfactory for the purposes of gathering data related to each policy analysed and a balance was struck among the groups consulted.

4.3.3.2. Research ethics and conduct of interviews

Considering that the research involved the voluntary participation of human beings it followed the University College London guidelines of research ethics. An application for ethical approval was granted for research project ID 5059/001. The research is also compliant with the Brazilian data protection legislation as issued by the National Commission on Research Ethics (CONEP) in the Resolution 196/96: Rules on Research Involving Human Subjects (1996). The study was considered of low risk to participants, involving adults without any known vulnerability for the exposition of their views on non-sensitive topics related to their practice. Participants were presented with a consent form that explained the objectives of the research, stressed their voluntary participation and their right to withdraw from the study. The interviews were recorded on a voice recorder and the question of anonymity was discussed with the interviewee. Whenever anonymity was requested a note was taken for future management of data. The audio files were saved in an external hard drive without specification that could identify the participants. A selection of interviews was sent for professional transcription with a confidential agreement being signed. The transcription files were then saved following the same procedure for the audio files. The documents related to research ethics are provided in appendix C.

Most interviews were made at the interviewee’s workplace or alternatively at their place of residence. A small number took place in public places such as cafés, restaurants and hotel lobbies. Only one interview was made over the phone. Mickecz (2012) argues that
the setting of the place to meet can have a considerable influence on the interview and he makes the case between offices and the ‘back stage’. In fact, when interviewees were met at public places or at their residences, they were found more relaxed and at ease to expose critical opinions. In the interviews that took place at their workplace the position of the individual seemed to play a role. Civil servants and institutional members were careful with their wording when describing events. However, some at the top positions in the local government, the private sector and other institutions were also relaxed about demonstrating their critical opinion about other people and events. This was particularly the case for the interview in one’s private office, rather than shared office spaces and meeting rooms.

Preparation for an interview involved learning as much as possible about the biography of the interviewees, their institutions and the main topics of conversation. To demonstrate being well informed and to have a knowledge of important dates, names and events facilitated gaining the trust of both elites and experts (Schoenberger, 1991; Mickecz, 2012). The protocol followed upon starting the interview included a brief personal presentation and explanation of the nature of the research, followed by establishing the relevance of the interviewee’s knowledge to a particular aspect of the research. Just before the start of the conversation permission was requested to record the interview in order to facilitate the taking of notes. Only two interviews were not recorded. In one case the person did not agree with the recording while in the other the meeting was fortuitous. In these two cases the procedure was to write quotes down on a notebook. In all the other cases the audio recorder was placed mid-way between the interviewer and the interviewee but not directly in front. The digital display was regularly observed to check for any problems. On some occasions, the interviewee requested to stop the recording in order to provide some background information to sensitive topics which were not transcribed, but notes were taken afterwards.

All interviews were semi-structured and a customised list of questions and checklist points was produced, generally consisting of three parts (see appendix D for an interview template). In the initial part the interviewee was asked to describe his/her professional trajectory prior to become involved with the policy in question, with ‘throw-away’ questions to develop rapport (Berg, 2001). Then, in the second and more extended part they were asked about their role in the design of the policy and information regarding the roles of others. These were regarded as the ‘essential questions’ to be carefully designed and complemented by probing questions (Berg, 2001). The interest was to identify who initiated
the discussion about the policy, how the policy problem was framed and who else was involved and the reason for their participation. Although a list of questions was produced, it was not followed strictly, allowing room to explore unidentified topics that seemed important and also to allow interviewees to lead the conversation. The questions were thus open-ended in order to allow interviewees to reflect on their role and express their opinion. At some instances, similar questions were adapted to the background of the interviewee. For instance, when asked if experiences in other places had an influence in the design of a policy, experts were comfortable to note their knowledge of other places. On the other hand, elite actors felt more challenged to acknowledge this. Once this issue was realised, the posing of the question was adapted to subtler ways such as asking the interviewee to compare the policy to similar experiences elsewhere. This would often open space for the person to talk about their knowledge of other places and acknowledge their learning. Elite members are often trained on talking in public and getting them to expose their opinions requires careful questioning (W. Harvey, 2011). Having this in mind, first rounds of interviews concentrated the participation of policy experts in order to accumulate sufficient information in preparation for interviews that seemed more challenging.

In the final stages of interviews more critical questions were explored, asking for more reflections regarding the outcomes of policy interventions, their achievements, and challenges/limitations. It was important, for such critical reasoning, to have already established a rapport and so these questions were often posed at the end when the interviewee was comfortable to talk about most issues.

No objection was made to the use of the recorded statements. However, in order to guarantee that personal opinions and recollections do not negatively affect interviewees the following strategy was employed in this thesis. Quotes from elite members are always identified by their names. These quotes are generally consistent with their statements made in public and due the nature of the position held by some of the individuals – such as mayor, secretary or head of an institution – it would be ineffective to anonymise their statements. As a rule, quotes from experts are anonymised. Although the quotes reproduced in this thesis do not present polemic or controversial topics, it was decided to not ascribe a quote directly to a person in these positions as to safeguard him or her from any problems.

4.3.3.3. Positionality and reflexivity

After finishing one elite interview the respondent wished me luck with the research and noted that ‘despite designing and implementing the policy we are conscious that you
guys will write the official story’. At first I was disconcerted by the statement. Was it a frank remark of being pleased to have contributed to an informed analysis or was it an ironic observation about the authoritative voice of academics on the analysis of public policies? The quote stayed in my head throughout the research and well into the writing up of the thesis. It put my positionality in the spotlight and led me to be more self-aware of my role as a researcher.

The subjectivity of qualitative research inquiry and the roles of the researcher and the researched is a recurring debate in the social sciences. Merrifield (1995) notes how different terms are used to discuss how the production knowledge is always situated, that is, mediated both by the biographies of those involved in the research (England, 1994) and the contexts of the time and the space where the research is carried out (Ward & Jones, 1999). As England (1994, p. 84) remarks, researchers do not ‘parachute into the fieldwork with empty heads and a few pencils or a tape-recorder in [the] pockets ready to record the “facts”’. In this sense, the perspective and interpretations of the researcher is always partial, shaped by its own attributes and the power relations present during the fieldwork. In order to make it more transparent and ethical researchers can situate their knowledge through a reflexive consideration (Mullings, 1999).

Sultana (2007, p. 376) defines that reflexivity in research involves a ‘reflection on self, process, and representation, and critically examining power relations and politics in the research process, and researcher accountability in data collection and interpretation’. Personal backgrounds, the relationship of researcher/researched, the political context at the time of the research and the authorship process are thus important checkpoints to make one’s position visible and the specificity of its perspective clear (Rose, 1997).

A critical manner to examine how personal attributes impact research is to reflect on how one’s position itself in relation to others in the fieldwork. In this research it involves how I presented myself during interviews, how I believe I was perceived and the power relationship established with policy experts and elites. Cochrane (1998) recognises that the negotiation of access can influence the research process and its outcomes. In this sense, the perception transmitted at initial contacts is crucial. My approach to interviewees was mostly through email or over the phone. I aimed at presenting myself as a serious researcher expressed in language, knowledgeable about the topic as demonstrated by name checking relevant topics and as someone coming from abroad for a short period of time. Presenting myself as from outside the country had multiple expectations. First to detach myself from the sensitivity of the local, and in some cases
national, political context. Second to gain the respect of contacts through institutional affiliation to a known university (Herod, 1999). Third to gain their sympathy as someone coming from far away and to expedite the process to set a date. The fact I was a research student also played an important role as it positioned myself as a ‘researcher-as-suppliant’ (England, 1994) for the knowledge of interviewees and reminded of my status in negotiating difficult accesses, patiently waiting at waiting rooms and having meetings cancelled, postponed or forgotten.

Once the meeting is secured a more intense power relationship is at play. The interviews generally took place in enclosed spaces where I sat opposite to one or two interviewees in close proximity. My cultural background as a white, middle-class male living abroad may have had an influence on my acceptability as most of my interviewees were also of similar characteristics and often mentioned personal experience with the place I was living in. I used different attires according to the etiquette of the place and I looked to adopt more or less formal tones depending on the position of the interviewee and the degree of casualness conceded. I also emphasised different aspects of my background as interviewees inquired about my credentials. The concept of an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’ is a useful way to reflect on one’s position during an interview (Herod, 1999; Mullings, 1999; Sultana, 2007). Rather than a fixed position, Herod (1999) states that researchers attempt to manipulate their position along the insider/outsider spectrum in order to present themselves as knowledgeable subjects while distancing from certain topics in order to allow interviewees to explain and expose their views. The fact that I shared the same nationality with most interviewees and was familiar with names, dates and events particular to the urban politics of Rio de Janeiro facilitated establishing a rapport. However, as I was also perceived as an outsider interviewees were comfortable to explain their perspectives of social and political events. This was relevant, for instance, when interviewees expressed critical remarks to political figures and their administrations.

Temporal variables also affect fieldwork and it is not different in a research about urban politics. I paid attention to schedule fieldwork outside electoral cycles when certain topics become sensitive and the access to policy actors more difficult. Ward and Jones (1999) employ the concept of ‘mode of entry’ as indicative of the temporal variations of a given research topic. Depending on the political context particular to the time when the researcher enters the fieldwork, there can be variations to the access to elite groups and the exchange of information therein. This was the case in this research as it examined three different policies during successive rounds of fieldwork. While discussion about
policies that took place some two decades ago did not seem to be sensitive – such as the strategic plan, past Olympic bids and waterfront projects – policies being currently implemented were more so. The hosting of the 2016 Olympic Games and the regeneration of the port area experienced varied degrees of support and criticism during the time of the research. Access to certain individuals was particularly difficult in the aftermath of critical press coverage about delays in the delivery of Olympic-related works. In June 2013 there were country-wide protests against the national government in relation to public service delivery and corruption that were also translated locally against the regional and local governments in relation to mega-events. Access to businesses and some institutions proved more difficult and led to the scheduling of another round of fieldwork. However, in all but two occasions interviewees spoke in an open manner. In one instance, the interviewee was guarded throughout the conversation and I felt pigeonholed in the category of academics being critical to the policy in question, even though I explored the positive aspects of it. On two occasions I also had the presence of a member of the public relations department sitting quietly in the room.

After the collection of data, the researcher is afforded with authority in the analysis of information, selection of quotes and the final presentation of results (Mullings, 1999). Once again the researcher is faced with the challenge of being aware of the subjectivity of his perspective and the objectivity expected of his analysis by the academic community. It is then that a fine balance has to be struck between being fair in the presentation of the views of others and being able to link analysis to theory. This is particularly the case when one starts with a meta-narrative and is led to identify only phenomena that is coherent with that theory. In this sense the social constructivist perspective adopted in this research aimed to give room for local agency to explain how the process of agenda-setting and policymaking took place and from the narratives of a broad range of groups identify patterns that can refer back to the theoretical starting points.

Returning to the sharp (or not) comment made by my interviewee, he was right in bringing to the fore my responsibility as an author of the events I analyse. The ‘power to authorise’, as Pryke (2003) remarks, affords researchers to acquire and exercise authority over the topic being portrayed and should be taken as a significant responsibility to both participants and the audience of the research. In the careful consideration of how data was collected, interpreted and presented I have strived to be reflexive and transparent about the production of this research.
4.4. Data analysis

The collection and analysis of data was carried out throughout the research with concentrated activities at certain periods, such as the analysis of transcripts following fieldwork. Early in the research a data management routine making use of the Word application was adopted that was kept and refined as the research progressed, which is explained below. The use of qualitative data analysis programmes – such as Atlas.ti and NVivo – was not considered initially as the protocols established were deemed satisfactory. Nonetheless, their application may have rendered some processes more streamlined. This section explains how the data generated in the research was administered and examined through content analysis.

4.4.1. How data was organised, selected and coded

Content analysis refers to ‘any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying special characteristics of messages’ (Hoislri in Berg, 2001, p. 240). ‘Messages’ in the case of this research refers to the transcriptions of interviews, content from policy documents and newspaper articles. Section 4.3 already described how relevant content was identified from documents and articles. In a similar manner, all interview transcriptions were read and the passages selected as relevant were highlighted.

All the selected quotes and information were copied to a Word file organised by policy and source of data. Hence, a folder related to mega-event hosting contained three main files relating to selected textual information from interviews, documents and media sources. The content of each file was organised according to a hierarchical structure available on outline view. The feature is available on Word 2013 found in the Office 365 ProPlus version that makes it possible to work on and navigate long documents with efficiency as one can use different levels as headings that can collapse texts. Level 1 was used for general categorisations of data identified as a text segmentation. According to Guest and MacQueen (2011, p. 50) segmentation is a ‘technique for bounding text in order to (1) assess and document the overall quality of data and (2) facilitate the exploration of thematic segments and their similarity, dissimilarity, and relationships’. It denotes the identification of the beginning and the end of a certain theme being discussed. For example, the organising theme ‘motivations of the Rio 2016 bid’ was adopted as level 1 and used to inform segmentation of all the textual data. Once data was reproduced, the segmentation
was analysed in order to identify its components and each component received a code. Keeping the same example of the theme above, different codes were identified such as 'urban development', 'city image' or 'funding leverage'. Each code was selected as level 2. Further detailing comprises sub-codes that ran on to level 9. At level 3 of 'urban development' for instance, there was another set of sub-codes such as 'transport', 'venues at Barra region', 'environmental regeneration' etc.

As the collection of data increased, the themes and codes were refined and linked to organising questions, such as 'How was the bid for the 2016 Olympic Games presented and justified?' After the analytical framework was defined around the issues of ideas, interests and institutionalisation, it was straightforward to ascribe each question to one of the 'three I’s'.

4.4.2. How data was analysed and presented

Once textual data is selected for analysis, a tension exists between what Berg (2001, p. 243) calls the 'manifest' and the 'latent' content of data. The former refers to the elements that are 'physically present' in the text and that can be counted while the latter involves the 'interpretative reading of the symbolism' of what has been expressed. The most likely situation for the researcher in qualitative research is actually to work with both. So, when the former head of planning of Rio de Janeiro declared in a speech that Rio and Barcelona were 'sister cities' during a seminar about 'best practices', the manifest content of the information would be considered of limited relevance. On the contrary, the interpretation of latent content informed by theory and other empirical evidence would have indicated an effort in establishing a commensurability between the two cities in order to justify the mobilisation of policy ideas between them.

The example is also valid to illustrate how interpretative reasoning was pursued in the analysis of data. Another stylised dichotomy in research is the choice between deductive and inductive reasoning in categorising data (May, 2011). In the case of the former a theoretical hypothesis is previously set and data is judged as corroborating or not the initial premise. Inductive reasoning is often linked to grounded theory, in which the researcher immerses himself in the data in order to identify patterns and build explanations. Although this research was not designed to verify hypotheses, it did draw from theory some assumptions regarding the nature of policy circulation. The analysis of data thus incurred in the confirmation or
alternative explanation to existing theoretical stances. Nonetheless, the main approach was inductive, as once a certain amount of data was collected, the research attempted to let stories ‘emerge’ and build explanations from what was collected. In this respect, attention was given to prioritise primary data from interviews to establish the contours of the narrative with other types of data supporting the discussion.

It is also important to note that the large majority of data was originally produced in Portuguese and relevant content also in Spanish. As sections of text and quotes from interviews were selected for use, the material was translated into English. Attention was taken to provide the closest possible translation considering colloquial speech, informal expressions and technical references. In reference to the latter, translation occurred whenever there was an equivalent term, such as in the planning terminology of ‘value capture’ that explains one of the financing mechanisms of the regeneration of the port area. In other cases, when translation implied a substantial loss of meaning, the original term was kept and explained. Thus although it is possible to translate plano diretor to master plan the translation does not give justice to the weight of the policy terminology in Portuguese as a major piece of legislation. Therefore, although the content of translated material may have been affected it is considered that their overall meaning was conserved and did not compromise the analysis derived from them.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has described and explained the strategy adopted in this research, its design, the methods employed and the analysis of data. The case of Rio de Janeiro was justified as a particularly rich context in which there was a continuous engagement with ideas about urban policies developed elsewhere. The operationalisation of the research is made through the analysis of three different policies that present similar characteristics of mobilisation of knowledge, institutionalisation and significant outcomes to the urban planning and development of the city. The selection of qualitative method involves the use of semi-structured interview, archival research of policy documents and newspaper coverage. The production of data and analysis was discussed according to the positionality of the researcher in the field and the dynamics of encounter with research subjects. The methods for data collection, management and analysis were presented and issues of research ethics and data presentation
considered. Before proceeding to the empirical section the next chapter contextualises social, political and economic processes that have shaped the recent history of urban politics and planning policies in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro.
CHAPTER 5

‘Ideas Out of Place’:
Urban politics and development trajectories of Rio de Janeiro

5.1. Introduction

This chapter provides the historical background to the case study and contextualises the urban policies examined in the following three chapters. The first section reviews the planning paradigms that have characterised Brazilian politics at the national level. The federal government has been an important space for the institutionalisation of planning ideas, particularly for progressive groups promoting the agenda of ‘urban reform’. The fast growing level of urban inequalities that marked the development of Brazilian cities in the post-War period have motivated different groups to define a common agenda for social justice and to press for its legal and institutional embedding in the apparatus of the federal government.

The second section contextualises Rio de Janeiro’s urban development patterns against this background. Throughout the past century, the city was a fertile ground in which planning ideas were promoted and pioneered. Their implementation has marked the development trajectory of the city and their impacts are still felt nowadays. After a brief review of spatial trajectories, the politics of the re-democratization period is discussed and the elaboration of the 1992 plano diretor analysed. The elaboration of the master plan was deemed an achievement of the local groups identified with the urban reform agenda. However, it also came to symbolise the end of a period in which left-wing administrations ran the city.

The analysis of urban politics at the national and local level serves to situate the period examined in the research and introduced in the third section. Since the early 1990s there has been a major departure in the local urban politics in relation to the previous period and policy ideas were instrumental for new actors to establish themselves in the political scenario. The 1993–2016 period can be understood as a stable timeframe that has seen the rise and establishment of a conservative politics employing the
narrative of globalisation to justify the mobilisation of circulating planning ideas. Three policies are considered as illustrative of this period and serve to identify three corresponding moments of the recent urban development trajectory of Rio de Janeiro: strategic planning, mega-event hosting and waterfront regeneration. The political context in which these policies were produced is examined and marks the point of departure for the analysis presented in the following chapters.

5.2. Urban politics and planning paradigms since the re-democratisation of Brazil

In a review of the development trajectory of Brazilian cities, urbanist Erminia Maricato (2000) stated that it was a history of ‘ideas out of place’. The assertion makes reference to the legacy of planning policies shaping urban development that carried the imprint of ideas developed elsewhere, most noticeably in European and North American cities. As examined in chapter three, circulating knowledge and planning techniques can be found in the wholesale renewal of the city centre of Rio de Janeiro in the early 20th century; in the functional modernist planning for the construction of federal capital Brasilia; or in the contemporary global city discourse supporting new central business districts in São Paulo (Needell, 1987; Holston, 1989; Ferreira, 2007). Maricato goes further to complement that it is also a history of the ‘places left outside the ideas’, that is, such ideas when implemented were applied only to particular areas while marginalising others, if not the majority of the surrounding urban space. Long from meeting the needs of most of the urban population, experiences such as the ones listed above exacerbated social exclusion and spatial segregation. ‘The application of models imported from the so called “first world”’, argues Maricato (2000, p. 123), ‘contributed for the Brazilian city to be characterised by an incomplete and excluding modernisation process’. The overcoming of this condition was the focal point that motivated different groups to come together at different times of the Brazilian history to formulate an alternative urban agenda and to campaign for its ideas to be institutionalised, especially at the federal level.

Brazil experienced one of the most dramatic rates of urbanisation of the 20th century during its socio-economic transition from an essentially rural-exporting country to an urban-industrial one (Fernandes, 2007). While only 10% of the population lived in cities in 1920 it accounted for 45% by 1960, reaching 85% in the last census of 2010 (table 5.1 and figure 5.1). In absolute numbers there was an addition of more than 100 million
new inhabitants between 1960 and 2000 (Cymbalista, 2008). Life in the largest cities for most of the migrating population corresponded to inadequate housing, precarious infrastructure and inefficient public service delivery. Maricato (2000) recognises that in large part the urban growth of Brazilian cities took place outside the remit of any plan or coordinated action.

Table 5.1. Percentage of the Brazilian population living in cities (IBGE, 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Urban Pop. %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>9.930.478</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>14.333.915</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>17.438.434</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>30.635.605</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>41.165.289</td>
<td>31.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>51.941.767</td>
<td>36.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>70.070.457</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>93.139.037</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>119.002.706</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>146.825.475</td>
<td>75.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>169.799.170</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>190.755.799</td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.1. Evolution of the Brazilian urban population over decades

The Brazilian ‘urban question’, particularly housing, became the topic of cross sectoral debates between the 1940s and 1960s with an important milestone reached in 1963. In that year the Institute of Brazilian Architects (IAB) organised a national conference on the theme of ‘urban reform’ to define a policy manifesto for housing and urban development. The event was catalysed by the agenda of structural reforms promoted by the recently installed left-wing government of President João Goulart to address the
condition of underdevelopment and social inequality. A draft bill was elaborated arguing for housing to be recognised as a social right that included access to developed infrastructures, and detailed a set of precepts to establish a new legal basis, of which the submission of property rights and land ownership to collective well-being was identified as a key issue. It also proposed the creation of a federal institution in charge of the housing policy, territorial planning and assistance to regional and local plans (Avritzer, 2010; Bassul, 2010).

This coordinating effort was disrupted in the following year by the military coup that instated a dictatorial regime that lasted until 1985. Nevertheless, some of the ideas of the urban reform agenda were incorporated by the military regime and resulted in the creation of the National Housing Bank and the Federal Service of Housing and Urban Development (SERFHAU) with limited results (Bassul, 2010). The relaxation of repression in the late 1970s and 1980s facilitated the reformation of organisations around the topic of urban reform – groups linked to the Catholic church, professional associations, trade unions, academia and social movements – and led to the articulation of the National Movement for Urban Reform (MNRU).

5.2.1. The institutionalisation of the urban reform agenda

Social movements and the MNRU in particular gained momentum to influence the actions of the state in the transition to democracy and in the elaboration of a new federal constitution between 1986 and 1988. The approval of amendments to be proposed by the civil society motivated MNRU to submit the Popular Amendment on Urban Reform petitioned by 130,000 signatures and based on three main principles that echoed the 1963 IAB seminar: the right to the city and to citizenship, including not only access to housing and public services but also redistributive policies that guaranteed the benefits of urbanisation to all; the submission of private property to a ‘social function’, that is a socially just use of land that contributes to the balanced development of the city and condemning real estate speculation; and finally, direct democratic participation in the government of the city (Santos Júnior, 1995; Cardoso, 1997; Grazia, 2003). It not only stated rights and demands but it also detailed a range of planning instruments that could promote social justice, such as progressive taxation of speculative urban property and land, compulsory parcelling and building, and expropriation compensated with public bonds (Bassul, 2010). On the course of the congressional discussion the proposal was significantly changed and the final result presented a reduced and modified version (Souza, 2007). The ‘urban chapter’ of the new constitution, described
in Articles 182 and 183, institutionalised the concept of ‘social function’ applied to private properties understood as the use of land in attendance to the accorded guidelines of a regulatory master plan (Brasil, 1988). In this sense, local authorities could apply a range of taxation and expropriation instruments targeting vacant and unused land. It also made compulsory the elaboration of regulatory master plans (*plano diretor*) for all cities with a population of more than 20,000 inhabitants. The result was in Souza’s opinion (2001, p. 161) a ‘strategic defeat’ as the agenda of urban reform was devolved to municipalities and reliant on the elaboration of a *plano diretor*, an instrument traditionally seen as the preserve of technocratic activity.

*Planos diretores* became widespread practice during the 1960s and 1970s in great part as a result of the creation of SERFHAU that promoted and provided funding and technical assistance to subnational governments to elaborate master plans. The period corresponded to the ‘golden age’ of Brazilian planning practice as the instrument was institutionalised at the different government levels, planning departments were created, architecture schools offered specialisation courses and private consultancies multiplied their activities (Bolaffi, 1992; Rezende, 2009). However, as Bolaffi (1992, p. 103) recognises ‘the resulting master plans were nothing but formal and abstract exercises’ whose technical analysis was divorced from political action and had marginal influence on public administration (Villaça, 1999; Feldman, 2005).

Planning practice during the period of dictatorship, symbolised by the *planos diretores*, was seen as a rational, modernist and top-down technocratic activity and was thus not part of the MNRU’s agenda (Maricato, 2000). Their repositioning as a central instrument for planning practice was part of the discussion and bargaining process carried out in the constitutional committees. Once repositioned, MNRU sought to overcome its technocratic reference and reshape it as an instrument to promote social justice and democratic participation (Santos Júnior, 1995; Fernandes, 2010). However, in order to enforce the instruments that could facilitate urban reform, it was necessary for their application to be regulated by new national laws. Thus a lengthy process of appraisal and analysis took place lasting 12 years. The MNRU was reformed as the National Forum of Urban Reform (FNRU) in order to consolidate a permanent pressure group at the national level and an advocacy coalition promoting the urban reform agenda at the local level (Saule Júnior & Uzzo, 2010; Rolnik, 2011). However, the FNRU activities became increasingly circumscribed by new globalisation and neoliberal ideas that entered the policy agendas of cities, states and the federal governments in the 1990s.
### Table 5.2 Timeline of the Urban Reform Agenda and key events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Key Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>National Seminar of Housing and the Urban Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Beginning of the military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Creation of the National Housing Bank (BNH) and the Federal Service of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing and Urban Development (SERFHAU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>End of the military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Formation of the National Movement for Urban Reform (FNRU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Urban Reform Popular Amendment appraised by the National Constituent Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Enactment of the new Federal Constitution with articles 182 and 183, the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘urban policy chapter’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988–2001</td>
<td>Appraisal and reviews of Senate bill 181/1989, the draft of ‘City Statute’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–2002</td>
<td>Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Enactment of federal law 10,257 the ‘City Statute’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003–2016</td>
<td>Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (PT) governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Creation of the Ministry of Cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>First Programme for Acceleration of Growth (PAC I) launched</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: elaborated after Avritzer, 2010; and Bassul, 2010.

#### 5.2.2. Neoliberalism, the City Statute and the neodevelopmentalism of the Workers' Party

The possibility of implementing urban reform was curtailed by the economic crises and ensuing macroeconomic restructuring programmes carried out from the mid-1980s throughout the 1990s. Although the 1988 constitution devolved powers to states and municipalities, granting more autonomy in legal, political and financial terms, credit and public spending were seriously circumscribed and social conditions aggravated by structural adjustment programmes that were part of conditional loans from international financial institutions – articulated as the ‘Washington Consensus’ discussed in chapter 3 (Cardoso, 1997; Valença, 1998; Fernandes, 2007). Important in this regard was the withdrawal of the (federal, regional and local) state from production and service areas through the liberalisation and privatisation of sectors such as financial services, telecommunications, manufacturing, mining, infrastructure and urban services. Regionally and locally, tax incentives, flexibilisation of regulation and economic development policies were prioritised while traditional forms of welfare provision stalled (Maricato, 2000). In this context of changes, traditional planning approaches were increasingly framed as unfit while strategic planning was promoted by external institutions and foreign consultants (Maricato, 2000; Rolnik, 2013), as it is analysed in detail in the case of Rio, in the next chapter.
The re-democratisation period was thus marked, in Caldeira and Holston’s (2005) view, by two contradictory forces: on the one hand political transformation and the activism of social movements; and on the other hand the adoption of neoliberal policies, including urban policies. FNRU’s lobby for the enabling legislation of the instruments related to the urban chapter was finally successful in 2001 with the enactment of federal law 10,257. The law, which came to be known as the ‘City Statute’, represented for Fernandes (2007, p. 182) a ‘new legal-political paradigm for urban land use and development control’ and established ‘the production of social equality in urban space as a fundamental objective of urban planning’ (Caldeira & Holston, 2005, p. 406). The law sets the guidelines orienting urban development and details the instruments that municipalities can use within the context of their statutory master plans to ensure social inclusion and environmental sustainability (Brasil, 2001; Rolnik, 2013). Not only were the instruments mentioned in the Constitution regulated, but it also introduced a range of new ones including the ‘urban operations’ analysed in chapter 8. Planos diretores were reinstated as products of participatory deliberation and were given a deadline of five years to be implemented.

In the following year the candidate of the Workers’ Party (PT) Lula da Silva was elected. Several organisations of FNRU had historical ties with PT as well as overlapping membership. One of their longstanding demands, a dedicated institution in charge of housing and urban policies, led to the creation of the Ministry of Cities, whose main positions were occupied by members associated with FNRU. The ministry became responsible for a series of national projects aimed at improving housing and infrastructure and for disseminating the methods and building the capacity of municipalities to implement participative planos diretores (Rolnik, 2011). While in keeping with the monetary policies established by the previous governments, Lula’s and the successive Dilma Rousseff’s governments were characterised as new developmentalist regimes, particularly for the large funding for infrastructural projects contained within the Programme for Acceleration of Growth (Klink et al, 2013; Singer, 2015). Important areas of urban development such as housing and sanitation were allocated extensive budgets after a period of 25 years of intermittent actions (Maricato, 2010). The institutionalisation of a new planning paradigm at the national scale and its implementation through public policies seemed to mark a new period of urban development with ideas concerned with the development of marginalised places. Nonetheless, their effective execution relied on the concerted action of local governments. Rio de Janeiro was a pioneering city, having elaborated and approved its
plano diretor as early as 1992. However, despite achieving the institutionalisation of some of the ideas of the urban reform agenda, it also marked the end of a period in which the effective implementation of a progressive planning paradigm seemed possible and is the topic examined next.

5.3. Ideas, planning and development in 20th century Rio

As the capital of Brazil for nearly 200 years Rio de Janeiro benefited from public projects aiming at improving its infrastructure. As examined in chapter 3, the first large-scale development project of the city took place at the beginning of the past century with the renewal of the historic city centre and the port area, a feat likened to that of Baron Haussmann’s Great Works of Paris that served as its model (Benchimol, 1992). The city experienced a frenetic and profound programme of works with the ultimate goal of ‘civilizing’ and ‘embellishing’ the capital of the ‘new Brazil’, by then a young republic and the world’s largest coffee producer, with the material and cultural traits of a modern and cosmopolitan city (Abreu, 2008). Passos’s bulldozing efforts saw the demolition of hundreds of tenement houses, home to many urban poor composed of freed slaves and migrants, attracted by the proximity to labour opportunities. A consequence of this action was the displacement of thousands of poor residents to more distant neighbourhoods served by the railway or to precarious self-built homes on the hills near the city centre (figure 5.2). The increasing formation of so-called ‘favelas’ by 1916 was such that a local magazine called for a ‘rigorous censorship’ of the ‘parasitic neighbourhoods of the hills’ that were ‘wrecking with their sordid existence the efforts made to dot the capital of Brazil with the magnificent aspects of a great metropolis’ (Revista da Semana in Abreu, 2008, p. 89).

In the first quarter of the 20th century two vectors of urban development that followed transport networks and socially and spatially stratified the city had matured – see figure 5.3 (Abreu, 2008). One followed the coastline south of the centre led by the opening of tramways to the wealthy neighbourhoods of Glória and Botafogo, where the elites built their mansions, and well across the hills into the coastal areas of Copacabana, Ipanema and Leblon where a ‘beach identity’ would be formed (O’Donnell, 2013). The other vector followed north from Centro, along the rail lines departing from Central do Brasil station toward industrial and rural districts such as Engenho de Dentro and Deodoro, and into the Baixada Fluminense region. Rio quickly evolved into a large metropolis reaching a population of more than one million in 1920 and more than doubling that figure after World War II (Abreu, 2008).
Chapter 5 - ‘Ideas Out of Place’

Figure 5.2. The Favella Hill in central Rio in 1920. Retrieved from http://portalaugustomalta.rio.rj.gov.br

Figure 5.3. Inverted map of Rio de Janeiro of 1929. Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mapa_da_Cidade_do_Rio_de_Janeiro_-_1929.jpg

Note: The centre and the port are located at the bottom left with the South End running along the coast on the left hand-side and the North End along the railway from the centre to the top.

The master plans developed for Rio de Janeiro during the 20th century exemplify Maricato’s assertion earlier in the chapter about the development of Brazilian cities taking place outside planning proposals, and particularly the inapplicability of mobilised planning ideas. After Passos, French architect Alfred Agache, affiliated to the Musée Social of Paris, was commissioned with the preparation of a new master plan for the city.
Developed over the course of three years in the late 1920s it applied the concepts of French *urbanisme* that considered urban planning as a science and art to systematically study the physical and social organisation of cities (Resende, 1982; Underwood, 1991). It aimed to order the urban space with monumental and beautifying projects, including the construction of garden cities, and extensive infrastructural programmes. Rather than a plan for immediate application, it established development policies to be followed in the long term (Oliveira, 2009). The thorough propositions of the plan were officially discarded in the following administration. Nevertheless, it influenced the development of local planning expertise with some of its technical proposals related to the circulation and sanitary systems being carried over the years (Oliveira, 2009). The hiring of another foreign planner took place in the 1960s with the Greek Constatinos Doxiadis. The plan exemplified modernist planning adapted to the developmental ideals of Third World countries. As Resende (1982) recognised, gone were the aesthetical concerns that characterised both Passos and Agache proposals; the current planning paradigm emphasised the search for efficiency in the ordering of the built environment. It applied ready-made ideas for the optimisation of the built environment, particularly for the road system. Similarly to Agache, the plan was not implemented but some of the proposals for new express roads were carried out in a piecemeal manner in the following decades.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Plans for the city of Rio de Janeiro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Pereira Passos Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927–30</td>
<td>Agache Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938–48</td>
<td>City’s Commission Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Doxiadis Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Pilot Plan for the area of Jacarepaguá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>PUB-Rio Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td><em>Plano Diretor</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–1996</td>
<td>Strategic Plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Elaborated after Andreatta, 2006.

The fast-pacing growth of metropolitan Rio during the dictatorship period was addressed by a ‘highway fever’ (Abreu, 2008) that led to the construction of new roads, tunnels and fly-overs such as the *Perimetral* elevated expressway over the port area; the *Aterro do Flamengo* coastal expressway facilitating the traffic flow between Centro and the South End; and the eight-mile cross bay *Rio-Niterói* bridge. However, these works
were testimony to the beginning of a slow political and economic decline with the
construction of Brasília as the new federal capital, which meant not only a loss of status
but also the departure of important elements of the city economy. Osorio and Versiani
(2013) contend that the economic dynamism of the city and region was closely related
to state investments while there was a lack of organised local economic interests to set
a new planning agenda during the transition period. According to the authors the actual
dimension of this decline only became clearly recognisable in the recession of the 1980s
while the region was surpassed by other Brazilian states in economic indicators,
including a contraction by a third of the participation of the region in the national GDP

Amidst the global economic crisis, Brazil reached the 1980s with an unsustainable level
of external debt and contracted growth. Structural adjustment programmes conditioned
by the loans from multi-lateral institutions further increased levels of poverty and
unemployment. Crime levels soared in Rio while organised armed groups started to take
control of the favelas as base for their illicit activities. The Rio de Janeiro of the ‘lost
decades’ of the 1980s and 1990s still attracted world-wide attention. This time, rather than
the background of Hollywood films of the 1950s, it was the execution of homeless children
at Candelária and unarmed civilians at Vigário Geral that captured international headlines.
Some of the business elite left the city, afraid of the wave of kidnappings, while companies
transferred their activities to other cities. The urban space became increasingly fortified
with walls and surveillance cameras to secure residences, offices and commerce. The
booming area of Barra da Tijuca, the new urban frontier for Rio’s upper and middle
classes, epitomised the new round of spatial segregation in the city with the construction
of exclusive enclaves of gated communities, shopping malls and express ways. In
retrospect, it is difficult to imagine that an Olympic candidature could emerge in such
adverse conditions. However, it was precisely the seductive idea of an urban turnaround
promoted by a former host city that would motivate the Rio Olympic project.

5.3.1. Urban politics in the return to democracy

The return to democracy in Brazil was a gradual process and elections for the three
levels of government resumed in stages. First were the elections for state government
that took place in 1982 while the country was still in a dictatorship, followed by the local
elections held in 1984. Finally, after a transition period in which the head of the federal
government was elected by congressional members, direct presidential elections took
place in 1989 (table 5.4). In the return to democracy, Rio de Janeiro politics was initially
dominated by a popular left-wing politics in which converged the opposition to the dictatorship and the agenda of social justice. It was against this background that the politics examined in this research marked a clear break.

Table 5.4 Elected governments for mayor of Rio de Janeiro, governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro and president of Brazil since the return to democracy (1982–2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>State governor</th>
<th>President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saturnino Braga (PDT)</td>
<td>1982→</td>
<td>Leonel Brizola (PDT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>←1984</td>
<td></td>
<td>José Sarney (PMDB)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcello Alencar (PDT)</td>
<td>1986→</td>
<td>Moreira Franco (PMDB)</td>
<td>Fernando Collor (PRN)** →</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>←1988</td>
<td></td>
<td>Itamar Franco (PMDB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cesar Maia (PMDB→PFL)</td>
<td>1990→</td>
<td>Leonel Brizola (PDT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>←1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994→</td>
<td>Marcello Alencar (PSDB)</td>
<td>Fernando H. Cardoso (PSDB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luiz Paulo Conde (PFL)</td>
<td>1996→</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>←1998</td>
<td>Anthony Garotinho (PDT)</td>
<td>Fernando H. Cardoso (PSDB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cesar Maia (PTB→PFL)</td>
<td>2000→</td>
<td>Rosinha Garotinho (PSB)</td>
<td>Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (PT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cesar Maia (PFL)</td>
<td>2004→</td>
<td>Sérgio Cabral (PMDB)</td>
<td>Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (PT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo Paes (PMDB)</td>
<td>2008→</td>
<td>Sérgio Cabral (PMDB)</td>
<td>Dilma Rousseff (PT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010→</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo Paes (PMDB)</td>
<td>2012→</td>
<td>Luiz Fernando Pezão (PMDB)</td>
<td>Dilma Rousseff (PT)** →</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Elected by the national congress in 1985, **Ousted from office by impeachment vote.

After returning from political exile, socialist politician Leonel Brizola created the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) that dominated the local and regional politics in the 1980s and 1990s. Not only did PDT constitute a political force around the charismatic leadership of Brizola but some of its defecting members went on to hold mayoral and gubernatorial positions in the following decade (figure 5.5). Brizola’s policy agenda signalled the prioritisation of social policies concerned with socially excluded groups, especially favela inhabitants (Sarmento, 2004). These policies focused on widening the provision of education and health services, community policing and the regularisation of illegal dwellings (B. McCann, 2014). In this respect, Brizola’s governments achieved mixed results and the entrenchment of his government siding with the plight of the poor polarised local politics, and his troubled relationship with the media further exacerbated reporting on the escalating crime levels (Rodrigues, 2004).
The regularisation programme of illegal dwellings – one of the main symbols of his policy agenda – had modest results. B. McCann (2014) recognises that regularisation did not offer enough incentives to dwellers as slum clearance halted, which in turn contributed to the formation of new favelas. The introduction of community policing as substitution for heavy-handed repression in the poor areas coincided with a time of organisation of drug trafficking and deteriorating economic and social conditions. Critics accused the state government of having limited police activity in the criminal areas while acquiescing to the increasing activity of informal trading in public spaces (B. McCann, 2014).

PDT local government also failed to live up to expectations. Saturnino Braga’s administration, the first directly-elected mayor, was marked by budget constraints and was declared financially bankrupt in 1988. In spite of this, PDT’s Marcello Alencar was elected as his successor and the mayor distanced himself from Brizola’s political approach. The restoration of the public budget and service delivery were the marks of his term (McCann, 2014). Some of his main urban policies programmes included small-scale regeneration interventions at the seafront (Rio-Orla) and a conservation programme for the historical buildings of the city centre (Corredor Cultural). Nonetheless, it was the elaboration of a plano diretor for the city, in attendance to the recently enacted constitution, that repositioned the discussion of the role of urban planning in the attainment of social justice.

5.3.2. The 1992 Plano Diretor

As discussed previously in this chapter, the 1988 constitution devolved to municipalities the implementation of an urban reform conditioned on the elaboration of regulatory master plans, or planos diretores, made compulsory to cities with a
population of more than 20,000 people. Elaborated between 1990 and 1992, the approved *plano diretor* of Rio de Janeiro was one of the first experiences of institutionalisation of the urban reform agenda in a major Brazilian city. Whereas other cities did not manage to have the instrument approved by the municipal chamber, as in São Paulo, in the case of Rio the combined efforts of the planning staff and pressure groups managed to overcome the resistance of some of the councillors and the real estate sector (Mello Filho, 1995; Cavalieri, 1994).

The initiative to produce a *plano diretor* that followed the premises established in the constitution’s urban policy chapter came from the planning staff at the secretariat of urban planning during the mandate of PDT’s mayor Marcello Alencar (1989–1992). In agreement with the idea of ‘social function’ and the new instruments proposed to promote a more equitable development, part of the planning staff took the lead to gain the support of the secretary and the mayor to elaborate a plan that was more socially and economically concerned than physical-territorial oriented (Mello Filho, 1995). Relatively insulated, backed by the mayor and with occasional public meetings with groups from the civil society and the real estate industry, the draft bill was produced in the planning office with the support of the academia. Once it was submitted to the municipal chamber for discussion and voting, some of the proposals generated controversy and attracted media coverage.

The main points of contention were the institution of the instruments of progressive taxation of vacant land and value capture (Cavalieri, 1994). The latter proposed that the construction of any building greater than the size of its plot of land would have to pay taxes that would be directed toward an Urban Development Municipal Fund used exclusively for the construction of social housing. The bill was strongly opposed by the articulated groups representing the real estate industry, who alleged that the instruments would cause profound negative effects on building activity at times of economic recession (Mello Filho, 1995). On the other hand, social movements and trade unions formed a forum to discuss the bill and submit amendments. According to Cavalieri (1994), one of the members of the planning staff that drafted the bill, planners played a key role in the approval of the *plano diretor* by following closely the legislative discussions and making themselves readily available to explain the concepts presented. According to the author, the bill incorporated a large number of amendments but that did not compromise the main approach and the proposed instruments.
The plano diretor was finally approved in June 1992, in large measure due to the support of an expressive number of left-of-centre councillors at the municipal chamber. In reflecting upon the experience, Cavalieri (1994) points out that the plan was still a product of technocratic activity even though planners were motivated by the urban reform agenda. In resemblance to the constitutional process of the urban chapter, the plan would only be effectively implemented once the instruments it proposed were adequately regulated in a separate bill. Later that year new municipal elections were held and the outcome negatively affected the progress of the institutionalisation of the urban reform at the local government level.

5.4. The periodisation of the case study

The period studied in this research covers a time span of 23 years starting with the election for mayor of Rio de Janeiro in 1993 and ending with the hosting of Olympic Games in 2016. It is argued that during this time, local politics was dominated by new political actors originating from the same group that created a relatively stable ideational context – despite personal clashes between these actors – that allowed the design, formulation and implementation of policies that were commonly supported. Moreover, this period represents a marked break from the one that preceded with a shift in the planning paradigm and policies of urban development that mobilised ideas from other places.

This period can be sub-divided in three distinct phases that coincide with mayoral terms and the main policies analysed in this study (table 5.5). The first phase runs from 1993 to 2000 with the ascension and establishment of local politician Cesar Maia and architect Luiz Paulo Conde, who served as the head of the urban office and succeeded Maia as mayor. This period is characterised as one of ‘paradigm shift’ as a result of both discursive and material practices that challenged previous planning approaches and resulted in changes at multiple orders of the planning subsystem. Important in this process of reforming existing structures was the institutionalisation of a project-led approach and the mobilisation of strategic planning knowledge from policymakers and consultants coming from the city of Barcelona.

The second phase covers the period between 2001 and 2008 when Cesar Maia returned to the mayoral office and was subsequently re-elected. He severed ties with the previous political coalition and concentrated powers over urban development decisions. However, these decisions, such as the bidding for mega-events, of which the experience
of Barcelona with the 1992 Games was the starting point, were in accordance with the established policy paradigm and are characterised as the naturalisation of entrepreneurial policies facilitated by the state. Nonetheless, these policies were less oriented to act as triggers of urban development and more as pragmatic approaches of city marketing, characterising the period as one of ‘ad hoc planning’.

The final phase starts in 2009 and ends in 2016 when Eduardo Paes, former aide to Cesar Maia, was elected and re-elected with the constitution of a new political coalition that extended beyond the local authority to align itself with the state and federal governments. The favourable economic context and political support enabled the implementation of mega-projects such as the regeneration of the port area besides the delivery of the facilities and infrastructure associated with the 2016 Olympic Games. This phase deepened the established paradigm with new alliances with private groups and their participation in the design of property-led development programmes and new governance structures. This exemplified a period of ‘speculative urbanism for the active and entangled presence of private actors in the delivery of the renewed waterfront.

Each of the selected policies is examined in detail in the following chapters. The ‘streams’ of these policies can be detected throughout the period under analysis, coming into greater attention at particular moments in time (table 5.4). Strategic planning, for instance, had an important causal effect in the initial phase when it was first formulated but much less in the subsequent versions when it came to resemble a plan of government. The mega-event strategy was first formulated in the first phase to then be discarded and reformulated afterwards while already in place in the final phase. The waterfront renewal programme has a much longer policy legacy garnering support over time until articulated through an opportune policy window in recent years.
Considering the importance of elected mayors and the formation of coalitions in the definition of the local development agenda, the sub-sections below detail the emergence of this group of actors and how their policy approaches related to wider economic and political contexts.

5.4.1. 1993-2000 Paradigm shift

The election of Cesar Maia for mayor in 1992 constituted a new political arrangement that broke away with the *Brizolismo* politics of the previous decade. Despite developing his political career in left-wing Brizola’s PDT, Maia joined centrist PMDB in order to run as a candidate occupying a position on the right of the political spectrum. According to him this was ‘an available space’ that made him position himself as a ‘liberal politician’ (Maia, 1996, p.19). His campaign emphasised the need to ‘re-establish authority, law and order’ (Maia, 1994) and to tackle the occupation of streets and the public space by hawkers who increased in numbers during the Brazilian economic recession of the 1980s and 1990s. Setting himself further apart from his political past, Maia declared that his government was ‘for the formally employed society, it speaks to the formal economy, it represses the excesses of the informal economy, marginality, urban disorder. Undoubtedly, it is not a government for the lumpenproletariat’ (Dias, 1995, p. 4).

At PMDB Maia became an independent leader who did not align with the local divisions of the party. Without the constrains of political bargaining he appointed specialists (técnicos) to the municipal secretariats and in this way sought to build his image as a conciliation between the técnico and the politician (Marques, 2007; Lima Júnior, 2010). During his mandate he left PMDB to join the right-of-centre Liberal Front Party (PFL) after coming into conflict over decisions about the following electoral campaign.

One of his initial decisions as mayor was to withdraw from the municipal chamber the proposed bills that regulated the *plano diretor* approved in the previous year. Alleging that wider discussion was necessary about the new planning instruments, these were not returned for appreciation and the statutory master plan was significantly circumscribed (PCRJ, 1993a). Instead, Maia promoted the elaboration of a strategic plan for the city with the advice of policymakers and consultants from the city of Barcelona. The mobilisation of the normative content and the methodology of Barcelona’s strategic planning supported the discursive practice and the new urban policies introduced by Maia’s administration and constituted a paradigmatic shift in urban policymaking. This policy process is the focus of the analysis in chapter 6.
Circulating Knowledge and Urban Change

The change was not only politically motivated but also had the support of professional groups. Most noticeably from local architectural practices represented by the Brazilian Institute of Architects (IAB/RJ), whose former chair, Luiz Paulo Conde, was invited by Maia to head the urbanism office. Conde was considered a ‘super secretary’ for his influence over urban matters that went beyond the particular remit of his secretariat (Moraes, 1992). Conde (1990) was also critical of plano diretor recognising it as an ‘academic idea that does not deliver. The plan is static … The more plans the city produces, greater are the chances to further deteriorate’ (p.6). Conde played an important role in establishing the connection between Rio de Janeiro’s and Barcelona’s political and professional networks and in the restructuring of the institutional framework that weakened the relevance of comprehensive master planning in favour of project-led approaches. His programme of interventions was partly credited to reversing the approval ratings of Maia’s administration and led to his election as mayor predicated on the continuation and deepening of the policy ideas introduced (Kramer, 1996).

5.4.2. 2001-2009 Ad hoc planning

After being defeated in the 1998 gubernatorial elections, Cesar Maia once again changed parties, leaving PFL after it decided to nominate Luiz Paulo Conde for mayoral re-election. Running against Conde for the small and centrist Brazilian Labour Party (PTB), Maia won his second term at the city hall by a narrow margin and decided to sever ties with the coalition group that sustained the previous two administrations. Not only was the relationship with Barcelona’s policymakers terminated but also the close engagement with the organised groups of businesses and architects. Gone were the figures of the ‘supersecretary’ and técnicos, as Maia distributed positions according to political alliances and centralised decisions over important urban interventions at the cabinet office (Marques, 2007).

Cultural and sports projects became the conduits to deliver ‘grand projects of international visibility and attractiveness’ (Maia, 2004:39). These projects included the construction of a new concert hall; an atelier complex for carnival groups; a centre of cultural folklore; a failed attempt to build a local branch of the Guggenheim museum (discussed in chapter eight); and the venues planned for the 2007 Pan American Games. These projects were justified by the need to restore the city’s image and centrality in cultural production promoted since the strategic plan (PCRJ, 1996). Of these, the hosting of mega-events had the most profound impact on the development of the city.
The bidding for mega-events became a central feature in Maia’s new political agenda and is the topic of analysis in chapter 7. The idea of bidding for the Olympic Games emerged in the policy exchange with the Barcelona consultants examined in chapter 6. The hosting of important events was promoted as a ‘mega-event strategy’ aimed at promoting large-scale urban interventions, leveraging necessary funding, defining deadlines and contributing to city marketing. After a failed attempt bidding for the 2004 Games, Maia supported the re-design of the strategy championed by the chairman of the Brazilian Olympic Committee, Carlos Arthur Nuzman, strictly concerned with improving the chances of the city being awarded the rights to host the mega-event. This phase of ‘ad-hoc planning’, in which urban interventions became an end to themselves, was best characterised by the programmes promoted in the hosting of the 2007 Pan American Games and the initial phase of the bid for the 2016 Olympic Games, as demonstrated in chapter 7. Nonetheless, the reformed mega-event strategy proved successful as Rio de Janeiro was nominated the host city of the 2016 Games. For Maia, the ‘main legacy of the Pan [American Games] were the 2016 Games’ (Calill, 2013). However, as new policy actors got involved with the mega-event strategy, accommodations for developmental projects were made. The hosting of the event became an important political asset that was strategically mobilised by new incoming mayor Eduardo Paes.

5.4.3. 2009-2016 Speculative urbanism

Eduardo Paes, a former aide of Maia who developed his political career under his tutelage, was elected in 2008 and subsequently re-elected until 2016. Although representing an inflection in terms of coalition arrangements, the urban policies adopted were in line with the paradigm and approaches established earlier, if not on a larger scale. This was generally supported by the growth of the Brazilian economy in the late 2000s and particularly by the sharp growth of the oil and gas sector in the state of Rio de Janeiro. It was also facilitated by the broad political coalition established between PMDB and PT at the federal government and reproduced at the regional and local scales.

The new mayor presented himself as the representative of an unprecedented alliance capable of securing funding and support for large-scale development projects, such as the interventions associated with the Olympic Games and the regeneration of the port area, that would ‘restore the importance Rio once had in the national context’ (Paes, 2010, p. 37). Paes was keen to use the event to change the image of the city as a place where policies are delivered on time and as a ‘good place to invest, to live and that has
a strong and thriving economy’ (Paes, 2012). Working with private consultants – attracted to work both within the public structure and as external advisers – in the design of important policies such as the outsourcing of the health service and the programme of public-private partnerships, he stated ‘not having any prejudice to work with the private sector’ and finding no problem in enabling the conditions for private profit (Veja, 2009; Gaspar, 2016). Fiscal incentives and flexibilisation of planning controls were conceded in projects related to the Olympics and to the waterfront regeneration programme Porto Maravilha. As the mayor recognised, the port area soon became ‘the area of the city with the most intense real estate speculation, even more than Barra, and thanks God it’s like that’ (Paes, 2014).

The politics of local development during this period was framed as pragmatic in order to get things done. In this respect, Paes (2012) argued that mayors should not ‘have an ideology’ but be ‘pragmatic’ and ‘deliver results’. This is illustrated by the mandatory review of the plano diretor finished in 2011, in which the urban reform ideals became diluted and neutralised, while the fixed deadlines set by the hosting of the Olympic Games were instrumentally applied to projects such as the waterfront programme. The solutions to urban problems were, in Paes’s (2012) view, something that an increasing number of mayors came to realise as ‘very concrete and objective’ without ‘space for ideological digressions’. In the case of Porto Maravilha it involved the design of a sophisticated financial and institutional architecture advocated by construction companies to minimise political risks and ensure delivery, as is analysed in chapter 8. In the continuous mobilisation of ideas developed elsewhere, the port area became a laboratory for testing new development policies.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the urban politics and development ideas that have informed debates and shaped trajectories in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro in order to set the background for the analysis of the case study. It identified the recent influence of two sources of planning ideas that have informed the development of urban policies since the return to democracy in the 1980s. Firstly, it described the broad articulation around the topic of the urban reform agenda led by a coalition of social movements, unions, professional groups and the academia aimed at changing the legal and political apparatus of the state to favour socially inclusive policies addressing the long-standing inequalities of Brazilian cities. This effort has been concentrated at the
national scale and resulted in the institution of the federal law City Statute, promoted as a ‘tool box’ to assist in the delivery of social justice. Parallel to this, the long-standing planning instrument of the statutory master plan, known as plano diretor, has been re-appropriated to promote more progressive and participatory policies at the local level. In this respect, the city of Rio de Janeiro was an early adopter of such institutional changes not least for the local and regional politics being controlled by left-wing politicians.

Secondly, it discussed – briefly as it will be further analysed in the following chapter – that neoliberal policies that promoted economic structural adjustment in the 1990s also affected cities and urban policies leading to the prioritisation of economic development, privatisation, flexibilisation of planning regulation and tax incentives. The way in which this new paradigm became locally embedded is the topic of the first chapter of the case study examined next.

The case study of contemporary development of Rio de Janeiro has been introduced and its urban and political trajectories contextualised. This has served to highlight the marked change in the approach to urban policies since the early 1990s with renewed political leaderships that is the focus of the research. It has been proposed to analyse this process of urban change through the examination of three policies that have been conspicuously circulating globally: strategic planning, the hosting of mega-events and waterfront renewal. Altogether they help to understand the development of the city in recent years epitomised by the staging of the 2016 Olympic Games. Each policy is illustrative of a sub-period and is individually examined in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 6

Paradigm Shift: The mobilisation of strategic planning from Barcelona to Rio de Janeiro

6.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the first of the three phases introduced in chapter 5 covering the period from 1993 to 2000. It is marked by the election of new political actors to Rio de Janeiro’s city hall and the ensuing change to the prevailing planning paradigm developed by previous administrations in reference to the urban reform agenda. The institutionalisation of a new urban agenda, and the marginalisation of previously elaborated instruments and personnel, was a consequence of two parallel processes that mobilised policy knowledge from the city of Barcelona. The first refers to the elaboration of a strategic plan with the assistance of Catalan policymakers and consultants that facilitated the formation of a political coalition. The second process relates to the institutionalisation of a project-led planning approach to which Barcelona also stood as reference, but whose practices circulated in the networks of the epistemic community of architects.

The structure of analysis of this chapter is organised according to the following sections. First, the content of the Barcelona model of urban regeneration is defined highlighting two dimensions that had extralocal salience in Latin America in the 1990s: project-led planning and strategic planning. Attention is paid to the social and institutional processes articulated by the local government of Barcelona in the constitution of international networks through which these two policies circulated. The establishment of the Rio-Barcelona connection is reconstituted by analysing official documents, public statements and interviews with both the demand and supply sides that mobilised the planning expertise. Second, the extent to which the mobilisation of strategic planning from Barcelona contributed to a paradigm change in Rio is examined through the content of the ideas that were proposed, the interests converged in the elaboration of the document and the process of institutionalisation of new planning approaches. The
embedding of strategic planning in Rio de Janeiro operated at different ideational realms that entailed swift changes in the planning paradigm that was to the advantage of some groups and at the expense of others. The way in which strategic planning also became identified with project-led interventions legitimated institutional reforms and support from the professional groups associated with the built environment. Third, the consequences of the new policies and reforms are examined, highlighting the marginalisation of plano diretor and the precepts of the urban reform agenda. Strategic planning became institutionalised as recurring practice in the city hall, notwithstanding its unclear impact over policymaking. Finally, the chapter concludes by reflecting on the preceding analysis and revisiting the analytical framework previously established.

6.2. The contents of the Barcelona model and its promotion in Latin America

The ‘Barcelona model’ of urban regeneration is often cited but rarely defined (Marshall, 2000; Monclús, 2003; Blanco, 2009). It makes reference to a diverse set of policies elaborated and implemented since the late 1970s that aims to condense the urban transformation accomplished in the city. Although the denomination of a distinct ‘model’ seems to have been first formulated by the academia (Montaner, 1990), it was later officially assumed by Barcelona city hall in an attempt to brand and disseminate its expertise in public policies. Illustrative of the latter is the Aula Barcelona initiative, consisting of the organisation of events and the production of literature – including ‘management booklets’ and ‘study booklets’ – written by the involved policymakers (see http://www.aulabarcelona.org). The model has circulated internationally through political and professional networks with an important presence in Latin American cities.

Translated according to the convenience of the parties involved in its promotion and interpretation, such policies invariably make reference to formal dimensions of spatial planning as well as public administration strategies: the renewal of public spaces with attention to urban design; large-scale urban development projects; the use of a catalyst event such as the Olympic Games to leverage intergovernmental support and funding; and the elaboration of strategic plans as a way to achieve consensus among sectors of the society in relation to the policies to be pursued in the mid-term (Marshall, 2000; Monclús, 2003; Capel, 2007; Blanco, 2009).

Table 6.1 adapts the periodisation proposed by Montaner (2004) and Capel (2007) in reference to the evolution of the Barcelona model and summarises the policies,
approaches and socio-political contexts of the initial phases in the 1980s, which is the period of reference for the network established with Rio de Janeiro policymakers. It emphasises differences between the planning policies and administration approaches as a way to highlight the features that acquired extralocal salience (Peck & Theodore, 2012), particularly in Latin America, and that became the object of articulation and promotion.

The urban development of Barcelona in the pre-Olympic years soon became an object of interest to different audiences (Garcia-Ramon & Albet, 2004). Considering the division presented in the table above it is possible to infer that the merits of the achievements represented by Barcelona were promoted through two main strands: in the epistemic communities of the academia, architecture and planning practice; and in the political channels articulated with other governments and international

### Table 6.1. The contents of the Barcelona model 1979–1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>Urban Planning</th>
<th>Public Administration</th>
<th>Socio-political Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy approaches</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–1986 Qualitative Urban Design</td>
<td>Prioritisation of deprived areas</td>
<td>Address urgent popular demands Participatory citizenship</td>
<td>Re-democratization Economic recession Deindustrialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emphasis on the urban project over the plan Small-scale interventions Trickle-down effect ('urban acupuncture')</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programmes</strong></td>
<td>Creation and renovation of public spaces and civic buildings Attention to urban design Renovation of historical buildings</td>
<td>Decentralization of the local government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large-scale infrastructural projects Regeneration of brownfield and port areas Iconic architecture New centralities program</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnerships City marketing Inter-city networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: elaborated after Montaner, 2004; Capel, 2007.
institutions. Such division does not denote a rigid differentiation between the two groups. Policy actors were as impressed by the aesthetic results as professionals became interested in administration strategies, aspects that came to be entangled in the case of Rio de Janeiro. This differentiation is useful to locate the actors and their networks in the promotion of their expertise.

6.2.1. Project-led planning and international networking

The urban transformation of Barcelona was interpreted according to Balibrea (2001) as above all a critique of Modernism, locally identified with regulatory master plans, urban sprawl, highways and large housing projects that characterised the development of the city during the years of dictatorship. This critique was developed by Oriol Bohigas – architect and head of the planning office in the early half of the 1980s – in Reconstitució de Barcelona (1985), a book-manifest and presentation of the public policies elaborated by his office. It presents a strong critique of Spanish planes generales (master plans) for being abstract, homogenising, utopic and repressive. In its place, Bohigas proposed an ‘urban planning oriented by the project, that only defines what has real possibilities to be delivered, that is free by its own anti-utopic nature from predictions that are unreasonable and methodologically unattainable’ (p. 24). This approach was applied to the programme of interventions in public spaces that earned international awards and attracted the interest of diverse academic and professional groups (Garcia-Ramon & Albet, 2004).

In reflecting upon the debate of an alleged Barcelona model of urban planning in an interview, Bohigas commented that the only distinctive feature of the Barcelona model that could be applied in other cities was the reverse of standard planning practice, starting from projects at the micro scale.

I only defend an urban method that surely is very typical of Barcelona, particularly in the 1980s, and that I still believe that is the only valid urban method which is applicable to practically all cities … The idea can be summarised in that the usual process, that is, passing from the master plans to partial plans and then to urban interventions, is a mistaken process. The adequate process to control and develop or even rebuild a city is exactly the opposite. (Cortí, 2008)

Bohigas’s approach echoes the position of other influential architects and urban writers, such as Aldo Rossi or Jane Jacobs, for its concern with heritage, the urban space and the integration of architecture with urban planning (Monclús, 2003). His discourse contrasts the project – sensitive to local dynamics – with regulatory master plans –
associated with abstract views that are imposed and ignore localised pre-existences. These questions were already present in Latin American debates in the 1970s and 1980s, where Bohigas circulated giving talks and developing projects (Jajamovich, 2012). Rio de Janeiro’s planning secretary Conde regarded, for instance, that ‘Bohigas had a great influence over [his] generation and disseminated ideas that resulted in new planning perspectives at the end of this century’ (Petrik, 1997, p. 40). After leaving the municipality in 1984 Bohigas and his partners assisted projects in European and Latin American cities as did other architects, engineers, public and marketing professionals involved with Barcelona’s public policies.

If the circulation of these professionals was facilitated in part to the academic and professional ‘informational infrastructures’ (McCann, 2011) through which their theoretical approaches became known, it is also important to take into account the internationalisation efforts taken by Barcelona policymakers in the 1980s (Barcelona, 1994). City marketing, as argued by two of the main policy actors (Borja, 1992; Forn, 1992), had to be seen as one of the core activities of a government, oriented to promote economic development and to establish channels through which information could circulate and assist decision-makers. ‘For a modern European city’, summarised Borja (1992, p. 23), ‘international projection is a question of life or death’.

Numerous initiatives were taken in the formation of intra-cities networks, hosting of conferences and events and engagement with international institutions, such as a prominent role in the organisation of the UN Habitat II conference held in Istanbul in 1996 (Barcelona, 1994, 2004), and the commission from the World Bank to prepare a material about policies and urban development (interview, J. Borja). The resulting book, ‘Barcelona, a model of urban transformation 1980–1995’ (Borja, 1996) became a reference material in the urban management training programme run by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean. These initiatives of ‘talking up’ the policies and practices carried out in Barcelona can be understood as forms of ‘policy boosterism’ with the intention of generating reputational capital, and situate the city within prevalent debates of urban development (McCann, 2013). Latin America was, as one policy document stated, the ‘region where Barcelona city hall has had the greatest visibility and where the majority of exchanges and relationships has been established’ (Barcelona, 2004, p. 41). The promotion of strategic planning was one of the main vehicles to establish these relationships and the reason that brought Barcelona policymakers to Rio de Janeiro.
6.2.2. The promotion of strategic planning

The relationship established between Barcelona and Latin American governments was facilitated by a number of factors. According to the former head of the foreign affairs office, the scholar Jordi Borja, it included personal networks, political identities and pragmatic objectives. The first diplomatic mission in the early 1980s was motivated by a discourse of solidarity with left-wing governments in developing countries; by the prospective support of the candidature to the Olympics; and by Borja’s own personal networks and interests to be involved with other governments. Providing further details, Borja recalled that,

Initially in the early 1980s there was a decision, we can say a political support, something we can attribute to the case of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, in relation to the dictatorships. I was the person in the government of Barcelona who, besides my own official duties, had a presence and an interest in Latin America. So, it was on my interest this political aspect. The mayor agreed, he said “Sure, very well, the most important thing is that we use all our relationships with Latin America to get them to know Barcelona because if we want to bid for the Olympic Games it is convenient to have friends”. (interview, J. Borja)

This relationship became more structured in the second half of the 1980s with the creation of the office of foreign affairs and the perspective that Latin America could ‘in the mid-term represent a significant market as long as there is a generous offer to transfer technology, training of human capital and modern infrastructures’ (Borja, 1992, pp. 23-24). One of the ways found to articulate this agenda was the creation of a holding of public and private companies headed by Borja to offer consulting services to local governments. Created in 1989, Tecnologías Urbanes Barcelona SA (TUBSA) grouped companies specialised in different areas such as traffic engineering, sanitation, geoprocessing and public management. It offered the ‘transfer of know-how’ to other governments and assistance in the preparation of loan applications to the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Union and the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation. It was claimed that the initiative demonstrated that ‘Barcelona City Hall was the only European institution that, through its companies, has undertaken the adventure to opening foreign markets’, and this way ‘through TUBSA, Barcelona exports itself’ (Farreras, 1989, p. 47).

TUBSA annual reports document a slow progress in finding markets both domestically and in Latin America (TUBSA, 1990, 1991, 1992). However, it noticed a growing interest in strategic plans, especially in Spain where it offered assistance for ‘the international projection of the city; the definition of a strategy and model of city; [and] the
improvement in the quality of public services’ (TUBSA, 1990, p. 14). As a result, a method was standardised and the product was promoted also in Latin America. This new phase reached maturity when TUBSA secured a consulting contract in Rio de Janeiro, as Jordi Borja argued in an op-ed piece in a local newspaper in 1993:

The elaboration of the strategic plan of Rio is particularly interesting, not only as a sign of prestige, but for opening external markets (…) the opportunity of a spectacular and continuous presence in Rio de Janeiro, through the elaboration of a strategic plan by the public and private companies grouped in TUBSA is an exceptional vehicle for the promotion of Barcelona. (Borja, 1993, p. 18).

The next section examines the activities in Rio and how the two discourses – Bohigas’ project-led planning and the strategic planning promoted by TUBSA – were located and mobilised by the new political actors of Rio de Janeiro.

6.2.3. Establishing the Rio-Barcelona connection

In chapter 5 it was described that one of the first decisions of Maia as mayor was to withdraw the bills on the planning instruments introduced by the 1992 plano diretor while promoting the elaboration of a strategic plan. For Maia this meant changing the administration approach from one of control and imposition to one of accepting organic processes and carrying out strategic interventions.

I am an economist … but I have learned from urbanists, among them Conde … that in summary you can identify in the planning school two main approaches. One believes that it rests on the urbanist to “build” the city, invite the people to live in the city. Like Le Corbusier, Lúcio Costa, Brasilia, Barra da Tijuca. The other understands the city as a living organism that develops, grows and it rests on its actors with action, with initiatives according to the needs, according to the resources, and to the public authority to intervene in order to strengthen the qualities of this living organism and to stifle the problems. We followed this second school. (interview, C. Maia)

As Maia’s planning secretary, Conde immediately changed the name of his department from secretariat of urban development to secretariat of urbanism (SMU). The change was symbolic of his intentions to move from a tradition of comprehensive planning to a focus on urban projects and design. Similarly to Bohigas, Conde was critical of planos diretores. A fellow architect at Rio de Janeiro’s branch of the Brazilian Institute of Architects (IAB/RJ) remarked that Conde was determined to make sweeping changes in the municipal planning office when he accepted the invitation for the public office.

He didn’t want to take the models usually adopted by the traditional left, that is, the urban and regional planning models, comprehensive local development plans, plans and plans and plans. What did he want? He wanted projects, projects and projects. (interview, L. F. Janot)
Circulating Knowledge and Urban Change

The new approach articulated by Conde held Barcelona as a reference of project-led planning. Conde, himself of Spanish descent, was acquainted with architecture networks in Barcelona, a city he visited regularly over the years (Infante, 1996b). For Conde, Catalan architect Oriol Bohigas was considered ‘a reference for his generation’ (Conde, 1997) and he openly acknowledged its urban policies as a source of inspiration in public statements.

Barcelona inspires me ... Barcelona was like Rio. It had lost its identity and was neglected but found strength to get back on its feet. We don’t copy all the context because the two cities are different so we copy the attitude. Barcelona excelled itself and Rio will do the same. (Infante, 1996a)

Maia declared his knowledge about strategic planning was due to a visit to Madrid in which he came in contact with consulting group Arthur Andersen, that were responsible for developing the plan in the early 1990s (Maia, 1998, 2004). Shortly after taking office Maia arranged meetings between his staff and Arthur Andersen. Deputy mayor Gilberto Ramos was entrusted to coordinate the elaboration of the plan and initial steps were taken until coming to a halt (Jornal do Brasil, 1993a; Maia, 1998). Maia was advised by Conde to look instead at Barcelona’s strategic plan which represented for him a different method of elaboration and with whose coordinators he had been in touch (Maia, 1998). A planning officer that worked closely with Conde recalled that, ‘Conde said “no, let’s go with Barcelona because Rio looks more like Barcelona, I think the issue of public space has more to offer”‘ (interview, municipal planner). The selection of the policy model to follow in this case confirms the assertion that objects of emulation are rarely the result of ‘rational transfer agents freely “scanning” the world for objectively best practices’ (McCann’s, 2011:109) but chosen by their ‘representational power’ and the policy imaginary of the demand side (Peck & Theodore, 2010).

The relationship between Rio and Barcelona policymakers was initiated by Conde and Jordi Borja. After the hosting of the 1992 Olympic Games, Borja was in Rio on vacation where he was introduced to Conde and the two discussed collaboration opportunities.

a friend in common told me that I had to meet an architect who was a very nice person, it was Luiz Paulo Conde. [Conde] said “listen, it is great, actually it is fantastic that you are here because I have just been appointed secretary of urban planning” (...) He asked me what we could do together, so it was from there that the idea of doing a strategic plan came about. My first work in Rio was the strategic plan in which I was one of the coordinators. (interview, J. Borja)
The meeting is recalled by Conde as taking place at Cesar Maia’s inauguration ceremony on 1st January 1993. Despite being acquainted with Barcelona’s architectural circles, Conde was new to Borja and to Barcelona’s strategic plan.

I met Jordi Borja at Cesar Maia’s inauguration. We had a chat, there was empathy, speaking alternatively in Spanish and Portuguese. He explained to me the strategic plan … He turned up at the inauguration, taken by another person. We were introduced. I knew Bohigas, everyone from Barcelona. Jordi was more of a sociologist, like [Manuel] Castells. They were not architects. (Conde in Lima Júnior, 2010, p. 151)

The statement indicates the different epistemic networks in which Conde and Borja circulated. While the Brazilian architect had personal and professional connections with Spain and Barcelona in particular, the Catalan scholar, politician and consultant had multiple connections in academia, municipal governments and multi-lateral institutions (Borja, 2012). Conde later travelled to Barcelona to learn about the strategic plan in detail.

According to Manuel de Forn, chief executive of Barcelona’s first strategic plan and a consultant at TUBSA, Conde became convinced about the benefits of the method of the strategic plan (interview, M. Forn). Five months later Conde organised with TUBSA a seminar in Rio to present Barcelona’s urban policies and to discuss them with the municipality staff. The ‘Rio-Barcelona: Urban Strategies’ seminar was organised as a three-day seminar taking place between 18 and 20 May 1993 at a hotel in Copacabana and brought several policymakers involved with the implementation of large-scale development projects, the hosting of the Olympic Games and the regeneration programme of inner city areas. Primarily directed towards the municipal planning staff, Conde presented the event as an opportunity for the city ‘to learn from the experiences of its sister city’ (SMU, 1993). According to Forn, negotiations for assisting the elaboration of the strategic plan were already at an advanced stage and the seminar was meant to introduce the consultants to the planning staff.

what we presented was to enliven things, we paid the seminar, so we talked about infrastructures, Jordi about politics as usual, I talked about strategies … we had already discussed with Conde, we had already discussed with Maia, the purpose was to connect with the highest positions of the municipality of Rio and to establish personal contacts. (interview, M. Forn)

The presentations held up Barcelona as a successful case in which the city left behind the domestic competition with Madrid to become ‘a European city in the list of the great urban centres and present at all the comparative rankings, including investment and analysis on services and transports’ (Forn, 1993, p. 12). In retrospect, Borja remembers
with some self-criticism the boosterism of the discourse that held Barcelona’s experience in an uncritical framing:

That seminar … presented a very positive version of the experience of Barcelona, without making explicit reference to the exceptional circumstances which made it possible, that there was no investment by the private sector, that it was an initiative of the public sector, that it was a moment of economic growth, that the local society was very active, there were too many factors favourable to Barcelona. (interview, J. Borja)

Manuel de Forn’s presentation attributed the urban and economic transformation of the city to two main policy ventures: public-private partnerships (PPP) and strategic planning (1993, p. 2). The relationship between the two sectors was boosted by the hosting of the Olympics when an ‘urban patriotism’ was established between public and private actors and which became a defining feature of their cooperation (p. 6). Strategic planning was described as a ‘central element for consensus-building’ among the public and private sectors but one that to succeed had to be developed from a shared perception of crisis (p. 11). The arrangements helped to kick-start projects in the city such as the development of new economic centres, the modernisation of infrastructure, the expansion of the economic base and the strengthened centrality of the city within a Mediterranean macro-region.

According to a planner that attended the event, the seminar caused a great impact on the audience, who learned in some detail the experience of Barcelona less than one year after hosting the 1992 Olympics (interview, municipal planner). There was also circulation of literature produced by the speakers and the presentation of a time-lapsed video showing the urban transformation of Barcelona narrated in Portuguese. The same planner acknowledges the seminar as a seminal event for the policy decisions that followed.

it looked like the Dutch [football] team of 74, they rocked! They came and played that film of the transformation of Barcelona and the audience was muted … that was an event of great significance. (interview, municipal planner)

The seminar marked the beginning of the collaboration between the policymakers of the two cities. As seen, the selection of Barcelona’s strategic plan as reference did not result from mediating exercises to select the most suitable approach but rather was driven by a reduced comparative frame in which personal preferences on the demand side and active promotion on the supply side were determinant. Strategic planning ‘made in’ Barcelona thus arrived as a ready-made policy instrument with a prestige and ‘moral authority’ that legitimated local policy decisions (Sorensen, 2010). Moreover, the ‘Barcelona model’ was
already being ‘ideologically anointed or sanctioned’ (Peck & Theodore, 2010) supported by the epistemic networks through which its ‘best practices’ already travelled and the reputation acquired with the recently held 1992 Olympic Games.

The next section analyses the content of the strategic plan, the interests that converged in its elaboration and its process of institutionalisation in the municipal planning structure. Together with Conde’s institutional reforms and programme of projects it led to a reorientation of policy rationale.

6.3. Rio de Janeiro’s strategic plan and project-led planning

The strategic plan ‘Rio forever Rio’ was elaborated over the course of 21 months between 1993 and 1995 (PCRJ, 1996). As indicated by Forn and Pascual (1995) the first phase of a strategic plan has to be dedicated to defining institutional arrangements, financing, selection of participants, operational structure, identifying critical topics and elaborating a promotional strategy. Table 6.2 summarises the time line of the elaboration of the plan. A memorandum of understanding was signed between the municipality, the Chamber of Commerce of Rio de Janeiro (ACRJ) and the Federation of Industries of the State of Rio (FIRJAN) and formalised in April 1994. It detailed the consulting fees to be covered by ACRJ and FIRJAN – shared among 40 companies and institutions that formed the funding consortium – and contributions in kind from the municipality with the secondment of staff and provision of working space. The consulting service was provided by a partnership between TUBSA and InterB consulting, a local company that enabled the operations of the Catalan group in Rio (PCRJ, 1993).

Table 6.2. Timeline of the elaboration of the strategic plan of Rio de Janeiro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993 May</td>
<td>Seminar Rio-Barcelona: Urban Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 Aug</td>
<td>TUBSA presents Barcelona’s strategic plan and the possibilities of cooperation with Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 Oct</td>
<td>Meetings between Conde (PCRJ), Mota (ACRJ) and Donato (FIRJAN). Lessa selected as chairman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 Nov</td>
<td>TUBSA workshops on concepts, methods and skills. Signature of a MoU between PCRJ, ACRJ and FIRJAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 Dec/94 Jul</td>
<td>First round of interviews with over 200 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 Feb</td>
<td>Creation of the business consortium with 40 companies responsible to finance the elaboration of the plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 Apr</td>
<td>Public-private cooperation signed and consulting services formally contracted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Circulating Knowledge and Urban Change

| 1994 Oct       | City Board formally instated at the Itamaraty Palace. |
| 1995 Jan       | Ratification of the diagnosis, objective and strategic tracks. |
| 1995 Feb-Jul   | Analysis of projects and proposals and the formation of 14 task groups |
| 1995 Sep       | Ratification of the final report at Palácio da Cidade |
| 1996 Apr       | Publishing of the strategic plan Rio Forever Rio |

Notes: compiled by the author from strategic planning documents

The business proposal for the hiring of the consulting services set a foretold outcome for the elaboration of the strategic plan, which would identify objectives and projects in a participatory process.

The objective of the plan is to set a vision for Rio de Janeiro – a competitive city integrated to international life – where it is assured for its population the full exercise of their citizenship. This vision will include a range of macro-economic, social, urban, cultural and environmental infrastructure projects that will define the development of the city in the next decade. The strategic plan will define a frame able to integrate all these macro-projects in a coherent manner. (PCRJ, 1993b, p. 4)

McCann (2004, p. 2010) recognises that visioning exercises such as strategic planning is shaped by three important factors. First, the selection of consulting services hired to coordinate the process that is reflexive of already established predispositions. Second, the practices of the consultants themselves in guiding the discussion and holding some issues as more relevant than others. Third, the ability and willingness of various groups to participate, support or oppose the process. These are all aspects that influenced the elaboration of Rio de Janeiro’s strategic plan and are examined below.

6.3.1. The idea

Finding opportunities. Recognising challenges. Foreseeing possible futures. Believing in concrete actions. Just as it is done in the corporate sector but at a bigger scale and more complex. Or is it to define objectives? Identifying ways and instruments to achieve them? Set deadlines and budgets? Just as is done in business or how a department is managed? A strategic plan for a city is a challenge! (PCRJ, 1994, p. 4)

Acknowledging the corporate roots from which it was adapted, city strategic planning is presented in the first promotional piece prepared by TUBSA for the municipality of Rio as a pragmatic and innovative planning approach ‘already applied in other cities’ that include ‘Barcelona, Madrid, Birmingham, Detroit and San Francisco among others’ (PCRJ, 1993b, p. 5). These are cities portrayed as having accepted the ‘challenge for change’ and that identified projects that made them ‘more attractive for the branches of transnational companies’ (PCRJ, 1993). The case for strategic planning found in Rio de
Janeiro’s related documents is often structured in three parts: a discussion of the global context, the argument for a new role of cities, and the promotion of the instrumental benefits of strategic planning to respond to new challenges. These correspond to different ideational realms that operate beyond the simple implementation of a policy instrument. Each dimension deserves a closer analysis in order to examine how it implies not only a change of settings or instruments, but a wholesale shift to a new paradigm (Hall, 1993).

First, the documents and supported literature reproduce dominant imaginations and representations of how global economies operate. The global context is presented as a scenario of profound and rapid changes caused by the globalisation of the economy, the decentralisation of production and the revolution of information technologies (PCRJ 1995, pp. 16-18; 1996, pp. 18-19). Such changes, coupled with the intensification of migration and urbanisation rates, are understood as producing scenarios of uncertainty that exceeds the ability of political control. The power of national states is challenged by transnational flows of capital and information with profound effects on cities. It is argued that it is in the sub-national levels of government that these challenges are most intensely observed and that can be addressed.

The reduction of autonomy of national states in macroeconomic decisions gives space for innovative responses at the sub-national government units. Consequently, it widens the scope of projects under the responsibility of these units or from local initiatives. (PCRJ, 1995, p. 18)

Second, normative ideas about where cities fit in with these new orthodoxies is emphasised. The local level is presented as playing an enhanced role in contemporary capitalist development particularly in the large metropolitan areas such as Rio where a range of services and infrastructures are in place. In a world where cities are interpreted as nodes in a global network of cities, ‘competition between countries and between cities came to be of fundamental importance for their development’ (PCRJ, 1996, p.18). The intensification of capital flows is thus seen as leading to an increasing competition between cities on a global scale.

The globalisation of economy poses new development challenges to cities changing the conditions for attracting capital, investments and high skills. In today’s world the city has to be competitive. (PCRJ, 1996, p. 11)

Third, once framings about contemporary global processes and the imperative for competitiveness are established, strategic planning is presented as a necessary step. It is argued that the local economy must be re-organised in a way that is ‘coherent with the process of globalisation, based in the decentralisation of the economy and in the
specialisation of activities with a high degree of flexibility’ (PCRJ, 1996, p. 16). It is argued that this newfound complexity exposes the limits of traditional forms of spatial planning. The partnership between public and private actors is thus presented as an indispensable condition and strategic planning as an efficient recourse capable of defining clear lines of action. Together, public and private actors can set a vision for the future and define projects through consensus-building.

The complexity of problems affecting cities and the uncertainties generated by the intensity of changes made evident the limitation of traditional ways of urban planning. Comes then the strategic focus of urban planning only possible with the alliance of public and private efforts and the mobilization of citizenship. Only in this way it is possible to create channels and procedures for participation that allows planning to deliver and have continuity as it is done in the private sector.

This process enables the public and private economic actors to design the desired city of tomorrow by defining cross-sectoral objectives and identifying projects capable of reaching consensus and commitment with the mobilised society. (PCRJ, 1995, p. 8)

According to Forn (1993, p. 10), it is a condition for the making of a strategic plan that a situation of crisis is perceived and shared among participating actors, otherwise it is not possible to reach a consensual agenda for coordinated public and private actions. Examples of urban crisis are illustrated by deindustrialisation, growing unemployment, rising violence and increasing informality. In the case of Rio these issues are articulated together with the economic and political consequences of having lost federal capital status.

Rio presents a scenario of relative stagnation, low self-esteem and an undefined position in relation to its future and its role in the national economy … Rio already had a very clear identity and a role while capital of the republic … Today it has to rethink itself and define a regional positioning conscious that at the end of this century cities will be even closer and integrated in a global network. (PCRJ, 1994, p. 1)

Strategic planning is thus justified as the medium through which the cooperation between the public and private sectors can be articulated in order to establish a ‘pact’ with civil society. The addressing of social inequalities is recast as a matter to make the city more attractive for investment. The ‘social setting’ – defined as comprising living conditions, poverty and marginalisation, safety, public spaces and services – is argued to be a ‘major conditioning or influencing factor on the decisions of the economic agents’ and ‘the attractiveness of the city’ (Borja & Castells, 1997, p. 125). Public and private actors, for their localised interests to strengthen the positioning of the city, can identify strategic projects that are in the best interest of the population.
This plan is a progress. It is a pioneering step taken by Rio de Janeiro that aims at introducing a concept of urban development based on public-private cooperation … The plan has to be understood as a group of projects and processes enhancing the positive trends of the city or reviewing unbalanced factors in common agreement between the public sector and civil society. This pact begins with the public-private cooperation and aim to deepen the true exercise of citizenship. (PCRJ, 1994, p. 1)

As noted above, the discourse promoting strategic planning aims to establish clear contrasts with ‘traditional planning’, particularly in reference to the actors involved in its elaboration, public support and participation. Nonetheless, there is an overlap of objectives in terms of the territorial, economic and social character of programmes that are common to both instruments (table 6.3). As a result, there is an effort on the part of TUBSA consultants to highlight the differences between strategic planning – portrayed as a dynamic, inclusive and action-oriented instrument – and regulatory master plans, framed as top-down and narrow activities mostly concerned with regulating action.

Table 6.3. Contrasts between strategic planning and regulatory master plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Planning</th>
<th>Regulatory Master Plans (Plano Diretor)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A holistic plan (economic, social, cultural, institutional) that includes spatial and non-spatial objectives.</td>
<td>Focused on aspects of ordering the urban space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A plan that sets general objectives, key themes and priority projects but do not locate them in space.</td>
<td>Main objective is to define land uses and the lines for public action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on consensus on important themes among social and economic actors and in the full participation of society.</td>
<td>Public participation is restricted to the presentation of planned interventions after details have been already finalised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWOT analysis of critical factors for economic development, social cohesion and to set targets for the city.</td>
<td>Restricted to physical, architectural and territorial studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a normative plan but based on the commitment among the institutions and social actors to achieve objectives.</td>
<td>Normative plan to regulate action of private and public initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is an action plan.</td>
<td>It is a plan that regulates action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: adapted from Forn and Pascual, 1995, p. 72; Borja and Castells, 1997, p. 156.

The promotion of strategic planning argues for fundamental changes in political paradigms while defining lines of action for which the plan acts as a road map. In comparing the instruments of strategic plan and plano diretor there is an implicit contrast between the planning paradigms that give them support. Considering the ideational layers elaborated by Campbell (1998) it is possible to identify the cognitive and normative elements present in strategic planning: paradigms, forms of action and instruments (table 6.4).
Strategic planning as a method does not implicate on itself a challenge to a prevailing paradigm. As an instrument for collective puzzling and deliberation it is akin to Hall’s (1993) characterisation of a first-order change discussed in chapter 2. However, the way in which certain pre-conditions are established for the successful elaboration of a strategic plan – such as its co-production with the private sector, the need to reach consensus – it also entails a change to policy approaches and frames. However, the most relevant aspect of strategic planning lies with its strong rhetoric of global processes of economic and social change, the role of planning in such context and the governance of strategic projects. The way in which this world view is supported and internalised can lead to a third-order change where not only the programmes and the frames are changed, but the overall objectives and the nature of policies are transformed.

At the very least, the introduction of strategic planning can result in a formal policy statement and compilation of intentions. In order to assess its contribution to the support of a new planning paradigm in Rio de Janeiro it is important to assess whose interests were identified with the plan and how its propositions were more widely institutionalised.

6.3.2. Interests

After the organisation of the Rio-Barcelona seminar further meetings were arranged between the TUBSA consultants, the municipality and the presidents of the business groups ACRJ and FIRJAN. As described by Borja and Castells (1997) and Forn and Esteve (1995), the cooperation between the public and private sectors was a fundamental aspect for the elaboration of Rio’s strategic plan, which in turn provided the space for strengthening the relations between the two. The main group responsible for steering Rio de Janeiro’s strategic plan – the board of directors, the executive board and the consultants – brought together a range of actors with varied interests and areas of institutional engagement. The overall supervision of the plan was attributed to the board of directors comprising institutional members ‘representing the economic and social cross-section of the city’ (PCRJ, 1996, p. 59) but ultimately ‘directly linked with those financing the plan’ (PCRJ, 1993b, p. 8). An examination of the interests of the
political actors, business groups and professional groups, mostly the architectural class, provides further insight into the mobilisation of the strategic plan.

Lima Júnior (2010) examined the reasons that motivated Cesar Maia to choose Barcelona’s method over the Madrid/Arthur Andersen approach. He recognised that each approach appealed to the different traits of Maia as a technocrat-politician. While the experience of Madrid was a technocratic exercise developed internally and thus coherent with Maia’s fondness for integrative management tools, he was convinced by Conde to hire the services of the Catalan consultants. However, Maia identified in Barcelona’s method more to be gained in terms of political capital.

The way the Executive Board of the Plan was composed makes clear the weight of the political aspect and the idea of participation mentioned by Maia. For someone having low social capital in the political parties he was affiliated with, the invitation for participation had an instrumental character, addressing the need of more articulation by the politician in the society. (Lima Junior, 2010, p. 157)

The elaboration of the strategic plan helped to strengthen the relationship between Maia and ACRJ more specifically. At the end of his mayoral term, ACRJ’s institutional publication provided a praising analysis of his mandate and portrayed Maia as a ‘determined, perfectionist, [and] obsessed’ politician with the ‘traits of a statesman’ (ACRJ, 1996, pp. 4-7). The proximity between Maia and ACRJ initiated through the strategic plan would later result in invitations of individuals associated with the institution to occupy positions in Conde’s government. The mutual correspondence confirms Lima Júnior’s claim of the actors’ need to develop social networks to advance their interests.

On the part of ACRJ, a centenarian institution representing the interests of businesses in the city, the involvement in the strategic plan opened space for direct political participation at a time of difficulties for local businesses. Businessman Humberto Mota, who took office as ACRJ chairman in June 1993, portrayed the period as a turbulent time when rising levels of crime caused businesses to relocate from the city.

Rio was going through a moment of extreme violence … several businessmen were kidnapped, many were assassinated, at a certain moment we had 40 simultaneous cases of kidnapping. Insecurity was rife, several families left Rio, important businessmen left for Europe, the United States, also São Paulo but Rio was suffocating, the crisis was worse … this was the scenario when I took over the presidency of the Chamber of Commerce. (interview, H. Mota)

At the ceremony of Mota’s inauguration as chairman there were present five state governors, an equal number of federal ministers and various politicians and business...
owners (ACRJ, 1993). According to Mota, it was his intention to organise a grand event and make a discourse of urgency to rescue the image of Rio de Janeiro as the city was ‘the national image of Brazil for better or for worse’ (interview, H. Mota). In the days after the event he described that he was approached by Maia and Conde with a proposal to work together in the development of a strategic plan.

[the] first visits I had [as president of ACRJ] were from Mayor Cesar Maia and the secretary of urban planning Luiz Paulo Conde … I have to stress that I did not know Cesar Maia very well, and I did not know Conde – they asked: “Your discourse was just a discourse or a plan of action?” I said … “obviously everything I said is what I am planning to do”. So they asked “Let’s work together?” “That’s all I want!”. That’s how the idea of the strategic plan was conceived. (interview, H. Mota)

Mota then garnered the support of FIRJAN, the business group representing the interests of industrial companies in the state of Rio, that together with ACRJ established the core institutional promoters of the plan. As analysed above, strategic planning is argued to succeed when there is a shared perception of crisis. Both Mota’s description of the period and Maia’s electoral commitment to ‘restore law and order’ mobilised an image or the city as having ‘hit the bottom’, marked by violence, insecurity and informality. As new political and business leaders, it is possible that Maia and Mota had identified, in collaborating in the strategic plan, opportunities to put into work their pledges. Moreover, the support of groups such as ACRJ and FIRJAN attended the premises set by TUBSA consultants.

The final document of the strategic plan set an overall objective, seven strategic lines of action and a list of projects related to a thematic policy area (PCRJ, 1996 – table 6.5). These actions were not restricted only to those in which the municipality or the local private sector had control, as it also included areas under the jurisdiction of the state government of Rio and the federal government – such as policing, underground and rail transport, the cleaning of the Guanabara Bay – or involved areas of multiple public ownership as in the case of the port area. The projects set in the plan are illustrative of how different views and interests from the participating politicians, businesses and architects were articulated.
Table 6.5. The objective and strategies of Rio de Janeiro’s strategic plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rio de Janeiro’s Strategic Plan – Rio Forever Rio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main objective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy 1</strong> – The 21st century carioca (jobs, education, health, youth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy 2</strong> – Friendly Rio (environment, public spaces, neighbourhoods)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy 3</strong> – Participative Rio (decentralisation of government, citizenship, policing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy 4</strong> – Integrated Rio (urban planning, new centralities, housing, transport)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy 5</strong> – Gateways to Rio (logistic, transport, telecommunications)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy 6</strong> – Competitive Rio (MICE industry, research and development, economic clusters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy 7</strong> – Rio 2004, regional, national and international centre (culture, sports, tourism, events)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: reproduced from PCRJ, 1996, p.25.
Circulating Knowledge and Urban Change

The federal and the state governments had an important role to play in enabling the city to ‘restore’ its image and become more ‘competitive’. Institutional actors operating at the state and national levels were consulted for their expertise and were also formally involved in the task groups. This group included high-ranking PMDB representatives, the party that Maia was affiliated with at the time, including Carlos Lessa, the overall chair of the strategic plan, and Renato Archer and Raphael de Almeida Magalhães, who were representatives of the federal government in large-scale projects such as the construction of the Port of Sepetiba, the creation of a Teleport in Rio (analysed in chapter 8), and the exploration of shale gas in the Campos Basin. They would also become involved as coordinators of Rio de Janeiro’s bid for the 2004 Olympic Games (discussed in chapter 7). Not surprisingly, these projects were listed as priorities for the city in the final plan while those related to security and the environment were more evasive (PCRJ, 1996).

The business interests represented by the ACRJ and FIRJAN delegates who occupied positions in the directors and executive boards lay between the local and the national scale for their stake in specific programmes. These included renewal projects in the central business area of Rio and programmes that articulated multiple government levels such as the Teleport, the regeneration of the port area or transport planning. These were all projects listed as strategic in the development of new areas of economic centrality (PCRJ, 1996).

Finally, Conde and the local architects represented at IAB/RJ were particularly concerned with projects to transform specific areas of the city. This was put into practice by Conde in the elaboration of two programmes of project-led interventions to improve public space and infrastructure in formal and informal areas of the city. The first, the Rio-Cidade programme selected 17 high street areas and pedestrian routes over the city. The second was the Favela-Bairro programme that focused on infrastructural improvement and ordering of public space in 15 favelas. Both programmes not only represented a change of policy approach by the content of their proposals but also resulted in the outsourcing of the elaboration of projects to private architectural practices. Conde commissioned IAB/RJ for the organisation of the call for proposals and selection of projects. Luiz Fernando Janot, former president of the institution, recalled Conde telling him he wanted ‘the architects involved, I want the architects to become responsible for the production of space of the city’ (interview, L.F. Janot). A former municipal planner stated that the outsourcing of the projects in the Rio-Cidade and Favela-Bairro programmes were ‘something never done before in Rio de Janeiro,
these projects used to be done internally, by internal architects' (interview, municipal planner). Both programmes had the support of intellectual circles related to the production of the city such as IAB/RJ. A former deputy planning secretary described that 'all the architectural firms were very happy with the government because there was work for everyone' (interview, deputy planning officer). Moreover, these projects were legitimated by the strategic plan as examples of action-oriented planning that prioritised projects that could be delivered in the short and mid-term, developed with other groups in society and to which there is consensus (see table 6.3).

The strategic plan of Rio de Janeiro brought together a range of policy actors belonging to different scales of policy intervention that shaped the content and direction of the proposals. The elaboration of the plan over the entire government of Maia served multiple purposes. First, it provided a space for engagement between different groups to formulate a proactive agenda that otherwise would not have the same mobilising effect. As new political actors, Maia and Conde were able to strengthen their engagement with elite groups such as ACRJ and FIRJAN and institutionalise their relationships in a policy dialogue. Second, the plan also served as a focal point in which these groups identified their interests in having their agendas ratified as strategic for the future of the city. The list of projects detailed as capable of realising the selected strategies included a range of policies and projects that were already under development, such as Conde’s project-led programmes and the national large-scale projects. Finally, it also served as a ‘coalition magnet’ (Bélard & Cox, 2016) of permanent mobilisation that supported Maia and Conde’s governments. Not only was ACRJ effusive in appraising Maia’s first government as Conde invited members of the institution to public positions – including Mota who became head of the development agency Agencia Rio (interview, H. Mota) – but the impact of strategic planning also extended to existing practices and is the topic examined next.

6.3.3. Institutionalisation

The institutionalisation of strategic planning and project-led programmes co-evolved in the design of new institutional frameworks. On one hand, Conde led a reform of planning competencies during Maia’s and his own government that resulted in ceasing the activities of comprehensive master planning. On the other hand, the elaboration of the strategic plan legitimated the concerted articulation of public and private actors and incorporated the precepts of the world view examined above in the official discourse.
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The critique of comprehensive planning in favour of more localised and clearly targeted interventions was the point at which converged urbanists’ concern with projects and the political discourse for strategic planning. To the extent that Conde seemed to be concerned with strategic plan in more practical ways, a planning scholar noted that it offered him a tool to legitimate change in the planning department.

[Conde] always positioned himself very clearly against this perspective of planning: ‘planning lost its urbanist references’. Planning was a tool, let’s say, of those who don’t know the city – in his perspective … He found the strategic plan … and it was as if heaven-sent because it gave him instruments to face traditional planners (interview, Lima Júnior)

Conde’s dissatisfaction with comprehensive planning, of which the 1992 plano diretor was a prime example, was also shared by other local architects grouped at IAB/RJ. Recalling an event held at the institution at the time, former chairman Janot explained that a significant group of architects identified in strategic planning the way forward for project-led interventions.

At the time there was an exhibition at IAB where there was a board with “yes” and a board with “no” [signs] … It was to say “yes”, for instance, to the Ministry of Education building, “yes” to Flamengo Park, “no”, for instance, to Presidente Vargas Avenue. I remember well that this group, that we called the group of Conde, [housing secretary] Sérgio Magalhães and others, [marked] “yes” strategic plan, “yes” urban design, “no” urban and regional planning, “no” plano diretor. (interview, L. F. Janot)

The contrasting examples illustrate not only the plan versus project debate but also modernist projects with varying degrees of concern with public space where architects had greater control over the final product. Janot further listed as reasons to be against comprehensive planning the ‘excess of bureaucracy’, the political control ‘in policy decisions and implementation of plans’ and the ‘demagogy’ supporting some ideas behind the plano diretor that made them unattainable (interview, L.F. Janot).

The turn to project-led planning was pursued at the expense of planning at the city level. During Maia’s government, Conde created a separate institution, the Pereira Passos Institute, concentrating the analysis of urban data and the production of studies and projects. Dedicated offices for environment and housing – previously under the planning banner – were created while the secretariat of urbanism (SMU) was restructured to concentrate on licensing and zoning (interview, municipal planner).

Comprehensive planning was perceived by Conde as an inefficient activity with an end on itself. Hélia Nacif, who served as head of planning during Conde’s mayoral term,
explained that ending activities of the macro-planning sector was an obvious outcome as the focus narrowed down to projects.

Conde ended with planning because it didn’t do anything … In the state it made sense to have urban planning but in the municipality it didn’t, it was used to do macro zoning that never ended, it tried to prepare maps based on a division of macro zones but it also never ended, it was going in circles … Then the focus narrowed down also due the ineptitude of planning at a large scale. (interview, H. Nacif)

As Conde succeeded Maia as mayor, further reforms marked the end of comprehensive planning. Spatial planning was decentralised in five large Planning Areas (APs) covering the city, each with increasing powers over their jurisdiction as a municipal planner recalled.

The master planning sector ended in the secretariat, I mean, already in this great change of 1997–2000 with the creation of the coordination units, of the APs, there was already the stripping of functions of urban planning, but after this period … there was no department in the secretariat that thought of the city as a whole. (interview, municipal planner)

Project-led planning was put into practice by Conde in the elaboration of the programme of projects discussed above, the Rio-Cidade and Favela-Bairro. The latter was developed together with the secretariat of housing headed by architect Sérgio Magalhães. According to Magalhães these programmes were pioneering in their urban proposals and set a new planning model.

These two projects, programmes of projects, are new because they start by recognising the pre-existing, the appreciation of what is already there, of the diversity … when you intervene in an encompassing way respecting the existing relationships in the favela, in spatial terms and social terms, economic and cultural, I believe that then you establish a new model, a new condition for the practice of urbanism in the city. (interview, S. Magalhães)

In the opinion of fellow architects, the two programmes represented an ‘inflection in the way to make projects’ and put Rio de Janeiro back into the national architectural spotlight (interview, L. F. Janot). The careful attention to urban design was considered a novel factor that overcame the influence of modernist planning and was in line with policies developed elsewhere such as those implemented by Bohigas in Barcelona discussed above (interview, A. I. F. Pinheiro, former planning secretary).

each place with its own personality, the lamp posts should be singular to each area … I believe that this was the great contribution of Rio-Cidade to the urban thinking of the city, this contrast between the modernist city and the traditional city … It is not Brasília anymore, Barra. It is the traditional city, the city that has urban life, where people circulate, as in Jane Jacobs’s thesis. (interview, A. I. F. Pinheiro)
In the first half of Maia’s government, the administration had low rates of popular approval, particularly when the *Rio-Cidade* programme was implemented with numerous interventions affecting several neighbourhoods (Pugliese, 1995). However, as the renovated areas and the *Favela-Bairro* programme were delivered it contributed to the upturn of approval rates to his government with great visibility to Conde (Kramer, 1996). Consequently, he was chosen by Maia to run as his successor and was elected in 1996, with both programmes continuing as strong political rationales in his government.

Parallel to the reform of the planning structures the strategic plan was elaborated by the Catalan consultants with the coordination of public and private actors. Luiz Paulo Conde chaired the board of directors that was responsible for, among other things, approval of the composition of task groups; the selection of key themes; the definition of the main objective; and the contents of the strategic plan (PCRJ, 1995, p. 7; 1996, p. 11). A ‘City Board’ was established presided over by the mayor and with the participation of 305 institutional members and ‘figures of relevance’ of the city (PCRJ, 1996, p. 59) responsible to endorse the proposals of the plan and representing the participation of society at large.

In the initial phase, the executive board and the consultants conducted 200 interviews with ‘key social actors’ (PCRJ, 1995), organised debates and consulted secondary data to ‘get to know Rio de Janeiro’ (PCRJ, 1996:59) and identify its crucial topics. These topics were organised under core themes, each commissioned for discussion to a task group formed by municipal staff and representatives of relevant institutions and chaired by a ‘person of recognised critical capacity and visibility in Rio de Janeiro’ (PCRJ, 1994, p. 11). Each group was tasked to analyse the responses to questionnaires sent to experts in the field (totalling 69 responses of which 56 fully answered (PCRJ, 1994, p. 10) and to produce a report applying the business-derived SWOT analytical framework. The activities of the task groups did not progress as the consultants expected and demanded direct intervention from the consultants and the head of the executive group, economist Carlos Lessa. Despite the intention of identifying key debates in an organic manner through the commissioning of task groups, consultant Forn explained that both he and Lessa had set some of the diagnosis themselves in order to comply with deadlines.

We gave them three months because we had the commitment to finish the diagnosis. The first came six months later … we had to lock ourselves in for three days, Carlos Lessa and me, to make the diagnosis because Carlos Lessa, he indeed knew a lot. What I had to do was to organise for him a frame of thinking to gather all the ideas in an ordered manner. (interview, M. Forn)
The third stage was dedicated to detailing the strategic lines and translating them into projects. New task groups were formed to elaborate objectives and identify projects. Public participation was stressed as one of the main virtues of strategic planning both in the consultants’ literature and Rio de Janeiro’s reports, with strategies and projects defined according to consensus. However, different participants invited as experts highlighted that consultation and participation in the task groups had a tokenistic character and the process was driven to render approval to already pre-defined policies.

They separated us in working groups but then… these things in Brazil are already set up isn’t it? … You become disillusioned, you feel that you are not listened to … That’s what happened to me, I gave up. (interview, participating scholar)

The meetings of the strategic plan, were meetings with great lunches, 100 people, talking about futilities and banalities and giving some opinion … it wasn’t a discussion in democratic terms, it was something directed towards an end. (interview, L. F. Janot)

The city hall presented its projects saying “I will do this, I will that”, they were going ahead anyway. It was an attempt to leverage support to the projects of the city hall. (interview, municipal planner)

The final phase culminated in the elaboration of the strategic plan that was endorsed by the board of directors and then by the City Board and officially presented at a special ceremony attended by representatives of the three levels of government and the private sector on 11 September 1995. Rio de Janeiro’s strategic plan was presented as ‘the basic tool guiding action in the city’ and it aimed to become the ‘obligatory reference for the future’ (PCRJ 1996, p. 9). However, the ability of the plan to inform policymaking was not very clear. Reflecting on the influence of the plan over the municipal planning activities, former secretary Hélia Nacif recognised that ‘it didn’t interfere, no, we didn’t even pay attention’ (interview, H. Nacif). A municipal planner presented a similar appraisal adding that greatest influence actually came from the shifting planning rationale that was already taking place.

I don’t remember seeing the unfolding of projects to become a reality. … Now the idea of projects, it continues stronger than ever at times without any relation to the plano diretor, with the planning of the city at large. (interview, municipal planner)

Seeing the rather dismissive remarks of policy actors involved in the planning office it may be tempting to downplay the strategic plan as a failed marketing exercise. However, rather than the limited influence of the final document in shaping policymaking in the following years, it was the process of elaboration that produced important results. First, it naturalised a discourse of competition that supported a change of policy focus.
to project-led planning. While Conde was already motivated to reform the institutional structure of municipal planning, the discourse of strategic planning reinforced his arguments. Second, it institutionalised the relationship of the public sector with private actors in the financing and steering of the strategic plan. Even though the results were limited, this proximity became naturalised as already argued. Finally, it marginalised other planning instruments, such as the plano diretor, that afforded greater influence from social groups. This impact is discussed in the next section.

6.4. Outcomes

6.4.1. The marginalisation of plano diretor

The publication of the strategic plan took place at a time of increasing support for Maia’s government. Media coverage highlighted the ‘truce for the future’ of the city in the participation of the mayor, the state governor and federal ministers in the presentation of the plan (Jornal do Brasil, 1995). Rio de Janeiro’s broadsheet O Globo (1996) ran an editorial in support, urging mayoral candidates running in the 1996 elections to pledge their commitment to follow the plan. The plan was portrayed as a symbol of a turning point of recent turbulent times.

Rio de Janeiro is in a positive moment as if awakening from a long and dark winter. The problems did not vanish, but there is hope to solve them ... The city is not anymore the arrival destination of hordes of migration. It can plan its spaces a little better, its life conditions. (O Globo, 1996, p.6)

Praise for Rio de Janeiro’s strategic plan also came from media from other regions. The newspaper Folha de São Paulo also ran an editorial commending the municipality of Rio for the initiative and setting it as an example to be followed. In an editorial piece it argued that it presented a clear contrast with the plano diretor as it galvanised participants to address the causes of urban crisis, here associated with informal settlements.

Contrary to the official Planos Diretores and the dozens of urbanist plans that depend on political will and action by governments that never leave the drawing boards, the Strategic Plan is based on the voluntary participation of the population, public institutions and businesses ... Rio did not want to believe that was in crisis and only reacted late in the 1980s onwards when it was out of control. São Paulo – having its favelas and miserable neighbourhoods in the peripheries – may take longer to wake up. (Beraba, 1995, p.2)

Dissonant opinions came mostly from academia and the trade unions. They were critical to the way the elaboration process was conducted, pointing to the lack of opportunity
to question arbitrary frameworks and the disregard to the former _plano diretor_. Responding to the editorial above, the president of the Union of Architects of the State of Rio de Janeiro stated that participating civil institutions questioned the methods being dictated by elite groups controlling the Executive Board and the Board of Directors which was leading to a document that only served for marketing purposes (Azevedo, 1995). Most importantly, it questioned opinion pieces such as the one expressed by the newspaper _Folha de São Paulo_ in blaming _plano diretor_ for the problems of cities when it was the political will of local authorities that constrained their implementation.

We cannot agree with the article when it declares the bankruptcy of Planos Diretores and Urbanist Plans … Rio de Janeiro’s Plano Diretor had in its elaboration the participation of civil society and was approved by the City Council. The responsibility for not regulating it and implementing is solely of the present administration. (Azevedo, 1995, p. 3)

A city study published by the World Bank (1999) labelled the strategic plan a ‘laudable achievement’ and ‘an unprecedented success as an exercise in consensus-building and partnership’ (p. 5). The institutions that supported the plan were also positive regarding its expected benefits. ACRJ (1995, p. 18) saw the plan as ‘free from political uncertainties and changes of government’. In the opinion of a former municipality planner the main outcome of the plan was the institutionalisation of the relationship between the municipality and private actors ‘that have never been so straightforward’ (interview, municipality planner). Taking into consideration the previous left-wing governments, the same planner stressed that it ‘created something that was unthinkable in the 1980s, that is, the mayor receiving big businesses to decide with them where to do large investments’. The elaboration of the strategic plan contributed to the participating groups to identify themselves as a new political coalition and to develop a new policy rationale.

[the] strategic plan was an attempt to stamp … a new way to manage the city, it is an ethos, the spirit of a political and business elite that dominate the city. The strategic plan is above all a first attempt of this group to build an identity. (Interview, P. N. Lima Júnior)

Accordingly, as noted in the previous section, the direct results of the strategic plan were rather in the development of this alliance and legitimisation of the institutional reforms already been carried out than as an instrument informing policies. This political alliance continued in Conde’s mayoral government while the plan was refined and updated (PCRJ, 1998). The relationship between the government and business groups became more straightforward with the creation of _Agencia Rio_, an urban development agency chaired by Humberto Mota after leaving ACRJ, in charge of
identifying opportunities for the development of strategic projects (interview, Humberto Mota). According to Conde’s plan of government presented to the municipal chamber (PCRJ, 1997), it was his intention to ‘deepen the relationship with the private sector through concessions to run public services’, which he defended as a practice of ‘modern cities’ and to ‘consolidate Rio de Janeiro as a global city’ (pp. 22-23). Despite this, few projects were implemented by Agencia Rio during Conde’s government.

TUBSA consultants described the results of the first strategic plan of Rio as a ‘total failure’. In the opinion of Jordi Borja (2012) it was ‘reduced to the complicity between the city government and business leaders’ with no ‘effective popular participation’ (pp. 170-171). Manuel de Forn admitted that the plan was not applied as an instrument of policymaking and that ‘what was left was a more ideological vision than a practical one’ (interview, M. Forn). He recognised some marginal benefits in bringing actors together and for achieving a momentum of cooperation between the public and private sectors.

it was a very sensitive moment and I believe that for what it was expected from the strategic plan its main achievement was to reach a point to say ‘man, we can do something’. Its failure obviously is that from doing something nothing was done. … The achievement was to create a momentum. (interview, M. Forn)

The more implicit impact of the strategic plan was the marginalisation of plano diretor as planning policy despite instituted by a municipal law. As seen, the withdrawal of the related planning instruments bills rendered the application of the plan as a resource to promote social justice unattainable. The strategic plan institutionalised a competing rationale that disregarded the urban reform agenda. Opposition councillor Eliomar Coelho identified similarities in the general objectives of both plans for their concern for quality of life and improving the city for the population (interview, E. Coelho). However, the strategic plan proposed to achieve its aims through ‘making the city competitive, integrated in the globalised world’, which conflicted with the proposals of the plano diretor.

[It] is a totally distinct rationale. One aims exactly at giving this city to everyone, promote development in a cohesive and rigorous manner for everyone. Democracy. The other follows exactly the market rationale, so it is right there that started the work to dismantle what was the 1992 plano diretor. (interview, E. Coelho)

The institutional reforms carried out by Conde also had the instrumental character of demobilising the planning staff directly involved with the elaboration of the plano diretor. Part of the staff was reshuffled in the newly-created departments and competencies. One
of the planners affected by these changes recognised that relocation was a natural outcome with the changes of a government, particularly with a different political orientation.

when there are major changes – in this case above all a political orientation that was pushed back and a new group came to power – it is natural for relocation to take place, not only of the leaders and the main actors of the government but also of the expert staff that is aligned to what is done … this happened with me, with my colleagues etc. We had to part to other ways. (interview, municipal planner)

The mandatory decennial review of the plano diretor took place in 2001, when Maia returned to the mayoral office. A report attending to the minimum requirements established by federal law was submitted but not accepted by the municipality attorney’s office. The proposal was then fragmented and sent for revision to different municipal departments, which seriously delayed the re-issue of the plan. After several reviews and amendments, it was only re-issued in 2011 under the government of Mayor Eduardo Paes, a topic examined in chapter 8.

6.4.2. Following strategic plans and the circulation of expertise

Upon the return of Cesar Maia to office in 2001 the first strategic plan was disregarded for reasons described in the previous chapter related to his rupture with Conde and from the former political alliance. In its place, a new strategic plan was produced with no reference to Barcelona or the methodology produced by TUBSA. The strategic plan ‘The Cities of the City’ (PCRJ, 2004) was developed internally and financed by the municipality. The approach taken was more localised with rounds of discussions taken at district level and a set of aims, objectives and policies defined for each area. Once again, there was little practical result coming from the exercise. Despite Maia’s re-election in 2004 the plan was affected by the prioritisation of attention and resources to the hosting of the 2007 Pan American Games and the construction of a new concert hall (interview, chair of Rio’s second strategic plan).

The elaboration of strategic plans was again an object of interest in the election of Mayor Eduardo Paes (2009–2016) and the idea of the City Board was revived in the 2009 and 2012 strategic plans ‘After 2016 – Rio more Integrated and Competitive’ (PCRJ, 2009; 2012). However, this time it was used as a programme of government and management instrument that defined sectoral objectives and targets for the municipality staff with rewards to departments for their achievements. Barcelona’s consultants were not involved anymore in the city’s following strategic plans. Nonetheless, the experience of TUBSA in Rio did conform to Borja’s (1993) expectation of generating prestige and open new markets, as other Brazilian and Latin American cities contracted their services.
While TUBSA secured the consulting contract in Rio de Janeiro a new institution was being established with the assistance of Barcelona’s City Hall to promote strategic planning in Latin America. In 1993 the Ibero-American Centre of Strategic Urban Development (CIDEU) was created with the aim to ‘export the ‘Barcelona Model’ and to ‘build a network among cities having Barcelona at the centre’ (APEB, 1999, p. 97). As the interest in the instrument became widespread in the 1990s CIDEU played an important role in the elaboration of strategic plans in Latin American cities such as Buenos Aires, Bogotá, Córdoba and Rosário (Steinberg, 2002).

In Brazil, Barcelona’s methodology of strategic planning was promoted both by CIDEU and TUBSA consultants, who secured consulting work in the elaboration of tourism strategies and urban development projects in the cities of Belo Horizonte (Bessa et al, 2007), Juiz de Fora (Oliveira, 2006), Nova Iguaçu (Cidades do Brasil, 2000), Porto Alegre (Albano, 1999), Salvador (Loiola & Miguez, 1997; Fernandes, 2004) and Santo André (Sakata, 2009). Rodrigo Lopes, chair of the second phase of Rio de Janeiro’s strategic plan, was also involved in consulting services in other Brazilian cities and was responsible for the translation and promotion of Barcelona’s methodology (Lopes, 1998).

Borja (2010) later recalled that in Latin America ‘the reception of the Barcelona model raises a big moral question’ (p. 221). According to him many cities ‘bought the discourse’ but were not necessarily committed to or applied the full contents of Barcelona’s urban policies. In many cases what prevailed were neoliberal approaches that, according to Borja, legitimised ‘enclaves rather than civic integration, and a lack of criteria of programmes to reduce social inequalities’ (pp. 221-222). This may well be the case for Rio de Janeiro’s strategic plan. There was, however, another attempt to translate the experience of the Catalan city in a more straightforward mobilisation of policy ideas. As a direct consequence of the engagement of Rio de Janeiro’s policymakers with Barcelona consultants, a bid for the 2004 Olympic Games was produced and became an important target of the strategic plan. This event and the mega-event strategy developed afterwards is the topic of the next chapter.

6.5. Conclusion

This chapter has critically examined the processes through which selected policies associated with the ‘Barcelona model’ of urban regeneration circulated through different channels from that city to Latin America and were grounded in Rio de Janeiro. It has shown how the supply and demand forces mobilising policy knowledge were socially
embedded in key policy actors looking forward to establish networks between the two cities. On the one hand, the region was constituted as a target market for the boosterism and entrepreneurial international agenda of Barcelona city hall while drawing on the personal networks of the head of the consulting group. On the other hand, the new political actors of Rio de Janeiro’s government represented an informed demand based on the epistemic networks of the head of planning and the mayor’s predisposition for adopting a new policy instrument. More specifically, it explored how the mobilisation of policy models drew from predisposed ideological alignments rather than the prospective evaluation of available references (Peck & Theodore, 2010; McCann, 2011).

Examining the idea of strategic planning through its ideational realms demonstrated how ‘particular engagements with the global’ (Ong, 2011, p. 2) are done in the practices of local groups and circulating consultants. More than simply the mobilisation of a policy instrument, the case for strategic planning operated at different ideational realms and localised dominant discourses about globalisation and competition among cities. It entailed the naturalisation of a relationship between public and private sectors in the co-production of policymaking and the subscription to a view of management practices as efficient approaches to govern cities. ‘Worlding up’ Rio de Janeiro in this case did not result in reflexive practices of outward looking policies but the restructuring of internal arrangements in terms of power coalitions and institutional forms.

However, the mobilisation of strategic planning cannot be reduced to a smokescreen as it would imply that interests were already defined and that the exercise was instrumental. Rather, the elaboration process provided the space in which actors that were not close to each other before were able to identify opportunities for mutual cooperation. Strengthening the relationship between the city hall and ACRJ was an important asset for the reputation capital of both the mayor and the chair of ACRJ as new leaders of their respective institutions. It also provided the opportunity for projects already under development to be ratified and legitimatized as strategic, as is the case of the programmes of projects led by the head of municipal planning and the large-scale national projects under the responsibility of participating federal actors. However, for all the rhetoric in bringing together public and private actors to identify opportunities, this cooperation did not translate into the carrying forward of new projects.
Although Rio de Janeiro’s strategic plan seems at first to have been of limited impact over policymaking, it is not on the final document but in the social production of the plan that material consequences can be observed. On the one hand, it enabled the formation of a new coalition that was sustained over two governments and supported the institutional reforms of the planning structures taking place. On the other hand, it legitimated ‘exclusion and silences’ (Cook, 2008) in the participation process and marginalisation of the plano diretor. Political and business leaders responsible for financing the plan occupied the majority of positions in the different boards created while the participation of experts was reduced to consultation. Most importantly, there was little referencing to the plano diretor in force apart from delegitimising its central role in shaping urban development. Coming from participants of the process of elaboration of the 1992 plano diretor, it was claimed that strategic planning was a depoliticising process that removed social actors and aims at the core of planning to be replaced by economic imperatives that further destabilised the urban reform agenda.

Considering the multiple streams of agenda-setting and policy formation, it was politics that had the greater influence in the opening of a policy window. As a policy, strategic planning was an ‘off-the-shelf’ solution provided by foreign consultants at the right time of political change. The definitions of the problem, in this light, were the discursive construction of an urban crisis and its relationship to a wider world-view to which strategic planning provided a response.

Overall, this chapter has demonstrated as necessary the nuanced analysis of the practices in which an idea is grounded and transformed during the policy process. More than simply the translation of the strategic planning method made in Barcelona, the elaboration process demonstrated how new political actors mobilise ‘fresh’ ideas that afford possibilities to leverage support in terms of political coalition and for their policy agendas. The extent to which outcomes from the mobilised policy can be measured lies less in direct relation to the policy but more on the indirect opportunities it generated.

Despite the claim of some of the expert staff in noting that there was no direct unfolding of the strategic plan into new projects, one exception stood out. The bidding for the Olympic Games emerged as an important project and became an enduring policy objective.
CHAPTER 7

Ad Hoc Planning:
The mega-event strategy and the hosting of 2016 Olympic Games

7.1. Introduction

The bidding for the Olympic Games emerged as an important policy objective during the elaboration of the first strategic plan of Rio de Janeiro. Despite the alleged ineffectiveness of the document to inform new urban policies, the hosting of mega-events became an enduring policy objective supported by different sets of interests in the last two decades. During this period three bids for the Olympic Games were produced alongside the instrumental hosting of the regional Pan American Games. Over the course of the uneven development of Rio’s Olympic project, hosting experiences from elsewhere were mobilised as references and expert knowledge hired to advise in the elaboration of a proposal capable of convincing the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to award the rights to organise the event in Rio de Janeiro.

This chapter reconstitutes and examines how this mega-event strategy (Andranovich et al, 2001) was conceived, what the motivations were in bidding for the Olympic Games, which sort of ideas it mobilised, whose agendas stood to benefit, and how it became institutionalised in the local and federal governments’ agendas. First, it is examined how the idea of an Olympic candidature was first articulated in the context of elaboration of the strategic plan that still had Barcelona as reference. Second, the analytical framework of the three I’s is employed to analyse how the mega-event strategy was reformulated in the early 2000s with the sole objective of being awarded the hosting rights. A local actor embedded in the networks of the IOC through the Brazilian Olympic Committee was able to gather political support for a project built on perceptions of what a winning Olympic candidature should look like. This entailed a complete change both of the spatial strategy and the governance of the bid proposal, while having the norms and values of the Olympic system internalised by political actors and public structures. As a result, a constellation of interests formed around the Olympic project related to multi-
level agendas. Third, the outcomes of the preparations for the mega-event are assessed in the changing political configuration that took place from 2009 paying attention to the increasing costs of the event, the nature of the projects and the private groups that gained with the urban interventions. Finally, in the concluding section, it is argued that the grounding and consequential support of a model is related to its flexibility to allow involved interests to reinterpret it. The Rio Olympic project also illustrates how ideas about local development become institutionalised as an enduring policy objective regardless of its articulation with wider issues of urban development.


The role that the Olympics played for Barcelona in terms of city marketing and in facilitating the delivery of large-scale infrastructural projects was emphasised by the consultants of TUBSA since the initial seminar that marked the beginning of the relationship between the policymakers from the two cities in 1993 (interview, municipal planner). The idea of Rio de Janeiro bidding for the Olympic Games emerged during the elaboration of the strategic plan as a way to set a clear deadline and catalyse efforts to achieve the objectives of the plan (Magalhães, 1997). It was argued that the Olympic candidature and the projects associated with it would ‘enable the rise of the city to the top of the world cities group’ (RBC, 1996, p. 21).

In the following year, the municipality commissioned a study to a local consulting group to survey potential venues and areas where Olympic competitions could be held (TCI, 1994). Some of these areas, such as the Maracanã sports complex, were considered natural choices for the availability of existing venues but others, such as the indication to build a suite of new facilities in the booming district of Barra da Tijuca, were justified on the grounds of vacant land and participation of the real estate market.

Later that year the municipal chamber authorised the inscription of the city as a candidate to the 2004 Olympic Games (PCRJ, 1994) with a bid committee formed in May 1995 (see timeline table 7.1). This committee – Sociedade Rio 2004 – was formed by the same institutions that financed the elaboration of the strategic plan – ACRJ, FIRJAN and Rio’s City Hall – and had the formal support of the federal, state and municipal governments. The executive group was headed by the same representatives of PMDB at the federal government involved in the studies of the strategic plan and with
the national development projects discussed in the previous chapter. The committee also had the presence of representatives of sports governing bodies such as João Havelange, president of the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) and an IOC member, and Carlos Arthur Nuzman, the recently elected chairman of the Brazilian Olympic Committee (BOC).

Table 7.1 Timeline Rio de Janeiro’s bid for the 2004 Olympic Games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>TCI report ‘Preliminary Study of Existing Infrastructure’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>BOC approves TCI report and Rio de Janeiro’s candidature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>Municipal city council approves Rio de Janeiro’s candidature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Sociedade Rio 2004 bid committee is formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>Carlos Arthur Nuzman is elected BOC’s president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>Beginning of the activities of the RBC consulting team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>Rio 2004 bid committee visits the IOC in Lausanne and president Fernando Henrique Cardoso addresses a letter of support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>IOC confirms Rio as candidate city to the 2004 Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>RBC report ‘Preliminary Draft of the Candidature for the 2004 Olympic Games’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Public presentation of the candidature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>Bid book submitted to the IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Visit of IOC Evaluation Commission to Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>Report of the Evaluation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Shortlist of final candidatures considered for voting. Rio de Janeiro’s bid does not qualify.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: compiled by the author from RBC reports and newspaper articles.

In order to prepare the bid proposal a consulting firm was created, the Rio Barcelona Consultores (RBC), that brought together some of the experts involved with the planning of the 1992 Olympics. Headed by architect Lluis Millet, responsible for coordinating the infrastructural and urban development department of the organising committee of the Barcelona Games, the proposal was elaborated in the second semester of 1995. It evaluated existing facilities and proposed to distribute urban interventions in order to promote structural changes in the city. To the surprise of the bid committee the proposed master plan suggested Fundão Island, the campus of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), as the centre of the interventions. The suggestion adapted some of the conceptual frames that informed the planning of the Barcelona Games and caused a division in the support from the members of the bidding committee.
Nevertheless, the support of part of the group guaranteed the submission of the application to the IOC.

In the initial reports of the activities of RBC addressed to the bidding committee (RBC, 1995a) it was stressed that a ‘total alignment with the decision-making bodies in charge of urban planning has to be secured. The urban project for the Games must be the urban project of the City’ (p. 3). The statement resonates with Millet’s (1995) explanation of the rationale behind the planning of the Barcelona Games where he argued that the event was used as an ‘excuse’ to bring forward projects already defined to be pursued in the long term. According to him the general planning concept for Barcelona was very simple and was not altered after he initially proposed it in 1982. It was based on the idea of ‘territorial balance’ by having areas of urban intervention located at each of the corners of the city, that in turn would promote induced effects in a balanced manner over most of the urban fabric (figure 7.1).

Millet’s proposal for the Rio Games drew on a similar abstraction. Following the principle of ‘territorial balance’ it transposed the concept onto Rio’s cartography where he identified two areas absent of existing facilities; the North End and Barra da Tijuca. Millet’s proposal opted for concentrating new interventions in the former, at Fundão Island, while locating few venues in the latter. The interventions at each cluster were expected to stimulate trickle-down effects in the surrounding areas (figure 7.2). When the proposal was presented at an internal municipal workshop, Millet (1996) stressed that the planning of Barcelona was used as a source of inspiration with the similar objective of stimulating a balanced development.

It is possible to see that, in reality, this is a decision of bringing balance to the four quadrants. There are proposals for areas in the north as well as for areas in the south and in the west. Therefore, I see that the balancing factor, upon which the Barcelona project was based, is also present in the project for Rio. (Millet, 1996, p. 32)
RBC’s proposal was thus in clear conflict with the previous study by TCI that indicated major interventions to be located at Barra da Tijuca. It was also against the expectations of some individuals in the bidding committee. This is reflected in an update report submitted in October 1995 where RBC compared the pros and cons of having Fundão as the main Olympic cluster as opposed to Barra (table 7.2).
It argued that the island offered the advantages of being in a more centrally located area near the international airport; of not being associated with real estate speculation and being aimed at improving the infrastructure of the university. However, the major challenges were represented by the need for a slum upgrading programme in the neighbouring favelas of Maré and Nova Holanda with a population of 62,000 inhabitants and the clean-up of the polluted waters of the Guanabara Bay. On the other hand, Barra da Tijuca was seen favourably for facilitating the sale of future Olympic accommodation; the availability of vacant land; and for the existence of quality infrastructure. However, it was argued that the operation could be associated with real estate speculation; for demanding the use of public funds that overlooked the priorities of the city; and for placing venues that were distant from the majority of the population, ‘in particular in reference to the North End, the region less provided with sports facilities’ (RBCb, 1995, pp. 17-18).

The designation of Fundão Island as the ‘heart of the Games’ also drew parallel with two planning ideas present in the development of Barcelona in the pre-Olympic years. First is the justification of using interventions to conclude an unfinished urban plan. The most significant intervention in Barcelona took place at the seafront in the regeneration of the brownfield areas of industrial and port uses. The redevelopment of this large area followed the homogeneous design established by engineer Ildefons Cerdà in 1859 in the project for the expansion of the city beyond the limits of the historic centre. Developing Fundão Island was also presented as a means to conclude the unfinished ‘General Plan for the University City – University of Brazil 1955’ (Rio 2004 bid committee, 1996, p. 36). An example of modernist planning, the plan was elaborated by architect Jorge Machado Moreira between 1949 and 1962 and established the land use of the almost 600 hectares of area. Never completed, Millet proposed to regenerate and consolidate the eastern area facing
Guanabara Bay with sports venues as well as expanding the residential area for students and teaching staff through the construction of accommodation for the athletes (figure 7.3).

Increasing the number of residents was linked with the second idea, that of developing a new area of urban centrality. One the main planning studies elaborated in Barcelona in the 1980s that guided the development of the city in the following decades was the programme ‘Areas of New Centrality’ (Barcelona, 1991). It identified twelve areas of obsolete uses in which the public sector should intervene and guide the participation of the private sector with the aim to establish a polycentric city (Busquets, 2004). The four Olympic clusters were integrated in this programme with particular attention to the seafront area as mentioned. A similar rationale was used to justify the interventions at Fundão Island. It aimed at developing its centrality with the diversification of activities and improving the infrastructure in order to overcome its isolation in relation to the city.

Therefore, that Fundão becomes a part of the city and not a zone, an academic ghetto, a highly qualified one, but still a ghetto. It is necessary to provide new uses at Fundão and introduce residential areas and the spectacle of sport as elements for the urban development of the university. (Millet, 1996, p. 37)

However, despite the imperative to align the plan for the city and the plan for the Games proclaimed by the consultants in the initial reports, the development of Fundão Island...
was not a priority in the municipality planning studies or in the imaginary of policy actors, not least for, as the site of a federal university, being under the remit of the federal government. Not surprisingly the unexpected proposals for the 2004 Olympic Games were met with mixed reactions from local political actors.

When first presented, architect Millet reminded that it caused ‘a great shock, they didn’t want at all, but then as we explained they became puzzled and at the end they accepted and were excited’ (interview, L. Millet). The acceptance was hardly straightforward but for consultant Jordi Borja the credibility of the consultants was an important factor. When asked why the proposal was approved despite generating controversy he recognised that:

well because we had much legitimacy … because when a team comes to you with something very well thought out, very well argued, it is difficult not to recognise it, right? Especially if you don’t have an alternative, a decent alternative. (interview, J. Borja)

In fact, the proposal caused a split in the group. In favour of the idea of Fundão as the key site were secretary Conde and the representatives of the federal government at the bid committee. In contrast, mayor Cesar Maia, sports bosses and alleged private investors interested in the Olympic project were not very supportive (interviews, M. Forn, P.A. Gomes, L.M. Mello). One of the members of the bid committee stated that the ‘city hall always wanted Barra. The decision to place [the Olympic Park] at the island of the university campus was a decision from this federal group of Rio that organised the governance [of the bid]’ (interview, L. M. Melo). The vice-chancellor of UFRJ at the time also stressed the importance of individuals linked to the university that were taking part in the elaboration of the strategic plan.

You also need to take into account the fact that some people at the city hall had a strong presence at UFRJ … [The executive group of the strategic plan] was headed by Carlos Lessa, who was professor emeritus at UFRJ … I was a member of the council and there were many people from UFRJ, people that came from or were linked to. So this was a really decisive factor to choose UFRJ as the place to make the project of the Olympic Village. (Interview, P. A. Gomes)

According to the consultants, Cesar Maia never got himself involved with the bid, something that was clearly demonstrated by his absence at the time of the visit of the IOC evaluation commission. In fact, the Olympic proposal slipped from his control in a series of factors, as with the decision to locate major interventions in a federal land area; for the relevance gained by federal politicians at the bid committee; and the high visibility of the support pledged by governor Marcello Alencar and president Cardoso to the bid
– the former a political rival of the mayor and both from a different political party. Maia spoke openly about his opposition and attributed it to the difficulty of coordinating multi-level governmental action.

At that time, I was the only vote against it … Fundão was chosen and everything was prepared to be built [there]. My logical thinking was a Brazilian one. In Brazil with one pen it is difficult to decide things. With four pens, the municipal government, the state, the federal, UFRJ council, then is something insurmountable, four heads, nothing can be decided. It doesn’t move. (interview, C. Maia)

As the Olympic project was made public and the promotional campaign started in 1996 it generated a strong level of public support. The proposal was officially submitted in August that year and the IOC evaluation team visited the city three months later. The report of the evaluation commission (IOC, 1997) pointed positively to the hosting of almost all the competitions within the city and the walking distances between the Olympic Village and the main venues. However, the contrast with the favelas nearby was seen as capable of having both positive and negative implications. Doubts were raised regarding the clean-up programme for the bay; crime and security remained a ‘difficult situation’ for the city; and the transport infrastructure suffered from ‘significant problems’ (IOC, 1997, unpaged). The telecommunication systems were also an issue and the report concluded with sceptical notes about budgeting and expected revenues. The expectations with Rio de Janeiro’s first Olympic bid were ended soon with the announcement of the shortlist of final candidatures that excluded Rio in March 1997.

Reflecting upon the failed outcome of the Olympic bid and the IOC’s sceptical evaluation of the candidature, Millet defended his proposal and pointed to the convergence of ideas between planners and politicians in Barcelona as a major difference with his experience in Rio. In his opinion the lack of unified support became apparent and jeopardised the bid.

The plan that we developed was correct. What happens is that in Barcelona we got very used to, let’s say, that técnicos and politicians were on the same page, there were no major disagreements among ourselves. [But in Rio] there were many internal disputes. [There were] many political disagreements between themselves and this does not help to move things forward. (interview, L. Millet)

Other consultants recognised that the plan was not attuned to local debates and that the RBC team got too immersed in their proposal that ended up imposing their views, as argued by consultant Manuel de Forn.
Well, the mistake in this case was not being very conscious about Rio’s situation and to impose our solution [that] wasn’t in the minds of anyone, not even Conde’s. Our mistake was not being sensitive enough, I mean, Millet got too excited and me too … the project was great, very expensive and challenging but it turned the city around. What happens is that the city was not prepared to be turned around, no one in the city was ready. (interview, M. Forn)

The bidding for the 2004 Olympic Games provides a rich illustration of mobilisation of policy knowledge and the politics involved in the grounding and institutionalisation of an idea. In this case, the policy window facilitated by the change in political direction at the city hall that brought strategic planning opened further opportunities for the consultants with the elaboration of a bid for the Olympic Games. The divided support that the proposed interventions generated is also illustrative of the different audiences of the Barcelona model discussed in the previous chapter. While strategic planning was a ‘polysemic idea’ (Béland & Cox, 2016) flexible enough to accommodate diverse sets of interest and contribute to coalition building, the Olympic bid developed by Millet was based on clearly defined principles of balanced and distributive urban impacts that did not have the same ‘coalitional glue’. To this proposition only part of the members of the emerging coalition present in the bid committee could identify benefits for their interests, particularly those linked to UFRJ. As Peck and Theodore (2015, p. xxiv-v) have argued, ‘audiences of received policy models have roles to play in the (social) production of these models’, to which it is possible to add that they only perform such roles if they can identify benefits for them. In this case only part of the coalition was able to do so while the other, represented not less by the mayor and the BOC chair, were distanced from giving their full support. Not surprisingly, when the Rio Olympic project was reformed after the failure of the 2004 bid with these individuals at the command, it was not in the Barcelona model that they looked for references.

7.3. Retooling the strategy: crafting the winning Olympic bid

The first Olympic bid constituted an important policy legacy that influenced the reformation of the mega-event strategy developed in the period of 2001–2009. The way in which the failure of the bid was framed supported drastic changes in the proposed spatial planning of the mega-event, in the governance of the project and in the strategy to gain credibility in the eyes of the IOC. During this period two other Olympic bids were produced and the regional competition of the Pan American Games was staged. In this respect, it is possible to identify two sub-periods. One runs from 2001 to 2007 when the
new strategy was designed for the bid for the 2012 Olympics and for the hosting of the 2007 Pan American Games. The other starts with the refinement of the strategy in the bid for the 2016 Games that took place in late 2007 up to the hosting in 2016. Table 7.3 summarises the main political and institutional events of this period while the following sections examine the contents of the reformed mega-event strategy, the aligned interests and the institutionalisation of the project.

Table 7.3 Timeline Rio de Janeiro’s bids for the 2007 Pan American Games and the 2012 and 2016 Olympic Games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>BOC assembly decides to focus on the Pan American Games and not support another Olympic bid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>BOC assembly supports Rio’s bid to the 2007 Pan American Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>XII meeting of National Olympic Committees in Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>Carlos Nuzman elected IOC member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Cesar Maia elected mayor for a second time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>Candidature for the Pan American Games presented to PASO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>Rio announced host city of the 2007 Pan American Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Lula da Silva elected president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>BOC chooses Rio as the Brazilian candidate for the 2012 Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Candidature for the Pan American Games presented to PASO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Rio 2012 bid book submitted to the IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Rio does not qualify to IOC shortlist for the 2012 Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Cesar Maia re-elected mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>Meeting with IOC officials to discuss the failed 2012 bid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>BOC assembly decides to support Rio’s bid for the 2016 Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Lula da Silva re-elected president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>Rio hosts the XV Pan American Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>BOC officialises Rio’s candidature for the 2016 Games with the IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Rio 2016 bid committee takes part in seminar at the IOC in Lausanne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Candidature acceptance application submitted to the IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>IOC shortlists Rio for the second phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Eduardo Paes elected mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>2016 bid book submitted to the IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>IOC Evaluation Commission visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Rio announced host city of the 2016 Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: compiled by the author from newspaper articles and BOC reports.
7.3.1. The idea

The 2007 Pan American Games – naturalising power control and locational decisions

The aftermath of Rio’s first Olympic bid was marked by a search for the reasons of failure. Analyses in the media pointed to a series of factors including the inexperience of the bid committee; the weak marketing strategy; the unfeasibility of the cleaning programme for the Guanabara Bay; the undeveloped transport and telecommunications systems; and the politics that permeated the bid (Jornal do Brasil, 1997; Ventura and Araújo, 1997). Entrenched political agendas – implied in the presence of political actors leading the bid committee – were seen to have jeopardised the governance of the candidature and the nature of the proposed interventions. BOC chairman Carlos Nuzman complained that his institution was ‘underused’ and argued that there is ‘a great rejection when the [national Olympic] committee is not the one leading the way, when there is a political emphasis in the candidature’ (Varsano and Bittencourt, 1997, p. 28). Also, the intentions of using the event to improve the material conditions of the deprived areas around Fundão Island was argued as being more politically motivated than realistic to convince the delegates of the IOC. Condemning the first bid for being ‘too political’ served thus to justify a change in the location of the main urban interventions and for having the BOC leading the following candidatures.

An opinion piece authored by Nuzman in local newspaper Jornal do Brasil in early 2000 is indicative of the basis of the new Olympic strategy. After establishing that the hosting of the Olympics was the ‘common goal’ of the ‘people of Rio and the BOC’, Nuzman argued that the IOC was not fond of candidatures based on large-scale infrastructural change. In a veiled criticism to the approach taken in the first bid he argued that certain conditions had to be in place – including venues – before preparing another candidature.

Gone are the days in which the hosting of the Olympics was synonymous with the salvation of all the problems of a city. Today, the IOC understands that the city needs to meet basic requirements in the first place – security, transport and the environment, and also to have a consolidated structure of sports facilities – to only then announce its intentions to host the Olympic Games. (Nuzman, 2000, p. 9)

Mayor Cesar Maia corroborated this view by discarding Barcelona as a valid reference for future Olympic proposals. According to him the chances of the city hosting the mega-event were dependent on meeting the conditions established by the IOC.
Barcelona developed the thesis that you have to contrast two ideas, an Olympics for the city or the city for the Olympics. It was absurd, a city for the Olympics, it had to be the Olympics for the city. Rio de Janeiro had to think on the Olympics to induce an important urban development. So they thought it should be Fundão. That’s fine. When I returned [to office] I considered this idea and said “either we want the Olympics or not. If we don’t want them, it’s fine by me. If we do want them, then is a city for the Olympics. What do we have to do to bring the Olympics here?” (interview, C. Maia)

As a result, the proposals that followed were less oriented by triggering infrastructural projects considered important for the development of the city and more concerned with meeting the necessary conditions to host the Olympic Games according to IOC requirements. The mega-event strategy became an end in itself.

A bid for the 2008 Games was first raised during Conde’s government but it did not progress (O Globo, 1999). Instead, Nuzman and Maia took control of the Olympic project and reformulated the mega-event strategy. According to Nuzman (2002, p. C6), the ‘Rio 2004 debacle served to define a new strategy’ and this was centred on two core premises. First was to locate the main interventions in the area of Barra da Tijuca and to concentrate facilities in a single site.

The choice of Barra is very important. During the Olympic candidature for 2004, Mayor Cesar Maia and I were against the choice of Fundão. The preference was for Barra due to the available space. Ever more the [Olympic] village and the venues are concentrated in projects like this. At Barra it is possible to build 70% to 80% of Olympic facilities. (Nuzman, 2002, p. C5)

The move was justified for following best practices set by the recent hosting of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, where the Olympic Park at the Homebush Bay area concentrated most of the built venues. In the opinion of the coordinator of the 2004 bid the ‘Sydney model’ became a clear reference for the BOC (interview, L. M. Melo), and in fact, the institution soon hired the services of Australian consultants that worked in the organising committee. The BOC chairman was specific in terms of his preferable location, the municipal racetrack of Jacarepaguá. In his opinion ‘this racetrack could give way to a great Olympic city. I have already explained this to the mayor. It rests on the city to decide’ (Nuzman, 2002, p. C5).

The decision for Barra was also defended by Maia in more pragmatic terms. Again making the case for a centralised governance, he justified that ‘Barra represents the idea of one single pen. All it takes is one signature from the mayor to define everything’ (Ventura and Araújo, 1997, p. 26).
The debate of locating the main urban interventions in the North End or in the Barra da Tijuca area was thus repositioned in terms of which alternative could best meet the requirements of the mega-event and the expectations of IOC members. The failure of the 2004 bid was interpreted according to its locational decision that served to delegitimise the option for the North End. The Barra da Tijuca area was then presented in terms of available space and institutional aspects of project delivery.

The second core premise of the new strategy was based on the argument that the city had to first improve its credentials in the organisation of other events. Following the advice of IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch (Jornal do Brasil, 2000a), attention was thus oriented to the regional Pan American Games, and a bid was awarded in 2002. As previously championed by Nuzman, new sports venues were located at the Jacarepaguá racetrack while accommodation was provided in a private gated development nearby. Soon after the Pan American Sports Organization (PASO) awarded the event to Rio, the city announced a new Olympic bid for the 2012 Games. The Pan American Games were thus legitimated as a two-step strategy with originally more modest venues reappraised to conform to IOC requirements that had an impact on costs and project management.

At this stage Luis Inácio Lula da Silva from the Workers’ Party (PT) was elected to the presidential office. A dedicated Ministry of Sports was created and the president fully endorsed the new bid (Jornal do Brasil, 2004). However, the Olympic ambitions again ended prematurely as the Olympic candidature failed to pass the shortlisting phase after not achieving a sufficient score in the technical evaluation. A low score was attributed to items related to transport, accommodation, safety and security (IOC, 2004). Nonetheless, support from the federal government proved to be more than a symbolic gesture as the soaring costs of the preparations for the Pan American Games were compromising the municipality’s budget. Federal aid guaranteed that preparations were completed just in time for the event, which registered good records of attendance and was praised by the IOC. The retooled Olympic strategy gave confidence to its promoters to prepare a new bid for the 2016 Games.

Having the mayor and the BOC in control of the mega-event strategy resulted in decoupling the staging of the event from the opportunity to promote urban development. The new strategy favoured an ad hoc planning of interventions intended to build a host of sports venues that conformed to the alleged preferences of the IOC in the planning of the Olympic Games. The 2007 Pan American Games produced
negligible impacts in terms of urban development aside from new sports facilities. Nevertheless, it firmly established the area of Barra da Tijuca at the centre of the candidature to the 2016 Olympic Games.

The bid for the 2016 Olympic Games – retrofitting urban legacies

Early in 2008 an official Olympic application was submitted for the 2016 Games. The preliminary planning proposal aimed to further develop the Jacarepaguá racetrack into an Olympic Park. The governance of the candidature was led by the BOC, having Nuzman as the president of the bid committee and key positions occupied by staff from the institution or coming from the organising committee for the Pan American Games (Rio 2016 bid committee, 2009a). Representatives of the three levels of government participated at thematic groups addressing each of the themes required by the IOC for detail in the bid book. The Special Committee of Urban Legacy (CELU) was one of the main forums where proposals were discussed and most importantly, contested.

The creation of the working group came from the pressure of the federal government to identify how public investment in the mega-event would result in material improvements for the population, as a member of the municipal special secretariat for the Pan American Games recalled.

During the [bidding] process it was decided, it was understood as necessary to create the CELU, because there was pressure from the governments involved … to pay attention to legacy, if this plan was aligned with the plans of the city. What happened? We saw that the plan, the original one, it wasn’t totally aligned with the planning of the city. (interview, municipal officer)

The preliminary proposal was discussed between the bid committee and the IOC shortly after the organisation of the Pan American Games. However, whereas the previous plans were narrowly defined between the mayor and the BOC, the presence and influence of the federal government at CELU – legitimated by the funding to the Pan American Games and endorsement to the 2016 bid – disputed the nature of the proposals (interview, APO member). According to a municipal planner that participated in the committee there was a split in the group upon the return of the bid committee from Lausanne.

The people at BOC went to Lausanne to present the master plan they had prepared, everything at Barra, absolutely everything was going to take place at Barra da Tijuca … When this group returns they found the técnicos from the governments rebelled! It was the governments’ group and the técnicos that
got together to contest that master plan. The federal government, leading the way, suggested that in order to have a legacy the proposal of the candidature had to be based on the plano diretor. (interview, municipal planner)

Parallel to the preparations for Rio de Janeiro’s third Olympic bid the municipal planning office was undertaking the update review of the city’s plano diretor, which became a compulsory requirement by federal law in 2001. As analysed in the previous chapter, Maia and Conde kept the policy instrument in all but name favouring instead the elaboration of the strategic plan. Maia reached his final year at the mayoral office with low levels of public support partly as a result of the impact of the US$ 1.8 billion Pan American Games upon the municipal budget that compromised the running of essential public services (Maia, 2008b). In the view of the planning officer, the mayor became detached from the daily running of the city while the staff working on studies such as the plano diretor and the Olympic bid worked with more autonomy. The plano diretor was again developed by the planning office with the intention to become a democratic instrument to guide urban policies in the city (interview, municipal planner). A significant outcome of this process was the definition of four areas, or macro-zones, each labelled according to a planning approach to inform local development (figure 7.4). Accordingly, the West End, an area of more recent occupation and deprived neighbourhoods, was defined as a region whose development should be assisted by the state. The North End, despite being longer established, also presented levels of deprivation and given the existing infrastructure should have its development stimulated. The affluent South End was identified as an area where development was already at a mature stage that should be controlled. Finally, the area of Barra da Tijuca, as a region of strong real estate activity, should have its development conditioned by public and private investments in infrastructure (PCRJ, 2011).

When juxtaposed, the Olympic master plan and the plano diretor were in conflict (figures 7.4 and 7.5). Barra was the main area for the allocation of public investments in the infrastructure, the military grounds at Deodoro in the West End were earmarked as a secondary Olympic cluster, and the existing stadia of Maracanã and Engenhão were to be used in the North End. According to the planning officer, federal government representatives coming from the Ministry of Sports and advised by the Ministry of Cities vented the possibility of substantial federal funding through the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC). However, they conditioned the investments to the observation of the plano diretor under review, which stimulated the planning staff to work on alternatives.
Figure 7.4. Macro-zoning and land use in Rio de Janeiro’s plano diretor. Clockwise from left: assisted, stimulated, controlled, conditioned (PCRJ, 2011)

Figure 7.5. Masterplan of Rio de Janeiro’s 2016 Games (Rio 2016 bid committee, 2009a)
The federal government [said it wanted] to invest in the Olympics, invest in the city as long as there is a legacy for the city and this legacy is based on the plano director. We had the promise – I think that Dilma was the chief of staff at the time, she was in charge of PAC [programme] – that there would be an Olympic PAC, a mobility PAC for us to invest in Rio de Janeiro, which had no federal investment since I can’t even dare to remember. We were living in penury without any [development] perspective. (interview, municipal planner)

An initial animosity took place between the city planning office and BOC’s technical team. The latter insisted on the concentration of facilities in a single site and the appeal of Barra to the IOC – ‘a pleasant place, otherwise we won’t win’ – while the former tried to spread interventions as much as possible, preferably in the North End (interview, municipal planner). It became clear that the two groups were working with divergent objectives.

They were worried, BOC’s job was to do the bid file, they had a client who was the IOC and our job was to do a legacy plan and the client was someone else, it was the federal government. The federal government was only going to invest in Rio de Janeiro for the Olympics if there was this plan. So it was two different objectives and clients and we had to come together and find a common denominator. (interview, municipal planner)

The discussion over producing ‘urban legacies’ with the hosting of the mega-event became a common denominator. As the planning staff discussed the possibility of using the event to promote urban interventions, arguing that ‘in the other Olympics the best practices were cases of regeneration of degraded areas, things that brought benefits for the city, Barcelona, Sydney’ (interview, municipal planner), some previous studies were analysed including the regeneration of the port area. The Australian consultants hired since the planning of the Pan American Games became unlikely facilitators in the negotiations. They identified the potential to enhance the appeal of the bid to IOC members by aligning the proposal with long-established projects, as the planning officer described.

We had some meetings until conciliating, it was a quite difficult process. And of all people, it was the Australian consultant who had nothing to do with this … When he heard about the port area he became interested … and managed to convince the experts from BOC. … [He] said, “wait, this can be a good argument”. There was also someone else at this meeting who was in public relations or marketing, he also opened his eyes and said “it can be a sound argument!” (interview, municipal planner)

A compromise was reached with the review of the location of some venues, albeit these were rather modest, such as the use of the Sambadrome – site of the annual carnival parade – for the archery and marathon competitions or the location of the sponsor’s village at the port area. The experts working at CELU also identified pending projects in
areas surrounding the competitions to fit plans for the city in the Olympic proposal. The short timeframe to prepare the bid document in the second half of 2008 was a constraint on the refinement of further planning studies, as a BOC member of the bid committee involved with the CELU highlighted, so existing studies were incorporated.

We had progressed to the second stage in June and in February we had already to submit [the bid book] but the document had to be ready by December for translation, editing etc. In reality we barely had four, five months to work so you cannot develop much. Many projects, the projects that were included were pre-existing ones … It was all CELU, the secretariats’ staff at the CELU that went to dig them. Every meeting they [would turn up and say] “hey I found this project”, “look, there is this housing project”, “there is this project here”. So they brought all these projects, some of them were from 20, 30, 40 years ago locked in the drawer. (interview, member of Rio 2016 bidding committee)

The result was the *Urban and Environmental Legacy Plan* (PLUA) (CELU, 2008), a compilation of municipal projects developed to inform the proposals of intervention for the Olympic Games. It comprised city-wide programmes in the areas of transport, environment, sanitation and housing; and also localised interventions around Olympic sites. In the view of the municipal officer at the special secretariat for the Pan American Games the main contribution of the plan was to give support and credibility to the Olympic candidature ‘in the sense of [showing to the IOC] “look, Rio de Janeiro has a proposal for legacy”’ (interview, municipal officer).

The PLUA may not have been able to profoundly change the general proposal of the BOC’s masterplan for the 2016 Games but nonetheless, the Olympic bid opened a policy window for some latent works and projects developed by the municipality to gain ground, such as rainwater reservoirs for flood control and the implementation of a network of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridors. Transport was one of the most criticised topics in previous IOC evaluation reports and the BRT model was championed by *técnicos* from the secretariat of transport as a feasible solution to link the clusters of Olympic venues. However, the initial challenge, according to the deputy secretary of transport, was to convince the foreign consultants that the proposal could be appreciated by the IOC.

The foreign consultants came and asked to see the secretary and said “if you insist on the BRT bus project you won’t win. IOC wants rail, IOC likes underground, the IOC likes…” so there was a certain confrontation from our side, we wanted to do a project that we saw as an important legacy … There was also a really good feeling that it was something developed within the secretariat, that managed to win, to sell it to an Olympic candidature. (interview, deputy transport secretary)
The final Olympic master plan proposed in the bid book was not as compact and less reliant on large-scale works as the experts at the BOC would have liked but rather than compromising the city’s chances, the foreign consultants advising the candidature correctly identified the mediation between the requirements of the mega-event and opportunities for urban development as an appealing sales pitch. It was argued that the projects proposed would enable Rio to ‘become a greater global city and an even better place to live, do business and visit’ (Rio 2016 bid committee, 2009a, p. 23). The Brazilian economy was by then presenting sustained levels of growth in the GDP and all infrastructural works were underwritten by the federal government in the US$ 240 billion budget of the PAC programme (p. 115). The report of the IOC evaluation commission (2009) stressed that Rio de Janeiro’s candidature presented an ‘excellent legacy plan’ that could potentially ‘accelerate the transformation of the city and that the Games would benefit from major infrastructure investments already planned for the long-term development of Rio’ (pp. 46-51). The announcement of the hosting rights to the 2016 Olympic Games that took place in Copenhagen in October 2009 finally awarded Rio de Janeiro’s continuous efforts in bidding for the mega-event. From the idea of an Olympics for the city present in the first bid to the city for the Olympics that oriented the second bid and the Pan American Games, the planning of Rio 2016 was able to use the idea of Olympic ‘legacies’ to retrofit some development projects around the proposals.

7.3.2. Interests

As seen in the previous section, the reformulated mega-event strategy was in close control of two policy actors, Mayor Cesar Maia upon return to office, and the president of BOC, Carlos Nuzman. This section examines how the new project was of interest to these actors as well as the rise of the project to the top of the national political agenda with the strong support of the federal government in the figure of the then president Lula da Silva.

Chapter 5 described how the rupture between Cesar Maia and Luiz Paulo Conde affected the mayoral government of the former in his second and third mandates. Maia distanced himself from the group of architects and business groups that were important in the period 1993–2000 and centralised decisions of urban development in the cabinet office. Important questions such as the location of venues linked with mega-events or new cultural facilities – such as the proposal of a branch of the Guggenheim museum and a new concert hall – were less oriented by a concern with an integrated urban development and reasoned more as symbols of achievement of Maia’s government. As
a result, these projects were located at sites that facilitated their delivery rather than their induced impact in the surrounding areas. The decision for the location of the Olympic stadium, for instance, was decided by Maia and Nuzman when surveying available public land, as a member of the special secretariat for the Pan American Games recounted.

That was a helicopter flight that the mayor took with Nuzman. [They] saw that large area, the railway land where there was a train depot and rail museum completely abandoned and thought it was good enough. There was no planning, nothing, no one thought about the surroundings, no one thought about how to get there. The only thing that was seen was that there was a station, a railway that ran close. (interview, municipal officer)

The other venues planned for the Jacarepaguá racetrack were also decided on the merit of available space. The original proposal was to end the auto racing competitions and to have the construction of all the facilities tendered out to a construction company that would undertake the costs in exchange for the private management of the venues and also to explore land for other commercial uses. However, the plan became unfeasible after the denouncement of the vote-buying scandal at the federal government level known as Mensalão. According to one of the architects of the venues, construction companies interested in the project were prospecting public pension funds to finance the enterprise and the change in the political climate halted negotiations.

They prepared a public tender where a consortium formed by [construction company] Odebrecht … offered “leave it to us that we do the racetrack, build all the facilities in exchange for the concession. After winning [the tender] there was that problem with Mensalão in Brasilia. What happened? They would prepare the business plan, call all the funds to finance that big business and then pay somehow, do the projects, build them and then operate, they would have the whole land to do other things. As there was that political problem the funds stayed away from any negotiation, they were left without funding. (interview, venue architect)

Previous to the political scandal a verbal agreement was allegedly secured between the mayor, the construction company, the Chief of Staff of the federal government and funding groups. Mayor Maia recounted that as the episode unfolded it cost the position of the Chief of Staff and consequently the agreement was unmade.

[Odebrecht] had an agreement with the federal government in which each venue would have the naming rights bought by [federal banks] Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica Federal, to give them assurances in relation to the [financial] balance. But this agreement was made with José Dirceu when he was Lula’s minister. There was a problem with Dirceu and he was sacked. [His successor] Dilma did not guarantee this agreement because she didn't know, it was all verbal. So they pulled out. (interview, C. Maia)
As a result, the construction of the sports venues – a velodrome, an aquatics centre and a multi-sports arena, alongside the stadium – was undertaken by the municipality. This caused a financial burden to the public budget and affected the running of public services. When the mayor was asked in an interview at the end of his last year in office about the main mistake of his administration he recognised the impact of the Pan American Games.

Maybe it was the Pan American, which I underwrote commitments that were beyond the means of the city hall. I had to reduce investments in the city and reduce conservation. I believe everyone took notice that conservation was deteriorated in the months leading up to the Pan American, and also after. (Maia, 2008)

If the event had a negative impact on the approval ratings of the mayor it conformed to the expectations and plans of the other coordinator of the Olympic project. BOC president Carlos Nuzman was a volleyball player and member of the 1964 Olympic team before retiring and becoming the president of the Brazilian Volleyball Confederation, a position he occupied for two decades. After being the vice-president of the BOC he became the chairman of the institution in 1995, remaining in this post until the present day. The year 2000 was particularly important in his rising career, when Rio hosted the XII Assembly of the National Olympic Associations and he was elected IOC member (Jornal do Brasil, 2000a, 2000b). According to him (Jornal do Brasil, 2000c, p. 5), this meant ‘being at the centre of important debates’ and he was later appointed a member of the Evaluation Committee assessing candidate cities for the 2008 Games.

The bidding for mega-events became a top priority for Nuzman and he played a pivotal role as a policy entrepreneur in championing the mega-event strategy at the different government levels and linking the institutional spaces of the IOC and Brazilian politics. When questioned by an interviewer about his long reign at BOC, he argued that the politics of the Olympic milieu demanded a continuous presence in order to advance agendas, establish relationships and learn strategies to improve credentials.

[The world of] sport demands more longevity. Along these years I had the opportunity to build an asset of relationships in this milieu. I speak with everyone at the International Olympic Committee. See how things work. In 2000, [IOC former president] Juan Antonio Samaranch called me: “Nuzman, get on a plane, I need to talk to you”. I went straightaway to Lausanne. The Pan American Games were taking place in the Dominican Republic, but the organisation was so bad that it was vented the idea to transfer it to Rio de Janeiro. Samaranch taught me the ropes. “Don’t get involved in this. Wait another four years to host a good Pan in Rio and then you get the Olympics”. (Nuzman, 2012, pp. 19-20)
As the bid for the 2016 Olympic Games was formulated, a constellation of interests formed around the idea of the mega-event, which became embedded in a series of multi-scalar political projects. After the distant involvement of the federal government in the conception of the 2012 bid and the organisation of the Pan American Games, the bid for mega-events became an important item in Brazil’s foreign policy agenda as a demonstration of the country’s soft power. The federal government was important in the financing of the bidding campaign and in the endorsement by President Lula da Silva. The Brazilian president was active in promoting the candidature, which benefited from his charisma and international presence (BOC, 2010). The policy of bidding for mega-events had started to produce results in 2007, when Brazil was confirmed by FIFA as the host of the 2014 football World Cup. The country also enjoyed more favourable coverage in the international press due to the economic growth and technological innovation, and for the government the ‘Olympic Games present the ideal platform for showcasing this progress globally’ (Rio 2016 bid committee, 2009a, p. 11). Lula’s speech at the presentation of the candidature on the day of the voting by the IOC indicates how the event was highly regarded as a testament for the recent economic and social progress.

I frankly say: it’s our time. Among the 10 largest economies in the world Brazil is the only country that did not host the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Among the countries that now seek for the indication we are the only that did not have that honour. For the others, will be just another Olympics. For us its will be an unparalleled opportunity increasing Brazilian’s self-esteem, consolidating recent achievements, inspiring for new progress. (Silva, 2009a)

The award to Rio de Janeiro was reported in the media as a recognition of the credibility and status of Brazil in the international system (Grudgings, 2009). In the press conference immediately after the award, the president emphasised the importance of the event to showcase the development of the country.

I confess to you if I die right now my life would have been worth it because Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, proved to the world that we achieved full recognition. Really, I mean, no one can now doubt the strength of Brazil’s economy, its social greatness, and our ability to present a plan. (Silva, 2009b)

The interests that drove the Olympic candidatures of Rio de Janeiro were mostly political, coming from actors that identified reputational capital with the staging of the event. As it was seen in the failed tendering of the venues built at the Jacarepaguá racetrack, private groups were not strongly involved with the Olympic project up to the award of the hosting rights. The award crowned the reorientation of the mega-event strategy initiated ten years before and the learning process to develop the candidature according to the identified requirements, expectations and values of the IOC. The next
section analyses how these were institutionalised in the mega-event strategy and reproduced by its actors.

7.3.3. Institutionalisation

The Olympic candidatures of Rio de Janeiro in the 1990s and 2000s offers the opportunity to analyse in the experience of an aspiring city the normative power exercised by the IOC through its bidding system and standard requirements. Between the period when the first candidature was produced in 1995 to the hosting award conceded in 2009, the Olympic bidding system was continuously transformed in a way that reflected IOC’s concerns with the longevity of the event. These included, for instance, increasing concerns in topics such as environmental sustainability or legacy planning that attempted to address criticism about the burden costs of staging the event. Linking the Olympic system and the Brazilian and Rio de Janeiro’s political context there were intermediaries that interpreted and translated the changing dynamics of the IOC to the strategy of hosting the Games. In this section the roles of the BOC and hired foreign consultants are examined in order to understand how they translated the alleged norms transmitted by the IOC and institutionalised them in the reformed mega-event strategy. First it is analysed how the locational and bidding strategy changes were argued and justified by public discourse. Second it examines the role of international consultants in providing technical and strategic knowledge and to bridge local agendas with IOC values.

The choice of moving the centre of interventions to the area of Barra da Tijuca was also defended by mayor Cesar Maia on the basis of understanding the dynamics of hosting the Olympic Games. Referring to an informal conversation with an IOC member during the bidding campaign for the 2004 Games he explained that he was led to understand that the mega-event could not take place on a site that contrasted harsh realities such as that of the neighbouring favelas of Fundão Island.

We had a chat and [the IOC delegate] told me “Listen, you have absolutely no chance. The choice of the location is a hindrance. You have to understand that the Olympic Games is a festival of the [human] race. So you cannot have a telephoto lens framing a 7 feet healthy German [athlete] next to an undernourished child that lives in that favela near Fundão. So, the location doesn’t work, you guys chose very badly” (interview, C. Maia)

The proposals for the Pan American Games and the 2012 Olympic bid were then taken to another direction, as examined above. The mayor worked closely with the BOC and his justification for the changes in the strategy expressed a learning process of the
dynamics of Olympic bidding. First, to accept the BOC role leading the project and second, to build venues regardless of the outcome.

We found out that [the 2004 bid] had a conceptual mistake because the one who has to steer, lead, orientate an Olympic project is sports not the public administration, it is not the political sector, we are enablers and full stop. We changed this for 2012 and we also didn’t qualify. Why? Because we found out that we had a very competitive proposal but that the whole project was a possibility, it was a willingness to do, we only had very few tangible things. (Maia, 2008a)

Learning the rules of the bidding process justified the hosting of the 2007 Pan American Games. The event was organised at a high cost and standards superior to those normally required. For the mayor this was still a price worth paying in the development of a solid Olympic bid.

When we went to Mexico City … we presented a candidature for the Pan American Games. Then when we returned the Brazilian Olympic Committee, after listening to the IOC, asked us to organise a Pan American with Olympic standards. … The costs increased not because things became more expensive but because the Pan American had its standards changed, the bar level was raised at the request of the BOC do improve our candidature to 2016. (original emphasis, Maia, 2008b) The quotes from the mayor demonstrate the important role that the BOC played as the intermediary in the translation of Olympic norms and the municipality, with the mayor abiding to the proposed changes. After working to gather the support of governments to the Olympic project the BOC also made the case of prioritising the hiring of international consultants to advise the candidature. However, this time rather than bringing experts on urban planning to advise on how the city could benefit from hosting the mega-event – the case of an ‘Olympics for the city’ – it was the other way round, experts of the Olympic system brought to shape a winning proposal – or a ‘city for the Olympics’ (see table 7.4).

The circulation of Olympic knowledge through the resources provided by the IOC for candidate cities and embodied in peripatetic consulting services contributed to the homogenisation of the bidding process, at least in its technical aspects (Payne, 2009; Oliveira, 2012). As Toohey and Veal (2007, p. 67) point out, the ‘selection process is partly technical and partly political’ and is ultimately shrouded by the ‘black box’ of IOC members’ preferences (Preuss, 2000, p. 99). With the bidding process becoming more competitive – as evidenced by the growing number of bidding cities – candidatures are won on details and unique features, with the media playing an important role.
Table 7.4 International consulting services for Rio de Janeiro’s bids to sports mega-events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Consulting Services</th>
<th>Expertise</th>
<th>Mega-event portfolio</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ernst &amp; Young*</td>
<td>Ernst &amp; Young*</td>
<td>Masterplan, venue planning, operations</td>
<td>OG (2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligent Risks</td>
<td>Intelligent Risks</td>
<td>Security and risk management</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Payne</td>
<td>Michael Payne</td>
<td>Strategic adviser</td>
<td>IOC marketing director, London 2012, Salzburg 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vero Communications</td>
<td>Vero Communications</td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>London 2012, Salzburg 2014 bid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francoise Zweifel</td>
<td>Francoise Zweifel</td>
<td>International relations</td>
<td>IOC secretary general and director of the Olympic museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven46</td>
<td>Seven46</td>
<td>Publishing</td>
<td>YOG (2010), OG (2012)</td>
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* Through Brazilian branch

Note: compiled by the author with information available at the companies’ and personal websites and Ministerio do Esporte 2007, CO-RIO 2007, BOC 2010, Oliveira 2012.

AG = Asian Games; CWG = Commonwealth Games; OG = Olympic Games; PAG = Pan American Games; WOG = Winter Olympic Games; YOG = Youth Olympic Games
As a consultant (Payne, 2009) pointed out, ‘(e)ver since the IOC banned Member visits to Host Cities, following the fall out of the Salt Lake scandal, media commentary has played an ever more important role – providing a critical platform to speak to members and opinion formers, and build momentum’. Unsurprisingly, sophisticated strategies of marketing and public relations are now central if candidatures are to capture the ‘hearts and minds’ of the IOC members and get their ‘big idea’ across (SV Ward, 2007, p. 134).

In the opinion of a former member of the BOC who was critical of the management of the institution, the hiring of foreign consultants for the candidature to the 2016 Games was mostly concerned with establishing an interface with the members of the IOC. A small number of consultants circulate in different candidatures and their networks are important to promote a campaign.

Most of these consultants are lobbyists, they are figures known in the Olympic milieu. One can argue “they help to structure the candidature”. [What] they help is to explain it to those who vote … they are people who make the interface between the candidature and the members of the Olympic committee … Now, it seems to me that these are the rules of the game. You have to have some people there; they have to be on your side. (interview, BOC former member)

Rio’s 2016 Olympic bid leveraged a considerably higher amount of funding than the previous ones totalling almost US$ 60 million (CGU, 2014) in the two phases of the candidature financed by the three levels of government (63%) and private donations (37%). More than half of the amount was used in the hiring of international consultants identified by their experience in bidding for mega-events and insider knowledge of the Olympic movement.

In the Applicant City Phase, the Rio 2016 Bid Committee contracted once again the services of Australian consultancy company Event Knowledge Services, previously involved with the delivery of the Pan American Games, to devise the master technical plan and the bid book. The international consulting firm McKinsey & Company worked alongside the Special Committee of Urban Legacy (CELU) to assist with the elaboration of the legacy vision. Finally, Michael Payne, former IOC marketing director and member of the London 2012 bid committee, was hired as senior strategic advisor. Payne’s insider knowledge due to his 15-year stay at the IOC aligned the candidature proposals with the Olympic Movement and IOC current concerns.
Circulating Knowledge and Urban Change

The participation of international consultants was important not only for their knowledge of the Olympic bidding process but also to give support to the arguments raised by the BOC in terms of how the campaign should be developed, as recognised a member of the municipal special secretariat of the 2007 Pan American Games who participated in the bid committee.

I believe that it was a strategic move of the BOC to have the backing of these consultants as a message to the governments: “it is not me who is saying that, it is these guys who know the IOC, who know the Olympic movement, who worked for London [2012 bid]”. (interview, municipal officer)

In a review of his experience advising the Brazilian bid, senior strategic advisor Michael Payne stressed the challenge to have government representatives not only agreeing with and backing the Olympic proposal, but to embody the values and the discourse of the Olympic movement.

Bid teams are strange animals. They need military discipline to develop a plan to stage the largest and most complex event in the world. They need the Machiavellian skill set to lock in the local politicians into the campaign and then to control them as the campaign embarks on its international journey. And they need to be able to become best friends to the voters. (Payne, 2009)

Strategies of the Rio 2016 campaign included the detailing of the 106 IOC members eligible to vote and the direct approach by the Brazilian president to lobby for the candidature. According to press article on the details of the campaign, ‘at each available moment in the official agenda the president found a way to attend a meeting or an event to meet the Olympic electorate’ (Gaspar, 2009, p. 86). The commitment of the main political actors with the bid was a strong point in the eyes of the IOC as Payne declared in an interview.

In the candidacy, one of the things that the IOC was positively surprised at was to see the strong bond between the Olympic community headed by Nuzman, the government and the city of Rio and the federal government. It looked like a tightly-knit team, at a level that the IOC rarely saw. (Payne, 2014)

As Rio progressed to the shortlisting phase, new consultants were hired to develop the marketing and public relations strategies regarded as crucial for the chances of a candidature. These included Mike Lee’s Vero Communications, responsible for the communication strategy of the bid, repeating a role previously performed for the London 2012 candidature; Scott Given’s Five Currents, which was previously involved in the ceremonies of Salt Lake City 2002 and the Pan-American Games 2007, now in charge of the bid’s presentation strategy; and Francoise Zweifel, former IOC secretory general, responsible for the international relations of candidature. The team of consultants...
briefed the members of the Executive Board at several events at which the candidature was presented, including the visit of the IOC Evaluation Commission. The report of the candidature (Rio 2016 bid committee, 2010, pp. 95-126) reveals that a few weeks before the meeting a ‘mock evaluation commission’ was organised with international experts flown over to Rio to perform roles as IOC examiners. In this ‘intense training’ both government officials and technical experts were submitted to a high ‘level of sternness’ as consultant Payne recounted.

It was a tough, ruthless experience, with the “dummy investigators” grilling bid members on their plans, challenging politicians on their true commitment, exploring every possible angle to catch them out. Well-heeled politicians used to the cut and thrust of local political debate were left speechless with the nature of potential IOC questioning – and were sent home to rethink their speeches and answers. (Payne, 2009)

The Report of the IOC 2016 Evaluation Commission was overall positive about the proposals, stressing the level of detail and high quality of presentations and documents provided (IOC, 2009, p. 85). In the months leading to the IOC session where the host city would be chosen, consultant Mike Lee worked with the international media to influence positive coverage about Brazil as economically strong (Gaspar, 2009). A key concern was to overcome prejudices, particularly from European audiences and present Brazil as ‘different, new, and able to refute any perceptions of the historical and social backwardness which had long been associated with Latin America’ (BOC, 2010, p. 144). The ability to influence media coverage was in the opinion of consultant Payne an essential strategy.

Communication spin doctors, selling your campaign, and briefing against the competition has become a fine art – but one that is critical to setting the agenda, creating a ground swell of support and movement towards a particular bid … By the time the IOC was turning to Copenhagen, the world’s press were running headlines: “The Rise and Rise of Brazil: Faster, Stronger, Higher”. (Payne, 2009)

The award of the hosting rights of the 2016 Olympic Games crowned the mega-event strategy reformulated ten years earlier, one that resulted in the learning and incorporation of knowledge associated with the functioning of the IOC system and intermediated by the interests linking it to Rio and Brazil’s political systems. The plan for the mega-event adapted selected ‘best practices’ and underwent changes to craft a competitive candidature. In the process, it became oriented as an end in itself as attested by its conflict with the city’s plano diretor. It also became a space for the articulation of a political coalition involving the three levels of government in the support of the 2016 bid. However, the preparations for the event would be strategically mobilised by a new political actor to symbolise a watershed moment of urban development.
7.4. Outcomes

After being awarded the hosting rights for the 2016 Olympic Games, Rio de Janeiro entered a seven-year preparation phase to implement and deliver the urban intervention programme promised in the bid book. During this time the confidence and optimism in the Brazilian and Rio de Janeiro's economy expressed by the official discourse of the candidature and reproduced in the close relationship among government officials have all but reversed. In the year of the staging of the 2016 Olympics severe political, economic and health crises have affected the country, the state, and the city of Rio de Janeiro.

In the sections below the realisation of the mega-event strategy is critically examined. Attention is paid to the key aspects of the governance of the 2016 Olympics, the carrying of urban interventions, the budget and interests aligned in the materialisation of the mega-event strategy. The visioning of the city emerging from the hosting experience has been, once again, compared with the experience of Barcelona. This return to the origins of the strategy is the topic examined next.

7.4.1. Still Barcelona and the governance of Rio 2016

On 18 March 2010 Rio de Janeiro's new mayor Eduardo Paes attended the two-day seminar ‘Rio-Barcelona: The Olympics and the City’ organised by IAB/RJ. Thirteen years after the organisation of the event that marked the beginning of the political relationship between the two cities, policymakers and experts from both sides once again discussed best practices and how Rio could make use of the mega-event to produce a significant urban legacy. Paes emphatically declared that ‘Barcelona is undoubtedly the great model we have to follow’ (Gismondi, 2010) while celebrating a cooperation agreement in the presence of former Catalan mayor Pasqual Maragall and many of the consultants previously involved in the assistance with Rio’s strategic plan. He affirmed that he was going to ‘hire Maragall’s consultancy because I want to be like Maragall in the future [and] the future of Rio to become like Barcelona’s’ (EFE, 2010). Paes summed up to journalists that the policy knowledge to be transferred lies in the approach that the municipality takes to the opportunities presented by the event.

My model is Barcelona 1992. Copying Barcelona’s mayor, I can say there are two kinds of Olympic Games: the one that serves itself of the city and the [one in which the] city serves of the Games. We have to serve ourselves of the Games to leave a tangible legacy in infrastructure and an intangible one to change the image of the city. (Paes, 2012)
References to Barcelona had again become a regular feature in the municipality’s discourse with the reference of ‘the Games serve the city’ constantly repeated and emblazoned on the walls of the viewing platform of the Olympic Park. However, despite what the references imply, the relationship between the cities had become rather symbolic without the direct engagement that marked Rio’s first Olympic bid.

The attitude of Mayor Paes in his constant allusion to the Catalan city can be interpreted in two ways. First, it is related to the reputational capital that Barcelona still holds among local governments everywhere as a best practice in mega-event hosting and turnaround of urban fortunes that confers legitimacy to projects mobilising it as a reference. Similarly to Maia, Paes was a new political leader who approached the local architectural class to attract the support of groups with an influence in shaping public opinion. After being elected, Paes straightened the relationship with IAB/RJ, described by an officer at the Olympic Municipal Company (EOM) as the ‘Barcelona group, which is the group championing interventions in the city centre, the group of interventions in the port area which is not exactly the group of the [Brazilian] Olympic Committee’ (interview, municipal officer). This association was important to gather support for the regeneration programme for the port area discussed in chapter 8, which has since been aligned with the Olympic Games. In holding the interventions at the port, located in the central area of Rio, as part of the urban legacy of the Games, Paes has been able to respond to criticism from groups such as IAB/RJ for the concentration of investments at Barra. On the occasion of the Rio-Barcelona seminar, consultant Jordi Borja refuted the comparison between the urban transformations of the two cities by referring to the centrality of Barra da Tijuca in Rio’s Olympic project as ‘highly suspicious. I can only understand it if it either attends to particular economic interests or to political interests to make the easiest choice’ (Borja, 2012, p. 18).

Second, the construction of Rio de Janeiro’s Olympic project in the frame of Barcelona also serves to emphasise the roles of the municipality and of the mayor in driving the urban transformation, mobilised by Paes to assume the public face of the Rio 2016 Games. The period immediately after the granting of the hosting rights was marked by internal struggles in the multi-level political coalition to define the structure of the governance of the project.

The proposal outlined in the bid book was to create a delivery body along the lines of the Olympic Delivery Authority responsible for the London 2012 Games. The Olympic Public Authority (APO) would be a public consortium formed by the federal, state and
municipal governments with centralised powers to deliver the infrastructure and services necessary for the organization of the event (the non-OCOG attributes). However, internal political disputes between the local and federal governments over responsibilities and legal obstacles to ensure complete powers weakened the remit of APO. While the approval of the institution at the federal level was delayed, the municipality decided to create its own delivery authority, the Olympic Municipal Company (EOM) while the state government concentrated the projects under its responsibility at the cabinet office (figure 7.6) (interview, APO member). In this overlapping institutional arrangement all the three bodies are nominally credited with delivering the Games. In practice, EOM operated as the main delivery body, especially after key projects under the responsibility of the federal and the state governments were devolved to the municipality, such as the Olympic Park and the Deodoro sports complex. In the end Mayor Paes’s efforts to be the poster child of the event prevailed while APO had the role of articulating the work of federal institutions and publishing the consolidated budget (interview, APO member).

7.4.2. The Olympic budget, intervention programmes and private interests

Rio’s candidature for the Games anticipated in 2008 that it would cost a total of BRL 27.75 billion (US$ 14.42 billion) split between the Organising Committee for the Olympic Games’ (OCOG) budget for staging the Games (BRL 5.63 / US$ 2.82 billion) and the non-OCOG budget belonging to governments for delivering the related infrastructure and services (BRL 22.12 / US$ 11.6 billion) (Rio 2016 Bid Committee, 2009b). This was the highest budget of all candidate cities but promotional material stressed Brazil’s positioning during the global financial crisis as a ‘small island in an ocean of negative economic results’ (Ministério do Esporte, 2009, p. 100). Strong emphasis was put on the earmarked national infrastructural budget of US$ 240 billion from which the Games would draw (Rio 2016 Bid Committee, 2009a, p. 35).

The total costs updated in April 2016 amounted to an increase of 34% of the original budget, excluding service expenditures such as security, educational programs and fan zones (APO, 2016; 2015). Mayor Paes explained that the total costs could in fact only be possible to be known after the staging of the event (Dolzan, 2015). It was decided to further split the non-OCOG budget in two categories. The Responsibility Matrix lists all the structural projects directly related to the Games under the remit of each government level. This includes the construction and reform of venues, temporary
Figure 7.6: Institutional map of the Rio 2016 Olympic Games (elaborated by the author).
installations, infrastructure and equipment. The second category is the Legacy Plan that includes expenditure on mobility, urban regeneration and environmental programs understood to have been fast tracked as a result of hosting of the event. This separate category is aimed at giving more evidence to projects to be considered as legacies (Table 7.5).

Among the ‘legacy projects’ the ones dedicated to the public transport network stand out. The transport plan presented in the bid was significantly reviewed to replace a proposed BRT corridor linking the South End to Barra by an extension of the underground network. The new Line 4 of 16km and six stations have since become the most expensive project in the Olympic portfolio representing almost a quarter of the total budget. More attention in the public discourse has been given to the implementation of the BRT system of four corridors, two of which are tied with the Olympic budget whereas one was part of interventions for the football World Cup.

Totalling 117 kilometres they consist of the Transoeste corridor linking Barra to the West End and the new metro terminal; the Transcarioca line, which cuts through the North End towards the international airport; and the Transolimpica, linking the Olympic Park with Deodoro. Proponents of the BRT system, such as former Bogotá mayor Enrique Peñalosa who became a global advocate of the policy, argue that it represents the only viable transport solution in terms of scale and cost for large cities in the Global South (Peñalosa, 2013). It is presented as a compromise between the lower costs of surface systems and the operation and comfort of underground. Critics, on the other hand, point to the marginalization of metro and rail expansion and that the system presents only temporary results as it can saturate quickly. The experience of the Transoeste and Transcarioca corridors already in operation seem to corroborate the latter argument. Press coverage of the systems inaugurated in 2012 and 2014 respectively document overcrowding and safety worries as routine occurrences (França, 2015; Victor and Ribeiro, 2015).

The Olympic Transport Ring also envisioned that the rail system would be completely renovated in order to deliver a ‘world-class’ service to the densely populated areas in the North and West regions (Rio 2016 Olympic Bidding Committee, 2009). After reaching a peak of 1 million day riders at the beginning of the 1980s the service currently carries around 620,000 passengers every day with frequent problems of disrupted services and overcrowding (Souza, 2014; Supervia, 2015). Olympic-related investments promised to ‘drastically focus on changing both the image and the effectiveness of the railway,
upgrading stations, fully modernising the rolling stock, upgrading infrastructure and systems, and improving maintenance works’ (Rio 2016 OCOG, 2009, p. 26).

Table 7.5. Rio 2016 budget estimates (BRL million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditures¹</th>
<th>BRL (mm)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Source of Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCOG budget</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Self-financed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-OCOG budget</td>
<td>31,683.7</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>Public and private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Responsibility Matrix</td>
<td>7,094.9</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Olympic Village</td>
<td>2,909.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Olympic Park (ppp)</td>
<td>1,685.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public-Private Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Olympic Park (public)</td>
<td>1,260.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal and municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Deodoro sports complex</td>
<td>820.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sambodromo</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>Private and Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Golf course</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>Private and Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Marina da Gloria</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Power/Electricity Infrastructure</td>
<td>58.90</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Athlete's park</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Olympic stadium</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rowing stadium</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other facilities</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal and municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Legacy Plan</td>
<td>24,588.8</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Metro Line 4</td>
<td>8,791</td>
<td></td>
<td>State and private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Porto Maravilha</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public-Private Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- BRT</td>
<td>2,395</td>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Environment &amp; sanitation progr.</td>
<td>1,604</td>
<td></td>
<td>State, municipal and private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Light railway</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal and private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Roads</td>
<td>972</td>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Urban renewal &amp; infrastructure</td>
<td>758</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal and municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rail stations upgrade</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Doping control laboratory</td>
<td>188</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Guanabara Bay cleaning progr.</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Training venues</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
<td>Federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Educational programmes</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>39,083.7²</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Elaborated by the author with data from Olympic Public Authority (APO), 2015, 2016.
1. The announced budget has yet to confirm expenditures with security while not including costs with personnel or compensation to displaced communities.

2. As of 29 January 2016 exchange rates, the total budget amount was equivalent to £6.838m (US$9.698m).

However, only the refurbishment of six rail stations serving Olympic venues were included in the ‘Legacy Plan’ with the remainder of the upgrading works under the responsibility of the private operator. A recent change in the terms of the contract transferred the refurbishment of the stations to the private operator and a consequential reduction in the number of carriages to be purchased (Nogueira, 2015). The reviewed agreement evidences the marginalization of improvements in the areas of highest demand for public transports. The new BRT corridors and the expanded metro network will significantly improve transport connections in the region of Barra but substantially improved services for the commuters based in the North and Baixada Fluminense areas – the latter responsible for a ridership of 2 million passengers daily to Rio (Observatório Sebrae, 2013) – have been postponed.

Olympic promoters refute criticism against the Olympic budget by citing statistics of the participation of the private sector. Accordingly, some 60% of the costs are covered by private funding (APO, 2015; 2016). These are largely represented by the construction of the Olympic Village, the new golf course and the public-private partnerships behind the construction of the Olympic Park and the regeneration programme of the port area. Despite being touted as enterprises ‘where there is not a single cent from the public purse’ (Brito, 2014) developers were attracted with the alteration of planning restrictions and the transfer of land ownership. In all cases floor-area ratios were changed to allow taller buildings to be erected. At the Olympic Park where land ownership of the previous racetrack belonged to the municipality, 78% would be transferred to the private partner to explore commercial activities including private housing, hotels and shopping malls (figure 7.7). The compensation and relocation of the evicted families living next to the Park in the favela of Vila Autódromo and the construction of a new racetrack at a protected green field site in Deodoro are both actually existing costs resulting from the destruction of the Jacarepaguá racetrack. However, they are not included in the Olympic budget and stand as reminders of the need for close scrutiny and inclusion of the social and environmental costs.

Some of the private companies involved are clearly concentrating the benefits of the volume of urban interventions. An analysis on some of the ten largest development programmes currently in place in the city, which includes Olympic projects and all the
BRT lines, demonstrates a small number of Brazilian construction companies present in most of the contracts (table 7.6). These are the companies Odebrecht, OAS and Andrade Gutierrez, known as the ‘four sisters’ alongside Camargo Correa for their dominance of the industry and of large contracts of public works (Belisario, 2014). It also includes company Carvalho Hosken, which concentrates its activities in the Barra region but that nonetheless stands as the largest landowner of the area with 6 million square metres.

Figure 7.7. Masterplans of the Olympic Park for the Games and post-event phases (Courtesy of Rio de Janeiro City Hall)

These are companies for which, although they did not have an influence in shaping of the mega-event strategy, their agendas were rapidly aligned with the awarded Olympic bid as the concentration of contracts suggests. If the governance of the Olympic
projects rested on the ambition of local political figures and sports bosses these companies have played a more central role in the championing of the regeneration programme of the port area. The project has been opportune promoted as the main legacy of the Rio 2016 Games and is the subject of the next chapter.

### Table 7.6 Main development projects in the city and construction companies involved

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme (BRL mm)</th>
<th>Odebrecht</th>
<th>OAS</th>
<th>Andrade Gutierrez</th>
<th>Queiroz Galvao</th>
<th>Carvalho Hosken</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Village (2,909)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Park (1,685)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deodoro cluster (626)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Line 4 (9,650)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Maravilha progr (8,200)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLT light railway (1,189)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRT Transolimpica (2,280)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRT Transcarioca (1,900)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRT Transbrasil (1,400)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRT Transoeste (900)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: compiled from Belisário, 2014; CGU, 2014; APO, 2015.

### 7.5. Conclusion

This chapter has critically examined the uneven development of the mega-event strategy in Rio de Janeiro that culminated with the hosting of the 2016 Olympic Games. On the level of the ideational realms in which the strategy operated, it can be inferred that it helped to consolidate the new planning paradigm examined in chapter 6 as demonstrated by the longevity of the strategy since first formulated in the context of strategic planning. Repeated candidatures argued that hosting the event would enable Rio to ‘become a global city’ by virtue of international exposition and in the justification for development projects. Initial ideas based on planning concepts developed in the experience of Barcelona with the 1992 Olympic Games that aimed at a distributive balance of urban development were not wholly supported by the coalition that emerged in the strategic plan. The failure of the enterprise was then framed by powerful actors critical of the strategy, such as the mayor and the BOC chairman, as a matter of decisions over location and governance structure. This legitimated a narrow redefinition of the strategy around perceptions of what
constituted a competitive candidature to the norms of the IOC. As the strategy matured and the bid for the 2016 Games was produced, new participating actors mobilised the IOC concept of 'legacy' to contest the narrow scope of proposals and distribute interventions more widely. The retrofitting of legacy in the Olympic project was thus mediated to the extent that it could be used as a strong argument in the candidature. References to Barcelona resurfaced but this time as a pale signifier of event-led urban change.

These points highlight the importance of local politics in the grounding of circulating ideas. In the case of Rio, the ability of planning models to take hold was dependent on their flexibility to allow local actors to interpret and appropriate them. Once the Barcelona model was discarded, local interests 'worlded' the strategy from within. Embedded in the networks of the Olympic system, the BOC chairman acted as a policy entrepreneur that intermediated the flows of information between the IOC and the local and national governments. This enabled him to argue for the leading role of his institution in the design of the project, to justify decisions over location, to hire international consultants and to legitimate the strategy of hosting a secondary event as a lever of credibility. On the part of the national government, the Olympic project was also convenient as a demonstration of soft power at a time of growing recognition of Brazil in geopolitics. Politics was thus the main driver of the mega-event strategy, with private groups such as the construction companies concentrating Olympic-related works benefiting once the hosting rights were awarded.

The importance that a globalised policy such as hosting mega-events still holds for governments is attested by the large public funds underwritten for the event and the way that IOC norms and values are institutionalised during the candidature. International consultants played an important role as gatekeepers of information about the Olympic system and trained political leaders in their public discourses and strategies to boost the competitiveness of Rio de Janeiro’s Olympic bid.

The vacuum created by the marginalisation of the plano diretor and the inoperativeness of strategic planning was filled by project-led plans such as the Rio Olympic project whose ultimate objective was the hosting of the event itself while accommodating development projects that could be framed as legacy. Among the projects considered as the most important Olympic legacy is the regeneration of the port area, the policy examined in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 8

Speculative Urbanism: The regeneration of the port area

8.1. Introduction

The regeneration of the port area of Rio de Janeiro has been touted as the main legacy of the 2016 Olympic Games by new mayor Eduardo Paes and the ‘world’s largest urban redevelopment project’ (Hines, 2012). After decades of studies, lobbying and proposals the regeneration programme was officially announced in 2009 and works started in the following year. The programme was officially presented as ‘one of the most important urban experiences of our times, a true historic mark in the development of Latin American port cities’ (Dias, 2010, p. 231). However, for all the inter-referencing efforts and previous attempts that incorporated foreign exemplars more explicitly, it was from the nearby experience in São Paulo with the planning instrument ‘urban operation’ that Rio’s Porto Maravilha was modelled. In this sense, the regeneration programme can be understood as an inherent relational-territorial response (McCann & Ward, 2010), that is shaped both by circulating ideas and models of waterfront renewal while being articulated through situated political and economic knowledges.

The aim of this chapter is to examine how the regeneration programme Porto Maravilha is ‘an idea whose time has come’ (Kingdon, 1984) that was shaped by policy legacies and designed by actors located outside political institutions. The structure of analysis is thus organised according to the following sections. First the different proposals elaborated in past decades are examined as a way of understanding the limits of the ideas that were mobilised and how the current programme sought to address the difficulties that were identified. Second, the application of the three I’s framework is used to analyse the key dimensions of the current regeneration programme: the idea of urban operation advocated by construction companies for the operationalisation of the programme; how the programme is situated in relation to the interests of politicians, developers and construction companies; and how the property-led rationale of the proposal was institutionalisation in the creation of the Urban Development Company of the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro (CDURP). Thirdly, the delivery of the programme is
evaluated after its first five years with attention to the transformation of the urban landscape, the incipient articulation of a new regeneration model, and the troubling political and economic contexts that have more recently affected the project. Finally, the concluding section reflects on the importance of policy legacies and situated interests and knowledges in the grounding of circulating ideas. Although the Porto Maravilha programme resembles the serial reproduction of redevelopment policies (Harvey, 1989), its importance and impact has to be situated as a ‘model in the making’ designed for the application to other Brazilian cities and one that deepens agendas of property-led redevelopment and privatisation of service delivery.

### 8.2. Visions of regeneration for the port area

The port area of Rio de Janeiro is located in the city’s centre next to the central business district known as Centro (figure 8.1). The first intervention for the modernisation of the port was concluded in 1910 when the waterfront was enlarged by landfilling the jagged coastline during the extensive renewal of the city centre. Over the next decades it became a busy port in the export of agricultural products and raw materials and the import of manufactured goods.

![Figure 8.1. Location of the port area of Rio de Janeiro (CDURP, 2014)](image)

The inadequacies of the port of Rio de Janeiro to adapt to the new container technology since the 1960s and the construction of the Port of Itaguaí in 1982 led to the decline of activities and to the dereliction of the urban landscape. Urban interventions in the region isolated the area and contributed to the further decay of the neighbourhoods of the port,
such as the construction of the *Perimetral* elevated highway built in the 1960s. Plans for urban renewal came in succession but were not able to overcome conflicting public interests, institutional resistance on the part of the port authority, and insufficient interest from private investors (table 8.1). Whereas previous plans failed to progress from the study phase or to produce minor interventions, the *Porto Maravilha* programme was facilitated by very favourable circumstances. An analysis of previous proposals serves to highlight what were the main challenges and how the current programme was able to overcome them.

Table 8.1 Timeline regeneration of the port area of Rio de Janeiro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1982</td>
<td>RIOPART and ACRJ organize the I Rio International Week proposing the Rio World Trade Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1983</td>
<td>International seminar <em>Developing port areas</em> at IAB/RJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1985</td>
<td>Model of Rio de Janeiro's Teleport by Nippon T&amp;T presented at IV Rio International Week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1988</td>
<td>Municipal decree creates the Area of Cultural Protection – SAGAS project, giving listed status to 1.782 buildings in the port neighbourhoods of Saúde, Gamboa and Santo Cristo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1989</td>
<td>Planave study <em>Urban development plan for the rear areas of the port of Rio de Janeiro</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1990</td>
<td>IplanRio study <em>The Port of Rio de Janeiro: Current situation, the question of modernisation and the role of the city hall in its management</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1991</td>
<td>TCI study <em>Gamboa port area: revitalisation proposal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1993</td>
<td>Public hearing for the Project Pier Mauá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1993</td>
<td>IplanRio study <em>Preliminary report – area of special urban interest Port Zone</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1993</td>
<td>Federal law 8.630 the 'law of modernisation of ports'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 1994</td>
<td>French architect Jacques Rougerie proposal <em>Oceanic City</em> commissioned by the municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1994</td>
<td>Iplanrio study <em>Revitalisation of the Port Area</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1994</td>
<td>IAU-RIF study <em>La Revitalisation de la zone portuaire de Rio de Janeiro</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1997</td>
<td>Pier Mauá, cruise terminal and warehouses 1 to 4 leased to the Pier Mauá Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2000</td>
<td>Guggenheim Foundation evaluates locations in South American and visits Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>IPP study <em>Porto do Rio: plan for the rehabilitation and revitalisation of the port area of Rio de Janeiro</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2002</td>
<td>Presentation of Guggenheim proposal designed by Jean Nouvel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2003</td>
<td>Rio City Hall and Guggenheim Foundation sign contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2003</td>
<td>Contract suspended by the Court of Public Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2006</td>
<td>Municipal decree calls for Procedure for Expression of Interest, later given to <em>Rio Mar e Vila</em> consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2007</td>
<td><em>Rio Mar e Vila</em> final report submitted to the municipality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.2.1. Circulating models of waterfront renewal

The first coordinated attempt to develop a proposal for the regeneration of the port area came from businesses in the foreign trade industry at the beginning of the 1980s. Having the Chamber of Commerce of Rio de Janeiro (ACRJ) as a focal point of activity, initiatives were put forward to lobby for the renewal of the waterfront drawing from experiences from abroad.

During the first half of the decade proposals ranged from the creation of a Special Economic Zone to the replication of many of the features of regenerated ports elsewhere, most notably that of Baltimore’s Inner Harbour. In the announcement of a design competition for the proposal it was specified that:

The project requests the creation of a show-room; hotels tailored to executives in the import-export trade; a world trade centre; leisure areas; shopping malls; marina; aquarium; museum; and the preservation of residential areas directly related to the region, [to be conceived] on the same basis as to what has been achieved recently by the port of Baltimore in the USA. (ACRJ, 1982, p. 11)

![Figure 8.2. Proposal for a Teleport in Rio (courtesy of Paulo Protásio)](image)
International seminars were organized annually to promote the industry and to discuss the renewal project with experts from abroad, including policymakers responsible for the regeneration of the London Docklands, Singapore and Taiwan (interview, business investor). In the mid-1980s the main references shifted to Asian cities as Japanese consultants helped to spread the concept of Teleports, a ‘complex for port areas with advanced telecommunication technology with transmission of information via satellite, connecting the city with the world with more efficiency and speed for the foreign trade’ (ACRJ, 1985:26). A scale model of what could be delivered in Rio was produced by the consultants attracting great media coverage (figures 8.2 and 8.3).

For all the efforts of local business investors to set a vision to transform the port area that replicated models from abroad, four issues stood in the way. First, local residents with the support of architects, planners and heritage institutions initiated a movement to request the preservation of the historic houses of the neighbourhoods of Saúde, Gamboa and Santo Cristo as a response to fears of eviction, and a listed status was granted by the municipality in 1988 (Sampaio, 1994). Second, the Port Authority, *Companhia Docas do Rio de Janeiro* (CDRJ), offered support in all but name that constrained the progress of the project. The then federal institution was the major landowner of the area and despite the decline in port activities it was reluctant to forego part of the docks and warehouses to the proposed plans (O Globo, 1983a, 1983b; Ministério das Cidades, 2005). Third, the complex land ownership of the area involved the municipality, state, federal government and associated institutions. As one of the
main proponents of the project explained, only a coordination of the diverse array of interests would enable the regeneration project moving forward, which at that time was an unlikely prospect given the conflict among the different levels of government.

[The main problem] was land ownership. Therefore, you needed support at the federal, state and municipal levels to intervene in that area. At that time Rio de Janeiro enjoyed the reputation of having the municipal government run by a party, the state by another and both being loathed by the federal government, which was another party, other channels, other dealings, there was no way of organizing anything with the three government levels. (interview, business investor)

Finally, the economic crisis that marked most of the 1980s ‘lost decade’ was far from positive in attracting the interest of investors to a large-scale development programme. The Teleport project dwindled until the first Cesar Maia administration when its label was used to designate an intelligent office development at Cidade Nova far removed from the original infrastructure-intensive concept. Piecemeal studies were carried out in the 1990s by the municipal planning office and CDRJ but it was only in the early 2000s that another coordinated attempt was made to promote the integrated regeneration of the port area.

8.2.2. Culture-led regeneration and the Guggenheim museum

In the early 2000s the municipality produced a series of studies about interventions in the port area. Elaborated by the secretariat of urbanism and the Pereira Passos Institute (IPP), the Porto do Rio programme contained proposals for small to medium-sized interventions with the aim of renovating public spaces, creating pedestrianised areas, converting buildings into cultural institutions and improving mobility in the region (IPP, 2001). In the presentation of the study, the planning secretary Alfredo Sirkis justified the programme as a need to catch up with other places around the world.

The city centre needs a revitalisation process similar to the centres of other great cities in the world (...) Several port cities in the world have successful projects of revitalisation of their old docks into new uses for leisure, offices, commerce, culture and residences. London, Baltimore, New York, Buenos Aires, Barcelona. Why not Rio? (IPP, 2001)

However, for Mayor Cesar Maia the regeneration programme was only feasible as long as there was a flagship development acting as a catalyst effect to attract interest. Influenced by the experience of the city of Bilbao the municipality entered into talks with representatives of the Guggenheim museum, who were prospecting new sites to expand the museum operations (Abreu, 2000; Bloch, 2001). Between 2001 and 2003
consultants produced studies about the creation of an iconic museum at the Mauá pier designed by French architect Jean Nouvel (figure 8.4).

The study prompted a campaign by opposition councillors to stop negotiations due the level of financial commitments on the part of the municipality (Jornal do Brasil, 2003; Magalhães, 2003a). A civil public action was moved and the Court of Public Treasury determined the suspension of the contract. It concluded that it created financial commitments that were not foreseen in the municipal budget; that it would have to be carried beyond the current mayoral mandate; and that the existence of clauses requiring confidentiality in the arbitration of potential conflicts was against principles of sovereignty (Magalhães, 2003b). The case was seen as a defeat for Mayor Cesar Maia and had a direct implication in the wider regeneration programme, as the secretary of urbanism explained.

[the mayor] asked to see me, when we were ready for many infrastructural works to be tendered, with the envelopes about to be opened. He said to me "Listen Sirkis! Without this Guggenheim thing, it won’t work because there is no catalyst and I won’t do a damn thing in the port area". He ordered me to suspend everything, all the process of tendering, everything … but the projects stayed. (interview, A. Sirkis)

The study identified three essential elements for the integrated development of the port area. First was the importance of reaching an agreement and working together with the federal government and its institutions that owned most of the available land and properties. In that sense discussions progressed slowly with a federal working group being established to analyse the proposals, lines of public funding, the institutional
arrangement and financing (Ministério das Cidades, 2005). Second was to attract the middle class, as the secretary was convinced that the chances to create a mixed-use area could only prosper if wealthier residents moved to the area (Sirkis, 2009). Finally, was the need to coordinate all the programs in a dedicated institution, an urban development corporation, following the experience of Buenos Aires and Paris (interview, A. Sirkis).

The studies that still need to be done are those relating to the private property market and institutional modelling that would allow for the constitution of a public-private authority that is able to carry out the revitalization programme quickly and continuously unaffected by the limited cycle of the municipal and federal terms ... The legal-political-institutional engineering for such project is one the greatest challenges of the next years. (Sirkis, 2005)

It was precisely the engineering foreseen by the planning secretary that was be the focus of a study carried by some of Brazil’s largest construction companies that finally facilitated the regeneration programme to be launched.

8.3. The Porto Maravilha urban operation

The regeneration of the port area became a priority in the political agenda of Mayor Eduardo Paes, elected in late 2008. Two days after the result of the local elections, Paes met with Governor Sérgio Cabral and President Lula da Silva in Brasilia. The programme was one of the vehicles that sealed the symbolic alliance between the three levels of government and signalled full political support to the programme. The alliance was portrayed as the ‘beginning of a new era’ compared with the hostile relationship between the municipal and state cabinets in the previous decades (Bresciani, 2008).

The Porto Maravilha programme encompasses a series of large-scale interventions in central Rio (figure 8.5) and the delivery of services for a period of 15 years between June 2011 and June 2026 divided in two phases. The first phase was carried out between 2010 and 2012 and entailed the upgrading of utilities, public spaces, roads and pavement financed by the municipal budget. The second phase has a duration of 15 years with large-scale interventions and the delivery of services carried by a public-private partnership formed by a consortium of Brazilian construction companies (table 8.2) and managed by a municipal urban delivery company. The second phase has an estimated cost of BRL 8 billion (£3.20 bn) and is financed through the sales of building rights and public land.

Between 2009 – when Paes was sworn into office – and 2011 – when Porto Maravilha was initiated – the programme was carefully designed to overcome the barriers
Chapter 8 - Speculative Urbanism

identified in previous plans. The sections below examine how ideas, interests and institutions were assembled to give the form and content to the programme.

Table 8.2. Programme of works and delivery of services of Porto Maravilha

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main works</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Construction of the Via Binário (Binário Highway) – parallel to Av. Rodrigues Alves; it is composed of two tunnels (Saúde with 81 m and Binário with 1.5 km), six traffic lanes, overpass connections with the Gasômetro Elevated Highway and an exclusive Light Rail Transit (LRT) strip;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Construction of the Via Expressa (Rodrigues Alves Avenue) - to replace the Perimetral Highway, it will consist of a 1.6-km-long tunnel with 6 traffic lanes;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Demolition of the Perimetral Highway;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Museum of Tomorrow;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Setting up new underground infrastructure for public lighting, power distribution and telecommunications, as well as: 122 km of drinking-water networks; 84 km of sewer networks; 36.5 km of drainage networks; 11 km of drainage galleries; 26 km of gas networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Implementation of new urban standards in approximately 70 km of streets;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Construction of 650 thousand square meters of sidewalks and 17 km of bike paths;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Planting of 15 thousand trees;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Construction of three sewage treatment plants (dry weather);</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Adaptation of the RFFSA tunnel for the LRT (light railway train);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The foundation structure for the LRT.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Water</td>
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<td>- Telecommunications</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Drainage</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
8.3.1. The idea

The first serious demonstration of interest from the private sector came in August 2006 in response to the municipal decree 26.852 that established the Area of Special Urban Interest of the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro (PCRJ, 2006). Under this designation the area became subject of studies for urban regeneration and, in attendance to federal law 11.079 that regulates the creation of public-private partnerships (PPP), a _Procedimento de Manifestação de Interesse_ (‘procedure for expression of interest’ – PMI) was issued. This policy instrument serves as an open call for expressions of interest by private companies to carry feasibility studies for the constitution of a PPP at their own expenses. If the proposal is taken forward a tendering process is established and the selected company or group of companies reimburse the costs of the study to the original authors. This was envisioned as a way to leverage expertise to overcome the knowledge gap between the public and the private sectors, thus facilitating the former with analyses and information for decision-making. The PMI for the port area includes a wide range of topics to be studied including technical and legal analyses, study of land occupation and land use, financial modelling, budgeting, environmental licensing and control of evaluation and project performance (PCRJ, 2006, p. 3).

A single manifestation of interest was expressed by a group of companies that formed a consortium for the specific purpose of the study. The _Rio Mar e Vila_ consortium was composed by some of the country’s largest construction companies: OAS, Odebrecht, Carioca Christiani-Nielsen, and Andrade Gutierrez, though the latter left the consortium during the elaboration of the study. The feasibility study was carried out between February and September 2007 and the consortium had access to municipal reports and

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**Infrastructure**
- public lighting
- electricity
- sewer
- gas

**Delivery of services**
- Upkeep and maintenance (paving of streets, signalling, public areas, drainage, structures, public lighting).
- Traffic management
- Cleaning (waste collection, road sweeping, sanitizing, cleaning of slopes and graffiti removal)
- Landscaping (planting, pruning, mowing, weeding, pest control)

Note: adapted from CDURP, 2015; Porto Novo, 2015.
data with the support of a task group formed by representatives of the secretariats of treasury, urbanism and IPP (PCRJ, 2007).

The final report focused on establishing a financial and institutional architecture to facilitate the regeneration programme (Rio Mar e Vila, 2007). It advocated strongly two core premises. Firstly, to characterise the programme as an *Operação Urbana Consorciada* (urban operation). In accordance with the specifications of the federal law known as ‘the City Statute’ discussed in chapter 5, this model of urban intervention gives the basis for planning controls in a delimited area to be reviewed and financially leveraged by the state (‘public value capture’) and used exclusively to finance the operation. It takes real estate interest as a premise and the modification of planning controls as a condition to attract investment, such as the redefinition of land uses, land parcelling and floor-area ratios. The *Rio Mar e Vila* financial proposal was thus based entirely on the sale of certificates of building rights that allowed the construction of towers above existing height limits – known as Certificates of Additional Construction Potential (CEPAC) – to cover all the necessary works in infrastructure and in the delivery of public services (Figure 8.6). CEPACs are issued by the municipality and regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) and traded as bonds in the market, that is, ownership of bonds is not necessarily linked to ownership of land or developing activity. Interested parties in new developments have thus to acquire land and buy the amount of CEPACs corresponding to its project in the market.

![Figure 8.6. Illustrative scheme of the financing of urban operations through CEPACs.](image)
The financing of the programme was thus dependent on real estate interest to which the report (2007, p. 76) confidently forecasted a demand of 24.5 million square meters until 2024 in ‘a conservative scenario’. In justification for the option for the urban operation the report was explicit in the experience that served as reference:

After the [enactment of the] City Statute only two urban operations involving the issuing of CEPACs were developed, both in São Paulo. The results obtained were positive, especially considering that it was a pioneering experience. São Paulo’s successful experience indicates that its model should be followed. Any different arrangement will be noticed by investors and thus compromise the attractiveness of the certificates. (Rio Mar e Vila, 2007, pp. 62-63)

The modelling of the programme thus needed to be carefully crafted to replicate the features of São Paulo’s urban operations and to adapt to urban regulations in Rio. The issue was further stressed, alongside the attractiveness for investment:

For a new security such as CEPAC, the main causes of concern are certainly of a legal nature. For this reason, we have always pointed in this study to the most cautious institutional modelling … It concerns simply of considering as an absolute priority the interest of investors, whom the financing of the operation is dependent upon. (Rio Mar e Vila, 2007, p. 63)

Secondly, and in contrast to the São Paulo project, the report (Rio Mar e Vila, 2007, p. 105) argued for the institution of an SPV as an ‘essential condition’ as a way to overcome the multiple land ownership and mandates from the different institutions of the three government levels. It argued as advantages for this arrangement the possibility to bring together all the different institutions involved in the programme; to ‘segregate’ the programme from ‘the risk and future income’ of the public parties involved – stressed as a key issue for the decision of investors; and a more flexible management and streamlined decision making (pp. 116-117). The institution would be a semi-private company with assets formed by the land transferred from the governments and their agencies and the CEPACs certificated to be commercialised. These assets would be subscribed to an investment fund to which the SPV would be the only share-holder and managed by a financial institution.

Differently from previous regeneration studies, the focus of the Rio Mar e Vila report was on the financial and institutional modelling of the urban operation rather than the aesthetics of the programme. It argued that the projects on which the scenarios were based incorporated the studies of urban intervention already developed by the municipality. This position was explained by one of the managers of the secretariat of urbanism who assisted the study as natural for the activities of the companies and accumulation of studies already produced.
When the [construction] companies sat with us to prepare their proposals, the study was refined. [They said they] did not have interest in the operation from an urban perspective. "We are construction companies, so what we want? We want to put our trucks in movement, our machines in operation and the workforce to work." That was it... They started the studies, saw that it was feasible, that it could be sustained and it worked out. It really blossomed. (interview, planning manager)

According to this general manager, the studies developed at IPP for the Porto do Rio project under secretary Sirkis had already established the projects that had to be executed.

The projects [were already] very detailed. Kerbs, pavement, draining structures, everything. There wasn’t anything else to be done. Should we do it all again? It didn’t make sense. What was missing was how to set an urban operation, which was something we did not have the experience in. That was the problem. (interview, planning manager)

The City Statute law established that the constitution of a given urban operation has to be foreseen in the municipal plano diretor when listing priority areas for urban development. This provides the basis for a detailed proposal to be followed and voted by the municipal chamber. The report of the consortium Rio Mar e Vila emphasised the need to include the programme as an urban operation in the plano diretor. As a result, the debate over regenerating the port area moved to other spheres as the city council engaged in the delayed review of the plano diretor after its first 10 years and as the municipal elections of 2008 were about to be held.

When Eduardo Paes took office in January 2009 he pushed forward the regeneration of port as a policy priority having the studies prepared by the construction companies as the basis for the programme (interview, municipal planner). As the review of the plano diretor progressed slowly in the city council, the executive office of the municipality submitted the proposal of the urban operation and the creation of an urban development company as complementary laws to the 1992 plano diretor still in force. The urban operation was announced in July that year in a ceremony presented by President Lula, Governor Cabral and Mayor Paes and the favourable momentum was strengthened with the award of the hosting rights of the 2016 Olympic Games announced in October. Having ample support in the municipal chamber where a political coalition was established, the proposed complementary laws 101 – concerned with the approval of the urban operation – and 102 – which created the Urban Development Company of the Port Area of Rio de Janeiro (CDURP) – were approved in November 2009 giving the legal basis for the start of the urban operation.
8.3.2. Interests

Different interests converged to the materialisation of Porto Maravilha. Central to the process were changes in the oil and gas industry that caused a rise in the demand for office space in Rio combined with the high rates of economic growth that the Brazilian economy experienced in the late 2000s. Politicians, international developers, and construction companies identified in the programme opportunities to further their interests.

The regeneration programme epitomised the alliance between two of the main political parties – PT and PMDB – controlling the federal and the state governments. The election of Eduardo Paes for the city hall signalled a novel situation of cross-scaler political alignment capable of galvanising support for the regeneration of the port area. As previous proposals found out, land ownership was key for any coordinated attempt to pursue a regeneration programme. Figure 8.7 shows that the largest areas for the negotiations of CEPACs are public land belonging to the federal government (62%), state government (6%) and the municipality (6%) with the remaining 25% being private properties (CDURP, 2010a). The full political support from the federal government was able to overcome the entrenched interests of the port authority and release land for real estate.

Figure 8.7. Land-ownership in the port area of Rio de Janeiro. Legend at the top reads: Federal, Port Authority, State, Municipality, Private (CDURP, 2010a).
The rising demand for office spaces in Rio de Janeiro was the turning point for the regeneration programme. According to a study by the real estate company Colliers International in 2009, Rio had a vacancy rate of 0.64%, the lowest in the world among the markets studied (Colliers International, 2009, p. 1). The strong demand put a particular pressure on the city centre mostly from companies having the state-run oil company Petrobrás and other federal government agencies as clients. The report concluded that Rio had the highest average price by square metre of top corporate space in the country. A study carried out by another international real estate company, Jones Lang LaSalle in 2013, presented a profile of the occupants of office spaces in the city. According to the analysis (2013) less than 1% of the companies based in the city occupied around 44% of total office space. A more detailed analysis demonstrated that companies in the oil and gas sector occupied 40% of top corporate spaces followed by the financial (18%) and telecommunication (10%).

The contribution of the industry to the regional GDP grew from 1.25% in 1995 to 12.03% in 2005 and 17.65% in 2012 (Ceperj, 2014). Most oil and gas extraction in Brazil takes place in offshore reserves requiring deep-water drilling technology, of which 81% are located off the coast of the state of Rio de Janeiro (ANP, 2016). In 2006 a large oil basin was detected along the pre-salt layer of the south-eastern coast of Brazil, with an estimated potential of generating four times more oil than the then national production and elevate the country to the position of the 6th largest producer by 2035 (IEA, 2013).

This marked change in the industry and the pressure on office space caught the municipality planners by surprise. According to the general manager of the secretariat of urbanism, a study of demand commissioned in the early 2000s to evaluate the chances of a regeneration programme did not show promising perspectives.

The study concluded that [new building] Torre Almirante would absorb, if I’m not wrong, demand in the centre for some five years … We said “damn, they are saying there is no demand”. Then it happened exactly the opposite because Petrobrás came and rented the whole building. We said “How come? There is something changing” [then] other companies linked with the oil industry turned up. (interview, planning manager)

During the second half of the 2000s a host of new developments and the retrofitting of existing stock were delivered in Central Rio. In 2005 North American developer Hines inaugurated the above mentioned Torre Almirante that was rented exclusively to Petrobrás. Tishman Speyer, another US-based company, delivered in 2010 the office towers Ventura Corporate having the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) as main tenant and in 2011 concluded the retrofitting of Virtus Corporate Offices sold to the
utilities company State Grid Corporation of China. Explaining the strategy of the company with these two developments, a manager from Tishman Speyer stated that the company quickly realised the improvement in the Brazilian economy and decided to invest in an area where local developers were not paying attention.

We see opportunities where the others don’t see. So, all the attention of the [real estate] market in Rio de Janeiro was turned to Barra da Tijuca where competition was fierce ... nobody looked at the city centre ... We saw an improvement to the economic scenario and thought “We’ll get in but should we go where everyone is fighting? The big developers? ... Let’s bet [on Centro] because here the real estate market is not paying attention and we believe in it. (interview, international developer)

The favourable results in the corporate market encouraged the company to evaluate a more substantial involvement in the proposals of development in the city centre. During the studies of financial modelling that followed the approval of Porto Maravilha and the creation of CDURP, the then chairman of the latter prospected the interest of a potential buyer which Tishman Speyer positioned as a key investor.

We were planning [a piecemeal operation] but when the gentleman from Tishman came here in 2011 ... he said “I put BRL 1 billion in this fund with shares if I am given the preference over the land around Francisco Bicalho [avenue]”. We said ... “great you will have the preference, we will include this in the design of the real estate fund so you sit there during the auction [of CEPACs] and you table a bid of BRL 1 billion”. However, we still needed 3.5 billion.’ (interview, CDURP former chairman)

At this stage Rio’s urban operation pointed to a different financing structure than that experienced in São Paulo, where the sale of CEPACs was carried out over a long period of time. Interest from investors encouraged the sale of the certificates in large batches to secure funding at the beginning of the programme. The feasibility of this strategy was secured when the state-run Federal Savings Bank (CEF) was attracted to the operation, applying the funds of the Employee Severance Indemnity Fund (FGTS).

We started prospecting the market, I tried all the pension funds, the most influential Brazilians investing in the real estate market, some banks, some big Brazilian entrepreneurs, and we were trying to structure a portfolio which could potentially attract three bids of 1 billion in the auction. That’s when the FGTS said “No, I am in. I want it, but I want to buy the whole lot. It has to be an auction of a single batch”. (interview, CDURP former chairman)

CEF is the second largest state-run financial institution in Latin America and the federal government’s main institution to finance infrastructure, housing and sanitation programmes. CEF is also responsible for the management of important assets such as the FGTS, which are monthly deposits of 8% of an employee’s salary that employers pay into assigned accounts. According to an executive manager from CEF, the
participation of the institution in the programme was a natural progress of their operations, considering their involvement in real estate development and the expertise developed in recent years.

We have developed this experience internally for a long time. In 2008, for instance, our department invested some BRL 10 billion in real estate bonds. So we have been studying the Brazilian real estate market for a long time, and we always had as one of the central premises … to be the main financial institution of the government’s public policies, and this, via the real estate, given CEF’s expertise is a condition that favour us. So it was in this sense, the analysis [of Porto Maravilha’s CEPACs] was to do with the real estate expertise we had developed, and the belief we had in relation to the real estate market in Rio. (interview, CEF investment manager)

The response makes clear two main motivations. First was the attractive return on investment that the urban operation seemed to offer. Second was the role of CEF to enable public policies from the federal government. This position is further evidenced by the executive manager when stressing that:

The keystone was the return on investment for FGTS. We believed that Rio’s real estate market would absorb well the urban operation, would absorb well the project, and we believed the FGTS could potentially maximise returns in taking part of the operation. This is one thing. Another is the role of CEF, as an agent of public policies, so this whole history is sort of entangled. (interview, CEF investment manager)

As a result, the auctioning of all the CEPACs took place in a single batch in June 2011, in which CEF tabled the only bid totalling BRL 3.5 billion with the certificates valued at an individual price of BRL 545. Additionally, it was also agreed that CDURP would make available to CEF the sale of 60% of the land in which the CEPACs were applicable. The bid amount corresponded to the projected costs of the infrastructural interventions, delivery of services and the administrative expenses of CDURP. About one year later CEF organised the auctioning of a small batch of CEPACs negotiated at an individual price of BRL 1,150 (CEF, 2014). For CDURP’s former manager the return of more than 100% to the original price of CEPACs was ‘great because you ended the discourse that there was political influence. It is for the FGTS to have profit and the real estate fund of Caixa to have profit, so it is great that both are having [it]’ (interview, CDURP former chairman). A similar statement was publicly made by CEF’s national manager for real estate funds:

Today the price of a single CEPAC is more than double of what we paid. What we have in the case of the Port is a virtuous cycle. We will finance the urban operation and we will maximise the returns to the Fund. We invested in the revitalisation and then we reaped the rewards. We do not give money away but investment, working for return and profit. Our business model has the objective to maximise the investment, which is private, of all the payers of the FGTS. (Pinto, 2013)
CEF also negotiated CEPACs directly with developers interested in the largest areas. Initial announcements comprised the development of office towers and business hotels by Odebrecht Real Estate Developments, Tishman Speyer and Trump International Real Estate.

Finally, there were two main factors that interested the construction companies that developed the Rio Mar e Vila proposal. First was the delivery of the civil engineering works proposed for the area – such as the construction of tunnels, express ways and the upgrading of the utilities infrastructure. In October 2010 the consortium Porto Novo, formed by the same companies of the Rio Mar e Vila study, was selected in the tendering process to appoint the private partner of the PPP. According to Porto Novo’s manager of institutional relations, the extensive programmes of works was attractive to the companies of the group.

The largest Brazilian engineering companies, saw that it was not possible to the usual … tendering of large projects. So they realised the opportunities in the change of law to organise themselves to study and propose projects, to be involved in long term projects … it is a project with a high volume of investment, so it has obviously stirred the interest of OAS, as it has stirred Odebrecht’s, as it has stirred Carioca’s. (interview, Porto Novo manager)

Second, the programme also included the delivery of urban services over the course of 15 years, renewable to another 15, including street cleaning; waste collection; maintenance of roads and public areas; street lighting; traffic management; and landscaping. Despite the experience of the companies in some of these areas the integrated delivery of all services concentrated in one company was a pioneering factor.

The provision of services in an integrated model under the responsibility of a single company as it is done here, is an innovative model, it doesn’t exist … Obviously there are private concessions where you see waste collection, management of highways, so, things that are already part of the scope of our work. But when you put everything as a single responsibility … then it became an innovation, a pioneering one. (interview, Porto Novo manager)

The payment for the delivery of works and services was sustained by the single sale of all the CEPACs that secured the viability of the urban operation, one of the main premises championed in the Rio Mar e Vila report. The other was the creation of an institution separate from the structure of the municipal government to coordinate the delivery of the programme.
8.3.3. Institutionalisation

The regeneration programme of the port area is sustained by a sophisticated financial architecture that institutionalises the relationship between three main actors (figure 8.8). First is the state, represented by Rio de Janeiro city hall and the urban development company, that are the preliminary owners of land and certificates of building rights and are the managers of the regeneration programme. Second is the main investor, which is CEF after purchasing the totality of certificates, responsible for paying the programme and negotiating certificates with the real estate market. Third is the private sector, represented by the construction companies responsible for delivering works and services; and the developers interested in negotiating certificates for new developments. The relationship among these actors is regulated through financial instruments – real estate investment funds – and partnerships – the PPP for works and services delivery and joint-ventures in new developments. As already noted, this architecture was facilitated by a positive economic scenario and the cooperation among different government levels, critical factors in the initial years of the Porto Maravilha programme.

After the 2008 municipal elections, the construction companies responsible for the Rio Mar e Vila report refined the original study and forwarded to Mayor Paes while he garnered the support of the state and the federal governments. A task group was formed with the participation of representatives of the municipality and the state of Rio, the federal Ministry of Planning and BNDES. According to CDURP’s former chairman ‘there was no legal modelling, not even financial, economic or institutional arrangements, it was zero’ (interview, CDURP former chairman). The initial idea was to have all three levels of government as partners in the urban development company responsible for coordinating the programme.

In the study of the [complementary] law there was a modelling, that did not happen, that was the creation of a company that could have from the beginning, as partners of the company, the municipality, the state and the federal government. Why? Because the most valuable asset was land … So the state government was cool we had already agreed becoming partners but it was essential that the federal government agreed. (interview, CDURP former chairman)

This multi-level partnership in a development company did not materialise. For CDURP’s former chairman the federal government was reluctant to institutionalise its participation.
Figure 8.8. Financial and institutional modelling of the *Porto Maravilha* operation (adapted from CDURP, 2013)
I credit more to the ideological stance of who was there in that moment for not accepting the federal government as partner understanding, mistakenly in my opinion, that we were going to pass public land on to real estate speculation. It was nonsense because the land was being sold by the amount evaluated by Caixa. Actually it was the sale of these lands that allowed the construction potential to be consumed by the emission of CEPACs. So, as they did not accept we moved on in having the municipality making the project to happen on its own. (interview, CDURP former chairman)

Carrying out the project on its own meant the constitution of CDURP and the studies of financial modelling, but the federal government remained essential to cut through all the red tape. As CDURP’s former chairman recognises ‘there was a lot of help, there was executive order that made life easier, there was presidential decree that made life easier but it would be much easier if they were in’ (interview, CDURP former chairman). The statement serves as evidence of the political coalition enabling the urban operation for which, despite not formalising its representatives in an institutional body such as in the delivery company, measures were taken within their respective jurisdictional boundaries. CDURP’s current chairman explained how this willingness operated in practice:

The municipality came to feature, to take care of this process almost exclusively, pressuring the federal government and the state government at certain points and moments, particularly in the land question, but still not as partners in the strict sense of the project, but in support. Without a doubt this articulation was important, especially for constituting an institutionalisation that went beyond the lines of a political agreement and became … an institutional feature that gave stability to the process. (interview, CDURP chairman)

After the approval of the urban operation efforts were directed to the creation of CDURP and the financial modelling. An analysis of each of these steps demonstrates how the idea of the urban operation was institutionalised.

CDURP was created as a semi-public development company with shares that were owned by the municipality. The company recruited key personnel from outside the municipal staff, most noticeably executives with a relationship with the pension fund of CEF employees, the third largest in the country. According to a head of division from CDURP this was an important feature to gain the confidence from investors and the real estate market.

[A] point that contributed a lot to the success that we see in the operation is the language of the market. Today our internal staff do not talk with the real estate market in different languages. We talk the language of the real estate market. We did a feasibility study, for instance, on CEPAC that pointed to [the certificate price of] BRL 545. It was an economic analysis of real estate. So, when the market comes to question it is not me who decides… it is because there is a technical study giving support to this and here are people fully prepared who know the market to deal with the market. (interview, CDURP manager)
Circulating Knowledge and Urban Change

Following the recommendation of the *Rio Mar e Vila* report to ‘segregate’ the delivery company from ‘risk’, a key feature of CDURP’s institutionalisation was to create a real estate investment fund to which the company’s assets, composed of public land and CEPACs, were subscribed. This fund, the Port Area Real Estate Investment Fund (FIIRP), of which CDURP is the sole shareholder, was created in 2010 and administered by CEF. The fund constituted the official channel of CDURP with the market, as CDURP’s head of division explained.

> What instruments do we understand that talk the market language? … The market didn’t know CDURP. It thinks “gosh, a relationship with a municipal company, there is a risk in this”. Everyone adds this to their calculations. How can we minimise this? How can this be a little more palatable for the market? So before we made CEPAC we put all our assets, which are land and CEPAC, and we allocated in FIIRP which has CDURP as single shareholder. (interview, CDURP manager)

Institutionalising the relationship among the different actors via real estate regulation served to address both the fundamental issues of credibility and risk, as the representative of the company further elaborated.

> The relationship with the winner of the auction is not directly with CDURP but with this fund of which I am shareholder. Looking at it today one may say “it doesn’t make a difference, it could be CDURP”. From a perspective of the structure this person is right but from a credibility point of view it is not. (interview, manager CDURP)

The estimated costs of BRL 8 billion of the operation had to be financed by the sale of assets from CDURP to investors. As discussed in the previous section all the CEPACs were auctioned in a single offer won by CEF paying BRL 3.5 billion in the application of resources from FGTS. According to the terms and conditions of the auction, CEF assumed all the costs of the programme operationalised via the constitution of another investment fund, the Porto Maravilha Real Estate Investment Fund (FIIPM). In this fund, CDURP subscribed the assets of FIIRP – CEPACs and land – in return for the payment of the operation. In its turn, FGTS subscribed BRL 3.5 billion with a contractual agreement of return on investment (ROI) of 6% AER above Brazil’s *Extended National Consumer Price Index* (IPCA). CEF’s role, as detailed by the regional manager, is to generate surpluses from the negotiation of CEPACs and land to investors as to pay for all the programme costs and the ROI to FGTS.

FGTS subscribes to FI Porto Maravilha BRL 3.5 billion and this BRL 3.5 billion will serve to make all the payments of the operation. But this is the key issue, the operation doesn’t cost 3.5 billion, the operation costs around BRL 8 billion, and is this difference between the 3.5 and the 8 billion that the [FII] Porto Maravilha
has to perform in order to pay for the operation while also returning the investment to FGTS. (interview, CDURP manager)

The relationship among the actors involved in the operation are thus centred on the real estate investment funds and their decisions constrained by commitments on ROI and performance indicators. The delivery of the urban operation is thus intrinsically tied with the dynamics of the real estate market while the risk of the operation is underwritten by CEF and FGTS. CEF is thus positioned as the main interlocutor with investors and developers with whom it is expected to extract profit in the negotiation of CEPACs and land.

Via the management of FIIPM, CEF detains the strongest bargaining power and is therefore positioned to exert the largest influence in the future of the urban operation. The next section examines the delivery of the Porto Maravilha programme five years on.

8.4. Outcomes

Between 2012 and 2015 a series of new developments were announced, projects speculated and foreseen interventions delivered. This initial phase confirmed the interest from the real estate market and gave confidence to the promoters of the programme. However, political and economic events in 2016 have seriously affected the programme. The subsections below discuss two of the main outcomes of the programme in its first years. First it assesses the relationship between ideas and institutions as to evaluate the proximity between public and private interests in the delivery of the programme, and how the urban landscape has been transformed as a consequence of the real estate rationale ‘locked in’ to the urban operation model. Second it examines the relationship between ideas and interests in order to analyse how the consortium of construction companies have sought to leverage the experience with Porto Maravilha to the development of a new model of urban regeneration.

8.4.1. The emerging landscape

The Porto Maravilha programme is predicated on a vision of regenerating spaces of degradation and abandonment into mixed-use. The neighbourhoods of Saúde, Gamboa and Santo Cristo are presented as places impacted by the decline of the port activity and the dereliction of the built environment. A common template in public presentations of CDURP representatives begins with images of decay in the area, as a ‘situation found’ before the implementation of the programme (figure 8.9). Mobilising the cultural and historical relevance of the region, the official discourse promises to return ‘a historical treasure to Río, and at the same time integrate areas with great
housing, cultural and economic potential, which will be transformed into an example of modernity’ (CDURP, 2015). In this ‘revolution’ of urban fortunes it is projected that the current population of 28,000 will increase fourfold by 2020.

The amendment to law that institutionalised the regeneration programme set some general ‘principles that will guide the planning, execution and monitoring of the urban operation’ (PCRJ, 2009:1). These include the prioritisation of public transport; a concern with the aesthetics, the urban ambience and historical and cultural heritage; and an integration of the area with Centro paying particular attention to residential use (PCRJ, 2009a, p. 1). This view was further elaborated by CDURP in the preparation of a study of impact in the local neighbourhoods:

This is the purpose of the interventions: transform the port region in a dynamic area that becomes a new urban planning reference for the city. It is aimed to follow the example of cities around the world like Buenos Aires, New York, Baltimore and Rotterdam, among others, that boosted their economies in recovering their degraded port areas and created new places for tourism. Thereby it will also benefit the surrounding areas where the renovation will radiate through improvements in the local ambiance and city flows, besides everyone else that uses the region. To sum up the whole city will benefit. (CDURP, 2010, p. 17)

Asked to detail what exactly has been followed from examples from other cities, CDURP’s current chairman argued that the programme has allowed to ‘advance
considerably with … what the urban renewal guidelines advocate: the compact city, a city that gives priority to people, to a sustainable urban environment, etc.’ (interview, CDURP chairman). In this sense for CDURP’s head of division it was important for the urban operation to build its credibility by sending ‘signs’ to the market of what was been pursued and two interventions were key.

First was the demolition of the Perimetral elevated expressway that bypassed the whole port area. The study of the construction companies emphasised that ‘the first measure to revitalise the area is the demolition of the Perimetral elevated highway, today a great barrier that cuts off the port area from the Guanabara Bay’ (Consórcio OAS/CNO/CCNE 2009, p. 11). The topic of demolition had already generated heated debates when first brought up by the consultancy of Catalan architect Oriol Bohigas to Mayor Luiz Paulo Conde in the late 1990s. The Porto Maravilha programme envisioned the creation of a pedestrianised boulevard on its place next to the waterfront warehouses and the construction of an underground express way to mitigate the impact on traffic flows. Carried out in two phases between 2013 and 2014 the demolition was personally facilitated by Mayor Paes.

The head of division of CDURP reckoned that for the real estate market, the demolition represented a firm demonstration of the seriousness of the urban operation.

We have overcome all the obstacles to arrive at the moment we are now, that is, the removal of the Perimetral, which for the city is emblematic and for the perspective of the real estate market is also emblematic … now the market can really see that what you preached, this region with a waterfront to the bay, it will become more valuable. It happened. (interview, CDURP manager)

In the opinion of the consultants of an international real estate company there was always some distrust in the intervention despite its priority status.

Is it really serious? Are they really bringing down the Perimetral? … You have to agree that it can be written down that it is going to be demolished but then it can also be “we changed our plans, the Perimetral is not going down anymore”. If the Perimetral is not coming down, you know this very well, you are not opening the city to the bay. It has a series of implications. (interview, real estate consultants)

Another important sign according to CDURP’s head of division was the development of an iconic building, which came to be the new Museu do Amanhã (Museum of Tomorrow) designed by Spanish architect Santiago Calatrava at the Mauá Pier, the same location of the ill-fated Guggenheim Rio. Initial plans for the museum envisioned the reform of the modest warehouses 5 and 6 but in January 2010 the municipality
announced a partnership with the Roberto Marinho Foundation – the cultural and educational arm of the Brazilian media conglomerate Grupo Globo – for the construction of the iconic building with the Spanish architect being chosen directly by the mayor (Magalhães & Bastos, 2010). The new museum is integral to the regeneration programme with its costs included in the urban operation budget. Its relevance according to the head of division from CDURP is to be a flagship for the urban operation.

For the market to see that this is really happening you have to give some signs … Today, the museum is a really important icon for the region … On top of being a sign, an answer that we are giving to the market it is a [cultural] cluster that we are creating in this area … No wonder that it is Calatrava who is doing the project. (interview, CDURP manager)

The demolition of Perimetral and the development of the Museum of Tomorrow, together with the upgrading of infrastructures, urban design and cultural institutions such as the Rio Art Museum and the AquaRio served to boost confidence in the programme. On top of the new parameters of construction facilitated by the CEPACs the municipality also tried to stimulate the market by offering tax incentives. These included the exemption of property taxes for a period of 10 years if new developments were delivered until the end of 2015 (PCRJ, 2009b; 2012). CDURP’s former chairman recognised that ‘[t]he perception of the real estate in relation to Porto Maravilha changed from disbelief to suspicion and now we are in a moment of “hang on, now it is real, I am in”’ (interview, CDURP former chairman). Among those that have decided to invest in the urban operation are national and international developers that announced a host of new office developments, which brought concerns to CDURP’s former chairman.

I was concerned in 2013 when the negotiations with Caixa started, I thought that things were moving at too great a speed. I didn’t think that it was good for us to have the definition of who were going to be the developers so soon in the first year, second year, in a project that is for 10, 15 years. The volume is very large, sometimes you define things and you define it badly. But we couldn’t interfere. Our option was: sold to Caixa… so long! (interview, CDURP former chairman)

As it was seen, CEF acquired all the CEPACs and the right to the public land responsible for consuming 60% of the certificates at the total cost of the operation. This list comprised seven properties considered ‘priority areas’ (see figure 8.9) for the prospect of the operation, six belonging to the federal government and one to the municipality totalling approximately 340 thousand square metres. Facilitated by the approval of a new federal law, the properties were sold to the municipality and then subscribed to CDURP’s asset, which in turn subscribed them to FIIPM.
Instead of reselling at a profit to prospective developers CEF has so far adopted the strategy of entering in partnership by bartering a composition of land and CEPAC according to each proposal. In the opinion of CDURP’s head of department this strategy is making investment in the area more attractive.

CEF’s partnerships have included developments in the ‘priority areas’ such as the twin corporate towers at Pátio da Marítima developed by Tishman Speyer and designed by British architect Norman Foster; the five Trump Towers at Clube dos Portuários; the residential development Porto Vida at Praia Formosa with Carioca Engenharia; but also developments outside these areas that consume CEPACs (figure 8.10).

CEF’s strategy postpones receiving the profit of the increased land and certificates in the short term for exploring the commercial value of new developments when delivered. This strategy is further illustrated by a local developer in negotiation with the institution.

Caixa is making deals by bartering. This is good for them because they have the “up side” and this is good for the developer [because] they do not need to pay upfront. … That means, you don’t place a burden on the developer at an initial moment. This is good for the market. (interview, CDURP manager)

Caixa is a public bank. The ‘public’ part they have already done, which was to acquire all the CEPACs at the amount that the municipality needed for all the urban infrastructure to be made. Now they are doing their ‘bank’ part that is “I
have CEPACs and I will sell for the best market price and if I believe in the developer I will barter because for me a new development is more valuable than cash at this moment. I prefer to receive it later” (interview, local developer).

Figure 8.11. Announced developments at Porto Maravilha (clockwise from left): Pátio da Marítima, Trump Towers, Porto Atlântico and Porto Vida).

Entering into partnership with CEF is attractive for developers as the representative of the association of real estate companies pointed out, noting that ‘with the Federal Savings Bank there is no risk of default’ (interview, ADEMI manager). However, they also get a higher say on the character of the development, as a local architect explained.

They look at every development and say “the math is not round; it is not fitting” … They participate in all developments. All developments have to be shown to them. If they say “I don’t like it, I will not approve this,” that’s it, the guy has to prepare another one.’ (interview, private architect)

As it was seen, CEF makes it explicit that their involvement in the operation is based on a market rationale, on the feasibility and attractiveness of the real estate facilitated by the programme. Considering the ‘urban renewal guidelines’ that the programme is expected to follow, it is important to examine how the overall vision for the operation is confronted by individual developments. In the opinion of the local developer, CEF’s financial rationale can compromise the operation, as they are not oriented by questions of urban planning and design. In his opinion CEF ‘has the commercial vision not the urban. The urban question is somewhat side-lined’ (interview, local developer).
This criticism to the programme has also been made by the former chair of IAB/RJ in highlighting the absence of a master plan (interview, L.F. Janot). The urban operation programme listed all the necessary infrastructural works, established a mixed-use zoning and established new floor-area ratios in the introduction of CEPACs. This was sufficing in the opinion of CDURP’s chairman.

This is another debate that we were already expecting from the beginning. When we talk about master plan – architects love debating this – in general you have an empty land and you have to define an urban design. [Here] there is an urban design that is preserved, therefore you cannot change … The decision of the kind of development to each location is a decision of the developer, of the market. You cannot establish at this level unless the whole territory belonged to a single owner, isn’t it? (interview, CDURP chairman)

CEF’s investment manager confirms the prevalence of the financial rationale in the institution’s appraisal of proposals but underlines that the analysis is interrelated with the overall contribution to the urban vision.

Our main analysis, no doubt about it, is financial because we have to give return to FGTS, that’s the basic premise. Now, given the scale of the operation we cannot be averse to local urban issues. We have learned that it was necessary to induce a certain kind of organised growth in the port region so we could have the mix of residential and commercial and not have what you see there in Canary Wharf and other places around the world. (interview, CEF investment manager)

The limited mandate of CDURP on individual projects was already expressed by the former chairman when discussing the decision to sell the CEPACs to CEF. For the current chairman there is no space for public intervention as each development is entirely a market decision.

Look, for more that we have preferences if an architect is working according to the norms, I can find it is a horrendous project. I can even say this to him, as I have done already. “I find it very ugly”. But if it is in accordance with the law, someone may think it is nice. There are people that find the original proposal for the Trump Towers a marvellous thing. I find it horrendous. (interview, CDURP chairman)

Given the facilities for the real estate market to define projects and the context of corporate demand, it has not been a surprise that office towers have been the overwhelming majority of the developments announced so far. The head of division of CDURP defended the position of the municipality for not determining land uses in order to not constrain the market interest. The municipality, or CDURP for that matter, can only indirectly influence the process. For the head of division of the institution this was a calculated decision.
I cannot make this operation without the real estate as my partner ... what we imagined that would be better? To transform the area as a mixed-use zone; don’t create a defined masterplan for the area, to leave this for the market to work out and, as the operation progresses, if it is not according to what the municipality imagines, we create instruments to shape this. (interview, CDURP manager)

The instrument alluded to is the possibility of making the price of acquisition of CEPACs cheaper in the case of residential developments. In this sense, the municipality has approved incentives to make residential developments more attractive.

I can approve an amendment in the law; I can create another inductor through a residential law, as we are doing now … We have questioned, “there are too many commercials what about the residential? It won’t happen?” ... “What do investors need to make it happen?” “The numbers are too tight”. "If we concede this incentive will it work?" “Numbers look better now, so let’s go this way”. (interview, CDURP manager)

The relationship between the municipality, construction companies and developers is embedded in the institutional design of the programme. The municipality recognises the sole importance of real estate profit for the viability of the project. The construction companies that designed the programme estimated the volume of CEPACs for which there is demand to pay for works and services. Finally, the operation unlocks public resources as developers have access to prime public land for developments in a disputed market. The developments announced in the first years were, for the head of division at CDURP, an evidence of the achievement of the operation.

When I see the level of investment in the area today [I know] this was the right decision. Our operation generated credibility and people are positioning. When I saw Donald Trump coming here saying that he would do a development that has some BRL 1.5 or 2 billion ... I say “There is something good to be here, really”. You see the real estate market fighting over Gasometro, which means an investment of R$ 3.5 billion, so the operation really worked from a real estate perspective. (interview, CDURP manager)

However, having the regeneration programme institutionalised this way means making the operation dependent on market dynamics. The slump in oil prices since the first half of 2014 and the economic crisis affecting the Brazilian economy have seriously impacted the development of Porto Maravilha. Since 2015 no further real estate development have been announced. Nonetheless the delivery of works and services has been guaranteed while CEF was left with the risk of the CEPAC.

8.4.2. A new regeneration model?

The Porto Maravilha programme is the most significant exercise in urban operation since the enactment of the City Statute. Its importance is attested not only by its scale but also
by the concerted application of a range of planning instruments and for the institutionalisation of planning actors in a complex financial architecture. The satisfactory experience so far, in the view of the urban development company and of the construction companies’ part of the PPP, suggests the formation of an urban regeneration model with the potential to be implemented in other cities.

The construction companies grouped at the Porto Novo consortium can be portrayed as the ‘policy entrepreneurs’ of the regeneration programme. In the call for PMI they identified the institutional and financial modelling as the key factors for the viability of the programme. Given the long timeframe that a large-scale project would entail, they pressed for the idea of an urban operation that could guarantee the funding of the envisioned urban interventions and service delivery while establishing a delivery company that would concentrate all the assets and institutional channels. A solution for the coordinated intervention in the area was thus ‘attached’ to the long standing institutional and funding problems.

However, as experienced in previous plans the complex pattern of land ownership meant that the political sphere was of fundamental importance to any concerted attempt. The political alignment between the three levels of government offered the opportunity for a favourable agreement between the parts. The proposal of the Rio Mar e Vila report was welcomed by the mayor and revisions were made that gave the basis of the urban operation proposal sent to and approved by the municipal chamber. It was not possible from the interviews conducted to establish direct relationships between the companies and the political actors. However, two important observations can be made.

First, due to the nature of funding of electoral campaigns in Brazil it is common for some of the largest business groups to provide generous donations to running candidates and parties. This is the case for construction companies, particularly OAS, Odebrecht and Andrade Gutierrez that have provided some BRL 165 million between 2002 and 2012 to PT and PMDB for national, regional and local campaigns (Belisário,2014). If not a direct evidence of the lobby for projects in their interest, it is safe to assume that being major donors, they would have access to running candidates to expose their ideas. This may be the case of Mayor Paes in taking the programme as one of his policy priorities and basing the proposal of the regeneration on the project developed by the construction companies.

Second, as this research was being carried out a large corruption scandal was unfolding involving top government officials, the state-run oil company Petrobrás, and a host of
construction companies. At the centre of the kickback scheme, construction companies won tendered contracts from the oil company at inflated prices with part of the money channelled to political parties to finance electoral campaigns. Several top executives were arrested and evidence collected. Among the evidences found, the newspaper *Folha de São Paulo* reported in 7 December 2014 the existence of written notes dating back to 2007 in which the OAS chairman communicates that both the president and the governor were aware of the regeneration programme and were taking the necessary steps for it to happen (Carazzai & Carvalho, 2014). At that time OAS, as part of the *Rio Mar e Vila* consortium, were developing the regeneration proposal. More recently, executives of Carioca Engenharia declared, after signing a plea agreement, to have paid bribes to the speaker of the lower house of the Brazilian Congress to lobby for the use of FGTS funds to finance the operation (Coutinho, 2015). The charge is yet to be processed by the courts but it stands as an evidence of the proximity between the country’s largest construction companies and top officials when it comes to public mega-projects.

As analysed above, the construction companies identified in the programme opportunities to guarantee their presence over a long time frame in the delivery of infrastructural projects while also gaining experience in the integrated delivery of public services. As the head of public relations conceded, the *Porto Maravilha* programme can be understood as a laboratory of a potential regeneration model that can be possibly rolled out to other Brazilian cities.

Here, companies see a laboratory of this business model. It has the potential of being applied in several cities (...) we often receive missions from other cities ... Niterói for example, São Paulo, cities from São Paulo’s state, Porto Alegre, Florianópolis, Salvador. It has stirred interest from a lot of people. (interview, *Porto Novo* manager)

At the heart of this model lies the idea of urban operation, an extensive list of infrastructural developments and service delivery, its financing via CEPACs and the possible guarantee from a state actor such as CEF to assume the risks of the operation. Institutionalising the relationships in real estate funds shields the operation from the vagaries of the electoral cycle while securing the payment for works and services. The involvement of the companies in the design and implementation of this model gives recognised advantages in future prospects.

The companies have created a new business model ... They are at the forefront because they already have the experience, obviously in other occasions other companies will participate, present proposals, you already possess knowledge
of how to do things, you become more competitive. (interview, Porto Novo manager)

The delivery of Porto Maravilha evidences the limitations of previous proposals that defined clear references in other cities while arguing for the need to catch up. The achievement of the construction companies was to focus on finding a suitable financial and institutional reference within the Brazilian context while leaving to the municipal bodies the concern with aesthetic questions. Their proximity to the high ranks of political channels enabled the championing of the project directly to key decision makers.

8.5. Conclusion

At first sight the landscape emerging in the Porto Maravilha regeneration programme resembles that of waterfront renewal schemes found elsewhere. Over the years, proposals envisioned the transformation of the derelict urban space into transformed spaces combining work, living and leisure after experiences abroad. This has led the municipality planning staff to study several interventions that were later incorporated in the current regeneration programme. However, as this chapter has examined, this analysis of a ‘serial reproduction’ provides only a cursory view of the dynamics of the making of the programme.

While there are explicit efforts to position Porto Maravilha among other regeneration experiences, an analysis of the making of the programme provides a richer understanding on the role of ideas in policymaking and of situated actors in the design of programmes. In this case, the circulating model of waterfront renewal was secondary to the more fundamental issues of institutional and financial modelling, a lesson duly learned in previous proposals. Operating as policy entrepreneurs, construction companies were able to adapt the planning instrument of urban operation recently regulated by the City Statute into a programme that deepened local economic development as planning paradigm. As a result, the relations of local government with private groups became institutionalised in the operation of real estate investment fund and returns on investments.

On the level of the interests involved, it is important to highlight the role of construction companies acting as a multi-scale broker to advance the regeneration programme. To this effect was contributed a favourable economic climate and real estate demand, while these companies were able to mobilise their networks with top government officials. The alignment of the multi-scale government coalition was able to overcome institutional
barriers and release public land for real estate development. Central to this was Paes’s liberal approach to working alongside private companies in the design of policies and embedding a pro-market rationale in the design of institutions such as CDURP.

In the preliminary analysis of the outcomes of the programme, two features of Rio de Janeiro’s experience were highlighted. First, it was demonstrated how the companies’ interests were articulated through an ingenious institutional and financial architecture to reduce the risks of the operation in order to guarantee the payment for works and services. Moreover, such opportunity was further leveraged as to experiment with a delivery model with the potential to be rolled out in other locations. Second, the entangled relationship between the public and private institutions in the delivery of a mega-project gives evidence to the particular nature of the Brazilian development dynamic, one in which large national capitals have proximity with major decision makers to propose and secure contracts while public agencies assume the risks of the operation. However, as noted above, a recent corruption scandal alongside the beginning of an economic recession has exposed the limits of this development logic. This has been reflected in the development of Porto Maravilha and provides an opportune point of conclusion for the period analysed in the research.
CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

9.1. Introduction

This research has examined the ways in which urban policymaking processes are embedded in and reflexively shape circulating ideas and inter-referencing practices. The analysis was informed by a theoretical framework that employs relational thinking to examine processes of urban change constituted by extended networks of policy knowledge and global imaginaries. The research was operationalised by an analytical framework centred on the role of ideas in the policy process and their dynamic inter-relationship with interests and institutions. The contemporary urban development of Rio de Janeiro provided the grounded case study to interrogate how urban policies were relationally produced taking as units of analysis three selected policies that have exemplified the development of ‘Olympic Rio’. The focus was on the situated practices of policy actors and on the social production of urban policies.

This final chapter summarises the findings of the research in light of the questions posed in chapter 1. The analysis of recent urban policymaking in Rio de Janeiro is reviewed in order to identify more general issues. The discussion then moves on to reflect on the key empirical, methodological and conceptual contributions of the thesis to existing literatures in planning and urban studies before making suggestions of areas for future research. An epilogue section provides the closing of this study by discussing recent political events that have signalled the ending of a political cycle not only locally but also at the regional and national levels.

9.2. Summary of findings

In the first chapter of this thesis three research questions were presented having a grounded perspective in the local public policy process. The aims were to understand the implications of relational policymaking to urban politics and development. The questions are revisited below taking advantage of the integrated analysis of the three selected policies.
1. What are the factors that lead local policy actors to draw on circulating policy ideas and inter-referencing practices?

An important feature of urban politics in Rio de Janeiro in the past two decades was the definition of policies carrying the imprint of experiences from elsewhere as major projects of new administrations. These were the cases of strategic planning during the initial period of Cesar Maia and Luiz Paulo Conde governments; the hosting of mega-events starting in the first Maia administration but profoundly reformed upon his return for a second and third mandates; and the bid for the 2016 Olympic Games and the programme of waterfront renewal upon the arrival of Eduardo Paes to the mayoral office. These were important urban policies that have influenced the local planning field and shaped the contemporary development of the city.

Why do political leaders look then for ideas and policy innovations from elsewhere? The reasons are varied and contingent to the political context of the time but borrowed prestige and self-positioning between ‘successful’ policy models were recourses that conferred legitimacy to the policies proposed.

A marked difference stands between ‘grounded’ ideas and policies that were ‘arrived at’. In the former group it is possible to identify the strategic plan, the first bid for the Olympic Games and the attempt to open a branch of the Guggenheim museum at the port area. In the case of Maia and Conde, they were both relatively unknown political actors whose surprising victories provided them flexibility to look for ‘fresh ideas’ to build on their political projects. As a técnico-politician, Maia was keen to implement new management instruments and Madrid provided his first reference of strategic planning, before turning to Barcelona. Consequential to this, the idea of a bid for the Olympic Games emerged as an ambitious project to address the objectives set in the plan. A similar approach was also taken in the failed attempt to build the Guggenheim museum as a ‘mark’ of Maia’s return to government and a global cultural icon. These policies drew on the status achieved by the cities where they were originally developed and gave legitimacy to personal agendas of leveraging political capital.

In common, these policies had the presence of consultants and policymakers directly involved in the design of the original references. Consultants arrived with authoritative knowledge to what constituted best practices and successful models and were provided with relative independence to set the contents of the proposals. Confirming what the literature on policy mobilities have identified (Cook, 2008; Peck & Theodore, 2010), the mobilisation of the ideas was highly selective. Strategic planning, for instance,
did not constitute a participatory process as initially claimed while the original Olympic bid was developed irrespective of the city’s official masterplan or existing planning studies.

Another common feature of the grounded ideas examined is their limited success or outright failure. As a former planning secretary stated, strategic planning did have an impact on the design of urban policies, although it contributed to other aspects discussed below. The proposals in the bid for the 2004 Olympics were discarded after being rejected by the IOC and the plan for the Guggenheim never came to fruition.

On the contrary, policies that were ‘arrived at’ had a better outcome in being implemented and to generate support. These include the reformed mega-event strategy and the Porto Maravilha regeneration programme. These policies were characteristic of worlding practices with claims of facilitating a developmental leap and re-situating the city in the world with a renewed global status. Inter-referencing gestures to Barcelona Olympic legacy during Eduardo Paes governments or the self-positioning of the port regeneration programme among ‘models’ of waterfront renewal, were practices that, as Ong (2011, p.17) has noted ‘seems to stir urban aspirations … as well as standing as a legitimation for particular enterprises’. The fact that these policies fared better in contrast to the examples above is related to the organic development of coalitions and their shaping of the ideas proposed, a point that brings the next question.

2) How are grounded ideas co-constitutive of interests and institutions during the policymaking process?

The analytical approach on the three I’s as mutually constitutive elements in the policy process allowed the identification of three important dynamics for understanding the outcomes observed. The first refers to the role of ideas in giving meaning to interests and facilitating coalition building. Upon arrival of Maia and Conde to the city hall both actors had low political capital with other institutions in the city. As seen, the mobilisation of the strategic planning method from Barcelona advocated the straightening of relationship between public and private actors and the creation of institutional spaces for cooperation. This has led to the support of the business groups represented by ACRJ in the financing and elaboration of the strategic plan. However, as noted above the plan had limited direct policy outcomes. Its main contribution was its indirect result in facilitating the formation of a new coalition that was sustained in the 1993-2000 period.

As one interviewee commented, having the mayor and the business elite sitting together to define a development agenda was a radical change from the politics of previous
governments. It was thus the process of elaboration of the plan that contributed for the formation of new alliances. Representatives from ACRJ took positions in the city hall while Maia consolidated himself as political force to reckon with that resulted in the election of Conde as his successor.

Also, the preparations for the Olympic Games and the port renewal were the conduits that enabled the full alignment of the local, regional and federal governments as a political coalition. The mutual cooperation established was already important in the organisation of the mega-event but proved essential for enabling the Porto Maravilha programme in the selling of federal public land to the municipality as well as expediting legal changes and red tape.

Secondly, relates to the appropriation of local actors of the grounded ideas. Béland and Cox (2016) had made the point of ‘polysemic’ ideas being able to appeal to wider audiences and thus serving as a ‘coalition magnet’. Just as opposite, narrowly defined propositions can foreclose support and weaken existing alliances. The first Olympic bid is illustrative of this. The mobilisation of the Barcelona model of event-led regeneration to Rio by Catalan consultants resulted in the proposal of centring development in an area that was outside the imaginary of key policy actors. Allegedly, the split in support contributed to diminish the chances of the candidature making it into the final shortlist. The mega-event project was then reformed by the main critics of the original proposal, the mayor and the chairman of the BOC, concentrating on less defined benefits as city marketing and boosting tourism numbers that allowed their redefinition of priorities in terms of spatial planning and the governance of the projects.

Thirdly, refers to the relationship between ideas and institutional frameworks. All policies examined resulted in the creation of temporary or semi-public institutional spaces for the elaboration, implementation and governance of the ideas proposed. The elaboration of strategic planning was made possible by the creation of a public and private association outside the democratic control of the municipal chamber or of the constituency. In the reformed mega-event strategy discussed above, the BOC chairman positioned himself as the key nodal link between governments and the Olympic system. The creation and re-creation of bidding and organising committees created the space were the mega-event strategy was defined outside democratic controls. Finally, the regeneration of the port area represents the most conspicuous blurring of public and private spheres in the governance of urban policy. Despite formally representing part of the municipal structure, CDURP development company has been staffed with
individuals from outside local government with experience both with public funding in real estate projects and property markets. This allowed, as one respondent noted, policy actors to ‘speak the language of the market’ and thus build trust and confidence in the ambitious redevelopment project with investors. The financial and institutional architecture designed and proposed by construction companies embedded market rationales and real estate speculation as the drivers of the regenerations process.

3) What are the implications for local politics in the mobilisation of circulating ideas and inter-referencing practices?

As discussed in relation to the first question, an important feature of mobilised ideas is their prestige as ‘policies that work’ and the borrowed credentials from experiences judged successful. There are two key implications in the institutionalisation of ideas and inter-referencing practices that can negatively affect local democratic processes.

The first refers to the foreclosing of political debate and the participation of certain groups. This point also relates to the temporary institutional spaces discussed in question 2. As seen in chapter 5, after having the urban reform agenda institutionalised in the 1992 plano diretor, the instrument was marginalised in practice by the administrations that followed. Despite the efforts of MNRU to institutionalise progressive planning practices at the federal level, the actual realisation of these ideals was dependent on the elaboration of local plans. Once the plano diretor was disregarded, the groups advocating the urban reform were deprived of a key institutional space to pressure the local government. On its place, the elaboration of the strategic plan became under close control of the municipality and private groups without the substantial involvement of civil society. When the plano diretor was updated as a compulsory requirement in the late 2000s, the lack of commitment of the local government with the plan and with participatory processes, resulted in a technocratic instrument with unclear resources for progressive planning.

The second critical implication is the depoliticisation of development policies as grounded ideas are presented as pragmatic or delivery-focussed, common-sense modes of intervention. In the reform of the mega-event strategy it was argued that in order to have a competitive proposal, certain locations had to be selected for possessing particular geographic and aesthetic qualities, while facilitating public delivery led by the municipality. Moreover, it was also necessary to build venues first before producing another Olympic bid, which legitimated the instrumental hosting of a second-order event. The matter of acquiring credibility in the project and incorporating
the alleged preferences of the IOC became the driving rationales for developing a project reliant on public funding and management. There was no space open for the general public to question the setting of priorities of locational decisions.

In this regard the *Porto Maravilha* programme stands as a more extreme example. It has been creatively designed to embed key market rationales on matters of risk, return on investment and speculation in the institutional relations between public and private agents. As a result, it has circumscribed the opportunities for residents and civil groups to press for welfare policies such as the construction of social housing, in spite of the fact that the main guarantor of the operation is a federal bank whose core aims are, ostensibly, to act as the implementation arm of the federal government infrastructural policies. Even more critical implications reside in the innovative scheme of public service delivery operated in an integrated manner by the private partner of the operation. Having different arrangements in relation to the surrounding areas, the programme is trialling new delivery models, that as analysed in chapter 8, has the potential to be rolled out in other Brazilian cities. The further development of the model, advocated by the large Brazilian construction companies with close proximity with multiple government levels, may be currently on hold, given the economic downturn and corruption investigations being carried out discussed below. Nevertheless, it points to a deepening segregation and social polarisation of the urban space as urban operation programmes are only practically feasible in areas of real estate interest and available infrastructure.

### 9.3. Contributions and limitations of the research

This research was informed by current debates in relational thinking and urban change. The examination of local policymaking drew on the literatures of policy mobilities and worlding cities to identify key issues in the grounding of ideas and inter-referencing practices. This was complemented by the application of an analytical framework based on the three I’s approach that incorporated concepts from the constructivist institutionalism literature. It is thus appropriate in the evaluation of this study to consider the empirical, methodological and conceptual contributions of the research alongside their limitations.

First, the recent development trajectory of Rio de Janeiro provided a rich case to examine how contemporary urban politics are embedded in extended networks and relational practices. Contributions include the geographical and research focus of the study, and the dimension of urban politics examined. The ‘thick description’ and critical
evaluation of the processes of relational policymaking were focused on a major city of the Global South that sits outside the usual focus on Western-centred analyses of contemporary urban change. It also examined a topic beyond that of ‘subaltern agency’ that concentrates much of the postcolonial literature. The research was also attentive to not subscribe to an all-encompassing narrative of neoliberalism of variegated manifestation by remaining open to understanding how the selected policies were shaped by varied socio-political processes. Even though features associated with urban entrepreneurialism characteristic of the neoliberalisation of local policymaking were evident and powerful in shaping policy imaginaries, the analysis also demonstrated the importance of political projects of incoming mayors eager to secure a political space and develop a coalition base. Moreover, it also situated policy practices within longer development trajectories that have concentrated public investment in central and elite areas at the expense of the socially and spatially segregated neighbourhoods.

Second, the analysis of the case study was operationalised through the application of qualitative methods aiming at unpacking and critically interrogating the social processes of mobilisation of knowledge and policy design. These involved archival research with the systematic analysis of policy documents and newspaper coverage, and the carrying out of semi-structured interviews with key policy actors. While the former enabled the provisional understanding of the genealogy of the policies examined and contextual information in preparation for interviews, the latter provided the key insights into the social construction of urban policies.

Although this choice of methods hardly configures a ‘step beyond the relative comfort zone of case studies and semi-structured interviews’ suggested by Cochrane and Ward (2012, p. 7) they were designed to overcome the spatial constraints faced by this research. This study was primarily developed at a site distant from the that of the case study with the advantages of mobilising important material resources and facilitating complementary fieldwork in the cities of Barcelona and Lausanne. However, the lack of continuous and extended stays in Rio de Janeiro limited the options of using other methods such as ethnographic observations. During the fieldwork visits it was possible to glimpse for instance, how civil society at large also incorporated global imaginaries of urban change, from cab drivers explaining how the renovated port will be ‘just like Barcelona’ to residents reflecting on the opportunities with the expected flows of visitors for the Olympic Games. These are relevant aspects for examining how policy agendas
are more widely supported beyond the restricted, though powerful, confines of the political actors and their coalitions.

Third, the main conceptual proposition put forward in the research was to bring together literatures in policy analysis and urban studies for their shared socio-constructivist epistemology and focus on the social processes of policymaking. It was argued that their emphasis on different aspects of the policy process offered the opportunity of a complementary framework to examine relational policymaking. This strategy offered conceptual gains but also presented some limitations for analysis. The application of the three I’s framework facilitated the demarcation of artificial boundaries of important dimensions of the policy process for analysis. However, as argued in chapter 2 attention was given to examine how ideas, interests and institutions co-evolved in the grounding and policymaking processes. It also allowed an integrated analysis with the flexibility of defining in the analysis which dimension(s) had more explanatory weight to policy outcomes.

Another contribution from new institutionalism literatures used in the research was the examination of ideational realms articulated in a given policy. This framework was important to support analysis to a certain extent. During episodes of paradigm shift, the identification of the normative and cognitive dimensions presented by a proposed policy allowed a structured and critical evaluation of the impact of an idea, such as in the advocacy of strategic plans and project-led planning. However, in different circumstances such as in the other policies examined its contribution was more modest. Although it was clear that some norms and values became embedded in political agendas, ascribing policy outcomes to coherent paradigms ran the risk of reading situated practices off from normative structures. As a result, the analyses of the mega-event strategy and waterfront renewal were less focused on establishing direct links between ideational realms and more oriented to understanding how interests shaped the process and ideas became institutionalised in agendas and frameworks.

The longitudinal analysis of the three types of policies pursued in Rio also illustrated the limitations of individual frameworks of the policy process to account to the outcomes observed. Advocacy coalitions were not as stable to make the ACF applicable for analysis, while most of the policy decisions were top-down and not insulated in stable sub-system politics according to PET analyses. On the other hand, the more fluid framework put forward by MSA was more applicable to account to the changes in political administrations as policy windows for pre-existing ideas to rise on the political
agenda. Some individuals and groups, such as the chairman of the BOC and the construction companies resembled the figure of policy entrepreneurs positioned between different extended networks and able to link policies to politics. Nevertheless, the stream of ‘problems’ was less independent and more integrated as discursive practices aiming to legitimate a proposed policy.

The theoretical approaches brought together in this research were methodologically and conceptually compatible for the analysis of relational policymaking. Their shared emphasis on the critical interrogation of ideas to account for policy and urban change offer relevant venues that can be further explored in future research.

**9.4. Agendas for future research on global knowledge networks**

The policy mobilities and worlding cities approaches are recent and burgeoning fields of inquiry that have encouraged a range of new research in the urban studies (e.g. 140 entries of the keyword “policy mobilities” in Scopus database since 2008). They touch upon important and ubiquitous issues of transnational networks and inter-referencing practices that are routinely present in policymaking and public discourse. Potential venues for future research may include improving the knowledge on how global knowledge networks operate and the grounded practices of agenda-setting of relational character.

Future research could be oriented toward examining how the ‘production of urban knowledge’ has been globally structured in recent years, not least motivated by the much repeated statistics that most of the world’s population now live in cities. As Gleeson (2012, 2013) has noted, ‘urban living’ is now a topic of inquiry that exceeds the social sciences as other scientific areas make claims for uncovering the ‘hidden laws of urban life’ while journalists and experts have made ‘urbanology’ a popular topic in mainstream literature.

These are not small anecdotes. Research agendas on urban policymaking and practice have attracted significant funds while bestseller authors enjoy favourable reviews and have found their positivist and naturalist arguments reaching prime ministers and policymakers (Gleeson, 2013). These include topics such as the importance of attracting creative classes to cities, the upgrading of infrastructures to turn places into smart cities, or speculative visions of cities planned around airports. These are topics that shape public discussion and urban imaginaries. Merrifield (2015, p. 755) has coined
this the ‘professionalisation or urban studies’ with the rise of experts and their ‘triumphalist’ discourses of the benefits of urban life.

Initiatives such as the annual Urban Age conferences organised by the London School of Economics and Political Science for instance, brings together policymakers, scholars and private actors to discuss key urban policy topics every year in major cities across the world. These conferences are self-described as ‘mobile laboratories, testing and sampling the social and physical characteristics of global cities through expert presentations and testimonials, research, site visits, mapping and informal information exchange’ (LSE, 2016). These events are ‘converging spaces’ that are important for the structuring and circulation of knowledge while contributing to the strengthening of relationships and advocacy agendas (Temenos, 2016). Events such as these, or the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat) for example, may be important clearing houses (Peck & Theodore, 2015, p. 175) framing policy debate and influencing agenda setting.

Other examples of globally structuring networks deserving more attention are the increasing transnational character of think tanks and the formation of cottage industries around particular policies. Well known multi-lateral institutions such as the World Bank and other international development agencies remain important, as are major consultancy groups, in the dissemination of policy knowledge. However, it seems that there is now a more crowded environment with transnational think tanks advocating particular topics such as the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy that focuses on BRT transport systems. As particular urban policies become highly sought-after, international markets are quickly established around them. This research was able to identify the formation of a mega-event industry during the 2000s composed by a number of specialised consultancies on topics such as strategic management of bidding campaigns, communication strategy oriented to influence mass media and the IOC or the preparation of bid books. These are knowledge brokers – in this particular case, set by former members of the IOC and organising committees – acting both as Global Intelligence Corps (Olds, 2001) and travelling technocrats (Larner & Laurie, 2010) who transit between bid campaigns and hiring opportunities in organising committees.

Ideas-centred analysis is another promising venue of research for urban scholarship to examine how different groups use ideas to get a topic to enter the public debate and campaign for their institutionalisation. The focus on agency in both policy mobilities and worlding analyses need not be solely on the usual policy actors such as elected
politicians, international consultants and private groups. Quite the contrary, expanding the scope in order to examine how civil society groups formulate their strategies that take the urban as a ‘milieu of intervention’ and draw from extended networks can point to quite different practices. This is certainly not a new phenomenon considering NYMBISM or the action of environmental groups in past decades. Nevertheless, following the decline of affiliation to traditional institutions such as unions, churches or political parties, there has been an increasing mobilisation of society around single-issue agendas whose organisation has been facilitated by new information technologies. These are groups that despite their fragmented claims have found new ways to influence policy change and some display clear relational practices.

Two localised examples – with the indirect participation of the author – and their anecdotal evidences comes to mind. The first comes from the group known as London Cycling Campaign, a registered charity that describes itself as ‘the voice for cyclists and those who want to cycle in London’ (LCC, 2016). Through campaigns and events to promote safe cycling it has sought to influence local policymaking. Among these was the ‘Love London, Go Dutch’ campaign developed for the local elections in 2012 to lobby candidates to incorporate ten principles to make London ‘streets as safe and inviting for cycling as they are in Holland’. The campaign held the latter as a paradigmatic example of cycle-friendly policies and claimed that all the necessary ‘know-how is available (it has been applied successfully on the Continent); now it needs to be pulled together and applied comprehensively here’ (see http://lcc.org.uk/pages/go-dutch). Campaigners organised fact-finding trips to the Netherlands and received the support of the Dutch embassy in the UK.

The second example relates to the protests of the Movimento Passe Livre (Free Fare Movement) in Brazil. Originally organised as protest groups to pressure local governments for concessions to students in public transport, it has developed into a decentralised network across the country campaigning for the full scrapping of fares as a fundamental ‘right to the city’ (Pomar, 2013). It has staged several protests over the years on the occasion of announcements of rises in fares and played a pivotal role in triggering the massive demonstrations of June 2013 when more than a million people in hundreds of Brazilian cities took the streets to protest against the government (Watts, 2013). Previously marginalised by the mainstream media, the 2013 protests opened the space for the free fare agenda to be discussed in major communication vehicles that examined the experience of similar policies in cities around the world (Costas, 2016).
The topic gained visibility and was present in the debates of the local elections in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in 2016.

These two examples demonstrate that situated engagements with circulating ideas to foster urban change is not reduced to the agendas of powerful policy elites or sustained by institutional knowledge networks. They can be found on the everyday practices of activists, concerned citizens, academics, professionals and students who take advantage of the facilities offered by new information technologies to connect and organise, ground and world ideas to make political claims. Comparative analyses of both successful and frustrated mobilisations can add to the understanding of relational policy practices.

9.5. Epilogue: the boom and bust of a political cycle

The year of 2016 is certainly one of the most turbulent in the recent political history of Brazil and of Rio de Janeiro in particular. Important episodes that have unfolded in the national, regional and local political spheres marked a dramatic ending following the period examined in this research. At the national level, the arrival of PT to power in 2002 heralded a period that conciliated the widening of social welfare and sustained economic growth. As it was seen, the rise of the profile of the country in international relations also reflected in the pursue of hosting mega-events perceived as demonstrations of ‘soft power’. However, by the time the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games were held the scenario was the complete opposite to those years of public support and economic strength when the rights to host the events were awarded. As briefly discussed above, in June 2013 a wave of public demonstrations took place across Brazilian cities in protest to the low standards of public services and the perception of generalised corruption in politics. The outrage was sparked by police violence against smaller protests of the Free Fare Movement in previous days. The imminent hosting of mega-events canalised much of the anger as protesters denounced the allocation of large public funds into the construction of stadia and related facilities while public schools and the health service were running in precarious conditions. Nonetheless, President Dilma Rousseff was re-elected in the following year but the economic and political conditions of the previous PT governments radically changed.

Since 2015, an economic recession has led to austerity measures accompanied by a deterioration of social conditions for many of Brazil’s poorest residents. This has been
accentuated by a political crisis with the dissolution of the PT-PMDB coalition after 13 years in power. Without the support from the lower house of congress and from the senate presided over by PMDB representatives, the impeachment of President Rousseff from office was concluded in September 2016 over the accusation of budgetary manipulation. Parallel to this, the investigation carried out by the federal police known as ‘Operation Car Wash’ has exposed a wide-scale corruption involving the state oil company Petrobrás. High-ranking politicians and construction companies including Odebrecht, OAS and Carioca Engenharia, have been accused of diverting money from inflated tendered contracts to pay bribes and finance political campaigns.

At the regional level, the financial position of the state government of Rio de Janeiro was seriously undermined by the sharp fall in oil prices and by the national economic downturn with an estimated deficit of BRL 17.5 billion (US$ 5.1 billion) for 2016 (Biller, 2016). Two months prior to the hosting of the Olympics it declared a state of financial emergency in order to request federal funds to deliver, among other commitments, the programmes associated with the mega-event such as the expansion of the underground. Since then severe austerity measures – including the increase of public servants’ pension contributions, tax increases on consumption items, reduction of up to 30% of the staff and the ending of social programmes – have been announced that have affected the running of public services and the payment of the salaries of civil servants. Finally, on November 17 former governor Sergio Cabral was arrested in relation to the investigations of ‘Operation Car Wash’ for the embezzlement of funds from infrastructural projects accorded with construction companies.

Although not as dramatic, the government of Eduardo Paes came to an end in the local elections held in October 2016. The mayor’s candidate, his chief-of-staff who ran on the prestige and the works associated with the Olympic Games, finished in third place. The victory of the elected mayor, federal senator Marcelo Crivella, has been described as the ‘rise of religious conservatism’ for his position as an evangelical leader (Watts, 2016). Not associated with Paes or Maia political machines, the election of the new mayor denotes the end of the political cycle started in 1993. This was summed up by Crivella in one of his first public statements declaring that ‘the cycle of large-scale works has come to an end’ (Berta, 2016). The consolidation of Olympic-related works is thus unclear. The public tendering for the administration of the Olympic Park has been postponed three times and there are doubts if it will attract the interest from private companies (Magalhães & Alves, 2016). Many announcements of developments in the
Porto Maravilha programme are on hold or have been discarded, while CEF still holds 91.2% of the CEPACs that have been issued to negotiate with the market (CDURP, 2016). The completion of other related works such as the full operation of underground line 4 and the fourth corridor of BRT Transbrasil are still awaiting definition. What will turn out of the city in its post-Olympic cycle and the continuity or change of its development trajectory remains to be seen.


Ministério do Esporte (2009). *Brazil – This is the country*. Brasilia: Governo Federal.


NEU SPAPERS AND OTHER MEDIA


APPENDIX A

List of policy documents consulted

Strategic Planning


**Mega-events**


Regeneration of the port area of Rio de Janeiro


APPENDIX B

List of interviewees

Name / Position / Institution / Place and date of the interview


APPENDIX C

Research ethics material

1. Ethical approval

UCL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
GRADUATE SCHOOL OFFICE

Professor Mike Raco
Bartlett School of Planning
UCL

9 September 2013

Dear Professor Raco

Notification of Ethical Approval

I am pleased to confirm that in my capacity as Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee I have approved your study for the duration of the project i.e. until September 2014.

Approval is subject to the following conditions:

1. You must seek Chair’s approval for proposed amendments to the research for which this approval has been given. Ethical approval is specific to this project and must not be treated as applicable to research of a similar nature. Each research project is reviewed separately and if there are significant changes to the research protocol you should seek confirmation of continued ethical approval by completing the Amendment Approval Request Form.

The form identified above can be accessed by logging on to the ethics website homepage: http://www.grad.ucl.ac.uk/ethics/ and clicking on the button marked ‘Key Responsibilities of the Researcher Following Approval’.

2. It is your responsibility to report to the Committee any unanticipated problems or adverse events involving risks to participants or others. Both non-serious and serious adverse events must be reported.

Reporting Non-Serious Adverse Events
For non-serious adverse events you will need to inform Helen Dougall, Ethics Committee Administrator (ethics@ucl.ac.uk), within ten days of an adverse incident occurring and provide a full written report that should include any amendments to the participant information sheet and study protocol. The Chair or Vice-Chair of the Ethics Committee will confirm that the incident is non-serious and report to the Committee at the next meeting. The final view of the Committee will be communicated to you.

Reporting Serious Adverse Events
The Ethics Committee should be notified of all serious adverse events via the Ethics Committee Administrator immediately the incident occurs. Where the adverse incident is unexpected and serious, the Chair or Vice-Chair will decide whether the study should be terminated pending the opinion of an independent expert. The adverse event will be considered at the next Committee meeting and a decision will be made on the need to change the information leaflet and/or study protocol.
On completion of the research you must submit a brief report (a maximum of two sides of A4) of your findings/concluding comments to the Committee, which includes in particular issues relating to the ethical implications of the research.

With best wishes for the research.

Yours sincerely

Professor John Foreman
Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee

Cc:
Gabriel Silvestre, Applicant
2. Consent form

Project Title: Transnational Networks of Policy Circulation: Visions and constructions of Olympic spars in Rio de Janeiro

INTRODUCTION: My name is Gabriel Silvestre and I am inviting you to take part in a doctoral research examining the planning and delivery of projects associated with the hosting of the 2016 Olympic Games. In order to understand current processes of change in the city it is necessary, in our view, to take into account different aspects influencing the design of planning programmes: the legacy of urban policies developed in the last two decades; the political interaction between the three levels of government; the experience of other cities with similar projects; the need for making the city more competitive; and varied visions of how the city should look like. Although this list is by no means exhaustive we expect that your views on these and other relevant topics will enable us to understand the emerging geography of Rio post-2016.

Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part it is important to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and feel free to ask if there is anything that is not clear.

Do I have to take part? No. The research is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time. If you decide to participate, you will be given this information sheet to keep and you will also be asked to sign a consent form.

What will happen? A semi-structured interview will be conducted with you for approximately one hour or less. The interview can be arranged for a day and time that is convenient to you and, with your permission, will be audio recorded.

Can I participate anonymously? Yes. Participants’ real names will not be used at any point. There is also a strategy for dealing with significant disclosures judged to breach the limits of confidentiality, which is available upon request.

What if I want further information or have concerns? This research in the UK is being supervised by Professor Mike Raco, whom you may also contact via email (m.raco@ucl.ac.uk)

Who is funding the research? This research is part of a PhD study funded by CAPES Brazilian Research Council.

Who has reviewed the research? In addition to the research team, the Human Participants and Materials Ethics Committee (HPMEC) at University College London have reviewed this research.

Thank you for your time and for agreeing to take part in this piece of research, your contribution is very much appreciated.

Gabriel Silvestre
CONSENT FORM

Informed Consent Form for ______________________ in Research Studies

Please complete this form after you have read the information sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.

Title of Project: Transnational Networks of Policy Circulation: Visions and constructions of Olympic spaces in Rio de Janeiro

This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): 5659/001

Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Before you agree to take part, the person organising the research must explain the project to you.

If you have any questions arising from the information sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.

Participant’s Statement

I have read the notes written above and the information sheet, and understand what the study involves.
• understand that if I decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw immediately.
• consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study.
• understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998.
• agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in this study.

Name of participant: ______________________ Signature: ______________ Date: __________

Name of researcher: Gabriel Silvestre Signature: ______________ Date: __________

Gabriel Silvestre • PhD candidate
The Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, Wates House 22 Gordon Street, London WC1H 0OB
Tel: +44 (0) 77 9201 5635 Email: gabriel.silvestre.11@ucl.ac.uk
3. Extension of ethical approval

UCL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

Amendment Approval Request Form

1. Project ID Number: 5659/001

2. Project Title: Transnational Networks of Policy Circulation: Visions and constructions of Olympic spaces in Rio de Janeiro

3. Type of Amendment(s) (tick as appropriate):
   - [ ] Research procedure/protocol (including research instruments)
   - [ ] Participant group
   - [ ] Sponsorship/collaborators
   - [x] Extension to approval needed (extensions are given for one year)
   - [ ] Information Sheet(s)
   - [ ] Consent form/s
   - [ ] Other recruitment documents
   - [ ] Principal researcher/medical supervisor
   - [ ] Other

   *Additions to the research team other than the principal researcher, student supervisor and medical supervisor do not need to be submitted as amendments but a complete list should be available upon request.

4. Justification (give the reasons why the amendments are needed):
   A final round of data collection is still necessary and will be carried out between January and February 2015. This will involve a few more semi-structured interviews with policy actors.

5. Details of Amendments (provide full details of each amendment requested, state where the changes have been made and attach all amended and new documentation):
   This amendment is in line with the original application and merely extends the period of data collection.

6. Ethical Considerations (insert details of any ethical issues raised by the proposed amendment(s))

7. Other Information (provide any other information which you believe should be taken into account during ethics review of the proposed changes):

Declaration (to be signed by the Principal Researcher):
- I confirm that the information in this form is accurate to the best of my knowledge and I take full responsibility for it.
- I consider that it would be reasonable for the proposed amendments to be implemented.
- For student projects I confirm that my supervisor has approved my proposed modifications.

Signature: [Signature]
Date: [Date]

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY:

Amendments to the proposed protocol have been approved by the Research Ethics Committee.

Signature of the REC Chair, Professor John Foreman: [Signature]
Date: 25/9/2014
APPENDIX D

Questionnaire templates

1. Questions used with a consultant involved with the first Rio Olympic bid

Making the model

1. You were involved with the Barcelona Olympic project from the very beginning and played an important role in the outlook of the urban transformation. How did materialise the invitation to take part in the project?

2. It was the first Olympics to make use of extensive regeneration works associated with the Games. What were the references for you that this was a feasible project?

3. What was the rationale in concentrating the facilities in four main clusters?

International Impact

4. At the time of the Games and up to now the Barcelona experience generated enthusiasm and interest. What do you see as the reasons for that and what that meant to you?

5. What do you see as the features that characterise the alleged Barcelona model?

Mobilising the experience

6. After 1992 you have worked in projects abroad such as ... How did these invitations emerge? How it was intermediated?

7. These were very different events and very different cities as well. What were the main features of your experience in Barcelona that you saw that could be transferred to these places?

Rio de Janeiro 2004

8. How did the Rio Olympic project materialise? How were you invited to assist the Rio 2004 bid?
9. At that time what were your views about Rio as a place?

10. To what extent was the experience of Barcelona transferable to Rio? Which were the limitations?

11. How was the selection process of the Olympic areas?

12. What were the reasons in your opinion for the original proposals not being followed in the subsequent bids?

13. Have there been any divergent opinions about the selection of the sites?

14. What were some of the main local issues that you came across in which proved to be challenging?

15. In your view what were the reasons why the bid failed to be shortlisted?

Rio 2000-2016

16. In the following years Rio continued to bid for the Olympics and hosted the Pan Am Games. Were you involved somehow in these projects? How do they relate to the first bid?

17. Barcelona is still an important reference to the Rio 2016 Games. How do you compare the overall project of Olympic clusters to those initially proposed in 1996?

18. In which ways do you believe that the experience represented by Barcelona 1992 is still relevant for cities aiming at hosting the event?

2. Questions used with municipal planner involved with the elaboration of the strategic plan and studies for mega-events

Personal background

1. How did you begin working for the planning department of Rio?

2. How was the department interaction with international planning experiences and consultants in those days?

Mobilising the experience

3. What was your role during the elaboration of the first Strategic Plan?
4. To what extend was the experience of Barcelona transferable to Rio? What were the limitations?

5. Did you have direct contact with the foreign consultants hired to advise the elaboration of the plan? How was the transfer of knowledge articulated?

6. How were the programs “Rio Cidade” and “Favela-Bairro” related to the Plan or the work of the consultants?

7. In which ways did the plan influence institutional reforms such as the creation of Pereira Passos Institute?

8. How do you evaluate the impact of the experience brought by these consultants in those years?

Rio 2004 Olympic bid

9. How did the Rio Olympic project emerge? Did you get involved with the first Olympic bid? How was the project coordinated at IPP?

10. How was the selection process of the Olympic areas?

11. Have there been any divergent opinions about the selection of the sites?

12. What were the reasons that you believe for some of the sites not being included the following bids?

13. What were the strengths of the candidature? And the shortcomings?

14. In your view what were the reasons why the bid failed to be shortlisted?

Rio 2000-2016

15. The planning of the PanAm Games and the proposals for 2012 were very different from the previous bid. How was the selection process of the new sites?

16. What was the role of foreign expertise at that time?

17. Which were the positive contributions generated by the event? Which were the limitations identified?

18. The overall Olympic project for the 2016 Games articulate large-scale interventions. Which aspects of the Barcelona experience do you see present in the interventions at Barra, Porto and the transport structure?

19. Barcelona is still a relevant reference for the Rio 2016 Games. What has changed in the relationship between the two cities compared with the first bid?

20. overall project of the Olympics to those initially proposed in 1996?