

Alan Ingram (2016) **Art, geopolitics and metapolitics at Tate Galleries London**

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Abstract

Art galleries and museums have often been considered as sites at which the international and the political are both enacted and reworked. But how exactly does art 'do' geopolitics? Taking existing work on art and geopolitics in the gallery and museum as its departure point, this article advances a specific conceptual argument for how art does geopolitics that connects thinking in this area with broader debates in aesthetics and politics. Building on Jacques Rancière's account of art as a *dispositif*, it explores the aesthetic politics – or metapolitics – through which artistic interventions have raised questions of oil within the Tate Galleries in London. Drawing out its ambiguities as well as potential critical implications, the article illustrates distinct ways in which the metapolitics of art may be activated via a discussion of *The Robinson Institute*, 2012, and of a series of interventions conducted since 2010 by the group Liberate Tate. In conclusion, the article draws out connections between the metapolitics of art and questions of governmentality.

Introduction

The outlines of military drones are marked out by white lines in major cities around the world. Photographs showing the faint traces of satellites that do not officially exist are made public. Someone walks along the Green Line in Israel-Palestine, dripping a line of paint from a can. An allusive documentary film traces diplomatic, corporate and intelligence interests involved in the extraction and transportation of oil out of the Caspian. A model ship, with sails made from patterned fabrics symbolising African identity and independence, is placed in a bottle and exhibited on a plinth in London's Trafalgar Square. An Iraqi man living in the United States affixes a small camera to the back of his head, so that it will take a photo of what is directly behind him, every minute, for a year, as he pursues his career and travels internationally. A collection of paintings, photographs and maps tracing the networks that bring oil to Britain and distribute it around the country is assembled and displayed in a prestigious building in central London. A group of people clad in black bring a block of ice from the Arctic and deposit it at the heart of an institution that is sponsored by an oil company.¹

As some of these examples illustrate, artistic practices, works and events are by no means confined to gallery and museum spaces, but the ways in which art might be said to enact geopolitics become particularly visible in and around them. Indeed, as work in political science and international relations has considered, the museum and the gallery are sites in which the international and the political are continually being both enacted and reworked.²

As political geographers have come to consider how art works and art exhibitions have addressed contemporary geopolitics, the Tate Galleries in London have emerged as sites of particular interest. Recent work has considered Mark Wallinger's 2007 work *State Britain*, which recreated an anti-war demonstration that had been largely cleared from Parliament Square within the prestigious Duveen Galleries at Tate Britain and Fiona

Banner's 2010 work *Harrier and Jaguar*, which installed two decommissioned military planes within, again, the Duveen Galleries.³ In both discussions, the ways in which the art works might be said to have interrupted and disrupted their surrounding spaces are identified as being central to their aesthetic and thus political significance.⁴

In this article I consider further the enactment and reworking of geopolitics within galleries and museums and at the Tate Galleries in London in particular, advancing a specific argument as to how art enacts geopolitics at such sites. In so doing, I suggest a conceptual narrative that both complements the recent literature on art in relation to geopolitics and reframes it in terms of broader questions of aesthetics and politics.

In much recent work on art in relation to geopolitics, the focus of interest has been on the manner in which art questions or resists particular *dispositifs* of geopolitical power; of, for example, border security, airpower, military urbanism or late modern war.⁵ At the same time, however, within this work, what Jacques Rancière refers to as the *dispositif* of art has tended to be under-conceptualised, with the result that the supposed power and critical efficacy of art is sometimes invoked more than explicated.⁶ When art's supposed power and efficacy is explicated at a conceptual level, meanwhile, analysis has tended to overlook the ambiguities of aesthetic politics. To consider more fully how art 'does' geopolitics, I suggest, it is useful to conceptualise art in terms of the *dispositif* through which its conditions of possibility are constituted and to which at least some of its ambiguities may be traced. Despite the continuing diversification of the sites and forms of artistic practice, galleries and museums remain central to the materialisation of this *dispositif*.

In focusing on these sites, I also provide further consideration of how different kinds of practices and controversies surrounding oil subtend contemporary geopolitics.⁷ As I discuss, these practices and controversies bear not just upon the invasion and

occupation of Iraq or the politics of security (addressed in *State Britain*), or military air power (addressed in *Harrier and Jaguar*), but on the use of oil in art and on the political economy of the arts themselves. What I try to show is how such controversies and practices have been played out *metapolitically* in museum and gallery space. My use of the term metapolitics here draws on Rancière's discussion of aesthetics as a specific kind of politics that may reflect, shadow or intertwine with 'politics proper', without being reducible to it.⁸ Rancière's idea of metapolitics has been cited in work on, for example, the politics of Cold War culture,⁹ but is particularly useful to develop in the present context because it points towards precisely those issues that have tended to remain under-conceptualised in political geography.

The article proceeds in three stages. First, I review the concept of the *dispositif* and consider its centrality to recent work in geopolitics. Second, drawing particularly on Rancière, I discuss the *dispositif* of art and its metapolitics. I then explore and exemplify the argument by considering two sets of interventions at Tate Britain and Tate Modern that have dealt with questions of oil, but which have sought to activate the metapolitics of art in distinct ways. In conclusion, I consider the broader implications of the analysis and how it might inform further research.

Geopolitics through the *dispositif*

A growing body of research approaches questions of geopolitics in terms of the *dispositif*, a concept introduced by Michael Foucault that denotes a 'thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble' of elements that assumes a 'strategic function' in the exercise of power.¹⁰ In taking as their object of investigation formations such as border control, risk, military urbanism, global health security, aerial bombing, the politics of walls and fences, logistics, urban resilience, drug control and ethical killing, a wide range of studies have either

invoked or evoked this idea.¹¹ In each case, a particular formation of geopolitical power is understood in terms of a constellation of rationalities, technologies, knowledges and tactics that coalesces around specific problems of government. If, as Giorgio Agamben suggests, the word *dispositif* 'is a decisive technical term in the strategy of Foucault's thought', then it has also become central to critical research in geopolitics.¹²

In summarising the role played by the concept of the *dispositif* in his research, Foucault outlined three things in particular. First, a *dispositif* is made up of diverse elements: 'discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid'. Second, a *dispositif* emerges as such because of 'the system of relations that can be established between these elements'. Third, a *dispositif* gains coherence in terms of how it acquires a dominant strategic function in response to 'urgent needs' at 'particular historical moments'. A given *dispositif* is further 'always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge'.¹³ Introduced via his research on sexuality, Foucault also discussed sovereignty, discipline and security, as well as police and military-diplomatic formations in these terms.¹⁴

The English language publication of the 1977-1978 lecture course *Security, Territory, Population* (STP) in 2007 has further enhanced the influence of Foucault's thought among scholars of geopolitics and related fields. Though his thinking on governmentality, biopower and security could to some extent be grasped through course summaries, interviews, short pieces of writing and individual lectures, as well as in other key books, the publication of STP has allowed a much fuller understanding of Foucault's work on these concepts and thus his analysis of modern forms of power. Key points of departure have been Foucault's discussions of the aleatory, events and crises of circulation; of risk and the use of economic means of government; of the milieu and the

population as objects and products of security; of the circulation of security practices between colonial and metropolitan spaces. His positing of police and military-diplomatic technologies as constitutive of the modern state and states system has also been highly influential. STP has subsequently become a key reference point for work on a wide range of topics related to geopolitics and security, particularly though not exclusively in light of the post-2001 US-led war on terror and the dramatic expansion of the security field.

This amounts to a significant reconceptualisation of geopolitics along Foucauldian lines in terms of rationalities and practices, techniques and technologies, in which the concept of the *dispositif* plays a central role, whether explicitly or implicitly. Some of this work has further been informed by reflections upon and iterations of Foucault's work by Agamben and by Gilles Deleuze, who have inflected the concept with their own particular concerns.¹⁵ Notably, while Foucault's *dispositif* exercises a 'dominant strategic function', liable to 'functional overdetermination' and 'strategic elaboration', the Deleuzian *dispositif* is

a tangle, a multilinear ensemble... And the lines in the apparatus do not outline or surround systems which are homogenous in their own right, object, subject, language and so on, but follow directions, trace balances which are always off balance, now drawing together and then distancing themselves from one another. Each line is broken and subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked, and subject to drifting.¹⁶

Whereas Agamben stresses the propensity of the *dispositif* 'to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviours, opinions or discourses of living beings', Deleuze emphasises the possibility of things becoming otherwise.¹⁷ As Stephen Legg summarises, 'What we have in these two discussions is, then, an acknowledgement that apparatuses are etymologically and genealogically indissociable from regulation and government, but that their very multiplicity necessarily opens spaces of misunderstanding, resistance and flight'.¹⁸ *Dispositifs* play an ordering role in orienting subjectivation and conduct, but to privilege their effectiveness in capturing and

containing lively beings (as does Agamben) is a questionable analytical choice in that it also obscures the extent to which *dispositifs* are enabling as well as constraining, productive as well as repressive, though in different manner and measure depending how, where and in relation to whom they operate.

A further dimension of the *dispositif* in Foucault's thought relates to how it implicates questions of materiality. *Dispositifs* are made up of 'discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid'. *Dispositifs* are therefore understood as being entangled in the materiality of things, whether epidemics, famines, factories, prisons, clinics, towns, bodies or populations, in complex ways that are constituted but not fully determined by human action or by power. This point is further emphasised when considering the evental character of the *dispositif*: it is around particular, urgent, events – especially crises of circulation (but potentially anything which exposes life to aleatory or chance events) that *dispositifs* form and shift.¹⁹

Such events may be understood as moments of threat or danger, but it is also with them that the future is particularly open to change and intervention. Events are thus crucial openings for the 'critical ontology of ourselves', outlined by Foucault in his essay *What is Enlightenment?* Here he argues that critical ontology 'must be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, or even a permanent body of knowledge', but 'an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits imposed upon us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them'.²⁰ In this context, an experiment may be thought of as an exploratory intervention in the configuration and functioning of a particular *dispositif* of power. But just as the *dispositif* is not purely repressive, so must it be recognised that experimentation is by no means inherently or necessarily progressive;

rather it is part of the ontology and practice of power itself: to exercise geopolitical power through a *dispositif* is necessarily to experiment with its composition and configuration.

Insights along these lines are evident in a number of English-language investigations by Euro-American scholars of how formations of geopolitical power are engaged via artistic practices.²¹ As Amoore and Hall argue in relation to borders and security, art enacts interruptions of the routines through which borders are performed, providing moments of enchantment or critical awareness. As Anne-Laure Amilhat Szary similarly argues, art works can intervene performatively in the production of border spaces. Alison Williams highlights how artworks can disrupt the geopolitical discourses of airpower through performative, material interventions, while Derek Gregory discusses how art can complicate and re-populate the reductive and abstract visualities that enable war. For Stephen Graham, art is one of a number of critical practices that can resist and experiment with the techniques of military urbanism. Andrew Barry's work, meanwhile, considers how ethical performances are staged in relation to the oil industry through hybrid artistic-research-activist practices. But while a number of theories about what art does and how it does it have been deployed in this literature, the prior ontological and epistemological questions of what art is and how we come to recognise it as such are often overlooked. To turn things around, it is possible to ask, what kind of a *dispositif* is art that it can enable geopolitics to be engaged in such ways?

Metapolitics of art

The idea of art that has tended to be highlighted in recent writings on geopolitics came into being in Western European societies during the eighteenth century, in the context of bourgeois revolutions, nationalist movements and colonial projects and an associated,

dramatic, expansion of means for the shaping of environments and the training, control and management of human bodies and populations.

It was during this period that the term aesthetics was coined to denote a concern with beauty and with the fine arts as a sphere of experience and practice distinct from the instrumental and practical concerns of science, economy or politics. It therefore also came to be associated with ideas of proper conduct, appropriate forms of sensibility and matters of judgement.²² Along with the creation of schools of art and of public as well as private museums and galleries, into which were gathered a wide variety of objects from metropolises, provinces and colonies, art and aesthetics thus came to play an important role in the configuration of the public sphere. In helping to organise space, knowledge and visibility and to specify appropriate and desirable forms of subjectification and conduct, they are implicated in the emergence of modern Western forms of governmentality.

Here I want to consider Rancière's argument that art in the singular is a *dispositif* that generates a particular kind of metapolitics. As he states, 'there is no art without a specific form of visibility and discursivity which identifies it as such'.²³ And as he expresses this elsewhere, in a statement that is pertinent to the existing literature on art and geopolitics, 'the project of politicizing art – for instance in the form of a critical art – is always anticipated by the forms of politicization entailed in the forms of visibility and intelligibility that make art identifiable as such'.²⁴ In other words, in order to work out what makes art political, we first have to consider what makes it art. We must enquire into its conditions of possibility and relate it to the heterogeneous ensemble of elements and the problems of government through which it emerges as such. This leads us towards metapolitics.

The conditions of possibility for the identification of art as such are for Rancière threefold: first, there is a breakdown in the hierarchy of the arts, in which 'the artistic'

can no longer be defined by listing a series of ‘fine’ art practices (music, sculpture, painting...) in distinction to practical or applied arts. Second, neither can art be definitively isolated from social and political life more generally: the practices and objects of everyday life appear in art and those of art appear in everyday life with increasing regularity. Third, this ‘aesthetic’ *dispositif* of art starts to displace the effectivity of the ethical and the representational *dispositifs* that preceded it: art is no longer understood to teach lessons about good conduct or to mirror proper social hierarchies and relations. In becoming disembedded from pre-existing accounts of ethics or social order, art can be about anything and for anyone and it can begin to evoke modern forms of autonomy, freedom and subjectivity in all their ambiguity. In this way, art acquires a distinct metapolitics that derives principally from art’s complex spatio-temporal, affective and experiential relation to ordinary life.

The *dispositif* of art is materialised through a heterogeneous ensemble of elements – schools, museums, galleries, exhibitions, performances, prizes, sales, works, philosophies of art – that allow things to be made, identified and experienced *as art*. The *dispositif* of art is composed of things and objects; practices and processes, sites and spaces; noise as well as speech; walls, floors, frames and screens; ‘material and symbolic space’.²⁵ Its metapolitics emerges from the ways in which it configures affect and sensation, shock and strangeness; but also common sense and sense-making. Rather than targeting affect directly, the metapolitics of art emerges via a specific sensory experience in which relations between affect and practice, emotion and cognition, imagination and reason, sensation and intention, are set in play, reconfiguring time, space and experience in ways that are precluded in ordinary life.

The metapolitics of art thus lie in how its “ways of doing and making’ ... intervene in the general distribution of ways of doing and making as well as in the relationships they maintain to modes of being and forms of visibility’.²⁶ As Deleuze’s

rendering of the *dispositif* would suggest, these ways of doing and making and their relationships to modes of being, forms of visibility and practices of sense-making, are always in motion, shifting, drifting and bifurcating across the diverse innovations and experiments of art movements as they wrestle with how sensibility and common sense, experience and practice, can be configured in any given historical moment. The distinctiveness of the *dispositif* of art is that it constitutes ‘a specific sensorium that stands out as an exception from the normal regime of the sensible’, while, paradoxically, in many respects (for example in the case of ‘ready-made’ art or in the appropriation of art forms by advertising) becoming indistinguishable from it.²⁷ Conceived in this way, the metapolitics of art are inherently and necessarily ambiguous.

So what happens when geopolitics appears in this *dispositif* of art? For Rancière, if art has a politics, it resides not in explicitly political content or messages, but in the metapolitics (or ‘primary aesthetics’)²⁸ of the *dispositif*. This lies in the interplay and tension between two tendencies that inhere in art’s condition as a distinct sensorium: withdrawal from life into an autonomous condition (as in art for art’s sake) and moving the other way and becoming life itself (as in anti-aesthetic and anti-art movements).²⁹ In the aesthetic *dispositif*, art can be both ‘autonomous’ from life and ‘heteronomous’ with it, outside and inside, at the same time. The aesthetic *dispositif* also promises radical equality: art can be anything, for anyone, but at the same time, ‘no direct cause-effect relationship is determinable between the intention realized in an art performance and a capacity for political subjectification’.³⁰ This is particularly so in the case of art that aspires to some critical or political role:

From the zones of indistinction between art and life [critical or political art] ... must borrow the connections that provoke political intelligibility. And from the separateness of artworks it must borrow the sense of sensory foreignness that enhances political energies. Political art must be some sort of collage of these opposites.³¹

In this argument, therefore, the political potential and limit of art derive less from its content than from the metapolitics of its artness. Furthermore, so long as we remain within this *dispositif*, in which ‘art’ is understood to constitute a distinct sensorium, art that attempts to become life (for example through direct political action) runs the risk of dissolving into the background, losing its charge or, conversely, becoming a ‘parody of its alleged efficacy’.³² Conversely, art that strives to protect an arena of freedom through autonomy from politics risks losing its connection to any kind of politics at all. If it is to be effective, political or critical art must maintain a degree of ambiguity between heteronomy and autonomy.

A key aspect of this metapolitics lies in the interaction between the ‘unreadable’ affect or sensation a work might engender and its ‘readable’ political sense. Indeed, Rancière suggests that ‘the dream of a suitable work of political art’ lies in engendering political effect ‘without having to use the terms of a message as a vehicle’.³³ The fact that this is termed a ‘dream’ expresses Rancière’s skepticism about whether affect and effect can actually be aligned in this way within the aesthetic *dispositif*, a skepticism expressed in his critiques of politically-engaged art works made during the 1990s.³⁴ Art’s metapolitics are fragile and prone to break down. One intriguing question is therefore whether more recent experiments in art – especially those emerging in relation to geopolitical events since 2001 – have been able to realise this dream any more effectively.

These dynamics are, it is worth emphasising, necessarily spatial: if art is metapolitical, it is ‘because of the type of space and time that it institutes, and the manner in which it frames this time and peoples this space’.³⁵ In other words,

there exists a politics of aesthetics that predates artistic intentions and strategies: the theatre, the museum and the book are ‘aesthetic’ realities in and of themselves... they are specific distributions of space and time, of the visible and invisible, that create specific forms of ‘commonsense’, regardless of the specific message such-and-such an artist intends to convey and or cause he or she wants to serve’.³⁶

Although Rancière writes that the politics of art ‘is not a simple matter of an ‘institution’,³⁷ the functioning of a *dispositif* can only be understood from the inter-related functioning of its elements, in which the manner of operation of specific institutions, in specific places at specific times, matters. And while the aesthetic regime of art promises equality and freedom, the art world remains highly regulated, with the funding, production, circulation, exhibition, exchange, appraisal and public reception of art mediated through art schools, public and private galleries and museums, auction houses, as well as academic disciplines, debates and schemes of critical evaluation. These in turn embody forms of cultural capital and social networks that are highly selective and which to a significant extent reflect broader forms of inequality and exclusion. However, Rancière’s influence within English-language art circles since 2000 – and his critiques of particular art works and movements notwithstanding – is down in no small measure to the extent to which he still holds out a potential political role for it. No matter how commodified, no matter how co-opted by oligarchic elites or vested interests, no matter how inscribed in the play of power, his work suggests, if art as such exists, its metapolitics remain open for those who would experiment with them.

Rancière’s thinking on aesthetics, politics and art can be taken as broadly genealogical. Yet while the political contexts, rationalities and tactics of art movements have indeed varied widely, he has nevertheless argued that the ‘models of efficacy’ that ‘govern our strategies, hopes and judgements regarding the political import of artistic practice’ can indeed be traced to late eighteenth-century Europe, to the emergence of art in the singular and to its openness to all kinds of practices and forms.³⁸ And though they undergo wide variation, these models and their conditions of possibility are, it would seem, still evident in the functioning of contemporary art galleries and museums. Because of the ways in which they are both regulated (in that they are inscribed with and within other dimensions of political, economic, social and cultural power) and regulatory (given

the role they play in mediating the boundaries between art and not-art, art and geopolitics), the possibilities for critique and experimentation that these institutions and spaces offer can usefully be understood as metapolitical.

Metapolitics of oil at Tate Galleries London

Though its importance in the geopolitics of the modern world is readily apparent, oil also finds its way into art in multiple ways, as a material to be used, as a problem to be explored and, not least, as a source of finance by means of which art may be supported, traded or co-opted. The centrality of oil to the Iraq war and to debates about climate change and the Anthropocene and the manner in which it has been politicised and enrolled in recent art projects lend it further relevance as a lens through which to consider how metapolitics and geopolitics come together in galleries and museums.

Recent works on the geopolitics of oil have focused particularly on its materialities and the technologies and practices through which they are constituted. As Tim Mitchell has argued, drawing on the work of Bruno Latour, an understanding of the geopolitics of oil must contend with the materiality of the networks through which it is extracted, transported, refined and consumed.³⁹ It is to a significant extent through these networks and the forms of expertise, calculation and economy through which they are constituted and managed, that 'energy security' has emerged as a modern *dispositif* of government. Drawing further on accounts of materiality, Andrew Barry has examined the role of scientific, activist and artistic practices in the constitution and contestation of oil as a geopolitical object.⁴⁰ In particular, Barry discusses the experimental practices of the London-based art-activist group Platform, which has questioned the role of London in reproducing the geopolitics of oil. Here I consider practices and projects that bear a number of affinities and connections with Platform's work, but focus specifically on how they activate the metapolitics of art. The question of metapolitics becomes particularly

evident in how galleries, understood as institutions, architectural spaces, archives and sites for diverse kinds of practices, are themselves utilised and activated in the realisation of art works and exhibitions. I therefore consider interventions that have focused on Tate Galleries in London in ways that reflexively involve and implicate the gallery in the execution of works and exhibitions. These are particularly illustrative of practices that borrow from art and geopolitics, while blurring distinctions between them, and which seek to align sensation and sense-making in particular ways.

An essential context for these projects has been the prior framing of the Tate as an important node in what Platform has called the ‘carbon web’. As described by James Marriott and Mika Minio-Paluello, the carbon web is a ‘network of bodies’ that includes oil companies but also ‘public and private banks, government ministries and military bodies, engineering companies and legal firms, universities and environmental consultants, non-governmental organisations and cultural institutions’.⁴¹ If this web is taken to include all carbon-based energy forms, then it might in fact already encompass the Tate from its inception under the auspices of the sugar refiner Henry Tate in 1897. However, it is Tate’s sponsorship by BP (formerly the Anglo-Persian Oil Company) that has been a particular focus of scrutiny. In questioning this relationship, Platform have argued that cultural institutions have been used to normalise and legitimise the activities of a company that has been implicated in human rights abuses and environmental destruction, and which contributes massively to anthropogenic climate change. The projects I consider below take up the question of oil in these terms, mobilising the gallery as a space that is putatively apart from life and the world, while implicating them in each other in different and contrasting ways. They are therefore apposite in demonstrating how the metapolitics of art can be activated in different ways.

The Robinson Institute took place at Tate Britain at Millbank, on the north side of the River Thames, in 2012. In it, curator Patrick Keiller presented an exhibition ostensibly put together by researchers who had discovered the film archive of a fictional ‘itinerant scholar’ who had explored the landscape of South East England in a series of travels, tracing links between places, events and ‘ongoing economic and environmental crisis’.⁴² In the exhibition, the concerns of The Institute were described as being ‘to promote political and economic change by developing the transformative potential of images of landscape’.⁴³ The exhibition thus adopted a political goal from the outset but pursued it via artistic means. It was comprised of seven distinct displays, each made up of a diverse assembly of paintings, photographs, maps, charts, video screens and other objects, arranged around the Duveen Galleries. Each of these displays considered a particular theme or problem relating to historical, political, economic and (in the attribution of importance to meteorites and space dust) cosmic forces shaping the English landscape.

Dispositifs of geopolitics appeared most prominently in display three, titled ‘Greenham Common, Aldermaston, and the Government Pipeline and Storage System’. This assembled a diverse range of art works, maps and texts to present a political cartography of oil and security networks running through Britain and of events through which those networks have been contested and reconfigured, suggesting a number of connections and resonances between art history and geopolitical history.

The text accompanying this part of the exhibition mentioned the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston and describes how it has been integrated into the US-UK defence relationship and the Trident nuclear weapons system. It also discussed the nearby airbase at Greenham Common and the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp created there in 1981. It went on to mention that Aldermaston is one of the destinations of the Government Pipeline and Storage System (GPSS), an energy security network linking government and corporate pipelines to supply fuel to

British and American military bases and to civil airports. A map of the GPSS and a reading copy of James Bamberg's book, *The History of the British Petroleum Company: Volume 2 The Anglo-Iranian Years 1928-1954*, which describes the 1954 overthrow of the Mossadeq regime in a coup orchestrated by the UK and the US, were positioned alongside the display of art works from the Tate and other collections. The display thus brought together both art and non-art materials in the context of an exhibition that was itself an art work.

The display was arrayed in three sections. The first section from the left was composed of two untitled, abstract landscapes of Iraq in red and black painted by the Scottish artist James Boswell in 1948, following his time serving there as part of the British occupation during the Second World War. This was located next to a striking, large format print of Andreas Gursky's 2005 photographic work *Bahrain I*, a digitally manipulated image of the Bahrain International motor racing circuit in which segments of the black track stand out starkly against the desert setting. The next section contained Sydney Carline's 1919 painting *Over the Hills of Kurdistan: Flying Over Kirkuk*, a watercolour that depicts RAF aeroplanes above the landscape of what came to be northern Iraq. It also displayed *Number 23*, an instantly-recognisable abstract expressionist work by Jackson Pollock from 1948 as well as the monochromatic works *Building Ships: On the Stocks* (a commissioned work of war art by Muirhead Bone, 1971) and *Bomb Falling into Water* (Leonard Rosoman, 1942). Also included were two anti-nuclear montages by Peter Kennard, *Haywain with Cruise Missiles*, 1980 and *Defended to Death*, 1983. Two films (*Oil for the Twentieth Century*, British Pathé 1951 and excerpts from Keiller's own *Robinson in Ruins*, 2010, including shots of elements of the GPSS) could be viewed on video screens. The third section displayed a Keiller digital photomontage showing a Ministry of Defence By-law notice from Aldermaston, a Raissa Page photograph showing protestors dancing on missile silos at Greenham Common in 1983, and a 1982 Richard Hamilton sketch of

Hugh Gaitskell, the Labour Party leader who opposed unilateral disarmament during the early 1960s.

This part of the exhibition thus presented a rich and suggestive array of artistic and other materials relating to the geopolitics of oil and nuclear weapons, their influence on the British landscape and how they have been taken up in politics, social history and art. Indeed, the display could be discussed at some length as offering a critical materialisation and representation of Britain's geopolitical predicaments in the era of oil. However, what I want to emphasise are what I take to be the metapolitical dimensions of the display and the exhibition more generally, which stem from the ways in which they 'frame' and 'people' the gallery.

The broader project from which *The Robinson Institute* stems was conceived in part through ideas drawn from Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, Karl Polanyi and Henri Lefebvre concerning the meaning of dwelling and home amidst capitalist transformation. Particularly important was the idea, elucidated through the figure of Robinson, that Lefebvre's concept of representational space, 'admits the possibility of change through efforts by, and works, of, the imagination', including art.⁴⁴ By walking, Robinson 'sought to recover the possibility of political and economic transformation', a project continued by the Institute's researchers as they explored histories that remained 'unfinished'.⁴⁵

What is of particular interest here is how *The Robinson Institute* draws upon the 'primary aesthetics' of the gallery. The exhibition assembled materials from museum archives together with other geopolitical texts to re-present landscape, place, history and politics, using the archive and the space of the museum to enact an alternative representation of Britain and its place in the world. It mobilised artistic materials and spaces – Tate archives and the Duveen Galleries – to question the wider networks within which they themselves were located and which made them possible. Yet while it implied

a critical analysis of contemporary crisis and of the role played in it by oil, and while open about its commitment to political transformation, it offered no programmatic or polemical statements. In this sense, it enacted the idea of the gallery as a space apart, a space for contemplation by a visitor.

As Rancière has argued,

In the museum, which is not merely a specific type of building, but a form of framing of common space and a mode of visibility, all ... representations are disconnected from a specific destination, are offered to the same 'indifferent gaze'. This is the reason that the museum today can accommodate not only all kinds of prosaic objects, but also forms of information and debate on public issues that challenge mainstream forms of information and discussion.⁴⁶

To the extent that it expressed a hope for political and economic transformation through engagement with striking images of landscape, the exhibition thus sought to engender effects 'without using the terms of a message'. Further, while the analysis evident in the exhibition might have been taken to implicate the Tate as an institution, no mention of this was made in the exhibition itself. As an exhibition in an elite cultural institution located a short distance from Britain's core government, military, intelligence, police and diplomatic institutions and funded by a major oil company, *The Robinson Institute* in no way sought to mobilise, compel or influence people in the manner wished for by some advocates of politicised art.⁴⁷

If art is *metapolitical* not because of its specific content but 'because of the time and space it institutes, and the manner in which it frames this time and peoples this space', then here this lay in the exhibition's respecting of the space of the museum as being apart from geopolitics, a space of contemplation and reflection; of free appearance and the free play of the faculties. The exhibition necessarily left aside the possibility of any direct geopolitical function or effect and was staked upon the possibility, discussed

extensively by Rancière, that a visitor might be intrigued, enlightened and thereby activated. This is a classic rationality of critical or political art, but one that embraces rather than disrupts the gallery as a specific kind of time, space and experience.

Liberate Tate

My second example concerns a series of interventions that proceed from an analysis of the problem of oil that is similar to that evident in *The Robinson Institute*, but which engage art's metapolitics by disrupting rather than embracing the functioning of gallery and museum space. It relates to works by Liberate Tate, a group that, beginning in 2010, conducted a series of unauthorised performances bringing bodies, oil and other materials into the spaces of Tate Britain and Tate Modern, located a little further down the Thames and on the opposite South Bank. Liberate Tate emerged in the context of a broad coalition of groups that had been campaigning on issues of environmental justice, corporate responsibility and foreign policy for nearly three decades. Central to this coalition was the group Platform, which had developed a sustained body of practice combining art, activism, research and education on social justice issues since its formation in 1983, turning to focus especially on the question of oil in 1995, in light of the controversy around Shell's North Sea platform the Brent Spar and the execution of the Ogoni writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian state.⁴⁸ By 2010 the relationship between oil companies and British cultural institutions had already been problematised by a range of groups, but at that time oil company sponsorship continued to be offered and accepted.

The specific move made by Liberate Tate was to conduct a series of interventions within Tate Britain and Tate Modern that were legible as the kinds of works that might be expected in a contemporary art space, but with crucial, performatively improper dimensions. These works have furthermore been documented

on a website that uses fonts and layout closely paralleling those of the Tate. Liberate Tate have thus to a significant extent worked through the appropriation of and overidentification with Tate, while also rendering it permeable to activist practices. These tactics are readily illustrated via a handful of brief vignettes.⁴⁹

In April 2011 the work *Human Cost* was performed in the Duveen gallery at Tate Britain. In this work, which took place on the first anniversary of the explosion of BP's Deepwater Horizon platform in the Gulf of Mexico, a naked male artist curled up on the gallery floor and two figures, veiled and dressed in black, poured thick black oil over him out of green watering cans bearing the BP logo. The cans were then left alongside the artist, now mostly covered in the oil, which had also started to spread out in a thin pool across the gallery floor. The work evoked sculpture and the role of the nude in art history and carried a certain risk to the health of the performer.

In video footage of this and other works, Tate staff appear either unwilling or unable to prevent these works taking place, but often quickly cordon them off and sometimes bring screens to shield them from general view. However, this does not prevent the works from attracting the attention and sometimes participation of gallery goers, nor their being videoed and photographed so that their reach can be extended through online dissemination. In another dramatic intervention, *The Gift*, 2012, the group 'installed' a blade from a wind turbine in the turbine hall of Tate Modern. The blade, measuring 16.5 metres in length and weighing one and a half tonnes, echoed the building's previous life as Bankside Power Station and signalled a possible transition away from carbon-based energy resources towards renewables. This work was cordoned off but video of the event also shows that, before workers arrived to dismantle and remove the object, it was encircled by people holding each others' hands. In a further indication of how the museum itself was mobilised through the work, a member of the

Tate initiated a petition to have the object, which was presented to Tate as a gift under the Museums and Galleries Act 2002, accepted into the collection.

The work *Hidden Figures*, which took place in the Turbine Hall at Tate Modern in 2014, used a black square of cotton material measuring eight metres across. Visitors to the gallery were invited to take hold of the square and to move underneath it, ‘manifesting a hidden figure’. This made explicit reference to *Black Square*, one of the most famous works by the early twentieth century Polish Russian suprematist Kasimir Malevich, which formed a centerpiece for a retrospective of the artist’s work then on show in the gallery. As the group stated, referencing the Tate’s refusal of a campaign demand to make public the extent of BP sponsorship: ‘*Hidden Figures* symbolises the black stain oil sponsorship makes on cultural institutions; the thick black redaction over the BP sum that Tate won’t reveal; the veil that Liberate Tate performers have worn; the figurative shapes these performers are making with their bodies.’ This was further linked with the argument that the Tate was a public space that should be equally accessible to all and not taken over by BP. In this way, Liberate Tate again located their intervention within art history and contemporary art practice as well as in relation to specific demands.

Utilising gallery spaces and practices, Liberate Tate have employed ‘the forms of visibility and discursivity that make art identifiable as such’, intersecting the metapolitics of art and the *dispositif* of oil in highly specific ways. Their interventions lend new resonances to Rancière’s statement that debates on contemporary art ‘are all about matters of spatialization’, dealing with ‘the sense of the common that is at stake in those shifts between one spatial setting and another, or between presence and absence’.⁵⁰ Bringing oil, a turbine blade, a black square and other objects into the gallery, their practices activate the *dispositif* of oil metapolitically, as art.

However, while Liberate Tate ‘borrow connections that provoke political intelligibility’ while mobilising ‘the sense of sensory foreignness’ of historical and contemporary art practices, they also seek to link their interventions with conventional political tactics like petitions, communiqués and collective letters. In Rancière’s terms, the risk that such tactics run is of short-circuiting the properly metapolitical nature and effects of art and being recognised as just protest. The further risk of this is that they might lose their affective charge, allowing them to be more easily dismissed or ignored. However, while some media reporting has described Liberate Tate’s interventions as ‘protest’, they have also been described as both performance art and protest.⁵¹ And while video and photographic records of the works emphasise the extent to which they have been reflexively staged as media events, some also appear to attract participation and enchantment among gallery-goers (some of whom may of course be ‘in’ on the work). This apparent entrainment of visitors to the gallery – and even gallery and security staff – as participants in individual works represents a further, distinct rationality of art, which aims to activate people not just as spectators but as more fully involved in the embodied realisation of works.⁵² These kinds of tactics, in which the lines between art and geopolitics are blurred and crossed through material and symbolic practices, have their own genealogies but are enabled in the first place by the prior existence of a space and time in which they might in the first place be recognised as art.

Conclusion

This article has aimed to develop a sharpened conceptual appreciation of how art engages geopolitics. Political geographers and others have so far developed a wide-ranging and illuminating corpus of work on artistic interventions in *dispositifs* of geopolitical power. But while a substantial body of work has considered how artistic practices engage particular formations of geopolitical power, this work has rarely inquired

into what makes the practices that are of interest specifically artistic. Rather, their ‘artness’ has been for the most part assumed. People, practices, works and events are commonly identified in terms of art, but the question of how this designation can be made at all and the implications of making it are often overlooked.

To put it in a slightly different way, the ontology and epistemology of artistic enactments of geopolitics have been under-conceptualised and, as a result, important aspects of their nature, stakes and implications remain under-explored. In particular, while the potentialities of artistic engagements are often valorised and their limitations noted, there has been little discussion of the manner in which they might both stem from art’s very conditions of possibility as a distinct form of practice and experience. Furthermore, it can be argued that it is to a significant extent in the conditions of possibility for art itself – rather than its specific content – that its critical potential and implications may be said to lie. Conceptualising art as a *dispositif* that carries a particular kind of metapolitics addresses these issues and helps in thinking through the critical relevance and implications of art that engages geopolitics.

In his essay *The paradoxes of political art*, Rancière writes that

[w]ithin any given framework, artists are those whose strategies aim to change the frames, speeds and scales according to which we perceive the visible, and combine it with a specific invisible element and a specific meaning. Such strategies are intended to make the invisible visible or to question the self-evidence of the visible; to rupture given relations between things and meanings and, inversely, to invent novel relationships between things and meanings that were previously unrelated.⁵³

Such strategies are in evidence in *The Robinson Institute* and the interventions of Liberate Tate. But what needs to be emphasised is the ‘given framework’ of the aesthetic *dispositif*, which allows art to be a distinct sensorium that is permeable to geopolitical practices without being collapsed into them. Conversely, when geopolitics appears within the sensorium of art, distinct modes of performance, affect, experience and perception (here,

spectatorship and participation) are implied. In the literature on art and geopolitics to date, much has been written about performances, affects, experiences and perceptions, but relatively little attention has been paid to what it is that makes them art, or to the implications of this condition.

While *The Robinson Institute* mobilised multiple representational devices within the parameters of a conventional exhibition, Liberate Tate's interventions comprised performances that were legible as art but which also challenged the Tate's ability to determine proper conduct within the gallery and the boundaries between art and geopolitics. If *The Robinson Institute* expressed the mobilisation of museum space through hybrid academic, artistic and curatorial practices, then the work of Liberate Tate reflects a move to develop artistic practices that seek to link metapolitics with practices in the sphere of politics proper. They represent distinct tactics, but both operate within and through a *dispositif* that allows art to exist as such and which entails certain consequences, which are revealed more fully by contrasting how different kinds of practices address and activate museum spaces.

I do not argue that one set of tactics is superior or more effective, but emphasise their conditions of possibility. Further, genealogically attuned, investigation might look more closely into how the rationalities, tactics and effects of specific art practices and movements engaging geopolitics seek to mobilise, but are also conditioned by, particular configurations of the *dispositif* of art. This would provide a way of thinking through more thoroughly the intertwining of the potentialities and limitations of artistic engagements of geopolitics.

More broadly, a consideration of art and geopolitics through the *dispositif* locates art as well as geopolitics in relation to governmentality. Intimately connected with matters of conduct and counter-conduct, of ethics and desire, art comes to play a significant role in modern technologies of power and practices of government, but also

in opening them to question. While art may appear as a means of enhancing the government of bodies, populations and *milieux*, it also holds out a promise of equality and the possibility that things could be otherwise, as well as offering a variety of means for pursuing these ends. If art is a *dispositif* of government, it is one whose metapolitics are ambiguous and open to appropriation.

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Notes

¹ These brief descriptions relate to artworks made in the last ten years by, respectively, James Bridle,

² For example, T. Luke, *Museum Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2002) and C. Sylvester, *Art/Museums: International Relations Where We Least Expect It* (London: Paradigm 2009); also S. MacDonald and P. Basu, eds. *Exhibition Experiments* (Oxford: Blackwell 2007).

³ On the former, see L. Amoore and A. Hall, 'Border theatre: on the arts of security and resistance' *Cultural Geographies* 17/3 (2010) pp. 299–319; on the latter, A. Williams, 'Disrupting air power: performativity and the unsettling of geopolitical frames through artworks' *Political Geography* 42 (2014) pp. 12–22. On the politics of contemporary art in London see also A. Harris, 'Financial artscapes: Damien Hirst, crisis and the City of London' *Cities* 33 (2013) pp. 29–35.

⁴ Others have argued that such interventions and spaces serve to domesticate criticality; see S. Murphy, *The Art Kettle* (Winchester: Zero Books 2012). Such opposing positions suggest the need to connect thinking in political geography with broader debates in aesthetics and politics. See A. Ingram, 'Rethinking art and geopolitics through aesthetics: artist responses to the Iraq war' *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 41/1 (2016) pp. 1–13.

⁵ Respectively, L. Amoore, 'Biometric borders: governing mobilities in the war on terror' *Political Geography* 25/3 (2006) pp. 336–51; Williams (note 4); S. Graham, 'Countergeographies' in *Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism* (London: Verso 2010) pp. 357–385; D. Gregory, 'War and peace' *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 35/2 (2010) pp. 154–86.

⁶ Rancière states that 'art is not the common concept that unifies the different arts; It is the *dispositif* that renders them visible'; J. Rancière (trans. S. Corcoran), *Aesthetics and its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity 2009), p. 23. Elsewhere, he states that 'In order to exist as such, art must be identified within a specific regime of identification binding together practices, forms of visibility, and patterns of intelligibility'; J. Rancière, 'Contemporary art and the politics of aesthetics' in B. Hinderliter, W. Kaizen, V. Maimon, J. Mansoor, S. McCormack, eds. *Communities of Sense: Rethinking Aesthetics and Politics* (Durham NC: Duke University Press 2009), p. 32.

⁷ A. Barry, *Material Politics: Disputes Along the Pipeline* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 2013).

⁸ J. Rancière (trans. Gabriel Rockhill) *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible* (London: Continuum 2006); J. Rancière (trans. S. Corcoran), *Aesthetics and its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity

2009). I therefore distinguish my usage of the term following Rancière from the account provided by Alain Badiou. A. Badiou, *Metapolitics* (Verso: London 2015).

⁹ C. Kodat, *Don't Act, Just Dance: The Metapolitics of Cold War Culture* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2015).

¹⁰ M. Foucault, 'The confession of the flesh' in C. Gordon *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1980), pp. 194-195.

¹¹ See, respectively, L. Amoore, 'Biometric borders: governing mobilities in the war on terror' *Political Geography* 25/3 (2006) pp. 336–51; C. Aradau and R. Van Munster, 'Governing through risk: taking precautions, (un)knowing the future' *European Journal of International Relations* 13/1 (2007) 89-115; S. Graham, *Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism* (London: Verso 2010); S. Elbe, *Virus Alert: Security, Governmentality and the AIDS Pandemic* (New York: Columbia University Press 2010); D. Gregory, 'Lines of descent', *Open Democracy* (2011), available at <<https://www.opendemocracy.net/derek-gregory/lines-of-descent>>, accessed 11 April 2016; S. Rosière and R. Jones 'Teichopolitics: reconsidering globalisation through the role of walls and fences' *Geopolitics* 17/1 (2012) 217-234; D. Cowen, *The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2014); B. Braun, 'A new urban *dispositif*? Governing life in an age of climate change' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 32 (2014) pp. 49-64. E. Herschinger, 'The drug *dispositif*: ambivalent materiality and the addiction of the global drug prohibition regime' *Security Dialogue* 46/2 (2015) pp. 183-201; M. Joronen, "'Death comes knocking on the roof": thanatopolitics of ethical killing during operation protective edge in Gaza' *Antipode* 48/2 (2016) 336-354.

¹² G. Agamben, *What is an Apparatus? and Other Essays* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2009) p. 1. The issues surrounding the etymology and translation of the term *dispositif* are complicated; in light of this I choose to preserve the French word rather than use the English terms apparatus or dispositive. See J. Bussolini, 'What is a dispositive?' *Foucault Studies* 10 (2010) 85-107.

¹³ Foucault, 'The confession of the flesh', (note 1) pp. 194-196.

¹⁴ M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Volume One: The Will to Knowledge* (London: Penguin 1998); M. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan 2007).

¹⁵ Agamben, *What is an Apparatus?* (note 3).

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- ¹⁶ Deleuze, 'What is a *dispositif*' in T. Armstrong, ed. *Michel Foucault: Philosopher* (New York: Routledge 1992) p. 159. As Bussolini (note 3) recognises, Deleuze comes close to redefining the *dispositif* as an assemblage. Here, the regulatory connotations of *dispositif* as well as its explicit mention by Rancière lead me to emphasise it rather than the Deleuzian assemblage.
- ¹⁷ Agamben, *What is an Apparatus?*, (note 3) p. 14. See also the discussion among researchers of security at <<http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/iccm/forum/research-methods/method-3/85>>, accessed 11 April 2016.
- ¹⁸ S. Legg, 'Assemblage/apparatus: using Deleuze and Foucault', *Area* 43/2 (2011) p. 131; see also Braun, 'A new urban *dispositif*?' (note 2).
- ¹⁹ W. Walters, 'Border/Control' *European Journal of Social Theory* 9/2 (2006) p. 187-203.
- ²⁰ M. Foucault, 'What is enlightenment?', in P. Rabinow, ed. *Michel Foucault: Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 1* (London: Penguin 2000) p. 319.
- ²¹ See: L. Amoore and A. Hall, 'Border theatre', (note 3); A.-L. Amilhat Szary, 'walls and border art: the politics of art display' *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 27/2 (2012) pp. 213–28; A. Williams, 'Disrupting air power' (note 3); D. Gregory, 'War and peace' (note 5); S. Graham, 'Countergeographies' (note 5); A. Barry, (note 7). See also A. Ingram, 'Experimental geopolitics: Wafaa Bilal's Domestic Tension' *The Geographical Journal* 178/2 (2012): 123–33; A. Ingram, 'Rethinking art and geopolitics through aesthetics' (note 4).
- ²² T. Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford: Blackwell 1990).
- ²³ Rancière, *Aesthetics and its Discontents* (note 8), p. 44.
- ²⁴ Rancière, 'Contemporary art and the politics of aesthetics' (note 6) pp. 40-41.
- ²⁵ Rancière, *Aesthetics and its Discontents* (note 8) p. 24.
- ²⁶ J. Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics* (note 8) p. 13.
- ²⁷ J. Rancière, 'The aesthetic revolution and its outcomes' *New Left Review* 14 (2002) p. 135, footnote 1, emphasis added.
- ²⁸ Rancière, *Politics of Aesthetics* (note 8) p. 13.
- ²⁹ Rancière, *Aesthetics and its Discontents* (note 8) p. 41.
- ³⁰ J. Rancière (trans. and ed. S. Corcoran) *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics* (London: Continuum 2010), p. 141.
- ³¹ Rancière, 'Contemporary art and the politics of aesthetics' (note 6), p. 41.
- ³² Rancière, *Dissensus* (note 30) p. 148.

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- ³³ Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics* (note 8), p. 63.
- ³⁴ Rancière, J. *The Emancipated Spectator* (London: Verso, 2009).
- ³⁵ Rancière, *Aesthetics and its Discontents* (note 8) p. 23
- ³⁶ Rancière, *Dissensus* (note 30) p. 141.
- ³⁷ Rancière, *Dissensus* (note 30) p. 141.
- ³⁸ Rancière, *Dissensus* (note 30) p. 135. The ‘Our’ here implies an identification with Euro-American art worlds and political locations. While he recognises that objects from the colonies helped to make the European museum, Rancière does not enquire into the coloniality of art.
- ³⁹ T. Mitchell, *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil* (London: Verso 2013).
- ⁴⁰ Barry, *Material Politics* (note 7).
- ⁴¹ J. Marriott and M. Minio-Paluello, *The Oil Road: Journeys from the Caspian Sea to the City of London* (London: Verso 2012) p. 6.
- ⁴² Introductory caption to exhibition, *The Robinson Institute* at Tate Britain, London 2012. While Robinson was fictional, the exhibition did actually form part of a larger artistic and academic research project, *The Future of Landscape and the Moving Image*, funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC). See <<https://thefutureoflandscape.wordpress.com/>>, accessed 12 April 2016. See also the book that accompanied the exhibition, P. Keiller, *The Possibility of Life’s Survival on the Planet* (London: Tate 2012). Aspects of Keiller’s work process and the project from which the exhibition stemmed are described in P. Keiller, ‘Landscape and cinematography’ *Cultural Geographies* 16 (2009) pp. 409-414.
- ⁴³ Introductory caption to *The Robinson Institute* (note 42).
- ⁴⁴ Keiller, *The Possibility of Life’s Survival* (note 42) p. 16.
- ⁴⁵ Quoted from text titled ‘Robinsonism’ at *The Robinson Institute*, Tate Britain 2012.
- ⁴⁶ Rancière, *Dissensus* (note 30) p. 139.
- ⁴⁷ For example, T. Monahan, ‘The right to hide? Anti-surveillance camouflage and the aestheticization of resistance’ *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 12/2 (2015) 159-178.
- ⁴⁸ See Platform, ‘History’, available at <<http://platformlondon.org/about-us/history/>>, accessed 11 April 2016. Platform have acknowledged the role played by geographer Doreen Massey in informing their work; Massey also contributed to the AHRC research project on which *The Robinson Institute* drew.

⁴⁹ The subsequent section refers to text, photographs and video available on the Liberate Tate website, <<http://www.liberatetate.org.uk>>, accessed 11 April 2016. The group conducted more than a dozen interventions at Tate Britain and Tate Modern between 2010 and 2016.

⁵⁰ Rancière, 'Contemporary art and the politics of aesthetics' (note 6) p. 31.

⁵¹ The former designation is used in a front-page *Financial Times* report on *Human Cost*; a News segment on the left-leaning Channel 4 refers to the work as both protest and art (both on Liberate Tate website, note 49).

⁵² Bishop, C. *Artificial Hells* (London: Verso 2012).

⁵³ Rancière, *Dissensus* (note 30) p. 141.