Hanchane, S;
Mostafa, T;
(2007)
School choice: income, peer effects, and the formation of Inequalities.
(LEST working paper series
).
HAL: Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société: Villeurbanne, France.
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Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the equilibrium on the market for schooling where both public and private schools coexist and where individuals are differentiated by income and ability. We introduce a non linear in means model of peer effect by shedding the light on the fact that school quality is not solely dependent on mean ability but also on the dispersion of abilities. We study the distribution of students across sectors while examining the conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium in the context of non single peaked preferences. Finally, we examine the presence of a hierarchy of school qualities. In the paper we shed the light on equity problems related to the access to educational quality while analysing the functioning of the educational system.
Type: | Working / discussion paper |
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Title: | School choice: income, peer effects, and the formation of Inequalities |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
Publisher version: | https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-0000953... |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
Keywords: | Peer group effects, Education market, Pricing discrimination, Majority voting equilibrium |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Education UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Education > UCL Institute of Education UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Education > UCL Institute of Education > IOE - Social Research Institute |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1521122 |
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