This chapter is an attempt to explore how Deleuze’s geophilosophy might be put to work methodologically. Geophilosophy is for Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1987) an attention to the connections between different things that come to constitute an assemblage. It is a kind of cartography that takes place on a plane of immanence, as connections are made and re-made horizontally, immanently, rather than (only) as a result of vertical hierarchies. As such, assemblages are diverse and multiple – ‘the synthesis of heterogeneity as such’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 330) – and machinic - connections are made between human and non-human things. Deleuze and Guattari theorise the machine in terms of desire, in that desire is a productive force that forms relations between different aspects of an assemblage. We argue that geophilosophy can be understood and put to work as a methodology – a means of mapping the relations in desiring machines. We reflect on the methodological dilemma of how one might map machinic relations, and question the directionality, flow and ethico-political workings of the machines under question. Mapping connections is not only a task of investigating what there is, then, but is also concerned with unpacking what might be. It is a methodology of looking differently at connections, and, possibly, a methodology of tracing how these connections might be made differently.

In this chapter, we take up a methodology of mapping through different empirical research projects with young people. This includes research on the relations between teenage girls’ bodies and images (Coleman 2009) and teens’ uses of social networking sites (Ringrose, 2011, 2012; Ringrose et al., 2012). These projects are clearly interested in different issues, and our aim here is not to flatten these differences but rather to flag up points of connection and to develop a methodological position on how we have interpreted data produced in them. In particular, our focus is on how our research has been interested in affect and the politics of looking, that is in how looking comes to constitute affective relations between bodies. In this sense we work with the oft-cited phrase from Deleuze that ‘a body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and being affected that . . . defines a body in its individuality’ (1992: 625). We treat the capacity of affecting and being affected as a series of relations that we can map according to the ways in which the capacity of becoming is extended (the molecularity of lines of flight, for example) or captured (as molar categorisations).

As our research has been on how bodies come to be constituted via contemporary visual culture, this chapter examines how looking is an affective capacity that extends or fixes the ways in which bodies become. We pay specific attention to how these processes of movement or capture are gendered and/or sexualised. Key questions we therefore address include: How does looking work and how does the body become in particular ways through looking? What type of looking is at work? We will suggest there are affective dynamics of looking, what we call ‘looking machines’ that inscribe bodies, cultivated in ‘postfeminist’ media contexts that celebrate objectification. However, we outline how a feminist Deleuzian methodology of mapping can help demonstrate both how objectification and bodily relations work, and how coercive practices might be disrupted.

A Feminist Deleuzian Mapping Methodology

There has been a range of important theoretical writing about Deleuze and the body (Guillaume and Hughes, 2011) and also on Deleuze and gender, feminism, sexuality and
queer theory (e.g. Colebrook and Weinstein, 2008; Beckman, 2011). This work has elaborated how bodies are reconfigured in ways that disturb the subject/object binaries of Western metaphysics and explored how new thinking tools are available that disrupt the naturalisation of essential gender difference, drawing particularly on tools from Deleuze and Guattari’s (1984) *Anti-Oedipus* and its epic critique of familial, conjugal and Oedipal organisation of sexuality and desire. Elizabeth Grosz has been especially important in underscoring feminist uses of Deleuzian thought for understanding the ‘volatility’ of the body, which in its active relation to other social practices, entities and events forms machinic connections… The body is thus not an organic totality which is capable of the wholesale expression of subjectivity, a welling up of the subject’s emotions attitudes, beliefs or experiences, but is itself an assemblage of organs, processes, pleasures, passions, activities, behaviors, linked by fine lines and unpredictable networks to other elements, segments and assemblages (1994: 120).

What is specific about the feminist approach to this framework is that it seeks to make sense of how these machinic bodies and assemblages work to materialise the coercive norms of patriarchy and gender. Grosz is explicit that Deleuze helps us to understand how gender, sexuality (and other ‘great divisions and global categories’) function through the body because his work produces a conceptual framework with the potential of ‘rendering more complex the nature and forms that these oppressions take’ (1994: 173).

Our aim in this chapter is to illustrate the methodological value of this feminist Deleuzian thinking about bodies and gender and sexuality in the analysis of empirical research practice. Thus, our focus in this chapter is not so much on processes of research collection – although this is important and worthy of more consideration – as on what a feminist Deleuzian approach opened up for how we came to understand and interpret the data that our research generated. We take seriously Deleuze’s disruption of there being any clear demarcation between theory and practice, and suggest that how data is made sense of – theorised – is a methodological practice. Indeed, Guattari (2009: 22), speaking of his work with Deleuze, said ‘Theoretical expressions should function as tools, as machines… and this is true in every field’:

> The most desirable effect that can be anticipated in the conceptual field is not in the order of comprehension but in the form of a certain efficiency - ‘it works or it doesn’t work’.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, this logic of efficiency encompasses ‘methodological’ thinking and, moreover, as part of their project of ‘transcendental empiricism’, empirical research should find new ways to see and transform the social. In thinking through the implications of this approach for empirical research we need to ask: in what ways does it enable us to demonstrate in new and different ways how things work in research encounters? In what ways is noticing different things in research data a methodological project?

This chapter considers how a Deleuzian approach enables us to think differently about gender and bodies by insisting we ask: How can we map how desiring machines work? What can bodies do and not do? Indeed, Mark Bonta and John Protevi (2004) have called the Deluezian approach ‘geo-philosophical’, because it offers what in our Introduction we call ‘clusters’ of ideas; conceptual mapping to help us understand time, space and movement differently.
Bonta and Protevi (2004: 10) provide an important outline of the political nature of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘geo-philosophy’, arguing,

A key dimension of Deleuze and Guattari’s work is the investigation of ‘bodies politic’, material systems or ‘assemblages’ whose constitution in widely differing registers – the physical, chemical, biological neural and social- can be analysed in political terms. Such an analysis proceeds along an ethical axis (the life-affirming or life destroying character of the assemblage) and a structural axis, the poles of which Deleuze and Guattari name ‘strata’ (the domination or putting to work of one body by another in a fixed hierarchy) and consistencies (what Deleuze and Guattari also call ‘war machines’ or ‘rhizomes’ which entail the formation of a network or assemblage of bodies with multiple, shifting and increasingly intense internal and external connections).

Our aim is to put this geo-philosophical understanding to work in a feminist Deleuzian cartographic methodological mapping exercise. Mapping as a methodology for research has been developed through concepts of rhizomatic movement (e.g. Alverman, 2000) to highlight connectivity, the middles, becomings and difference in research processes, where mapping is distinguished from repetition and tracing patterns. Rhizomes are highlighted as tuberous structures that connect to other things, rather than the singular roots of one tree. In this chapter, we develop a cluster of concepts related to ‘mapping’ (Kaufman and Heller, 1998) and apply these methodologically to demonstrate the machinic, connective aspects of bodies - what Deleuze and Guattari called desiring machines - which form relations between parts and bodies in assemblages. Our interest is in mapping affect and bodily capacities; we are interested in how bodies affect and are affected by things, and to therefore think of bodies’ potentials for movement or fixity in space. One of the specific concerns of our research is the relationship between bodies and images, or visual culture, and we unpack the affective intensities and dynamics of how images work. We explore how young people relate to images in their everyday lives offline, but also in online spaces of social networking sites, drawing on a range of empirical data with teens from several studies, asking: How do the relations of looking work differently according to gender and sexual ‘dualism machines’, as Deleuze and Guattari might call them?

The chapter specifically contributes to thinking about visual methodology and how images work affectively in online space. For instance we show how extensive gender norms create fixity through gender and sexual dualisms when looking captures girls, reducing them to their body parts or the ‘wrong’ sexuality, as ‘skets’. But we also examine how these are unfixed and disrupted to show when we find life-affirming potentialities in assemblages.

The becoming of bodies: Looking, images, affect
Rebecca Coleman’s book *The Becoming of Bodies* develops a Deleuzian feminist approach to help us move from problematic and much critiqued analyses of media *effects* upon bodies, (expressed for instance in debates surrounding body image), to a discussion of media *affects* - an affective analysis to reconsider the relationship between bodies, and images. Media effects arguments position images as a ‘hypodermic needle’ that penetrates the minds of young people in particular in ways that damage self-esteem and confidence (see Egan and Hawkes, 2008 for a critique). Drawing on focus groups, individual interviews and image making sessions with young white women, aged 13 and 14, which explored the knowledges, understandings and experiences of bodies that different types of image make possible, and impossible, Coleman argues that images do not operate in such simplistic ways because
‘bodies and images are not separate but experienced through each other. Images therefore do not reflect or represent bodies but produce the ways in which it is possible for bodies to become’ (2009: 94). As part of this argument, Coleman considers the role of looking in constituting images of bodies; for example, the girls discussed how other people’s views of them gave them a particular image of their body. As such, Coleman restages looking as not simply a one-way gaze, as feminist work on the ‘male gaze’ might imply rather as an affective relation between bodies. Looking is understood as the capacities of bodies to affect and be affected. Moving away from a simple feminist pronouncement of objectification, she elaborates Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism to map out how these capacities are extended or fixed via gendered relations. She draws attention to how the girls discuss views from boys and girls operating differently. Gender in this sense is an extensive molar category that comes to capture and fix the molecularity of becoming:

Fay: if someone said that to me, like I don’t know said something horrible to me, like a boy, then I’d just think ‘well you’ve got a load of spots on your face today’ [Laughter]
Dionne: yeah but girls don’t say it, boys that are cocky and confident
Fay: say it
Dionne: and popular sort of like say ‘oh you look really fat’ and then like the other boys laugh and…
Dionne: but if we were like to say something like ‘oh you’re really spotty’ then they would be like ‘oh shut up you big ugly cow’ or something and then you wouldn’t know what to say back because like it hits you harder than it hits them
Anna: that’s what happens though, like you say one thing and they can say as much to you and you can’t say anything back
Dionne: yeah
Anna: and the minute you say something back and they just flip and say…
Dionne: yeah even if you said the same amount of stuff it still wouldn’t hurt Their feelings as much as it would hurt you

Mapping out the capacities of affecting and being affected makes clear that the knowledges through which the girls’ bodies are fixed through relations with boys are not equal or reversible, since girls are ‘hit harder’ by the affect of the words from boys. The girls are not able to ‘fight back’ and fix and objectify boys’ bodies in the same ways:

Beckie: so boys make comments about girls’ appearances, can girls do the same back to boys?
Tina: no cos boys don’t
Casey: boys don’t really care
Chloe: no we can’t
Catherine: they’ll just hit ya
Chloe: we can’t just go up to someone and say ‘you’ve got a smaller willy than him ain’t ya, ain’t ya?’
Tina: cos then they’ll be like ‘ergh’
Chloe: ‘why you looking at my dick for?’ or they’ll go ‘c’mon let me show you it, what can you do with it’

This mapping marks a shift away from a psychological reading of the individual girl’s or boy’s intentions or psyches to the social and affective relations through which their bodies
become in particular ways. It is, then, an approach that maps the connections between different elements in encounters or assemblages. Coleman shows how bodies become through and are constituted by gender and sexual relations, which enable or delimit bodily movement and possibility in time and space.

In thinking through this data, Coleman also argues, however, that Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism insists that capacities cannot be known prior to or in advance of material bodily encounters, which means there are unknown spaces for movement. Indeed, she explores how girls resist and fight back against the fixing of the body through looking. Through analysis of the interview data, she identifies how the girls’ position looks or appearance in opposition to self or personality. For example, in the extracts discussed above, looks are an ‘intense’ organ of the body that reduce the girls’ bodies to this specific aspect of the body; looks become the way in which that body is fixed. But girls also resist the force of looking by privileging ‘personality’ as an organ of the body to disrupt the power of looking and looks:

Emily: when Tasha said, like when she was saying that whenever she fancies someone they won’t go out with her cos she’s really fat and ugly and stuff and I said it wasn’t, that’s not what it should have been but no offence to my sister or anything but she isn’t really that pretty but she’s got a boyfriend and everything and so I don’t really think it is how Tasha said it is

Beckie: ok, so how do you think it is?
Emily: well, I don’t think you should go for looks, it’s just like, if you’re a nice person and you’ve got a really nice personality and stuff then, yeah, you should go out with them

Beckie: that’s more important?
Emily: yeah
Beckie: do you think Tasha was saying that or do you think she was saying you shouldn’t go out with someone?
Emily: well, I don’t know cos, she was saying, cos I know she’s got a really nice personality cos I know her, but she kept saying that no boy would want to go out with her cos she’s really ugly and she’s really fat and everything, but I don’t think she is

Here Emily suggests that personality not only should be but often is prioritised over looks, since she offers an alternative analysis of ‘how it is’ that affective relationships happen. Coleman argues that Emily knows Tasha through her personality, which does not reduce the body to looks, and explores how complex affective relationships of trust and honesty between girls can disrupt the fixing of girls bodies in time and space.

Looking on digital social networks: Desiring machines, affective assemblages and bodily capture
In her solo writing and with co-authors, Jessica Ringrose (Renold and Ringrose, 2008, 2011; Ringrose, 2011, 2012; Koefed and Ringrose, 2012) has used a similar Deleuzian framework to explore girls’ relationships with popular media images to consider the affective dimensions of bodily capture through looking, organised through what has been termed a ‘post-feminist’ media context (Gill, 2008). Media contexts have been discussed as post-feminist because in a reversal of feminist thinking about sexism and the male gaze, self-objectification of the girl or woman’s own body is now commonly viewed as a space of consumer based freedom in what some have called ‘commodity feminism’ (Tasker and Negra, 2009); and more intense
objectification of the male body has been positioned as a democratisation of looking now available to girls and women.

As we saw with Coleman’s work, however, some Deleuzian inspired questions about the body turn the relationship away from subject/object dualisms and from understanding a one-way direction of images causing harmful media effects upon the body to an investigation of how looking works and how bodies are relationally and affectively experienced through images. Deleuzian thinking means we must change the question from simply asking ‘who is objectified, and in what ways?’ to: How does the (self-)objectification of girls and boys bodies work through relations of looking and through images? What are the affective and bodily relations through which images operate?

Ringrose’s work has explored how these relations work in social networking sites among young people (14-16) at secondary school through interview and online ethnography based research. Social networking sites require the construction of a visual cyber-subjectivity largely constructed through multiple modalities of signs, but largely photographic images. The body is signified through gendered and sexualised discourses through the photos and other mediums, but feminist Deleuzian thinking goes beyond semiotic, discursive and cultural analysis (Gilbert, 2004). This approach can prioritise how young people experience images of the self and others, to map how bodily captures happen and when movement occurs, exploring the affective quality of these flows through their machinic interactions in assemblages.

As noted above, Deleuze and Guattari consider the body as complex, multi-faceted and machinic, that is plugging into and out of other machinic parts. The body is therefore what they call a ‘desiring machine’, but not bound up as a singular entity but always coming into being through relations with other bodies and things in various assemblages. They argue ‘machinic assemblages’ are complex social configurations through which energy flows and is directed (Malins, 2004). ‘Assemblages’ is a useful way to think about social entities as ‘wholes whose properties emerge from the interactions between the parts’ (De Landa in Tamboukou, 2010: 685). Assemblages are ‘characterised by relations of exteriority … [that] imply that a component part of the assemblage may be detached from it and plugged into a different assemblage in which its interactions are different’ (ibid.: 10). There is never a neutral flow of power, however, bodies are affected and affect through their relations in assemblages.

Using Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblages, Ringrose (2011) has theorised social networking sites as relational, ‘affective assemblages’. These concepts can work to think of virtual space and relationality in new ways that disturb the online-offline binary and the human-non-human dimensions of distributed agency, in much thinking about cyber space and real life (Clough in Kuntsman, 2012: 9). Take for example the virtual spatial geography of online social networks of like Facebook (Paparachissi, 2009). These can be understood as assemblages, where desiring machines plug into each other via virtual Facebook profiles which then plug into other profiles. Crucial for this chapter are the findings in Ringrose’s research that young people often feel they have to ‘look good’ to plug into the assemblage in ways that resonate with Coleman’s findings of how girls related to photographic images of the self:

Daniela (14): Girls, I think, take more care over how it looks and like their pictures.
Marie (16): You don’t really want to put, put a picture on there that makes you look like you just woken up in the morning!

Nicola (14): You only put a nice picture up. Not one of you looking awful.

Louisa (16): You can airbrush yourself … you can make yourself look better then, well – what can I say? – I’ve been doing it all the time!

The ‘geo-philosophical’ task for the social scientist is to map out how the internet ‘works’ (Buchanan, 2007) and the networked assemblages become in specific time/space instances. In the young people’s social networking sites under study, ‘looking good’ is an embodied assemblage of meaning and experience; it is constructed in relation to a flow of images and affects where the local and global come together in ‘glocal’ (Montgomery, 2007) networked becomings in relation to idealised versions of girl and boy bodies as: ‘sexy’, ‘buff’ and ‘well-fit’.

This returns us to Deleuze and Guattari’s over-riding concern with the body and their repeated question: ‘what can a body do’ within a particular assemblage of relations? Using these geophilosophical concepts, we can think through how to map how gender works through images and how it enables or disables desiring machines in particular ways. Indeed, as with many feminists inspired by Deleuze (for example, Grosz and Braidotti), it is critical to underscore the ethico-political aspects of the geo-philosophical mapping afforded by this approach. It enables us to gauge the relations through which the body or desiring machine is captured and territorialised, creating fixed gendered sexual(ised) differences, through dualism machines, in this case via injurious heterosexed norms (to also invoke Butler’s (1993) important conceptual work on bodies and the heterosexual matrix, which confines normative gender identity to heterosexual masculine and feminine identities).

Drawing on these concepts, we can map what is repetitive of the molar (wide scale, extensive) norms and how these norms striate space, or (to blend a Foucauldian (1982) idea with Deleuze’s thinking) carve out the ‘conditions of possibility’ for movement. If, as we will argue, the body is captured through these processes and denied movement (that is flows of desire are constrained in specific ways), we also want to ask, how might these constraints be disrupted or de-territorialised (Renold and Ringrose, 2008) and how do we account for this? As one example of addressing this question, Ringrose explored sexual regulations where girls are disciplined as ‘sluts’ when they are viewed as giving off the wrong type of gendered ‘looks’ in their peer relations. She looked at the affective force of ‘slut’ to ‘stick’ onto girl bodies (Koefed and Ringrose, 2012) to ‘pin them’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002) into a difficult set of social relations since they must balance looking ‘sexy’ in the right ways:

Daniela (14): I think like if you’ve got like say a slutty girl, she’ll take a picture of her body or whatever and have it as her image … If I came across a Beboi that’s someone’s got a picture of their cleavage and their body, and nothing else. I’ll think, ‘Well, they obviously think too much of themselves’.

Daniela is describing how the image creates a look of conceit but also the look of ‘sluttyness’ if girls display ‘too much’ rather than shielding their body from looking. Mapping the micro nuances of what girls do online through a Deleuzian analysis of immanent becomings (rather than mimesis or cultural reproduction) is critical, however, because girls also could disrupt this fixing and bodily capture by using the less-regulated space of social networking
sites to experiment with ‘digital’ slut ‘looks’. For example, Daniela actually adopted the online social network (Bebo) user profile name of ‘slut’ while her best friend, Nicola (14) used ‘whore’, after older girls called them ‘sluts’ at school, describing they would say about each other:

Daniela: She’s my whore and I’m her slut. Whatever. Get over it!

Daniela and Nicola’s Bebo profile-assemblage partly disrupted the molar and extensive organisation of gender and sexuality used to regulate girls’ overt sexual expression as ‘sluts’ by taking up, using and becoming sluts in a new way that was life-affirming rather than life-destroying. This was not a one-way-total line of flight from the molar, injurious norm of ‘slut’, however, as there was continual risk in inhabiting this space for teen girls as we continue to explore below.

**Ideal looks and body parts: boobs, pecks and ‘back off’**

To further demonstrate the methodological work that Deleuze makes possible we will use a few examples from Jessica’s most recent project on young people and ‘sexting’ (Ringrose et al., 2012). This project explored how young people (13-15) communicate sexually through digital technology including social networking sites such as Facebook and mobile phone networks like Blackberry messenger (BBM). The project was explicitly undertaken with the methodological aim of mapping online space and exploring experiences of this with young people. We looked at Facebook activity online then discussed images with young people and were talked through their interactions on Blackberry messenger. The following analysis continues to explore how ‘looks’ orient digital spaces shaping bodily relations in particular ways, asking: What are the ideal looks for engendered bodies?

Tropes from advertising and popular media circulate within social networks and work to orient particular ideal girl and boy bodies on social networking sites as part of an ‘affective assemblage’ of meanings (Ringrose, 2011). A Deleuzian frame helps to illustrate how this contains and striates the space around what constitutes an ideal gendered bodily pose. For instance, our sample included a teen girl who did some professional modelling, posting copious amounts of these images on Facebook, which introduced specific terms of photographic bodily reference into the peer group of a slim and mechanically mannequin-like posed feminine body. Other typical examples of ‘sexy’ girl body photos include a genre of self-produced images of the poser in the mirror taken with a camera from a high angle to emphasize cleavage and a diminishing size of body (thin-ness).

Jodie (13): like when girls take pictures they like take it from above like this and you can see down their top and I think they do that on purpose and like some girls like they squeeze their boobs together to make them look bigger and everything.

To map how these looks work relationally within a particular assemblage we have to find out what happens when this type of image is plugged into the peer networks under study. Jodie talked about how ‘sexy’ images generates more ‘looks’ and ‘adds’ of your profile and further requests for images of girls in bikini and bra:

Jodie (13): Some boy asked me, ‘Can I have a picture of you’, I was like, ‘My display picture’ and he was like ‘No I mean a special photo’ and I was like, ‘What special photo’ and he was like, ‘Like you in your bra’ and I was like ‘No’, and I was like, ‘I have one of me in my bikini’ And he was like, ‘can you send it
anyway’ and I was like, ‘Victoria’s got it’ because he knows my cousin. And then them two went to the same school, so I was like, ‘you can ask her to send it’ and then I was like, ‘Victoria delete the photo and don’t send it to him’. Like when you say no to people, like you fall out with them, so I just make excuses.

The attention to breasts illustrates a particular form of ‘looks’ around specific body parts in the peer social network, where breasts become an intensive or ‘special’ organ of high value for the female body.

Images of idealised masculinity included topless pictures taken in the mirror of boys' six-packs and back muscles. Evaluation of the ‘looks’ of the images happens through ‘likes’ and ‘dislikes’ from peers in the assemblage. For instance Kamal talked proudly about having 42 people like the image of his back muscles on Facebook. There was, however, danger that people might not like the six pack photo, or possibly that a boy could be seen to be effeminate or gay by being too vain about his appearance. And while we found multiple instances of boys posting and commenting on their six packs and aspiring to post photos even if they didn’t feel they could, this was organised through ideal ‘looks’:

Nathan: Nah nah nah! For me to do that [post a photo of his chest] I would have to be completely big. I’d wanna be proper big to do that. I wouldn’t want to do some little half, got a little peck here, little peck there. I’d want to be fully big. And I wouldn’t do it in the mirror. I’d get someone to take it of me. Outside or something, not in my house, in the gym I’d get someone to take it of me in the gym like this.

These relations of looking in the ‘looking machines’ of social networks can be highly pleasurable. Jodie is pleased to be asked for a photo in her bra and Kamal enjoys having 42 people ‘like’ his back muscles on Facebook. But the Deleuzian framework for analysis we are showing encourages us to map out how the relations between the images the bodies and the young people capture and fix young people’s bodies and capacities (for desire, as desiring machines) in particular ways. Jodie has described the high value of ‘big boobs’, and Nathan of ‘completely big’ muscles. Jodie has described carefully negotiating a refusal to post or send such a photo, and Nathan did not want to post up images of any ‘little pecks’. The way that a particular body part can come to contain the whole (i.e. how the body can be reduced to one organ) emerges more clearly through a further investigation of how the young people used another social network, Blackberry messenger (BBM). The relations of the looks of bodies organised the social relations of looking through BBM in textual and photographic ways. In order to get BBM contacts you do a broadcast in order to have others ‘add’ you to their contacts. These broadcasts also revolved in large part around particular looks, highlighting particular valued body parts. As Cherelle and Mercedes (both 13), explain:

Jessica: Okay, so what did people say about you when they do a broadcast?
Cherelle: They say, ‘Stop what you are doing, add Mercedes, she’s gifted’ that means pretty and stuff like that. Yeah stuff like that and ‘she has good conversations’.
Jessica: Okay, is it mostly about your appearance?
Cherelle: Yeah mostly about appearance when it comes to broadcasts.
Jessica: Okay so tell me exactly what they would say?
Cherelle: If it is a boy and a girl told a boy to BC their pin then they will say, ‘Oh she has big tits and a big bum... and if you get to know her, she’s nice’.

Mercedes: like ‘add this chick she got a back off’

Jessica: What’s the back word?

Mercedes: Back off. That is a big bum.

Jessica: So that’s a good thing?

Mercedes: Yeah, it is what they are like expecting in girls. It is like good features.

Jessica: Yeah, like their dream girl is probably like a big bum, nice breasts and long hair and like a nice skin tone...

Mercedes: A girl wrote this about you and who did she want to add you?

Jessica: So do you think the size has like some bearing on whether girls are popular or not?

Mercedes: Eve is popular and she ain’t got big

Veronica: Yeah she ain’t got big breasts.

Cherelle: But she is a lightie.

Veronica: I can’t remember but one boy told me yeah, I asked him yeah, ‘What’s the first thing you see in a girl yeah?’ and he is like, ‘Oh her tits’...

Ashley: I hate it when guys yeah, like ‘What do you see in me first yeah?’ they will be like your eyes or something and what they think really is our breasts. (focus group, year 8)

Again, while there is affirmation and pleasure (Mercedes is pleased she got 40 adds) the Deleuzian analysis of the bodily relations helps us to very simply understand how the broadcasts reduce the girl to her looks and her body parts ‘tits and bum’, which are highlighted to get ‘adds’. Cherelle (13) explained that several boys moved from responding to broadcasts and seeing he display photo to asking her ‘can I have a picture of your tits?’ As we saw Jodie (13) similarly described receiving requests for photos in her bra. The girls also discussed how the politics of the broadcasts reduced their bodies to the ideal ‘looks’ around certain parts like their ‘breast’ size and ‘skin tone’:

Jessica: Yeah, like loads of boys yeah. So she asked me because she wanted me to have more people, she broadcast it yeah about like 40 boys added me. (focus group, year 8)

Deleuze helps us to think about how images work energetically, that is to enable or contain flows of energy around sexuality and what is possible or impossible to imagine about a body as result of the look that is created in an image. From this conceptual starting point, then we can methodologically get to grips with trying to discover the value that can be derived from a photo through its relation in the affective network or assemblage of connections. How do the looking machines here constrain girl and boy bodies, materialising sexual difference?

To demonstrate the gender dualisms, the sexual difference created and that become through the looking machines online consider another image on Facebook. Assad posted a photo of his six pack photo and he tagged some girls in the photo so they would be sure to see it. One of the tagged girls then commented under the photo that she would look forward to seeing it (his body) for real when they ‘hooked up’ later in the week. In this instance, Assad confidently displays his body and receives a positive evaluation and response with the implication of real intimacy. Girls, however, had a more difficult time posting or sending body photos, which could be subject to the ‘hard hitting’ from girls and boys that we
discussed above. To investigate further how the images of girls' bodies work in the networked assemblage we are mapping worked we return to the images of breasts that are requested in the assemblage. There were numerous examples discussed of boys using these photos on their social networking site or even as their profile photo on Blackberry messenger profiles. For instance there was much discussion in interviews of photos of girls' body parts with the name of the boy written on it (with a marker) most commonly on part of the cleavage.

**Love, respect and ‘skets’: Bodily capture, fixing and disrupting**

The Feminist Deleuzian approach we are elaborating enables us to think about how the photos work or what do they enable or stop the body from doing or becoming? In one way the photo worked by generating value for the boy who is signalled in the photo as owning the valued body parts (the breasts) – it operates as potential proof of a sexual relationship with the body in the photo (Ringrose and Harvey, 2012).iv The photos also work through the extensive categories of gender and sexuality which striate (that is carve up and limit movement) in both online and offline space. Most boys and girls called girls who took or sent such photos as ‘stupid’ other girls who did not respect themselves. This was because the ‘look’ of these images would categorize the girl as a ‘sket’:

Irina: But most girls who do that and send the pictures they already have had sex or will do it or are ready to do it, yeah. It is like, you know ‘skets’, as in like they will give some random one to anyone and they show off their body.

Alexandra: I wouldn’t want people to see – I just don’t do it, I don’t think it is the right kind of messages…I think I have like respect for myself. I wouldn’t like other people – like I’m not really bothered to get attention from other people, like I wouldn’t be like posting my naked pictures on my – I wouldn’t even take naked pictures, because I think that is very stupid.

The images stick to and pin down and fix the body in the photo as ‘sket’ because they ‘send the wrong message’ through the look, that the body is to be sexually available instead of shielded, as mentioned earlier. The Deleuzian approach goes beyond reading representations or attitudes, however, to unpack how the ‘look’ of the images materialises gendered bodies which become in dualising and hierarchical ways through the relations with and to these images. Indeed, the look of this type of image also worked to de-value the girl as shame-less and not worth a relationship:

Kaja: She is not the type of girl I would want to go out with…I wouldn’t like want to be seen with her…girls like this I wouldn’t love. I don’t know why, I just wouldn’t love. I wouldn’t have respect for them…It might sound rude yeah but girls like that, I’m not being rude yeah, but I would just have sex with her and then leave her. I wouldn’t want to – I would talk to her, but I wouldn’t get in a relationship with her.

Again we see the relations of sexual difference, the dualism machine of gender. Kaja can gain value from the photo at the same time that he that devalues the girl. He wants to look (online) but not be ‘seen with’ because he cannot ‘love’ or ‘respect’ the girl. This same gendered difference was evident in Monique (15) and Kylie’s (15) discussion of how the images worked:

Kylie: But the thing is the girl shouldn’t be so stupid as to send it.
Monique: If the boyfriend really wants to see it he can see it in person and that’s it.
Kylie: The girls want to impress their boyfriends but they don’t want to them to do nothing with the photo.
Monique: But that is what most of the younger lot think.
Kylie: Impressing them, that is losing respect.
Jessica: What do the younger lot think?
Kylie: They think, ‘Oh if I wear this, and I do this for him then he is going to love me, and I am impressing him’.
Monique: Love, hum!
Kylie: The thing is yeah like if the girls are going to send them the picture that is also leading the boys on.
Monique: You are fuelling their disrespect.
Kylie: They think then maybe she will also do this. And then when the boy tries it –
Monique: And it doesn’t work, they are confused. Because you are sending mixed messages.
Kylie: For me as a girl if I sent a picture to that boy and it has got passed on, it is my fault, because one I shouldn’t have took the picture, however that boy is in the wrong also.
Jessica: What if they ask you for a picture for example, which I have seen the year eights saying they are like, ‘Oh like they are asking for a picture of me in my bra like every day’.
Monique: Yeah, and it’s like ‘No’!

Here complex relationships between images, looks, and the engendering of bodies or how gender and difference become are apparent. The images of girls’ body parts seem saturated with the affects - affective intensities - where sending or posting an images of girls body parts seem to be a doing or becoming that creates sexual ‘wrongness’ or ‘stupid-ness’ more so than for boys. Like Kaja, Monique and Kylie suggest this looking won’t generate ‘love’ but ‘disrespect’ for girls, but they also tried to resist this gender dualism:

Kylie: We try to challenge it all the time. Like if we have sex, straight away, we are a slag. The second a boy has sex, you are real player you got in there. The minute the girl does it, it’s bad, and we always say to the boys ‘so if I do this with this person I’m a slag but if you do it with that person no one says anything to you?’
Monique: They have never said it to me but they did say about me that I was a slag and I made a point in front of all the girls of saying it is my body what I do with it is up to me. My mum knows I have spoken to her about it.
Kylie: And everyone respected you more for it.
Monique: Do you get what I’m saying? I use protection, I have done my research, I’m not stupid, I didn’t just go and have sex freely and thought, ‘Yeah let’s just do it because he wants to do it’. I made the decision by myself and I said to all the girls, so all of you lot want to call me a ‘sket’ because you are not sexually active whatever, whatever, so be it. I don’t care, and I carried on with my life and eventually they all respected me because they said, ‘Do you know what she’s not hiding it, she confident about what she does’, so they left me.

This passage foregrounds an explicit ‘challenge’ to the double standards of the sexual difference machine where girls are called ‘sket’ or ‘slag’ for sexual activity and boys called ‘players’. Monique resists the injury of ‘sket’ by declaring her sexual activity, which
disrupted the relations of looking and the fixity of ‘sket’ by the peer group, so that the intensity of slut eventually ‘left’. The bodily relations that enabled this unfixing of her from ‘slut’ included her relationship with her mum a teen mother who told Monique she could always come to her to discuss sex, and friends like Kylie, who were part of a peer group that undertook a joint visit to the local sexual health clinic to get condoms and familiarise their friends with birth-control. The Deleuzian attention to when something injurious can unfix from a body, affording more space and movement is crucial in helping us see how Monique can stage her gendered body somewhat differently (see also Renold and Ringrose, 2008; 2011; Jackson, 2010).

Conclusions
In this paper we have explored how a feminist Deleuzian approach creates useful cartographic tools that help us map out what bodies can do. This basic starting point helps to re-think our understandings of how bodies relate to one another. This aids in moving away from a simplistic media effects approach to one that considers the rich affective complexity of relations between bodies and images and how and when images do engender and capture and fix bodies. In particular, we explored the idea of looking machines on social networks that inscribe sexual difference and the gendered and sexualised affects attached to images by the young people. For instance, we showed how girls’ bodies were captured as ‘slut’ or ‘sket’ or ‘slag’ but also how they challenged this, unfixing their bodies from these captures. Bringing together our diverse data to demonstrate the methodological usefulness of Deleuze is part of contributing to the ‘transcendental empiricism’ Deleuze insisted could change the ways we understand and act in the world. Indeed plugging our research findings into one another, as we’ve done here, creates an assemblage to demonstrate how concepts can work to enable new types of seeing and thinking about our research. There is always an ethical dimension, which we have sought to make explicit – methodologically we isolated clusters of concepts that work to take forward our political projects, in this case a feminist consideration of the workings of gender and sexual dualisms and hierarchies.

When social scientists’ create cartographies that demonstrate the machines and relations that striate (e.g. dualise) the social they are illustrating ethical and political dimensions of life (exploring power) through their research process. As Hickey-Moody and Malins (2007: 18) argue, ‘Deleuze’s philosophy makes socio-political empiricism an imperative, because the assemblages that social researchers and practitioners form with the world necessarily have implications for bodies and their capacities’. When social scientists find and map the capture, fixing and unfixing of the body and its machinic connections they offer hope and possibility for something different in the social. With this chapter we have sought to make just this form of methodological intervention.

References
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.

**Notes**

i For a longer discussion of the research methods see Ringrose, 2012.
ii Bebo was a popular online social network for young people in 2008 at the time of this research project; usage is now largely supplanted by Facebook.

iii Blackberry messenger is a social network for Blackberry phone users. The user creates a profile and can ‘add’ other Blackberry messenger contacts through a pin number, which is broadcasted by other users.

iv See Ringrose and Harvey (2012) for a much fuller analysis of the exchange value of these images within the affective economy of ‘sexting’.