Dwenger, N;
Kleven, H;
Rasul, I;
Rincke, J;
(2016)
Extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance: Evidence from a field experiment in Germany.
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
, 8
(3)
pp. 203-232.
10.1257/pol.20150083.
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Abstract
We study extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance in the context of a local church tax in Germany. This tax system has historically relied on zero deterrence so that any compliance at baseline is intrinsically motivated. Starting from this zero deterrence baseline, we implement a field experiment that incentivized compliance through deterrence or rewards. Using administrative records of taxes paid and true tax liabilities, we use these treatments to document that intrinsically motivated compliance is substantial, that a significant fraction of it may be driven by duty-to-comply preferences, and that there is no crowd-out between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance: Evidence from a field experiment in Germany |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1257/pol.20150083 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150083 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © 2016 AEA. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1508664 |
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