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Asymmetric enforcement of cooperation in a social dilemma

Nikiforakis, N.; Normann, H.-T.; Wallace, B.; (2009) Asymmetric enforcement of cooperation in a social dilemma. (ELSE Working Papers 334). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access

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Abstract

We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the average punishment effectiveness of the institutions, we find that asymmetric punishment institutions are as effective in fostering cooperation and as efficient as symmetric institutions. At the individual level, we find that players with higher punishment effectiveness contribute similar amounts to the public account, but have higher earnings and punish more than their weak counterparts.

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: Asymmetric enforcement of cooperation in a social dilemma
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php
Language: English
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14998
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