UCL Discovery
UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

Competition and Coordination in Bank Regulation: The Financial Crisis of 2007–09

Provost, C; (2016) Competition and Coordination in Bank Regulation: The Financial Crisis of 2007–09. International Journal of Public Administration , 39 (7) pp. 540-551. 10.1080/01900692.2015.1028634. Green open access

[thumbnail of Main article]
Preview
Text (Main article)
Provost Competition and Coordination in Bank Regulation.pdf

Download (175kB) | Preview
[thumbnail of Figure 1]
Preview
Text (Figure 1)
Provost Competition and Coordination in Bank Regulation -Figure 1.pdf

Download (6kB) | Preview
[thumbnail of Figure 2]
Preview
Text (Figure 2)
Provost Competition and Coordination in Bank Regulation - Figure 2.pdf

Download (8kB) | Preview
[thumbnail of Figure 3]
Preview
Text (Figure 3)
Provost Competition and Coordination in Bank Regulation - Figure 3.pdf

Download (8kB) | Preview
[thumbnail of Figure 4]
Preview
Text (Figure 4)
Provost Competition and Coordination in Bank Regulation - Figure 4.pdf

Download (9kB) | Preview

Abstract

The ability of businesses to shift regulatory jurisdictions has long raised questions about whether this generates a regulatory race to the bottom (RTB). Prior to the Financial Crisis of 2007–09, the structure of U.S. federal bank regulation raised similar questions, as banks could choose their regulator and regulators received fees for assessing banks. I investigate this question, through the theoretical lenses of bureaucratic structure, regulatory capture and bureaucratic reputation. Relying on quantitative and qualitative data, I find that the initial regulatory structure did induce a regulatory RTB, but once the Financial Crisis had begun, reputational fears on the part of federal agencies reversed the race, as the regulators strengthened standards and brought more enforcement actions. The paper ultimately shows that multiple theories help to explain what is going on with regulatory RTBs.

Type: Article
Title: Competition and Coordination in Bank Regulation: The Financial Crisis of 2007–09
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2015.1028634
Publisher version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2015.1028634
Language: English
Additional information: Copyright © 2016 Taylor & Francis. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the International Journal of Public Administration on 30 November 2015 and available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01900692.2015.1028634
Keywords: Banking and finance, bureaucratic reputation, race to the bottom, regulatory capture
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Political Science
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1492812
Downloads since deposit
308Downloads
Download activity - last month
Download activity - last 12 months
Downloads by country - last 12 months

Archive Staff Only

View Item View Item