Chiu, H; (2014) Corporate governance: the missing paradigm in the mandatory bail-in regime for creditors of banks and financial institutions. Journal of Business Law , 2014 (8) pp. 611-634.

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Abstract

Mandatory bail-in is set to become an important part of any process relating to the resolution of banks and financial institutions. This article supports the public interest arguments underlying mandatory bail-in but argues that it is necessary to consider how bail-inable debt holders’ interests and concerns should be addressed. The article argues in support of a limited range of ex ante corporate governance rights for bail-inable debt holders as a matter of principle as well as being instrumental for the fair and orderly implementation of mandatory bail-in. Such corporate governance rights may be framed in soft law. This article argues that the scope of such rights could be shaped according to the interface between bail-inable debt holders’ private interests which justify their corporate governance role, and the public interest in orderly resolution that affects the scope of such rights.

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