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Private provision of public goods in the local interaction model

Matros, A.; (2003) Private provision of public goods in the local interaction model. (ELSE Working Papers 69). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access

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Abstract

This paper analyses the evolutionary version of the Public Good game (Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998)) when agents can use imitation and best reply decision rules. I provide a condition, which completely describes agent behavior in the long run, for any number of neighbors and any total number of agents. Moreover, it is shown that it is enough to have just one decision rule per agent in order to obtain the same long run outcomes. The paper gives an explanation why we might observe irrational cooperation in the rational World.

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: Private provision of public goods in the local interaction model
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2003
Language: English
Additional information: Figures 1 and 2 are included as separate files
Keywords: JEL classification: C70, C72, C73
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14613
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