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Evolutive equilibrium selection I: symmetric two player binary choice games

Vaughan, R.; (2004) Evolutive equilibrium selection I: symmetric two player binary choice games. (ELSE Working Papers 113). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access

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Abstract

The aim of the paper is the construction of a distributional model which enables the study of the evolutionary dynamics that arise for symmetric games, and the equilibrium selection mechanisms that originate from such processes. The evolution of probability distributions over the state variables is studied using the Fokker-Planck diffusion equation. Equilibrium selection using the ��basin of attraction�� approach, and a selection process suggested by Pontryagin are contrasted. Examples are provided for all generic 2-person symmetric binary choice games.

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: Evolutive equilibrium selection I: symmetric two player binary choice games
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php
Language: English
Keywords: JEL classification: C78. Symmetric games, equilibrium selection, diffusion processes
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14570
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