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Retaliatory equilibria in a Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects

Albano, G.L.; Germano, F.; Lovo, S.; (2004) Retaliatory equilibria in a Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects. (ELSE Working Papers 118). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access

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Abstract

We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects, thus showing that while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object.

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: Retaliatory equilibria in a Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php
Language: English
Keywords: JEL classification: C72, D44. Ascending auctions for multiple objects, clock auctions, FCC auctions, collusion, retaliation
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14566
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