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Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post

Armstrong, M.; (2008) Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post. Review of Network Economics , 7 (2) pp. 172-187. 10.2202/1446-9022.1144. Green open access

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Abstract

A postal regulator typically faces two issues which make the design of efficient access pricing especially difficult and which complicate the process of liberalizing the industry. First, universal service obligations, together with the presence of fixed costs, require retail prices to depart from the underlying marginal costs of the incumbent provider. Second, competing firms may be able to bypass the incumbent’s delivery network. Within a simple and stylized framework, this note analyzes how access charges should best be set in the light of these twin constraints.

Type: Article
Title: Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1144
Publisher version: http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1446-9022.1144
Language: English
Additional information: © The Berkeley Electronic Press 2008. For the Discussion Papers in Economics version, please see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/2549/. Please also see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/15101/ for the version published din the American Economic Review.
Keywords: JEL classification: L11, L87. Postal service, access pricing, liberalization, universal service
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of SandHS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14556
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