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Rational adversaries? evidence from randomised trials in one day cricket

Bhaskar, V.; (2007) Rational adversaries? evidence from randomised trials in one day cricket. (ELSE Working Papers 194). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access

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Abstract

In cricket, the right to make an important decision (bat first or field first) is assigned via a coin toss. These "randomised trials" allow us to examine the consistency of choices made by teams with strictly opposed preferences, and the effects of these choices upon game outcomes. Random assignment allows us to consistently aggregate across matches, ensuring that our tests have power. We find significant evidence of inconsistency, with teams often agreeing on who is to bat first. Choices are often poorly made and reduce the probability of the team winning, a surprising finding given the intense competition and learning opportunities. Keywords: interactive decision theory, zero sum situation, randomised trial, treatment effects.

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: Rational adversaries? evidence from randomised trials in one day cricket
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2006
Language: English
Additional information: Please see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/15425/ for details of the version published in The Economic Journal
Keywords: D8, D210
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14525
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