Zalabardo, JL;
(2014)
Précis of Scepticism and Reliable Belief.
Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía
, 33
(3)
88 - 91.
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Abstract
The problem of scepticism and the analysis of knowledge are two central topics of the traditional epistemological curriculum. They are intimately related. Sceptical arguments purport to establish the conclusion that most knowledge is impossible by showing that there are necessary conditions for knowledge that we cannot satisfy. Whether these conditions have the status that sceptical arguments ascribe to them will depend on how knowledge should be analysed. If the right analysis makes room for instances of knowledge that don’t satisfy the conditions that the sceptical arguments treat as necessary, the arguments will have to be dismissed as unsound. This aspect of the problem of scepticism is brought to prominence by externalist analyses of knowledge. All extant sceptical arguments appear to rest on principles concerning the nature of knowledge that are rejected by externalist analyses. If this is right, then scepticism poses a problem only for those who endorse internalist analyses of knowledge.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Précis of Scepticism and Reliable Belief |
| Location: | Spain |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | https://www.unioviedo.es/Teorema/Spanish/Numeros/X... |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | Knowledge, Scepticism, Reliability, Evidence |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1451595 |
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