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Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, G.; Morris, S.; (2007) Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma. (ELSE Working Papers 218). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access

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Abstract

This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and periods. We focus on the purifiability of one-period memory mixed strategy equilibria used by Ely and V¨alim¨aki (2002) in their study of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with private monitoring. We find that any such strategy profile is not the limit of one-period memory equilibrium strategy profiles of the perturbed game, for almost all noise distributions. However, if we allow infinite memory strategies in the perturbed game, then any completely-mixed equilibrium is purifiable.

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2006
Language: English
Additional information: Please see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/15426/ for details of a version published in the Review of Economic Dynamics
Keywords: C72, C73
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of SandHS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14515
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