REFERENCE ONLY

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON THESIS

Degree MPhil Year 2005 Name of Author

COPYRIGHT
This is a thesis accepted for a Higher Degree of the University of London. It is an unpublished typescript and the copyright is held by the author. All persons consulting the thesis must read and abide by the Copyright Declaration below.

COPYRIGHT DECLARATION
I recognise that the copyright of the above-described thesis rests with the author and that no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author.

LOANS
Theses may not be lent to individuals, but the Senate House Library may lend a copy to approved libraries within the United Kingdom, for consultation solely on the premises of those libraries. Application should be made to: Inter-Library Loans, Senate House Library, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.

REPRODUCTION
University of London theses may not be reproduced without explicit written permission from the Senate House Library. Enquiries should be addressed to the Theses Section of the Library. Regulations concerning reproduction vary according to the date of acceptance of the thesis and are listed below as guidelines.

A. Before 1962. Permission granted only upon the prior written consent of the author. (The Senate House Library will provide addresses where possible).

B. 1962 - 1974. In many cases the author has agreed to permit copying upon completion of a Copyright Declaration.

C. 1975 - 1988. Most theses may be copied upon completion of a Copyright Declaration.

D. 1989 onwards. Most theses may be copied.

This thesis comes within category D.

☐ This copy has been deposited in the Library of UCL.

☐ This copy has been deposited in the Senate House Library, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.
On the Relation between God and Creatures in the Monadological System

Kenichi Kamioka

University College London

M. Phil.

March 2005
ABSTRACT

The main task of the present thesis is to clarify Leibniz's conception of the relation between God and creatures, in contrast with Spinozism. Before performing this task, I shall show that the relation between God and creatures corresponds in the monadological system to the relation between the soul and the body, and that these two relations are both ontological—by which I mean that they are essentially concerned with the distinction between a being and its being. In order to explicate these two relations properly, I shall adopt the Heideggerian ontology as a method of the interpretation of Leibniz.

The present thesis has three parts. In Part One I shall determine the relation between the soul and the body with recourse to Heidegger's ontological difference, and show that this relation corresponds to the relation between God and creatures (or the world as the sum of created beings). In Part Two I shall show more clearly how these two relations correspond. In order to do so, I shall determine in more detail the relation between the soul and the body, by grasping it as the relation among the dominant monad, its body and the subordinate monads. This latter relation will be explicited again by the ontological difference. In Part Three I shall treat of a paradox which follows from the correspondence between the God-world relation and the soul-body relation; that is to say, if God is to the world as the soul is to its body, it follows that he is the world-soul which has the world as its body—the doctrine which Leibniz consistently rejects, ascribing it particularly to Spinoza. I shall show that this doctrine itself does not contradict the theory of monads. It is in this part that the contrast is made between the monadological system and Spinozism.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS AND REFERENCES</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATION</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART ONE</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART TWO</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART THREE</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS AND REFERENCES

Where English translations are available, I have quoted from them, sometimes with modifications. References to Leibniz’s works are keyed to the list of abbreviations which follows.
ABBREVIATION


M  Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology. Trans. by George R. Montgomery. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1902

INTRODUCTION

There was an opinion prevailing in 19th-century Germany among historians of philosophy, according to which the monadological system ends in Spinozism.\(^1\) This opinion was so deep-rooted that even in Leibniz's lifetime there existed a suspicion that his theory of monads has an affinity with Spinozism. Wolff was obliged to struggle against the accusation that Leibniz was a plagiarist of Spinoza. The well-known controversy between Jacobi and Mendelssohn, which broke out over Lessing's Spinozism, was somewhat concerned with the relation between the two philosophers. Of the German idealists, who were deeply influenced by this controversy, Schelling went so far as to identify 'monads' with 'modes,'\(^2\) assuming it as admitted that 'Leibniz's monads are not a decisive measure against Spinozism.'\(^3\) The said opinion is in line with this long-established tradition.\(^4\)

Meanwhile, in the late nineteenth century, Ludwig Stein published a book entitled \textit{Leibniz und Spinoza}. This book treats of the development of Leibniz's philosophy in connexion with Spinoza, and in part in connexion with Plato, who provided Leibniz with 'weapons'\(^5\) against Spinozism. And what Stein presented there, though not entirely

\(^2\) See Schelling, \textit{Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom}, pp. 16-7. When he describes the history of philosophy, however, he makes a distinction between the philosophy of Leibniz and that of Spinoza; see, for example, \textit{On the History of Modern Philosophy}, pp. 64 ff.
\(^3\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 17.
\(^4\) For further details, see Stein, \textit{Leibniz und Spinoza}, Kapitel I.
\(^5\) \textit{Ibid.}, S. XI; see also S. 134 ff.
accurate, appeared to bring the matter to an issue at that time. For instance in the essay ‘On the Relation between the Philosophy of Spinoza and That of Leibniz,’ published in 1899, Robert Latta says: ‘[Stein’s *Leibniz und Spinoza*] seems to me to prove conclusively that Leibniz was no more a plagiarist of Spinoza than he was a plagiarist of Newton, but that he was “philosophically homo sui generis.” strongly influenced by thinkers like Plato and Spinoza, yet in his philosophy neither Platonist nor Spinozist but always Leibnizian.’ It is indeed true that this book of Stein’s threw great light upon the relation between Leibniz and Spinoza, which had long remained obscure; but as to the difference between the two systems, he avoided forming a definite conclusion. Instead, he closely scrutinised the *Réfutation inédite de Spinoza par Leibniz*, which was published in 1854 by Alexandre Foucher de Careil, and showed that it in fact contains no “refutation” of Spinoza, but an ‘examination of his basic teachings from the standpoint of the theory of monads,’ whose results, however, are not satisfactory. ‘Nevertheless,’ Stein adds, ‘until the end of his life Leibniz had an unshakable conviction that his theory of monads completely overcame [Spinozistic] pantheism.’ Stein, however, gives us no explanation for the basis of this conviction.

At the turn of the century, in his *Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* Bertrand Russell, mentioning the relation between the two systems, concluded that ‘Leibniz, whenever he treats God at all seriously, falls involuntarily into a Spinozistic

---

7 Stein, *Leibniz und Spinoza*, S. 237. According to Stein, Foucher de Careil, being overzealous to purify Leibniz of all Spinozism, somewhat exaggeratedly so entitled; see *ibid.*, S. 224 ff.
9 *Ibid.*, S. XIV; see also S. 250 ff.
pantheism.'\textsuperscript{10} Since then, it seems to me, the relation between the philosophy of Leibniz and that of Spinoza has become a minor subject which is discussed only occasionally.\textsuperscript{11}

I have made these historical remarks in the first place because it seems to me that the monadological system differs essentially from Spinozism and that this difference becomes distinct especially when the relation between God and creatures is spoken of. When, for instance, Leibniz explains the difference between his system and Spinozism, he insists upon the plurality of monads; for, according to him, Spinoza in contrast conceives of God as the only substance and of creatures as its modifications or accidents. Writing to Bourguet, who doubted that there is an affinity between the theory of monads and Spinozism, Leibniz says with some irritation: 'I do not see how you can deduce any Spinozism from this; to do so is to jump at conclusions. On the contrary, it is though these very monads that Spinozism is destroyed, for there are just as many true substances, as many living mirrors of the universe which subsist always, or as many concentrated universes, as there are monads; according to Spinoza, on the contrary, there is only one substance. He would be right if there were no monads; then everything except God would be of a passing nature and would vanish into simple accidents or modifications, since there would be no substantial foundation in things, such as consists

\textsuperscript{10} Russell, \textit{The Philosophy of Leibniz}, pp. 185-6.

\textsuperscript{11} For example, Hicks, 'The "Modes" of Spinoza and the "Monads" of Leibniz,' Friedmann, \textit{Leibniz et Spinoza}, Parkinson, 'Leibniz's Paris Writings in Relation to Spinoza' and Adams, \textit{Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist}, Chapter 4, section 3. This is partly because, I think, after the publication of Russell's \textit{Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz} (1900) and Louis Couturat's \textit{La Logique de Leibniz} (1901), their interpretation—which regards Leibniz's philosophy as being 'almost entirely derived from his logic' (Russell, \textit{The Philosophy of Leibniz}, p. IX)—became predominant.
in the existence of monads' (G III 575/L 663).

These words, to be sure, sound too simple and naïve to 'destroy' Spinozism. But, Leibniz himself never thought so. In a sense, therefore, the main task of the present thesis is to understand the real meaning of the above statement, that is to say, to clarify the relation between God and creatures in the monadological system, in contrast with Spinozism.

But before performing this task, I should like to show, to a considerable extent, the uniqueness of the Leibnizian conception of the relation between God and creatures, without, however, reference to Spinozism. In the monadological system, as we shall see, the relation between God and creatures corresponds to the relation between the soul and the body. And these two relations are both ontological—by which I mean that they are essentially concerned with the distinction between a being and its being. Therefore, in order to explicate these two relations properly, I shall make recourse to what Heidegger calls the 'ontological difference'—by which beings are rigorously differentiated from their being. In other words, I shall adopt the Heideggerian ontology as a method of the interpretation of Leibniz. This may perhaps surprise the reader. So I wish here to inform the reader in advance that whenever I introduce a Heideggerian concept to my argument, I shall endeavour not only to explain this concept as clearly as possible, but also to make it clear why I need to apply such a concept to Leibniz's philosophy. Thus, I believe, the reader—even if unfamiliar with Heidegger’s philosophy—will have no great difficulty in understanding the main argument. (Sometimes I shall enter somewhat minutely into Heidegger’s philosophy in footnotes; but they are not essential for the understanding of the main argument.)

The present thesis will be divided into three parts.
Part One is a preliminary study for the following two parts. I shall begin by considering what kind of being God and creatures are in the monadological system: God will be characterised as a spirit destitute of body, and creatures as corporeal substances. As the status of corporeal substances in Leibniz’s philosophy is highly controversial, I shall have an opportunity of entering into recent discussions on it. But the chief aim in this part is to show the correspondence between the relation of the soul to its body and the relation of God to his creatures (or the world as the sum of all created beings). Therefore I shall speak mainly of the relation between the soul and the body, between simple and corporeal substances. This relation, as I have already mentioned, will be determined ontologically, that is to say, with recourse to Heidegger’s ontological difference. Moreover, the thesis which Leibniz often advances in his later writings, namely that ‘a body is an aggregate of monads,’ will be interpreted ontologically. I shall also try to explain, on the basis of these considerations, how Aristotelianism and Platonism coexist in Leibniz’s philosophy.

Part Two is the main part of the present thesis. It is intended, in this part, to show more clearly how the relation of the soul to its body corresponds to the relation of God to the world. I shall first of all try to determine in more detail the relation between the soul and the body, by grasping it as the relation among the dominant monad, its body and the subordinate monads. This latter relation will be divided into two relations: the relation of the dominant monad to the subordinate monads and the relation of the subordinate monads to the body of the dominant monad. And in order to explicate these two relations properly, I shall again have recourse to Heidegger’s ontological difference. But in this part it will also be divided into two kinds; one will be applied to the relation between the dominant monad and the subordinate monads, and another to the relation
between the subordinate monads and the body of the dominant monad. These two kinds
of ontological difference, however, are rather difficult to understand, and require a
further explanation. Since Heidegger himself acquired them from his unique
interpretation of Plato’s theory of ideas, I shall survey it at some length in order to
support the above explanation. Through this survey it will be shown that there is a
structural resemblance between Plato’s theory of ideas and Leibniz’s theory of monads.
(But, in the present thesis, I shall avoid treating directly of the relation between Leibniz
and Plato, though it is an interesting topic.)\textsuperscript{12} After explicating, by the two kinds of
ontological difference, the relation of the dominant monad to the subordinate monads
and the relation of the subordinate monads to the body of the dominant monad, I shall
further try to show that God is the most dominant monad; that all created monads, on
the other hand, are subordinate to him, making up a part of the world; but that each one
of them, as a dominant monad, does the same thing as God, imitating him in a greater or
less degree. The essential difference between God and creatures in the monadological
system will also be shown. Finally, the correspondence between the soul-body relation
and the God-world relation will be clarified.

Part Three is a supplement to Part Two. For, in this part, I shall treat of a paradox
which follows from the correspondence of the relation between the soul and the body
with the relation between God and the world. That is to say, if God is to the world as the
soul is to its body, it follows that he is the world-soul which has the world as its body.
But Leibniz consistently rejected such a conception of God, ascribing it particularly to
Spinoza. I shall then examine the reason for this rejection and criticise the opinion of

\textsuperscript{12} On the relation between Leibniz and Plato, see for example Stein, \textit{Leibniz und Spinoza}, Kapitel
Kuno Fischer, according to which the conception of God as the highest monad leads to
the doctrine of the world-soul: with the aim of showing that this doctrine itself does not
contradict the theory of monads. This aim will be achieved by reconsidering what has
been said of the relation among the dominant monad, its body and the subordinate
monads. It is in this part that the contrast is made between the monadological system
and Spinozism.
Before treating of the relation between God and creatures in the monadological system, I should like to make clear what kind of being God and creatures are.

Leibniz characterises God in various ways; for example, he speaks of God in the *Discourse on Metaphysics* as ‘an absolutely perfect being’ (G IV 427/L 303), ‘the sun and the light of souls’ (G IV 453/L 321), ‘the greatest of all beings’ (G IV 460/L 326), ‘the most perfect of all spirits’ (G IV 460/L 326), and ‘the monarch of the most perfect Republic consisting of all spirits’ (G II 14/L 326); in the essay *On the Radical Origination of Things* as ‘the ultimate reason for things’ (G VII 302/L 486); in *Considerations on Vital Principles and Plastic Natures* as being ‘above all matter’ (G VI 546/L 590); in the *Monadology* as ‘the primary unity or the simple original substance of which all the created or derivative monads are products’ (G VI 614/L 647); and in the *Correspondence with Clarke* as ‘intelligentia supramundana’ (G VII 358 ff./L 679 ff.). But I have no intention of treating of all these features here; instead, I wish to take up only this feature, that God is ‘above all matter’; that is to say, that he has no body. ‘God alone,’ says Leibniz, ‘is entirely detached from body’ (G VI 619/L 650). Although God is a spirit, since he is without body, he has no limitations; therefore he is called ‘actus purus’ (G II 325).

On the other hand, creatures must have a body; in other words, being extended, they are always corporeal substances. Each of these substances, like men or animals, is composed of an organic body and the soul which is its entelechy. According to Leibniz, no entelechy can ‘ever lack an organic body’ (G II 251/L 530; cf. G II 324 ff.; G VI 545-6/L 590; G VII 330). ‘Together with a particular body,’ he says, ‘each monad makes
a living substance' (G VI 599/L 637). By the way, there are in an organic body an infinity of simple substances which are the souls of the organs or cells of this body; and these simple substances are dominated by one simple substance, the soul of this entire body. Under such domination a body which is itself divisible into smaller bodies *ad infinitum* is substantially unified by its soul; it is thus that a living organism results from simple substances or monads. In the preliminary study for his letter to Des Bosses of 5 February 1712, Leibniz writes that ‘monads,’ being ‘under the domination of one monad,’ ‘make up one organic body, that is, one machine of nature’ (G II 439/AG 199).

‘And in this,’ he continues, ‘consists the metaphysical bond between the soul and the body, which constitute a *unum suppositum* . . . . And these are those which make up a *unum per se*, that is, a *unum suppositum*’ (G II 439/AG 199). From this it is clear that Leibniz regards a corporeal substance composed of soul and organic body as a *unum per se* or a *unum suppositum*.1 Since, according to him, ‘*Ens* and *unum* are convertible

---

1 In the *Correspondence with De Bosses* (1706-16) Leibniz seems to think that the union between the soul and the body cannot be sufficiently explained only by the pre-established harmony. Therefore he admits ‘some real metaphysical union between the soul and the organic body’ (G II 371/L 598), which makes them a *unum per se* or a *unum suppositum*. This admission had already been made by him to Tournebmine, who maintains that the pre-established harmony does not account for the ‘union’ between the soul and the body, but only for their ‘correspondence’ (cf. WF 246 ff.; G VI 45/H 68-9; see also Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, Chapter 10, section 5 and Rutherford, *Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature*, Chapter 10). And now Leibniz, in order to explain the unity of a corporeal substance, develops the concept of a ‘substantial bond [vinculum substantiale]’ (cf. G II 435 ff./L 600 ff.); the substantial bond is a ‘real unifier’ (G II 435/L 600) which unifies a collection of monads and makes them be a single living creature. ‘Monads,’ he says, ‘do not constitute a complete composite substance, since they do not make up a *unum per se* but merely an aggregate, unless some substantial bond is added’ (G II 444/L 602). Therefore it seems to me that the substantial bond is in essence nothing else than the domination of a dominant monad over the monads subordinate to it. (More will be said of this in Part Two.) In any case, the doctrine of the substantial bond has long since perplexed commentators; for it results in admitting a
terms' (G II 304/R 248; cf. G II 97/M 191), and 'what is not truly a being is not truly a being' (G II 97/M 191), we can say that a corporeal substance is truly a being. Moreover, as corporeal substances are in some sense 'assemblages' of simple substances (L 636), they are called also 'compound' substances; and regarding them Leibniz repeats (in the same study which I have just quoted): 'Composite substances are those which constitute a unum per se, composed of a soul and an organic body, which is a machine of nature resulting from monads' (G II 439/AG 199). Undoubtedly he thinks here that corporeal substances are a unum per se and a basic unit of nature.

The same idea is expressed in the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) and the Correspondence with Arnauld (1686-90), where Leibniz laid the foundations of his mature philosophy. For instance, after confirming in section 12 of the Discourse that

metaphysical union between the soul and the body, other than the union which is given to them by the pre-established harmony. (For further details, see Russell, The Philosophy of Leibniz, pp. 147 ff., Rescher, The Philosophy of Leibniz, pp. 121 ff., Broad, Leibniz: An Introduction, pp. 124 ff., Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, pp. 299 ff. and Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, pp. 276 ff.) By the way, as we shall see shortly, in the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) and the Correspondence with Arnauld (1686-90) Leibniz conceives of a substantial form as giving a substantial unity to matter; hence it has the same character as the substantial bond. (In fact in a letter to Des Bosses of August 1715 he identifies the substantial bond with 'what the Scholastics call a substantial form' (G II 504/L 614).) Whence the same problem as above mentioned arises. But in this period he seems not to care much about it. For he speaks of the soul as a substantial form by reason that it unifies its body substantially, while at the same time he says: 'The soul is . . . the form of its body, because it expresses the phenomena of all other bodies according to their relation to its own' (G II 58/M 135). (Cf. Brown, Leibniz, pp. 165 ff., Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, pp. 291 ff. and Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, pp. 266 ff.) In what follows, however, I shall scarcely speak of the union between the soul and the body which is given by the harmony of perceptions; for I believe that there must be a real metaphysical union between the soul and the body which is not explicable only by this harmony. This union, however, does not compete with the pre-established harmony, but complements it. (Cf. Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, pp. 294.)
'anyone who will meditate about the nature of substance . . . will find\(^2\) that the entire body does not consist merely in extension . . ., but that there must necessarily be recognized in it something related to souls, which is commonly called a substantial form . . .' (G IV 436/L 309), he makes in section 34 an assumption that 'the bodies which make up a *unum per se*, for example man, are substances . . . and . . . have substantial forms' (G IV 459/L 325). Since, as I have already remarked, matter can be divided into smaller parts *ad infinitum*, it cannot by itself constitute a single being; in order to do so, it requires a soul or a substantial form which unifies these parts and makes them one. If, therefore, a body lacks a soul or a substantial form, it remains a 'unum per accidentem,' a 'being by aggregation,' 'plura entia'—in a word, a 'phenomenon.' Accordingly, he writes to Arnauld: ' . . . the matter which is understood as the mass in itself is only a pure phenomenon or appearance, as well-founded, however, as is space and time. It has not even those precise and determined qualities which can enable it to pass as a determined being . . ., because figure itself, which is the essence of a limited extended mass, is never, strictly speaking, perfectly determined in the state of nature because of the actually infinite division of the parts of matter . . . . Consequently extended mass, when considered without entelechies . . . , is not a corporeal substance but a wholly pure phenomenon like the rainbow. It has been also

\(^2\) The first draft has in addition these words: 'that bodies are not substances in strict metaphysics (this was indeed the opinion of the Platonists), and . . .' (L 328). 'Bodies' here do not mean corporeal substances composed of the soul and the body, but bodies by themselves, putting aside their souls (cf. G II 75/M 159). This is indeed in accord with Plato's opinion; for, according to Leibniz, Plato is the one who 'showed very clearly that matter alone does not suffice for forming a substance' (G II 76/M 161); in the essay *On Nature Itself* (1698) Leibniz repeats: 'Surely if corporeal things contained nothing but matter, they could most truly be said to consist of a flux and to have nothing substantial, as the Platonists long ago recognized' (G IV 509/L 502).
recognized by philosophers that it is the substantial form which gives a definite being to matter . . . ’ (G II 118-9/M 222). It is to be observed here that Leibniz acknowledges the substantial form to be that ‘which gives a definite being to matter.’ As I shall argue presently, if a soul is thought to be that which gives a being to its body, or that which endows its body with a unity, it can itself be neither a being nor a unity in the strict metaphysical sense; for it is rather that which makes its body be, or that which unifies its body. And what is to be called a ‘being’ or a ‘unity’ in such a case is what is given a being, or what is endowed with a unity—that is to say, a corporeal substance, such as a man or an animal. 3 Therefore, Leibniz says: ‘. . . man . . . is a being endowed with a real unity; his soul gives him this unity although the mass of his body is divided into organs, ducts, humors, spirits, and that the parts are doubtless full of an infinity of other corporeal substances endowed with their own entelechies’ (G II 120/M 224).

I thence form a judgment that corporeal substances are basic beings in the monadological system; in other words, that every being in the monadological system is a corporeal substance composed of soul and body. To this, however, many will object: for it has been widely accepted since the publication of C. D. Broad’s lectures on Leibniz 4 that although in the Discourse and the Correspondence with Arnauld Leibniz certainly conceived of corporeal substances as being no less real than simple substances and as constituting a unum per se, a genuine being, he changed his mind afterwards and

3 It is, nevertheless, possible to call simple substances ‘beings’ or ‘unities,’ although in a special sense; as for instance when Leibniz says that simple substances are ‘absolutely real’ (G II 119/M 223). In this case corporeal substances are regarded as ‘phenomena.’ But we cannot simply identify these phenomena with what is not real, until we understand in what sense simple substances can be called ‘beings.’ See the following argument.

4 Broad, Leibniz: An Introduction.
came to conceive only of simple substances (or monads) as existing in reality, and of all the rest resulting from them as beings by aggregation, that is to say, 'phenomena.' According to Broad, this change occurred in the *Correspondence with De Volder* (1699-1706).\(^5\) In fact Leibniz writes to De Volder in June 1703: ‘... only simple things are true things, and the rest are beings by aggregation and therefore phenomena, existing, as Democritus put it, by convention but not by nature [\textit{nomō not physei}]...’ (G II 252/L 531); in January 1704: ‘Therefore I feel that the bodies that are popularly regarded as substances are nothing but real phenomena, and are no more substances than parhelia and rainbows are\(^6\) (G II 262); and in June 1704: ‘... there is nothing in the world except simple substances and, in them, perception and appetite’ (G II 270/L 537). These words are seemingly out of accord with the passages quoted above from his earlier writings. Therefore it is said that in his philosophical career Leibniz had two different views on corporeal substances. The one may be characterised as 'Aristotelian' and the other as 'idealistic' or 'Platonic'; for in the *Discourse* and the *Correspondence with Arnauld* he adopted the substantial forms of the Peripatetic Schoolmen, holding that the soul and the body are inseparably united in one substance, but after the *Correspondence with De Volder* he sharply distinguished monads from bodies, and

\(^5\) *Ibid.*, p. 88 ff. If this view of Broad's is right, the theory of the substantial bond, which Leibniz advanced in the *Correspondence with Des Bosses* (1706-16), will be regarded as an inauthentic part of his later philosophy; and perhaps one may say with Russell, that Leibniz developed this theory in order to 'reconcile his philosophy with the dogma of transubstantiation,' (Russell, *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 151), and that he himself never believed it. Hence, one may continue, the substantial bond is 'rather the concession of a diplomatist than the creed of a philosopher (*ibid.*, p. 152). Broad's evaluation of the theory of the substantial bond seems quite similar to Russell's (see Broad, *Leibniz: An Introduction*, pp. 124 ff.).

conceived of the latter as reducible to the former, or, it may be said in Plato’s language, of the former as ontós on, what really is, and of the latter as mē on, what really is not. Many regard these two views as inconsistent, while, on the other hand, Daniel Garber regards them as ‘two different ways of working out what is, at root, a single position.’

I favour this opinion of Garber’s. It is true that Leibniz’s philosophy has both Aristotelian and Platonic features, but it seems to me that they are, as we shall see, harmonised in a particular way. This is why, for instance, Leibniz never felt it

---

7 Strictly speaking, it has been recognised that there are two models of reduction in the later Leibniz. The one is called the ‘aggregate thesis’ by Nicholas Jolley (‘Leibniz and Phenomenalism,’ p. 154); for bodies, on this model, are to be reduced to ‘aggregates of monads’; in other words, ‘a particular aggregate of monads appears to human observers as an extended physical object’ (ibid., p. 155). The other model, it is said, is ‘phenomenalistic’; for bodies, on this model, are reducible to ‘sets of harmonised perceptions,’ as for instance when Leibniz says: ‘Matter and motion . . . are not so much substances or things as they are the phenomena of percipient beings, whose reality is located in the harmony of the percipient with himself (at different times) and with other percipient beings’ (G II 270/L 537). Many regard these two models as incompatible; hence some think that Leibniz only flirted with phenomenalism; some, however, think that Leibniz was at first committed to the aggregate thesis, but that he afterwards came to embrace a phenomenalistic opinion in regard to the nature of bodies. (See for example Montgomery Furth, ‘Monadology,’ pp. 14 ff., Louis E. Loeb, From Descartes to Hume, pp. 301 ff. and Catherine Wilson, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, pp. 190 ff.) On the other hand, some argue that these two models are reconcilable. (See for example Robert Merrihew Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, Chapters 9 and 10.) I shall have occasion very soon to make some remarks on Leibniz’s ‘phenomenalism.’ In regard to the aggregate thesis, I shall argue it from an ontological point of view.

8 Garber, ‘Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years,’ p. 65. However, Garber acknowledges also that Leibniz’s idealism differs significantly from his Aristotelianism (see ibid., pp. 62 ff.). For instance, in his later years Leibniz came to shift the emphasis from corporeal to incorporeal substances, that is to say, to monads. (I shall later try to explain why he did so.) Adams also thinks that ‘the Aristotelian elements that are undeniably present in Leibniz’s thought are not inconsistent with his monadological theories’ (Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, p. 308); but unlike Garber he regards the former as a ‘part’ (ibid., p. 308) of the latter, holding that Leibniz was an idealist throughout his career. See ibid., Part III.
contradictory to speak at once of the Peripatetic doctrine of substantial forms and of Plato's doctrine of matter.—In any case, as long as Leibniz speaks of bodies as 'phenomena,' it will be asked, how can we hold that corporeal substances are 'basic beings'?

To this I will reply in the first place: if monads alone are beings, then corporeal substances resulting from them become something less than beings—namely, 'phenomena' as Leibniz himself says. But if corporeal substances, in virtue of monads, can be called 'beings' or at least regarded as a 'kind of being,' we can no longer call these monads 'beings'; for in this case these monads are not beings, but rather something more than beings—what makes beings be, the being of corporeal substances.9

Secondly, I find it important to make a distinction between beings by aggregation which have a true unity and beings by aggregation which lack a true unity. (It seems to me that Leibniz retained this distinction throughout the last thirty years of his life.)

The former are those beings whose reality derives intrinsically from their souls—namely, corporeal substances: e.g., a man or an animal. This kind of being is a being by aggregation in the sense that it is composed of organs and cells; but these organs and cells, as we have seen, are substantially unified by a dominant entelechy. Therefore Leibniz writes to De Volder in June 1703: 'When I say that even if it is corporeal, a substance contains an infinity of machines, I think it must be added at the same time that it forms one machine composed of these machines and that it is actuated, besides, by one entelechy, without which it would contain no principle of true unity' (G

---

9 Here it is necessary to distinguish beings from their being. I shall have a further opportunity to make this clear hereafter.
II 250/L 529).

The latter, on the other hand, are those beings whose unity is given by the mind of the percipient and which have only an ‘accidental’ or ‘arbitrary’ (G II 250/L 529) unity; or those beings whose reality derives from their component elements endowed with a true unity and which have only a ‘borrowed’ (G II 261, 267/R 249, 242) reality: e.g., an army of men or a herd of animals. In the Correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz speaks of this kind of being as depending upon ‘the fiction of our minds’ (G II 76/M 161; cf. G II 102/M 198) and as ‘a being of the imagination or perception, that is to say, a phenomenon (G II 96/M 190)’; and what constitutes its essence ‘consists solely in the mode of the being of its component elements’ (G II 97/M 190). But this does not mean that beings by aggregation which lack a true unity are ‘wholly imaginary’ (G II 97/M 191) and have no reality nor substantiality at all: ‘I do not say that there is nothing substantial or nothing but appearance in things which have not a true unity, for I acknowledge that they have as much of reality or substantiality as there is of true unity in that which enters into their composition’ (G II 97/M 191; cf. G II 96/M 189-90). In my judgement, Leibniz says nothing more than this in the Correspondence with De Volder: ‘Whatever things are aggregates of many, are not one except for the mind, nor have any other reality than what is borrowed, or what belongs to the things of which they are compounded’ (21 January 1704) (G II 261/R 249); and again: ‘A thing which can be divided into several (already actually existing) is an aggregate of several, and . . . is not one except mentally, and has no reality but what is borrowed from its constituents’ (30 June 1704) (G II 267/R 242). Furthermore, in order to describe the manner of the being of these latter beings, he refers to Democritus both in the Correspondence with Arnauld and in the Correspondence with De Volder; in a letter to Arnauld he writes:
‘We may say of these compounds and of similar things what Democritus said very well of them, namely esse opinione, lege, nomō’ (G II 101/M 196-7); correspondingly, in a letter to De Volder he speaks, as we have seen, of beings by aggregation (which, it is evident, lack a true unity) as ‘existing . . . by convention but not by nature [nomō not physei]’ (G II 252/L 531).

By the way, the rainbow, which Leibniz often takes as an example of phenomena, is of the kind of the latter beings—if drops of water, of which it is composed, can be compared to a ‘pond full of fish’ (G IV 482/L 456; G VI 618/L 650); in this case, the reality of the rainbow comes from microorganisms living within the drops of water. A mere mass of matter which lacks a soul must be of this kind; for it is, as Leibniz himself writes to De Volder in June 1704, ‘nothing but a phenomenon grounded in things, like the rainbow or the mock-sun, and all reality belongs only to unities’ (G II 268/L 536). Therefore, when Leibniz says that ‘bodies that are popularly regarded as substances are nothing but real phenomena, and are no more substances than parhelia and rainbows are,’ we should think that by ‘bodies’ he means those bodies which lack a soul. By contrast, when he says in the draft of the letter of Nov. 28-Dec. 8 to Arnauld that ‘bodies are substances and not merely true phenomena like the rainbow,’ we should think that by ‘bodies’ he means bodies which have a soul, namely beings by aggregation which have a true unity. And if by the expression ‘phenomenon’ is meant that which really is not, but which seems to be—that is to say, ‘semblance,’ it is to be used only to describe bodies which lack a soul, namely beings by aggregation which lack a true 

---

10 i.e., secondary matter, which ‘exists like a herd or a family, that is to say, like an ens per aggregatum’ (G II 304).
In fact in the tabulation which appears in the supplement to his letter to Des Boss of 19 August 1715, Leibniz treats of such a being as an animal as being classified as a ‘unum per se’ and a ‘full being’; but on the other hand, he treats of such a being as an

11 Thus I think that those who maintain that in his later years Leibniz became a phenomenalist have made a double mistake. Firstly, they do not distinguish beings by aggregation which have a true unity from beings by aggregation which lack a true unity, treating every kind of being by aggregation as having no true unity; and, secondly, since they do not admit beings by aggregation which have a true unity, they conceive of beings by aggregation which have no true unity—although these beings, as we have seen, are not ‘wholly imaginary’ in virtue of their component elements, each of which is a being by aggregation which has a true unity—as ‘purely mental’; as a result, they are obliged to abandon even the distinction between ‘real’ phenomena such as the rainbow and ‘imaginary’ phenomena such as an orderly dream. But it is this idea that Leibniz rejects in a letter to Arnauld, by saying: ‘You object, M., that it might be of the essence of bodies to have no true unity. But it will be then the essence of bodies to be phenomena deprived of all reality as would be an orderly dream, for phenomena, like the rainbow or like a pile of stones, will be wholly imaginary if they are not composed of beings which have a true unity’ (G II 97/M 191-2). (It is true that a being by aggregation which lacks a true unity, as Leibniz writes to Arnauld, is ‘a being of the imagination or perception, that is to say, a phenomenon’ (G II 96/M 190); in the Conversation of Philarete and Ariste (1711) he repeats that a being by aggregation which lacks a true unity is ‘a being of reason or rather, of imagination, a phenomenon’ (G VI 586/L 623). But this does not mean that a being by aggregation which lacks a true unity is an ‘imaginary’ phenomenon; as I have already observed, it is a ‘real’ phenomenon.) But it may still be asked, why Leibniz sometimes speaks as if he was a phenomenalist? As far as I can judge, by the thesis that bodies are reducible to sets of perceptions, he means that in representing the soul ‘discovers’ all physical objects ‘in their being’ (Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 12); as for instance, when Aristotle says that ‘the soul is in a way all existing things’ (Aristotle, De Anima, Book III, 8. 431b 21; see also Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 12); in other words, the above thesis is an ontological one. And on the basis of this ontological thesis, a distinction between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ phenomena and a distinction between beings by aggregation which have a true unity and beings by aggregation which lack a true unity should be made; nonetheless, those who hold that Leibniz is a phenomenalist seem to arrive at the above thesis by discarding these two distinctions. I therefore think that their opinion is right, but only on the surface.
army of men or a herd of animals as a ‘semisubstance,’ and as being classified as a
'unum per aggregationem,' a 'semibeing,' and, what is most important, a 'phenomenon'
(G II 506/L 617). Therefore, strictly speaking, only beings by aggregation which lack a
true unity should be called 'phenomena.' In other words, corporeal substances
composed of soul and body are something more than phenomena; and if this be so,
they cannot but be that which is—namely, beings. And if they are beings, simple
substances, as I have already remarked, should not be grasped as beings, but rather as
the being of beings.

In order, therefore, to understand the relation between simple and corporeal
substances properly, I think it good to consult what Heidegger \(^\text{13}\) calls the 'ontological
difference.' The ontological difference is the distinction 'between being and beings,' and
'not between one being and another being.' \(^\text{14}\) According to Heidegger, being is
'essentially different from a being, from beings,' although it is 'always the being of a

\(^{12}\) But this does not mean that corporeal substances are 'well-founded' phenomena; for
'well-founded' phenomena, like 'pure' or 'real' or 'true' phenomena such as rainbows, means
nothing else than beings by aggregation which lack a true unity. If, nevertheless, one still calls
corporeal substances 'phenomena,' this expression 'phenomena' must be understood to signify
'beings in general'; as for instance, when Leibniz says that since the consideration of substantial
forms 'serves no purpose in the details of physics . . . .,' ' . . . they ought not to be used to explain
particular phenomena' (G IV 434/L 308). (The Greek expression 'phainomena,' from which the term
'phenomena' derives, can also mean both 'ta onta' (beings) and 'semblance.' See Heidegger, Being
and Time, pp. 25 ff. and Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 104 ff.) But in this case the distinction
between beings by aggregation which have a true unity and beings by aggregation which lack a true
unity will disappear.

\(^{13}\) I am greatly indebted to Heidegger for interpreting monads as the being of beings. According to
him, 't[he monadology tries to clarify the being of beings' (Heidegger, The Metaphysical
Foundations of Logic, p. 85). For his own interpretation of Leibniz, see for example ibid., First

\(^{14}\) Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 17.
being',\textsuperscript{15} for, he says, 'the being of beings "is" itself not a being.'\textsuperscript{16} Thus 'the first philosophical step in understanding the problem of being consists in . . . not determining beings as beings by tracing them back in their origins to another being—as if being had the character of a possible being.'\textsuperscript{17}

Nevertheless, being is often spoken of as if it were a being. And the same can be said of the monad; for it is on the one hand such a being as a unity, but on the other hand it is that which unifies what is not a unity in itself and which makes it be as a unity—in a word, a unifier. That is to say, just as the word 'being' can signify both 'a being' and 'the being of a being,' so the monad can be both a being and what makes a being be, the being of a being. This is why Leibniz speaks of monads sometimes as 'unities,' and sometimes as 'the principles of a true unity' (G IV 478/L 454). Since for him, as I have already touched upon, 'one and being are reciprocal terms' (G II 97/M 191), monads can be both 'beings' and 'the principles of a true being.' It is because of this ambiguity that he sometimes identifies monads with corporeal substances.\textsuperscript{18} To be sure, the monad, taken by itself apart from its body, is what makes this body be as a being, but in so far as it always has a body, it cannot but be as a corporeal substance; therefore it is quite possible to speak of a monad as if it was a corporeal substance. But in order to avoid confusion it would be better to treat of corporeal substances composed of soul and body as basic beings, and of simple substances as the being of these beings.

And if the relation between simple and corporeal substances is ontological in the sense that I have just explained, the thesis which Leibniz often advances in his later

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. p. 17.
\textsuperscript{16} Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{18} Cf. Broad, Leibniz: An Introduction, pp. 88 ff. and Wilson, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, pp. 190 ff.
writings, namely that 'a body is an aggregate of monads,' is also to be interpreted ontologically. This thesis, however, has been traditionally understood to mean that a collection of monads appears as a body when it is 'misperceived' by other monads.¹⁹ (Following Donald Rutherford, we may call this interpretation the 'misperception interpretation.') That is to say, bodies are nothing else than the products of confused perceptions; and if this be the case, all bodies, whether organic or inorganic, become illusions or well-founded phenomena. But as far as I can judge, this can be said only of beings by aggregation which lack a true unity, such as an army of men or a herd of animals, the rainbow or the parhelion, and a mere mass of matter which lacks a soul; for, as we have seen, this kind of being is given a unity by the mind of the percipient, is made to be by this mind, and exists only for this mind—although it is not 'wholly imaginary,' but only 'semimental' (G II 304, 306), obtaining its reality from its component elements endowed with a true unity. (Thus, strictly speaking, this kind of being is not an aggregate of monads, but rather an aggregate of corporeal substances, each of which, as we shall see below, is an aggregate of monads.)

By contrast, in the case of beings by aggregation which have a true unity, namely in the case of corporeal substances, such as a man or an animal, their existence does not depend upon whether they are perceived or not; for their unity comes intrinsically from their souls. In other words, a soul makes a body be by unifying it. And since, as I have already remarked, a body can be divided into smaller bodies without end, and since each of them is unified again by its own soul, it follows that there are in a body an infinity of souls, although they are dominated by a 'pre-eminent' (G II 252/L 530)

²⁰ Ibid., p. 12.
entelechy, which is the soul of this body; or, as Leibniz says in section 70 of the *Monadology*, ‘each living body has a dominant entelechy which is the soul in the case of an animal; but the members of this living body are full of other living beings, plants, and animals, each one of which also has its dominant entelechy or soul’ (G VI 619/L 650). It is in this sense, I suppose, that a body, or more precisely, a living body, a corporeal substance, is a ‘compound’ substance—an ‘aggregate’ of monads; or, as Leibniz says in section 1 of the *Principles of Nature and of Grace*: ‘Compound substance is the assemblage of simple substances, or monads’ (G VI 598/L 636); and in section 2 of the *Monadology*: ‘... the compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simples’ (G VI 607/L 643).

Therefore, to speak more accurately, monads ‘are not really ingredients but merely requisites of matter’ (G II 451/L 604)—requisites for being as beings by aggregation which have a true unity, or even as beings by aggregation which lack a true unity; for without the former, the latter cannot be even as illusions or well-founded phenomena.

Incidentally, Rutherford has already observed that the relation between simple substances and bodies resulting from them is an ‘ontological’ one.22 The question now to be considered is, when Leibniz speaks of bodies not as aggregates of simple substances but as resulting from them, what does he mean by ‘result’? Nicholas Jolley, for example, suggests his meaning is that ‘a particular aggregate of monads appears to

21 He also says in a letter to De Volder of June 1699: ‘When you ask further if an animate body [corpus animatum; Loemker translates this phrase as ‘an inanimate body’; but I think that this is a mistake] has its own entelechies “distinct from the soul”, I reply that it has innumerable such entelechies, since it consists in turn of parts each of which is animated or as if animated’ (G II 184/L 520).

human observers as an extended physical object';\textsuperscript{23} this is, indeed, in perfect accord with the misperception interpretation. On the other hand, Rutherford makes a different interpretation. He begins by quoting a definition of the term 'result' which is offered in a study from the 1680s by Leibniz himself: ‘I understand that to result [resultare], which can immediately be understood when those things from which it results have been posited.’\textsuperscript{24} And Rutherford says:

> It is apparent from this definition that resulting is not a physical or causal relation. It is instead best understood as a relation of ontological determination. To say that a given being “results” from certain other beings is to say that its existence can be conceived as being immediately determined by the existence of those prior beings.\textsuperscript{25}

In other words, being prior to bodies, simple substances determine their being. And since without simple substances bodies cannot be, we may call these substances the \textit{a priori} condition under which bodies can be—in short, the \textit{being}, or more precisely, \textit{the beingness of bodies}.\textsuperscript{26} This is, I believe, what Leibniz has in mind when he says in a letter to Arnauld: ‘. . . there is no plurality without true unities . . . . . . the plural presupposes the singular . . . ’ (G II 97/M 191); in section 1 of the \textit{Principles}: ‘There must of necessity be simple substances everywhere, for without simple substances there

\textsuperscript{23} Jolley, ‘Leibniz and Phenomenalism,’ p. 155.
\textsuperscript{24} Rutherford, ‘Metaphysics: The Later Period,’ p. 149.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 149.
\textsuperscript{26} Strictly speaking, what makes a body be is the soul of this body. And in order for a soul to make its body be, it needs to dominate other souls contained within the parts of this body. I shall speak of this in more detail in Part Two.
would be no compounds' (G VI 598/L 636); and in section 2 of the *Monadology*: ‘There must be simple substances, since there are compounds’ (G VI 607/L 643).

The above interpretation, however, as Rutherford admits, does not exclude the misperception interpretation; for, as I have explained above, bodies which lack a true unity, in so far as their unity comes extrinsically from the mind of the percipient, remain misperceived, that is to say, illusions or phenomena, although well-founded by their component elements, by bodies which have a true unity. And it appears to me that Leibniz prefers to use the term ‘result’ especially in this case. For instance, he writes to De Volder in November 1703: ‘An aggregate is nothing save all those things considered at once, from which it results; and these naturally have their unity only from the mind on account of the things which they have in common, like a herd of sheep . . . ’27 (G II 256); and in June 1704: ‘Accurately speaking, . . . matter is not composed of these constitutive unities but results from them, since matter or extended mass is nothing but a phenomenon grounded in things, like the rainbow or the mock-sun, and all reality belongs only to unities’ (G II 268/L 536). But on the other hand, as I have already quoted, he says: ‘Composite substances are those which constitute a *unum per se*, composed of a soul and an organic body, which is a machine of nature resulting from monads’ (G II 439/AG 199). In any case, there remains ambiguity in the thesis that bodies result from monads, unless we make a clear distinction between beings by aggregation which have a true unity and beings by aggregation which lack a true unity.

After having seen all of this, it is easy to understand how Aristotelianism and Platonism coexist in Leibniz’s philosophy. When we think of soul and body as two

---

inseparable causes of one substance, that is to say, as form and matter, we are Aristotelian; and this is the position which Leibniz held in the Discourse and the Correspondence with Arnauld, where he adopted the substantial forms of the Peripatetic Schoolmen. ‘If the body is a substance . . .,’ he says, ‘we must necessarily conceive of something which is called substantial form and which corresponds in some sort to the soul’ (G II 58/M 135); for ‘a continuum is not only divisible to infinity, but every particle of matter is actually divided into other parts as different among themselves . . . . And since this could always be continued, we should never reach anything of which we could say, here is really a being, unless there were found animated machines whose soul or substantial form constituted the substantial unity independently of the external union of contact’ (G II 77/M 162). We may say then, that the substantial forms are what gives a substantial unity to a body and makes it be as a real being, or, as he puts it elsewhere, what ‘gives a definite being to matter’ (G II 119/M 222). When, therefore, he tried to ‘rehabilitate’ (G IV 478/L 454) the substantial forms, his chief aim, it seems to me, was to clarify the being of a being; in other words, he seems to have sought to grasp being in its relation to that which is, a being. In this case, a being and its being are inseparably united in the former, just as a body and its soul are united in a corporeal substance; hence, his main interest during this period was in ‘corporeal substances’ composed of soul and body.\(^{28}\)

But on the other hand, if we separate the soul from its body, and conceive of the former as \(ontós\ on\), what really is, and of the latter as \(mé\ on\), what really is not, we are Platonic; and this is the position of the later Leibniz, which is well expressed in the words: ‘. . . there is nothing in the world except simple substances’ (G II 270/L 537);

and the body is now regarded, following Plato, as something like a shadow: ‘... in philosophical strictness,’ he says, ‘the body does not deserve the name of substance, a view which seems to have been Plato's, who says that there are transient beings which never subsist longer than a moment’ (G VI 586/L 623). To put the matter ontologically, we may perhaps say that in his later years Leibniz gradually came to think of being itself apart from beings; conversely, beings were, so to speak, alienated from their being and reduced to phenomena. Moreover, since he called being the ‘monad’ and spoke of it as a being, the monad became the only being which really exists. ‘... only simple things,’ he says, ‘are true things, and the rest are... phenomena...’ (G II 252/L 531). But if we speak with metaphysical strictness, the monad is not a being but the being of a being; and in so far as being is always the being of a being, it is not wholly separable from that which is. This is why he never abandoned corporeal substances, as some say he did. For instance, in section 63 of the *Monadology* he says: ‘The body belonging to a monad which is its entelechy or soul constitutes what may be called a living being with that entelechy; with a soul it constitutes an animal’ (G VI 617-8/L 649). In fact ‘the world of the *Monadology,*’ as Garber rightly points out, ‘is as full of organisms as is the world of the *Correspondence with Arnauld.*’

From this I draw a conclusion that in either case Leibniz’s thinking was orientated towards ‘being.’ In the *Discourse* and the *Correspondence with Arnauld* he tried to grasp it as the being of beings, as ‘the basis of bodies’ (G II 58/M 135); whereas in after-years he was inclined to think of it as such, determining its essence as the unity of perception and appetition. He always employed, however, these two principles, being and beings, and laid greater emphasis upon the latter when he speaks of the substantial

---

forms, and upon the former when he speaks of the monads. Therefore, it seems to me that the transition from the substantial forms to the monads is nothing else than this change in emphasis.\(^{30}\)

Now, I have already shown that creatures are corporeal substances, basic beings in the monadological system, and that what constitutes their being (or their unity) is their soul.

Let us then consider the case of God more carefully. As we have seen at the beginning of this part, he is a spirit; if so, he is a principle of unity, or of being. A principle of unity is always accompanied by what is unified by it; and a principle of being by what is made to be by it. In the case of creatures, what is unified and made to be by their soul is their body. God, however, is without body. What, then, we may ask, does he unify and bring into being? The only answer to this question, it seems to me, is ‘creatures,’ or more precisely, the whole of his creation, namely the world created by him. That is to say, God in creating the world unifies it and brings it into being.\(^{31}\) If this be so, it follows that the relation between God and the world corresponds in the monadological system to the relation between the soul and the body; just as a soul makes a body be by unifying it, so God makes the world be by unifying it. In short, God is to the world as the soul is to its body. This correspondence between the God-world relation and the soul-body relation will be discussed at greater length in the following two parts.


\(^{31}\) Although each creature is unified and made to be by its own soul, it is also unified and made to be by God. I shall argue this problem in Part Two.
PART TWO

In the last part, we have concluded that the relation between God and creatures corresponds to the relation between the soul and the body. We have drawn this conclusion on the basis of our ontological determination of the relation between the soul and the body; that is to say, if God is a spirit, he must have something which is unified and made to be by him—this something is thought to be the world as the sum of all created beings; therefore he is to the world, as the soul is to its body.¹

There is, by the way, a passage where Leibniz seems to acknowledge the parallel between the God-world relation and the soul-body relation. His words occur at the beginning of the essay *On the Radical Origination of Things*, where he treats of God as the ultimate reason for the existence of the world: ‘Besides the world or aggregate of finite things, there is a certain One which is dominant, not only as the soul is dominant in me or rather, as the Ego itself is dominant in my body, but also by a much higher reason. For the dominant One of the universe not only rules the world but fabricates or makes it . . . ’ (G VII 302/L 486). It is true that the relation between God and the world is different from the relation between a soul and a body, in that while God created the world, a soul finds its body already existing; but it cannot be denied that Leibniz here has in mind a similarity between the two relations.

Therefore we can consider the soul-body relation as a miniature of the God-world relation;² and those determinations which are given to this miniature can be applied to

¹ There follows from this correspondence a paradox that God has the world as his body; I shall, however, leave this paradox until we arrive at the next part.

² Herbert Wildon Carr says: 'The theory of Monads has its origin in a reflective meditation on the nature of mind and body and their union. The guiding thought is that in the mind-body relation we
the original. In this part, then, I shall enter more minutely into the relation between the soul and the body, with the design of showing in more detail how it corresponds to the relation between God and creatures.

In the last part, we have grasped the relation between the soul and the body as identical with the relation between being and beings, with recourse to Heidegger’s ontological difference. Since a body can be divided into smaller bodies ad infinitum, it cannot by itself constitute a single being; it is, then, necessary for a soul to unify these bodies and to make them one; in this sense, the soul is the principle of the unity or being\(^3\) of its body. Thus, the soul and the body do not belong to the same sphere of being. If, therefore, we speak with metaphysical strictness, we cannot even say, e.g., that a soul has a body—for if a soul has a body, these two must belong to the same sphere of being. Nevertheless, the soul unifies its body. But this does not mean that the soul acts physically upon its body, but that the soul, as a dominant monad, dominates other monads which enter into the parts of its body; in other words, that it unifies its body through the medium of these subordinate monads. Therefore, the relation between the soul and the body cannot fully be comprehended as the relation between two terms; it consists, strictly speaking, of three terms: the dominant monad, its body and the subordinate monads contained within the parts of this body. That is to say, the relation between the soul and the body is the relation among the dominant monad, its body and the subordinate monads. For the sake of argument, however, I divide this relation in two:

---

3 For Leibniz, as we have seen, ‘one and being are reciprocal terms’ (G II 97/M 191).

---
1) the relation between the dominant monad and the subordinate monads;

2) the relation between the body of the dominant monad and the subordinate monads.

Let us begin with the relation between the dominant monad and the subordinate monads. The question now to be considered is, in what sense the dominant monad holds sovereignty over the subordinate monads, or in what sense the subordinate monads are in subjection to the dominant monad—in short, the meaning of domination and subordination is to be clarified. Leibniz, however, speaks very little of this; what we can refer to is his letter to Des Bosses of 16 June 1712, in which he writes: ‘... considered in the monads themselves, domination and subordination consist only in degrees of perfection’ (G II 451/L 605). That is to say, the dominant monad is more perfect than the subordinate monads. In regard to the perfection which monads have, Leibniz says: ‘... the soul ... has perfection in proportion to the distinctness of its perceptions’ (G VI 604/L 640; cf. G VI 615/L 647); in other words, the more perfect a monad is, the more distinct its perceptions are. If this be so, his meaning is probably that the dominant monad has more distinct perceptions than the subordinate monads have. Then we may ask: What do they perceive in a distinct or confused way? To this Leibniz gave us no answer; instead, Bertrand Russell suggests that it is what happens in their neighbourhood, namely in the body which specially pertains to the dominant monad, and within which the subordinate monads are contained:⁴

Leibniz is not very definite as to the meaning of domination, but the following seems to be his

meaning. Every monad perceives more clearly what happens in its neighbourhood than what happens at a distance. If, then, in a certain volume, there is one monad with much clearer perceptions than the rest, this monad may perceive all that happens within that volume more clearly than do any of the others within that volume. And in this sense it may be dominant over all the monads in its immediate neighbourhood.5

This interpretation of Russell’s is based upon the assumption that the relation of the dominant monad to the subordinate monads can be explained only through their perceptions especially harmonised with one another. There is textual evidence supporting this assumption; for instance, Leibniz writes in the same letter, which I have quoted above: ‘. . . I [do not] see what a dominant monad would detract from the existence of other monads, since there is really no intercourse between them but merely an agreement’ (G II 451/L 604). The ‘agreement’ here means, of course, the agreement of their perceptions, which is derived from the pre-established harmony.

But I wonder whether the relation of the dominant monad to the subordinate monads can be sufficiently explained in terms of the harmony of their perceptions; simply because, as we have seen in the last part, monads make up a unum per se under the domination of one monad, and this can never occur in the case of those monads which are free from such domination. To be sure, one can still say that this making-up of a unum per se is only the result of perceptions especially harmonised. But here, we might assume some kind of bond, which links up the subordinate monads, which is given by the dominant monad, and which never exists between the monads having no master to be obeyed. There is, indeed, ground for this assumption: Leibniz called such a bond

‘vinculum substantiale’—the substantial bond,\(^6\) which, according to him, is the same as ‘what the Scholastics call a substantial form’ (G II 504/L 614; cf. G II 503/L 613), and always ‘adheres’ to the dominant monad (cf. G II 496/L 611). We may, therefore, identify it with the domination of the dominant monad over the subordinate monads.

In fact he remarks that monads make up a *unum per se* with the addition of a substantial bond, just as they do so under the domination of one monad: ‘Monads do not constitute a complete composite substance, since they do not make up a *unum per se* but merely an aggregate, unless some substantial bond is added’ (G II 444/L 602)—although, he says, this bond causes no change in them: ‘The unity of corporeal substance in a horse does not arise from any ‘refraction’ of monads but from a superadded substantial bond through which nothing else is changed in the monads themselves’ (G II 451/L 604). But it seems to me that this bond, although it has no effect upon monads *themselves*, establishes a relation between the dominant monad and the subordinate monads (cf. G II 439/AG 199)—a relation which is not perfectly explicable in terms the harmony of perceptions, but which requires *ontological* consideration. For, as we have just seen, by virtue of a substantial bond, monads can make up a *unum per se*, that is to say, a being. Therefore, if we accept the idea of the substantial bond, we will be able to explain the relation between the dominant monad and the subordinate monads in a different way from Russell.\(^7\)

Now, as I have already shown, with the addition of a substantial bond, that is to say, under the domination of one monad, monads make up a *unum per se*, a being. This

\(^6\) On the theory of the substantial bond, see Part One, note 1.

\(^7\) Russell, as we have seen in Part One, does not accept the concept of the substantial bond as a genuine part of Leibniz's philosophy. Cf. *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, pp. 151 ff.
being owes its beingness, or, it may be said, the fact that it is as it is, to these subordinate monads. We may say then, that they constitute the beingness of this being. But it is to be noted here that this constitution cannot be carried out except under the domination of the dominant monad, and is possible only through this domination. In other words, the dominant monad enables the subordinate monads to constitute the beingness of a being; in speaking thus, we may conceive of the dominant monad as the condition under which a being can be, that is to say, the condition of the possibility of being; for without it, the subordinate monads could not constitute the beingness of a being, and consequently there would be no being. On the other hand, we may conceive of the subordinate monads simply as the beingness of a being. Therefore, the relation of the dominant monad to the subordinate monads can be grasped as the relation of the condition of the possibility of being to the beingness of a being.

We have already determined the relation between the soul and the body with recourse to the ontological difference, by which beings are sharply distinguished from their being. But, we are now facing a more complicated situation; for while, as we have seen, the dominant monad is to its body, as being is to a being, it is to the subordinate monads, as the condition of the possibility of being is to the beingness of a being.

In order, therefore, to understand the relation between the dominant monad and the subordinate monads properly, I think it well—following, again, Heidegger—to divide the ontological difference into two kinds. The one is called the ‘transcendental difference’; this is the distinction of a being from its beingness. The other is called ‘transcendence-related difference’ [transzendenzhafte Differenz]; this is the distinction

---

8 More will be said of this later.
of the possibility of being from the beingness of a being. Thus, the relation between

Properly speaking, the transcendence-related difference is the distinction of the condition of the possibility of being from a being and its beingness. According to Max Müller (Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart, S. 75-6), in the first elaboration of Division Three of Part One of Being and Time—of the division entitled ‘Time and Being,’ Heidegger distinguished the following three kinds of difference:

a) the ‘transcendental’ or ontological difference in the narrower sense: the distinction of a being from its beingness.

b) the ‘transcendence-related’ or ontological difference in the broader sense: the distinction of a being and its beingness from being itself.

c) the ‘transcendent’ or theological difference in the strict sense: the distinction of God from beings, from beingness and from being.

In after-years, Heidegger himself made the following marginal note on the title ‘Time and Being’ which appears in section 8 of Being and Time (p. 35):

The transcendence-related difference. (Joan Stambaugh translates ‘transzendentzhafte Differenz’ as ‘the difference bound to transcendence.’ But as I wish to translate ‘transzendenthaft’ in one word, I use the expression ‘transcendence-related,’ which was suggested by my supervisor, Professor Sebastian Gardner.) The overcoming of the horizon as such.

For Heidegger, being is ‘that which determines beings as beings, that in terms of which beings have always been understood no matter how they are discussed’ (Being and Time, p. 5). And it is time that makes possible this understanding of being; or, as Heidegger says: ‘. . . being is understood and conceptually comprehended by means of time’ (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p 274); and when functioning as such a condition, time is called ‘temporality’; and thus temporality is ‘the condition of the possibility of all understanding of being’ (Ibid., p. 274; cf. Ibid., Part Two) or ‘the horizon of every understanding and interpretation of being’ (Being and Time, p. 15); it is that in which being consists, the essence of being, ‘being itself.’ In order, therefore, to thematise time or being itself—or, as Heidegger himself says, in order to overcome ‘the horizon as such’—we must needs transcend not only a being but also its being (or more precisely, its beingness):

We confront the task not only of going forth and back from a being to its being but, if we are inquiring into the condition of possibility of the understanding of being as such, of inquiring
the dominant monad and the subordinate monads can be explicated by the transcendence-related difference.

On the other hand, the relation between the body of the dominant monad and the subordinate monads can be explicated by the transcendental difference; for, as we have seen, the subordinate monads constitute the beingness of the body of the dominant monad. But this relation is not to be confused with the relation between the soul and the body, which we have determined by the ontological difference between being and a being. For the soul, as contrasted with its body, is the dominant monad, and as such makes this body be; whereas the subordinate monads merely constitute the beingness of this body, and moreover they cannot do so without the dominant monad. (Or, we may say that when we considered the relation between the soul and the body in the last part, we cast the soul in the rôle not only of the dominant monad, but also of the subordinate monads. But now, we are considering the soul more carefully as the dominant monad, which is clearly distinguished from the subordinate monads.)

Now it is manifest that the relation between the dominant monad and the subordinate monads can be determined by the transcendence-related difference, while the relation between the subordinate monads and the body of the dominant monad by

\[
\text{even beyond being as to that upon which being itself, as being, is projected. (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 282).}
\]

Because of this transcendence, 'Time and Being' requires the *transcendence-related* difference, by which time or being itself is distinguished from the being of a being. (I shall have a further opportunity to speak of this later.) This is why I resort to this difference in order to distinguish the condition of the possibility of being and the beingness of a being. (I am greatly indebted to Ryoichi Hosokawa's book, *The Range of Heidegger's Philosophy*, for the above discussion; see *ibid.*, especially, Parts One and Two.)
the transcendental difference. It is therefore necessary to know something more about these two kinds of ontological difference. Heidegger himself obtained them from his unique interpretation of Plato’s theory of ideas.\textsuperscript{10} According to Heidegger, as we shall see shortly, the relation of the idea of the good and other ideas is explicable by the transcendence-related difference, and the relation between an idea and the thing which participates in it by the transcendental difference. Therefore, there must be a structural resemblance both between the relation of the idea of the good to other ideas and the relation of the dominant monad to the subordinate monads, and between the relation of an idea to the thing participating in it and the relation of the subordinate monads to the body of the dominant monad. In order, then, to show this resemblance, I wish here to outline Heidegger’s interpretation of the theory of ideas. After that, we shall return to our subject.

First of all, according to Heidegger, ‘the theory of ideas is ontology.’\textsuperscript{11} Ontology here means a science of \textit{being}, and not of \textit{beings};\textsuperscript{12} it is ‘the theoretical conceptual interpretation of being, of being’s structure and its possibilities.’\textsuperscript{13} By contrast, all other sciences ‘have as their theme some being or beings, and indeed in such a way that they are in every case antecedently given as beings to those sciences’;\textsuperscript{14} ‘they are posited by them in advance.’\textsuperscript{15} Therefore every science which is not ontological but, in

\textsuperscript{10} See, for example, Heidegger, \textit{Nietzsche, Plato’s Sophist, Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology} and \textit{Introduction to Metaphysics}; see also Hosokawa, \textit{The Range of Heidegger’s Philosophy}, Parts One and Two.

\textsuperscript{11} Heidegger, \textit{Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie}, S. 98.

\textsuperscript{12} On the distinction between being and beings, see Part One.

\textsuperscript{13} Heidegger, \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13.
Heidegger's phrase, 'ontical,' is 'a posting knowledge of beings and a positing attitude toward beings.' Just because of this difference, ontology is identified with what Aristotle calls 'first philosophy'—for he says at the beginning of Book IV of the *Metaphysics*:

> There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attribute of this part; this is what the mathematical sciences for instance do.

That is to say, ontology is not an enquiry into such and such a being, but an enquiry into being: in Heidegger's phrase, a 'question of the meaning of being.' Therefore to say that the theory of ideas is ontology is the same as saying that it addresses the question of the meaning of being.

For the Greeks, 'being means *ousia*'; *ousia*, or more fully *parousia*, signifies

---

18 *Ibid.*, Book Γ, 1. 1003a 21 ff. Cf. Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, pp. 9 ff. But on the other hand, first philosophy is *theology* (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, Book E, 1); it is a science of an 'immovable substance,' that is to say, of God. In this case ambiguity arises in first philosophy: it is a science of *being*, while at the same time it is a science of such a *being* as God. And here Heidegger sees 'the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics' (cf. Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, pp. 42 ff.). For the present, however, I wish to ignore this ambiguity, conceiving of first philosophy solely as ontology—even though I shall speak of God hereafter.
'presence,' 21 'constant presence,' 22 or 'the presence of what endures in the unconcealed.' 23 And so Heidegger thinks that Plato interpreted ousia as idea. The Greek expression idea means the look of a thing. A thing presents itself in its look; therefore the look of a thing constitutes the presence of the thing. Thus, Heidegger says:

The word idea means what is seen in the visible, the view that something offers. What is offered is the current look or eidos of whatever we encounter. The look [Aussehen] of a thing is that within which, as we say, it presents [präsentiert] itself to us, re-presents [vor-stellt] itself and as such stands before us; the look is that within which and as which the thing comes-to-presence [an-wesst]—that is, in the Greek sense, is. 24

By the way, Plato's interpretation of ousia as idea, according to Heidegger, has its roots in 'productive activity,' 'the comprehension of being by way of production.' 25 When, for instance, one makes a desk, one sights the model beforehand, 26 and, in accordance with it, makes a desk—that is to say, brings a desk into being; it is this model that is what the Greeks call idea or eidos; or, as Heidegger says:

The potter forms a vase out of clay. All forming of shaped products is effected by using an

21 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 64.
22 Ibid., p. 216.
26 One sights this model beforehand, not by means of the eye as a particular organ of the body, but by means of 'the soul's eye.' 'Plato and Aristotle speak of omma tes psuches, the soul's eye, which sees being.' (Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 109.)
image, in the sense of a model, as guide and standard. The thing is produced by looking to the anticipated look of what is to be produced by shaping, forming. It is this anticipated look of the thing, sighted beforehand, that the Greeks mean ontologically by eidos, idea. The shaped product, which is shaped in conformity with the model, is as such the exact likeness of the model.²⁷

This is in accord with what Plato says in Book X of the Republic:

"Do you want us to make our consideration according to our customary procedure, beginning from the following point? For we are, presumably, accustomed to set down some one particular form [eidos] for each of the particular 'manys' to which we apply the same name. Or don't you understand?"

"I do."

"Then let's now set down any one of the 'manys' you please; for example, if you wish, there are surely many couches and tables."

"Of course."

"But as for ideas for these furnishings, there are presumably two, one of couch, one of table."

"Yes."

"Aren't we also accustomed to say that it is in looking to the idea of each implement that one craftsman makes the couches and another the chairs we use, and similarly for other things? For presumably none of the craftsmen fabricates the idea itself..."²⁸

²⁷ Ibid., p. 106.
²⁸ Plato, The Republic of Plato, Book X, 596 A-B.
That is to say, making a couch, for example, means to look to the idea of couches beforehand, and to bring this idea to show itself in an actual couch; consequently, it is by this idea, that the actual couch is made to be seen as such, made to come to presence in its look, and therefore made to be; or, as Heidegger says:

Something produced “is” because the idea lets it be seen as such, lets it come to presence in its look, lets it “be.” Only to that extent can what is itself produced be said “to be.” Making and manufacturing therefore mean to bring the look to show itself in something else, namely in what is manufactured, to “pro-duce [her-stellen]” the look, not in the sense of manufacturing it but of letting it radiantly appear [erscheinen]. What is manufactured “is” only to the extent that in it the look, being, radiates [er-scheint]. To say that something manufactured “is” means that in it the presence of its look shows itself.29

29 Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume I, The Will to Power as Art, p 176. Heidegger further holds that the comprehension of being by way of production was absorbed by the Schoolmen, who identified ’to be’ with ‘to be created by God.’ For instance, he says:

... even if creation out of nothing is not identical with producing something out of a material that is found already on hand, nevertheless, this creating of the creation has the general ontological character of producing. Creation is also interpreted in some sense with regard to production. Despite its different origins, it was as if ancient ontology in its foundations and basic concepts were cut to fit the Christian world-view and interpretation of that which is as ens creatum. God as the ens increatum is the being which is absolutely without need of being produced and the causa prima of every other being. (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 118-9.)

This view of Heidegger’s seems quite interesting and closely related to our subject—though we cannot enter into its detail.
Up to now we have seen how the idea, as the look, constitutes the being (or more precisely, the beingness) of a being. Plato, however, speaks further of the idea of ideas, the highest idea, the idea of the good. In Book VI of the Republic he divides the region of the intelligible from that of the visible, and analogises knowing ideas to seeing things; and he insists that in addition to that which sees and that which is seen, there should be a ‘third thing’—a thing in the absent of which the sight can see nothing and the colour cannot be seen. According to him, it is the light, or more precisely, the sun. The sun is that under which the one who sees can see and all that is seen becomes visible; on this point, he says, it is ‘the offspring of the good’—that is to say, ‘an offspring the good begot in a proportion with itself’; for the good is that by which the one who knows can know and all that is known becomes knowable, unconcealed and, in consequence, true. Thus, Plato says:

“Therefore, say that what provides the truth to the things known and gives the power to the one who knows, is the idea of the good [hē tou agathou idea].”

Moreover, he thinks that the sun not only provides what is seen with visibility, but also with generation; correspondingly, he holds that the idea of the good not only provides what is known with knowability and unconcealment, but also with the possibility of being:

30 Plato, The Republic of Plato, 507 C-D.
31 Ibid., 508 B.
32 Ibid., 508 B.
33 Ibid., 508 D-E.
“I suppose you’ll say the sun not only provides what is seen with the power of being seen, but also with generation, growth, and nourishment although it itself isn’t generation.”

“Of course.”

“Therefore, say that not only being known is present in the things known as a consequence of the good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result of it, although the good isn’t being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power.”

In regard to these words, Heidegger says in the first place:

The sun also confers warmth, through which the capacity for seeing and the visible things first become “beings,” or, in the Greek view, first become the kind of things that can each in its own way come to presence into the unconcealed. Correspondingly, the “idea of the good” is not only something that confers “unconcealment,” on the basis of which knowing and knowledge become possible, but is also what makes knowing, the knower, and beings as beings possible.

The idea of the good, idea tou agathou, makes beings as beings possible. As we have seen, a being is said to be, only to the extent that in it the idea, as the look, radiantly appears; and now, this appearance is possible only under the sun, that is to say, only through the idea of the good. Therefore, the idea of the good transcends all other ideas, all beingness; or, as Plato says: ‘the good isn’t being but is still beyond being [epekeina tês ousias].’ In regard to this, Heidegger says:

34 Ibid., 509 b.
The "good" here does not mean what is orderly in the moral sense, but the valiant, which achieves and can achieve what is proper to it. The agathon is the standard as such, what first grants being the potency to unfold essentially [wesen] as idea, as prototype. What grants such potency is the primally potent. But now, insofar as the ideas constitute being as ousia, the idea tou agathou, the highest idea, stands epekeina tês ousias, beyond being.36

The idea of the good lies even beyond being. It is the idea of ideas, the essence of ideas; in other words, the essence of being, being itself. And being itself grants being the ability to unfold itself as idea, and as such ultimately makes the being of beings possible: it is the condition of the possibility of being. Accordingly, Heidegger says:

. . . Plato conceives being as idea. The highest of ideas, however—and that means at the same time the essence of all ideas—is the agathon. Thought in a Greek sense, agathon is what makes suitable, what befits a being and makes it possible for it to be a being. Being has the character of making possible, is the condition of possibility.37

So much for Heidegger's interpretation of the theory of ideas. Let us then sum up what has been said above. The relation of a thing to its idea is explicable by the difference of a being from its being (or beingness); and the relation of ideas to the idea of the good is explicable by the difference of the being (or beingness) of beings from the condition of the possibility of being, or being itself. As I have already mentioned, Heidegger calls the former difference 'transcendental'; for through this distinction, we

can surmount beings, thematising their beingness. On the other hand, he calls the latter difference ‘transcendence-related’; for, as we have just seen, being itself transcends not only beings but also their beingness; it is upon this transcendence that the difference is based.  

Returning to our subject, we may say that the relation between the dominant monad and the subordinate monads is comparable with the relation between the idea of the good and other ideas. For just as the idea of the good makes other ideas able to constitute the beingness of things, so the dominant monad makes the subordinate monads able to constitute the beingness of its body; in this respect the dominant monad has an affinity with the idea of the good, and the subordinate monads with other ideas. On the other hand, the relation between the subordinate monads and the body of the dominant monad is compatible with the relation between an idea and a thing participating in it. For just as an idea constitutes, as a look, the presence or beingness of a thing participating in it, so the subordinate monads constitute the beingness of the

---

38 We can now clearly see why Heidegger had need of the transcendence-related difference in order to treat of ‘Time and Being.’ As has been briefly explained, time is the condition of the possibility of all understanding of being, and as such transcends not only a being but also its being; so that there is a close similarity between time and the idea of the good. Heidegger in fact speaks of the idea of the good as the light in which one can see and grasp the being of a being, that is to say, as the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being:

... seeing and grasping the being of a being requires a light; and this light, through which being as such is illuminated, is the agathon, the idea of the ‘good.’ Only in so far as there is an understanding of being, is a being accessible in its being. This understanding of being, according to Plato, is possible only because there is the idea of the good. ... This agathon is epekeina têς ousias, lies, as it were, ‘even beyond being [über das Sein noch hinaus].’ (Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie, S. 256; cf. Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 283 ff. and Hosokawa, The Range of Heidegger’s Philosophy, pp. 79 ff.)
body of the dominant monad. (There is, however, a subtle difference between these two relations: while each idea, separately from every other, constitutes the beingness of all the things that participate in it, the subordinate monads together constitute the beingness of a particular body—that is to say, the body belonging to the dominant monad. This is somewhat concerned with the topic of the next part.)

These considerations may suffice for the determination of the relation between the dominant monad and the subordinate monads, and between the subordinate monads and the body of the dominant monad.

Now, according to the monadological system, there are throughout nature monadic domination and subordination. As Leibniz says in section 4 of the Principles, ‘not only is there life everywhere, joined to members or organs, but there are also infinite degrees of it in the monads, some of which dominate more or less over others’ (G VI 599/L 637). Moreover, it must be confessed that every created monad is at once dominant and subordinate; that is to say, that however dominant a monad is, it is at the same time dominated by a more dominant one. This can be applied not only to the souls of animals but also those of humans; for, as Leibniz says, ‘our soul, far from being the lowest of all, finds itself in the middle, from which one may rise or sink’ (G VI 543/L 588). ‘Otherwise,’ he continues, ‘there would be a deficiency in order, or what some philosophers call a vacuum of forms’ (G VI 543/L 588). Therefore, every created monad, as a dominant monad, is analogous to the idea of the good, but as a subordinate monad, remains analogous to some other idea; in other words, it bears the two characteristics...
simultaneously.

There is, however, in the monadological system, one special monad, which is always dominant and can never be dominated by any other, and, in consequence, to which all created monads are subordinate—I mean God, who stands at the top of the monadic hierarchy; he is the most dominant or highest monad, and as such truly deserves the idea of the good. Unlike all other dominant monads, each one of which is the condition of the possibility of the being of its body, God is the condition of the possibility of the being of all bodies, that is to say, of the whole physical world; to put it more generally, he is the Creator of the world and as such what ultimately makes possible the being of all beings.

For instance, Leibniz speaks of God in the Discourse as ‘the principle and cause of

---

40 In the monadological system, no lowest monad exists, but the highest monad. Therefore, although this system can be extended downwards to infinity, it is closed by God when it is extended upwards; it is a closed system. From this there seem to follow several paradoxes, one of which I shall argue in Part Three.

41 God has been identified with the idea of the good: especially by Neoplatonists, by whom Leibniz was profoundly influenced in his youth, and whose doctrines, according to Christia Mercer, are ‘the primary source of his conception of God and the relation between God and creatures’ (Mercer, *Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development*, pp. 174-5). Indeed, in section 28 of the Discourse Leibniz is willing to accept the opinion that God is the sun (which, as we have seen, is proportional to the idea of the good) and the light of souls: with reference to ‘the Fathers, who were always more Platonists than Aristotelians’: ‘God is the sun and the light of souls—*lumen illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum*; and this opinion has not been invented only today. In addition to the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers, who were always more Platonists than Aristotelians, I recall having observed long ago that at the same time of the Scholastics, several believed that God is the light of the soul and as they put it, the *intellectus agents animae rationalis*’ (G IV 453/L 321). For a further discussion on the relation between Leibniz and Platonism, see Fouke, ‘Emanation and the Perfections of Being: Divine Causation and the Autonomy of Nature in Leibniz’ and Mercer, *Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development*, Part Three.
all substances and all beings’ (G IV 461/L 326), ‘the origin of existences’ (G IV 461/L 326); in the essay On the Radical Origination of Things as ‘the ultimate reason for things’ (G VII 302/L 486); in the Theodicy as ‘the reason for the existence of the world’ (G VI 106/H 127); and in the Principles as the answer to the question: ‘Why is there something rather than nothing? (G VI 602/L 639)’ To be sure, according to him, all possibles or essences have a ‘certain urgency [exigentia] toward existence’ (G VII 303/L 487) or a ‘pre-tension to exist’ (G VII 303/L 487; cf. G VI 603, 616/L 639, 648), and tend to exist in themselves (cf. G VII 303/L 487). But they are not able to come into existence by themselves—for none of them have reason for existence in themselves. Therefore, in order for possibles or essences to exist, there is required something which leads them to exist, something which produces them in the original Latin sense of the word42—or, it may be said, something which bridges the gap between essence and existence. It is this something that is God—whose essence involves existence, and consequently who exists by absolute or metaphysical necessity (cf. G VII 303/L 487, G VI 602, 614/L 639, 647). Thus he is a ‘necessary being’ (G VI 602, 614/L 639, 647), and as such ‘makes possible the transition from essence to existence’43 (cf. G VII 407/L 708).

Strictly speaking, however, this transition, as is well known, consists of three processes: firstly, by his understanding God knows all possible things, or things expressing an essence; secondly, by his will he chooses the best things out of them; and

42 ‘To accomplish means to unfold something into the fullness of its essence, to lead it forth into this fullness—producere’ (Heidegger, Pathmarks, p. 239). Indeed, according to Leibniz, created monads are ‘products’ of God (G VI 614/L 647; cf. G IV 439 ff./L 311 ff.).
finally, by his power he brings these best things into existence: as a result, only the best exist in actuality (cf., for example, G VI 106 ff./H 127 ff.; G VI 616/L 648). Meanwhile, Leibniz recognises these three attributes in all created monads, and regards these monads as imitating God in a greater or less degree. For instance, he says in section 48 of the Monadology: ‘There is in God the power which is the source of everything, there is also the knowledge which contains the variety of the ideas, and finally, there is the will which makes changes or products in accordance with the principle of the best. This corresponds to what is in created monads the subject or basis, the perceptive faculty, and the appetitive faculty. But in God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect, and in created monads or entelechies—or perfectihabes, as Hermolaus Barbarus translated this word—they are nothing but imitations in the degree to which the monad has perfection’ (G VI 615/L 647).

We may now interpret the above quotation thus: every created monad, as a dominant monad, has a resemblance to God; for it enables the monads subordinate to it to constitute the beingness of its body, and, by doing so, makes possible the being of this body. And this making-possible is expressed, as in the case of God, as an action; that is to say, firstly, by its perception each created monad perceives (or represents) possible things; secondly, by its appetition it desires only the best thing, leaving out all the

44 Perception, as Leibniz so defined, is ‘the representation of a multiplicity in what is simple (G III 575/R 261; cf. G VII 529); in other words, by perception the monad, as the simple, represents in itself something multiple. But in order for the simple to represent the multiple, the simple must always precede the multiple in a metaphysical sense; to borrow Heidegger’s expression, it must ‘anticipate [voraus sein]’ (The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 90) the multiple which it represents. Thus the monad, as the simple, has the character of the a priori. According to Heidegger, Leibniz fully understood this by saying that the monad is ‘preeminent’ (G II 252/L 530; cf. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 90). If we borrow Heidegger’s expressions again without fear
rest; and finally by its power\textsuperscript{45} it brings this thing into practice.\textsuperscript{46} Among others, of their strangeness, a monad must ‘reach out [ausgreifen]’ and ‘grip [umgreifen]’ the multiplicity in advance (cf. \textit{ibid.}, pp. 90 ff.). It is in this sense that I say that by perception a monad ‘perceives (or represents) possible things.’ By ‘possible things’ I mean the multiple anticipated or gripped in advance by the simple. For a further discussion of the Heideggerian interpretation of perception, see \textit{ibid.}, pp. 89 ff.

\textsuperscript{45} ‘Power’ here means the capability to integrate perception and appetition into action. In this capability, it seems to me, we can find a clue to Leibniz’s conception of being. ‘Power,’ he says, ‘relates to being’ (G VI 107/H 127). Incidentally, Heidegger thinks that Leibniz interpreted the essence of the monad—which, for Heidegger, is the same as the essence of being—as the unity of perception and appetition, as the ‘representative striving [vorstellende Streben]’ (Heidegger, \textit{The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic}, p. 91; cf. Heidegger, \textit{Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom}, p. 95); according to Heidegger, this interpretation of being as the representative striving can be traced back to Aristotle, who held \textit{noēsis} and \textit{orexis} to be the basic faculties of living beings (cf. Heidegger, \textit{The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic}, p. 91); and on the other hand it established the tradition of German philosophy, in which being is grasped as will. For instance, he says in his lecture on \textit{Nietzsche}:

\begin{quote}
The conception of the being of all beings as will is very much in line with the best and greatest tradition of German philosophy. . . . In one of Schelling’s most profound works, the treatise \textit{On the Essence of Human Freedom}, published in 1809, that philosopher writes: “In the final and ultimate instance there is no other Being at all than Willing. Willing is Primal Being.” And in his \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} (1807) Hegel grasps the essence of being as knowing, but grasps knowing as essentially identical to willing. Schelling and Hegel were certain that with the interpretation of being as will they were merely thinking the essential thought of another great German thinker—the concept of being in Leibniz. Leibniz defined the essence of being as the original unity of \textit{perceptio} and \textit{appetitus}, representation and will. (\textit{Nietzsche: Volume I, The Will to Power as Art}, pp. 34-5.)
\end{quote}

Besides Schelling and Hegel, Kant, the founder of German idealism, divided human reason into theoretical and practical; Schopenhauer, taking over this view, wrote the book entitled \textit{The World as Will and Representation}; and Nietzsche, being influenced by this book, spoke of ‘the will to power.’

\textsuperscript{46} ‘Substance is a being capable of action’ (G VI 598/L 636; cf. G IV 468 ff./L 432 ff.). The soul animates its body by action; in this sense the soul is the principle of the life or \textit{being} of its body. Thus, to say that the soul unifies its body means that it actuates its body. For instance, Leibniz says
however, spirits or rational souls, having these attributes in a preeminent way, finds themselves far closer to God; and thus they are often compared to ‘images of God,’ or more straightforwardly, ‘little gods’: for instance, Leibniz says in section 5 of the *New System*: ‘... we must not mix up indifferently, or confuse, minds or rational souls with other forms or souls, for they are of a superior order and have incomparably more perfection than have the forms which are sunk in matter, which I believe are found everywhere. For in comparison with these, minds or rational souls are as little gods made in the image of God and having in them some ray of the light of the Divinity’ (G IV 479/L 454-5). This means that spirits, unlike other souls, *know, will* and *act*—imitating God consciously, in other words, serving him freely;\(^4\) or, as Leibniz

in an essay on Cartesian philosophy, written in 1702: ‘... this entelechy is either a soul or something analogous to a soul, and always naturally actuates [{\textit{actuo}}] some organic body, which, taken separately, indeed, set apart or removed from soul, is not one substance but an aggregate of many, in a word, a machine of nature (G IV 395-6/AG 252-3); and in a letter to De Volder of June 1703: ‘When I say that even if it is corporeal, a substance contains an infinity of machines, I think it must be added at the same time that it forms one machine composed of these machines and that it is actuated, besides, by one entelechy, without which it would contain no principle of true unity’ (G II 250/L 529). Cf. Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, pp. 309 ff.

\(^4\) Here God is to be considered rather morally than metaphysically; or, as Leibniz says, ‘we must add morals to metaphysics’ (G IV 460/L 326). ‘That is to say,’ he continues, ‘we must consider God, not only as the principle and cause of all substances and all beings, but also as the head of all persons or intelligent substances and as the absolute monarch of the most perfect city or state, such as is the universe composed of all the spirits together, God himself being the most perfect of all spirits, as well as the greatest of all beings’ (G IV 460/L 326). As we have seen, God, as the idea of the good, transcends all being. This means, on the one hand, that he is the condition of the possibility of all being; but on the other hand it can mean also that he is what is superior to all being, what all being has not been yet, what all being ought to be—that is to say, the ought (cf. Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 210 ff.). Therefore he is not only ‘the architect and efficient cause of our being’ but also ‘our master and final cause, who must be the whole end of our will and can alone make our happiness’ (G VI 623/L 652); he is ‘the Author of all good’ (G VI 622/L 652) or ‘the source of all,
says in section 36 of the Discourse: ‘Only spirits are made in his image and are, as it were, of his blood or like the children of his household, for only they can serve him freely and act with knowledge in imitation of the divine nature’ (G IV 461/L 327). Thus they are ‘architectonic’ in their actions; and in ruling their bodies they perform like God. As Leibniz says in section 14 of the Principles, ‘[t]he spirit not only has a perception of the works of God but is even capable of producing something which resembles them, though in miniature. For not to mention the wonders of dreams in which we invent, without effort but also without will, things which we should have to think a long time to discover when awake, our soul is architectonic also in its voluntary actions and in discovering the sciences according to which God has regulated things (by weight, measure, number, etc.). In its own realm and in the small world in which it is allowed to act, the soul imitates what God performs in the great world’ (G VI 604-5/L 640).

But on the other hand, every created monad, as a subordinate monad, remains remote from God; for it merely makes up a part of the body of the dominant monad.\footnote{I shall explain this in more detail in Part Three.}

It is this ambivalence—being at once dominant and subordinate—that constitutes the nature of created monads, and therefore that distinguishes them essentially from God.

Having once understood all of this, it is easy to see how the relation between the soul and the body corresponds to the relation between God and the world. Just as the good’ (G VI 606/L 641), and thus ‘distributes his goodness’ (G IV 457/L 324) among all beings. But, as we have just seen, this is known only to spirits; and this is why Leibniz speaks of ‘the city of God,’ which is composed of all spirits and governed by him (cf., for example, G IV 461 ff., 485-6/L 326 ff., 458; G VI 605 ff., 621 ff./L 640 ff., 651 ff.). I think that this ‘government’ (G VI 622/L 652) can provide us with a good model of the domination of the dominant monad over the subordinate monads; but we cannot enter into this detail.
relation between the soul and the body is the relation among the dominant monad, the subordinate monads and its body, so the relation between God and the world is the relation among God, created monads and the world; and just as each subordinate monad makes up a part of the body of the dominant monad, so each created monad makes up a part of the world. But here, it may be objected that such a conception of the relation of God to the world makes him 'the world-soul' which has the world as its body—the doctrine which Leibniz usually ascribes to Spinoza and consistently rejects. I have already suggested this objection several times; and now I have to devote myself to meeting it in detail. This will be attempted in the next part.
PART THREE

In the last part, we have seen that if God is to the world as the soul is to its body, it follows that God is the world-soul which has the world as its body. Leibniz, however, does not accept such an idea. If this be so, how can we explain this paradox? In answer to this, I shall first of all consider why he rejects the doctrine of the world-soul or of a single universal soul, and then show that even though God, as the most dominant monad, is the world-soul, it does not contradict the theory of monads.

In the essay entitled *Reflections on the Doctrine of a Single Universal Soul* Leibniz describes this doctrine thus: 'Some discerning people have believed and still believe today, that there is only one single spirit, which is universal and animates the whole universe and all its parts, each according to its structure and the organs which it finds there, just as the same wind current causes different organ pipes to give off different sounds. Thus they also hold that when an animal has sound organs, this spirit produces the effect of a particular soul in it but that when the organs are corrupted, this particular soul reduces to nothing or returns, so to speak, to the ocean of the universal spirit' (G VI 529/L 554). And in section 8 of the *Theodicy* he says: '... others ... went so far as to advocate a universal soul forming the ocean of all individual souls, and believed this universal soul alone capable of subsisting, whilst individual souls are born and die. According to this opinion the souls of animals are born by being separated like drops from their ocean, when they find a body which they can animate; and they die by being reunited to the ocean of souls when the body is destroyed, as streams are lost in the sea. Many even went so far as to believe that God is that universal soul, although others thought that this soul was subordinate and created. This bad doctrine is very ancient and
apt to dazzle the common herd' (G VI 54/H 78). The reason that he judges the doctrine of a universal soul to be ‘bad’ is, that it treats of individual souls as being born and dying—in a word, as mortal; such treatment of individual souls ends in denying their subjectivity and in accepting that God alone is a true substance—for a substance, as is commonly understood, must be imperishable.1 Something perishable, then, is not really a substance but merely a *modification* of it. Therefore, Leibniz often ascribes the doctrine of a universal soul to Spinoza, who, according to him, admitted only one substance which is permanent and divine, and regarded all the rest as its ‘evanescent and flowing modifications or phantasms’ (G IV 508/L 502). ‘Spinoza,’ he tells us, ‘who recognizes only one single substance, is not far from the doctrine of a single universal soul’ (G VI 530/L 554; cf. G IV 508-9/L 502).

On the other hand, Leibniz insists not only upon the plurality of substances, but also upon their indestructibility: ‘... monads,’ he says, ‘can only begin or end all at once, that is to say, they cannot begin except by creation or end except by annihilation’ (G VI 607/L 643). And, besides, he holds that not only the soul but also the body is subsistent: ‘... the souls and even the animals subsist always’ (G VI 545/L 590). To be sure, the

1 Strictly speaking, there is another reason for which Leibniz rejects the doctrine of the world-soul, and which can briefly be formulated thus: Since the world is infinite, it is not a whole; therefore it cannot be considered as an animal nor as a substance. For instance, he says in section 195 of the *Theodicy*: ‘... infinity, that is to say, the accumulation of an infinite number of substances, is, properly speaking, not a whole any more than the infinite number itself, whereof one cannot say whether it is even or uneven. That is just what serves to confute those who make of the world a God, or who think of God as the Soul of the world; for the world or the universe cannot be regarded as an animal or as a substance’ (G VI 232/H 249; cf. G II 304-5; G VII 399/L 702-3). I do not, however, treat of this reason in detail; instead, I shall show that even though God is the world-soul, he is in a particular way separated completely from the world, and therefore that the world is not itself a corporeal substance, nor, as Leibniz puts it, a ‘divine animal’ (G VII 399/L 703).
body, being composed of parts, is decomposable and sometimes becomes so small as to be hardly perceptible; but he believes that it cannot be detached completely from its soul. Thus he says that ‘organic bodies are never without souls,’ and that ‘souls are never separated from organic bodies’ (G VI 545/L 590). He thinks also that his doctrine of pre-established harmony has firmly established this fact; for in advocating it he has shown ‘that the soul with its functions is something distinct from matter but that it nevertheless is always accompanied by material organs and also that the soul’s functions are always accompanied by organic functions which must correspond to them and that this relation is reciprocal and always will be’ (G VI 533/L 556). Consequently, he says in section 73 of the Monadology: ‘. . . there is never complete generation or, strictly speaking, perfect death, consisting in the separation of the soul. What we call generation is a development and an increase, just as what we call death is an envelopment and a diminution’ (G VI 619/L 650).

This being so, it is obvious that the monadological system is not compatible with the doctrine above described, that is to say, which advocates that individual souls should return, after the destruction of their bodies, to the ocean of a universal soul. But if this doctrine allows the plurality of substances and therefore the subsistence of individual souls, it will itself be acceptable; for in this case one only speaks of God as a universal spirit. In fact Leibniz says: ‘In itself the doctrine of a universal spirit is good, for all who teach it recognize in fact the existence of divinity . . . . But to go so far as to say that this universal spirit is the only spirit and that there are no particular souls or spirits, or at least that these particular souls cease to subsist, is, I believe, to exceed the bounds of reason and to advance, without any basis, a doctrine of which we have not even a distinct concept’ (G VI 530-31/L 555). And as we have seen, even though God occupies
the position of the most dominant monad, of the world-soul, each one of created
monads, which are subordinate to him, maintains, as a dominant monad, autonomy and
independence, and subsists as long as God does (cf. G IV 485-6/L 458; G VI 598/L 636).
Therefore, we cannot simply identify, under the pretext of God as the highest monad,
the theory of monads with the doctrine of a universal soul which Leibniz rejects.

I have made these remarks, because Kuno Fischer has actually made such
identification, claming that the conception of God as the highest monad leads to the
doctrine of the world-soul, 'which,' he says, 'goes definitely against the spirit of
monadology.'

Let us then examine briefly how Fischer has come to put forwards such a claim. He
points out that there is an antinomy in Leibniz's concept of God. His argument is as
follows. Firstly, as the highest monad, God is without limit, that is to say, without body.
Secondly, however, in the monadological system, as I have already observed, the
relation of the soul to its body corresponds to the relation of God to the world; and,
besides, souls are always accompanied with organic bodies. Thirdly, therefore, such a
monad as God, i.e., as has no body, is not really a monad. In consequence, these two
propositions contradicting each other can be accepted at the same time: 'God is a
monad' and 'God is not a monad.' Here are Fisher's words:

God was the highest monad and as such had to be conceived as being without all limit and
matter. Wholly immaterial as he is, God finds himself out of natural connexion with the world,

---

2 Fischer, *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Leben, Werke und Lehre*, S. 615. See also Robert Latta's
comment on section 70 of the *Monadology*; Leibniz, *The Monadology and Other Philosophical
Writings*, p. 257.
thus being absolutely distinguished from all other beings. That opposition of the material and immaterial, which Leibniz attempted to resolve into the relation between the soul and the body, now presses between God and the world. But then it is a necessary condition of every individuality to be with limit and matter; and this is the nature of every monad. An unlimited monad, therefore, is a monad which is not really a monad. In this apparent contradiction is the Leibnizian concept of God. Both are accepted: the proposition, ‘God is a monad,’ and its contradictory opposition: ‘God is not a monad.’ In this antinomy the Leibnizian teaching of God wavers also in its expressions.3

But it is inconceivable that God is not a monad; for, as Leibniz says, he is ‘the primary unity or the simple original substance of which all the created or derivative monads are products’ (G VI 614/L 647; cf. G VII 502). Thus we are constrained to accept only the proposition that God is a monad;4 but, Fischer says, this conception of

3 Ibid., S. 613/4.
4 On the contrary, Russell dismisses the idea that God is a monad, on the score of a ‘wide gulf’ between God and created monads (The Philosophy of Leibniz, p. 187); and as to the passages in which Leibniz speaks of God as a monad (G III 636; G VII 502), he regards them as ‘slips’ (The Philosophy of Leibniz, p. 187). But as far as I can judge, even if God is distinct from created monads toto genere or infinitely, there remains a continuity between them; otherwise Leibniz would not say either that ‘every substance is . . . like a mirror of God’ (G IV 434/L 308), or that creatures bear in themselves the character of the Creator (cf. G IV 428/L 304). As I have already shown, God, as the most dominant monad, is the condition of the possibility of the being of all beings. But this does not conflict with the idea that God is a monad; for, as we have seen, each created monad, as a dominant monad, does the same thing as God does, though in miniature. By the way, what if God is not a monad? According to Fischer, God will become an ‘unlimited substance’ (Fischer, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Leben, Werke und Lehre, S. 615), which is lacking in personality, and from which all created things emanate without moral necessity (see ibid., S. 615; cf. G IV 439/L 311 ff.; G VI 614/L 647); such a concept of emanation, as gives up not only God’s self-determination but also creatures’ independence (see ibid., S. 615), ‘looks like,’ Fischer says, ‘Spinozism’ (ibid., S. 615). Erdmann had

62
God makes him the world-soul which has the world as its body. He begins by confirming the correspondence between the relation of God to the world and the relation of the soul to its body, views God as *monas monadum*, and concludes that God is 'the world-soul in the world-body':

According to the rudder of the teaching of monads, God must be to other beings, as the dominating monad is to the subordinated monads, as the highest monad is to the lower monads and as the soul is to its body. In this consideration God is called 'monas monadum'; he is the perfect soul in the perfect body, the world-soul [*Weltseele*] in the world-body [*Weltkörper*].

To which I have two points to argue. Firstly, even though, in the monadological system, the relation of God to the world corresponds to the relation of the soul to its body, it does not necessarily follow from this that God has the world as his body. For, as we have seen, the relation between the soul and the body, strictly speaking, is the

---

5 According to Russell, this traditional expression 'monas monadum' is not to be found in Leibniz’s writings. ‘It was used by Bruno,’ he informs us, ‘from which it used to be thought that Leibniz got the word monad’ (*The Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 187). ‘This fact,’ he continues, ‘seems to have led Hegel to suppose that Leibniz also used the phrase, and subsequent writers, with the exception of Erdmann, seem to have rashly assumed that Hegel had some authority for the supposition’ (*Ibid.*, p. 188). From these things Russell draws the conclusion that God is not a monad. ‘Thus,’ he says, ‘it is better not to regard Leibniz’s God as one among monads . . .’ (*Ibid.*, 188).

relation among the dominant monad, its body and, most important, the subordinate monads; in other words, the subordinate monads mediate, as it were, between the dominant monad and its body. And by dominating them, the dominant monad has its body, not immediately but mediately; those which have this body effectively and immediately are the subordinate monads, which are contained within its parts. (And, of course, each of these subordinate monads, again, as a dominant monad, has its own body through the medium of the monads subordinate to it; and this process goes to infinity. Therefore, speaking strictly in a metaphysical sense, no monad, in so far as it is a dominant monad, has its body immediately; this is why, as we shall see below, God, being always predominant, is entirely detached from his body.) Fischer, however, conceives of the relation between the soul and the body simply as the relation between two terms, without realising that this relation, in the monadological system, is the relation among three terms. This is evident from the fact that in the above quotation he treats of the relation between the soul and the body as the same as the relation between the dominant monad and the subordinated monads; but these two relations are not the same thing.

Secondly, therefore, even though God is the world-soul in the world-body, this body is distributed, as it were, among created monads, which are subordinate to him; and in this distribution, he finds himself entirely detached from his body (cf. G VI 619/L 650). Moreover, because of this detachment, he alone is 'actus purus' (G II 325), being 'above all matter' (G VI 546/L 590); this is why Leibniz calls God 'substantia supramundana' (G II 259) or 'intelligentia supramundana' (G VII 358 ff./L 679 ff.).

Whence it follows clearly that although God be the highest monad, namely the world-soul, this does not go against the spirit of monadology.
It can be seen also from what has just been said, why Leibniz, writing to Bourguet, who doubted that there is an affinity between the theory of monads and Spinozism, could declare with confidence: 'I do not see how you can deduce any Spinozism from this . . . . On the contrary, it is through these very monads that Spinozism is destroyed . . .' (G III 575/L 663). For Leibniz grasped the relation between the soul and the body, not dualistically, but in view of a third which plays an intermediary role between the two; and it is this very third that made him far removed from Spinozism—according to which God has the world as its body immediately, and according to which there is only one corporeal substance which is divine and permanent; in contrast with such a theory, he distinguished God from the world by making created monads mediate between the two. That is to say, on the one hand, every creature is close to God, in so far as it is a dominant monad and leaves its body to the monads subordinate to it; but on the other hand, every creature is remote from God and remains a part of nature, in so far as it is a subordinate monad and makes up a part of the body of the dominant monad. It is thus that creatures are at once divine and natural, and, so to speak, the compounds of God as the purely spiritual and nature as the purely material; and herein, I think, lies the essence of the relation between God and creatures in the monadological system.

By these considerations, I believe, I have thrown some light upon the subject. Now, I should like to conclude this thesis, which is so long that I have never written before, and which I have written in a foreign language, with the lines of Manilius prefixed by Leibniz as a motto to the Theodicy:

. . . Quid mirum, noscere Mundum

65
Si possunt homines; quibus est et mundus in ipsis,

Exemplumque Dei quisque est sub imagine parva.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary texts


Secondary texts


Garber, Daniel. ‘Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years.’ In Okruhlik and Brown, eds., *The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz*, pp. 27-130.


Parkinson, G. H. R. 'Leibniz's Paris Writings in Relation to Spinoza.' *Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa* 18 (1978), pp. 73-89.


Rutherford, Donald. 'Phenomenalism and the Reality of Body in Leibniz's Later Philosophy.' *Studia Leibnitiana* 22 (1990), pp. 11-38.


