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Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships

Cripps, M.; Mailath, G.; Samuelson, L.; (2007) Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships. (ELSE Working Papers 253). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access

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Abstract

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed player�s reputation is private.

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007
Language: English
Keywords: JEL classification: C70, C78. Reputation, imperfect monitoring, repeated games, commitment, private beliefs
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of SandHS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14445
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