UCL Discovery
UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

An experimental test of Rubinstein's bargaining model

Binmore, K.; Swierzbinski, J.; Tomlinson, C.; (2007) An experimental test of Rubinstein's bargaining model. (ELSE Working Papers 260). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access

[img]
Preview
PDF
14439.pdf

Download (338kB)

Abstract

This paper offers an experimental test of a version of Rubinstein’s bargaining model in which the players’ discount factors are unequal. We find that learning, rationality, and fairness are all significant in determining the outcome. In particular, we find that a model of myopic optimization over time predicts the sign of deviations in the opening proposal from the final undiscounted agreement in the previous period rather well. To explain the amplitude of the deviations, we then successfully fit a perturbed version of the model of myopic adjustment to the data that allows for a bias toward refusing inequitable offers.

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: An experimental test of Rubinstein's bargaining model
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007
Language: English
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14439
Downloads since deposit
311Downloads
Download activity - last month
Download activity - last 12 months
Downloads by country - last 12 months

Archive Staff Only

View Item View Item