Binmore, K.;
(2007)
Can knowledge be justified true belief?
(ELSE Working Papers
265).
ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
Knowledge was traditionally held to be justified true belief. This paper examines the implications of maintaining this view if justication is interpreted algorithmically. It is argued that if we move sufficiently far from the small worlds to which Bayesian decision theory properly applies, we can steer between the rock of fallibilism and the whirlpool of skepticism only by explicitly building into our framing of the underlying decision problem the possibility that its attempt to describe the world is inadequate.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Can knowledge be justified true belief? |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007 |
| Language: | English |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14434 |
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