UCL Discovery
UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials

Jehiel, P.; Meyer-ter-Vehn, M.; Moldovanu, B.; (2008) Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials. (ELSE Working Papers 297). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access

[img]
Preview
PDF
14360.pdf

Download (269kB)

Abstract

We introduce several notions of potentials for mechanism design problems with interdependent values, and relate them to implementation in ex-post equilibrium. Whereas ex-post implementation is closely linked to the ordinal concept of best-alternative potentials, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism corresponds to the stronger notion of a cardinal potential: agents agree not only on the best al- ternative, but also on the quantitative differences between all alternatives. We characterize all valuations that allow for cardinal potentials, and use this characterization for: 1) Identifying valuations for which ex-post implementation is possible; 2) Identifying classes of valuations for which all ex-post implementable choice rules correspond to cardinal potentials. The latter allows us to extend to interdependent valuations a result for dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, due to Roberts (1979).

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2008
Language: English
UCL classification: UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of SandHS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14360
Downloads since deposit
236Downloads
Download activity - last month
Download activity - last 12 months
Downloads by country - last 12 months

Archive Staff Only

View Item View Item