Ren, J;
Wong, K-K;
Hou, J;
(2013)
A Forward-Looking Nash Game and Its Application to Achieving Pareto-Efficient Optimization.
Applied Mathematics
, 04
(12)
1609 - 1615.
10.4236/am.2013.412218.
PDF
AM_2013112017242452.pdf Available under License : See the attached licence file. Download (257kB) |
Abstract
Recognizing the fact that a player’s cognition plays a defining role in the resulting equilibrium of a game of competition, this paper provides the foundation for a Nash game with forward-looking players by presenting a formal definition of the Nash game with consideration of the players’ belief. We use a simple two-firm model to demonstrate its fundamental difference from the standard Nash and Stackelberg games. Then we show that the players’ belief functions can be regarded as the optimization parameters for directing the game towards a much more desirable equilibrium.
Type: | Article |
---|---|
Title: | A Forward-Looking Nash Game and Its Application to Achieving Pareto-Efficient Optimization |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.4236/am.2013.412218 |
Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/am.2013.412218 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | Copyright © 2013 Jie Ren et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Keywords: | Belief; Cognition; Iterative Algorithm; Nash Equilibrium; Pareto-Optimality; Stackelberg |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > Dept of Electronic and Electrical Eng |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1421171 |
Archive Staff Only
View Item |