McKay, PK;
(2007)
Freedom, Fiction and Evidential Decision Theory.
Erkenntnis
, 66
(3)
pp. 393-407.
10.1007/s10670-007-9040-7.
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Abstract
This paper argues against evidential decision-theory, by showing that the newest responses to its biggest current problem – the medical Newcomb problems – don’t work. The latest approach is described, and the arguments of two main proponents of it – Huw Price and CR Hitchcock – clearly distinguished and examined. It is argued that since neither new defence is successful, causation remains essential to understanding means-end agency.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | Freedom, Fiction and Evidential Decision Theory |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.1007/s10670-007-9040-7 |
Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-007-9040-7 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-007-9040-7. |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Maths and Physical Sciences UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Maths and Physical Sciences > Dept of Science and Technology Studies |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1397590 |
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