

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE ENGLISH CROWN AND ITS EMBASSY IN CONSTANTINOPLE WITH PRETENDERS TO THE THRONE OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF MOLDAVIA BETWEEN THE YEARS 1583 AND 1620, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE PRETENDER STEFAN BOGDAN BETWEEN 1590 AND 1612.

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ABSTRACT

In the late sixteenth century English commerce expanded under the auspices of the Levant Company into the Ottoman Empire, which resulted in the establishment of an English Embassy at Constantinople, enabling the English Crown to pursue its aspirations as a European power. English Ambassadors involved themselves in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire and surrounding states, including those of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, both Ottoman vassal states. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries a number of men claiming to be the rightful rulers of these principalities sought the support of the English Crown and its Embassy in Constantinople; prominent amongst them was Ștefan Bogdan.

The Introduction discusses various historians' contributions to the study of Ștefan Bogdan's career. Chapter 1 examines Moldavia's relations with the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Poland. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the status and activities of the English Embassy and its early ambassadors. Chapter 4 deals with England's involvement with Moldavian and Wallachian pretenders prior to Ștefan Bogdan's approaches. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine Bogdan's aspirations, the steps he took to achieve his goal and the reasons for his ultimate failure and considers the nature of the support accorded him by the English Crown. Chapter 8 discusses the career of Gaspar Gratiani, a former embassy employee, who was appointed Prince of Moldavia as a reward for subsequent services to the Sultan. The Conclusion discusses the preoccupations of English diplomacy in this period as revealed by English policies towards Moldavia. This thesis aims to describe the establishment of one of the first permanent English Embassies abroad and shed light on a difficult period in the history of what is now part of modern Romania.

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INTRODUCTION

The question of political contact between England and the principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania in the early seventeenth century is one which has received little attention from English historians since the publication of the 1621 edition of Richard Knolles' *Generall Historie of the Turkes* despite the existence of a wealth of primary source material in British archives. Eric Tappe has published a number of articles on such early political contacts concentrating, however, on the period after the restoration of Charles II to the English throne; he has also published a collection of documents found in British Archives which relate to the principalities between the years 1427 and 1601. (1)

Considerably more research has been conducted by Romanian historians on these early political, and also economic, relations, and some attention has been devoted to the question of foreign support for pretenders to the thrones of the Wallachian and Moldavian principalities, both of which were in this period vassal states of the Ottoman Empire. As the title of my thesis suggests, I intend to deal mainly with the principality of Moldavia and its relations with representatives of the English Crown, and in particular with the support accorded to one pretender: Bogdan Sasul (son of Iancu Sasul) who changed his name to Ștefan Bogdan in 1600. However, Wallachia's predicament was very similar to that of Moldavia and therefore reference will be made to Wallachia's affairs for

purposes of comparison.

Bogdan claimed to be a descendant of the fifteenth century Moldavian Prince, Stephen the Great (Ștefan Cel Mare), and spent much of his early life seeking election to the Moldavian throne through the patronage of Ottoman officials in Constantinople (Istanbul) (2) and a number of rich Venetians: he was unsuccessful because of his opponent's influence with the Sultan and spent a long time in hiding; he was even said to have taken refuge in the house of the English Ambassador Edward Barton [1588-97]. The Ottoman Sultan sought to control changes in the leadership of Moldavia and Wallachia by manipulating his right as the suzerain power to confirm the elections of their rulers before they took power. In effect the Sultan appointed these princes. In doing so he was amenable to persuasion through gifts but also to advice as to who was the most suitable candidate. Thus the patronage of those who had access to the Sultan and upon whose advice he relied, or who could provide the necessary cash and appropriate contacts, was eagerly sought by aspiring princes.

In 1601 Bogdan visited the court of Queen Elizabeth I of England, where he received letters of recommendation to the Ottoman Sultan; the English Ambassador Henry Lello [1597-1607] was ordered to protect him and take up his case at the Ottoman *Divan* (the Ottoman Council of Ministers). Lello obeyed his orders until the pretender was thrown into an Ottoman prison in 1604. In 1606 Bogdan escaped from prison dressed as a woman and travelled the Courts of Europe seeking foreign

assistance to regain his father's throne. Eventually he arrived in England in the summer of 1607. He successfully petitioned King James I to grant him letters of recommendation to the Ottoman Sultan and to the new Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Thomas Glover; he also received a grant of money towards his travel expenses and the promise of 10,000 French crowns to be used as bribes at the *Divan*. Whilst in England, Bogdan became acquainted with Lady Arbella Stuart, the King's cousin, and conceived the idea of asking for her hand in marriage if he was elected to the Moldavian throne.

In Constantinople, Sir Thomas Glover worked energetically to secure Bogdan the Sultan's nomination as Prince of Moldavia at his own expense, bribery being a useful instrument of diplomacy in Constantinople. Despite the enormous sums of money spent, the project was a failure. Glover was recalled to England in 1611 and replaced by Paul Pindar; by this time Bogdan had abandoned his hopes of ascending the Moldavian throne and converted to Islam; he was rewarded with the grant of a *Pashalik* (an Ottoman military province) in December 1611.

Three Romanian historians have published studies of Anglo-Romanian relations (3): Nicolae Iorga held the view that in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries Anglo-Romanian relations were largely unco-ordinated, the result of adventurous individuals as opposed to deliberate state policy; furthermore, he argued that since wandering Moldavian and Wallachian pretenders were a feature of this period it was inevitable that Englishmen should come into contact with them. Paul

Cernovodeanu and Ludovic Demeny have argued that support for men such as Bogdan was part of a deliberate commercial policy by the Levant Company and the English Crown. Cernovodeanu has expanded upon this view in a number of articles and a book on English commercial policy. (4) We shall return to these different interpretations later on in this introduction.

The earliest surviving published account of England's entanglement with Bogdan was written by William Lithgow, a Scottish traveller, who stayed in Sir Thomas Glover's house in 1611 when Ștefan Bogdan was also in residence there. (5) Lithgow's account is essentially an eulogy upon the generosity of Sir Thomas Glover whom he considered to have been ill-used by Bogdan. Glover had received the pretender into his own house when other Christian Ambassadors had refused to help him, he had maintained him at his own expense for two years and had promoted his cause at the *Divan*, providing him with money and all other essentials to maintain him according to his status. According to Lithgow, Bogdan's ingratitude was demonstrated when, having heard that Glover was to be replaced, he sneaked away without explanation and converted to Islam the very same morning. Lithgow commented that for all his great Dukedom (sic), Bogdan was now content with a palace and a pension.

Lithgow's version of events can be regarded as a useful primary source because he knew Bogdan and Glover at the time of the events described; despite his disapproval of the pretender's behaviour he

conceded that he was a charming and friendly individual; he also provides a testimony to Glover's good character which contrasts with other descriptions of him. The fact that Lithgow considered it necessary to do this confirms other evidence which shows that there was some controversy in England about Glover's conduct of his Embassy, not only with regard to his prosecution of the King's instructions on behalf of Stefan Bogdan. Lithgow's account confirms other sources which show that Glover maintained close contact with Bogdan after his conversion to Islam. Lithgow's writings also confirm the high status of the English Embassy in Constantinople and the cosmopolitan nature of the Ottoman capital, but they were not intended as an historical treatise; they were merely an account of his travels. He made no attempt to discover further information about the pretender or enlarge upon the details which he reported, many of which he had probably received directly from the mouth of Sir Thomas Glover. Lithgow's book is an instructive primary source as regards Glover's reaction to Ştefan Bogdan and an assessment of the pretender's character.

A second version of Bogdan's misfortune was written by Thomas Gainsford in *Glorie of England* (6), an extremely chauvinistic publication which takes the form of a comparison of contemporary England with various other countries, their cities, forms of government and so forth, in which England invariably emerges as superior. In Gainsford's opinion, England's "glorie" was amply demonstrated by its Crown's support of the "true" Prince of Moldavia driven out of his own country by an usurper,

who sought help as a Protestant and received kindness and the protection of the English Embassy at Constantinople.

According to this account Bogdan was, as a result of either threats or corruption, removed by force from the English Embassy and imprisoned. Gainsford wrote that after his escape he went to Poland, the Habsburg Emperor, and the King of France for help but was rebuffed; he then returned to England where he saw the differences in the entertainment accorded to Princes between England and other nations: in London he was treated with the respect due to his status, given letters of recommendation to the Sultan to secure his re-establishment upon the Moldavian throne and a large sum of money granted by the Levant Company upon the faintest hope of his success. Such English generosity was, in Gainsford's view, in marked contrast to the meanness of other nations and the avarice of the Turks who accepted expensive gifts upon Bogdan's behalf whilst treating him with contempt and scorn, setting aside petitions for his cause with excuses and eventually refusing to sponsor him as had been promised. Gainsford commented:

“where is now the Turkish ostentation of supporting the innocent and distributing justice to all sorts of people?”

This is an example of the kind of rabid English patriotism which regarded contempt for foreigners as an important attribute of an English gentleman, yet saw the patronage of unfortunates as the highest expression of English superiority. Since Gainsford clearly received his information second-hand, this book cannot be regarded as an important primary source from which to glean new information about the English

Embassy's dealings with Bogdan. Nevertheless, this source is of use for a different reason: as we shall see in this thesis, the decision of the English Crown to accord its support to Bogdan was one which had provoked considerable controversy within circles close to the Crown in England and which also provoked great interest within the wider political society in London. Gainsford's book was published in 1618, eight years after the removal of Glover as Ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan Ahmet I in an atmosphere of disgrace and recrimination; this suggests that this matter was still discussed, perhaps with regard to whether or not the English Crown should in future exercise its patronage in such a manner. Gainsford agreed with Lithgow's view that the patronage of Stefan Bogdan was motivated by generosity and the desire to assist a Protestant prince whose fortunes were at their lowest ebb. As we shall see, King James always insisted that he had acted from the most selfless of motives.

There is a short account of Bogdan's career in Richard Knolles' *Generall Historie of the Turkes* (the edition of 1621). Knolles' history, first published in 1603 and updated in subsequent years, is a long and detailed history of the Ottoman Empire with a particular interest in the Empire's European wars and shows a considerable understanding of the complex system of relationships between the Ottomans, their vassals, the Tatars and the princes of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, and with the Habsburg Empire and the Kingdom of Poland. Although meagre on detail for Bogdan's early career and occasionally incorrect on certain

facts, the study of Sir Thomas Glover's patronage of Ștefan Bogdan concurs with Glover's reports preserved in the State Papers. (7) In a number of respects the book shows an accurate knowledge of the negotiations between Glover and the Ottomans and his less than cordial encounters with the Grand Vizier. (8) It may have been based upon Glover's own account of his actions in Constantinople which he had been required to give on his return to England.

In agreement with Lithgow and Gainsford, the book ascribes James I's reasons for supporting Bogdan to the following motive:

"His Maiestie of Great Britaine pitying his miserable estate recommended him by his letters to Sir Thomas Glover... with commandment to assist him and sollicite his restitution." (9)

The author places the career of Ștefan Bogdan in the context of the recent history of Moldavia and its relations with adjacent states. He refers to Moldavia's miserable state as being due not merely to the existence of so many princes with a claim to the throne but also to the fact that this state of affairs made the principalities:

"prey to Turke, Tartarians and Polonians, all partisans to these sovereigns." (10)

The author saw Bogdan's efforts to gain the Moldavian throne as part of a struggle for control of Moldavia between Poland, supporting the Movilă faction, and the Ottomans. (11) He attributed Bogdan's failure to the counter-measures taken against the pretender by Constantin Movilă (the reigning Prince) and the corruption of highly-placed officials at the Ottoman court, in particular to Movilă's financial connections with Murat

Pasha the Grand Vizier (the Sultan's Chief Minister), who attempted at his instigation to have Bogdan arrested and executed. The author's verdict upon the history of the three principalities during this period is that events conspired:

“to the end that these unfortunate regions should never be without some touch of miserie;” (12)

and they had the misfortune to be surrounded by three European powers which endlessly interfered in their affairs; he regarded Stefan Bogdan's experience as an illustration of this.

Following a brief interest in Ștefan Bogdan in England during the early seventeenth century, the pretender appears to have been forgotten. Interest in Bogdan was revived in 1897 in an article written by Nicolae Iorga, one of Romania's best known historians, concerning Romanian pretenders who claimed descent from Stephen the Great. (13) Based largely upon documents published in the *Hurmuzaki* series, (14) Iorga's article gives a brief outline of Bogdan's life mainly concerned with the fate of his father Iancu Sasul, Prince of Moldavia [1579-82], his early life and his involvement with a number of powerful and influential Venetians. It describes Bogdan's early campaign to gain the Moldavian throne which he pursued by cultivating the patronage of Ottoman officials; even at this early stage the rulers of Poland were suspicious of him and on several occasions tried to have him maimed or killed. Iorga points out that Bogdan's life was saved by the intervention of the English and French Ambassadors. The account of Bogdan's visit to England is extremely brief and Iorga gives only a skeleton account of Sir Thomas

Glover's efforts on the pretender's behalf. The article places great emphasis upon political events in the principalities and the ambitions of the numerous pretenders; Bogdan was on the periphery of these events, but Iorga hints that he could have been drawn more fully into the military struggle for control of Moldavia and, had luck been on his side, through this he could have ascended the Moldavian throne. Whilst Bogdan's fortunes were limited by the turnout of events, he was no mere instrument of policy, but a prime mover and a driving force in his own interests.

In 1913 Ion Botez published two articles (15) which drew attention to the fact that a "Prince of Moldavia" and a "King of Moldavia" were mentioned in two Jacobean comedies (16) and pointed out that for a long time literary historians had been unable to identify these characters. (17) In these articles Botez identified the Prince or King of Moldavia as Stefan Bogdan by referring to the existence of letters mentioning him in the Hurmuzaki publication *Tesauru de Monumente Istorice* vol III [Bucharest 1860 (ed. Papiu Ilarianu)] and in Iorga's article; he argued that the coincidence of trends in drama towards heroics and adventure in foreign lands coupled with an increase in foreign travel and discovery ensured that Ben Jonson and Beaumont and Fletcher had no need to invent these characters. He concluded that the manners, personality and circumstances of this visitor to London created a great impression upon those connected with the Court.

In 1917 Marcu Beza published an article entitled 'English travellers in Romania' (18) which confirmed this view and went on to

identify the character in the Jacobean comedies with the Prince whom William Lithgow had met in Constantinople, thus pointing out to an academic readership that, despite contemporary ignorance about Romania, England had a long history of contact with the principalities through the travels of a number of Englishmen. In the same year Nicolae Iorga published *Histoire des Relations Anglo-Roumaines* [Iasi 1917], the English version of which was published in Bucharest in 1931. Continuing his previous work upon this subject he wrote about Bogdan as one of the most enduring of a number of pretenders:

“Always most numerous and often of doubtful origin [who] for some time found means to get at influential people in Constantinople and even gain monetary assistance and diplomatic protection from the courts of Western Europe”; (19)

arguing that the initiative was very much on the part of these pretenders to make best use of the generosity of Western courts to support their own causes in the East. He regarded Sir Thomas Glover’s actions on Bogdan’s behalf as being motivated by greed; he was:

“a merchant-diplomat, out for personal gain, who financed princes and then had to support them through thick and thin in order to recover his money.” (20)

This assessment of Glover’s reasons for according Bogdan his support is somewhat wide of the mark: as we shall see later on, Glover supported Bogdan because he was ordered to. Iorga briefly, and with a certain amount of irony, surveyed the life and exploits of Bogdan, whom he regarded as an unscrupulous adventurer. He concluded that Glover’s departure marked the end of the first era of Anglo-Romanian relations:

henceforth the duties of the Ambassadors were more strictly diplomatic, they behaved with greater dignity and their houses no longer afforded refuge to pretenders pursued by their enemies; as we shall also see, in supporting pretenders to the Moldavian and Wallachian thrones, the English Embassy was acting very much in a diplomatic capacity. Iorga also asserted that British commerce and British influence was not to be met with upon the Danube for another two centuries: (21) he had no suspicion of official royal or commercial policy to support princes in order to gain trading privileges.

A number of letters relating to Bogdan are to be found in the appendix to the English edition of Iorga's book; these were discovered by Elvira Georgescu amongst the State Papers in the Public Record Office in London. (22) This appears to have been the first time that the subject was approached using English sources. In 1934 Elvira Georgescu published a study of Bogdan's second visit to London and its consequences, based upon other documents in the English State Papers, including twenty-four letters written by Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury between 1607 and 1611. (23) This might have provided the means to study the true nature of England's support for the pretender. Unfortunately this is not the case: the documents published represent only a small proportion of those amongst the State papers; some of those selected are the least informative and often only part of a document has been transcribed. There are a considerable number of mistakes in the transcriptions, which is, however, understandable given the difficulties of

the 'secretary hand' in which the letters were written, and there are no references to the contents of the missing sections in the accompanying article. This is unfortunate since this article has been used as a major source of information upon the contents of the British archives for Romanian historians, the majority of whom were not until recently in a position to visit London to consult these documents.

Georgescu's article chronicles Bogdan's career between 1607 and 1611, making some reference to the political problems and intrigues in which Moldavia was embroiled due to the policies of the Ottomans and Poles, whilst noting that Ștefan Bogdan was responsible for stirring up dissent in Moldavia and amongst dissatisfied Moldavian boyars (the landowning nobility) who came to Constantinople. Elvira Georgescu noted an increasing interest in the non-Christian world amongst Western Europeans in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries which made it easier for men such as Bogdan to find a sympathetic reception; she also refers to England's general interest in Ottoman affairs quite apart from Bogdan's suit, and to Bogdan's work on his own behalf in correspondence with his protectors the King and Queen of England and the Earl of Salisbury; he issued reports upon the progress of his affairs and some of his efforts to gain the support of other European rulers.

There is a brief mention of Bogdan's ill-fated project of marriage with Lady Arbella Stuart, with the conclusion that Lady Arbella had given the pretender little encouragement; Bogdan's alliance of 1610 with Gabriel Bathory, Prince of Transylvania, who aspired to be elected King

of Poland, is also outlined. Georgescu's article can be regarded as a short survey of some of the salient questions in the matter of England's support of this particular pretender. (24)

Bogdan's career was next discussed in the work of Paul Cernovodeanu and Ludovic Demeny as referred to above, (25) the thesis of which is that the contacts between the first four English Ambassadors (William Harborne, Edward Barton, Henry Lello and Sir Thomas Glover) and Moldavian princes were pursued in order to gain trading privileges in Moldavia for English merchants, so that they might sell their own goods there, buy raw materials to ship home and, in particular, make the trade route between the Black Sea and the Baltic, which passed through Moldavia, safe for Englishmen to travel. In other words that English support for pretenders was a manifestation of English colonialism towards the Romanian principalities in order to further the interest of "capitalist-type trade" by big international companies. (26) It is my contention, however, that the Levant Company had no interest in Ștefan Bogdan because they had no well defined policies towards Moldavia. In order to advance this argument in the rest of my thesis, it is necessary to consider a number of topics which form the basis of Demeny and Cernovodeanu's case.

Economic penetration into the Levant by English merchants had been stimulated by the appointment of an Ambassador to Constantinople in 1582. In 1583 a set of commercial privileges, known as Capitulations were granted by the Ottoman Sultan to English merchants; they provided

for the payment of a small customs tax of 3% upon the value of goods and the right of English merchants to sail under their own colours. At the same time a monopoly trading company, which later became known as the Levant Company was set up to administer the trade. (27) Prior to this there is evidence of English merchandise, conveyed from the German lands to Lwow in Poland, finding its way into the Romanian lands, although mostly in the form of gifts. The new circumstances outlined above provided opportunities for English merchants to come into direct contact with the population of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania.(28)

The principal articles exported by the English merchants consisted initially of woollen cloth, and metals (particularly tin) indispensable for Ottoman artillery. In exchange they imported spices and other oriental products such as fine silks, cotton thread and medicinal drugs. (29) The English set up trading-posts, known as factories, in the Near-East, North Africa and the Greek islands. Cernovodeanu argues that it was natural that the merchants should focus their attention on the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia because they enjoyed a privileged status within the Ottoman system due to their: “economic and political semi-autonomy”; (30) the possibility of trade with Moldavia was viewed with particular interest owing to its position on the Black Sea-Baltic trade route. Strong commercial ties with Moldavia might allow the Levant merchants to trade directly with Poland in their own goods or those bought in Ottoman territories and would ensure distant connections for them with Baltic ports.

The Levant Company was not the only English Company trading in Eastern Europe: there was also the Eastland Company, set up in 1579, operating in the Baltic, and the Muscovy Company, operating out of Archangel. Moldavia appears not to have had a significant direct commercial relationship with the Eastland Company; imports of English cloth normally arrived in Moldavia from the south along the Constantinople road or from the Black Sea ports and the Danube. Agents of the Eastland Company, who bought Moldavian exports such as forest produce (potash and “ashes of potash”) and big cattle, did so indirectly. The goods were brought to Poland from Moldavia for sale in Lwow and other commercial centres and sold on by merchants living in Poland to agents of the Eastland Company, established in Danzig and other Baltic ports. (31)

According to Demény and Cernovodeanu’s argument there was an incentive for English merchants operating in the Levant to trade directly with Moldavia, not only to deal in English cloth, but also to undercut the Eastland Company by buying Moldavian exports in Moldavia. A number of expeditions were made to Moldavia by Englishmen, for example John Newberie, who visited the principality in 1582, and Henry Austell, who went there in 1585, (32) both of whom were involved in commerce. The main piece of evidence put forward to support the case that the Levant Company was seeking to expand its business with Moldavia, is a grant of trading privileges to English merchants by Prince Petru Șchiopul in 1588.

At his recall to England, Ambassador William Harborne travelled through Moldavia on his return home. According to the protocol he took with him letters from the Sultan which commanded Prince Petru to entertain him courteously. Petru did so and on August 27th September 5th 1588 at his camp at Tutora granted the following privileges:

“From now on the subjects and all merchants of her highness [Queen Elizabeth I] have permission to settle down and travel in our country, to buy, to sell, to make contracts and in a word to look after all that is covered by negotiation and in private life with no obstacles or prohibitions, submitting themselves for all that to our right of customs at 3%. and not at 12% as other foreign merchants pay and even natives.” (33)

furthermore, it is argued that the initiative behind the grant of these privileges came from the Levant Company. In an article entitled ‘Privilegiul comercial acordat Negustorilor Englezi in Moldova la 1588...’ (34) Cernovodeanu wrote that the encouragement of Moldavia’s external trade also entered into the considerations of Petru Șchiopul and those of his ministers, amongst whom was the *Postelnic* [Master of the Prince’s Household] Bartolomeo Brutti who was particularly active in Moldavia’s commercial and political business. This is evident from a letter dated June 1st 1587 from Brutti addressed to Queen Elizabeth (35) assuring her of his own loyalty and service and the loyalty and perpetual friendship of his master Petru Șchiopul.

Cernovodeanu has suggested that the English Crown supported pretenders to the throne of Moldavia because these privileges were not upheld by the various princes who occupied the throne. They gradually became forgotten because internal conditions in the principality were

unfavourable to trade. It was not until the conclusion of the Turko-Polish war in 1621, Cernovodeanu points out, that a period of unrest and internal uncertainty came to an end thereby creating conditions conducive to the spread of normal traffic for the merchants of the Levant Company. (36) In the meantime the Levant Company and the English Crown resorted to supporting their own candidates to the Moldavian throne in order to ensure that England's privileged trading position in Moldavia was re-established. It is argued that:

“after the renunciation of the Moldavian throne by Petru Schiopul, Edward Barton, the new Ambassador, who enjoyed the confidence of the Grand Dragoman of the Porte and was aware of the importance of the role of Moldavia in the international framework of commercial exchange initiated by the Levant Company in South-East Europe, decided to become personally involved in this direction.” (37)

Thus he decided to support the nomination as Prince of Moldavia of Aron Vodă, who might then respect the provisions of the treaty; in other words he sought out a likely candidate to succeed Petru in order to protect England's commercial privileges as part of a deliberate English policy, which was continued when he supported the nomination of Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul) as Prince of Wallachia. Furthermore, when the hopes invested in both proved illusory, the search was directed towards other suitable persons who would show themselves more receptive to the extension of Levant Company traffic in South-Eastern Europe. Amongst the numerous pretenders wandering between Constantinople, the Papal Court and Western Europe at the end of the 16th century, the attention of the interested parties settled on Bogdan Sasul (Ștefan

Bogdan) who was of royal blood. Cernovodeanu maintains with regard to Sir Thomas Glover's role, that he calculated the opportuneness of supporting a ruler favourable to the English in Moldavia in concordance with the interests of the Levant Company. Furthermore, qualities such as intelligence and personal charm attracted the goodwill and sympathy amongst ruling circles in England and, it is said, were in great demand due to the necessity of having a ruler favourable to English commerce upon the Moldavian throne. The desire to exploit these trading privileges in Moldavia is linked in Cernovodeanu's book *English trade policy in the Levant* with English efforts to gain access for their shipping to the Black Sea. (38)

However, whilst there was without doubt interest in the 1580's in the commercial possibilities offered by the principality, this does not mean that the establishment of such a trade was a high priority. The 1590's saw increasing internal instability in Moldavia as the Ottoman Empire, Poland and the Habsburg Empire struggled against each other to control the Principality's affairs. Thus whilst individual merchants in Constantinople might have been in a position to take advantage of trading opportunities in Moldavia when conditions allowed, the Levant Company establishment, a lengthy sea voyage away in London, was not well-placed to promote trade with Moldavia as a long-term investment when the Principality's leadership was so prone to change. It is important to distinguish between individual merchants who were willing to take considerable risks for their own profit and the Levant Company itself,

which existed to supervise and administrate the Levant trade, was much more conservative in outlook and was wary of committing the Company to high-risk investment in peripheral areas of Europe such as Moldavia.

As we shall see, Edward Barton was approached by supporters of both Aron and Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul) and persuaded to place his considerable influence behind their causes. Similarly, it was Stefan Bogdan who sought out English support and the English Crown granted it despite the reservations of the Earl of Salisbury and later the direct opposition of the Levant Company. This thesis will show that there was a conflict between the interests of the Levant Company and the aspirations of the English Crown. Due to a lack of relevant data it is impossible to be certain of the amount of English commercial activity in Moldavia either before or after the grant of these privileges. Furthermore, we do not know whether or not the trading privileges of 1588 were upheld. A letter written by the merchant John Sanderson in 1600 suggests that trade with Moldavia and Wallachia, disrupted by conflict, recovered quickly when peace was restored. Sanderson was writing after the defeat of Mihai Viteazul, Prince of Wallachia, who had briefly taken Moldavia and Transylvania under his control, and when Ieremie Movila, supported by the King of Poland, had been re-established on the Moldavian throne:

“Now that Bugdania and Valachia is open, and Poland in great friendship with these [the Ottomans]... sales cannott chose but be good... a wourse time then wee have had these two years past was never in these parts;yet now I see so great alteration likelie that, if I had any sparke of avvise or counsell that might prevaile with my friends,I would say and pray them for their own proffitt to

send what I writt for..." (39)

This suggests that Petru Șchiopul's privileges had not after all been forgotten, furthermore, if trade with Moldavia was attractive and safe passage through that state guaranteed under Ieremie Movilă's rule, as Sanderson's letter implies, it was unnecessary for the Levant Company to support a project to overthrow Movilă in favour of Ștefan Bogdan. At the time of writing Sanderson appears to have welcomed the accession of Ieremie Movilă. One can guess that this trade had some significance for Moldavia and that the Prince had granted trade privileges in order to encourage it; however, as we shall see, this was not the only reason he did so.

Brutti's letter to Queen Elizabeth, written one year prior to Prince Petru's grant of commercial privileges to English merchants, suggests that the initiative to establish a formal commercial relationship between England and Moldavia came from Petru Șchiopul. There is no evidence that these trading privileges were lobbied for by the Levant Company in London, although they were doubtless welcomed and taken as evidence of England's status in the eastern fringes of Christendom. Harborne had first made contact with the rulers of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in September or October 1578 when on his first journey to Constantinopl. It is noted by Richard Hakluyt that he met the "Voivodes" (Mihnea II, Prince of Wallachia, 1577-83; Petru Șchiopul, Prince of Moldavia, 1574-79) and in order to obtain their good opinion, he offered them "certaine courtesies". This initial contact may have been followed

up by either Harborne or Petru Șchiopul. There is evidence that Harborne had been in regular and amicable correspondence with the princely authorities in Moldavia at least since 1585. In October of that year one of the Prince's servants wrote to Harborne concerning the visit to Iași of Henry Austell and Jacomo Manucci who was an agent of the English Secretary of State, Sir Francis Walsingham. These contacts laid the foundations of an informal diplomatic relationship between England and Moldavia which Brutti later tried to strengthen with his letter of 1587. Petru Șchiopul's grant of trading privileges in 1588 was probably intended to cement this burgeoning relationship.

At the Ottoman court the English were held in high regard, partly due to the fame of Queen Elizabeth I, and William Harborne had established good relations with some Ottoman officials. On the other hand, Petru Șchiopul had had a somewhat stormy career as Prince of Moldavia and was in 1588 in his third reign. (40) In order to maintain his position as Prince, he needed influence at the Ottoman court from as many quarters as possible, to act as advocates and even to lend money. One method of doing so, used by other rulers, was to establish relations with foreign Ambassadors and Princes, not only through correspondence (hence Brutti's letter) but also by offering inducements and showing goodwill towards such rulers (hence the 1588 agreement).

Secondly it was probably more important for Moldavia to encourage trade with England than vice versa. England had already built up a substantial trade in other areas of the Levant and could conduct a

profitable business without trading with Moldavia. From Moldavia's point of view encouraging trade with English merchants would increase the supply of luxury goods and English cloth available inside the province at reduced prices because they could be bought directly; eventually customs receipts would increase as trade increased. We know that there was considerable demand for luxury goods in Moldavia and Wallachia: in compensation for the loss to the Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia of the profits formerly gained from the lucrative export of salt to the Empire, now an Ottoman State monopoly, the Princes were granted valuable customs concessions on the import of certain goods from the Ottoman Empire, particularly luxury cloth. Thus in 1572 the Prince of Moldavia imported 4500 ducats worth of cloth without paying any duty. (41) The Princes of Moldavia had plenty to gain from encouraging their principalities growth as an international market-place.

For wealthy and influential men such as Brutti there was the possibility of acting as a channel of influence to the Prince for the English merchants. The merchants would be unfamiliar with the way of life, language and terrain in Moldavia and would welcome assistance from agents living in the Principality to facilitate their commerce. Introductions to suitable agents could be controlled or manipulated by the likes of Bartolomeo Brutti and his associates. There would even be opportunities to sell on elsewhere the goods bought from English merchants. Furthermore, Bartolomeo Brutti, as we shall see in Chapter IV, was a man with ambitions to enter the service of Princes more important than the

Prince of Moldavia and was therefore intent upon attracting their attention by doing some service for them or their subjects and thereby gaining their good opinion.

There were considerable difficulties for English merchants who wished to involve themselves further in trade with Moldavia. Under the Capitulations, English ships had not been granted access to the Black Sea, hence they had no access to Moldavian sea ports; the alternative methods of transport, by road using pack-horses or up and down the Danube, were not practical for very heavy goods transported in bulk and provided additional difficulties. Firstly the Danube flows into the Black Sea in the ports with which English merchants were forbidden from trading; secondly the Ottoman authorities operated a monopoly over raw materials produced by the principalities which they reserved for their own use and the supply of their Empire's needs, and would not allow foreigners to buy these goods for export. This monopoly was not always rigorously applied but would, nevertheless, have served to discourage foreign merchants from involving themselves on a regular basis in anything other than the supply of their own exports, or luxury goods bought elsewhere, to the principalities. Since they could not transport Moldavian produce out of the Principality and could not buy the goods in Constantinople, they were in no position to take full advantage of Petru Șchiopul's trading privileges until their ships had access to the Black Sea. The timber or potash trades were, for the time being, effectively out of bounds for the Levant Company as far as large scale commercial

ventures were concerned. (42)

The Black sea trade was dominated by Greek, Armenian and Jewish merchants operating out of Constantinople with agents on the Danube and in the Crimea and Dobrudja. The Greeks already occupied an important position in the internal trade of the Empire. There were Greeks dispersed throughout the Empire; furthermore, Greek merchants usually owned their own ships. The Greeks of Constantinople became very important as agents for western merchants because they had their own networks of agents in the provinces. They supplied goods from the Black Sea region and were involved in the contraband trade. The Armenians were becoming increasingly important traders in Constantinople because of their involvement in the transit trade from Persia to Constantinople. The Jews were particularly involved in the collection of customs and taxes collected on shipping and merchandise, as well as being bankers and money-changers. The Jews, Greeks and Armenians controlled most of the goods which were used in foreign trade in the Ottoman Empire. They had a vested interest in the development of foreign trade, but on their own terms. The main products were cereals, for example Ukrainian wheat; wax and honey; leather and other animal skins including expensive furs from Muscovy which brought large profits; also animal fat, woven materials and tobacco, and wood from the Anatolian coast. Moldavia was also a large exporter of timber for shipping. It was natural that English merchants should be interested in the possibilities offered by this lucrative trade, particularly as it would

enable them to compete with the Muscovy Company in the fur trade and, more importantly, enter into direct trade with Persia, eliminating the need for Ottoman subjects as intermediaries. (43) Efforts to gain access to the markets of Persia and to the silk-route between Persia and Constantinople were a preoccupation of the Muscovy Company.

Almost as soon as the Levant Company was established in Constantinople, it was petitioning the Ottoman authorities, through the English Ambassador, to grant English ships access to the harbours of the Black Sea: this access was always refused. Not only did they face Ottoman opposition but also that of the Greek and Armenian merchants who wished to maintain their own monopoly of the lucrative Black Sea trade. In 1606, Sir Thomas Glover, the English Ambassador, managed to secure the insertion of a clause in the Capitulations which allowed English merchants to trade with Caffa and other Black Sea ports provided the cargo was affreighted on Turkish ships and the goods exchanged in Constantinople only. The Levant Company therefore had a foothold in the Black Sea area and English merchants were in a much more favourable position in Constantinople than they had been. However, they were not, as a result of this, able to compete on equal terms with Greek and Armenian merchants involved in this trade. It is likely that the diplomatic activity directed at gaining access to the Black Sea was motivated by the desire to gain direct access to the markets of Persia and to enter into the fur trade; there is no evidence that the extraction of these trading concessions were primarily motivated by a

wish to commercially exploit the Principality of Moldavia.

There were further problems to be solved before the Levant Company was in a position to enter into trade with Moldavia in a significant manner. Merchants travelling in caravans of pack-horses or wagons overland to Moldavia needed some assurance of safety; travel would be unlikely to be attempted if there was a constant danger of being attacked and robbed by bandits, (44) and it was an even less viable journey in war-time. Between 1593 and 1606 the Ottoman Empire was at war with the Holy League; the principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania became absorbed in this war. In the period following this, these principalities were frequently at arms or occupied by armies and there were in addition numerous raids by the Tatars. It would seem unlikely that the Levant Company contemplated investing heavily to promote an organised trade with Moldavia during such a period of instability.

In this thesis I intend to show that the available evidence does not support the argument that England's support of aspiring Princes was motivated by a mercantilist policy on the part of the English Crown and the Levant Company. Chapter IV will show that Edward Barton was persuaded to lend a limited degree of support to both Aron and Michael the Brave and was drawn into greater involvement in Aron's campaign against his better judgment and without the involvement of the English Crown. In Chapter VI we shall see that Henry Lello was a reluctant and unenthusiastic advocate of Ștefan Bogdan, whom he regarded as a fraud

and a nuisance; Chapter VII will show that Sir Thomas Glover was also initially opposed to lending his support to this pretender for sound financial reasons, and, throughout his campaign to gain the Moldavian throne for his protégé, he entertained serious doubts about the wisdom of involving the English embassy in such a project because of the extreme likelihood of failure. The Levant Company expressed its opposition to the project in several letters which have survived and maintained that it had no interest in Bogdan. As we shall see in Chapter IV, Levant Company merchants complained when Barton became heavily involved in the affairs of the pretender Aron. The Earl of Salisbury, the Secretary of State and Lord Treasurer of England, advocated only limited support for Bogdan to increase England's influence in South-East Europe, provided this did not damage relations with the Ottoman Sultan. It was Ștefan Bogdan who took the initiative by approaching the Queen and later the King of England, persuading them to support him, with a sorry tale of how he had been deprived of his rightful throne by an usurper, with extravagant promises about how useful he could be to England once he became Prince. I intend to show, furthermore, that England's involvement with Bogdan had the potential to disrupt the balance of power in this area of Eastern Europe to the detriment of England's relations with Poland and the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan's displeasure at the English Ambassador's intervention in the affairs of one of his vassal states had an unfortunate effect upon the Levant Company's commerce.

The period to be covered by this thesis is one in which the

Ottoman Empire was greatly occupied with internal difficulties and wars with Hungary and Persia; one can see strong tendencies, held in check since the reign of Stephen the Great, for the Principality of Moldavia to break away from Ottoman suzerainty. Given the political realities in the area it was not possible to do this without entering into an arrangement with a powerful neighbouring state. Having loosened the Ottoman hold under the rule of the Movilă Princes (Ieremie, Simeon and Constantin), Moldavia found itself under the sway of Poland; this produced tensions and conflict inside Moldavia; furthermore, Moldavia was as much an instrument of Polish foreign policy as it was of Ottoman foreign policy. It is important, therefore, to discuss two matters: firstly the constitutional position of Moldavia in the Ottoman Empire, showing the growth of Ottoman power over the Principality; and secondly Poland's ambitions towards Moldavia and the Polish Crown's decision to install Ieremie Movilă upon the Moldavian throne.

CHAPTER 1: THE PRINCIPALITY OF MOLDAVIA

The principality of Moldavia, founded *circa* 1359, stretched from the Eastern flanks of the Carpathian mountains in the west to the river Dniester and the Black Sea in the East; between the principality of Wallachia in the south and the Kingdom of Poland in the north. Due to this proximity Moldavia always had close relations with Poland and between 1387 and 1497 Moldavia was an Appanage of the Jagiellonian dynasty; at this time Wallachia was already falling under Ottoman control; Poland's control over Moldavia weakened during the first half of the sixteenth century. (1)

The reduction of neighbouring princes to vassal status and dependence, in preparation for the imposition of direct rule, was an integral part of the Ottoman method of conquest. (2) The fate of Wallachia had been settled between 1441 and 1459, whereas it was not until 1513 that Moldavia was completely reduced to vassal status, and the principality was not fully in the Ottoman grip until Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent [1520-1556] had conquered the greater part of Hungary. Moldavian princes had looked to Poland and Hungary for help against the Ottomans, but any aid given proved unreliable and not at all disinterested in its intention. Prince Stephen the Great (Ștefan Cel Mare) [1457-1504], the foremost Moldavian resistor of Ottoman conquest, found his efforts in that direction hampered by having to fend off Poland's attempts to restore Moldavia to its own control. Having spent his reign

switching his obedience from one side to another in order to escape from the clutches of both, in 1503 Ștefan agreed to pay the Ottoman's tribute of 4000 ducats annually; at his death in 1504 he advised his son Bogdan to submit to the Ottomans if the terms were good, in preference to Poland or Hungary. (3)

After Ștefan's death, the rivalry between his sons caused the principality to move further into the Ottoman orbit when Bogdan, the Sultan's candidate to rule Moldavia, ascended the throne. Bogdan agreed to an annual tribute of 11,000 piastres supplemented by 40 brood mares and 40 falcons for the Sultan's own use. The first permanent Moldavian envoy in Constantinople, the *kapu-kihaya*, was established; his status as envoy did not preclude him being regarded as a hostage to the prince's good behaviour. (4) Henceforth the Ottomans saw the opportunity of involving themselves in the election of princes of Moldavia by lending their support to one of the candidates, as a means of increasing their indirect control over the principality. In 1513 Moldavia officially became an Ottoman vassal state, and despite numerous attempts to break away from Ottoman suzerainty, some successful for brief periods, the principality remained subservient until the nineteenth century. (5)

The Ottomans never ruled Moldavia directly, except for a brief period in 1595-6 when Moldavia and Wallachia were officially turned into *Evalets* (Ottoman administrative units) as a punishment for rebellion. After a heavy defeat in battle and Poland's imposition of Ieremie Movilă

in Moldavia, both principalities had their vassal status restored. There had been much speculation as to why this system of indirect rule was preserved. Donald Pitcher has suggested that Ottoman vassal states can be classified according to the reasons for their subordination, one such reason being their military value in such a state. Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, the Crimea and districts of Kurdistan fall into this category since they formed an outer band on the Ottoman empire's frontiers against Christendom in the west and *Shi'a* Moslems in the east, important both for defence and attack. During the period of Ottoman expansion the vassal states' subordination was a prelude to absorption under direct rule when the empire's borders spread outwards. When such expansion stopped, they acted as buffers against invading armies. (6)

The most permanent feature of official relations was the obligation to maintain good relations with the Sublime Porte and show obedience to the Sultan. The yearly tribute might be regarded as a tangible mark of this, in return for which peace was maintained. The amount that the princes were forced to pay increased massively in value during the sixteenth century: in the years 1552-61 the tribute demanded from the prince of Moldavia stood at 30,000 ducats, by 1593 it had increased to 65,000 ducats. In addition there was a tribute in kind of such things as honey, cereals, hides, tallow and cloth. Moldavia and Wallachia came to be looked upon as sources of revenue to offset the effects of currency inflation within the Empire and to pay for its numerous wars. (7) In this

and other ways, Moldavia was expected to support Ottoman foreign policy. Although the prince was allowed to conduct his own foreign relations and sign treaties with other rulers, he was prescribed to be:

“friend of the Sultan’s friends and enemy of his enemies”

and had to supply military aid, mainly light cavalry, in time of war; the prince served in person when the Sultan himself took the field. Moldavia had to make provision for the Ottoman forces during war, including the delivery of necessary goods at fixed prices which were collected by Ottoman officials sent out specifically from Constantinople. Later on these officials often became permanently resident in the principality. (8)

Moldavia also became a source of raw materials and food for Constantinople. *Firmans* (declarations) were issued by various Sultans specifying the kind of supplies, such as cereals, sheep and cattle, and the price to be paid. Although the buyer was excused payment of various fees and taxes during the raising and delivery stages, he often ended up selling at a loss. This trade for all practical purposes was a monopoly working to Ottoman advantage. The earliest evidence of this system in Moldavia dates from 1586; it indicates that despite the prince’s supposed autonomy in internal matters, in reality he was unable to defend himself or his subjects from such an encroachment upon his sovereignty. Both Moldavia and Wallachia possessed large quantities of salt whose export to the Ottoman Empire provided a major source of revenue for the princes. That the Ottomans regarded the principalities’ export of this natural resource as important is demonstrated by their issue of special

regulations to govern the salt trade, which was particularly vital for the cattle-raising industry in the Balkans, where salt was rare, for the preservation of meat. A large and steady supply of salt was also demanded by the cities of the Empire and that supplied by the principalities was of high quality. The Sultan's Imperial kitchens received 114 tons of salt annually as a "Tax on Salt for the Imperial Kitchens". In order to ensure that the principalities' salt supplies were not exported out of the Empire the Ottomans introduced a State monopoly on salt in the second half of the sixteenth century, prohibiting export abroad. This amounted to a major encroachment upon the princes' autonomy as well as a substantial reduction on their revenue; for example, the Ottomans paid the Wallachian treasury 1 asper per boulder of salt but resold the salt for 2 aspers per boulder. As mentioned in the Introduction, valuable tax concessions for the import of various luxury goods were granted to the princes and boyars as compensation for the revenue lost to them, nevertheless the princes found, as in so many other matters, the authority over an important part of their principality's economic life removed to Constantinople. (9)

Another form of extortion was that of the compulsory "gifts" initially to be given whenever a new prince ascended the throne, the first example of which was probably the payment in 1541 by Petru Rareș of 12000 ducats when he was placed upon the Moldavian throne for the second time by Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. As time went on numerous officers of state expected to be paid off with such gifts. Due to

the frequent changes of prince and to the Ottoman's increasing control over their appointment, such gifts became more or less a regular tax and were a heavier imposition than the basic tribute. The *kapu-kihaya*, whilst watching over the prince's interests in Constantinople, also paid out substantial sums as gifts. A.D. Xenopol calculated that in the early seventeenth century, when the annual tribute had been reduced, Moldavia and Wallachia were able to produce a yearly revenue of 600,000-800,000 ducats of which two-thirds went to Constantinople. (10)

The prince came to be regarded as a 'tax-farmer', responsible for collecting and delivering the cash and goods that went to Constantinople. For this they had, of necessity, to rely heavily upon the boyars (landowning nobility) to collect what was required from the peasantry. Whilst the princes came and went in rapid succession, the boyars were a fixture, therefore the ruling prince had to rely upon cliques of friendly and co-operative boyars as a powerbase. He had little opportunity to lay down further foundations to his rule; much of what had previously been Crown land was granted to boyars in return for support or co-operation and never returned to the Crown. The power of the boyars was an obstacle and a counterpoint to that of the prince and increased steadily. The political arrangements of the Kingdom of Poland, particularly after the Union of Lublin in 1569, which enshrined the principles of the noble democracy, were of considerable attraction to Moldavian boyars as a model of government which limited the power of the monarch. (11) The Ottomans were often able to play the boyars off

against their prince should he prove intractable.

In exchange for tribute the prince, called *Hospodar* or *Voivode*, was in theory to be an autonomous Orthodox Christian ruler. He was, again in theory, to be elected by the boyars of the principality from amongst the members of the royal house, subject to Ottoman approval. Ottoman officials were not to interfere in the internal affairs of the principality; no Ottoman garrisons were to be stationed there; no Ottoman troops were to enter the principality during peace-time; no Moslems were to settle or to own property in the principality and no mosques were to be built. These last principles were due to the Ottoman concept of war: Ottoman troops went to war in the name of Allah; conquered land became part of the *Dar ul-Islam* (the land of Islam). A tangible and symbolic sign of such proprietorship was the building of a mosque to honour the victory. Without such a sign Moldavia was marked as Christian soil. Furthermore, fully conquered soil came under the direct rule of Moslem officials; land was taken under State control, since it now belonged to the Sultan, fortresses were built and garrisoned by Ottoman troops.

In reality, however, Moldavia was no model of autonomy. The fortresses of Kilia, guarding the north bank of the Danube Delta, and Cetatea Alba (also known as Akerman) (12), which controlled the mouth of the Dniester, had been held by Ottoman troops since 1484. Other fortresses were constructed and garrisoned on Moldavian soil, for example the fortress of Bender in the Province of Bessarabia, to secure

the port at Cetatea Alba. Furthermore, Moslems began to settle and mosques were built. (13) Meanwhile, as pointed out above, the tribute and dues demanded increased and the principality came to be regarded as a source of resources for core territories and a source of finance for the Ottoman Empire's wars; the system of forced purchase was seriously at odds with any principle of autonomy. One of the greatest indices of this encroachment upon autonomy was, however, in the election and maintenance of princes.

Ottoman interests necessitated the presence of princes on the thrones of their vassal states who would keep their frontiers stable and secure without constant supervision; full autonomy in electing a prince was therefore undesirable if it were to prejudice this. When Petru IV Rareș [1527-38; 1541-46] began to play off Hungary, Transylvania, Poland, Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire against each other, he became a liability and was removed by force. This demonstrated that if a prince tried to act independently against the Ottoman interest he placed himself at war with the Sultan and was treated accordingly. Petru Rareș was replaced by his brother Ștefan who embraced Islam and surrendered the Budjak to the Sultan. Petru returned to the throne in 1541 but at a cost: he had to pay 10,000 ducats for the privilege and, most importantly, had to accept a janissary guard (Ottoman infantry) in his capital. (14) The janissary guard was a symbol and instrument of Ottoman control over the prince. Prince Michael the Brave of Wallachia also had a janissary guard imposed upon him; he began his famous

revolt with a massacre of the janissaries and other Moslems living in his capital, Tirgoviste. (15)

The practice of Ottoman nomination and deposition of princes was established at the expense of the principle of boyar election. Although it was still regarded as important that the prince should be a descendent of a former prince, this was often not the case; some of those appointed were not even of Romanian origin. (16) An attendant change occurred in the perception of the source of princely authority: no longer by free election but now emanating from appointment by the Sultan who, in his *berat* (the proclamation of appointment) enjoined upon all the boyars, priests and people that they should recognise the prince as their ruler; if they did not their land would be regarded as *dar ul-harb* (the land of war) upon which it was the Sultan's duty to make war. Essentially a prince ruled because he had the Sultan's support. On the other hand the Sultan was obliged to protect the people of Moldavia against their enemies and deposed princes who oppressed them. The symbols of the prince's authority, the standard, the robe of honour and the cap of office, were received from the Sultan. An Aga accompanied the prince to his capital, seated him on his throne and had the proclamation of his rule read to his people. (17)

In practice the appointment of a prince was less straightforward. The Ottomans did take the views of the native boyars into account, the support of a party of whom the prince would need to enable him to rule. The new prince usually needed an army at his disposal to depose his

predecessor who was usually unwilling to go and who would often flee to neighbouring states such as Poland, Hungary, Wallachia or Transylvania to drum up support to regain his throne. He would often be joined by disgruntled boyars left out of the new prince's administration. There was no shortage of people willing to involve themselves in the nomination or placing of a prince. Poland was particularly involved in lobbying the Ottoman government in favour of or against various candidates for the Moldavian throne. The prince of Transylvania frequently intervened: it was at the instigation of Sigismund Bathory in 1592 that the English Ambassador in Constantinople, Edward Barton, joined the campaign to obtain the nomination of Michael the Brave to the Wallachian throne (18) and in 1610 Gabriel Bathory entered the military and diplomatic fray on behalf of Ștefan Bogdan.

Thus by the second half of the sixteenth century, the usual method of obtaining the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia was to obtain the nomination of the Ottoman Sultan and interference in the appointment of princes became an instrument in the hands of other rulers to attempt to shift the balance of power in this part of Europe in their own favour. Three ingredients were vital to secure the throne: influence at the Ottoman Court, the means to depose the old prince and money. Each aspiring prince would attempt to buy the consent of the Sultan and in addition that of the great officers of State, the reigning Sultana, the Sultan's mother, the harem, the Eunuchs and anyone else who had influence with the Sultan. When Radu Mihnea was removed from the throne of Wallachia in

1611, Radu Șerban offered up to 100,000 ducats to be recognised as his successor. (19) The growth of a direct financial relationship between the Sultan and the princes contributed to the decline of princely power as their monetary obligations towards him, upon which their continuation upon the throne depended, increased. The princes of Moldavia and Wallachia became heavily dependent on money borrowed from bankers and money lenders inside and outside the Ottoman Empire, and occasionally upon other rulers who supported them. The Polish Crown paid heavily to support the Movilă princes on the Moldavian throne.

A further factor entered the mire of intrigue and corruption surrounding the nomination of princes with the arrival in the Ottoman capital of Ambassadors from France, Venice and England. They were not able to involve themselves on the military front but they were in a position to provide influence at the Ottoman Court and money. They became involved when aspiring princes actively sought their support. Whilst the Ottomans were somewhat suspicious of intervention in their internal affairs, these Ambassadors were to achieve some successes: the French secured the Wallachian throne for Petru Cercel in 1583; the English Ambassador of Edward Barton obtained the throne of Moldavia for Aron Vodă and was influential in obtaining the nomination as prince of Wallachia for Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul). Once the value of approaching these Ambassadors was recognised, pretenders took to visiting the courts of Europe to obtain letters of recommendation to the Sultan from foreign rulers and financial aid. The Ottoman Empire's

appropriation of the right to place princes in Moldavia and Wallachia drew these-principalities into the web of international competition in Eastern Europe, the threads of which were to reach many influential courts in Western Europe. An examination of the career of Ștefan Bogdan will serve to explore and illuminate the processes at work.

Despite the growth of Ottoman power over Moldavia, Poland continued to have a deep interest in, and pursue relations with, the principality and continued to have some influence in the area. Poland was looked upon as a haven for Moldavian refugees and as a natural ally to aid the principality in curbing Ottoman encroachment upon its political autonomy. (20) Polish-Ottoman relations were greatly concerned with Moldavia but were rarely based upon direct conflict and hostility; Poland and the Ottoman Empire occasionally found themselves in an uneasy co-operation, particularly in the face of the actions of Moldavian and, to some extent, Wallachian princes whom they regarded as rebellious, who threatened to upset the equilibrium between the two powers by flirting with Habsburg support to pursue their independent interests. The guiding principle of Poland's foreign policy in the South-east during the sixteenth century seems to have been to avoid a direct military engagement with the might of Ottoman military power. This section will review the considerations that influenced Poland's actions with regard to Moldavia in the period specified in the thesis title, thus all the illustrations of these considerations are taken from this period, especially the two decades either side of the turn of the century. This is

not intended as an exhaustive survey of Turko-Polish or Moldavian-Polish relations.

Moldavia's status as a vassal state, that is not under the direct rule of a *Beylerbey* (an Ottoman military governor) and with no Ottoman troops in permanent residence, made it a useful 'buffer zone' protecting Poland against the might of Islam. The first necessity was, therefore, to ensure that the rule of Moldavia remained in the hands of a Christian prince. Ambassador Edward Barton remarked:

"having the Bugdan's [i.e. the Moldavians] (21) Christian confiners [on the border], his subjects rest secure from the tyranny of the Turkes, if a Beglerbey should set in Bugdania, he should have like troubles and dayly discontentment as the Emperour of Germany and the Grand Signior his neighbours have." (22)

The rulers of Poland liked to present themselves to the Ottomans as the Sultan's friend; correspondence frequently contained references to "ancient friendship" and good neighbourliness which their predecessors had cultivated persistently and which was stipulated in treaties. As well as being an area of primary production for the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan peninsula also provided for some of the agricultural, pastoral and mining requirements of Poland; therefore it was not only political considerations but also pressing economic needs which kept Poland-Lithuania in the Ottoman orbit and ensured its continued interest in Moldavia and in gaining access to the Black Sea area. (23) Such an attitude was dictated by necessity. Foreign commentators not conversant with the military and economic realities facing Poland looked askance at such accommodation with the infidel, seemingly at odds with the welfare

of Christendom. To illustrate: in 1595 when the Habsburg Emperor was enjoying considerable success at war with the Ottoman Empire, it was a matter of some comment that that the King of Poland did not enter the fray on the side of Christendom, despite, as Edward Barton reported:

“many earnest invitings by the Emperor and his partners to join with them.”

The reason, Barton went on, was that Sigismund Bathory, the Prince of Transylvania (a Hungarian) an ally of the Habsburg Emperor, had taken the “provinces” of Wallachia and Transylvania under his ‘protection’ and placed trusted deputies there as princes. (24) But:

“the king of Poland [was] offended that the Prince should meddle with Bogdania which formerly belonged to the kingdome of Poland.” (25)

This letter leads us to a consideration of a third factor. There was a triangular relationship between Poland, the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire centred on the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania. With regard to Moldavia, the most important relationship was, generally speaking, between Poland and the Ottomans. However, when Habsburg fortunes were rising, the threat that they might attract the principalities into their orbit became real. Moldavia’s first emergence as a principality there had been through rivalry over her alignment between Poland and Hungary. (26) Much of the old Kingdom of Hungary was now under Ottoman rule as the *Pashalik* of Buda. The King of Hungary, now ruling over a sliver of territory in the north-west, was a vassal of the Habsburg Emperor. From a Habsburg point of view

the orientation of the Romanian principalities became an important consideration in the war with the Ottomans. As vassals of the Sultan, the Moldavian, Wallachian and Transylvanian princes were obliged to provide military service and supply his armies in the field. Furthermore, the principalities were a natural theatre of war for the Ottoman and Habsburg armies, so whoever had control of them was at an advantage. It was the Habsburg Emperor's success in this that provoked Poland's anger: it wanted no Habsburg satellites on its southern or western borders.

Rebellion against the Sultan's suzerainty by the principalities could lead to Habsburg encroachment there or make their maintenance as stable buffer-states untenable; the danger was that the Sultan might consider it more practical to place them under the direct rule of a *Beylerbey* with Ottoman garrisons stationed on their soil, thus posing a direct threat to Poland's southern border. Edward Barton remarked:

“for if now the Tartar a people unarmed by the confinity of Podolia of Poland enter and was the same with infinite damage without resistance how much more the forces of the Grand Signior if they fostered in Bugdania, neighbour to the house of Poland, wilbe more able to ruine the same.” (27)

Tatar raids were a great menace to Polish territories. The Tatars of the Crimea were vassals of the Sultan, called upon to serve as light cavalry and as raiders, inflicting great damage with lightning strikes and 'scorched earth' tactics. They guarded the Steppe approaches to the Black Sea and could be called upon to quell rebellion in the principalities. (28) Tatar parties raided Polish territory annually, burning,

looting and carrying off prisoners to be sold as slaves. Polish attempts to control them through police operations were put forward as evidence of Poland's defence of Christendom. (29) Protestations against Tatar raids were a frequent content of correspondence between Poland and the Ottoman Empire. A further cause of concern was that if Moldavia became an Ottoman province it could be used as a base for Tatar raids in to Poland's territory. (30)

On 4th October 1595, Barton reported that the Tatar Khan had requested that his brother be made ruler of Moldavia:

“promising that in such case nott only to conquest the same, but byndinge himself alwayes to maynteyne itt against the King of Poland, the Prince of Transylvania and others.”

The Sultan refused, but in order not to provoke the Tatars, he agreed that a cousin of the Khan, now in the Sultan's service, should govern the province with Ottoman, not Tatar, soldiers. (31) There was a real threat that Moldavia might be taken under direct rule as a result of Prince Aron's rebellion and it was this that lead to the decision of the Polish Chancellor Jan Zamoyski to place Ieremie Movilă on the Moldavian throne by force in October 1595. Zamoyski managed to negotiate the agreement of the Tatar Khan; the “election” of Movilă was confirmed by the Sultan probably in February 1596 after he was assured that Poland would pacify the present tumults and that the said prince would be faithful and loyal to the Sultan. The Poles warned that:

“if the Sultan prefer a Turk to the Government thereof, [the King] foresaw a cause of perpetual debate between this Empire, and the King of Poland,”

probably a veiled threat that Poland would be prepared to join with the Habsburg's to throw out a Moslem ruler in Moldavia in order to defend its own interests. (32)

The Poles pursued direct relations with the princes of Moldavia. These relations were often soured on the one hand by Cossack raids into Moldavian territory (33) and on the other by raids into Polish territory by the subjects of the prince of Moldavia. In 1594 inhabitants of the province of Podolia, which bordered Moldavia to the north, complained to the Polish Chancellor Zamoyski that such raiding incursions had been made with the knowledge of Prince Aron. The previous year Zamoyski had had cause to complain to Aron about the robbing of Polish merchants in Moldavia and directed him to ensure that justice was rendered. The rulers of Poland were often looked to by the prince or inhabitants of Moldavia to intercede on their behalf with the Sultan regarding Tatar raids and the damage done to lands, livestock and people. (34)

Polish envoys were even requested to intervene with the Ottomans over the amount of tribute paid by Moldavia, for whom a great rise would:

“ruin the country, make the people poor... without whom it would be difficult for the land to bear fruit.” (35)

At various times Moldavian princes fled to Poland to evade the wrath of the Sultan; indeed when Ștefan Bogdan escaped in 1606 he made his way via Wallachia to Poland. Conversely the King of Poland could often be relied upon to co-operate with the Ottomans to bring “rebellious” princes to justice. In 1582 Iancu Sasul, Ștefan Bogdan's father, escaping

the Sultan's wrath and intent upon flight to Transylvania, travelled through Poland where he was arrested and executed upon the orders of King Stefan Bathory who blamed him for raids into Polish territory. In 1594 Petru Şchiopul, after being deposed upon the Sultan's orders, did not dare to commit himself to the protection either of the King of Poland, or of the prince of Transylvania, lest the Sultan demand they hand him over:

“by which way the Grand Signior formerly hath recovered many princes fled.” (36)

The Poles were no more interested than the Ottomans in fostering independence for Moldavia Poland had not abandoned the dream of Polish territory once again stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The actions of the Ottomans suggest that whilst Moldavia remained under Christian rule, the ideal prince was one who kept the peace in his principality, paid all taxes and dues exacted by the Sultan and co-operated fully with Ottoman foreign policy objectives. Otherwise he would be swiftly replaced. The rulers of Poland had never given up their claims to suzerainty over Moldavia; throughout the sixteenth century they had been unable to make good these claims. The late sixteenth and early seventeenth century saw Poland in a position of comparative strength. The Ottomans were involved in wars elsewhere and were suffering internal difficulties: revolts, the insubordination of their standing infantry (the janissary corps), administrative difficulties, the effects of inflation and a series of ineffective Sultans. (37) Being thus otherwise occupied the Ottomans allowed Poland to increase its influence over Moldavia.

Poland began the seventeenth century as one of the most powerful states in Europe. The threat to its eastern border had abated whilst Muscovy was plagued with dynastic and internal strife and a series of pro-Polish princes had been installed upon the Moldavian throne in the shape of the Movila family; there was also a strong pro-Polish party in the principality. (38) The Ottomans allowed Ieremie Movilă to maintain a Polish guard; there were Polish advisers in Moldavia and the Movila were supported militarily and diplomatically and with money and gifts in Constantinople. Poland used this position to negotiate for Moldavia's return to Polish suzerainty. If this was not forthcoming, the King of Poland was prepared to accept the right of nomination of Moldavian princes, although these princes would still have to pay tribute to the Sultan. (39) This right was apparently promised by the Sultan in 1600 but was probably never honoured. In 1606 Poland was still pressing for the above concessions. (40) In 1611 Constantin Movilă was deposed in favour of Stefan Tomşa, an Ottoman candidate. After this, although Poland continued to try and influence nomination of princes, they were never again in such a strong position in Moldavia.

The period in which Moldavia became embroiled in the Hungarian war was crucial for the principality's future: there was a real danger that it would be taken under direct Ottoman rule. When in 1594 Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania made common cause with the Habsburg Emperor, their defection constituted a serious threat to the Ottoman lines of communication from Constantinople to Belgrade, Buda and Gran. The

Danube was of enormous importance as a water-route much used in the transport of guns and munitions to the Hungarian front. (41) It is arguable that Poland's action in sponsoring and placing the Movilă on the Moldavian throne, ensuring that they co-operate with the Ottomans and rule in peace, was instrumental in maintaining Christian rule in the principality and its official autonomy. For Poland, this period of war (1593-1606) demonstrated both the danger of Moldavia being placed under the control of a *Beylerbey* and the threat of the principality falling under Habsburg influence. Having placed their clients, the Movilă, on the throne, the rulers of Poland were closer to the restoration of their former suzerainty; for this reason they strenuously opposed the aspirations of Ștefan Bogdan.

CHAPTER II: THE ENGLISH EMBASSY AT CONSTANTINOPLE

In order to consider how and why the English Embassy became embroiled in the affairs of Moldavian pretenders, attention must be paid to its *'raison d'etre'* and the circumstances in which it worked. The embassy's inception took place against the background of the establishment of the 'Company of Turkey Merchants' in 1581, which was reconstituted in 1592 as the Levant Company. A brief outline will be given of the circumstances which led to the extension of English commerce to the Ottoman dominions. The main purpose of this chapter is to establish the ambassador's diplomatic credentials and depict the environment in which he operated. Greater emphasis, therefore, will be reserved for an analysis of the importance of ambassadorial status, the extension of the embassy's political role, the bearing of communication difficulties with England and relations with the Ottoman authorities on the ambassador's prosecution of his duties. Extensive use will be made of direct quotations from primary source material which conveys a sense of the atmosphere in the Sultan's capital city.

The project to institute direct commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire was taken in hand by two powerful and influential London merchants, Edward Osborne and Richard Staper. (1) The prospects were attractive and the setting up of an English trading company in the Levant was a logical step. The demand in England for goods from the East, in particular spices, silks, drugs, oils, carpets and so

forth, had previously been satisfied by foreign merchants: by the Venetians in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and thereafter by merchants operating out of Antwerp which became a depot for oriental goods conveyed via the Cape of Good Hope by Portuguese shipping. However, the English market for these luxury goods was at the mercy of events abroad over which England had no control. The Venetian trade had declined with the eclipse of Venice's seapower by the Ottoman fleet and the revolt of the Netherlands from the King of Spain after the 1560's once again disrupted this trade. Shortages caused by fluctuations in supply must have focussed the minds of English entrepreneurs on the advantages of making their own inroads into oriental commerce. Finally, Spain's aggressive ambitions towards Portugal, which culminated in that country's conquest in 1580 by Philip II and the absorption of the Portuguese commercial empire into the Spanish domain, threatened to put England's rival and enemy in a position to dominate the entire oriental trade and to flaunt her increased naval power to England's disadvantage. (2) The threat from Spain was a powerful factor in Elizabeth I's willingness to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Sultan.

These commercial considerations coincided with the widening of a previously parochial English outlook, as alluded to in the Introduction of this thesis to embrace the glamour and mystery of the East and a taste for the pleasures of foreign travel. The might of the Ottoman Sultans had been made apparent when Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent marched

his armies as far west as Vienna in 1529 and indeed the works of a number of Elizabethan dramatists assumed in their audience some knowledge of the manners and customs of the Ottoman Empire. (3) Some English merchants had already visited the Levant in an individual capacity. For example, in 1553 Anthony Jenkinson had been granted safe conduct by Suleiman the Magnificent and permission to trade in his dominions on an equal footing with the Venetians and French. This privilege appears not to have been made use of. (4) Moreover the difficulties faced by merchants on their own were such that, Hakluyt suggests, after 1550 the Levant trade was:

“in manner quite forgotten”

until Osborne and Staper revived it, although there is evidence that a few English merchants had been conducting a brisk trade into the Ottoman territories before the founding of the ‘Turkie Company’ (5) However, rather than allow individual merchants to trade on their own Osborne and Staper favoured a monopoly company to protect, supervise and administrate English commercial activity in the Levant. It would also ensure that the number of merchants permitted to trade would be small, ensuring that the profits to be made were restricted to a small group.

The possibilities were alluring; the Venetians had continued to trade in the Levant and the French had been established there since 1536. Naturally, in the minds of those hoping to gain trading privileges in the Levant, what a Frenchman could do, an Englishman could do better. Furthermore, the cessation of the Ottoman Holy War against

Christendom, following the death of Suleiman the Magnificent, offered stability and peace, conditions which were conducive to trade of the sort which the Levant Company had in mind.

In order for the 'Turkie Company' to operate successfully, the persons and goods of English merchants needed a guarantee of safety. Edward Osborne and Richard Staper sent agents to the Sultan in Constantinople at their own expense to secure a safe-conduct for William Harborne; the latter travelled there in 1578 to secure a freedom to trade for all English subjects. In June 1580, after an exchange of letters between Queen Elizabeth and Sultan Murat III [1574-1595], the latter extended a general promise into a formal grant of twenty-two articles or "Capitulations" which set down the privileges accorded to English merchants in their own right. Previously they had had to trade under the French flag and under the surveillance and representation of the French Consuls in accordance with the French treaty of Capitulations of 1536. (6)

A monopoly company was the normal method of commercial organisation in sixteenth century England. William Harborne defended the monopoly trade in the Levant because it served to:

"increase the profits and lessen the dangers",
and made it easier to collect the funds necessary to finance the embassy. (7)

On 11th September 1581, Queen Elizabeth granted twelve merchants a patent giving them the sole right to trade in the Ottoman

Empire for seven years, all other English subjects being forbidden to do so. The patentees were given authority to make laws and ordinances for the government of their merchants and trade, provided these accorded with English law, and to fly the royal arms on their ships. In return they were obliged to import and export enough merchandise to pay customs duties of 500 pounds per annum during six out of the seven years of the patent. The Queen also reserved for herself the right to nominate two members of the Company. (8)

The next problem was to gain a foothold at Constantinople and establish appropriate conditions for trade to take place. However, problems arose as soon as the English Capitulations had been granted. The Venetians and, particularly, the French were opposed to the advent of a rival group of merchants. In 1580 the Secretary of State, Sir Francis Walsingham, warned of attempts to sabotage the merchants plans, suggested that an ambassador's:

“repair thither is to be handled with great secrecy... for that otherwise the Italians that were here will seek underhand that he might be disgraced at his repair thither.” (9)

The French Ambassador argued that the issuing of English Capitulations was contrary to a clause in the French Capitulations which placed English merchants in the Levant under the French Ambassador's protection. Not only was this a blow to French status and jurisdiction, it would also deprive the embassy and consuls of the payment of a levy or “consulage” by those trading under their flag. (10) Thus even before Harborne returned home the French Ambassador at Constantinople,

Jacques de Germigny, secured the cancellation of the English Capitulations. Harborne's efforts to obtain their restoration were thwarted. Germigny was able to 'pull rank', partly because the Sultan wished to maintain good relations with France, but also because Harborne had no official status; Ottoman society was stratified and very status-conscious. Harborne had been negotiating in a private capacity, as a merchant on behalf of merchants. The Ottomans were amenable to establishing both commercial and diplomatic relations with England. After the cancellation of the Capitulations the Sultan himself requested Queen Elizabeth to send an Ambassador to him to continue negotiations. (11) Thus the question of the title and authority of the Company's representative came to the fore.

During the negotiations in England concerning Harborne's status, the major stumbling block was the source of financial support for the embassy: the Company hoped the Crown would take on this role. However, the Queen at this time was not in a position to pay for an embassy in a far-away capital; on the other hand the financial prospects of the new company were good; furthermore, it was more in the immediate interests of the merchants to have a permanent embassy in the Ottoman capital than in those of the Crown. The Queen, therefore, insisted that the Company pay and refused to commission Harborne until they agreed. (12) The embassy was financially supported by the Company, not the Crown, throughout the period under discussion. It is often stated that whoever holds the purse strings has the greatest

influence over policy. In this case that was not so: since the ambassador was present as a representative of the Crown, with credentials from the sovereign to give him authority, he could undertake diplomatic duties as well. How often the Crown cared to make use of this capacity was its business; the Company had no veto power over diplomatic activities.

In the Company's eyes the embassy was primarily present in Constantinople to build and protect English commercial interests. Yet if they had merely needed a 'commercial agent' they would no doubt have settled for this cheaper alternative. Since both the French and Venetian merchants were under a fully-fledged ambassador, in order not to place English merchants at a disadvantage their protector and negotiator required equal status. It was hoped that by becoming his sovereign's representative, Harborne would be in a position to establish official relations with Ottoman Ministers who could assist him in outmanoeuvring further attempts to cancel the Capitulations.

The importance of ambassadorial status is illustrated by the expense to which the Company was prepared to go, with no certainty of the re-establishment of the Capitulations: Harborne would require travelling expenses for himself and a suitable retinue; money to establish and equip an embassy; a salary to maintain himself in a style befitting his position, as well as presents for the Sultan and bribes for his officers and favourites in order to obtain audience and favourable consideration. (13)

A second illustration is the efforts to which the French and Venetians went to prevent Harborne being officially received. The French

Ambassador alleged that this would breach the Franco-Ottoman alliance; the Venetian Bailo Marosini was ordered by his government to pay 15,000 *zecchini* to obstruct the Englishman's reception. However, the Grand Vizier dismissed the French and Venetian objections, stating that the Sublime Porte was open to all those who desired peace. William Harborne received his commission as Ambassador from Queen Elizabeth in 1582 and her letters of recommendation to the Sultan, both of which set out the ambassador's duties to:

“nourish and deserve the benevolent affections of good princes towards us”

and to keep the league of peace between the Queen and the Sultan “perfect and inviolable” in addition to his duties to nourish and preserve England's trade in the Levant and protect the English merchants' trading privileges. Harborne was received by Sultan Murat III in May 1583 with ceremony equivalent to that normally accorded to a French Ambassador and the Capitulations were restored. The foreign embassies in Constantinople were established in Pera, a suburb of Galata, a port of Constantinople, on the Asian side of the Golden Horne, which dominated international traffic and at which foreign ships landed. The western merchants had their houses and shops there. There were many other shops and markets there dealing with the sorts of goods in which those engaged in commerce were interested and also with merchandise connected to shipping. Galata had a very large non-Moslem population, prominent amongst which were the Jewish, Greek and Armenian communities. The role of Greek and Armenian merchants in the Ottoman

Empires trade has been mentioned. The Greeks dominated the Galata guilds involved in ship construction, repair and equipment etc. Armenians, Greeks and Jews were very active in the guilds which dealt with merchandise of interest to foreign merchants, for example: Silk traders (Armenians); Satin traders (Jews); Jewels (Jews and Greeks). Jews were also active as brokers between the Ottoman administration and foreign merchants, especially, as we have seen, customs and taxation, for whilst the tax-farmers were mainly Moslems, they tended to employ Jews to deal with non-Moslems. The Ottomans tended to be scornful of foreign merchants and preferred not to deal with them directly. For foreigners to negotiate the massive bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire without assistance from those who understood it was extremely difficult. They therefore looked to the Greek, Armenian and Jewish merchants of Galata to assist them. A close relationship between the foreign merchants and the non-Moslem residents of Galata was established; this insulated the foreign merchants from significant contact with Moslems. (14)

Anglo-French, and to a lesser extent Anglo-Venetian, rivalry, did not cease. Further unsuccessful attempts were made to have the English Capitulations dismissed. Harborne meanwhile began to make a success of his embassy. He won a reduction in the customs duties payable by Englishmen from 5% to 3%, thereby placing his countrymen in a more favourable position than their foreign competitors.

There was greater scope for social intercourse amongst the

permanent Christian ambassadors and the merchants whom they represented. Social contacts were desirable between the different nations, for they lived in a small and narrow society. The English, French and Venetian ambassadors lived in the same quarter of Constantinople: Pera. They also had summer residences in the small village of Belgrade outside the city. For the ambassadors, social life was taken up with elaborate banquets and complex ceremonial. However, national pride and questions of etiquette made such occasions fraught with difficulty. This was particularly true with regard to the English and French Ambassadors when they were together, between whom there was a long-running battle over precedence in matters of ceremony, which the latter claimed as their own. Nevertheless strict attention was paid to protocol and both the English and French Embassies diligently paid each other courtesy visits on all important occasions which were conducted with elaborate formality, each nation intent on exceeding the others in their displays of wealth and splendour.

In the period under discussion, Anglo-French relations were also complicated by the question of authority over the *merchants-forestiers*, (Western European merchants not represented in Constantinople by permanent ambassadors), a dispute which had some royal encouragement on both sides and particularly over the Dutch merchants who came in increasing numbers to the Levant after 1594. This dispute, pursued over many years under the auspices of Edward Barton, Henry Lello and Sir Thomas Glover, was marked by Ottoman prevarications and

complicated intrigues by the English and French against each other. Relations soured to such an extent that Glover was convinced that the French ambassador was trying to assassinate him. The matter of jurisdiction over the Dutch was eventually resolved in 1612 when they received Capitulations of their own and established an ambassador in Constantinople; this did not end Anglo-French rivalry. Such a conflict over jurisdiction is an indication of the muscular and often aggressive attitude of the English Embassy, which aimed to supplant the French Embassy in the pre-eminent position in Constantinople, and of the Levant Company which aimed to supplant France as the most powerful trading nation in the Levant. Nevertheless, when relations were very bad co-operation was still possible:

“The two Ambassadors of France and England, though very ill-disposed towards each other, are still united over the interests of their sovereigns, which is to harass Spain.” (15)

Relations between the English and Venetian Ambassadors were usually much warmer; being uncomplicated by questions of precedence or jurisdiction they were more informal and friendly. For example, Agostino Nani, the Venetian Ambassador, was on very good terms with Henry Lello and met with him frequently, even though at this time the activities of English pirates in the Levant, attacking French and Venetian shipping, were a major source of tension. Anglo-Venetian friendliness did not mean that Venice and England were not commercial rivals. The establishment of an English presence in the Levant had been a threat to Venetian commerce and the Venetians had been very keen to secure the

exclusion of English merchants. In 1601, Agostino Nani suggested to the Grand Vizier that the only solution to the problem of piracy was for the Sultan to ban all English ships from his ports, because the English, under the cloak of friendship, were secretly trying to prevent the traffic of other nations. (16)

The letters of the Venetian Ambassadors contain many expressions of hope that the Levant Company would find the Oriental trade not sufficiently profitable and would therefore dissolve itself. It was in Venice's interests to undermine England's position. Under the surface of amity and civility, the three permanent embassies were engaged in subversion against each other. As Nani wrote:

"I will proceed with the utmost caution and secrecy so as not to be discovered, for the English Ambassador, while complaining to me of the friendly offices of the French Ambassador, was able to relate them precisely word for word as they were said, and openly displayed his hostility, while covertly he alluded to me by complaining that my Dragoman sometimes also acted in an unfriendly spirit."

Influence with the Ottoman *Divan* (*Diwan-i Humayun: the Imperial Council*) (17) was necessary to ensure that the Capitulations were observed, to protect English merchants from enslavement, imprisonment and unlawful exactions of money by Ottoman officials. These usually proved to be difficult tasks, for the observance of the Capitulations depended largely on the goodwill and generosity of the Sultan and his government; in many areas of the Empire his writ scarcely ran. Success depended on the diplomatic skills of the English ambassador in forging political alliances and knowing who needed to be cultivated with gifts

and bribes.

A favourite tactic employed by the French and Venetian Embassies to undermine the position of their English counterpart was to cast doubt on his status by reference to the fact that the Company paid his salary. Thus in 1593 the Venetian Bailo wrote home that Edward Barton:

“is dependent on the English merchants who pay his salary and employ him in the interests of their trade”

implying that he was merely a commercial agent. Harborne went to great trouble to maintain the pretence that he was:

“only maintained by her Majesty and that rather for causes of estate than of traffic.” (18)

It was feared that if the Ottoman government regarded the English ambassador as a stipendiary of merchants, his dignity and status would have been adversely affected and the Sultan’s Ministers would probably refuse to receive him; merchants were of low status in the Ottoman Empire. Harborne protested to the Grand Vizier that:

“he was a great noble, greater than any other here; and even if that were not so, they had no right to consider his private position, but only the magnificence of the Queen his mistress.” (19)

From its inception the embassy had a dual role and there was the possibility of tension or even conflict of interest between the ambassador’s function as guardian of merchants and royal representative at a foreign court. Osborne and Staper’s project had received royal backing almost from the beginning. The Queen had paid for Harborne’s first trip to Constantinople, her two chief ministers also

showed their support: the Secretary of State, Sir Francis Walsingham, wrote "A Consideration of the Trade into Turkey", (normally regarded as having been published in 1580 but which could have been published in 1578, which would suggest that Walsingham was a prime-mover behind the establishment of the Levant trade). There were various advantages in opening up direct relations with, and a trade route to, the Ottoman Empire. Such a trade would naturally increase the Customs revenues of the Crown as well as the prosperity of the English cloth industry; it would also greatly benefit the security of the realm by strengthening and maintaining the "navy" which was, as Walsingham put it:

"one of the principallest strengths and defences of this realm which otherwise would like to decay." (20)

Of the greatest political significance was the need to counteract the naval strength of Spain and an English alliance, or at least friendly relations with the Ottomans, would be of advantage to both sides, for the King of Spain: "can never be without wars with the Turk." (21) The advantages to English foreign policy against Spain must have been a powerful factor in the Queen's decision to grant diplomatic status to William Harborne. The Turkey Company itself alluded to these advantages when pressing their case:

"considering the mighty power of this prince... [i.e. the Sultan] a very friend of his friend, and the late heavy enemy to his contrary... and his uninvited amity tending to the benefit of her people is not to be refused... her Majesty pleasing to use of the Grand Signor in any matter of estate, having her agent there continually resident, the same may be readily effectuated." (22)

Harborne was assiduous in selling to the Ottomans the advantages of

alliance with England against Spain, in particular after the King of Spain brought Portugal's Indian territories, which adjoined the Sultan's territories, under his control. As war between England and Spain became more likely, Harborne's efforts intensified.

Since the Ottoman naval defeat at Lepanto (1571), in which the Spanish fleet was heavily involved, relations between Spain and the Ottoman Empire had been based on a series of truces which required renewal every few years. Harborne, hoping to persuade the Sultan to abandon the truce, was careful to emphasise the common danger shared by the Sultan and his own sovereign. He appears to have obtained a promise, shortly after his arrival, that if Queen Elizabeth's fleet attacked Spain in the Atlantic, the Sultan would reciprocate in the Mediterranean; a similar promise was exacted in writing in 1585. England's appeal to the Ottomans for assistance against Spain was supported by King Henri III of France who sent an envoy to the Sultan in 1588 to warn him that if Philip conquered England he would soon overwhelm the Ottoman fleet too. In spite of continual reminders the Ottomans never complied with their agreements. (23)

A second tactic was to appeal to Moslem hatred of idolatry, a hatred also shared by Protestants. It was hoped that common cause could be made by persuading the Sultan of the similarities between his faith and that of the Queen of England. In her writings addressed to the Sultan, Queen Elizabeth referred to herself as:

"the most invincible and mighty defender of the Christian faith against all kinds of idolatries of all that live among the Christians and profess the name of Christ." (24)

In November 1587 Harborne suggested to the Sultan that he had been given his power by God expressly for the purpose of destroying image-worship and that he must not incur divine wrath by ignoring a chance to do so in alliance with England. By this time Anglo-Spanish relations had been broken off and war was inevitable. Harborne complained bitterly that his Queen was struggling alone to fulfil the command of God; that confident of the friendship and promises of the Sultan she had refused peace with Spain, thereby placing her kingdom in jeopardy; now Philip II was determined to destroy her completely with the assistance of the Pope and all idolatrous Princes. After her defeat, he warned, since there would be no other obstacle to his power, Philip would direct his invincible military forces to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Although Harborne failed in this attempt to obtain naval co-operation, he did manage to persuade the Sultan not to enter into a new truce with Spain, and hoped that this would dissuade Philip II from making an attack on England. The attack went ahead in the shape of the Spanish Armada; Philip was sufficiently confident of Ottoman inactivity not to be deterred.

After Harborne's retirement in August 1588, Edward Barton took over as agent until a new ambassador could be appointed and continued his efforts to obtain an Anglo-Ottoman alliance against Spain, even after the defeat of the Armada: on 18th January 1589 he wrote that he was daily doing his best to incite the Ottomans against Spain. He also suggested that there should be a delay in the appointment of Harborne's successor to demonstrate the Queen's disappointment and show the

Sultan that he could not take England's friendship for granted. (25)

In February 1589, Barton complained to the Grand Vizier that the previous year the Ottoman vassal state of Ragusa, also known as Dubrovnik, had sent ships and 4,000 mariners to aid the King of Spain, at the behest of the Viceroy of Naples. The Vizier promised to warn Ragusa not to do so again; he also promised the preparation of the Sultan's fleet for the coming summer, but Barton remarked that no evidence of this could be seen at the arsenals. Furthermore, one Hassan Pasha had informed him that unless an uprising in Tripoli compelled it the Ottoman fleet would not set forth one galley. (26)

So greatly did England desire alliance with the Ottomans that as time went on the ambassador's manner of addressing the Sultan and his Minister's became more and more servile. The Sultan was at this time at war with Persia, which was one reason why he did not wish to commit himself to an alliance and further conflict. Moreover the more desperate for an alliance England appeared to be, the more sensible it appeared to the Ottomans to stay out of naval conflict between England and Spain, in case England was defeated. If Spain had threatened the Sultan's fleet an alliance with England might have come about, but the Ottomans tended to show reluctance to make decisions on diplomatic matters until forced to do so by circumstances; therefore they made plenty of promises, then one excuse after another, from which very little materialised. One major advantage of good relations with England was the English trade in tin and gunpowder, both important for the Ottoman artillery. Therefore, care

was taken to keep the English in hope of success which failed to materialise as a result of adversity and not from indifference. (27)

Despite his reluctance to enter into a formal alliance with England, it would be untrue to say that the Sultan did not desire friendship with England. In 1585, the Venetian Bailo Marosini reported to the Senate on the importance of the Protestant faith in Anglo-Ottoman relations: the Sultan was convinced that, owing to the English Crown's anti-Catholic stance, England would never unite against him with other Christian princes. The Sultan apparently hoped that it would be possible to play on these religious differences to his advantage. (28) Harborne and Barton's diplomacy in this area achieved little of substance but established England in the Sultan's opinion as a friendly power.

Harborne justified his residence in Constantinople as being:

“a marvellous eyesore for suspicious heads... [meaning the Queen's enemies]”

and similarly Edward Barton was later to assert that his presence had:

“prevented the Spaniard from resolving confidently upon his enterprises and... forced him to spend in these parts 300,000 ducats yearly in extraordinary charges.”

Despite Harborne's lack of success in obtaining an alliance, the Sultan clearly had a high regard for him. The defeat of the Spanish Armada further increased England's prestige. In 1589, after Harborne had been recalled to England, Murad III wrote to Queen Elizabeth praising his loyalty in pursuing his Mistress's interests, and asked her to reward him:

“worthy to be of you esteemed, honoured and before others

promoted.”

Furthermore, he suggested that Harborne return to Constantinople to continue as ambassador: if this were not possible some other ambassador should be appointed without delay. (29) Such high regard was not merely reserved for the first English ambassador: his successor Edward Barton was soon to carve out for himself a similar position of favour and eventually became an even greater influence with Sultans Murat III and Mehemet III. John Sanderson, who had been Barton’s secretary, wrote:

“I note the extraordinary esteme [that] was had of the ambassiatour aforenamed with them all in generall, both Christians, Turkes and Jewes.” (30)

The extent of his prestige and of the trust in which he was held is illustrated by events in 1590:

“Learning that the Grand Signior is preparing for war with the Poles her Majesty [Queen Elizabeth] commands Barton to urge him to desist. England draws all kinds of munitions out of that country, and relies upon those supplies to carry on the war with Spain.”

Furthermore, it was in England’s interests to prevent the Ottomans being diverted into another war because they needed them to be free to attack the Spanish fleet. Apparently as a consequence of the Queen’s representations, Sultan Murat III concluded peace with Poland. (31) In 1593, Stefan Bathory, Prince of Transylvania [1581-1602] wrote to Edward Barton and Sinan Pasha, the Grand Vizier, on behalf of Mihai Viteazul; these letters helped him obtain the throne of Wallachia. The previous year G. Gifforde commented that Barton’s prestige was shown

by his successful backing of Aron Vodă for the throne of Moldavia. (32) In 1596 Barton, with the Queen's permission, accompanied Sultan Mehemet III and his armies to lay siege to the fortress of Agria (Eger) in Hungary. Thomas Glover, who was Barton's secretary at the time, wrote a description of the journey and justified his actions as follows:

"if any think it ill that a Christian Ambassador should accompany the Turke in this war against Christendome they may please to understand that his intents were to doe service to the Christians if occasions were offered for peace: as also he did in delivery of the Emperor's servants here mentioned." (33)

Under Harborne and Barton the English Embassy established a reputation for diplomatic skill and trustworthiness which the Sultan and the Habsburg Emperor were glad to make use of. Barton's attendance of the Sultan's campaign was probably the pinnacle of his diplomatic career and demonstrated the esteem in which he was held by the Sultan. When Barton died in 1597, Girolamo Capello, the Venetian Bailo, commented:

"By the death of the Ambassador the Turks have lost their intermediary in treating of peace with the Emperor."

The Sultan hoped that Barton's successor Henry Lello would be equally useful to him. When, shortly after Barton's death in 1598, overtures for peace were again made to the Habsburgs by the Ottomans, Lello was approached to assist in the negotiations:

"The Sultan will not write the first letter, and is said to have requested the English Envoy [i.e. Henry Lello] in consequence to begin the negotiations and to write to the Waiwode Michael [i.e. Mihai Viteazul] and to advise him to send the tribute. It is thought that this would be the beginning of a peace to be concluded between his Msajesty [i.e. the Habsburg Emperor] and the Sultan.

This is why the English envoy has been sent to the Prince of Wallachia [i.e. Mihai Viteazul] to give him every information and to ask him to impart what he has learned to the Emperor through one of his envoys." (34)

Under Henry Lello, Ottoman aid was again sought against Spain, motivated as much by a desire to revive the friendly relations based on mutual enmity towards Spain enjoyed by the English Embassy under Harborne and Barton as by the expectation that an actual alliance would come about. In February 1602 the Venetian Bailo wrote that Lello had communicated with Lieutenant Halil Pasha and the Chief Eunuch:

"that certain of the Spanish ships had attacked his Mistresses fleet, and that the English fleet should take the sea as strongly as possible, in order to execute a joint attack on the King of Spain." (35)

However, during Henry Lello's appointment as ambassador the honour in which the English Embassy was held went into decline; this was accelerated by the death of Queen Elizabeth I in 1603. One of the major reasons for Lello's difficulties appears to have been his lack of experience when appointed which meant that he was not so useful to the Sultan as his former master had been. Once it was clear that he did not enjoy the Sultan's favour as Barton had done, he began to be treated with disdain by those Ottoman officials whose confidence Barton had enjoyed. A further cause of the decay in Anglo-Ottoman relations was the suspicion that England was preparing to make peace with Spain, for despite avoiding involvement in a joint operation the knowledge of a mutual interest and the threat of co-operation was considered an important weapon against Spanish ambition. (36) After the death of

Elizabeth I, Lello complained that the Sultan declined to recognise him as ambassador and refused to observe the Capitulations. (37) The position of the embassy was made worse by King James I's attitude towards the Ottoman Empire: he expressed himself firmly opposed to Anglo-Ottoman co-operation and pronounced in favour of Christendom uniting to drive out the infidel. Thus he was highly indignant at the conclusion of peace between the Habsburgs and the Sultan in 1606. (38) He frequently stated that he had little interest in good relations with the latter, of whom he spoke with great disdain with regard to the embassy:

“He says he keeps an Ambassador at the Porte not for his own pleasure or interest but to satisfy his subjects who are Merchants there, and who bear all the charges of the Embassy; he has no share in it beyond consent.” (39)

Therefore in 1605, when the Ottoman government suggested that King James mediate a peace between the Sultan and the Habsburg Emperor, (which could have greatly benefited the English Embassy by increasing the favour in which England was held), Lello felt it necessary to play down this suggestion, because he did not consider that his King would wish to involve himself. (40) Although James appears to have been persuaded that the good relations established with the Sultan under his predecessor should be maintained, his lack of enthusiasm precluded any close association between the two Crowns. This expressed distaste of the Ottoman Empire did not prevent him attempting to make use of the Anglo-Ottoman diplomatic relationship to support the aspirations of Stefan Bogdan in the interests of increasing English influence in Eastern

Europe.

The activities of English pirates in the Mediterranean, which Lello was powerless to stop, had done great harm to England's reputation in the Ottoman Empire:

“Achmet Pasha publicly reproached the Dragoman [Interpreter] of the English Ambassador with much bitterness, saying that the Porte received nothing but damage from the Queen's subjects, and in his anger went so far as to declare that the Ambassador was doing no service here and had better go.” (41)

By 1606 the Sultan and some of his Ministers considered breaking off relations with England altogether, although others emphasised the benefits of friendly relations with England and regular commerce, in particular the import of gunpowder. (42)

Since the English Embassy was no longer required to persuade the Ottomans of the advantages of a naval alliance against Spain it was no longer involved in the kind of high level political activity carried out under Harborne and Barton. When Henry Lello was ordered to support Ștefan Bogdan's campaign for election to the throne of Moldavia, he received explicit instructions not to carry his support so far as to do anything which could prove offensive to the Ottoman authorities. The business of the embassy was largely confined to promoting and protecting the interests of English merchants operating in the Levant; Lello was content that the embassy's role in the Sultan's dominions should not be extended.

When appointed as ambassador, Sir Thomas Glover, unlike Lello at his appointment, had the advantage that he was already experienced

in the work of the embassy and was apparently well respected by the Ottomans. Glover seems to have hoped to conduct the embassy's operations along the lines established by Edward Barton. Hoping to revive the idea of Anglo-Ottoman co-operation against Spain, Glover offered the co-operation of English shipping for a projected Ottoman armada, (43) but this idea met with no enthusiasm at home. Nevertheless, under Sir Thomas Glover, the role of the English Embassy in Ottoman affairs was extended and he became secretly involved in negotiating on the Sultan's behalf for peace with Spain. Glover's personality was such that he was not easily intimidated or dragooned. His demeanour did not make him particularly well-liked but affection was not a vital ingredient for diplomatic success. Glover was able to demand that his dignity be respected. For this reason he seems to have been better regarded in Constantinople than his predecessor, however Glover's influence never reached the heights achieved by Barton or Harborne. One reason for the failure of Glover's suit on behalf of Bogdan, when compared with Barton's success in supporting pretenders, was the difference in esteem in which the two men were held.

The concentration in this chapter upon the diplomatic activities of the ambassadors is not to make any judgment upon the relative importance of the embassy's diplomatic role and the duties undertaken on behalf of the Levant Company. It is merely to assert that from its inception the embassy built up a tradition of diplomatic activity unconnected with the commercial policies of the Company which

supported it financially.

There is some ambiguity as to whether the Crown or the Company had the right to choose the ambassador in the early years. Naturally it was the Crown which made the appointment, but it has been assumed, for example by A.C. Wood, that until the reign of Charles I and the return from Constantinople of Sir Thomas Roe in 1628, the office was filled by Company appointees without royal interference. It is true that in 1625, when the King tried to force the appointment of Sir Thomas Phillips and then that of Sir Peter Wyche, the Company vehemently objected. However, this was partly due to the high-handed manner of the King's proceedings, since he did not bother to consult the Company about the appointment and partly due to the unsuitability of the candidates, in particular Phillips who was a courtier and client of the Duke of Buckingham and had no experience of the Ottoman Empire. The Company therefore asserted its right to elect the ambassador against the encroachment from the King, although they eventually had to submit. (44) Nevertheless, it would not be true to say that the Crown had never previously exerted influence on the appointment of ambassadors.

Harborne and Barton were, as far as it is possible to tell, Company candidates. The latter had been Harborne's secretary and remained in Constantinople after his voluntary departure, but was not officially commissioned until 1592. There was some uncertainty as to whether it was to the Company's benefit to continue to support an ambassador. As we have seen both Harborne and Barton wrote to the Secretary of State,

Walsingham, to argue that the embassy was important and probably pressed him to use his influence to ensure that the embassy continued (45). Similarly Lello, who had for a short time been Barton's secretary, took his place when the latter died. However, it appears by Lello's own admission that he received ambassador's credentials through the intercession of Sir Robert Cecil. (46) Lello later pleaded his case to the King and Cecil, now Earl of Salisbury, for his own continuance as ambassador. (47) It was the Company which certified Lello that he was being recalled but the decision appears to have been taken under some pressure from the Crown. Thomas Glover had lobbied the Crown and the Company to secure Lello's dismissal and used his influence with the Crown and the Company to win the embassy for himself. He was a Squire of the King's Body, but was also an experienced former employee of the Company in Constantinople. Glover used his influence at Court and with the Company to win the English Embassy for himself. Presumably his appointment was a matter of mutual agreement between the Crown and the Company. (48) Glover's removal from the embassy was purely a Crown decision; the exact circumstances will be explained in Chapters III and VII. The Company had been prepared to renew his appointment when they received notice from Salisbury:

"We have been certified by Sir Thomas Lowe our Governour and the rest that it hath pleased his Majesty for some special service to recall Sir Thomas Glover from his residency at Constantinople and in his place by their nominacon to elect and constitute [Paul Pindar] Ambassador." (49)

It appears from this letter that Paul Pindar's nomination was decided as a result of consultations between the Crown and the Company. His recall was largely a Company matter: Pindar was anxious to return to England when his term ended and the Company decided to suppress the embassy and rely on an Agent at Constantinople. (50) One may conclude that although the Company paid the ambassador's salary and expenses, its right to elect him was a prescriptive right based on the Crown's willingness to appoint candidates acceptable to the commercial interests of the Levant merchants. The Crown retained the right to commission and remove ambassadors without reference to the Company and frequently intervened directly with the Governor in the Company's affairs.

All the ambassadors took care to furnish the Crown with detailed reports on the internal affairs and foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire, with particular emphasis on the Sultan's dealings with the Habsburg Emperor, the King of Poland and the principalities, as these matters were seen as tending to the welfare of Christendom. For example Henry Lello wrote every fortnight to the Secretary of State, newsletters were also circulated to England and probably to other embassies in Europe, in particular the Crown's representatives in Venice, the affairs of that State being of importance to the ambassador in Constantinople's prosecution of his duties on behalf of the merchants, as well as in his dealings with the Venetian Bailo in Constantinople. The efforts undergone to dispatch such reports are evident from reading them and the careful attention to

accuracy is suggestive of a great interest in the affairs of Eastern Europe amongst some members, at least, of the English government.

It is difficult to assess exactly how the ambassadors obtained their information. The main sources were probably the Dragomans, officially Interpreters, who were employed for routine negotiations with ministers and officials, conveying messages and acting as a general channel of communication between the embassy and the *Divan* (Imperial Council). They were expected to make contacts inside the Ottoman administration to gather intelligence. The Ottoman government was a hot-bed of intrigue and it was therefore in the interests of the ambassador not only to discover information on matters of policy but also on who was out of favour with the Sultan and who was worth cultivating. The Dragomans also frequently came into contact with their counterparts in the employ of other embassies, another source of information. Italian was the diplomatic language of the Levant; many of the Dragomans were Ottoman subjects of Italian origin, or Italianised Levantines and therefore often in danger of summary punishment by an official displeased at what they had to convey. They were often reluctant to deliver messages which might be the cause of displeasure or to forcefully press for the information required by their masters. Furthermore, Dragomans from rival embassies were even known to fabricate amongst themselves what to say to Ottoman officials and their masters to avoid annoying either side and putting themselves in danger. With such disinformation and confusion involved in prosecution of official business it is little wonder that

ambassadors frequently complained about the Dragomans. Furthermore, many of them were decidedly untrustworthy, often abandoning their masters to serve other ambassadors or the Ottoman government, or even acting as double agents. Therefore secrecy was very difficult. (51)

However, for a skilful and trustworthy Dragoman the rewards could be rich. Perhaps the best example of a successful career is Gaspar Gratiani who was employed at the English Embassy as a Dragoman. He was also in the service of Ștefan Bogdan around 1605, but no doubt left his service when he realised Bogdan was not likely to ascend the throne of Moldavia. He was later encountered negotiating with the Habsburgs on behalf of the Ottoman government. His service of the Sultan was rewarded with the Duchy of Naxos and, in 1619, with the principality of Moldavia. (52) Bartolomeo Brutti was another individual who rose to a position of power after commencing his career as a Dragoman; his nephews Cristoforo and Bartolomeo Borisi also rose to prominence through careers as Dragomans.

The ambassadors themselves were assiduous in establishing a network of informants, building friendships with senior Ottoman officials and the Sultan's favourites, including the Eunuchs of the Harem. (53) They also maintained cordial relations with other Christian ambassadors. Although outside the period under discussion, the following extract from a newsletter written by Sir Thomas Roe in 1622 concerning the Polish Ambassador is interesting:

“He had order to communicate with mee and ye other Ministers of Christian Princes... I have not yet visited him by reason of my sickness and am now resolved not to deferr it, because he hath a

letter from the King [of Poland] and as he pretends, other things to communicate with me, which he cannot doe by message.” (54)

They also made contact if they could with envoys of other foreign princes as well as travellers and merchants, for news of the territories through which these people had passed. The consuls employed by the Company to act as the ambassador’s deputies in the major commercial centres, collected information in a similar manner and communicated it to Constantinople. Finally, the embassy made use of paid informants and spies. In 1614 Paul Pindar wrote:

“there is little occured of grate matters worth ye aduising for indeed of all reports among the people I am stil jealous of the truth of them because they are so generally given to lying and inventing of newes. For they do for ye most part drinck certain drinks and eat certain confections with opium and some other ingredients of yt nature, wch do intoxicate their braines and then they will talke and discourse their fancies wth such confident assuerations that many things are related so by hearsay from others yt very often it is report of very strange newes for truth yt are only mens fantastical dreamings.” (55)

However, it was reported that Barton deliberately encouraged guests in his embassy to drink large amounts of alcohol in order to gain information. Given the possibility of disinformation, misinformation or downright lies, the ambassadors were careful to get confirmation of the truth. A great advantage in this area was a knowledge of local languages and Ottoman Turkish, (56) not only for gathering and checking information but also during negotiation.

The ambassadors were often charged with specific instructions on political as well as commercial matters. The distance between Constantinople and England forced the ambassador to rely on his own

judgment and diplomatic skill. Nevertheless success in crucial negotiations, especially when money was to change hands, frequently required final agreement from London. The Company itself was not immune from intrigue and backstabbing and an ambassador was often fearful that misjudgment on his part, if taken on his own initiative, would be taken up by his rivals, leaving him liable to recriminations when he returned to England. There were many men ambitious to fill the ambassador's shoes and not averse to campaigning to have the present incumbent removed. (57) Furthermore, the Ottomans often required Royal letters to satisfy them of the veracity of the English Embassy, as happened to Henry Lello in his efforts to placate the Sultan's wrath at the activities of English pirates in the Levant. (58) Delays in communication with England could cause serious difficulties, as is evident from the note of desperation which sometimes crept into correspondence. (59)

Out of a small sample of letters which include the date of receipt, none of them reached their destination inside 60 days, most took between 65 and 85 days; one letter from Sir Robert Cecil took 111 days and a letter to Sir Thomas Glover from the Levant Company took 157 days, over 5 months. Henry Lello also complained at receiving no letters from England for 9 months. (60) Some letters failed to reach their destination altogether, having either been lost or stolen. Those sent by sea could be lost through shipwreck, or mislaid or misappropriated when the ship stopped at ports on the way; the activities of pirates created an added danger. Equally, overland routes were fraught with danger from

bandits and robbers. Messengers travelling by land or sea were vulnerable to weather or local conditions which could delay them on any part of their journey for days or weeks. (61)

Various methods were employed to overcome these problems. Several copies of each letter were sent to increase the possibility of information reaching its destination. The ambassador would usually include a 'précis' of the contents of his previous letter each time he wrote. The Crown and the Company wrote much less frequently and it is a lot less clear whether they regularly dispatched copies of their correspondence. Both the Crown and the Company were somewhat tardy in replying to the ambassador's letters. Sir Thomas Glover complained to the Company, which had not answered his letters on a matter of grave importance:

"it causeth me greatly to misruale at yor silence, espetiallie in this principall matter, which soe highlie conserneth providence." (62)

On extremely important matters letters were entrusted to special messengers, instead of being placed in the hands of ordinary merchants, or ships' crews. However, even such special messengers were not merely sent to the Levant to deliver letters but had other business to conduct as well; the letters, therefore, were frequently delayed for the preparation of these matters. Thus Henry Lello's letters of credence as an ambassador were held back until the ship transporting Thomas Dallam and the present of a musical instrument was ready to depart. (63)

Letters to and from Constantinople were normally sent via Venice, often on Venetian ships, which sailed to and from the Ottoman capital

very frequently. Sir Thomas Glover employed an agent there to handle his correspondence, in order to increase its chances of reaching England without interception. It is probable that other ambassadors employed a similar method. (64) Letters were sometimes sent overland in caravans of merchants travelling to or from Constantinople via Poland or central Europe. But in times of war or unrest this was not a reliable method. (65)

A further major problem was that of correspondence being intercepted by spies, as Edward Barton remarked in a letter of June 27th 1589 in which he requested that he might be told if his letters arrived safely. Naturally the English ambassador's rivals were anxious to lay their hands on information concerning his most secret negotiations. If letters were intercepted by the Ottomans containing hostile comments, then the repercussions for the embassy might be damaging. To guard against espionage, each ambassador was issued with a cipher to encode secret or sensitive information. The most common use of code was a substitution of numbers for certain names; thus the Sultan was referred to as 105, the King of Poland was 16 and the Emperor was 10. In some letters certain paragraphs, sentences or merely parts of sentences were encoded using symbols in the place of letters, all the encoded words were run together with no spaces between them, only occasionally were whole letters written in code. Considering the grave concern expressed by Barton at the interception of letters, it is reasonable to assume that some coded letters also suffered this fate, the codes might have been broken if enough samples were obtained, therefore the

ciphers could be used only in matters of the utmost importance. The English Embassy was no doubt also involved in the interception of letters from other embassies. A large number of letters contained in the Calender of Venetian State Papers are noted as having been originally written in cipher. The ambassador's cipher was issued by the Crown and used for diplomatic correspondence. This fact and the quality and meticulous attention to detail of the ambassador's letters is a further indication that the embassy was not merely a commercial agency masquerading as a diplomatic post for business reasons; it was of genuine political importance and fully competent to deal with sensitive diplomatic business.

The embassy employed a large staff. After the ambassador the most important offices were those of the Treasurer and Secretary, who was also known as the Chancellor. The Treasurer was responsible for collecting all the money due to the embassy from the Consulage, levied at 2% on all imports and exports at the Constantinople 'factory'. He also paid out, at the ambassador's request, money for "avantias" (illegal payments extorted by Ottoman officials), gifts and bribes and paid the wages of all Company servants. (66) The Secretary documented all the official business of the Constantinople factory and the embassy. He ranked as the ambassador's deputy when the latter was ill or absent and was sometimes employed in negotiations with the Ottomans on his master's behalf. In the early years of the embassy he usually took on the ambassador's role after his death or departure. (64) The embassy also

had a resident doctor and Chaplain on its staff to serve the whole of the Constantinople factory. The Chaplains were at this time paid 50 pounds a year and granted a free passage to the Levant, with a grant to equip their Ministry. Many of the Chaplains were men of great learning and piety, who used their time in the Sultan's dominions to study the manners and customs of the Turks, the Eastern churches and explore the many classical remains in the Balkans and the Middle East. William Biddulph, who was Chaplain to Henry Lello and briefly to Sir Thomas Glover until he incurred the latter's enmity, wrote an account of his experiences which was published in the series *Purchas His Pilgrimes*. (68)

The ambassador also employed Janissaries to guard him and never ventured out unaccompanied. Besides the prestige value of having a permanent guard, such a practice was strictly necessary to prevent him being subjected to insults, shoved and spat on in the streets. Between 1582 and 1588, William Harborne expended 362 pounds 18 shillings and 4 pence in Janissaries' wages. The list of Harborne's expenses is a useful source to glean information on the style in which the ambassador lived: it included over 1,000 pounds spent on his apparel and a similar amount in Dragomans' wages. The stable bill was over 600 pounds ;the housekeeping expenses nearly 4,500 pounds. Servants wages accounted for 1,372 pounds and charges at the Ottoman Court (a euphemism for bribery) came to 2,683 pounds with a further 1,442 spent on presents. The sum total for Harborne's embassy was 15,341 pounds 8 shillings and 2 pence. (69) The Company was seriously concerned at the

expense of the embassy, which further increased under Barton, in particular due to his diplomatic efforts on behalf of the Sultan and his expedition with the Sultan's army into Hungary. However, it was imperative the ambassador lived in splendour, for a show of pomp and grandeur was expected of a man of his status; he could command little respect in the magnificent surroundings of the Ottoman Court if he lived simply and dressed in plain or dowdy clothes.

As well as the money raised from the consulage at the Constantinople factory, the Company was also entitled to levy a tax on currants to assist them in paying for an embassy, although they also had to pay the Crown 4,000 pounds a year for this privilege. (70) The ambassadors also received an allowance from the Sultan. (71) However they constantly complained of being short of money. In 1589, Edward Barton argued that if the embassy was to be maintained either the Queen or the Company should increase his allowance for household expenses:

“for hithertoe her Majesty's officers have been far inferior in countenance to those of other Princes, not expending the third part of that which the Emperor and the King of France's Ambassadors are allowed.”

He felt that this brought dishonour upon the Queen. (72) Yet in fairness to the Company the Constantinople embassy was something of a 'bottomless pit' into which more and more money could be poured, to achieve ever more splendid results for the ambassador's appearance. A large retinue of servants and grooms were employed, some of whom came from England whilst others were Greeks and Armenians, some permanently and others hired for special occasions, in order to outshine

the rival embassies. In 1599, Thomas Dallam wrote:

“The last of October my Lord Imbassador wente to the Vizier’s house with all his train of Englishmen; for that daye the Vizier had appointed to end a controversie which was betwixt him and the French Imbassador, but the French Imbassador seinge us go by his house with a greater company than he could make, he would not com after us, the which was little for his credditt.” (73)

The ambassador’s entire retinue had to be provided with a livery, which probably had to be renewed for each audience with the Sultan. Thomas Dallam described Lello’s retinue on the occasion of the delivery of a present to the Sultan, at which ceremony Lello was to deliver his letters of credence:

“he did ryde lyke unto a kinge, onlye that he wanted a crowne. Thare roode with him 22 jentlmen and martchantes, all in clothe of goulde... The other six weare martchantes; these did ridein vestes of clothe of golde, made after the cuntrie fation [perhaps meaning the rural fashion of the area around Constantinople], thare went on foute 28 more in blew gownes made after the Turkie fation [i.e. the Ottoman style] and everie man a silke grogen [grosgrain] cape, after the Italian fation. My liverie was a faire cloake of French green. ” (74)

It was important for an ambassador to try and outdress his fellow ambassadors and thereby to increase the esteem in which he was held by the Ottomans. A suitably majestic manner had to be cultivated in all proceedings. This appears to have been one problem which Henry Lello experienced: his apparent difficulty in projecting a confident “gesture and oration” (75) which had been second nature to his predecessors. The necessity of such demeanour will be dealt with below. Glover was disgusted with Lello when, in order to pay his debts, he was:

“himself in publicke in the market place daylie in selling of his gowns, furs, saddles and other household stuffe, which much

defames the honourable place he held here and in the vulgar voice it is reported that he rather merits the name of merchants factor than the King of England's Ambassador." (76)

When an ambassador presented his credentials to the Sultan, he did so at a ceremony referred to as "kissing the Sultan's hand." Lello described the form of reception to Thomas Dallam thus:

"We call it kisinge of the Grand Sinyor's hande, bute when I com to his gates I shalbe taken of my horse and seartcht, and led betweixt tow men holdinge my hands down at my sides and so lede unto the presence of the Grand Sinyor, and I muste kiss his kne or his hangings sleve. Havinge deliverede my letters unto the Coppagawe [*Capi Aga*: gatekeeper] I shalbe presently ledd awaye, goinge backwardes as long as I can se him, and in peyne of my heade I must not louke to have a sighte of him." (77)

Whenever there was a change of ambassador or a new Sultan ascended the throne presents were given to the Sultan, the Sultana and usually many of the chief officers: the Grand Vizier, the Admiral of the Fleet, the Janissary *Aga* [i.e. the Commander of the Jannisary corps] and the Chief Pasha. (78) Edward Barton presented the Sultana with the following:

"12 goodly pieces of plate, 36 garments of cloth of all colours, 20 garments of cloth of gold, 10 garments of satin, 6 pieces of fine Holland [cloth], and certain other things of good value."

To the Sultana Safiye, Queen Elizabeth sent:

"a jewel of her Majesty's picture set with rubies and diamonds; 3 pieces of gilt plate, 10 garments of cloth of gold; a very fine case of glass bottles, silver and gilt; and 2 pieces of fine Holland." (79)

The present presented on behalf of Henry Lello, which Thomas Dallam had built and delivered to Constantinople, was a musical instrument, a magnificent golden organ, which also chimed the hours. Thomas Dallam was one of the most skilled organ-builders in England; this was clearly a

very prestigious present. It is known that Barton complained about the delay in arrival of the Queen's gift to Sultan Murat III which did not arrive until October 1593. The present was a prerequisite for the recognition of his new status as ambassador and the prolongation of the English capitulations. On delivery of a present to the Sultan, the ambassador was allowed by custom to make three demands "as thought expedient to the Queen's honour". (80)

At the reception of an ambassador, the Sultan occasionally presented gifts. When Sir Thomas Glover boasted of his own magnificent and honourable reception, he emphasised the Sultan's gifts of vests of gold to him and his gentlemen and that he granted him an allowance to provide for his household, which Glover said was contrary to his usual custom. (81) This is probably a great exaggeration, for we know that others received an allowance from the Sultan, although not necessarily at their arrival, but there may be some truth in it for Lello had warned Dallam that:

"It was never known that upon the receaving of any present he gave any reward unto any Christian, and tharfore you must louke for nothing at his hands." (82)

Gifts, whether given at changes in administration or at other times, were looked on by the Ottomans thus:

"what we or any other Christians can bring unto him he do thinke that we doe it in dutie or in feare of him or in hoppe of some great favoure we expect at his hands... wheat the preparinge we made and have bene aboute ever sence your [Dallam's] cominge, [are] for the credite of our nation." (83)

The Ottoman assessment of the English's motives was not altogether

wide of the mark, as Girolamo Capello, the Venetian Bailo remarked:

“The English who know their advantage, will make great profit out of this, and will find a ready assent to all their demands.” (84)

However, the capital to be made out of a gift could be shortlived if handled badly; Lello spoke impertinently to a Vizier and was sharply rebuffed. Capello reported:

“The bombast of the English is considerably reduced. Their ship sailed away two days ago and the Ambassador is left with very few people, and I suspect he will presently lay aside all his imaginary claims; if the Cheif Gardner did not support him he would fare ill.” (85)

The giving of gifts was an instrument of diplomacy, but because all supplicants at the Divan provided gifts as a matter of course, it was by no means the key to success at the Ottoman Court.

It was asserted above that the Sultan's government was a hot-bed of corruption. Under the early Sultans, however, efficiency and sound judgment were the mark of the Ottoman administration. Decline had set in swiftly after the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent; although it was still possible for men of ability to achieve high office, the Ottoman Court became a place where factionalism, intrigue and the struggle for influence over the Sultan were rife. One of the main causes of this was the quality of the Sultans themselves. Lello described Sultan Mehemet III as a man of:

“no wisdom or capacitie ledd by the Emperesse who hath no regard butt money, his Counsell nott of wisdom able to manage any thing for the good of the Empire and nott suffered or daringe doe anythinge without the Emperesse consent...” (86)

The sons of the reigning Sultan were imprisoned in the Harem, in

an atmosphere of bribery extortion and petty political feuding, in order to prevent them building up bodies of support to enable them to attempt a coup against him. Any suspicion of such action carried the threat of death. When the Sultan died his eldest son would succeed and would execute his own brothers in case they became a focus of revolt. Therefore those in line for the throne were brought up under a constant threat of death in an atmosphere of boredom and claustrophobia. Such conditions are unlikely to have been conducive to mental or moral strength. Furthermore, the Sultan came to the throne with no experience of warfare, administration or important political decision making. It is small wonder therefore that the Sultans in the period under discussion were heavily under the influence of their favourites, who usually included their mothers and other women of the Harem and the Eunuchs with whom they had been brought up. Needless to say these people had also spent all their adult lives in the palace and had no experience of the world beyond its walls. Lello summed up the problem thus:

“The ould Empress is in greater favour than she ever was and is thought she once again will carry the cheiffest sway of this Empier and displace this noe P: [Pasha] and prefferr to the place Ebrahim Bassa her son-in-law such is the inconstancies of 105 [the Sultan] in all his accione for what he commandeth one day wth the counsel and advise of some is the next day revocated by the advise of others.” (87)

Due to the Sultans' failings an increasing burden fell on the Grand Viziers who became increasingly powerful in government. Once a man attained that office, the Sultan's entourage would forge new political alliances either with the new Vizier, in order to benefit from his patronage,

or with his rivals in order to seek his removal. The Viziers and all the others in office had to calculate the effects of policy on his chances of staying in power. (88) The Sultan's ministers and his favourites were in a position of tremendous power and influence, because they were guaranteed access to him. It was natural, therefore, for others to court their favour. A suit supported by one of these people had a good chance of success.

Inflation was a major problem in the Ottoman Empire. Those hit hardest were people on fixed incomes such as government officials, who were thus likely to be tempted by bribes and greed began to play an important role in some aspects of decision making. Corruption became commonplace and as the Sultans lacked the strength of character to stamp it out, those with a vested interest in the system would viciously intrigue against a Grand Vizier who wished to carry out reforms to end such practices. The depth of venality is well demonstrated by another of Lello's letters. He reported that the Sultan had commanded a vizier to be strangled, his usual command when the service of one of his officials displeased him:

“but for money the old Emperesse saveth all their lives, who upon this bad newes imputeth the same to the cheif viceyre who is by reporte to be deposed wth in two dayes and one of his son-in-lawes thereto preferred.” (89)

The Sultana was clearly worth cultivating; thus, as Dallam reported, Lello sent Paul Pindar, who was then his secretary, to present privately to her a coach worth 600 pounds. (90) As Barton had reported:

“matters of importance cannot be handled with these but with

excessive expense.” (91)

Barton had considered that the reason for the Ottomans' failure to enter into alliance with England was that the Spanish had out-bribed him with the Viziers to procure their efforts in dissuading the Sultan. (92) It is apparent that various interested parties in a particular negotiation would bribe the same officials, with the result that whoever gave the most money had the greatest chance of receiving a favourable outcome. In many important matters, delaying tactics would be employed in the hope of extorting as much money as possible. This appears to have been ultimately the case in Glover's suit on behalf of Ștefan Bogdan.

The servants of those with access to the Sultan set themselves up as channels of influence. John Sanderson gave an account of a grisly murder of a woman and her sons:

“This was an act of the Spahies, in spite of the Great Turkes mother; for by the hands of this Jewe woman she took all her bribes.” (93)

The most interesting account of the means through which negotiations could be successfully handled dates from a period outside that under discussion in this thesis; but there is little doubt that the process employed was similar. It concerns the lengths to which Sir Thomas Bendysh, who was ambassador at Constantinople between 1647 and 1661, had to go to obtain the dismissal of his predecessor Sir Sackville Crow [1633-47] and his own acceptance as ambassador. Before Bendysh's arrival Crow had given the Grand Vizier a great present to secure his own reinvestment as ambassador; the Vizier

accepted his generosity but did not reinvest him; instead he had Crow placed under house arrest at the request of the English merchants, which cost them 40,000 pounds.

On arrival Bendysh demanded audience with the Sultan. The Grand Vizier delayed matters by declaring that he should present to him his letters of credence and the letters cancelling Crow's commission. Bendysh was meanwhile informed by another source that the Vizier would try to affront him by refusing to carry out his investiture as ambassador, thus he sought the aid of the "Vizier's Jewe" to influence the Vizier in his favour. It would be reasonable to assume that money changed hands during this interview. The visit to the Vizier took place; however he declined to listen, merely suggesting a meeting between Crow and Bendysh; he then attempted to persuade Bendysh to part with Crow's letters of revocation. When he refused the Vizier employed a different tactic, informing Bendysh that he believed him to be the true ambassador but must hear Crow's side of the story too. Bendysh replied that since the Vizier believed him and had received a fine present from him, he should do him the honour of investing him. The Vizier said nothing and left.

Bendysh later found out that the Vizier had been given five bags of money by the Venetians to hinder his investiture. The French Ambassador was also active on Crow's behalf; he was said to be:

"commonly called Sir Sackville Crow's broker; this man swears and says anything Sir Sackville Crow would have him."

Bendysh eventually went to see Crow in the company of three of the

Vizier's officials; Crow was forced by them to read his letter of revocation. However when Bendysh attempted to gain audience with the Sultan, the Vizier attempted to delay him with placatory messages. Bendysh's next tactic was to send messages to various unspecified "great men" around Constantinople, saying that Crow and the French and Venetian Ambassadors were trying to deprive him of his rightful office even though Crow had been removed from office by the Sultan's *hati-serif*, in the hope that this would reach the Sultan's ears. He then wrote to the Vizier to ask for his assistance in gaining audience with the Sultan and threatening that if progress was not made he would return to England to report upon how he had been treated in Constantinople. The Vizier eventually agreed to Bendysh's investiture, which took place on October 10th 1647. The new ambassador then offered the Vizier a gratuity of 20,000 pounds to redress a number of grievances including the swift confirmation of the Capitulations, reassurances as to his own rights of precedence and the immediate deportation of Crow. Further delaying tactics were employed by the Vizier. Finally the merchants went back to the "Vizier's Jewe" who promised to see these things granted for the sum of 55,000 pounds. Bendysh preferred not to become directly involved; he told the merchants that the matter should be a private transaction between themselves and the Jew, whilst he would appear to rely on gratuity with the Vizier. The bargain was concluded and within five days the "Vizier's Jewe" obtained a *hati-serif* as desired. (94) Little of substance could be achieved at the Divan without bribery.

Relations between the ambassadors and the Ottoman court were rarely concerned with anything other than official business. Differences in religion and social life meant that closer associations occurred on few occasions. Sometimes, however, it was possible to overcome mutual suspicions and establish friendships. Barton possessed about as much of the Ottomans' confidence as it was possible to win. John Sanderson pointed out:

“By meanes chieflie of the Turks mother [’s] favoure and some money he made and displaced both princes and patriarkes, befriended Viseroyes and prefferred the sutes of cadies (who ar thier chefe priests and spiritual justices). The Hoggie, a very comely, grave and wise Turke, who was Sultan Mahomets schoolemaster and I may say counsellor was a very true friend and an assister of Master Barton in all his business with the Grand Signior.” (95)

When, as previously mentioned, Henry Lello sent his secretary Paul Pindar to the Sultana with a present:

“[she] did take greate lykinge to Mr. Pinder, and afterwardes she sente for him to have his private companye” (96)

Such instances appear to have been rare. Nevertheless it was possible, with careful handling, to establish a working relationship with even the most ill-disposed Ottoman official. One major problem was that a change of Vizier, which happened quite frequently, disrupted such a *modus operandi* and required establishment of relations with the new officeholder. Thus Pindar, during his own embassy, lamented the execution of the Grand Vizier, Nassuf Pasha, even though he was:

“a cruel, turbulent and most uniuist man. [of]...uncivil and unfriendly deportment against all Imbrs [i.e. ambassadors]”;

although his successor had expressed goodwill towards him:

“I have rather cause to be very sorry then glad of this sudden alteration.” (97)

We have seen that Harborne and Barton in particular were able to establish the embassy in a position of influence and inspire confidence in the Sultan and his senior officials as to their abilities and trustworthiness. The Ottomans also expressed goodwill towards Queen Elizabeth and a certain admiration for her. Yet they did not in any way regard Christian princes as equals. The normal attitude towards non-Moslems was one of extreme contempt and scorn. The Sultan’s Christian subjects were very much second class citizens and foreign Christians were treated with sufferance. Even West-European men of status were popularly known as “hogs” and Pera, the quarter of the city in which foreign ambassadors lived, was referred to as the “pig-quarter”. (98) The description of the elaborate ceremony involved during an audience with the Sultan is an indication of the ambassador’s low status and illustrates the suspicion with which he was viewed. When Dallam had seen the Sultan receive his present, he found Lello and all his Company:

“had stode all these tow houres expecting the Grand Sinyor’s coming to another place whear he should deliver his Imbassage and letteres... As he was speakinge unto me their cam towe brave Turkes ridinge to my Lord, biddinge him to take his place and staye a little.” (99)

He was probably introduced to the Sultan as “the naked and hungry barbarian” who “ventured to rub his brow upon the Sublime Porte.” (100) Lello was further humiliated in 1601 when although he had brought a gift

with him, as was the usual custom, he was dismissed by the Viziers with only a couple of words and was not even permitted to sit down, which upset him greatly. (101)

In 1599 the Venetian Bailo noted that Lello was a man of little experience and less prudence; when he spoke to the Grand Vizier about certain claims he had, he was rebuffed in such a manner that he had to withdraw in confusion. (102) A year later he wrote:

“The Capudan showed that he made little count of the [English] Ambassador and said at length that, as far as he could see, the Ambassador was good for anything else, except to be Ambassador at the Porte.” (103)

Attempts at humiliating ambassadors was something of a ritual which the Ottomans enjoyed at every possible opportunity; Lello's problem was that he did not know how to react to this. He was neither stubborn, cunning nor forceful enough to inspire respect amongst the Sultan's senior officials, with only one of whom did he have good relations: the “Chief Gardner”. (104)

The esteem in which he was held had reached such a low ebb by 1601, that he was not able to gain audience with the Sultan to present an important petition; he was reduced to waiting in the Sultan's garden in the hope of seeing him. When the latter caught sight of him, he enquired what it was he wanted. Lello made signs that he wished to present a petition and the Sultan ordered a cord to be let down from the window of his kiosk. Lello had to tie the petition to the cord. (105) Lello was greatly ashamed of the indignity and he made no mention of it in his letters home to England; the Venetian found out about this incident from his own

sources.

Lello was quiet and timid and seems to have had no understanding of how to deal with affronts to his dignity. John Kitley, in a letter to John Sanderson, gives a most unkind account of his diplomatic manner:

“he satt uppon his horse with a ruddie [i.e. red with blushing] downe look, as though he had been streyning at a close stoole: and when he came before the Grand Signor, stoode with his hands handsomlie before him, like a modest midwife, and began a trembling speech in English, as you knowe sounding like of a goose devided into semiquavers; which was so disgratiouse that, had it not bine for respect of Hir Majestie, he had bine deprived of all the Grand Signor his graces.” (106)

Sir Thomas Glover’s rumbustious and flamboyant manner was more suited to commanding respect, but he tended to ruin the effect because he found it difficult to moderate his hot temper. Whilst he persisted with his efforts to obtain the Moldavian throne for Ştefan Bogdan he incurred the wrath of the Grand Vizier: on one occasion, both men became so heated that the Vizier threatened to send him in chains to England to be executed. (107) On another occasion Glover was referred to as:

“that red boar of an English Ambassador.” (108)

Glover does not appear to have been much more popular with the Ottoman *Divan* than Henry Lello.

Sir Thomas Bendysh triumphed in his dispute with Sir Sackville Crow because he was patient yet persistent; he argued his case with skill whilst maintaining his dignity and eventually he was prepared to call the

Vizier's bluff. Yet he also frequently suffered attempts to affront his dignity. On one occasion when, in order to insult him, the Vizier removed Bendysh's chair from the room in which they were to meet so that he would have to conduct his business standing, Sir Thomas ordered one of his gentlemen to kneel down and lean on his hands and then sat down upon him. At another audience, the French Ambassador was given precedence in seating positions, at which Bendysh took umbrage and pushed the French Ambassador from his chair to sit on it himself. On a third occasion during an argument between Sir Thomas and the Grand Vizier, Bendysh stood up and kicked the stool out from under the Vizier, saying that his Master Charles I was dishonoured by the Vizier's behaviour and would have reparation for the Vizier's affront. Surprisingly, such actions did not harm his reputation at all:

"This resolute and gallant behaviour made him only the more considerable." (109)

whereas Lello had been soundly rebuffed for impertinent behaviour. It seems that if arrogance and contempt were met with arrogance and an insistence on being treated in a fashion appropriate to his status, an ambassador would be accorded more respect than if he was meek and civil. Nevertheless, despite Lello's frequent humiliations at Ottoman hands his embassy does not seem to have been as unsuccessful as his enemies made out; the merchants at least appeared to have been satisfied with his performance and he remained English Ambassador for nearly 10 years. Furthermore, we shall see that Lello's cautious approach to conducting his embassy prevented him from being seriously

compromised by his support of Ştefan Bogdan.

Some brief attention should be paid to relations between the English Ambassador and his counterparts from other nations in Constantinople. Such relations are of lesser importance than those with the Ottomans for the purposes of this thesis. The English Ambassadors' main contacts were with the French and Venetian Ambassadors; like him they were permanent representatives and fulfilled a similar function. The King of Poland and the Habsburg Emperor frequently sent representatives to Constantinople for specific purposes, but they were not permanently resident during this period. They were occasionally held under house-arrest as hostages for the good behaviour of their masters. Opportunities for co-operation on matters of mutual interest between the English Embassy and the Polish and Imperial representatives occurred infrequently for they had few areas of interest in common; likewise they had few issues on which their interests were in direct competition, so the occasion for rivalry and ill-feeling were also infrequent. Nevertheless the English Ambassadors were assiduous in paying courtesy visits and maintaining cordial relations in order to collect information on the state of Turko-Polish relations. The Ottomans appear to have looked upon such proceedings as a form of conspiracy and did their utmost to discourage them; they occasionally forbade such meetings to take place. (110)

Edward Barton built up good relations with the Polish Chancellor Jan Zamoyski during the 1590's in order to oppose the extension of Habsburg interest in Eastern Europe; during this period, diplomatic

contact became a matter of some importance to England and Poland. Polish interests came into direct conflict with English activities when England began supporting Ștefan Bogdan; the Poles were particularly industrious in working against the English Embassy and Bogdan, for if Bogdan replaced Poland's client, Ieremie Movilă, upon the Moldavian throne, Poland would lose much of its influence in Moldavia. Matters became extremely heated and Sir Thomas Glover and a Polish ambassador almost came to blows. Eventually the King of England intervened and recalled Glover.

The English Crown's representative in the Ottoman capital had a difficult task to perform. He was cut off from his home in an environment in which he faced occasional danger, frequent harassment and attempts at humiliation and almost constant frustration and procrastination. Yet the ambassadors' letters to England are circumspect concerning the frustrations and delays, only in moments of great annoyance did they expound on these matters. It will become evident later that the government in London had little understanding of the difficulties with which the Ambassadors had to contend. Edward Barton had supported pretenders with such apparent ease that it was natural that other pretenders should turn to the embassy as a safer, more reliable and less mendacious source of patronage. The English Crown showed itself similarly amenable to such activities and expected Lello and Glover to achieve the same quick success. Yet the latter two never commanded the amount of influence that Barton had; when they failed to obtain the throne

of Moldavia for Ștefan Bogdan, they were suspected of misconduct and had to answer serious charges made against them.

CHAPTER III: BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF FOUR AMBASSADORS TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE BETWEEN 1588 and 1620

In this chapter I intend to present an account of the origins and careers of four ambassadors to Constantinople: Edward Barton [1588-97]; Henry Lello [1597-1607]; Sir Thomas Glover [1606-11] and Paul Pindar [1611-20] in order to enlarge upon one of the themes of the previous chapter: the status of the English Embassy. Therefore considerable attention will be given to the methods by which the individuals concerned obtained appointment as ambassador, the intrigue and rivalry involved and the influence of the English Crown in the process. I shall show that all four men were extremely ambitious and that appointment to the ambassadorship was the pinnacle of a career of service to the Levant Company abroad and a possible springboard to further advancement in England; if made use of properly it was also a position from which great wealth could be accrued. Most of the ambassadors' time was spent in ensuring the observance of the Capitulations and protecting the lives and property of those they represented, which has little importance for this thesis, therefore accounts of the ambassadors' main preoccupations will be given only briefly unless they serve to enlarge upon questions of relative success or failure in their duties or of the difficulties they faced in carrying out their duties.

Some attention has already been given to the illustrious career of Edward Barton: he became in effect a yardstick by which the careers of Lello and Glover came to be measured by their contemporaries to their disadvantage. Barton was born around 1562, probably the second son of Edward Barton of Wenby in Yorkshire, of whom nothing is known (1); Edward Barton senior may have had some connection with the Baltic trade in which Edward Osborne and Richard Staper had been involved, alternatively he may have been a member of the same City Livery Company as either Osborne or Staper, for the young Edward was appointed as secretary to William Harborne in 1583 at the age of 21, despite having had little education. Fynes Moryson described him thus:

“He was no more learned then the Grammer Schoole and his private studyes in Turkye could make him, but he had good skill in languages, especially that of the Turkes.” (2)

The languages he knew included Turkish, Latin, Greek and probably Italian and French. In order to begin the process of establishing a Levant trade, the Company preferred men of experience in trade to act as ambassador, to men of learning: with the possible exception of Henry Lello the first five ambassadors were not men who had been educated as “gentlemen”, Edward Barton probably accompanied Harborne to Constantinople in 1583; he never returned to England again. In 1584, in order to extend the English Embassy’s direct contacts with rulers, Harborne sent him to the Barbary States to register the English merchants’ Capitulations with the Viziers of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, where English seamen faced great danger of capture by the Sultan’s

subjects in acts of piracy. Assurance was sought that English ships would be allowed to pass freely and be allowed to defend themselves if attacked:

“To the end that our ships might not come in danger of breach of league, if they should shoote at the gallies of those of Algier, Tunis and Tripolis in the West.”

Barton had further business with the “Romasan” *Beylerbey* of Algiers concerning the freeing of slaves. (3) He was also sent to Tripoli to procure the release, on Sultan Murat III’s commission, of one Thomas Sanders and others who had been captured by pirates on a ship called “The Jesus”, Sanders writes thus of the meeting with Barton:

“all our Company that were in Tripolis came that night for joy to Master Barton and other commissioners to see them. Then Master Barton said unto us, welcome my good countrymen, and lovingly intertained us, and at our departure from him, he gave us two shillings, and said serve God, for tomorrow I hope you shall be as free as ever you were.” (4)

Barton was treated with respect by the Governor of Tripoli, although as a mere secretary he did not entertain him personally:

“The King arose and went to dinner, and commanded a Jew to go with master Barton and other commissioners to show them their lodging which was a house provided and appointed by the said King. and because I [Sanders] had the Italian and Spanish tongues, by which their most traffique in that countrey is, Master Barton made me his Cater to buy his victuals for him and his Company, and delivered me money needful for the same.” (5)

Edward Barton was extremely competent as Secretary to the Embassy; in the extract above he comes across as fully aware of the dignity of his position but also as a considerate and generous man capable of inspiring respect, affection and admiration in others. When William

Harborne departed for England in August 1588 he was confident to leave Barton behind as agent to look after the Queen's and the Company's interests, despite his youth.

Fynes Moryson, who stayed at Barton's house was most impressed with Barton:

"He was courteous and affable, of good stature, corpulent, fair complexion and a cheerful countenance, which last made him acceptable to the Turkes, as likewise his person (for they love not a sadd countenance and much regard a comely person)... he was man of good life and constant in, the profession of the reformed religion..." (6)

As noted in Chapter II, life for the English in Constantinople was limited mainly to the society of a small group of bachelors. Alfred Wood described the social life of the English community in his book on the Levant Company:

"They were magnificent in their clothing, houses, furniture, horses and equipage; their tables were laden abundantly; they kept a large staff of domestics; and they gave lavish entertainments, which were generally prolonged until the comualty was drowned with the good liquor provided... At Constantinople the 'Jolly Cup' commonly closed the evening, either in the merchants houses or the cabarets of Galata where the Franks [West Europeans] enjoyed a kind of liberty found scarcely anywhere else in the Ottoman Empire... the majority of factors remained single and placed a very liberal interpretation upon the liberty they might enjoy in that condition... looser connections than the marriage bond were frequent..." (7)

It is estimated that there were over 200 cabarets in Galata, in which the low-life of Constantinople were said to gather. John Sanderson, who knew Barton well, described the effect that a long period spent in Constantinople had on him:

"I sawe a great alteration; from serving God devoutly, and drinking

only puer water, nowe to badnes stoutly and much wine (the witts hater). Ther to live I perceaved great temtation.” (8)

There were also allegations made during a court case of 1594, that Barton had been less than honest in his dealings with Aron Vodă. Sanderson was strongly disapproving of the bawdy atmosphere of Barton’s household, alleging that Barton had built an enclosure “for the conveyance of whores” and that at one time there were seventeen such women in the house:

“but the ambassiator caused all to depart except his owne, wit whome and alcamy [alchemy] he wasted his allowance. But what availed my counsell? Prid [e] and selfewill was to rife in all.” (9)

It was also reported that Barton was forced to move his quarters from a Moslem area to the Christlan Quarter of Pera, because the activities of his household were considered offensive to Moslems. Sanderson’s description may have been something of an exaggeration, since he was not a man given to moderating his feelings and although he and Barton were friends they had a somewhat stormy relationship: Barton once punched Sanderson in the face and locked him in a room after the latter had attacked another man in his presence; furthermore Barton owed Sanderson a lot of money. It is possible that the question of offence to Moslems was a useful excuse to have the Embassy moved to an area where it could be kept under surveillance easily. However, both Sanderson and Barton seem to have respected each other and it is unlikely that the above account of the ambassador’s domestic arrangements is a complete fabrication. The normal duties of the

ambassador on behalf of the Company must have become tedious to a man of great intelligence after a long period in office and it is probable that Barton cultivated a taste for extravagant living in order to relieve the boredom. The need to relieve boredom was probably another motive for Barton to involve himself in political activity in Constantinople.

He secured the friendship of a number of the highest ranking and most influential officials of the Ottoman state, including the Grand Viziers Ferhad Pasha and Sinan Pasha, the *Mufti* Mehemed Bostanzade and Cigala, the *Kapudan* of the Ottoman Navy (Yusuf Sinan Pasha Cigalazade, a renegade Venetian). Furthermore, his involvement as a mediator during 1589-90 when negotiations to settle the Empire's differences with the Kingdom of Poland took place attracted the good opinion of Sultan Murat III who held him in great favour; Barton also enjoyed the great favour of Murat's successor Mehemet III [1595-1603]. His understanding of the complexities of Ottoman politics and his sympathetic attitude towards the state in which he had carved out an important role for himself ensured that he became a trusted source of advice for the Sultan.

Although he does not seem to have been raised to the rank of Ambassador until 1592, Barton wanted to be seen as an important diplomatic representative of his sovereign, a major influence in the political affairs of Eastern Europe; in doing so he distanced himself from his other role as protector of the English merchants. He established good relations with the Polish Chancellor Jan Zamoyski, who was intent upon

keeping Poland outside the Habsburg-sponsored coalition against the Ottoman Empire, and used his influence with the Sultan's ministers to persuade them to adopt a moderate policy towards Poland. Barton perceived that the anti-Ottoman alliance put England's commercial interests in the Mediterranean at risk from Spanish advances into the area; Spain was a member of the Habsburg coalition and England's rival as we saw in Chapter II, and extensive efforts were made by England to secure Ottoman co-operation against the Spanish fleet. Barton, therefore, hoped to secure a maintenance of the *status quo* in South-East Europe by preventing the Habsburg coalition from holding the balance of power in the area. In 1591 he seems to have offered some support to Sigismund Bathory's campaign to gain the Polish throne if it became vacant, in opposition to a Habsburg candidate. In 1591 Barton also tried to persuade Sultan Murat to take up arms against the Habsburg's, to "set the infidel against idolators", but was forced to reverse his policy and argue for peace, upon the orders of Queen Elizabeth I.

It was a great honour for Barton to be ordered by Mehemet III to accompany the Ottoman army into Hungary in 1596 in case he could be of use as a mediator in any negotiations which might become necessary. It demonstrates the trust in which Barton was held because, as it was thought, nothing like this had occurred before. There could have been repercussions for England's reputation and commerce if Barton had refused: it was argued in his defence that a refusal could have been interpreted as a calculated insult, although in actual fact the French

Ambassador refused a similar invitation. In truth Barton wanted to go on this expedition and believed that it would be to the embassy's advantage if he did so. Barton's expedition incurred considerable displeasure in England, in particular from Queen Elizabeth: it greatly offended her that her Ambassador was accompanying the Infidel into battle against Christian armies bearing England's colours on his tent; the French Ambassador in Constantinople made use of the climate of opinion (against Barton amongst Christians) by spreading rumours, which were widely believed, that Barton was bearing arms. This was probably not true; furthermore, he and Thomas Glover, who wrote an account of Barton's expedition, protested strongly that the English Ambassador's presence might make it possible to procure peace between the Ottomans and Hungary. Glover also insisted that Barton successfully obtained the release of captive Christians to prevent them being sold into slavery. He obtained the release from captivity of 23 members of a former Imperial Embassy, imprisoned since 1593 and sent his Dragoman, another member of the Brutti family, to Prague to offer his services as mediator. (10)

Suspicious as to Barton's loyalty were rife because it was felt that he was becoming too closely associated with the Ottoman Court, it was even considered that there was something un-English about him. Fynes Moryson perceived Barton's long absence from England, and the English government's ignorance of the reality of life in the Ottoman Empire, as militating towards frequent misconstructions being placed upon Barton's

activities :

“howsoever Mr. Barton had strong parts of nature and knew well how to manage great affairs in the Turkes Court; yet he coming yong to serve our first Ambassador there and being left to succeed him, could not know the English Court, nor the best wayes there to make good his actions.” (11)

He also excited the resentment of the merchants in Constantinople who felt that he was not sympathetic to their interests and was blind to the effects his activities might have on their commerce; they considered that his diplomacy constituted meddling in State activities and that if he made a mistake which harmed the Ottoman cause retribution would be taken out on them resulting in the confiscation of their goods. (12) They depended upon the goodwill of the Sultan to ensure that their privileges were upheld.

The merchants' fears appeared to have been justified when Barton's proteges, Aron *Vodă* and Michael the Brave, (Mihai Viteazul) rebelled against the Sultan, refusing to pay tribute and acting in the interests of the anti-Ottoman alliance; however the Sultan did not blame the English Ambassador for the behaviour of these princes and even made use of his influence with them in unsuccessful efforts to negotiate their return to obedience. Barton also managed to secure the appointment of one Meletius as Patriarch of Constantinople. Meletius, formerly Patriarch of Alexandria, had been a frequent visitor to Barton's house:

“This holy Patriarcke Padre Melete was a very comely blacke longe-beared man... This man was very meeke in the shewe of his behaviour towards all sorts and manner of men... Yet he inspired and got by Master Barton's meanes and money to be Patriarcke of

Constantinople.” (13)

After Barton's death Meletius left the Patriarchate: there are several contemporary versions of the circumstances of his departure. John Sanderson asserted that he had become tired of the continual financial exactions of the Ottoman authorities whereas William Biddulph wrote that Meletius' enemies were able to force him from office once he lost his powerful patron. As an important contact with the Ottoman government and as Meletius' creditor, Barton was in such an enormously influential position close to the Patriarch that he was probably greatly resented by members of the Orthodox Church hierarchy, who must have baulked at the prospect of a heretic having influence over the head of their Church, particularly if Barton was perceived as interfering in Church matters.

Biddulph wrote that:

“being a man of knowledge... he laboured to reforme the Greekes of many of their superstitious customes... whereupon... [after Barton's death] they said their Patriarch was an Englishman, and no Greeke and therefore...diesplaced him. Yet bearing some reverence towards him for his learning they made him again Patriarch of Alexandria...” (14)

If Biddulph, a clergyman employed by the Levant Company and a man close to the ambassador, interpreted Barton's interest as an attempt to influence the Patriarch on matters of doctrine, it is understandable that the Greek church hierarchy placed an even less favourable interpretation upon the ambassador's discussions with the Patriarch. Barton's influence with the Ottoman *Divan* enabled him to protect Meletius from excessive financial demands from the Ottoman authorities and from his enemies

within his own church; it is likely that he was forced out of office once Barton's death had removed a major source of influence and finance.

Barton greatly enjoyed the sense of power and importance brought by the opportunities to use his favoured position with the Sultan to patronise others. He had a taste for power politics and intrigue and revelled in his role as maker of Princes and Patriarchs and peace negotiator between the major powers of Eastern Europe: he was immensely proud of his accomplishments as a diplomat. However, other Englishmen did not view his activities in the same way. Edward Barton's unusually good relationship with the Ottomans and his efforts to maintain peace between them and their neighbours was often misinterpreted as a desire to subvert the efforts of Christendom to defeat the Islamic threat on its borders. Fynes Moryson argued:

“they did him great wrong, who did attribute his greatnes in the Turkish Court, to his betraying the Counsells of Popish Christian Princes, especially such as were enemies to the State of England... he protested to abhor from furthering the Turkes designes against any the greatest enemy of his profession and Country, further then to divert them for the tyme from some malicious attempt.” (15)

Barton's success is particularly striking in that from the time of William Harborne's departure in 1588 until 1591 or 1592 he had not formally received his commission as Ambassador, merely holding the title of Agent: this did not impede his proceedings with the Ottoman government, he had a reputation built up during his time as Harborne's secretary and the useful contacts established, and his knowledge of Ottoman Turkish and the Ottoman *modus operandi* to assist him and he

quickly inherited the favour which Harborne had previously enjoyed:

“I thinck no Christian ever had greater power with any Emperor of Turkye or the offices of his state and Court then he had in his tyme.” (16)

Richard Wrag recounted how, on the occasion of the delivery of Queen Elizabeth’s present to Sultan Murat in 1593, Barton was able to obtain redress for an insult accorded him by the Grand Vizier by threatening to withhold delivery of the gift:

“to no small admiration of all Christians that heard of it, especially of the French and Venetian ambassadors, who never in the like case against the second person of the Turkish Empire durst have attempted so bold an enterprise with hope of so friendly audience and with so speedie redresse.” (17)

Barton’s political activities inevitably cost him money because he invested his own funds to support his proteges aspiring to high office, on the understanding that he would be reimbursed once they achieved office; frequently he was not. He was constantly short of money, complaining that he received a smaller salary than the other Christian ambassadors in Constantinople. Matters were made worse by the fact that the merchants were frequently tardy in paying his allowance. In 1596 he was paid 1,500 gold ducats by the Company every half year, 1,100 li (pounds) by the Queen of England and 1,000 li by the Sultan, although this last was paid in kind: wood, mutton, beef, hay, oats and such provisions; great difficulty and expense had to be undergone to procure the Sultan’s allowance. Barton was noted as being in debt to the Company to the tune of 4,000 li and had to borrow 5,000 crowns from

John Sanderson to pay for his journey with the Sultan's army into Hungary in 1596. The Secretary of State, Lord Burghley, was persuaded to conduct an enquiry as to:

“What entertainment has been made to Mr. Barton in certainty, and whether he has been allowed the 4 per cent promised [probably referring to the Consulage]; what allowance he had from the beginning of his service; when he has had any and what it was for, as he complains of great want and unkind answers and that Collins and Salter the Consul and vice-consul at Tripoli deny him relief.” (18)

Barton's financial problems were compounded by his decision to stand surety for Aron *Vodă* when he became Prince of Moldavia. Aron did not pay his debts and Barton was later sued by one Charles Elman to the tune of 25,000 crowns. At his death, after the sale of his property to pay his debts and funeral expenses, Barton was described as “not worth one asper” (19). He seems to have been motivated primarily by the desire for power and influence rather than the pursuit of great wealth. Money seems to have been a means to carry on the business he enjoyed, not an end in itself. He died aged around 34 years old in the latter part of December 1597. The *Dictionary of National Biography* states that he died on the island of Halki where he was seeking refuge from the plague, having succumbed to the disease there. However, a letter in the Travels of John Sanderson shows that in fact he died of dysentery in Constantinople and was buried at Halki:

“honourably, having about 300 persons accompanying his corpes to the waterside and so returned for he was buried at the monastery 20 miles of.” (20)

He left a sister, Mrs Mary Lough, and a kinsman, Robert Barton.

Sanderson described a visit to his tomb:

“[he] lyeth interned (according to his always desire) under an olive Tree, before the entrance into the Monasterie... a stone of white marble is layed upon him. Letters thereon engraven of his title and Decease.” (21)

Barton's early death was a great loss to the Embassy: the merchants were less lucky in his successors. If he had lived he would probably have remained Ambassador for many years. Barton's successful support of pretenders to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia had a significant impact upon events in the principalities, as we shall see in Chapter IV. Furthermore, other pretenders saw the wisdom of going to England for support rather than to Venice or France.

Out of the four ambassador under consideration, Henry Lello is the one about whom there is least information: apart from the English and Venetian State Papers, the major source of information about him is John Sanderson's correspondence which is, to say the least, a hostile source. Furthermore, I have been unable to discover where he was born or where he died and information as to his activities before and after his tenure of the Constantinople Embassy is somewhat scarce.

Amongst the names of the men to whom the Levant Company Charter was granted is that of one Henry Lello, an associate of William Harborne. (22) This Henry Lello was probably the Ambassador's father, since to be admitted to the fledgling Company a man would have needed substantial capital to invest, commercial experience and prominent membership of one of the major City of London Livery Companies whose members were active in the overseas trading Companies such as the

Muscovy Company. According to the work of T. K. Rabb, our Henry Lello became a member of the Levant Company in 1600, four years after he first went to Constantinople as Barton's secretary. (23) As a boy he received a gentleman's education at Oxford University, although there is no record of his matriculation; he then attended the Inns of Court in London; later in 1603, whilst he was Ambassador at Constantinople, he was admitted to the Fellowship of Gray's Inn. (24) One can only speculate as to how he was employed between finishing his education and becoming Barton's secretary in 1596. He probably had some connection with trade in Italy because he had a fluent knowledge of Italian.(25)

When Edward Barton asked for:

"som sufficient man to be his secretary... [they]... findinge a man meet for the same..[had]... compounded with him to come thether for his Honour's service." (26)

The young Henry Lello probably used his father's influence to obtain the appointment as secretary, it is also probable that he had some connection with the English Court for he was acquainted with Sir Robert Cecil the Secretary of State. Acquiring the appointment was something of a career move: working to assist the ambassador in his official duties would bring experience in the functioning of the Ottoman government and the operation of diplomacy, as well as a chance to learn Ottoman Turkish: such experience would be invaluable for a subsequent application to fill the ambassador's job when it became vacant. It is worth noting here that all of the ambassadors under discussion here had

previously been secretary to the Embassy. In the early years something of an informal career path appears to have been established and for all the initial lack of financial remuneration the secretary's job was worth having. The following extract concerns the Venetian Ambassador to England's conversation with Paul Pindar's newly appointed secretary who was on the point of leaving for Constantinople:

"He is going with the full intention of succeeding to the post, otherwise he would not have left the Prince's service." (27)

Lello was unfortunate in that he had little time to acquire experience as secretary before the sudden death of Edward Barton. Being an ambitious man he welcomed his subsequent appointment as Ambassador, indeed he probably petitioned for it: in Chapter II we saw that he obtained the position through the favour of Cecil, the Secretary of state. Lello's short occupation of the office of secretary had apparently not been particularly impressive: on hearing of Barton's death, Elizeus Sothven at Aleppo lamented to John Sanderson:

"So for this wee have in truth great cause to be hartely sorrey; and more for that in that place is nowe none of our nation capable to supply his ro[o]m. I wishe it had not bee your happ to have come away before this chance had happened; for now ther is none fitt in any sort to performe the place; being Harry Lyllow, for want of a better... [is]... faine to supply." (28)

Lello experienced enormous difficulties in attempting to establish his authority and gaining some measure of respect; his acknowledged lack of experience made this task all the harder and he does not seem to have been able to overcome his initial problems. His dislike of the Ottomans is occasionally evident in his correspondence and his

prejudices prevented him gaining a proper understanding of the society in which he had to work. His approaches to the Ottoman authorities were rarely judged correctly: according to his critics, he was humble when he should have been haughty and impertinent when tact was needed (29) and lost patience easily. Some of his prejudices may have originated in his great piety; all the ambassadors carried on some sort of religious observance but it is particularly striking in the accounts of Henry Lello that he was regarded as a very religious man and seems to have made a virtue out of appearing virtuous. This is not to say that he was anything other than sincere in his religion but his somewhat ostentatious piety seems to have been thoroughly irritating to some of his colleagues although others altogether approved. For example, Thomas Dallam mentioned proudly that:

“My Lord would not suffer he to go to worke, because it was our Sabothe day.” (30)

William Biddulph, preacher for the factory at Aleppo wrote that Lello in many ways exceeded Barton’s greatness:

“especially in his religious carriage and unspotted life; and had no the times been more troublesome in his Regiment, than in the times of his predecessor Master Barton; he would everyway have gone beyond him. He first of all reformed his familie, and afterwards so ordered himself in his whole carriage that he credited our Countrey.” (31)

From the opposite point of view John Kitely, the Embassy physician who despised Lello, lampooned Biddulph’s eulogy, drawing attention to his alleged misdeeds as ambassador:

“a worthie drugge in virtue (as Theophilus [William Biddulph] sayeth)... he reformed his house (you know) to his great profite; he

was an instrumental cause that manswooled the Bishoppe of Salonique... enstalled Prince Yancolo in the stockes, was beaten by Brevis; and the Mary Rose was burnt in his regiment.” (32)

It is difficult to say what was meant by reforming his house; it is possible that the reference was to the Embassy household: he is hardly likely to have approved of the licentious lifestyle enjoyed by his predecessor. He also voiced his disgust at his successor, Sir Thomas Glover's sexual appetites; Lello's statements were used by Glover's enemies in England to undermine him in the Company's estimation. (33)

Lello's religious zeal was to cause trouble amongst his fellow ambassadors: firstly through his request to convert a building in Pera to exclusive Anglican worship and subsequently by an ill-judged conversation with a Pasha, which ended in Lello slandering the King of France as a traitor and a Papist. The latter incident was smoothed over by Lello's secretary, Paul Pindar, and the offending remarks were blamed on mistranslation by Lello's unfortunate Dragoman. (34) The plan to establish an Anglican centre of worship was a genuine attempt to curb the licence of the English factors in Constantinople. A similar project had already been attempted by Edward Barton but it would appear that Lello's mode of putting his plan into operation upset his colleagues who accused him of trying to gain special treatment for the English. Lello wanted to raise the status of the Anglican religion in Constantinople, particularly because the other "Franks", the Greeks and the Turks referred to the English as Lutherans and "infidels", saying that they did not believe in Christ. Lello insisted that he wished to educate these

people as to the true nature of the Anglican rite. The Venetian Ambassador, Girolamo Capello, considered the relations of the various religions in Constantinople a matter so delicate and sensitive that to meddle with it might produce the gravest (unspecified) consequences. (35) Lello seems to have been extremely short-sighted towards those of a different religious persuasion and distaste for Islamic customs and the corruption of the Ottoman bureaucracy compounded his inability to comprehend the Ottoman mentality.

However, he was not a hypocrite, nor was he harsh or cruel. Thomas Dallam wrote warmly of Lello's kindness and friendliness and much is made of his meek deportment, even by his enemies; some of his letters to the Secretary of State are humble to the point of obsequiousness. There is no consensus as to his character in the available source material: to those who liked him he was a kind, wise and religious gentleman; to those who disliked him he comes across as a smug and narrow-minded fool; to the Ottomans he was a "hogge", worse than a "knave", a madman and an "insufficient swine", incapable of any reason. (36) However, despite the contempt of the Sultan's officials and the slanders of his enemies, Lello's Embassy was not the picture of incompetence that the hostile sources make out. Orhan Burian has published an account of Lello's Embassy which shows that he was quite successful as Ambassador, the merchants' trade did not suffer under his care, on the contrary in the Capitulations issued to English merchants England's status as most favoured nation was confirmed; furthermore, as

we shall see, although Lello failed to gain the Moldavian throne for Ștefan Bogdan as he was ordered to do, he managed to avoid becoming embroiled in the pretender's intrigues, something which his successor failed to do. (37) If Lello's Embassy had been a failure he would have been recalled long before completing ten years in the post, regardless of the expense of providing a replacement.

The main problems of Lello's Embassy were as follows: the dispute with France about jurisdiction over the *Merchants-forestiers*, mentioned in Chapter II; the perennial problem of English piracy in the East Mediterranean, which Lello could hardly have been expected to solve himself and which was to pose similar problems for his successors; the imprisonment by the Ottomans of Sir Thomas Sherley (38); and his promotion of Ștefan Bogdan, which resulted in the latter's imprisonment by the Ottomans whilst under his protection. Lello was accused by those who hoped to remove him from office of deliberately betraying Bogdan. When Lello returned to England, he did so in some disgrace to face charges which included allegations that he had ill-treated a man recommended to his protection by the Queen of England.

Chief amongst those working against Lello were Thomas Glover, John Sanderson and John Kitely. Glover, who had been Lello's secretary between 1600 and 1604, wanted to ascend the 'career-ladder' to become ambassador. He spent two years in London, working for his own advancement and undermining Lello's reputation with the Levant Company, by bringing Lello's alleged incompetence to the notice of its

leading members, and with the Crown by highlighting dissatisfaction over Lello's efforts to gain the Moldavian throne for Ștefan Bogdan, hinting at betrayal. John Sanderson had initially been opposed to Lello's appointment as Ambassador because he had considered himself better qualified for the appointment, nevertheless when he returned to Constantinople in 1600 he had given Lello his full support. At the same time he had also offered Thomas Glover his patronage and began working against Lello on Glover's behalf after once again falling out with the ambassador, initially over lack of recompense for a horse of his which he alleged Lello had deliberately "run to death", and after that for being a major party in a dispute in which Sanderson was involved with Mary Lough, the administratrix of Edward Barton's will. (39) John Kitley's motive for siding against Lello appears to have been based entirely upon personal antipathy. The campaign against Lello's reputation did not end when he was replaced by Glover, indeed it became even more vicious after his return to England. Glover even tried to enlist the aid of Thomas Sherley in the campaign against Lello; in a letter written in August 1607 he hinted that Sherley ought to spread damning stories about Lello in London that Lello was a fraudulent and deceitful hypocrite who, under the pretence of puritanism and godliness, sought all means possible to damage others and defraud them of their goods.

At Glover's arrival in Constantinople, he and Lello embarked upon a dispute which began as a petty squabble based upon individual pride but swiftly escalated into a serious public quarrel. Lello had been piqued

to learn that he was being replaced by his "sometyme old servant" (40); his attitude seems entirely understandable if he was aware that Glover had been plotting against him; certainly the latter's subsequent treatment of him left a lot to be desired. Lello received a most impertinent letter from his appointed successor asking him to vacate the Ambassador's residence immediately and find alternative accommodation. The terms in which Glover couched his request were an affront to Lello's dignity because it was implied that the latter no longer had any status. Lello had a further grievance with the Levant Company merchants who were reluctant to finance his journey home: he appealed for help to Sir Robert Cecil, now Earl of Salisbury. A less arrogant person than Glover would have handled Lello with patience and due respect to his former position, thereby avoiding a damaging quarrel.

The animosity between the two men was of long standing: Glover remarked that there were many in England who did not believe that he and Lello were capable of coming to an amicable agreement; he subsequently complained about his:

"ould and inveterate enemy breaking out into open malice." (41)

Lello was so consumed with his sense of grievance that he allowed his hatred of Glover to get the better of common sense or professional duty to avoid holding the English Embassy up to ridicule. He delayed his departure to England upon the pretext of lack of money. The French Ambassador, spying an opportunity to damage the reputation of the English Embassy, publicly supported Lello, who reciprocated. Lello

visited the French Embassy frequently and, according to Glover, failed to pay courtesy visits to the English Embassy or do anything to help his successor's proceedings. (40) He also allowed himself to become the centre of a group of Englishmen who had fallen out with Glover, notably Hugh Holland, whom Glover had unilaterally denounced as a "notorious papist" and William Strachey, Glover's secretary, who had incurred the disapproval of his master. Lello continued to write letters to the Secretary of State, as if he were still Ambassador, containing copious abuse of Glover. Friends warned Glover:

"Master Leillo hath not of late used you [Glover] very kindly. The most ill of his late writing is little credett to himselfe, for he hath manifested his malitiose hart."

Eventually the Earl of Salisbury was forced to intervene: he wrote sternly to both men after receiving news of Glover's assertion that Lello was plotting to murder him and that he was a traitor to King James. (41) Particularly serious in Salisbury's eyes was Lello's association with the French Ambassador which was rumoured to be undermining Glover's efforts to obtain the patronage of the *Merchants-forestiers*. Lello was also alleged to have said publicly that Glover had no authority from England to act on this matter. Salisbury warned Lello to leave Constantinople as soon as possible and advised him that not only was he expected to give an account of his treatment of Ştefan Bogdan but he would have to answer charges of bringing the Embassy into disrepute:

"Yf Lillo have wrought of envy (as you writt) to crosse your proceedings, he will never be able to answer it, but your Lordship being very well assured thereof, spare not to writt it again and againe as of his former dealing with Yancoline." (42)

By the time this letter was written Lello had already left Constantinople, presumably because Glover had made arrangements with the English merchants to give the former Ambassador the money he needed to repay. Nevertheless the quarrel with Glover was resumed upon his arrival in England where John Sanderson acted as Glover's informant and adviser. He suggested that Glover write frequently to Salisbury concerning Lello, but that he should concentrate on defending his own "fame and effectual proceedings" in order not to appear malicious. Sanderson was concerned that Glover's enemies in England would support Lello and slander him to the Secretary of State and the Levant Company: he was correct in his suspicions, for by November 1607 Glover was being accused of bigamy, of violence towards his household and servants and of bringing the Embassy into disrepute.

Lello's initial reception in England was decidedly cool:

"At first receipt of the Grand Signor's Letters the King's Magistie shewed no countenance, nether gave him wourd for his welcome in Inland: but however, afterward he procuered frendship to be heard in a message he brought from Savoy, and two sondry times was with his Magistie. Himselfe [Lello] touldeth me that he was to goe againe the day after; which he did, and was knighted." (43)

His return to favour did not satisfy him; he was intent on revenge against Glover and his supporters, particularly Sanderson, whom he considered had not only advised Glover to apply for the job of secretary to the Embassy but was also the sole cause of his subsequent preferment as ambassador. (44) He decided to attack Sanderson through that which he held most dear, his money, hence the great energy he exerted in the

aforementioned dispute over Edward Barton's estate. Sanderson urged Glover to act quickly to counter Lello's justification of his conduct of his Embassy:

"for I see he is subtill and unjust in his cariadge of wourd and so no doubt in deeds... Eldred is his counsoler... yours formerly and my ever most mortal enemy... I for my part have bine most divilasly [devilishly] deceived in his Machiavellian carriadge towards me..."

The French Ambassador had remained in contact with Lello, providing him with detrimental stories about Glover which were used to attack him. (45) Lello also had spies inside the English Embassy; from this source allegations reached England that Glover had sodomised a young boy, that he had committed adultery with a maidservant employed at the Embassy, that he was sadistic in his behaviour towards his male servants and was cruel to his wife. There were further accusations that Glover was completely under the thumb of Ştefan Bogdan, with the implication that Bogdan was privy to information detrimental to his protector's reputation. (46) William Biddulph's eulogy of Henry Lello, which included an attack upon Glover, was published by Lello's supporters, probably as part of a campaign to have him restored to the embassy; this was frustrated by Glover's supporters within the Company. Nevertheless Glover's reputation had been tarnished by Lello's propaganda which gave weight to the displeasure of the English factors in Constantinople at his financial exactions, his threats towards them and his neglect of their concerns whilst he was involved with the affairs of Ştefan Bogdan. (47) Glover's removal from office was not a direct result of Lello and his supporters' campaign, nevertheless it contributed to suspicions that Glover was untrustworthy and even disloyal to the Crown.

Glover meanwhile had not ceased to attack Lello's reputation. In 1608 he sent a memorandum recording an incident of 1600:

"The vizier sent Master Lello wourd from the Divan... that he was a caphier... [*Kafir*, an infidel] that is worse than a knave, and bad him depart from the contry... (the vizier had rebuffed him to his face,

called him a madman and said he had written to the Queen what he was and that she out to know what an insufficient swine the merchants had placed in Constantinople)... willing Thomas Glover [at that time secretary]... that when occasion of business was he should come and informe him; for he said this ganchier (hogge) is not capable of any reason." (48)

Since this extract shows Lello in an extremely bad light, whilst putting Glover forward as competent and respected by the Ottomans, its purpose was obviously to counter Lello's aspersions upon his good character by highlighting the different capabilities of the two men and to prove that Glover was most qualified to be ambassador.

Lello's behaviour towards Glover, however unjust the latter's treatment of him, belies the noble, virtuous image of him put forward by Biddulph. It seems that Lello was kind, generous and friendly towards those he likely and respected, but was roused to hatred and malice when someone crossed him. He was capable of bearing a grudge for years and in such a case behaved foolishly and unpleasantly.

He made a considerable fortune in the Levant, continuing to trade whilst he was ambassador and, according to Sanderson, rarely did a ship leave Constantinople without Lello shipping out merchandise for his own profit. On his return home he shipped 11 bails of silk via Venice. His business ventures continued: on February 6th 1608 he was admitted as a freeman of the East India Company, investing 137 pounds 10 shillings in the fourth East India voyage. (49) Thereafter Henry Lello disappears from the records, apart from a codicil to the will of Dame Anne Spencer, widow of Sir John Spencer, citizen and alderman of London, which

reads:

“To Sir Henry Lelloe knt a jewel of £10.” (50)

Sir Dudley Carleton, English Ambassador in Venice, described Sir Thomas Glover’s arrival there in 1612 on his journey home to England:

“he appeared one day like a comet all in crimson velvet and beaten gold, but had all his expectations marred on a sudden by news of Prince Henry’s death.” (51)

This anecdote neatly illustrates Glover’s love of pageantry and his delight in being the centre of attention. He was an extravagant character, arrogant, proud and ambitious; his assessment of his own importance reached such heights as to be entirely out of proportion and he was bound to make himself unpopular: Carleton, although circumspect, was not an admirer and this quotation suggests that he was highly amused at Glover’s failure to make the desired impression.

Thomas Glover came into the world in a suitably chaotic manner. He was born at sea on a journey between Danzig and London. His mother was described as a “Pollonian” by William Lithgow. (52) Glover’s grandfather, John Glover of Baxterby in Warwickshire, came to reside at Mancetter in that same county. He had four sons: John, William, Robert, who was burned at the stake as a heretic in Coventry in 1555, (53) and Thomas (54) the father of our ambassador. Thomas senior, being a younger son and therefore not in expectation of any property, went into commerce. He became involved in the Muscovy Company in its infancy, accompanying Anthony Jenkinson, who was to be instrumental in ensuring the early success of the Muscovy Company, on his first voyage

to Russia in 1557, where the latter had been commissioned to act as agent for three years. (55) Thomas Glover senior probably took over from Jenkinson as agent in Moscow, he was certainly employed in that capacity between 1563 and 1573. He purchased his Polish wife from the Tsar Ivan the Terrible:

“...the Kinge [Tsar] had sold one Thomas Glover, a cheiffe agent for that Company [the Muscovy Company] a wiff bowren of a noble howse in Polland, Basmanovey, taken captive at Pollotzcoe, for ten thowsand Hongers [Hungarian?] ducketts in gold; and yet shortly after, fallinge into som displeasur, robbed him of 16 thowsand pounds more in cloth, silk, wax, furrs and other merchandizes, and sent him and his deare wiff emptie owt of this land.”

Thomas Glover was banished from Russia in 1573 as a result of Queen Elizabeth's complaints to the Tsar that he and other Englishmen had been conducting a trade independent of the Muscovy Company; our Thomas Glover was probably born on his journey home to England. (56) Thomas Glover junior was brought up in Constantinople “from a boy”. Probably his father, who was eventually pardoned by Queen Elizabeth, used his connections with the big trading companies in the City of London, prominent amongst whom were Edward Osborne and Richard Staper, to gain his son a position as a page in the retinue of Harborne or Barton. In order to make a career with the newly constituted ‘Turkie Company’, as his father had done with the Muscovy Company, the young Thomas Glover needed to gain experience in the working of the Embassy, the conduct of successful negotiations with the Ottomans and their language. He could already speak and write the “Slavonian tongue”

(meaning Polish) fluently. (57) Glover held a position in Barton's household around 1592; in 1596, by now aged 23, we find him employed as Barton's secretary accompanying him on his journey with Sultan Mehemet III to war against Christendom in that year. (58) During this period he had some involvement in Barton's dealings with Moldavia and Wallachia, incurring debts of his own. (59) He was replaced as secretary to the Ambassador by Henry Lello in March 1597; when Barton died in September of the same year, Paul Pindar took over the post of secretary, but Glover remained in Constantinople:

"many times serving as dorgoman [Dragoman] to his Lordship [Henry Lello]... having need of conferrance with the greatest men..." (60)

It must have been during his youth, under the influence of Edward Barton, that he acquired his taste for rich and splendid clothes, extravagant living and other predilections which will be described later.

In 1599, when Pindar was sent to England with letters from the Sultana to Queen Elizabeth I, (61) Glover took his place as secretary to Lello who acknowledged him as a competent man who served him well. It was agreed in all quarters that Glover's understanding and experience of Ottoman law, custom and protocol made him a useful employee of the embassy:

"indeed the ambassiator cannot misse him..." (62)

John Sanderson, however, felt that the status of the embassy would be increased if the secretary were a more educated man:

"som yonge jentellmen that had the Lattin tongue perfect wear sent out from England for the purpose." (63)

Glover was extremely ambitious: he was prepared to take on the job of secretary, although for over a year he received no proper salary, as a stepping-stone to better things. He used his position to forge powerful connections through John Sanderson. The latter had taken on the role of patron and wrote to Glover frequently with advice which usually contained exhortations to moderate his behaviour: he emphasised the importance of not making enemies, especially amongst the powerful members of the Levant company whose good opinion would be useful to him. (64) Others sought Glover's advancement; Sanderson wrote to John Kitley in 1604:

“Per Master Glover I received your kind, and in his case most favourable, letter. He is much bound to you how grateful I know not. He is forward to the highest place of preferment at Constantinople. Yf God prosper his health and actions, this voyage the next springe the present for the Great Turk shalbe sent to him.” (65)

In 1603, Sanderson wrote that the Company knew well, through his furtherance of their business, that he was an asset to them both in Constantinople and elsewhere and that he deserved to be promoted ahead of all others. (66)

Although Lello had no complaints over Glover's usefulness, relations between the two men were not good. Rumours that Glover had openly criticised his master reached Sanderson in Scanderoon; he advised his friend that it would be to his credit to be meek in his behaviour towards Lello, that he should: “support his imperfections.” (67) Lello was probably jealous of Glover's successful handling of the

Ottoman *Divan* in contrast to his own rebuffs: whilst he received threats from the Vizier, Glover was treated with respect. It seems to have pleased Glover to encourage such treatment.

Lello sent him to England in November 1603, to explain the state of the Constantinople embassy and the problems caused by the activities of English pirates for the merchants and the Embassy. Glover probably left London to return to the Levant in May 1604. (68) Whilst he was in London he was in close contact with Sanderson who now lived there and was active in the Company on behalf of his protege, who was showing a distinct lack of gratitude for Sanderson's efforts which were beginning to bear fruit:

“... he hath not honoured me with the valewe of 2d at his comminge, all the time of his beinge, nether at his departure out of Inghland... What meanes of his great good I have bine cannot be hidd, yf himself would; though now peradventure, rising he may scorn his best consellor.” (69)

Glover, clearly aware of his growing reputation with the Company and at Court was becoming arrogant. In prosecuting Lello's business, Glover would have come into contact with the Secretary of State, Cecil, who was to become his patron; Glover appears to have impressed Cecil with the “spirite and courage” which the Viziers in Constantinople had admired. (70) He also seems to have been a wealthy man: Sanderson informed his correspondent Robert Barton that Glover had offered to lend Barton money and that said he had the means to enrich his friends. (71) Sanderson appears to have hoped that, if Glover became ambassador, he would concentrate upon making his fortune in the Levant

(ambassadors were at this time allowed to trade upon their own account) and in so doing would, out of gratitude, promote Sanderson's commercial interests. He had a reasonable expectation of this since Lello had made himself very rich during his term of office and his servants and supporters had shared in his good fortune. (72)

Glover did not stay long in Constantinople; in October 1604, Francisco Contarini, the Venetian Ambassador there, wrote that Glover had been received in audience by the Sultan and had presented letters from the King of England on the subject of piracy. He also said that he was to return to England shortly where he would receive credentials as English Ambassador to Constantinople. Glover had therefore already been canvassing support in earnest. Lello appears to have been unaware of Glover's machinations for, when Glover left the Ottoman capital in December 1604, he took with him a letter of recommendation written by Lello requesting the King to give his former Secretary some preferment in his service. It is possible that the ambassador hoped to use Glover as an informant, to provide information about the King's wishes and to give advance warning about threats to Lello's position, as well as to promote his interests at Court. Glover became a "Squire of the King's body",

"A gentleman as highly esteemed as of them that honourably attend upon our person." (74)

Glover used his position to ingratiate himself at Court. Immediately upon his return to England, confident of his own advancement, he applied for a Coat of Arms, which was granted on 11 April 1605. (75) He also courted

the favour of the Secretary of State, with whom he would correspond if he became ambassador. Cecil, if impressed with Glover, would be a valuable patron since his influence with the King and the Levant Company was enormous. Cecil did indeed use his influence to obtain Glover's knighthood and probably his appointment to the Embassy; Glover also enjoyed the favour of the Lord Chamberlaine. (76) Cecil made use of Glover as an adviser on Ottoman affairs.

Once Glover had become aware that he would not be appointed Ambassador to Constantinople immediately, he began a subtle campaign to undermine Lello in the esteem of the Company and the Crown. In his letter of recommendation for Glover, Lello had asked if he was to continue as ambassador and had been requested to remain. (77) Glover seems to have taken it upon himself to furnish details of his former master's rebuffs, failures and ill-treatment by the Ottomans. (78) Lello's alleged ill-treatment and betrayal of Ştefan Bogdan, in particular, damaged the King and Secretary of State's estimation of him. Salisbury had already been petitioned by Bogdan and Gaspar Gratiani; Glover and his allies appear to have done their best to imply something disgraceful in Lello's behaviour towards the pretender. Glover wrote to inform Lello of the King and Salisbury's displeasure that the pretender had been imprisoned whilst under the protection of the Embassy. (79)

There was considerable competition for the post of Ambassador in Constantinople, but Glover was an obvious choice; Lello was informed by the Company in April 1606 that he was to be replaced by Glover:

“Supposing the same to be to great purpose and effect for better

effecting of their business.” (80)

Glover was knighted on August 17th 1606 and a royal warrant was issued for the engraving of the signet ring with which he would seal his official correspondence. Glover sent servants ahead of him to Constantinople to make arrangements for his arrival. These arrangements included the removal of Lello from the Ambassador's official residence. Glover's letter to Lello, referred to above, expressed the new ambassador's regret that he could not accommodate his predecessor due to the "somewhat extraordinary" size of his retinue; to add further insult Glover demanded that Lello immediately deliver all the household goods belonging to the embassy (plate, linen, carpet, kitchen utensils etc.) into the hands of a servant, with a warning that if he did not co-operate trouble would await him in England. Lello was told that if he made no difficulties, Glover would be pleased with him and the Company would be more likely to favour him when he returned to England; furthermore, there was the hint of a threat that a lack of co-operation would result in forceful complaints being made with the object of obtaining Lello's disgrace. Glover's arrogance had reached new heights with his latest preferment: the new ambassador boasted that this appointment was due first and foremost, not to the favour of the Company and the Secretary of State, but of the Almighty Himself. (81)

Glover arrived in Constantinople on December 23rd 1606; on the 28th his ships entered the Sublime Porte on the Sultan's orders. The Sultan watched a display mounted by the English community of mock

combat and discharge of artillery and was said to have been so impressed that he sent ten of his pensioners to welcome the new ambassador conveying gifts. When Glover and his retinue disembarked they were honourably escorted to their lodgings by several of the Sultan's officers, captains and companies of soldiers. Glover boasted that such treatment showed extraordinary favour, much more than was customary. (82) In fact this seems to have been standard protocol. In January 1607 Glover presented the King's letters and present to the Sultan who was said to have been delighted with his gift. (83) After a month's delay he was admitted, on February 8th, to kiss the Sultan's hand which marked his official acceptance as Ambassador to the Ottoman Court. He had, in the meantime, visited the Viziers, magistrates and ministers to court their favour, asking them to be present at the hand-kissing ceremony in order to:

“make the way better and more acceptable against my entrance to the Grand Signior.” (84)

Meanwhile, Lello's delayed departure was cramping Glover's style, particularly when he began selling his belongings openly in the markets of Constantinople and continued his open association with the French Ambassador, whilst Glover was petitioning on the question of the *Merchants-Forestiers*. Glover alleged that Lello denied that his successor he had any right to the Consulage and had refused to accept money collected on Glover's instructions to assist him in paying his debts thereby allowing him to depart. Glover insisted that he had treated Lello with respect, honour and courtesy. Lello disagreed with this, referring to

his successor thus:

“a man so blown bigge with his owne pryde that they who have sett him up as an Idoll against me and therefore much les myself are to hope but little good from him.” (85)

Glover's high-handedness towards the members of his own retinue created considerable friction amongst the English community: he accused his secretary William Strachey of intriguing with Lello against him and forbade the two men to meet; Strachey disobeyed, no doubt with Lello's encouragement, stealing out at night when others were asleep. Strachey was also accused of showing a letter from the King addressed to the Sultan to Henry Holland, a “notorious Papist” whom Glover had placed under house arrest on suspicion of espionage until he could supply testimony supporting his loyalty to the English Crown. (86) Strachey was turned out of the Embassy; he returned to England around June 18th 1607, much aggrieved, and assisted Glover's enemies in the campaign against him. (87) News reached England of a stream of vicious accusations by Lello and Glover against each other. Glover even accused Lello of stealing the plate and furnishings belonging to the Embassy and of passing information regarding England's campaign for jurisdiction over the *Merchants-Forestiers* to the French Ambassador. Glover's spies in the French embassy reported that it was the source of rumours that Glover had forged the new Capitulations, granted in 1606, to give himself jurisdiction over the *Merchants-Forestiers*; Glover alleged that Lello's influence was behind all this; he also wrote to the Earl of Salisbury that he had information that Lello did not intend to return to

England but planned to become a French subject. (88)

Many of the accusations against Lello doubtless had their roots in Glover's fertile imagination. Every setback Glover suffered and every move the French Ambassador made against him was blamed on Lello's envious and malicious intrigue. The new Ambassador's hatred of his predecessor was extravagant. Glover had gloried in his success at obtaining a renewal of the Capitulations which included a new clause bringing the Dutch and all other Europeans, except the French and Venetians, under the English banner. He also took the opportunity to draw attention to Lello's "incompetence" by making an issue of the title accorded to the King of England in the Capitulations obtained by Lello which was inferior to that accorded to the King of France. (89) The French Ambassador's anger at the extension on paper of Glover's authority and the probable consequences of this in matters of precedence was a cause of considerable tension between the two Embassies. The French Ambassador's bribes obtained Ottoman agreement to cancel the grant on the grounds that the extension of Glover's authority had been unintended, but Glover refused to surrender the Capitulations and lost his temper with the Vizier, insulting him; the Vizier retorted:

"that he would inform my kinge, that I was more fitt to have bin employed in some war-like affayres to gett townes and Castles, than to be an Ambassr here, to extorte and take things from them perforce." (90)

The French Ambassador began to conduct a personal campaign to have Glover recalled: he wrote a letter of complaint about the new English Ambassador to the King of England. When the Venetian Bailo tried to

mediate between the two parties involved in this increasingly complicated dispute, Glover dismissed him as a “double-faced villain”, The dispute was expanding to involve the English and French mercantile communities in Constantinople. When some Frenchmen attacked Glover in his garden, he accused Lello of conspiring to murder him.(91) In a letter of June 9th 1607 the Levant Company rebuked Glover:

“the merchants themselves do not give any contentment wch maketh us beleeve that wch was ever doubted that your place you now hold made you forget youself.”

Glover was ordered to moderate his behaviour, to leave the matter of the *Merchants-Forestiers* in abeyance and not to be credulous of rumours which were probably invented by others to exacerbate the feud. He was further censured for ejecting Strachey from his house in a foreign country without means of support and was called upon to reconcile himself with his employees or furnish them with the means to return home. Finally he was exhorted to model himself upon Edward Barton, whom they made out to have been a model of virtue:

“A man of that courage and temper that his better fortunes did not make him seem greater than he was, nor could misadventures anyway dismaye him, neglecting... [mercies]... proceeding from other mens weaknes, disdayning revenges, giving place to noe when the matter required it and yet as sociable and familiar with the meanest merchants here as could be wished, whereas nowe we are informed that you regard them not but suffer them to waite and attend your pleasure as people of no respect when they have occasion to repair unto you, yet we accompt them as ourselves.” (92)

The Company foresaw damage to the Embassy and the Company's

concerns if Glover's feuds continued. For instance, the hostility between the new Ambassador and his predecessor must have created practical difficulties and prevented Lello handing over the business of the Embassy to Glover. Lello was not inclined to explain the current state of negotiations, the attitudes of the Sultan's ministers and favourites and the currently most reliable sources of information. The Embassy archives and files should also have been handed over and explained. The subsequent delays in Glover's prosecution of his business meant that time which should have been spent on Embassy business was wasted finding out the exact state of that business. It is not known what Lello did with his papers, whether he took them with him or whether they remained in Constantinople. Resolution of the various matters of controversy was sought but not achieved. Glover's feud with Lello continued after the latter's departure from Constantinople, both parties unwilling to back down and seek a reconciliation. (93) On Lello's departure, Glover expressed the hope that God would reward him as he deserved. (94)

Although Sir Thomas Glover had a difficult relationship with the merchants he worked hard on their behalf and achieved some notable successes. As we have seen, he secured a renewal of the Capitulations, the text of which was used as a standard for later Capitulations. (95) His forceful manner and his ability to exert his authority was noted in Chapter II and his vigour in protecting the life, liberty and property of English and other Christian merchants was mentioned by a several observers:

“he relieved more slaves from the Galleys, pay'd their ransomes and sent them home freely to their Christian stations, and kept a better house, than any Ambassador did, that ever lay at

Constantinople.” (96)

His house was said to have been a sanctuary to which Christian slaves fled in secret before being sent home; Glover’s actions in helping these unfortunates were not universally admired perhaps because some of them had been engaged in piracy; the Levant Company complained to Glover:

“of the great damage wee are brought into by your ordinary receaving into yor house and conveying them away in or shipping of sundry [Christian] captains and whereby you much injure the dignity of yor place and hazard the loss of our goodes and imprisonment of our people praying you therefore to be more considerate hereafter to prevent so great inconvenience.” (97)

In 1609 he briefly obtained a licence for an English ship “The Royall Defence” to enter the Black Sea and a project was instituted to open up a silk-route via Trebizond and Persia. Although this project was forbidden by the Ottomans in 1610, the procurement of this privilege demonstrates Glover’s assiduity in pursuing commercial matters. William Lithgow related how Glover obtained summary punishment of the Ottoman Governor of Patras at whose instance the English consul there was poisoned during the winter of 1610-11:

“for whose death the worthy and generous Ambassador, Sir Thomas Glover... was so highly incensed, that he went hither himselfe to Peterasse; with two Jannizaries, and a warrant sent him from the Emperour... [the Sultan]... who in the midst of the market-place of Peterasse caused one of these two Janizaries strike of the head from the shoulders of that Sanzak [i.e. *Saniak Bey*] and to put to death divers others also that had been accessory to the poysoning of the English consul; and the ambassador returninge againe to Constantinople, was held in singular reputation even with the Turkes for prosecuting as powerfully the course of Justice, and would not shrink for no respect.” (98)

When the term of Glover's appointment was almost up, the Levant Company seems to have been amenable to his continuance as ambassador, although the manner of their correspondence was somewhat cold. He was extremely unpopular with the merchants:

"no merchant has will or love to speak to you."

In 1611 his involvement in Ştefan Bogdan's affairs was such that it occupied so much of his time he neglected the merchants affairs. (99) As we shall see in a later chapter, his recall was on purely political grounds. It is worth noting that Glover was again considered for appointment as Ambassador to Constantinople in 1619, but at the instance of the King, not the merchants. (100)

Many of Glover's contemporaries regarded him as a thoroughly unpleasant man. His patron and mentor, John Sanderson, wrote him numerous letters which urged him to curb his overbearing manner with those who came to petition him:

"Be affable, humble and meke in your high place; all heare report the contrary of you, some saying that your humore is so dangerous and carriage so haughtie that they never dare writt, deliver you what written by others, nor speke to you." (101)

For a long time after Lello's departure Glover refused to visit the French Ambassador, a breach of protocol; Sanderson warned him not to allow private grievances to interfere with his official duty. (102) The frequency with which Sanderson offered Glover advice suggests that such advice was usually ignored; those who followed the progress of Glover's embassy developed the impression that he regarded the embassy as his

private domain and was unwilling to accept guidance from others about how he should conduct the embassy's affairs. As we shall see in Chapter VII, the Crown and the Company held reservations about Glover's willingness to obey direct orders and his tendency to exceed his mandate. In fairness to Glover his responsibilities frequently necessitated taking major decisions about which there was no time to wait for advice from England; furthermore, the Crown and the Company appear to have been ignorant of the way in which the Ottoman state operated. Glover was a man impulsive and extravagant in character and when he became tired of waiting for his orders or considered that the advice he was given was useless, he chose to act in ways which he considered sensible but which others considered to be destructive of the embassy's reputation and to exceed the authority granted him.

Sir Thomas Glover's vicious temper brought accusations of cruelty: he was reported to have beaten the Master of his Household, George Coxden, many times on the soles of his feet before throwing him into prison. John Roberts, a servant, was said to have been beaten about the head and body and Edward Abbott, an English factor accused the Ambassador of striking him. On one occasion, during dinner, Glover struck his wife in front of witnesses, whom he also threatened with violence. The Levant Company was greatly concerned, although Glover strenuously denied all these reported incidents. (103) There were also complaints that he lived so extravagantly that he claimed more Consulage dues than he was entitled to. Glover was noted for his

hospitality, which was considered an asset:

“When time and occasion is presented, no-one more royall in expenses, nor in apparell more somptious, nor in ceremonies more copious; no-one ever so gratiouse in this Porte for obteyning of favours, nor ever wilbe more magnanimous in defending of injuries. And these thinges, thus moderated, I thinke are great virtues.” (104)

Sanderson continued to support Glover at Company meetings, advising others that their best course would be for him to remain ambassador; in reply he was told that if Glover continued in office it would be upon the understanding that he would moderate his lifestyle. (105) Many of Glover’s financial problems were due to the burden of supporting Ștefan Bogdan and his retinue, as we shall see in Chapter VII. Despite his often less than pleasant temperament, Glover retained the respect, loyalty and even liking of many people. A major theme of the correspondence between John Sanderson and John Kitley, the Embassy physician, was the need to curb the excesses of Glover’s explosive nature and indeed to protect Glover from himself. Sanderson had a somewhat fatherly attitude towards his protégé tinged with apprehension of falling foul of his temper. He wrote tactfully to rebuke Glover for his numerous *faux pas*, for despite his sojourn at the English court, Glover lacked any knowledge of basic protocol: Sanderson rebuked him for addressing the Archbishop of Canterbury as “Reverend Sir” :

“My Lord Grace of Canterbury takes place... [i.e. precedence] above a duke and is a most sufficient wise and excellent consoler, not to be offered reward of inferiours, nether to be titled under his degree.” (106)

Glover’s friends hoped that his wife might exercise a moderating

influence. She was born Anne Lambe, daughter of M. Lambe of Padley in Suffolk and had been provided with a “vertuous and religious” upbringing by Lady Wentworth, the wife of Sir John Wentworth, a powerful landowner in the county. She appears to have married Glover shortly before his departure as Ambassador to Constantinople:

“he is matched with a most discreet, wise, mild, and very gentill gentillwoman, a lambe by her father, and no lesse in her owne nature, a lady worthy to be ever most beloved.” (107)

She does not seem to have had any success in moderating her husband’s excesses, although she was not a submissive woman; on occasion she was said to have been constant, bold and courageous and more resembling a lion than a lamb. Her life in Constantinople would have been extremely restricted. Few of the factors were married and there were few women in Constantinople with whom she was in a position to mix, firstly because as an ambassador’s wife she had to be conscious of her status and secondly because she was required to live a secluded life in accordance with Ottoman ideas of decorum. It was only when the Embassy household and the Factors retired to the countryside to escape the summer heat or the plague that she would have been allowed greater freedom. Lady Glover died of plague on 2nd November 1608:

“The Saturday she eat, she dranke, she was merie and pleasant, the Sunday morning being the thirtieth of October 1608 she sickened, the Wensday following, being the second of November she dyed” (108)

Sanderson wrote that Glover was too manly and heroic a spirit to have

been overcome by grief at the death of "one wife". (109) Lady Glover had apparently expressed the desire to be buried in England; her husband refused to bury her in Constantinople and laid her body in a cellar. This scandalised many people who accused Glover of doing his wife a great wrong in not according her a Christian burial. (110) After he was succeeded as ambassador by Paul Pindar, Glover determined to take his wife's body back to England, but eventually decided to bury her in Constantinople, using the excuse of funeral arrangements to delay his departure. He invited the other Christian ambassadors to attend the funeral but the French, Venetian and Dutch Ambassadors excused themselves on the grounds that disputes over precedence would not allow them to attend. The funeral ceremony took place on 14th April 1612. (111)

Glover had no children from his marriage but had sired several illegitimate offspring. Upon his arrival as ambassador, the embarrassing presence of a woman by whom he had had two children awaited him. Glover found the woman a husband, warning her that she should not attempt to come near him again. The boy was sent to Germany at the first fitting opportunity and the girl seems to have died. In a letter of 1608 there is also the mention of a three year old bastard son of Sir Thomas Glover by a Greek woman; this boy was sent to be brought up in Venice on the orders of Richard Staper. The presence of an illegitimate child of an English Ambassador in Constantinople was considered an embarrassment to the Levant Company, particularly if Glover was failing

in his responsibility towards the child, hence Staper's intervention. The boy had inherited his father's linguistic skills: he spoke fluent Greek and had a passable knowledge of Turkish and Italian. He was later apprenticed to an apothecary. (112) There is also a report that one of the English maids in Glover's household had been made pregnant by him. (113) There were further rumours that his sexual preferences were not confined to adult women:

"And more to me [John Sanderson] reported that you kepe ther a poore boy, which you have putt up in fine aparrill, and that you lie with the said boy..." (114)

This report may may been slanderous; it is, however, worth noting that Glover's enemies when seeking to undermine his reputation did so not through accusations of incompetence, which would have been hard to substantiate, but through reports of cruelty, greed and sexual libertinism, which were likely to be believed.

Mention has already been made of Glover's carelessness of his friends and supporters. Although extravagant in maintaining himself in a manner he considered suitable to his exalted station, he was not generous to those whom he disliked. His sister in England, Mistress Peacocke, whose husband had abandoned her and then died, was reduced to petitioning the Levant Company and Henry Lello for money to support herself and her children. (115)

Glover was an intelligent man who could be extremely charming when it suited him; he certainly did not lack courage and audacity. After his removal from the embassy, although clearly apprehensive at his

probable reception in England where he was expected to answer serious charges concerning his dealing with Stefan Bogdan and allegations that his Embassy had been used to conduct espionage on behalf of Spain, Glover determined to return home in splendour "like a comet". His progress to England was reported in the letters of the English Ambassador to Venice and there was widespread interest in his reception on his arrival. Glover was confident that he would be cleared of all charges; his confidence was rewarded and he was soon in great favour with the King. As we know there was even consideration of his reinstatement as Ambassador at the instance of the Crown; however he was not sufficiently popular with the Company for this to happen. In 1624 his advice was sought concerning the status of Scottish merchants in Constantinople under the Capitulations in comparison with those of the English. (116) He was often at Court and was a well-known character there.

He had left Constantinople with enormous debts owed him by Stefan Bogdan, at least half of which were never repaid. He seems to have had considerable financial difficulties because he petitioned for the grant of several offices which were accompanied by financial remuneration. He found to his dismay that these offices had already been granted to others. (117) The manner of Sir Thomas Glover's death hardly fitted his inflated opinions of himself. In 1624 he was employed as a Court messenger. In this capacity he was sent to communicate a message to an envoy from Algiers: before he had spoken two words he

collapsed and died. He was at this time so poor that the Levant Company was expected to pay to bury him, although I have found no record of such a payment. In the register of St. Olaves Church in Hart Street, London, a church with close connections with the Levant Company, there is an entry for April 25th 1625: "Thomas Glover a knight" with the word "church" written in the margin. If this is our Sir Thomas, the Company did not pay for a memorial plaque. (118)

In the *Dictionary of National Biography* there is a comprehensive account of Paul Pindar's activities after his return from Constantinople in 1620 (119), however the entry devotes little space to his career with the Levant Company which for our purposes is more important. Pindar comes across as a pleasant personality and an efficient ambassador. He was born at Wellingborough in Northamptonshire in 1565 or 1566, the second son of Thomas Pindar and the grandson of Robert Pindar of Yorkshire. His family had intended that he should receive a gentleman's education: University, the Inns of Court etc.; but Paul Pindar preferred to enter the world of commerce. He was apprenticed at the age of sixteen to Mr Parvish, a London merchant involved in the Italian trade, who sent him to Venice at the age of eighteen to act as his factor. The young Pindar was greatly impressed by Venice and throughout his employment as Ambassador in Constantinople he showed great sympathy for Venetian interests.

An article in *The Gentleman's Magazine* of 1787 reports that Pindar resided fifteen years in Venice:

"trading on his own account, and on commission both from his old

master and divers other of the most trading kingdoms, by which he got a very plentiful estate.” (120)

Pindar was highly ambitious and had his sights on advancement through a career with the Levant Company. In 1599 he obtained employment as secretary to Henry Lello. He was present at the ceremony of presentation of the musical instrument constructed by Thomas Dallam, whom he had accompanied from England, to the Sultan in 1599 and greatly impressed the Sultan's mother. When Dallam returned to England Pindar went with him on commission from Lello to acquaint Elizabeth I with the proceedings of the French over the *Merchants-Forestiers*, taking gifts and letters from the Sultan and his mother. (121) Whilst in England he had great difficulty in obtaining reimbursement of his expenses from the Crown and the Company. His expenditure was felt to have been somewhat extravagant and it was expected amongst some members of the Company that he would not be sent back to Constantinople at the Company's expense. John Sanderson had a good opinion of Pindar's abilities and character:

“He is a sensible, wise jentallmanlike man and one that hear hath much credited out nation, I protest to you I am sorry of his departure for hear he will be mist.”

The Venetian Ambassador, Girolamo Capello, described Pindar as having an acute mind and considered that it was he who really governed the ambassador. (122) Pindar was replaced as secretary by Thomas Glover, nevertheless he had his sights on greater preferment. Whilst in England he petitioned the Secretary of State, Sir Robert Cecil, to advise

the Queen to appoint him to a new position as Consul of Venice, whose presence there would be invaluable in preventing non-members of the Levant Company from breaking the Company's monopoly of trade in the Levant. This was also a matter of concern to the Venetians, for many of those trading illegally were pirates. Pindar was concerned that the Venetians might prohibit English use of the port of Venice:

“The consul authorised from her Majesty, may execute forfeiture of goods and ships of all that trade of her subjects not being of their freedom.” (123)

Pindar was confident of his ability to fulfill such a commission due to his long experience of Italian commerce. (124) He was also aware of the importance of Cecil's favour and remarked that if Cecil wanted to help him in his suit he would bring it about. Pindar hoped to by-pass the Levant Company to procure this post because, he thought, they were bound to object to the idea on the grounds of the cost involved, whereas if they were told that the Queen had already resolved to create the position, they would be forced to agree to it. (125)

Pindar renewed his petition to the Crown after the death of Queen Elizabeth, confident that Cecil's influence with the King would be sufficient to ensure his success, since it would cost the Crown nothing and the merchants would see the advantages of a Consul in Venice. (126) Once again he was unsuccessful. Pindar seems to have taken the refusal of his petition as a personal affront to his abilities rather than a matter of policy: he remarked that he would be discouraged forever from making a petition at court. His ambition, however, got the

better of his sense of grievance. In the meantime he continued to trade on his own account, becoming involved once again in commerce with Venice. (127) He maintained his acquaintance with the Secretary of State, offering his services whenever they were required. In 1602 it was rumoured that he was acting as a banking agent for Cecil, who:

“feared to have so much money in England lest matters should not go well.”

this refers to the succession of James VI of Scotland to the English throne, which was Cecil's project; if it had failed England might have been plunged into civil war. (128) The rumour was probably true, for a letter of 1603 written by William Hicks, hints at Pindar's usefulness to Cecil in unspecified matters abroad. Hicks gave Pindar the following recommendation:

“He is exceedingly industrious, of great understanding and experience; he writes well and speaks well; he is secret, and would do you [Cecil] very good service in many ways, on that side not only without your charge, but to help to discharge some of your charges in those parts.” (129)

Eventually Pindar's abilities were recognised and he was appointed Consul at Aleppo in November 1606, which was the most important of the Levant Company factories after Constantinople. This was a salaried post, accompanied by around 2,500 dollars per annum. The function of the Consul was in many ways similar to that of the ambassador, without the attendant diplomatic duties. In internal matters he was the representative of the Ambassador's authority, exercising control over the factors' behaviour; in external matters he was

responsible for the maintenance of the English Capitulations, the protection of the English “nation” from oppression by Ottoman officials and subjects, unlawful financial exactions, false imprisonment and so forth. He was also the centre of the factory’s social life, expected to offer hospitality to English and sometimes foreign travellers and exchange hospitality with other consuls and local dignitaries.

The Consul was allowed to trade on his own account; Pindar made great profit out of his residence at Aleppo. (130) In 1608 John Sanderson advised Sir Thomas Glover to keep on good terms with Pindar in order to use him for his own profit, at the same time he advised him to be wary, implying that Pindar was ambitious to take over Glover’s position. (131) There appear to have been a number of complaints about Pindar’s activities as Consul. In 1608 Ottavio Bon, the Venetian Ambassador, told Glover that Pindar was charging consular dues on Venetian goods arriving on Flemish vessels on the basis of England’s supposed authority over the *Merchants-Forestiers*.

Glover agreed that Venetians could not be included in this category, remarking that Pindar was acting on his own initiative in order to ingratiate himself with the Levant Company. Glover seems already to have felt his position threatened by Pindar. A letter to Aleppo, ordering Pindar not to meddle in affairs that were not part of his remit, elicited the polite assertion that the ambassador had no power to command the consul, implying that the two positions were of equal status. Glover was clearly concerned that Pindar was trying to resolve the problem of the

Merchants-Forestiers himself, thereby usurping the authority of the ambassador, making Glover seem superfluous and incompetent in order to obtain the Embassy for himself. (132) In 1610 a Mr Haggard was sent secretly overland to take over as Consul at Aleppo and to “take account” of Pindar’s activities. This was probably in response to complaints about Pindar’s lavish spending: he had presented bills to the Company for reimbursement of 40,000 *piastres*, which the Company challenged. (133) In 1611, there was a further suggestion of Pindar’s aspirations towards the embassy, when Sanderson heard of an unnamed man who promised to provide a present for the Sultan at his own expense if he were appointed ambassador. This man may have been Pindar who was by this time in London; Sanderson viewed this challenge sufficiently seriously to mention it to Glover. (134)

When Pindar returned to England he satisfied his debts. He also brought with him a collection of Arabic, Persian and other Oriental manuscripts, twenty of which were presented to the Bodleian Library in 1611. (135) He was called upon to give advice on commercial matters in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly with regard to the importance to the Levant trade of good relations with Venice, to enable English merchants to make use of the port there. His arguments were eloquently put and demonstrate his knowledge and experience; he showed himself to be a man of intelligence and common-sense; he knew that he could be useful for England’s trade policy; in his practical and uneffusive way he was as ambitious as Glover and Lello: he seems to have aspired to the

status of merchant “aristocrat” rather than that of career diplomat, perhaps modelling himself on the Venetian patrician houses. Antonio Foscarini, the Venetian Ambassador in England, wrote to the Doge and Senate

“Pindar is a person of growing importance and very dear to Lord Salisbury, with whom he has long interviews in which, as I hear from himself and others, he has advanced various views... which are highly appreciated by Lord Salisbury. The election to the post of Ambassador at Constantinople will soon take place, and it is thought certain that the choice will fall on Pindar.” (136)

Salisbury was influential in the election of Pindar to the embassy which took place in September 1611. The Venetians welcomed the appointment because of Pindar’s self-professed good will towards Venetian interests. He left England secretly with only a small retinue; Glover was not informed in advance of his recall and great trouble was undergone to ensure that he was not aware of Pindar’s journey. The reasons for this stealth will be discussed fully in the relevant chapter, suffice it to say now that concern as to Glover’s loyalties was such that it was feared that rather than return to England, he might elect to stay in the Levant and even, it was feared, convert to Islam. The presence of a trustworthy individual such as Pindar was necessary to prevent such a scandalous occurrence. (137)

The Venetians were anxious to cultivate Pindar’s goodwill; to oblige him they waived the export duty on goods he was transporting to Constantinople “on his Majesty’s service” that is to say to use as gifts. They were also careful to gain the goodwill of Pindar’s secretary, who in

the event of the ambassador's illness would take over his position. (138)

One reason for this trouble was the need for co-operation between France, England and Venice to frustrate Dutch plans to set up an embassy in Constantinople and open up Dutch trade in the Levant.

There were genuine reasons for all three nations to be concerned:

“... it is feared that as the Dutch have begun to trade in almost all parts of the Mediterranean, they will absorb the whole traffic, as they are content with very moderate gains; their ships are light and do not cost half as much as English ships cost; owing to their lightness and the skill of their crews they can sail with half the number of hands, and though they last a shorter time they can offer freights at half the price of an English ship.” (139)

Co-operation was needed to oppose the issue of Dutch Capitulations.

Another question of concern to the Venetians was the rumoured English project to establish an alternative trade route to the East Indies which would by-pass the Ottoman Empire. The Venetians hoped that if this materialised, English involvement in the Levant would decline and their trade in that area could be taken over by Venetian merchants, provided the Dutch were prevented from becoming established in the area. (140)

The Doge and Senate advised the Bailo, Simon Contarini, to keep a watchful eye on Pindar, to note his actions on anything that might be worth knowing and send them as detailed an account as possible. (141)

The French Ambassador contented himself with insulting Pindar in front of Sir Thomas Glover, perhaps hoping to provoke a dispute similar to that which broke out between Lello and Glover; he alleged that Pindar was a bankrupt merchant and implied that his letters of credence were false. To his credit, Glover loyally defended his successor and vouched

for the validity of his letters. (142) Contarini paid a formal visit:

“he seems to me very courteous and desirous of a closer connection with your Serenities’ Ambassadors. On my departure he told me that his Master had said, ‘I have nothing to do with the King of the Turks; I send my Ambassador to him solely for the protection of the Merchants my subjects residing in his state.’” (143)

The new Ambassador’s remit was purely commercial, the embassy having got into trouble over Sir Thomas Glover’s non-commercial activities. Pindar had been given specific instructions to that effect. Since his abiding interest was commerce and the promotion of English trade he was probably content to limit his activities thus and not become involved in the affairs of the Sultan vassal states as his predecessors had done. Pindar also impressed Contarini with his calm and reasonable behaviour when informed of the French Ambassador’s insults:

“The Englishman replied that he was the Ambassador of a great and highly honoured sovereign and should be recognised as such; and in any case he would value others precisely as they valued him. And here the conversation ended, and the episode in the hands of anyone less temperate might have led to a more violent resentment.” (144)

Opposition to the establishment of a Dutch Embassy was somewhat uncoordinated. Pindar was initially confident that the Dutch had no chance of success; when he eventually offered his co-operation it was too late. The Dutchman Cornelius Haga spent large sums of money to secure a grant of Capitulations to Dutch merchants. (145) Despite the opposition of the other ambassadors to his reception, he soon established amicable relations with them as colleagues. The position of foreign residents in Constantinople had always been somewhat

insecure, dependent as they were on the goodwill of the Sultan and highly placed Ottoman officials to ensure that their privileges were observed. During Pindar's administration they found their privileges under attack and this situation brought the embassies into closer co-operation. The Grand Vizier had ordered that all letters leaving Constantinople be intercepted and their contents read and a declaration was issued telling all foreign subjects to pay the *Casaplik*, a tax which contributed to the upkeep of the Janissaries, whose numbers were increasing. The ambassadors put forward stern resistance. It is to Pindar's credit that he was prepared to waive the question of precedence which usually prevented the English and French Ambassadors from meeting together in public in order that they could put forward a united defence of their privileges. Pindar's confidence in his own abilities and status meant that he felt less need to constantly insist on the full observance of his dignity when the foreign embassies were under such serious threat. All the ambassadors declared that the above protocols were contrary to their Capitulations. The Vizier threatened to prohibit imports of foreign cloth and silk if they caused trouble and to re-examine their various Capitulations, which implied that changes would be made to them. He also threatened to force all the embassies to move from Pera, in the suburbs of Galata on the Asian side of the Bosphorous, to the city of Istanbul itself, where they could be kept under close surveillance. The proposals to make foreigners pay the *Casaplik* appear to have been defeated. (146) However the attacks on the Capitulations continued.

In 1614 several clauses in the English Capitulations were removed, including the right to protect non-English foreign nationals; Ştefan Bogdan had been protected under this clause. The French Capitulations were similarly curtailed, whilst the Venetian Capitulations remained intact. The Ottomans had a legitimate case for removing this right of protection or “extra-territoriality” because subjects of hostile rulers could come to the Sultan’s dominions, perhaps to act as spies, and conduct their activities whilst under an Embassy’s protection. On the other hand the removal of this right of protection would decrease the foreign ambassadors’ standing and influence and also interfere with their right to obtain the freedom of Christian hostages and slaves. It also removed their right to protect their own servants and Dragomans who were regarded under the Capitulations to be dependents of the princes whom they served. In this last case pressure might be exerted on Dragomans to divulge secrets or act as spies, without right of redress for the Ambassador. The English and Dutch were later able to acquire a special right of protection for their Jewish Dragomans. (147)

The concern of some Ottoman officials for the ambassadors’ rights was minimal. In 1617, without warning, three Dragomans and the secretary of the French Ambassador were thrown into prison and the French Ambassador was accused of assisting the escape of a slave. His residence was surrounded and his servants interrogated; when he refused to admit his guilt, he was forcefully removed from his house and held prisoner. When the other ambassadors protested, they were

informed that the Vizier had contemplated attacking all their houses and if their French colleague did not give up the slave he would be hanged. They replied that the Ottomans could not have treated the ambassador worse if they had been at war with France. The Vizier, after reflecting on this, released the Frenchman. (148)

Another threat to the embassies' special status came with a census of the "Franks" (West Europeans) resident in Constantinople and a prohibition on "Franks" passing from one district of Constantinople to another, which would make commercial activity very difficult. The man responsible for this, the *Cadi* Moro, published a declaration that all foreigners staying in Constantinople for more than a year should be subject to a *Carazo*, (this was not an innovation, merely an attempt to enforce an existing law) a tax devoted to the upkeep of mosques. It was suspected that this idea, which had been defeated before, had the support of the Sultan. Although a promise was received from the Vizier that all bachelor merchants and all Dragomans would be exempt, the *Cadi* did not suspend his attempts to force these individuals to pay. Dragomans were interrogated and mistreated and the French Ambassador complained of ill-treatment of French merchants; he threatened that all the foreign ambassadors would be forced to leave the Ottoman capital if the Capitulations were continually disregarded in this manner. If the ambassadors left, the merchants would leave too and the Sultan would lose customs revenue. The Venetian Bailo wrote:

"I fear that harm will come to some of our Dragomans, as they can find no safe way of escape from this dog."

A major problem was that the *Cadi*, with his own channel of access to Sultan Mustafa I [1617-18], refused to accept the authority of the Vizier. Corrupt and greedy officials could carve out their own lucrative schemes for extortion, with little hope of redress for those at the receiving end. Nani also suspected that the Vizier had a secret understanding with the *Cadi* to turn a blind eye to his excessive zeal. When the ambassadors tried to act together in defence of their own interests, the Vizier would only see them separately on different days. They foresaw little hope of resolving the matter quickly.

Furthermore, in order to protect the interests of their own "nations" they often found themselves at cross purposes. When Pindar was threatened with violence against his merchants and Dragomans he agreed to pay the *Carazo* on their behalf, which undermined the efforts of the other ambassadors to present a united front. Nani believed that as a last resort the ambassadors should be recalled and merchant ships from their respective countries should be forbidden to come to the Ottoman Empire. This might force the Sultan's ministers to allow matters to resume their former course. Eventually bribery and threats by the ambassadors to leave bore fruit and an order to lift the tax was issued. Nani knew that the Vizier's orders were of little use against the *Cadi* and therefore pressed for an Imperial decree that the tax could not be imposed as the *Cadi* wished. His success in obtaining this decree greatly increased his reputation. However, the ambassadors remained convinced that the question of protection of foreign residents would not be allowed to

rest. (149)

The perennial problem of piracy was much discussed. The Ottoman Viziers took the attitude that piracy was the fault of foreign ships and would not admit that the Sultan's subjects were also involved in such activities. In 1616, Pindar complained to the "Captain of the Sea" (the *Kapudan* of the Navy) that in the space of one year, one hundred English ships had been captured at the Straits of Marmora by Ottoman subjects; between 1609 and 1616 the pirates of Algiers had captured 466 English and Scottish ships and reduced their crews to slavery; despite numerous complaints on this point, which in return received numerous promises of action, there had been no improvement. Pindar threatened that if the Ottomans were unwilling or unable to conduct effective police operations in the Levant seas, the various Christian nations which were suffering as a result of this piracy would launch a united fleet to avenge themselves; furthermore, he threatened, if this fleet should, in the course of its police operation, take possession of an Ottoman seaboard the Ottomans could have no cause for complaint to the Christian ambassadors since their inaction had resulted in the victims of piracy taking matters into their own hands. (150)

English pirates were also active in the Levant and were the cause of many complaints with which Pindar had to deal. At one stage the Grand Vizier claimed 300,000 *zecchini* in damages from Pindar. The English Ambassador proposed to the Levant Company that all ships should be sent out well-manned and heavily escorted but they were not

impressed, due to the expense involved. By 1617 the problem of English piracy was so acute and so embarrassing that there were proposals mooted for an English fleet to be sent against the pirates in the Levant. The Venetian Ambassador pointed to a major flaw in this proposal by asserting that the pirates only had to withdraw into safety and hide when the fleet arrived, then wait until its departure before they resumed operations. In the meantime they might take the opportunity to plunder towns and villages in Ottoman territories. This would make the problem even worse. (151)

Pindar became impatient to leave Constantinople. However, when he asked the Grand Vizier for permission to depart, leaving behind a deputy, he was refused. The Ottomans did not want him to depart until a successor was provided because they had, so it is alleged, heard rumours of joint naval preparations by Spain, England and Holland against the Barbary coast to rout pirates operating there. The presence of a fully-fledged English Ambassador in Constantinople would :

“give them assurance that their Masters will not make trouble anywhere, under the pretext of pirates or of anything else.” (152)

Pindar, furious at the Ottoman's arrogance in detaining him, reluctantly agreed to remain. Yet despite their ill-treatment of him, Pindar had won the respect and friendship of important members of Sultan Ahmet I's government, including the Grand Vizier Halil Pasha, who sent Pindar a description of the Ottoman expedition, which he had led, into Persia, on his return to Constantinople in April 1618. It began thus:

“To the courteous Lord and Nation of the Messias both Great and Honourable among the people of Jesus, and the true determiner

of Christian Affaires. Our good friend the English Ambassador, whose latter days bee felicitie, to whose noble presence (after our many kind salutations tending to all god affection and manifestations of Joy, worthy and beseeming our Friendship:) Our loving advice is this..."

and ended thus:

"And this our present Letter is written unto you, for the respect and preservation of our Friendship: and even as our Amitie hath beene hithertoe sincere and firme, so likewise by the Grace of God at our arrival in the happie Porte, it shall bee in like manner maintayned and continued, that cannot possible bee..." (153)

Pindar was eventually allowed to depart in 1620, when the Levant Company recalled him, intent on replacing him with an agent. He returned to England via Spalato and Milan, where he received hospitality of the Count of Spalato and the Duke of Jena. The Count of Spalato described him as a person of merit and prudence, deserving of public favour. On his arrival in England he was knighted on 18th of January 1620. (154) His favour at Court was considerable and he enjoyed the King's patronage on several occasions. This part of his career was described at length in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, articles in *The Gentleman's Magazine* and *Northamptonshire Notes and Queries*. He continued to be involved in commercial matters: in 1624 or 1626 he received, in company with one William Junor, a grant from King Charles I of the "farm" of revenue from the alum, the manufacture of which he had helped introduce into England with an Italian friend in the reign of Charles I. He had invested a large amount of money in the East and had brought home some splendid jewels. He lent both jewels and money to the Crown: around March 1639 it was estimated that his recent loans

amounted to 100,000 pounds:

“for this Sir Paul never fails the King when he had most need.”

In 1643 and 1644, Pindar sent large sums in gold to the King in Oxford for the transportation of the Queen and her children abroad. At his death on 22nd August 1650, he was owed large sums of money by the Crown, various noblemen, the Exchequer and Dutch East India Company. Few of these debts were ever recovered. It seems that he used his wealth to gain entry at Court and to find respect and favour there. He must have loved the magnificence of Court life and enjoyed being in the position of creditor to the most powerful in the land. These powerful men took advantage of his generosity and ultimately took advantage of him.

In his will, dated 24th June 1646, he left one third of his estate to the children of his nephew Paul, according to the *Dictionary of National Biography* which states that he never married. However, an article in *The Gentleman's Magazine* says that he had a son Thomas, the son of whom, Paul, was created a baronet in 1662. This is almost certainly mistaken, since the pedigree in the *Visitation of London* confirms that our Paul Pindar was not married. His estate was valued in 1639 at 236,000 pounds, “exclusive of desperate and bad debts”. (155)

Pindar had been a great patron during his life. Whilst ambassador in Constantinople he had taken upon himself the care and education of a number of English youths, including a Master Robert Withers:

“after his ten yeeres observation at Constantinople, where he was educated by the care and cost of the late honourable Embassadour from his Majestie Sir Paul Pindar and weel instructed by the Turkish schoole Masters in the Language, and

admitted also to further sight of their unholy Holies then is usual.” (156)

There was also one Lawrence Speght who was buried in Clapton in Northamptonshire on 7th March 1674 whose monument includes the following inscription:

“And me [sent] to Turkey where the noble Care
Of Sir Paul Pindar Lord Ambassador
Did feed me, cloathe me breed me and provide
A large subsistence for me till I dy’d
Which I enjoyed contentedly
As he did give me affectionately.” (157)

Pindar’s provision of Robert Withers’ education probably has a parallel in that provided by Edward Barton for Thomas Glover.

Pindar also indulged his taste for patronage by giving benefactions to several churches: St. Botolphs in Bishopsgate, London, Wellingborough Church, Northamptonshire, St. Paul’s Cathedral and Peterborough Cathedral. In his will he left legacies to various hospitals and prisons in and near London. (158) He had built for himself a magnificent house in Bishopsgate Street Without which was described, with illustration, in *Thornbury’s Old and New London*. In the late 18th century the house was used as a tavern called “Sir Paul Pindar’s Head”, the sign of which was probably based on Pindar’s portrait which was painted during his residence in Constantinople and an engraving of which is featured in *The Gentleman’s Magazine* of 1787. This house was pulled down in 1890 but its frontage is preserved in the Victoria and Albert Museum. (159)

Pindar was buried with great ceremony at St. Botolph’s Church

Bishopsgate on 3rd September 1650 in a gigantic leaden coffin in a vault adjoining the crypt. The funeral oration was preached by Nehemiah Rogers, Rector of that church. (160) The funeral was such an important occasion that three pages of its particulars are contained in the Domestic State Papers of that year. His epitaph was engraved on a stone of black marble; it read as follows:

“Sir Paul Pindar. Ambassadour to the Turkish Emperour, anno 1611, and resident there nine years, faithful in negotiations, foreign and domestic, eminent for piety, charity, loyalty and prudence. An inhabitant twenty-six years in this parish. A bountiful benefactor, deceased the 22nd of August; aged 84 years.” (161)

CHAPTER IV: EARLY CONTACTS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE PRINCIPALITIES OF MOLDAVIA AND WALLACHIA

Prior to the establishment of an English Embassy in Constantinople, English diplomats and Crown servants had paid some attention to events in the principalities. The Crown became involved with Petru Cercel, a pretender to the throne of Wallachia before the establishment of the embassy, and afterwards with Ioan Bogdan, a pretender to the Moldavian throne, the latter quite independently of the Levant merchants or the embassy. (1) By the 1590's, however, the success of the embassy and the status of the English Ambassador made England a major potential source of support for aspiring princes; this explains why Aron *Vodă* and Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul) presented themselves to Ambassador Edward Barton in the hope of recruiting his influence to their cause. This chapter will re-examine the source material concerning English involvement with the aforementioned pretenders which took place over a period of thirty years. Historical background will be included only where strictly necessary. In order to elucidate the motives for England's involvement with these pretenders I shall compare the careers of Petru Cercel and Ioan Bogdan and Edward Barton's support of Aron with his support of Mihai Viteazul.

The rise of the Ottoman Empire created a perception of the countries of Eastern Europe as the front line defence of Christendom against Islam; news of the military success of Vlad the Impaler in the mid

fifteenth century was sent to England by William Wey, an English pilgrim, who had heard about it in Rhodes; in 1510, during preparations for an anti-Ottoman alliance, the English envoy in Vienna, Sir Robert Wingfield, informed Henry VIII that he hoped to meet emissaries from Eastern Europe, including some “Vallakkys” (Vlachs), by which he probably meant Wallachians or Moldavians (2); in 1527 Sir John Wallop, Henry VIII’s emissary to Hungary, met an envoy of Petru Rareș of Moldavia. English diplomats in Padua and Venice kept the Lord Chancellor of England, Thomas Cromwell, informed of such events as Suleiman the Magnificent’s expedition into Moldavia and the expulsion of Petru Rareș from the principality. In addition to news of the shift of power in South-East Europe in favour of the Ottoman Empire, information about internal politics in the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania and the relations between the princes and their close neighbours was sent to England. A letter of 1561 noted that initially the Moldavian prince “Jacobus Heraclides Despot” enjoyed:

“the consent of the cheife of the nobility”;

another of 1563 sent from Vienna contained news of his murder. In 1572, news of Bogdan Lapușneanu’s flight to refuge in Poland was received in England and in 1572 of the rebellion against Petru Șchiopul by the pretender Ioan Potcoava supported by the Cossacks. (3)

The late 16th century was, for the principalities, a period in which the boyars assumed an increasingly powerful position in internal politics, appropriating land to their own control, and thereby being able to

exercise their political and military might in favour or against the ruling prince. (4) This was also a period, as we have seen, in which the Ottoman government had taken upon itself the right to appoint the prince. The turnover of ruling princes was high, some of them lasting mere months in power. There were also considerable numbers of aspiring princes awaiting the opportunity and the means to ascend the throne of either principality. A further development was that hereditary right to the throne counted for less when the Ottomans made their choice of prince. All of these factors afforded copious opportunities for other states or individuals to attempt to influence the principalities' affairs in accordance with their own political or religious perspectives. The English Crown's support for Petru Cercel and Ioan Bogdan, as we shall see, was motivated by less specific considerations than this because at this point it had little knowledge of, or interest in, the principalities' internal affairs; on the other hand Edward Barton seems to have been persuaded to become involved with Prince Aron and Mihai Viteazul because he had very particular ideas of his own about how their foreign policy should operate.

The backing for Petru Cercel's accession to the Wallachian throne was almost exclusively French, (5) the English Crown had only a minor involvement; Ioan Bogdan initially enjoyed French support, turning to England for help when that failed; he was eventually reduced to wandering the courts of Europe in a vain search for another patron. The involvement of Edward Barton was instrumental in obtaining the throne of

Moldavia for Aron *Vodă*; in the case of Mihai Viteazul, Barton's backing was important but not crucial. What all these pretenders have in common is that they actively sought English support.

Cercel claimed to be the son of Pătrașcu the Good (Cel Bun), a former Prince of Wallachia [1553-57]. He alleged that at the age of ten he had accompanied his elder brother (also called Pătrașcu) to the Ottoman capital as a hostage to his father's good behaviour. After their father's death both boys were apparently sent to Rhodes at the request of the new Prince Mircea Ciobanul. In 1568 Petru was transferred to Aleppo in what is now Syria and the following year to Konieh in Anatolia, from where he escaped to Constantinople. He then moved on to Wallachia and attempted to regain his father's throne, before fleeing to Brașov. In 1572 he was in Poland, where he enjoyed the support of Zygmund August [1548-72] and his elected successor Henri Valois [1573-75]. He was forced to flee to Vienna when Henry Valois returned to his native France, having incurred the enmity of Stefan Bathory, Prince of Transylvania, who was elected King of Poland in Valois' stead [1578-86]. Between 1575 and 1577 he was canvassing support amongst the German princes and from the Papal Legate, Cardinal Morone. Having achieved nothing in these quarters he moved to Genoa; he was now 33 years old. He apparently intended to join the Christian army in Malta, but was persuaded instead to seek a Papal recommendation to the King of France. The Pope hoped to use him to further the Counter-Reformation in Wallachia and Petru was happy to give any impression which might

further his cause. In January 1579, upon his arrival in France he courted the favour of various influential nobles who sent letters on his behalf to Constantinople. (6)

At the same time, no doubt having heard of England's intention to establish a diplomatic presence in Constantinople, he set about cultivating the English Crown as an additional source of support. He sent an envoy, Francois de St. Bonnet, to London, probably in January 1580, to present his case. St. Bonnet's efforts appear to have awakened the interest of Lord Burghley, the Lord Treasurer and Sir Francis Walsingham, the Secretary of State, although Cercel's statement that he was too busy to attend in person is unlikely to have pleased the Queen. St. Bonnet's mission was also intended to assess England's willingness to support him. (7) There is in existence a Latin document written in Burghley's own hand concerning Cercel's genealogy, probably based on St. Bonnet's exposition. (8) By April a decision had clearly been made to investigate Cercel's intentions and his chances of success with a view to according him some support. Cercel was in contact with Sir Henry Cobham, England's Ambassador in Paris, and was probably under investigation by Captain Jacomo Mannuci, one of Walsingham's spies. Once Cercel had received news from the Sultan that he might safely proceed to Constantinople, Queen Elizabeth offered to write on his behalf to the Sultan. (9) He maintained contact with Cobham throughout 1580 to ensure England's continuing interest, even though he had been informed that no financial support would be forthcoming:

“showing him clearly the sundry causes sufficiently known by

which her hyghness hath ben constreyned to bestow her treasure, and has signified lykwise how her Majesty must uppon the immynent danger compelled to procure of her subjects supply of great summes for to sustayne her extraordinary charges of the Realm." (10)

On some occasion in 1580 Petru Cercel visited England in person, residing in London at the house of an Italian, Bonifaccio, in Fenchurch Street. This visit is most likely to have occurred soon after St. Bonnet's visit to London, since the Queen would undoubtedly have wanted to meet Petru before officially according him her support, and therefore took place before April. He wrote a number of letters to the Queen whilst in London, asking for her replies to be sent to the address in Fenchurch Street (11), probably first to sue for audience and then to petition, unsuccessfully, for financial support.

In September 1580 Petru Cercel was given permission by the Ottoman Sultan to return to Constantinople. He left Paris in February 1581, travelling first to Venice where he was received by the Senate, then Ragusa before arriving in the Ottoman capital where he lodged in the house of the French Ambassador. Despite a continual flow of letters of support emanating from the French Court addressed to the Sultan and his Ministers, Cercel became very pessimistic of his chances of success and considered abandoning his ambitious plans in order to return to France. The French Ambassador, de Germigny, continued to work energetically on his behalf and Petru was persuaded to remain. William Harborne, the English Ambassador, alleged that de Germigny had a particular motive for wanting for wanting Petru to remain under his

protection because the pretender had maintained the entire embassy establishment by borrowing money at interest during his three year stay; after his investiture as Prince of Wallachia Petru showed his gratitude by showering the French Ambassador with gifts. (12)

In November 1582, Cercel took the initiative on his own behalf by forcing an audience with the Sultan to argue his claim to the Wallachian throne, in doing so he attracted the attention of the latter's principal heir who became an enthusiastic supporter and a powerful channel of influence with the Sultan. In June 1583 Petru Cercel was nominated as Prince of Wallachia and presented with the symbols of his rule; he arrived in Wallachia in September of that year. His rule was turbulent and short-lived, like that of many other Wallachian princes. (13) On July 15th 1585 William Harborne reported that Petru Cercel had escaped from Wallachia with money and jewels worth 116,000 ducats, but was apprehended by the Prince of Transylvania who confiscated his treasure but allowed him to escape. In January 1589 he was seen in Venice by one of Lord Burghley's agents; the English Crown maintained some interest in his fortunes until his death which seems to have occurred around 1590. (14)

As the status of the English Embassy in Constantinople increased, the Court of Queen Elizabeth became the focus of interest amongst a number of leading figures in Moldavia. Thus in 1587, as we saw in the Introduction of this thesis, Bartolomeo Brutti offered his services and those of his Master, Prince Petru Șchiopul, to the Queen of England,

whilst at the same time pursuing friendly relations with her Ambassador William Harborne. This was followed in 1588 by Petru Șchiopul's grant of commercial privileges to the English merchants. (15) As noted in the Introduction, Petru Șchiopul and Bartolomeo Brutti hoped to make use of Queen Elizabeth's personal prestige and the influence of her Ambassador in Constantinople to strengthen their respective positions in Moldavia against the ambitions of those who pretended a claim to the Moldavian throne. From the point of view of the English, apart from the commercial advantages thereby gained in Moldavia over their competitors, they could expect the Prince and Brutti in particular to act as friendly agents of the English Crown to complement the presence of their Ambassador in Constantinople.

In 1587, at the same time as Brutti and Petru Șchiopul were conducting their own diplomacy with the English Crown, Queen Elizabeth's Chief Ministers, Lord Burghley and Sir Francis Walsingham, came into contact with a pretender to the Moldavian throne, Ioan Bogdan, who was supposed to have been the son of Prince Ștefanița, another grandson of Ștefan Cel Mare. Ioan, who carried his genealogy with him on his travels, claimed that his throne had been usurped during his minority by Petru Rareș, Ștefan Cel Mare's son. Ioan's brother Ioan-Cel-Cumplit, had ruled Moldavia for a short time before meeting his death in 1574, when he was tied by his limbs to four camels which pulled at him tearing his body apart. Some years after this happened, Ioan Bogdan decided to go to France to seek the support of the King for his petition to

the Ottoman Sultan to be granted the Moldavian throne. Ioan unsuccessfully attempted to obtain letters of recommendation to the French King from the Habsburg Emperor. Pope Gregory XIII was more obliging and Ioan arrived in France with letters addressed to Henry III (Henry Valois who had supported Petru Cercel). Ioan sent his son, whose name is not known, to England to seek further support there and wrote to Sir Francis Walsingham in August 1587. (16) Walsingham appears to have interested himself in Ioan's predicament and received his son with great kindness and courtesy. Queen Elizabeth did not share his enthusiasm, as we shall see.

At the end of 1588, Ioan Bogdan left France with Henri III's backing for his attempt to persuade the Ottoman Sultan to nominate him Prince of Moldavia, he travelled to Venice in the company of Harlay de Sancy, the King's envoy. Burghley and Walsingham's spies in Venice had been instructed to watch him, they sent word of his arrival in the same report that noted the presence in Venice of the deposed Petru Cercel. (17) Ioan's good fortune ran out in Venice: Henri III was murdered and in the confusion caused by the interregnum, de Sancy was unwilling to accompany him further. Bogdan was told to continue the journey to Constantinople on his own and to stay in the French Ambassador's house whilst awaiting de Sancy's coming. The death of his patron left Ioan with no status in Constantinople. The French Ambassador (de Germigny) refused to welcome him, presumably not wishing to be seen supporting a protege of Henri III until he had been confirmed as

Ambassador by the new King; according to the report of the English Ambassador, Edward Barton, de Germigny gave his tacit approval to his servants' ill-treatment of the pretender and their demands for money which he was unable to repay. They were allowed:

“To breake open his chamber dores, his chests and waletts and to take away all he had, even to his beddinge...” (18)

Ioan fled to Edward Barton's house for safety, hoping to use his friendship with Sir Francis Walsingham to gain help to return to Western Europe. Barton agreed to dispatch him as soon as possible to Venice from where he could travel to England, with Barton's recommendation to try his luck again:

“for the obteyning of her Highnes letters to the Grand Signior in his favour.” (19)

Barton warned Walsingham that Bogdan's poverty meant that he had little chance of obtaining the Moldavian throne because of the large sums of money necessary for such an undertaking. Thus warned, Walsingham evidently decided not to give his backing to Ioan Bogdan; any enthusiasm generated by their earlier contacts had been undermined by the cementing of good relations with Petru Șchiopul and Bartolomeo Brutti, which he did not wish to destroy by backing a rival prince. His previous interest in Ioan had probably been awakened because, with Henry III's support, the pretender had had a good chance of ascending the Moldavian throne and Walsingham had wished to 'hedge his bets' so that whether Ioan or Petru had ruled in Moldavia, England could maintain its friendship with the prncipality's rulers. Therefore, although he was

kindly received, Ioan did not obtain any major help for his cause. Nevertheless he managed to cultivate the French Ambassador in London and with his help returned to France in 1591 to try and win the backing of Henri IV. The financial support he sought was not forthcoming from King Henri and so in July of the same year Ioan returned to London. Queen Elizabeth was not anxious to listen to his pleas and merely granted him a safe conduct out of England in August 1591. (20)

Ioan does not appear to have been able to return to Constantinople, instead he was reduced to wandering the princely courts of Europe trying to raise money to support his cause but only being granted sufficient money to continue his humiliating journey to exhibit his genealogy and letters of recommendation. The last record of him is that of his attempt to raise a loan from the banker Octavian Fugger in Augsburg in November 1599. (21)

A comparison of these two careers demonstrates that Ioan Bogdan probably, and Petru Cercel definitely, sought initial support from powerful figures in states neighbouring their principalities, in particular from Poland and Austria, in order to obtain some form of protection and status with which to approach the Sultan. These states were also regarded as sources of practical support such as provision of money and soldiers; they were close to Wallachia and Moldavia, had considerable experience in dealing with the Ottoman Empire and had a potential interest in maintaining clients on the thrones of these principalities. As we saw, Cercel was initially successful in gaining favour in Poland, but when

the balance of power in this area of Eastern Europe shifted in favour of Stefan Bathory, Cercel thought it wise to flee. This illustrates the problems inherent in involving oneself with the major protagonists in a region, where questions of allegiance and enmity came into play. Practical support from such states was, in any case, dependent on the state of their relations with the Ottoman Empire. Stefan Bathory was preoccupied with a campaign against Muscovy; any major interference in the affairs of one of the Sultan's vassal states would sour relations with the Sultan and might provoke retaliation. Bathory was himself, as Prince of Transylvania, a vassal of the Sultan and was therefore obliged to maintain cordial relations with the suzerain power. He was not interested in involving himself unnecessarily with an itinerant prince who could offer him nothing besides a genealogy and a tale of usurped rights. As Prince of Transylvania, Bathory must have developed a cynicism born of experience towards such individuals.

Both pretenders approached the Papacy which apparently accorded little in the way of practical help, but which upheld the idea of a Christian alliance against the Ottoman Empire and hoped to extend the Counter-Reformation to areas where Catholicism was not the majority religion. France was seen as a natural ally in this, thus both men sought and received the Pope's recommendation to the King of France, a useful patron because he maintained a permanent Ambassador in Constantinople. The major factor in Cercel's success was that he enjoyed the unqualified backing of the French King through his

Ambassador in Constantinople.

The election of Henri Valois to the throne of Poland had been intended to establish an outpost of French influence in Eastern Europe which would strengthen France's diplomatic and strategic position against her chief rival in mainland Europe: the Habsburg Empire. This was thwarted when Henri Valois left Poland and returned to France to safeguard his succession to the throne; although he continued to title himself King of Poland, Stefan Bathory was elected to rule in his place. His initial support of Cercel, whilst he was still in Poland, was motivated by a desire to extend French influence into Wallachia which would complement the position of the French Ambassador in Constantinople. His continued support of Cercel and his patronage of Ioan Bogdan was a continuation of this policy. Cercel was given a solid base in Constantinople, the French Ambassador's house, from which to operate; he was furnished with money to help him pursue his claim, and was in a position to forge alliances with the Sultan's ministers and favourites; Ioan Bogdan was to have accorded the same treatment; the loss of Henri's support spelt the death of his ambitions to obtain the Moldavian throne. Neither Cercel nor Bogdan were mere passive instruments of other princes' foreign policy; both men were extremely active in their own causes, seeking protectors and arranging financial support for themselves. It was they who approached foreign powers, making promises in order to gain their help. When sources closer to the principalities were unwilling to help West European support was sought

in order to place the pretender in a position where he could acquire the favour of the Sultan, his Ministers and favourites. These were the people who would be his real masters once he gained the throne.

I shall now turn to England's interests in the affairs of these two men. The patronage of Queen Elizabeth was seen as useful by both Cercel and Ioan Bogdan, but was of secondary importance to that of the King of France. Cercel addressed himself to the Queen via Lord Burghley, the Lord Treasurer, Ioan Bogdan via Sir Francis Walsingham, the Secretary of State: these were men to whom Elizabeth had delegated the conduct of her foreign policy. A summary of St. Bonnet's mission to England has survived. (22) It concentrates on putting forward the "legitimacy" of Cercel's title to the Wallachian throne as guaranteed by treaty, which had been undermined by the vindictive intrigue of the Ottomans; the thrust of the argument which Petru had charged St. Bonnet to assert was that the hereditary right of a Christian prince had been undermined by the infidel. This was probably carefully calculated to appeal to the prejudices of West European monarchs who were sensitive to matters of legitimate title. It outlines the process whereby tribute was imposed on the rulers of Wallachia and Cercel was presented as the rightful heir to a valiant tradition of opposition to Ottoman subjection:

"The Princes of Valaquie in defence of their libertie opposed themselves aghainste the continuance of this exaction and so, cravinge of the aid of other princes, their neighbours and speciallie of the King of Hungarie have manie yeares withstoode this clayme aghainste those Turkish Emperors." (23)

The Queen was reminded that the Moldavian and Wallachian princes

defence of their lands had for a long time prevented Ottoman penetration deep into Europe and that other European rulers behind the front line should be grateful for their efforts.

St. Bonnet argued that Pătrașcu was treacherously murdered in favour of Michael, a servant of Rustem Pasha, Vizier to Suleiman the Magnificent:

“The Emperor [Sultan] alledge the k. [Cercel] yong yeres and other great reason whye it was more conveniente to send a man of more age and of good experiance and therefore resolved that Michel... should be their [i.e. The Wallachians'] governor duringe the minoritie.” (24)

Pătrașcu's son, Petru Cercel, remained as a hostage to ensure Michael's good behaviour; however Wallachian nobles sought, according to Petru's story, to have the young prince restored. Upon hearing this Cercel escaped to Transylvania where he was sheltered by Prince Louis who attempted to restore him to the Wallachian throne. After Louis' death Petru escaped to Poland to the protection of Palatine Laski, who helped him gain the favour of Zygmund August, the King of Poland. Zygmund did not wish to get involved in the affairs of the principality and advised him to look to the princes of Germany for help. When Michael died, Petru was informed that the Sultan had refused to invest Michael's son as prince and anyone else with a hereditary claim to the Wallachian throne; Petru therefore turned to Zygmund August's successor as King of Poland: Henri Valois.

From the Ottoman point of view, military imperatives at this time dictated that hereditary claims to the thrones of the principalities were of

little moment in comparison with the necessity of keeping these frontier buffer zones subservient and orderly. The hereditary principle was set aside in favour of appointment by the Sultan in order to make the ruling prince beholden to those who had placed him there. This was reinforced by the practice of keeping hostages to good behaviour; the presence of pretenders potentially worked in the Ottoman's favour because it reminded the incumbent prince that he could be replaced. The presence of a boy on the throne of either of the principalities presented many potential difficulties because the child would be vulnerable to the influence of relatives, advisers and others whom the Ottomans did not control, unless they were prepared to place their own troops in the principality which would provoke much opposition. The presence of a boy would mean that there was no-one with military experience on the throne to lead the defence of the principalities or to organise the raising of levies in time of war. The support of boyars was no longer the most important factor involved in gaining the Moldavian throne, it was however important for the prince if he were to rule successfully.

Cercel's story as revealed in this document contains certain omissions, notably he neglected to mention the role of the Papacy in obtaining the favour of the King of France, since this is likely to have been disapproved of in England, Queen Elizabeth having been excommunicated in 1578. Nor did Petru mention his elder brother who was a hostage of the Sultan and would have a prior claim to the throne if he were still alive. Burghley was given no reason to doubt that Petru

Cercel was indeed the son of Pătrașcu. Ștefan Pașcu's biography of the pretender, based on the narrative of his servant, Francisco Sivori, (25) points out that he was accepted as genuine in every court he visited and that Sivori, who spent years in Petru's company, did not entertain the possibility that his master was a fraud. Rumours that Cercel was not who he said he was surfaced only after he was elected Prince of Wallachia. William Harborne reported that Petru was said to be one Alexandru, the son of an Orthodox priest:

“of an obscure familie in the morea... [who] coulde so long shaddow his base birth under the princelie lynage of the annycyente Voyvodes of the Wallachia, and through an aspiringe mynde endowed with singular guiftes of knowledge in sondry tongues abuse both Sigismonde and the French Henrie, late King of Poland.”

Alexandru was said to have been a servant of a former prince of Wallachia's adviser who had been forced to look for a new livelihood after he had dissipated the fortune which had come to him after the death of his wealthy wife; he had hit upon the plan to present himself as the true Prince of Wallachia. Harborne reported that this story emanated from those closest to Petru although not Sivori:

“a certain Genovaies long time in service to his predecessors banished and now in chief credit with him.” (26)

William Harborne was not a man to have been easily taken in by malicious gossip and it is likely that he repeated this story of Petru's origins only because it was widely reported and believed. However he may have been unaware of Burghley's interest in the matter and therefore reported the facts as he heard them without further

investigation. It is possible that this story was put about by those who had a grudge against Cercel, perhaps having fallen out of favour with him, or having been passed over in the new prince's affections in favour of Sivori, in an attempt to ruin his reputation in Constantinople and adversely effect his reception in Wallachia. This would explain why these rumours emerged after his investiture. It is also possible that Harborne was predisposed to believe them since, as he repeated frequently, Cercel was a protege of the King of France and his Ambassador in Constantinople and could be expected to forward French interests. There is a note of glee in his correspondence at the idea of the French being taken in by a charlatan. The French Ambassador's successful backing of Petru Cercel seems to have provoked some jealousy in William Harborne. In any case the genuineness of Cercel's claim, or the lack of it, did not prevent his investiture.

Prior to according Cercel his nomination as Prince of Wallachia, the Sultan and his advisers had objected to his claim on the grounds that he was a bastard son of Pătrașcu by one of his many concubines. P.P. Panaitescu has, however, argued that Petru must have been legitimate because his three sons were recognised as kinsmen by the Băleanu family. Furthermore, he states that the *Vornic* Ivașcu Băleanu and the *Ban* Udrea Băleanu must have been Petru's cousins because Voica Băleanu, their aunt, was Pătrașcu's one and only wife. (27) If Petru and his sons were recognised and acknowledged inside Wallachia as legitimate descendants of Patrascu then the rumours reported by

Harborne were probably malicious gossip. Moreover, the Ottomans' questioning of Petru's mother's marital status was merely an excuse to block Cercel's claim, since, as we shall see in the next chapter, it was extremely common for an illegitimate son of a prince to be nominated to the thrones of the principalities. The significant point here is that Petru's acceptance as a kinsman by the Băleanu family, makes it highly unlikely that Petru was an impostor, as his enemies claimed.

Cercel's brief reign was most notable for the greed and corruption of the prince. According to William Harborne he strenuously promoted French interests in South-East Europe at the expense of English ones. When the English Ambassador tried to court Cercel's favour the prince appeared to respond with friendship but was obliged to put French interests first because he needed the continued support of the French Ambassador in Constantinople if he was to remain in power. This resulted in what Harborne regarded as treachery: he accused the prince of working maliciously against the interests of English merchants. Harborne did not report what Petru was supposed to have done but he asserted that:

“[Cercel's]... services our contraries have used to the uttermost of our prejudice”

The phrase “our contraries” probably refers to France and Harborne was probably referring to the treatment of English merchants in Wallachia; however, another explanation of this phrase is that Cercel had contacts with other rivals of England such as Venice and the Habsburgs who were anxious to prevent an Anglo-Ottoman alliance against Spain: princes in

Cercel's position could not afford to be exclusive in their associations.

Harborne's verdict upon Cercel contains a certain grudging admiration:

"A commendable worldly wit, refined by experience of continual exercise, notwithstanding greatly spotted with vicious actions of his life... From which Janus two-faced sectaries, God deliver us..." (28)

People who struggle against great odds to win power often develop strengths which others abhor; Petru Cercel had shown political skill and intelligence in his search for patrons; he was knowledgeable about the current state of Sultan's household and government and was able to instruct Queen Elizabeth to whom she should write:

"... unto the Mother of the Great Turke by whom he is much governed as also to his Firste Bassa Ahmato and to the Admiral of the sea Lucialli, by whom all this Prince's affairs must be managed." (29)

Cercel had also ensured that he presented himself to the consideration of those in the Queen's government who were most influential in foreign affairs, that is Burghley and Walsingham, and in doing so he had deliberately offered himself as an instrument of the Queen's affairs abroad. This introduced Burghley and Walsingham to the idea of pursuing relations with potentially important individuals such as Cercel and Ioan Bogdan to complement the activities of the embassy in Constantinople.

Two letters affirm the favourable reception in England of Ioan Bogdan's son when on a mission to obtain Queen Elizabeth's patronage for his father:

"he affirmeth his sonne to have been formerlye favourablie entertayned by your Honnour... Walsingham]." (30)

In a letter of 1587 from Ioan Bogdan to Sir Francis Walsingham, the former referred to the great benefits already bestowed upon him at Walsingham's intercession and "by his means", he also mentioned previous correspondence and referred to the Secretary of State as a friend. Walsingham monitored Ioan Bogdan's progress with a view to making use of him in the future. If Bogdan been placed on the Moldavian throne he would have tried to make use of his friendship with the Queen of England through the English Ambassador, his own ambassadors and by using his son as an intermediary. Initially Ioan Bogdan's chances of success were probably similar to those of Petru Cercel; circumstances changed as we have seen, and Edward Barton advised Walsingham not to support Ioan Bogdan unless he could persuade Queen Elizabeth to make a large financial commitment to the pretenders cause.

In his previous correspondence Barton had remarked upon the poor status of pretenders to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia and their vulnerability to the deception of unscrupulous Ottoman officials as well as to the vengeance of their rivals:

"The three Grekish gentlemen I formerly certified your Honnour to have affected the government of Wallachia, Bogdania and Moldavia had the same success I had forfeared: the one dieng in the waie, being poyzoned by his friends to shunne the discredit might come to his parents by his ignominious death: the second in Bogdania boored through the nose with a hot iron, a part of his eares cutt off and kepte in chaynes, the thirde handled after the same sorte, but put to certaine taylors to learne to sewe..." (31)

It is not clear why Barton referred to Bogdania and Moldavia as if they were separate principedomes, when we saw in Chapter I that the term

Bogdania was usually used to refer to the Principality of Moldavia as a whole, although it was sometimes used to refer to some portion of what later came to be called Bessarabia, which was part of the principality of Moldavia. This suggests in 1589, the time of Barton's writing, he was somewhat ignorant of the principality's affairs.

Burghley and Walsingham maintained their interest in the principalities but no longer wished to become involved in the affairs of pretenders to their thrones. Giacomo Manucci, Walsingham's spy, visited Moldavia and Wallachia in 1585, the year of Cercel's overthrow, on his way home to England from Constantinople, having been granted a safe conduct and letters of introduction by the Sultan. The two ministers also followed Edward Barton's activities on behalf of Aron and Mihai Viteazul. (32) There were possible commercial advantages to be accrued from establishing friendly relations with rulers in the area but their chief motivation was a more general desire to extend England's influence in Europe. The late sixteenth century was a period in which the Crowns of Western Europe were extending their influence eastwards; the English Crown was jockeying for position with other states, both politically and commercially. In attempting to do this rulers maintained agents, both official and unofficial, to supply information, assist in negotiations or merely facilitate good relations with the most influential powers; they could also be expected to give assistance to the ruler's subjects travelling abroad on business. Bogdan and Cercel were intended by the French to act in this capacity; Burghley and Walsingham were persuaded

by the idea of assisting these two men to prevent the French from excluding English influence from the principalities altogether.

England's major rival in Europe was Spain. The two pretenders were not in a position to support the English against Spain and it was not for this purpose that Burghley and Walsingham were interested in them. However, they were in a position to be of some use in confounding the interests of the Austrian branch of the Habsburg dynasty on its eastern borders:

“Wherefore, if occasion serve, no opportunitie is to be omitted to compound all discontents with neighbours abroad, so as the same may be with the honour of God and benefitt of the Realme and to procure as much friendshipp as may beilest by sufferinge thinges to runne on careleslie at randome, our enemies prevent us of the meanes and they cannot be recovered when we would wish it.” (33)

As we already know Ioan Bogdan promised to send ambassadors to England once he ascended the Moldavian throne. It is unlikely that Cercel and Bogdan were expected to act as spies or agents; they might however be useful in less specific ways: friends of England, perhaps providing the English Ambassador with information on the activities of Poland, Austria and the Ottoman Empire, and forwarding English diplomacy in Eastern Europe by showing favour towards the English Ambassador's agents who passed through Moldavia and Wallachia. William Harborne concurred with such a policy; therefore he pursued good relations with Bartolomeo Brutti and Petru Șchiopul. Edward Barton also tried to cultivate favourable relations with the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia and enjoyed friendly relations with Bartolomeo Brutti.

However, both Harborne and Barton were cautious about the extent of their involvement in the affairs of the Sultan's vassals because the success of their embassies was dependent upon their host's goodwill and favour.

Bartolomeo Brutti did not confine his ambitions to maintaining his influence in Moldavia. As we have seen he was instrumental in the accordance of commercial privileges in Moldavia to English merchants in order to attract the attention of the Queen of England and offer her his services; he was in good odour with the King of Poland, Zygmund III Vasa [1587-1632] and used his service of Poland's interests to attract the attention of Queen Elizabeth once again. In 1590 it was reported that Brutti might travel to England on behalf of King Sigismund and that, whilst serving his Master, would:

“behave himself verie wisely, both in word and deed maynteyning the honour and credit of her Majesty.”

A few months after this report, Brutti wrote from Warsaw to Queen Elizabeth, reaffirming his readiness to serve her; she replied to thank him for his services but did not, as Brutti may have hoped, suggest that he serve her further in any capacity. (34) Brutti wrote as Chief Minister to the Prince of Moldavia to express his gratitude at the favour shown him by Edward Barton particularly with regard to his successful negotiations to maintain the peace between Poland and the Ottoman Empire. One may surmise that Brutti was trying to draw the Queen's attention to England's shared interest in keeping the peace between these two states. The Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia feared war because they would be

obliged to become involved and furthermore any occupation of their princedoms by Ottoman forces might result in them being taken under direct rule.

As we saw in Chapter II, Queen Elizabeth also wished to prevent the Sultan going to war against Poland. It is certain that Brutti was used as an intermediary with the King of Poland in the negotiations to maintain the peace. Friendship with men such as Brutti, Petru Șchiopul and later Prince Aron made it possible for Barton's agents to travel safely via Moldavia to Poland, where they could conduct the Ambassador's business and take ship in the Baltic to England in greater safety than was possible in the Mediterranean, where attacks on merchant shipping were a major hazard. For a short period, until war broke out between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburgs, the route home to England via Moldavia and Poland became a preferred route home for the ambassador's staff and for private business men with small amounts of baggage to return to England in safety. Thomas Wilcox, Barton's agent, dealt on the ambassador's behalf with both Bartolomeo Brutti and Prince Aron in just this way, whilst travelling to England on his Master's business; it was into his care that Brutti entrusted his letter to Queen Elizabeth.

Queen Elizabeth was content to take up offers of service and allow her ambassadors to pursue good relations with the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia only to the extent that she was not required to commit herself to any financial expenditure. She was prepared to give letters of

recommendation to Petru Cercel and Ioan Bogdan because she expected that if they were successful their gratitude to her might be of use to her subjects or her embassy in the future. She expected them to arrange the financial backing for their campaigns from other sources, just as she expected the Levant Company to pay for her Ambassador in Constantinople although she intended to use him to conduct her own diplomacy. She paid for gifts for the Sultan and the Queen Mother because this was standard protocol and she expected results in the form of Ottoman co-operation against Spain. Expenditure upon schemes to support the election of the Sultan's vassal princes, of whose usefulness to her foreign policy she had yet to be convinced, was of little interest to her.

Edward Barton's involvement in the elections of Aron to the throne of Moldavia and Mihai Viteazul to throne of Wallachia was not directed from London. Barton enjoyed the favour of both the Sultan's who ruled during his embassy; as we saw in Chapter III, he also had the respect and liking of the *Mufti* Mehemed Bostanzade and the Viziers Ferhad Pasha and Sinan Pasha; he was also friendly with Cigalla, the *Kapudan* of the Ottoman Navy and Sadeddin the "Hoggie" [*Khoja Efendi sa'd al Din*], Imperial tutor and Ottoman historian, as well as being a friend and patron of Meletius Pigas, at that time Patriarch of Alexandria and later Patriarch of Constantinople. Barton's position of influence in Constantinople made him ideally placed to be approached by pretenders. Nevertheless out of the numbers of pretenders said to haunt

the courts of Europe, Barton only lent his support to two, both of whom already had powerful backing. Barton had neither reason nor inclination to lend his weight to causes which did not already have a good chance of succeeding, since to do so would not have enhanced his reputation. On the other hand were he to be instrumental in the investiture of a prince of either Moldavia or Wallachia, his prestige in Constantinople would increase and he would place himself and his embassy in a position whereby he could be even more useful to the Sultan as a man of influence with one of his vassals, thereby serving to increase his favour with Sultan Murat III. Barton's enthusiasm for the causes of pretenders should not be over-estimated and he clearly attempted to avoid becoming financially involved with any of them. In the cases of both Aron and Mihai Viteazul he was approached by their supporters who persuaded him to lend his assistance to their causes and the desired result were achieved swiftly. He was never in a position where he had to pursue the matter with the persistence of De Germigny in the case of Petru Cercel, or of Sir Thomas Glover, in the case of Ștefan Bogdan.

As we know, Barton and Meletius Pigas considered that the Protestant and Orthodox churches shared a common cause against Roman Catholic proselytising. Both Barton and William Harborne had been concerned at the successes of the Counter-Reformation in Moldavia. Under the patronage of Bartolomeo Brutti, Jesuits had been invited into Moldavia in 1588 after their expulsion from Transylvania. Brutti had allowed the Jesuits a free hand to convert Petru Șchiopul's

subjects, particularly in those areas with Hungarian and Saxon majorities. The so-called “Hussites”, who were in fact followers of several Protestant churches, had been expelled from their churches and their liberty to practise their own religion was curtailed. Petru, probably under Brutti’s influence, ordered his Catholic subjects to obey the Jesuits and encouraged Catholic propaganda from Poland. Pigas had lent himself to the campaign to convince Barton to support Aron as an anti-Jesuit candidate. Aron promised Barton that he would restore the “Hussites” to their churches and liberties when he became prince.

Barton successfully petitioned the Ottoman *Divan* to invest Aron as Prince of Moldavia, only to find that the Greek merchants backing him could not furnish the money they had promised. The English Ambassador now found himself in a difficult position; gratuities were expected by those who had engineered the choice of Aron; Barton would be made to look ridiculous if, after all that had been done, Aron could not be invested because those who had appointed him were not paid the money they had been led to expect. If this were to happen the next time Barton offered a gift or bribe he would not be trusted and his favour with people of influence close to the Sultan would be diminished. Therefore, when other merchants interested in backing Aron came forward with offers of finance, Barton was persuaded to stand surety and also to invest some of his own money; other Englishmen, including Thomas Wilcox and Richard Babington, also raised money so that the sums required to purchase Aron’s principedom could be reached. Aron purchased a

diamond ring for the Sultan and an emerald girdle for the Sultana Isachi, valued at 25,000 Crowns, from one Charles Elman, with Barton standing surety, a sum which was never repaid. Barton thus became much more involved in the pretender's affairs than he had originally intended. (35)

Aron ascended the throne already burdened with debts. Not only was he required to reimburse his creditors, he was also expected to honour the debts of his predecessor. Furthermore, continued Ottoman support had to be bought. None of this made his task of maintaining himself on the Moldavian throne any easier. No doubt Aron, like many of his predecessors and those who occupied the throne after him, made provisions for his inevitable overthrow: no prince of Moldavia, cognizant of the fact that the average reign in that principality lasted less than ten years, could afford to be overthrown only to find himself penniless. Meanwhile, in order not to become responsible for Aron's debts, Edward Barton had to support his protégé in Constantinople to ensure that he remained on the throne. Aron's costly present to the Sultan was paid for by Barton; in Moldavia extra taxes were levied which were said to have demanded an ox from every family in the land. (36) Aron managed to alienate so many of his boyars that those of their number who fled Moldavia to take up residence in Constantinople secured his overthrow. He was replaced in June 1592 by Alexander the Bad (Cel Rău).

Aron's overthrow was a blow to Barton's standing in Constantinople which had reached new heights when his protege was invested; it also left him exposed financially since he had stood as Aron's

surety. (37) It was therefore imperative that the prince was restored. Barton canvassed the support of the commanding officers of the Janissary Corps and that of the Prince of Transylvania, Sigismund Bathory. The good relations built up between Barton and Bathory was to result in the latter approaching Barton to support his own candidate to the throne of Wallachia, that is Mihai Viteazul. The English Ambassador's gratitude for Bathory's intervention was called upon and Barton provided a *quid pro quo* by giving his support to Mihai. Aron was restored to the Moldavian throne in October 1592 through the support of Ottoman and Janissary forces. Barton was determined to ensure that Aron now fulfilled the promises made before his first investiture. Not only had he failed to pay his debts, he had also neglected to restore the liberties of the "Hussites". Thomas Wilcox and Richard Babington accompanied Aron to Iasi as Barton's representatives in order to put pressure on him to carry out his obligations to his protectors. Wilcox managed to extract a promise:

"that everyone of the credytors accordinge to the quantitie of thear debts receive part of their payments dewringe my abroad in Bugdania" (38)

Wilcox was still attempting to recover his and his Master's money when Aron was deposed for the second time in May 1595. He owed Edward Barton more than 30,000 pounds. He was much more successful in his second task to ensure that Aron kept a promise to reinstate the "Hussites":

"Aron present Prince of Bugdania, her Majesty's servant upon motion made by Barton in her Majesties name hath restored the

libertye of custoumes to the Hussites and redilivered their churches to them... as formerly thae they had there..." (39)

Barton was convinced that he was acting in England's interests and did not consider that he was obliged to await official approval from London before proceeding:

"this maie be compassed without suspition of her majesties knowlage or practise therof, for that the Ambassador needeth no other mediator then himself..." (40)

Barton's diplomatic activities, undertaken on his own initiative, were presented as evidence by his enemies that he exceeded his authority as ambassador. His friendships with high-ranking Ottoman officials and the interest and admiration with which he studied oriental customs and religion were regarded with suspicion and in Constantinople and in London, a city he had not visited since the English Embassy was first established. Furthermore, his concentration on affairs of state and information gathering caused him to employ people skilled in these matters, whose outside associations lead to accusations that they were involved in activities hostile to the Ottoman Empire.

It was a frequent complaint of the English mercantile community in the Levant, under Barton and his successors, that time spent in conducting business unconnected with their commercial interests was neglectful of those interests. After his death Barton was held up to his successors as an ideal ambassador in his devotion to the interests of English merchants; he was not universally regarded so during his own embassy. Barton found himself open to attack from those who wished to

destroy his favour with the Queen and the Lord Treasurer. Charges were brought against Barton by three merchants accusing him of unduly increasing embassy expenses by employing agents such as Wilcox and several foreigners including Paolo Mariani, who was alleged to have confiscated the property of English Merchants. Paolo Mariani was the prime mover behind Aron's campaign. Mariani had substantial contact with the Levantine business world and acted as intermediary between Barton and Aron's brokers. Aron had the backing of a consortium of Levantine merchants who had promised to furnish the money necessary to purchase the support of influential figures close to Sultan Murat. Mariani was a highly influential man in Constantinople who acted as the joint Anglo-French Consul in Cairo for some years and was now employed as an agent and spy by the English Embassy where he enjoyed immense influence over Edward Barton. John Sanderson, who had been appointed his vice-consul in 1585, described him, with his customary lack of generosity, thus:

“Paolo his witt was a maker of Patriarcks and Princes, a setter up and puller down of them and ambassiators, a poysoner and filthy liver, a wars and peace maker, a garboyler... [i.e. a maker of tumults].”

Barton owed much of his success as patron to the efforts of Mariani, who acted as “fixer” behind the scenes for the ambassador. Sanderson remarked upon Mariani's great influence with Edward Barton, referring to him as the Ambassador's counsellor and adviser. Mariani, Aron and Meletius Pigas, now Patriarch of Constantinople, approached Barton for his support in the campaign to secure the election of Aron to

the Moldavian throne. One may surmise that it was Paolo Mariani who persuaded Barton that Aron might be useful to English interests, apparently presenting the pretender to him as a man:

“better effected in religion then the rest and that was supposed to be less Spanishe.” (41)

The three merchants, Gabriel Whettenhall, Thomas Belk and Thomas Butterworth, alleged that Barton was totally enthralled by Mariani and was unable to control his activities or those of other members of his household. Barton’s supporters countered these aspersions upon his good name with the explanation that Mariani was employed because he was a man of great judgment and experienced in dealing with the Ottomans. His usefulness to the embassy in providing intelligence and facilitating embassy business had been of great service to the English nation. Furthermore Barton trusted his loyalty and did not think that he was a Spanish agent as his enemies alleged.

Barton’s enemies accused Gabriel, the servant of his agent, Thomas Wilcox, of putting the embassy in great peril by forging coinage which had subsequently been used by Barton to pay his expenses. Barton defended himself and Wilcox by pointing out his endeavours to protect English trade and in the service of the Queen to procure an Ottoman Armada against the Spanish fleet. He had also done much to assist the King of France, Henri IV, by procuring the Sultan’s recognition of the new King’s Ambassador and the detention of the ambassador’s predecessor who had been sympathetic to the Holy League. The expense of employing Wilcox was more than justified by his services in

procuring the Ottoman peace with Poland in 1590, assisting the King of France and obtaining the expulsion of the Spanish agent in Constantinople and imprisonment of his spies. Furthermore Wilcox was in great favour at the Polish Court and had also been honoured by her Majesty the Queen.

Barton's supporters alleged that Belk, Butterworth and Whettenhall had made these accusations against Wilcox out of jealousy because they were angry that Barton chose to employ foreigners at his embassy and ignore them. Barton alleged that they lacked judgment and discretion and were in any case of little use to him because they did not have the requisite language skills. They were also, he said, lazy and unco-operative they had refused to travel to Poland to inform the King of the peace which Barton had negotiated with the Ottomans. Wilcox went to Poland in their place. Being unable to attack Wilcox directly because of his favour with the King of Poland and Queen Elizabeth, the three merchants decided, Barton said, to attack him through his servant Gabriel with the accusation of "stamping false coin".

The three merchants assisted a bitter enemy of Barton, Don Solomon, the Duke of Mylilene (also known as Alvaro Mendes, a prominent Portuguese Jew), carrying letters from him to the Queen's physician, Dr. Lopez. These letters alleged that Barton had been recruited as a Spanish agent by Mariani. Don Solomon also spread word in Constantinople that through his friendship with Dr. Lopez he had procured Barton's dismissal from the embassy. Don Solomon intended to

discredit Barton through his associates; the English Ambassador was labelled a fool who had been duped by Aron's supporters, amongst whom were David Passi and Moshe Benevisti. Both Passi and Benevisti seem to have been on the embassy payroll; Don Solomon alleged that they were both agents of the King of Spain. The timing of this attack on Barton suggests that it was part of a campaign to prevent Aron's reinstatement in Moldavia by discrediting his patron. (42)

On March 22 1592, Lord Burghley wrote to Don Solomon on Queen Elizabeth's instructions to assure him of her high regard and inform him that it was not through her desire that Barton employed and protected Mariani and David Passi, alleged enemies of the Ottoman Empire, and allowed them to act against him. These allegations may have damaged Barton's reputation in Constantinople and they were taken sufficiently seriously in England for Barton to dispatch Wilcox to England on a mission to explain the reasons for his involvement with Aron and Mariani. The Fugger bankers in Germany received news of the extent of the Queen of England's disapproval of her Ambassador's involvement in affairs unsanctioned by her:

"Letters came to the Queen of England's agent here [i.e. in Constantinople] in which she bitterly reproaches him for neglecting her affairs and those of her merchants with the Porte, and working for his own advantage. Thus he tried to install the Wiowodes of Moldavia and Transylvania [presumably Wallachia was meant here here] as Patriarchs exactly as though she was unable to pay him decently for the services he performed and provide him with a livelihood." (43)

Revelations about Barton's embassy's activities did not disappear.

In 1594 the French Ambassador alleged that Mariani was a Spanish agent. At first the charges were ignored, but in 1595 he produced enough evidence that he was passing information about Turkish forces to Spain to have Mariani hanged. (44) Another of Aron's supporters was a Monsieur de Planca, whom John Sanderson later came to suspect Mariani of having murdered.

Some of the charges against Barton were precipitated by his involvement with Aron. It is possible, viewed in the context of Aron's subsequent behaviour, that the pretender was selected a protégé by Mariani and other alleged Spanish agents because he could be persuaded to rebel against the Sultan if war broke out between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. If Barton had remained aloof from the pretender's affairs as he had intended, he could have prevented himself becoming closely identified with Mariani's less than scrupulous associates. However, Barton was not greatly discouraged by the criticisms made of his conduct; he was confident of his abilities as a diplomat and succeeded in riding the storm. As we know, in 1596 he once again incurred criticism in England by accompanying the Sultan to war against the Habsburgs; he did so because he knew that his negotiating skills could be of use in negotiations between the opposing sides and the goodwill and respect of the Sultan, earned by his endeavours, could only make his other duties as ambassador easier.

To return to Aron: Barton seems to have been deceived by Mariani as to the pretender's usefulness to his own plans. Barton's set out his

own conception of the drift of events in Eastern Europe:

“The Austrians daily practise to make breach of the peace concluded betwixt the Pole and the Grand Seignieur, for that the Emperour of Germany seeketh all meanes possible to place his younger brother King of Poland, which would be much preiudiciall to her Majesties’ well-wishers.” (45)

Barton’s principal policy objective was to oppose Habsburg influence in the principalities and Poland. England currently enjoyed good relations with Poland and Barton had established himself in the favour of Jan Zamoyski, the anti-Habsburg Chancellor of Poland, who had successfully opposed the election of a Habsburg candidate to the Polish throne on three occasions. Barton considered that a Habsburg King of Poland would not favour diplomatic or trade relations between England and Poland; he was also aware that if the Ottoman Empire went to war with Poland, the Habsburg Empire would inevitably involve itself in any conflict. Two possible outcomes of this eventuality were equally undesirable: Moldavia and Wallachia might be annexed either by the Ottomans or the Habsburgs, thereby destroying the buffer zones, made up by these two principalities and Transylvania, which existed between them; if this happened, relations between the two power blocks would remain constantly unstable.

Barton probably hoped to use his influence with Aron as a means to maintain peace between Poland and the Ottomans in the same way as he had made use of his good relations with Bartolomeo Brutti. Barton probably also intended to procure the aid of Moldavia and Wallachia and to oppose the election of an Austrian candidate to the Polish throne.

Barton outlined his concerns and asked the Queen for further instructions and for her authority to proceed in this way. If Zamoyski or the Prince of Transylvania asked him to win the assistance of Aron or Mihai Viteazul against the Habsburgs he would not have time to send to England for advice or wait for an answer. (46) It was for this reason that Barton built up good relations with Sigismund Bathory, the Prince of Transylvania, and the two men co-operated with each other in support of Aron and Mihai Viteazul. With the latter he was careful to limit his involvement and thus avoid the mistake he had made when he became financially involved with Aron. Barton merely added his recommendation to that of Sinan Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and Mihai's relatives Iancu and Andronicus Cantacuzine. Mihai acknowledged himself indebted to Barton through his entertainment of Edward Bushell and William Aldridge, who travelled through Wallachia in April 1594. (47)

If Barton had expected to use either prince as a tool of his own policies, he was greatly mistaken. It should be noted that out of the many pretenders who claimed the thrones of the principalities only the most courageous, cunning and persistent were ever likely to realise their claims. Once the princes mounted the thrones they knew that their chances of remaining in place for any length of time were small unless they were prepared to do all in their power to protect their positions. Both Aron and Mihai conceived that once war broke out between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, their best chance of breaking away from Ottoman suzerainty lay in aligning themselves with the Habsburg

Emperor. Much has been written about Mihai's revolt against Ottoman rule and the extent to which this revolt was either planned or opportunistic. Whatever the truth is, Edward Barton was not involved. Indeed in 1597 he tried to reconcile Sigismund Bathory of Transylvania and the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Sultan after all three had aligned themselves with the Habsburg Emperor.

One may conclude that, whatever Edward Barton's ambitions, the English Crown did not conceive of the English Embassy's role in Constantinople as being that of a major power-broker. However, the English Crown and its representatives became involved in European affairs in order to increase English influence throughout Europe to rival that of Spain, France and Austria. Barton, on the other hand, successfully established himself as an intermediary and mediator between the great powers in Eastern Europe and could therefore make informed judgments about where England's interests lay. This policy was essentially an opportunist policy, since in all cases outlined in this chapter, the English Crown and the English Embassy were responding to overtures made to them because they were in a position to offer help, initially because of Queen Elizabeth's reputation in Europe and later because of the presence of the English Embassy in Constantinople and its increasing importance in the region. France had been in the same position in previous decades.

Thus England set up precedents of involvement in one of the more distasteful aspects of Balkan politics and in the affairs of a number of

highly unscrupulous individuals, which culminated in the patronage of Ștefan Bogdan. It would not be unfair to state that Petru Cercel and Aron's main motivation for ascending the thrones of their respective principalities was that in doing so they were in effect purchasing the highly lucrative right to levy taxes. Barton expressed his disillusionment with Aron:

“the present most ungrateful Prince of Bugdania who, having been twice preferred by my meanes, and once saved from the gallows, and owing me sixty thousand duckets, not onely hithertoe hath not paid me one penny, but seeketh to fly into Hungary when he should be deposed.” (48)

The example of Barton's involvement with Aron contained lessons for his successors which were appreciated by both Henry Lello and Sir Thomas Glover when they were presented with letters of recommendation on behalf of Ștefan Bogdan. As we shall see, neither man welcomed the task of making representations on behalf of a pretender whose chances of success were not great and who, even if he did succeed in persuading the Sultan to invest him as prince, would remain a burden upon the embassy's resources for at least as long as he remained on the throne.

CHAPTER V: IANCU SASUL, HIS SON BOGDAN AND IEREMIE MOVILA: CONCERNING THE INSTALLATION OF PRINCES ON THE MOLDAVIAN THRONE IN THE LAST QUARTER OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

Bogdan Sasul, who later became known as Ștefan Bogdan, laid claim to the throne of Moldavia as a direct descendent of three former rulers of the principality: as great-grandson of Ștefan Cel Mare; grandson of Petru Rareș and son of Iancu Sasul (the Saxon). Iancu's own career is relevant to this chapter because he acquired the Moldavian throne, which he ruled between 1579 and 1582, using methods similar to those later employed by Petru Cercel and Aron *Vodă*. In effect the last decades of the sixteenth century saw the emergence of a standard route to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Sultan's appointment. In some respects Mihai Viteazul's (Michael the Brave) efforts to unite the principalities under his own rule by military force and Ieremie Movilă's installation by the force of Polish arms were attempts to break Moldavia and Wallachia out of this pattern.

In the period 1545-1593 the rulers of both principalities changed with great regularity. In Moldavia nine princes occupied the throne in eleven reigns; in Wallachia there were eight princes and ten reigns. No prince managed to maintain his rule longer than nine years, the more usual length of reign in Moldavia was between two and five years, in Wallachia between four and six years. The large sums of money involved

in securing a prince's appointment to the throne encouraged the Sultans to change the princes frequently; this meant that the position of the reigning prince was extremely insecure and bound to the continuing favour of the Sultan and those closest to him. This situation also made it difficult for other states to build up and maintain influence with the reigning prince which could threaten the Ottoman hegemony.

Iancu Sasul was the bastard son of Petru Rareș by a Saxon woman from Brașov. Rareș, was himself illegitimate, the son of Ștefan Cel Mare by Maria Rareș. (1) Iancu appears to have been brought up as a German, indeed Saxon chroniclers claimed that he was truly the son of a leathercutter and harness-maker from Brasov, called either Georg Weiss or Meissen Hannes, by a Romanian woman. After Iancu's investiture, an observer reported to the Habsburg Emperor:

"I have my doubts about all this... [Iancu's claim to the throne] and consider Ioan [Iancu] really to be a German from Transylvania for he speaks German better than any other language." (2)

His religion was Lutheran and whilst on the Moldavian throne he maintained contacts with Transylvanian Germans, including one Colonel Rueber with whom he made preparations to facilitate flight should the Sultan Murat III attempt to overthrow him; Reuber helped him remove a fortune from the Moldavian treasury to the fortress of Kesmark in the county of Zips in Hungary. Iancu also built up diplomatic contacts with the Pope and the Habsburg Emperor in the hope that they might support him against those who tried to secure his removal. Under the influence of his Chief Minister, Bartolomeo Brutti, a major aspect of Iancu's policy was to

support the spread of Roman Catholicism in Moldavia to the detriment of the Orthodox Church hoping thereby to win the Pope's favour. Both the Ottoman *Divan* and the anti-Habsburg party in Poland-Lithuania were suspicious of Iancu's German contacts, for these people were seen to take advantage of Iancu's favour and attempt to establish themselves in positions in Moldavia from which they would be difficult to dislodge. The gains made in Moldavia by the Catholic Church were continued during the second reign of Petru Șchiopul [1582-91] under the auspices of Bartolomeo Brutti who maintained a correspondence with a number of prominent Roman Catholics and Papal Emissaries, such as the Archbishop of Lwow, Jan Dimitri Solikowski, and the Papal Envoy in Poland, Annibale di Capua. (3)

Despite his claimed descent from the Moldavian princely dynasty, Iancu's lack of close identification with the principality, emphasised by a native language different to that spoken by his subjects, did not inspire loyalty amongst the boyars with whose co-operation he had to rule. Questions of lineage were important to the Moldavian political community and deep-seated discontents surfaced in 1595 with the installation of Ieremie Movilă, when the Polish Chancellor Jan Zamoyski voiced what must have been current concerns amongst Moldavian boyars in a carefully argued justification:

"I have not installed for you as prince some imaginary offspring of Moldavian voievods, like many who ere now aspired to the succession; nor any other of Wallachian family, but a nobleman of Moldavian lineage [Ieremie Movilă]..." (4)

Iancu's son Bogdan changed his name to Ștefan Bogdan perhaps

to distance himself from his Saxon father and closely identify himself with his Moldavian lineage by taking the surname Bogdan, the name of the *Voivode* who, around 1363, revolted against his Hungarian overlord to establish a state around the river Moldova which was to form the basis of the Moldavian principality. (5)

Iancu had apparently consented to be excluded from the Moldavian succession, perhaps under pressure from supporters of the Lapușneanu family which wished to restrict the succession to its own branch of Ștefan Cel Mare's descendants (and which recognised him as a potential rival). (6) Any such agreements aimed at building up the power of one family in Moldavia were not considered by the Ottomans to be binding; Iancu showed his political astuteness by repairing to Constantinople to try and obtain the throne through the direct intervention from the Sultan, ignoring his previous agreement. Several interesting points arise from this: firstly, illegitimate birth did not exclude a male descendent from the princely line from the succession, nor was there any right of primogeniture. By custom a prince was required to be "bone of princely bone" which appears to have meant that he had to be descended directly through the male line, and could not claim descent through a woman. In the sixteenth century the Ottomans adhered to this custom. Between the reign of Ștefan Cel Mare [1457-1504] and the installation of Ieremie Movilă in 1595, there was in fact a preponderance of illegitimately born princes succeeding to the throne. Moldavian princes, as we know, rarely managed to maintain their rule for long,

consequently the chances of a legitimate son of an age to rule succeeding his father peacefully after the latter's death were reduced, since princes rarely died of natural causes whilst still on the throne. Once a prince was overthrown, his family would retreat into exile and his sons would join the ranks of pretenders to the throne. This pattern can be seen in the case of both of Iancu's sons, Alexandru and Bogdan.

Iancu's renunciation of his rights to the succession, followed by his journey to Constantinople, shows that arrangements made without the agreement of the suzerain power were of little account. The power-brokers were in Constantinople, not Moldavia; the Ottoman capital was therefore the place for an aspiring prince to argue his claim. Iancu was exiled to Rhodes probably at the instance of the incumbent Prince of Moldavia, (either Bogdan Lapuşneanu or Ioan-Cel-Cumplit) in order to prevent him becoming a focus of intrigue conducted by the prince's enemies. Whilst in Rhodes Iancu married Maria Paleologus, who will be discussed briefly later. In 1574 Iancu was promised the Wallachian throne instead of Alexandru Mircea [1567-77]; the latter, however, managed to maintain his rule and successfully persuaded the Ottomans that Iancu was a trouble-maker and should be sent once again into exile, this time to Aleppo. Wallachian boyars rebelling against Alexandru pressed the Sultan to appoint Iancu as their new prince; despite the fact that Wallachia was the richer of the two principalities Iancu preferred to occupy his father's former throne. Iancu showed himself in later life to be a greedy and unscrupulous man, apparently this did not prevent him

entertaining a keen regard for his own Moldavian ancestry, despite his later tendency to regard the principality merely as a limitless source of income.

In 1579 Iancu made the acquaintance of Bartolomeo Brutti, a former agent of Philip II of Spain, exiled in Rhodes at the instance of Giovanni Marigliano, Philip II's Envoy to the Sultan. Brutti had worked for Marigliano in 1577, during negotiations for a peace treaty between Spain and the Ottoman Empire, but had incurred his bitter enmity. Having lost his powerful Spanish protectors, Brutti cultivated the patronage of Iancu, who now enjoyed the favour of the *Sanjac-Bey* of Magnesia, later to become Sultan Mehemet III. Brutti had been saved from the galleys by the intervention of Koja Sinan, known to the foreign ambassadors as Sinan Pasha, who was to become Grand Vizier in 1580. Brutti determined to build up on the interest this Vizier had shown in him, by securing his support for Iancu's claim to the Moldavian throne and bribed Sinan's servant, Joseph Nasi, to obtain his support and through Nasi obtained a channel of influence close to the Sultan. Sokullu Mehemed, the current Grand Vizier, was Sultan Murad's brother-in-law; his support seems to have been obtained through Sinan's intervention and soon afterwards the Sultan was persuaded to nominate Iancu as Prince of Moldavia. The new prince showed his gratitude to Bartolomeo Brutti by bringing him to Iasi, the Moldavian capital, as his Chief Minister.

The Brutti family, Albanians from the Istrian peninsula, had once held the Lordship of Durazzo, eventually ceding it to Venice. Various

members of the family had acted as envoys, Dragomans and spies on behalf of Venice and Spain. Anti-Ottoman espionage conducted by Spain and Venice had intensified after the Ottomans' naval defeat at the battle of Lepanto when the idea of a Christian crusade against the Ottomans in the Mediterranean received support from many quarters, particularly amongst the Roman Catholic powers. A large network of spies seems to have been built up in Ottoman territory with established links to Rome, Madrid and Venice. In 1575, whilst serving his Dragoman's apprenticeship, Bartolomeo Brutti obtained the release of Christian prisoners of the Ottomans; he appears to have been recruited by Spain as a spy because he left Constantinople in 1576 apparently to go to Spain. When he returned to Constantinople in December 1577 he did so in the entourage of Giovanni Marigliano. Although incensed at the ill-treatment he received at the hands of his Spanish protectors, Brutti did not abandon his support for the Roman Catholic powers in Europe; he did much to encourage the spread of the Roman Catholic faith in Moldavia. (7)

Sokullu held the office of Grand Vizier between 1565 and 1595; when he died, between this date and 1616, there were some seventeen different Ottoman Grand Viziers holding office, some of whom held office three, four or five times: for example Koja Sinan, an Albanian, whose first period as Grand Vizier ran from August 1580-December 1582; his second ran from August 1589-August 1591; his third, January 1593-February 1595; his fourth, July-November 1595; his fifth, December

1595-April 1596. The period during which the tenure of office for Grand Viziers was at its shortest was the period 1593-1606, particularly whilst the Ottoman Empire was at war with the Habsburg Empire and whilst Mihai Viteazul was conducting his rebellion against Ottoman hegemony. However even before this the Vizier rarely spent more than two years in office before he was ousted; this situation was to make the predicament of the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia worse, for every time the Grand Vizier was changed the prince had to establish friendly relations with his successor; this inevitably involved gifts and bribes from the prince in addition to the other customary gifts, tribute etc. The opportunity was also provided for a pretender to ingratiate himself with the new Vizier or his potential successors. (8)

Iancu had cultivated the favour of Doamna Chiajna, a daughter of Petru Rareş and wife of Mircea Ciobanul (the Shepherd) Prince of Wallachia [1545-54; 1558-59] and therefore his own half-sister. Chiajna was a good friend of the powerful Sultana Safiye, Sultan Murad's wife, and had contacts amongst the Greek bankers of Galata from whom Iancu was able to borrow money. Iancu was said to have paid the Sultan 800,000 *galbeni* (ducats), the Sultana 20,000 and the Grand Vizier 50,000 *galbeni* to secure his appointment to the Moldavian throne. Bartolomeo Brutti had attached himself to Iancu's cause and had made himself sufficiently useful to the pretender for the latter to show his gratitude, as Brutti had no doubt intended he should, by taking him into his service in Moldavia. As we know, Brutti had been a Dragoman in

Venetian and Spanish service and was knowledgeable about the *modus operandi* of negotiations with the Ottoman *Divan*, as well as probably acting as Iancu's interpreter. In Moldavia he was rewarded with confiscated lands left vacant by the execution for treason of a powerful boyar. He was given the command of infantry and cavalry forces and the right to collect revenues to the value of 3,000 *galbeni* per annum at the port of Galati. He was eventually appointed *Postelnic* (Marshall of the Prince's Household), one of the leading officials at the prince's court whose major functions included receiving those who craved audience with the prince and conducting the prince's business with foreign courts including the Ottoman. A knowledge of foreign languages was a distinct asset in this position, because of the volume of correspondence and diplomacy between the Prince of Moldavia and the Ottoman *Divan*, as well as diplomatic relations between Moldavia and its neighbours. (9) The office of *Postelnic* also conferred powers of jurisdiction over areas under the holder's control. By the time Iancu was overthrown, Brutti had become one of the most powerful men in Moldavia, so successful was he that he remained *Postelnic* under Iancu's successor Petru Șchiopul, whom he had previously helped to overthrow when working for Iancu's own installation as prince.

Brutti's service of Iancu and Șchiopul can be seen as a successful "career-move" which did not stop with his achievements in Moldavia; as we know from the previous chapter, he used his position and experience in Moldavia to enter the service of the King of Poland, collaborating with

Edward Barton to negotiate a continued peace between Poland and the Ottomans in 1590 and made numerous attempts to enter the service of the Queen of England through his contacts with her ambassadors. He was a forerunner of men such as Paulo Mariani and Gaspar Gratiani who were also to begin their careers as Dragomans. These men were politically adept and thrived through intrigue, making their fortunes through manipulating the Ottoman system on behalf of businessmen, embassies and even pretenders to the thrones of Wallachia and Moldavia. They took advantage of contacts made and favours done to amass large amounts of money and, even more importantly, positions of influence and power.

To return to Iancu Sasul: once invested as Prince of Moldavia he was dispatched from Constantinople at the head of an army to ensure that the Sultan's orders were executed without opposition from inside the principality. He was immediately faced with the need to raise enough money to satisfy his creditors that they would be repaid all that he owed them, as well as the tribute and gifts to his political overlords. Therefore he levied heavy taxes, requiring an ox from every household. These taxes were not levied merely to fulfil his financial obligations; Iancu was also preparing for his inevitable overthrow; during his reign of three years Iancu dispatched 100 wagons out of Moldavia, forty of which were full of money. After three years of rule he had paid out 200,000 *galbeni* to his supporters in Constantinople; in March 1580 he sent a gift to Sinan Pasha of 150 horses. (10) The Chronicler Grigore Ureche, who was not

one of Iancu's admirers, described him as a man of incredible greed, someone who murdered men in order to seize their land for his own use. He also accused him of fornication, although judging by the numbers of illegitimate sons born to Moldavian princes, Iancu was not particularly unusual in this respect. He also continually disregarded the liberties of the Orthodox church in favour of Roman Catholicism; Bartolomeo Brutti had considerable influence in his attitude towards the majority faith in Moldavia, persuading Iancu that such a policy might best attract the sympathy of the Catholic powers through the mediation of the Pope. (As a Lutheran Iancu might otherwise have looked to German Protestant princes for support.). Iancu was partly successful in this policy although it did not save him from his eventual fate: after his overthrow the Pope, not having heard of Iancu's execution, attempted to persuade the Ottomans to restore him to the throne, petitioning through the medium of the King of France and his embassy in Constantinople. (11)

In Moldavia all State functions (judicial, legislative, executive and military) were invested in the prince, who exercised his powers through his officials sitting in the *Divan* or Prince's Council. The *Divan* discussed important matters of state in order to advise the prince; the *Divan* members were rewarded with a proportion of taxes and fines levied by them on his behalf through local bodies such as the "Council of Great and Aged People" which assisted the leaders of free villages with unimportant judicial matters, questions of land-use and apportioning taxes, and the elected bodies which administered towns. This structure

remained in place whoever was prince and, because reigns were short, the princes rarely had time to entrench their authority before they were overthrown; the boyars who held office and their families were extremely influential in the *Divan* and in political life in the principality. It required a particularly forceful prince to stamp his authority on the state which he ruled.

The hierarchy of officials does not appear to have been rigidly fixed. As well as the *Postelnic*, at Court the leading officials were the *Vornic* (Court Marshall or Palatine), the *Logofăt* (Chancellor) and the *Vistier* (Treasurer) there were also a number of territorial officers: the *Pîrcălab* (Castelan), The *Starost* (Infantry Commander), the *Hatman* (Cavalry Commander). Many of these officials, such as the *Vornic* and the *Postelnic*, developed other functions in particular rights of jurisdiction. The *Postelnic* appears to have increased his importance in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. During Iancu's reign, some of the most important offices were held by the Movilă family, which was itself to found a princely dynasty: Ieremie the *Vornic* reigned as Prince between 1595 and 1600 and 1601-1606 when he died; his sons Constantin and Alexandru reigned between 1607 and 1611 and between 1615 and 1616 respectively. Simeon the *Pîrcălab* ruled Wallachia from 1601 to 1602 and Moldavia from 1606 to 1608; his sons Mihai, Moise and Gabriel reigned for brief periods, Gabriel 1618-20 and Moise the youngest 1630-31. Under Iancu, Balică Movilă was *Hatman* and Gheorghe Movilă a bishop; Iancu's religious policies attacked the position of the latter. The

Movilă were leading figures in a rebellion against Iancu which was to lead to his replacement by Petru Șchiopul; they were one of the most powerful boyar factions in Moldavia having at their disposal wealth, lands and manpower, in addition to strong connections with Poland, which will be dealt with later in this chapter. Ieremie Movilă was so unhappy with Iancu's rule that he took refuge in Poland. (12) One may speculate that many boyars found the Ottoman Empire's imposition of princes without reference to Moldavian political society extremely galling, particularly when these princes spent their brief reigns plundering the resources of the country to buy support in Constantinople and embezzling a fortune to support them in their retirement. In this period when the influence of the great boyars was at its height, it is no surprise that many belonging to this group felt they would be better suited to governing the principality and would have considerable more success in doing so. (13)

Iancu also succeeded in alienating those who had supported him outside the principality including Doamna Chiajna who returned her allegiance to Petru Șchiopul and began using her influence to undermine Iancu's reputation at the *Divan* in Constantinople, perhaps cultivating Ottoman suspicions concerning Iancu's diplomacy conducted with powers ill-disposed to the Sultan. The Prince of Moldavia's relations with his Wallachian neighbour Mihnea deteriorated; such a situation was unfortunate for both principalities for, despite inevitable minor rivalries in matters of status and neither state's desire to be dominated by the other, their shared predicament, common language and similar customs and

systems of government, in addition to dynastic ties, which gave enormous potential for co-operation in areas of mutual interest. A major advantage to the Ottoman Empire of Poland's installation of Ieremie Movilă in 1595 was that it divided the principality from Wallachia at the time of Mihai Viteazul's rebellion. Moldavia under Ieremie's predecessor Aron *Vodă* had made common cause with Mihai.

Iancu either tolerated or was unable to prevent raids into Polish territory and particularly into the Ukraine; the Cossacks, whom King Stefan Bathory was trying to bring under the control of the Polish Crown by setting up the Cossack register, inevitably retaliated by raiding Moldavia. (14) After Iancu fled from Moldavia, Stefan Bathory wrote to Sultan Murad III to explain the circumstances of a Cossack raid into Moldavia, a potential cause of tension with the Ottomans:

"... some of the Cossacks had set out against Iancu Sasul, who caused them damage when he was Prince. Finding that he had been removed, they then left. Some of them have since entered into service of Petru Schiopul, but if these commit any reckless actions he would take care of them." (15)

Moldavia's geographical position ensured that the Polish Crown and Polish magnates considered they had a legitimate interest in the principalities internal affairs: Iancu's behaviour made him highly undesirable as the ruler of a sensitive area. Cossack raids into Moldavia were an encroachment upon the Sultan's prerogative, retribution would not normally involve an Ottoman expedition but might take the form of a punishing raid by the Tatars acting on Ottoman instructions which would inevitably result in a cooling of relations between Sultan Murad and the

King of Poland. Iancu was also suspected of intercepting correspondence between Bathory and the Sultan; such hostile behaviour was another potential threat to Turco-Polish relations which Bathory, having pressing business against Muscovy, was intent upon keeping on a friendly basis. Finally Iancu's courting of the Habsburgs was a potential threat to Bathory's own principality of Transylvania.

Despite his difficulties with other states, Iancu's downfall was precipitated by a rebellion led by boyars supporting the Lapusneanu family's claim to the throne who attempted to place Ioan Lungul (the Long) on the throne as their alternative candidate to Petru Șchiopul who had Ottoman support; prominent amongst the leadership was the Movilă family. The rebellion was defeated on Iancu's behalf by Bucium, the chief *Vornic*, and Bartolomeo Brutti, although they were not necessarily acting out of loyalty to Iancu. Brutti had maintained his contacts in Constantinople and may have been in secret contact with Petru Șchiopul, knowing that Iancu was not likely to remain long on the throne. Brutti was anxious to secure his own powerful position in the principality by facilitating Petru Șchiopul's return to the throne; this would explain Brutti's continuation as *Postelnic* and his favour with Petru. The rebels were dispersed and fled from the principality; a group of them went to Constantinople to petition the Sultan to have Iancu replaced, although they were surely aware that that Petru Șchiopul would be preferred to Ioan Lungul. It would seem that the major thrust of the rebellion had been the removal of an unpopular ruler but at least some of those involved

wished to reassert the right of Moldavian boyars to elect their prince. The Sultan was amenable to the request for another prince and sent an envoy to escort Iancu to Constantinople:

“Iancu, prince of Moldavia, brought great damage to his subjects and did not carry out our orders; so now that the great boyars of Moldavia have written to me [the Sultan] pleading and informing us about their losses, and about what they wish us to do. Finding this to be true, we have dismissed him from his rule and placed there Petru Voivod who was Iancu’s predecessor.” (16)

Iancu fled in time to avoid being brought to Constantinople by force and thereby escaped prison or death at Ottoman hands. He hoped to reach Hungary, where preparations had already been made for his exile; to avoid capture by his former subjects he intended to travel via Poland. However, he had miscalculated the degree of annoyance he had caused Stefan Bathory because the latter ordered his capture. Bathory man-handled and beat Iancu personally, berating him for his hostile behaviour towards Poland; his treasure was confiscated and Iancu was beheaded at Lwow. (17) Bathory was not a man who shrank from summary justice (18); he may have feared that Iancu would merely be imprisoned by the Ottomans and might even find a way to ascend the Moldavian throne once again. Furthermore, Bathory, although the Sultan’s vassal as Prince of Transylvania, had no obligation as King of Poland to return the former prince to Constantinople; since Iancu had permitted attacks on Polish territory and on Polish interests, Bathory preferred to deal with him personally and his execution served as an example to other who might consider similar actions.

Iancu's wife Maria Paleologus stayed in Poland with her children: two sons and three daughters. The Paleologus family were descendants of the former Byzantine Imperial house; a marriage between the daughter of a noble Byzantine dynasty and a son of a Moldavian prince was a dynastic alliance which suggests that one and a half centuries before Phanariot rule was established in Moldavia and Wallachia, powerful Levantine families in the Ottoman Empire were aware of the political, social and economic advantages of establishing their influence in the principalities. The Sultan's vassal princes had considerable status in the Empire, conferred with the insignia presented by the Sultan, although this status was diminished by the venality which had become an integral part of a prince's succession. The prince's autonomous status allowed him to exercise an important influence in the affairs of the region; the economic advantages of ruling either principality have been set out, it is hardly surprising that there were a large number of people who had their sights on acquiring some foothold in the principalities.

There was considerable Greek involvement in the principalities; it was not unusual for princes or pretenders to marry Greek women. However the 'Phanariot' oligarchy which emerged in the course of the seventeenth century was not descended from the old Byzantine aristocracy, although the Phanariots went to great efforts to invent illustrious genealogies for themselves. The Phanariot rise to prominence was due primarily to service within the Ottoman administration and their dominance of the Orthodox hierarchy in Constantinople. The first

Phanariot is held to have been Panayotis Nikousios (1613-73) who rose to the position of Grand Dragoman of the Porte; this position came to be a prerogative of the Phanariots until 1821, when the Greek revolt caused the Ottomans to lose confidence in the Phanariots. The use of the post of Dragoman to obtain influence in the Ottoman Empire was not an innovation of the Phanariots, as we know from the discussion of Bartolomeo Brutti, Paulo Mariani and Gaspar Gratiani, and it is these individuals who were more properly the forerunners of the Phanariots. Gratiani even obtained the rule of Moldavia (1619-21), just as a century later the first Phanariot Prince, Nicholas Mavrocordatos, was to do, using influence already obtained through service to the Ottoman administration.

The Brutti family, and other families connected to it by marriage, prospered through Bartolomeo's position in Moldavia; Bartolomeo and his brother Benedetto owned property and 'customs farms' there, another member of the family, was a retainer of Petru Șchiopul, then an emissary of Mihai Viteazul and returned to Moldavia as secretary to Radu Mihnea. Cristoforo Brutti, another brother of Bartolomeo, was sent as emissary to Warsaw by Petru Șchiopul in 1589. On his return to Iași he became a member of the *Divan* ; later he returned to Constantinople as Dragoman to the Venetian Ambassador to Constantinople. Bartolomeo's nephew Marc Antonio Borisi also worked as Dragoman to the Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople and his daughter appears to have married Gaspar Gratiani in 1620. Marital alliances between various

Levantine families were pursued deliberately in order to reinforce their social and political influence in the Ottoman Empire: Bartolomeo Brutti's wife was the niece of the Imperial Ambassador's Dragoman and the sister of a prominent Venetian merchant. The Phanariot families of the eighteenth century were to build up political and marital alliances to reinforce their preeminence in the Christian society of Constantinople in a very similar manner. (19)

To return to Maria Paleologus: her cunning and determination on behalf of her family matches Iancu's efforts on his own behalf. Her husband's embezzled fortune lost to her, she set herself to obtain Stefan Bathory's forgiveness despite the fact that a number of Polish magnates were intent on sending her and the children to Constantinople; she was eventually taken under the protection of the Polish Crown, was granted some land and went into business as an importer of luxury goods from the Ottoman Empire to be sold in Lwow. (20) Her eldest son Alexandru went to Constantinople soon after Iancu's death to petition for the Moldavian throne. He was aged between fifteen and seventeen but his youth did not prevent his imprisonment in the fortress of "Seven Towers" (situated on the Asian shore of the Dardanelles, which held political prisoners of some importance) probably because he had no-one of influence to protect him. There is no further mention of him, so he probably died in prison. (21)

Bogdan was considerably younger than his brother. He was born in Poland, presumably after his father's death in 1582. (22) He first

staked his claim to the Moldavian throne in 1593, when he would have been ten or eleven years old. He spent his early years in Lwow in southern Poland which has been described as a particularly unruly area of a country where private wars, banditry and brigandage were commonplace, where the law was as often broken as kept and a wronged party would often set out to exercise justice on his own initiative; this environment would have been one of the earliest influences upon him. (23)

His mother would have brought him up as far as possible in a manner to suit his status as a prince. He appears to have had some education: his signature, to be seen on letters in the Public Record Office in Chancery Lane, suggests a man who was used to writing; unless he had a secretary to accompany him wherever he went, even in prison, he could write in Italian (he spent several years in Italy when his sister lived there) and Latin and no doubt acquired some knowledge of Greek from his mother. Other activities would have included the traditional skills and pursuits which befitted a nobleman: elaborate social manners, hunting and entertainments and most importantly marksmanship and swordsmanship. In Constantinople he carried a sword seven hands long and three fingers wide, which was said to have been the true sword of Atilla, found in Moldavia. (24)

His distinguished ancestry was a powerful influence upon the young Bogdan; in his later wanderings in Europe he carried his Romanian genealogy, which he probably knew by heart and which, for

purposes of regaining the throne, he considered most important. Through his mother he had a Byzantine inheritance, so no doubt he was brought up to think of himself as an heir to two noble traditions: in his letters, after 1600 when he had changed his name, he signed himself "Stefan Despot". Just as Maria Paleologus would have absorbed a somewhat glorified perception of Byzantium, there was also a 'Byzantine' tradition within Moldavia. This tradition was reflected not only in the Orthodox church in Moldavia and Wallachia in art, customs and liturgy but also at the princely court. The great state offices in both principalities had been modelled on those of the Byzantine Empire, transmitted through mediaeval Bulgaria and Serbia, and the court preserved elaborate ceremonies which helped to bolster the prestige and grandeur of the prince's rule. Bogdan hinted at this tradition by use of the word "Despot" to describe himself which may have been adopted as a reaction to Ieremie Movila's cultivation of a Byzantine genealogy for himself, as will be discussed later. (25) One may speculate that the young Bogdan was brought up on stories of his illustrious ancestors, Ștefan Cel Mare and Petru Rareș, and of South-east Europe before the advent of the Ottoman Empire. The "glorious" history of the Balkans was transmitted through chronicles and through oral tradition.

During Bogdan's youth, Maria had been working hard to establish contacts which would be useful to her son. She maintained good relations with the Polish Crown and the friendship of the Archduke Maximilian. The King of Poland, Zygmund Vasa, supplied Bogdan with

letters-patent to prove his claim to the Moldavian throne, Maximilian recommended Maria with her son Bogdan to the Doge of Venice:

“... Maria Vidua Joannis Janculae, olim Palatini Moldovae, Bohdan eius filius.” (26)

She was probably anxious that the fate that had befallen her eldest son should not be repeated with her youngest. On 6th March 1593 she was in Venice with her family and retinue; she now pushed her son to the fore and it was Bogdan who wrote and signed the letter to the Doge asking for financial help and a recommendation to the Ottoman Sultan:

“I, Bogodan, son of the well-remembered Giancula, legitimate successor in the Principality of Moldavia, and the Princess Maria my mother desiring to go to Constantinople in order to recover the realm which is mine by right; I wished to come to this most serene city to make reverence to your Serenity...”

He stated his wish to travel to Constantinople via Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and asked for letters to the rulers there to ensure his safe conduct; he promised to show his immense gratitude to Venice once he was established on the throne of Moldavia. (27) The diplomatic and commercial advantages of having a Venetian protégé upon the Moldavian throne were not lost on the Doge; he wrote to the Venetian Commander at Ragusa asking him to facilitate the passage of Bogdan and his family to Constantinople and ordered 25 *galbeni* (ducats) to be presented to Bogdan. (28) The young pretender probably returned to inform the Doge that his financial situation was so dire that he required more money, for he was granted a further hundred ducats. Instructions were issued to the Venetian Bailo in Constantinople to take Bogdan and

his mother under his protection and to take a hand in their affairs, for if Bogdan were installed on the Moldavian throne he would be greatly in Venice's debt. (29)

One hundred and twenty five ducats was hardly a sufficient sum to support a serious attempt to secure Bogdan's appointment; clearly the Doge intended to supply diplomatic aid but steered clear of major financial involvement; however Venetian support would facilitate Bogdan's efforts to obtain financial backing once he arrived in Constantinople. Bogdan gave the impression that his installation in Moldavia would be achieved easily and without major expenditure. Many of the strengths which served Bogdan well in later life were already in evidence: a forceful but charming character and the ability to persuade those in positions of authority that he was a man whose efforts to become prince were worthy of support.

Maria Paleologus occupied herself further in negotiating a successful marriage for one of her daughters with Giovanni Zane, a Venetian nobleman and a member of a family which supplied a number of Venetian diplomats, including Marco Zane, the current Bailo in Constantinople. This marriage, apart from its importance in providing for the future of one of her daughters, created an alliance between a major Venetian family and her son and thereby a potentially important source of support and influence in Venice. The speedy conclusion of the marriage arrangements shows the eagerness of the Venetians to acquire a position of influence in Balkan politics, following the example of the

French and English and perhaps reflects an anxiety to prevent Bogdan going to France or England for support.

Edward Barton's close involvement with Aron *Vodă* and Mihai Viteazul had lead indirectly to a close involvement with the Ottoman Empire's own foreign policy. Since the Ottomans did not maintain permanent ambassadors in foreign courts Barton was sometimes used by the Ottoman Sultan in diplomatic matters; in this way he became a figure of great influence in their dealings with their Romanian vassals and with the Habsburg Empire and this influence was useful in his other areas of responsibility in Constantinople. In the same manner the French had in previous decades tried to promote the importance of their own embassy, for example with their support of Petru Cercel; Venice was intent on emulating this tactic, to improve its political and commercial position in the Ottoman Empire. Venice was particularly keen on maintaining good relations with the Ottoman Empire because the Republic was heavily dependent on the export of foodstuffs from the Ottoman Empire. (30)

In July 1593 Bogdan left Venice for Constantinople; he was preceded by his mother anxious to prepare the way for him. If the young Bogdan failed in his bid for the throne, the family would be condemned to a backwater at best and very likely a life of poverty, insecurity and danger, since so much appears to have been staked on the young pretender gaining the Moldavian throne. Maria approached the Bailo, Marco Zane, with the Doge's letters of recommendation; the latter was not over

enthusiastic to have this task thrust upon him and attempted to explain to the Doge that the operation upon which he was embarking was not a straightforward one:

“The fact that he is the highest of the descendants of the Princes and is trying to gratify the people who would like to see the end of government of Sanjaks and Beylerbey and others of the Empire that does not take any account of the Ministers, due to the importance of gifts which they receive as tradition.” (31)

Zane expressed himself reluctant to interfere in internal matters of the Empire and unlike Edward Barton does not appear to have relished a major diplomatic role for himself because he did not think it prudent to attempt to take on such a role. The Bailo tried to distance himself from close association with Bogdan but promised to find an opportune time to give Maria and her son satisfaction. He advised her to pursue her campaign herself with approaches to Sinan Pasha and Ferhad Pasha, another former Vizier and the Commander of the victorious Ottoman forces in the war against Persia, both of whom were acquainted with Maria through their involvement with Iancu Sasul; they allegedly owed her favours which would be performed in return for gifts. Sinan's friendship was judged to be particularly important and Bogdan was advised to approach him personally with gifts. Zane was no doubt aware of the numbers of pretenders who approached the *Divan* and suspected that if Maria and her son were supplied with Venetian money to support them in comfort they might be less anxious to persevere; in other words he suspected them of being gold-digging charlatans of whom the Venetian State should be wary. (32) On the other hand the impression

Bogdan appears to have given the Doge and Senate is of a young prince unjustly deprived of his father's throne, for whom the people of Moldavia were clamouring and who could be restored to his rightful position if his case were taken up by some generous foreign power.

Zane avoided the expense of supporting Bogdan in his own establishment, the young Pretender taking up residence in the household of a wealthy banker, Ludovico, who became his patron and took control of his money, some 10,000 *zecchini*, and a number of precious objects. Ludovico kept Bogdan in the style of a "man of good manners" and won his loyalty which subsequently turned out to be misplaced. (33)

Bogdan won the support of Ferhad Pasha who decided to place him on the throne of Wallachia; the pretender was willing to accept this alternative offer despite his previous protestations of being the true and rightful heir to Moldavia. This opportunism is a demonstration of how beholden many princes were to their Ottoman patrons. Had he succeeded in mounting the Wallachian throne, Bogdan would have owed his position entirely to the whim of Ferhad Pasha; no doubt Bogdan feared that had he refused the offer of Wallachia he would alienate Ferhad Pasha and lose any chance of gaining the Moldavian throne. The ambition to rule was the abiding principle in Bogdan's life. Ferhad's plans for his protégé were opposed by his rival Sinan Pasha, who supported the candidature of Radu Mihnea, son of Prince Mihnea. The need to replace the incumbent Prince of Wallachia, Mihai Viteazul, had

become urgent because Mihai was in revolt against Ottoman authority and had sided with the Holy League against the Sultan. The support of the *Capi-Aga* clinched the choice of Bogdan as the new Prince of Wallachia. (34)

Mihai's initial act of rebellion was an attack on his creditors who accompanied tax-collectors around the country making illegal exactions in addition to the enormous sums they were demanding from the prince; Mihai invited them to assemble in a building which he then set on fire. He then joined in alliance with Aron, Prince of Moldavia and Sigismund Bathory, Prince of Transylvania in revolt against the Ottomans. As previously mentioned, there is little agreement amongst historians as to what exactly led Mihai to revolt: whether he had made plans even before becoming prince, or whether conditions within the principality were the major cause of his rebellion. Certainly Mihai faced an aggressive and proprietary attitude from the Ottomans, who regarded the prince as an Ottoman official in all but name, and excessive demands for military support including forced sales of foodstuffs, as well as the customary flow of wealth from the principality to Constantinople. Mihai seems to have received considerable encouragement for the idea of revolt from Bathory and the "Apostolic visitor of the Latin Churches in the European part of the Ottoman State", one Komulovic, who had toured the area in 1593. The Tatars were sent to Wallachia to put down the revolt in November 1594, since the Sultan's soldiers were said to be unwilling to suffer the cold weather; the Ottomans viewed Mihai's revolt with great disquiet,

since the alignment of Wallachia, Transylvania and Moldavia with the Holy League cut off a valuable source of support and supplies for the Ottoman forces and placed the theatre of war in hostile hands. Furthermore, their defection constituted a serious menace to supply lines running from Istanbul to Belgrade, Buda and Gran. The Danube's importance as a water route for the transport of guns and munitions to the front in Hungary ensured that part of the Ottoman war-effort was directed towards defence of the Danube, therefore:

“... to show that the Grand Signior hath a care of the said exploite hee hath appointed generall...on[e] Mustafa Bassa, sonne-in-lawe to Sinan Bassa the Visier... in whose compamy goeth twoe young Princes of the said provinces, in whose ayde allsoe are appointed to be in readiness the Beglerbies of Bendir, Akerman and Silistria, confiners to Wallachia and Bugdania.” (35)

The young Princes in question were Bogdan and Ștefan Surdul, to be placed by force of arms in Wallachia and Moldavia respectively. Bogdan was therefore presented with a major opportunity to attain the status of Prince; however, Edward Barton suspected that the military operation underway to install him was a prelude to the installation of an Ottoman Beylerbey, since the Sultan's military campaign in Hungary was proceeding well, and he predicted that Poland would take some action to prevent this:

“I thinke the King of Poland would look about him for where now having the Bugdans Christian confiners, his subjects rest secure from the tyranny of the Turkes, if a Beylerbey should be sett in Bugdania, he should have the like troubles and dayly discontentment as the Emperour of Germany and all the Grand Signior his neighbours have, and therefore I thinke the newes thereof will either make him enter league with the Emperour of Germany, or to send hither continuall expostulations to divert the

Grand Signior from that designe.” (36)

Barton’s suspicions may have been justified, for Bogdan and Ștefan Surdul had no guarantee that the Ottoman troops would withdraw from the principalities once they been installed; if Ottoman troops were present in the principalities the young princes would have found themselves so restricted as to be little more than puppet rulers. This may have been Ferhad Pasha’s logic of attempting to place two young and inexperienced individuals in the principalities, in place of the likes of Mihai Viteazul, an experienced soldier and administrator and a former governor of the Wallachian province of Oltenia, who had proved himself a dangerous choice of prince from the Ottoman point of view.

Orders were sent to the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia to accept their new rulers and the Tatars were told to make:

“a generall incursion into these provinces, to kille, sacke, incaptive and indammage the inhabitants without pity or respect as much as they may.” (37)

The inhabitants would have paid a high price for their prince’s defiance, but Aron and Mihai maintained a state of readiness to defend themselves. Bogdan’s expectations of a throne were dashed when Mihai undertook a daring raid across the Danube to attack the Ottoman camp at Rusciuk in February 1595:

“in one night [Mihai]... passed over to the number of five thousand souldiers, and marched directly to the Turquishe campe, whoe seeing them a farre off thought first they had been Tartars, but after perceiving them to be Christians, put themselves in order of battell soe well as the tyme would permit them, and ioyninge with the enemy for a while resisted, but soone were overcome and the Generall himselfe slaine, whose head the Christians cut off and carryed away with them, making also great search for the new

Prince whom the Grand Signior had preferred to that province, but hee was fled upon a light Turkish horse.”

That this prince was Bogdan is confirmed by several sources including Balthasar Walther’s Chronicle which records the same incident. (38) Bogdan was despoiled of all his goods and escaped with a small force which scattered on the way back to Constantinople, whence Bogdan returned almost alone. He went into hiding with his mother and sister. Rusciuk was looted and plundered and the remainder of the Ottoman forces were robbed by Mihai’s Hungarian soldiers:

“The Turkish soldier above all other souldiers goeth richly attired in so much that even the poorest hath his sinister garnished with silver, or hath a long coate... of Venice cloth.”

Sinan Pasha, the Grand Vizier, retaliated and captured Bucharest suggesting that native rule be replaced by direct Ottoman rule. Meanwhile Ștefan Surdul, Bogdan’s proposed counterpart in Moldavia, returned to Constantinople.

“... [Stefan] being departed [to Moldavia] and not finding himselfe strong enough to try masteries with Aron or to take possession of Bugdania, lingered about the confines untill the arrivall of Vizier Bassa at Adronople who, seeing his residency there needles, but especially by report, havinge comission from the grand Signor to gett a Beglerbey over the said province, that it be noe more governed by Christians deposed the said Stephano and sent him backe hither.” (39)

Sinan Pasha further dashed Bogdan’s hopes of obtaining the rule of a principality by ordering the strangulation of his patron and protector Ferhad Pasha; the young pretender found himself ‘back to square one’, nevertheless he exhibited a continued determination to achieve his

ambition to rule and resumed his efforts as before. He appears to have been embarrassed about the fiasco of his attempted installation in Wallachia and in the following years tended to gloss over or ignore this evidence of a streak of opportunism in his character. When he related his story to the Venetian Bailo Zane's successor Venier, he left him with the impression that the Ottomans had pressured him into accepting a principality to which he had no claim by descent. (40)

Sinan, meanwhile, was not able to annex either Moldavia or Wallachia; in November 1595 he was forced to leave Bucharest, leaving his army and equipment behind. Furthermore, Sigismund Bathory of Transylvania had replaced Aron with a lieutenant of his own. Of the two alternative scenarios on offer concerning the rule of Moldavia, neither was considered acceptable to Poland, nor to the Khan of the Crimea, Gazi Giray [1588-96; 1596-1608]. The Tatars had considered Aron as a "forsworne traitor" (41) and had intended to install Ahmed Bey the *Sanjak Bey* of Bender (Tehine) and Kilia in Moldavia, but concluded instead an agreement with the Polish forces (camped at the juncture of the rivers Tura and Prut), that the Khan would support the appointment of Ieremie Movilă in Moldavia in return for a Polish undertaking to stop Cossack raids on Tatar territory. (42) It was envisaged that Poland and the Tatars would exercise a joint protectorate over the principality; the appointment succeeded in relaxing tension between Poland and the Ottoman Empire and prevented Poland being dragged into the conflict between the Ottomans and the Holy League on the Habsburg side.

Edward Barton described Ieremie Movilă thus:

“I, a Bugdan borne, and though nott of the Princely bloode yett of discretion and humanity sufficient to governe the sayed Province... for whose fidelity and integrity towards the Turke they both gave their warrantie [i.e. the King of Poland and the Tatar Khan].” (43)

Neither Poland nor the Ottomans wished to see Moldavia under Transylvanian control; the Ottomans were prompt in their acceptance of an accomodation with Poland which ensured that Moldavia remained aligned to Constantinople:

“[the Sultan] instantly created the sayed Ieremie Prince being absent and sent him a cape [cap] of maintenance according to the use of that contry, an enieweled sword, a horse with his furniture and fifteen garments of brocade...” (44)

The new regime was welcomed by Edward Barton in Constantinople who established friendly relations with Ieremie and maintained his previous contacts with Jan Zamoyski. (45) He seems to have been particularly glad that Sigismund Bathory of Transylvania, who had Jesuit sympathies, had no further opportunity to exert influence over Moldavia.

Whilst this was happening, Bogdan was renewing his appeals to the Venetian Bailo Venier, engaging his sympathy with carefully calculated pleas of ill-luck and ill-treatment at the hands of others. Venier described the pretender as a “poor unlucky youth” in a letter to the Doge in which he reminded the latter of previous Venetian promises to the pretender; he expressed his intention to help Bogdan investigate the embezzlement of his money by Ludovico. This was a major setback for Bogdan; not only was he without the means to support his mother and sister but he now lacked the means to buy protection against Ieremie’s

attempts to have him imprisoned; having made himself conspicuous as a major candidate for the Moldavian throne:

“... now he hides together with his mother and young sister in fear of [Răzvan and Ieremie] in case they find him... Now this young man has sent to me crying of his miserable state... I wish to represent to you this and other issues which move the compassionate to compassion.” (46)

Bogdan's strong and attractive personality proved at this time and on many other occasions to be his greatest asset; he was saved from a desperate and seemingly hopeless situation by the generosity and pity of the Venetian Bailo who accorded him his protection and succour.

Bogdan began a new approach to obtaining the throne: the Polish envoy in Constantinople was now a major influence in affairs relating to Moldavia, therefore Bogdan concentrated his efforts in this direction. In September 1597, having borrowed money for gifts and gratuities, he approached Stanislaw Golski, the Polish Envoy, requesting him to use his influence with the Vizier Damad Ibrahim (April-October 1596; December 1596-November 1597) to secure his appointment as Ieremie's successor. Bogdan had either come to the conclusion, or had been advised, that it was pointless to attempt to secure Ieremie's overthrow whilst the Ottomans were obliged to adopt a policy of co-operation with Poland. According to Edward Barton, Golski pretended to support Bogdan's petition, taking his money and gifts whilst arranging for the pretender to be arrested on suspicion of plotting to murder Movilă:

“... he hath caused the sonne of Yancolo, whose father 17 years seince was prince of Bugdania and nowe the sonne sought and sued for the same pryncedome, to be taken and imprisoned, though first he had promised him all favour and furtherance to his

preferment to that Princedome in which action what himselfe thinketh himselfe I know nott, but under collour of friendship to imploye the authority of his kinge in the first action of his Ambassadorie to deceave a poore child and thereby beinge in the hands of the Turkes to put him in danger of his life or fayth (for no doubte one must succede eyther death or to turne Turke) is generally heer misliked of all Christians." (47)

This appears to have been the first occasion on which Barton took a serious interest in Bogdan. Balthasar Walther accepted that the pretender had been involved in a plot against Movilă; on the other hand the French and Venetian ambassadors believed that he was entirely innocent. The Polish ambassador apparently first asked the Vizier to have the young pretender mutilated by cutting off his nose and ears and send him into exile in Tripoli. Bogdan was imprisoned when news came of the plot to murder Movilă; the allegations could have been concocted by Golski or brought to his ears by an informer who exaggerated rumours about Bogdan, on the other hand Bogdan could have spoken of his desire to have Ieremie removed, without making any specific arrangements. Equally the pretender may have been guilty; it is really impossible to say whether or not Bogdan would have had the resources necessary to breach Ieremie's security and murder him. Barton's outrage at Bogdan's treatment at Poland's instigation, which was shared by his fellow ambassadors, suggests that the evidence against Bogdan was slight. This incident demonstrates the resolve with which Chancellor Zamoyski intended to maintain Poland's grip upon Moldavia. (48)

Zamoyski was not content merely to see a pro-Polish ruler in Moldavia replaced by another after a short term Ottoman candidate; he

wished to ensure a much greater degree of stability in the principality by ending one of the major causes of instability: the uncertainty over the succession. Zamoyski's solution was to grant a privilege to the direct descendants of Ieremie Movilă. The chronicler Miron Costin, quoted in I. Miculescu-Prăjescu's article 'New Data Regarding the Installation of Movilă Princes', refers to the Sultan's grant of eternal sovereignty to Ieremie, his sons and grandsons, and a privilege granted by the King of Poland on 25th March 1597:

"Therefore will his Highness Ieremie Movila hold the sovereignty of Moldavia to the end of his days and after his death, his issue in the male line will be raised by us to that throne" (49)

A letter of March 1617 from the French Ambassador to the King of France refers to this grant: that Ieremie was promised that his children would always succeed him from father to son and the Sultan would never invest anyone else in Moldavia. (50) Having obtained this major change in Ottoman policy, the Poles were ill-disposed to pretenders such as Bogdan setting themselves up in opposition to the Movilă dynasty in Moldavia. Bogdan had probably been unaware of these agreements when he approached Golski, but these considerations explain the latter's harsh reaction to Bogdan's approaches.

Bogdan escaped death in prison due to the intervention of Damad Ibrahim, the Grand Vizier, who was attracted by his cheerful spirit and good looks and took him into his household as a page; he became:

"more and more beloved of the Pasha, being received into his private chamber, because talents of this type were delightful to the Turks." (51)

The immediate threat to his life was removed, but Bogdan was effectively a prisoner in Ibrahim's household, dependent upon him for protection and was in no position to resist the Viziers attentions. There was considerable concern about his position among the foreign embassies and the Greek Orthodox community, as well as the grief to his mother , particularly since it was felt that Bogdan would be unable to resist the pressure to convert to Islam, which would render him ineligible to rule Moldavia. (52) The Venetian ambassador expressed his concern at the pressure which Bogdan was believed to be under:

“of this prince it is said that Bassa is of the opinion to have the cure and the protection to keep him in a state whereby he [Bogdan] will always be dependent on his authority and that he would become Turk.” (53)

Bogdan was aware of the damage being done to his cause by his captivity, particularly as rumours were circulated that he had succumbed to pressure; indeed Ibrahim's entire household believed that he had embraced Islam. However Bogdan always maintained that he had not and never would convert. He was particularly concerned that no rumours should reach the ears of his sister in Venice, with whom he appears to have had a close relationship, for what he referred to as “her own interests”. The scandal for her, a Venetian noblewoman, of having a renegade brother would greatly damage her reputation in Venetian society; it would also ruin Bogdan's own chances of receiving further support from Venice.

The pretender was rescued from this situation when Ibrahim was disgraced for, amongst other things, withholding from the Sultan the

news of an Ottoman defeat in Hungary (November 1597). The former Vizier left Constantinople to take up residence in a fortress in Scutari where he had built a palace. Bogdan and another pretender (possibly Radu Mihnea) were set free. They retreated to the protection of the Venetian Embassy and appear to have taken up residence in the English Embassy. Bogdan would here have made the acquaintance of Thomas Glover, John Sanderson and Henry Lello. The first two men became quite friendly with him and later on referred to him warmly as their friend in their correspondence. Bogdan was by now extremely conspicuous as Ieremie Movilă's rival for Moldavia. The latter's agents saw him as such a threat that they, no doubt with Movila's approval, begged the new Vizier to have him killed, offering a gift of 4,000 Hungarian ducats. Maria Paleologus pleaded on her son's behalf and persuaded the Vizier, probably by offering a bigger bribe, to trick Movilă's agents into thinking that the pretender had been killed. They were shown the body of a man suspended on a hook which was then thrown into the waters of the Golden Horn. This body was then buried in a sack as Bogdan Sasul; the real Bogdan remained, of course, alive and in hiding. (54)

The pretender was a young man of enormous courage; he had escaped death at least three times and must have realised that his chances of attaining the Moldavian throne were not good, yet he was determined to persevere. His upbringing had convinced him of his right to rule and, having no land or money of his own, he was fitted for no other purpose in life. He was reliant on the favour and compassion of others to

assist him towards his goal and protect him from his enemies; he had learned to manipulate the Ottoman system through bitter experience, and had learned that many of those with whom he came into contact were not to be trusted. Nevertheless he had no option but to trust people. His personality and his wide experience gained at a young age made him an interesting character: he had lived in Poland and Venice, in an Ottoman household, in that of a Levantine banker in Constantinople, as well as the residences of the Venetian and English Ambassadors. Furthermore he had a talent for attracting the interest of others and making them like him and concern themselves about his fate.

He cultivated the favour of Iusef Bey, a renegade Venetian living in Constantinople, (formerly called Cievatelli) and brother-in-law of Omer Aga, the Chief of the *Seraglio*. Iusuf Bey had a daughter, Elena Cievatelli, a postulant nun in the convent *Corpus Domini* in Venice. Iusuf paid her an allowance and had promised to supply her with a dowry for the convent when she took her final vows. Instead he offered Bogdan Elena's hand in marriage and his own support to gain Moldavia, the latter proposition being dependent on the former going ahead. Bogdan agreed to the proposal and began negotiations with the Doge whose permission was necessary. He went to Venice to court Elena whom he said considered him a more than suitable husband and thanked him for offering her this unexpected chance of marriage. Elena later said that she had not wanted the marriage which had been forced on her by Iusuf-Bey, who threatened to discontinue her allowance and cancel her dowry.

Bogdan may appear cynical about his marital future, but for princes marriages were normally undertaken for political or diplomatic advantage. There was, however, considerable opposition to this union amongst the Venetian Senate and from the Pope. (55)

Unfortunately for Bogdan his reputation had proceeded him. He was considered to be “tainted” by the religion of his Ottoman patrons and it was feared that Elena’s immortal soul would be endangered if she married Bogdan and went to Constantinople where she might be under pressure from Iusuf to convert to Islam. In desperation Bogdan offered to place her in the care of his sister in Venice until he was crowned Prince, but the Pope was clearly suspicious of the pretender’s own faith and in December 1599 refused permission for Elena to abandon the veil and marry. Having once again reached a ‘dead-end’ in his campaign Bogdan did not hurry back to Constantinople. (56) The Venetian Bailo in Constantinople, Girolamo Capello, had been sympathetic towards Bogdan and had attempted to dispel the rumours of the pretender’s conversion, arguing that they were put about by his enemies to discredit him. He said that Bogdan had lived in his house for two years and he knew him to be a Christian. The rumours were carefully disseminated by Ieremie and the Polish Ambassador in Constantinople. Capello’s assurances of Bogdan’s adherence to the Christian faith were not believed.

Events in Moldavia took a course unconnected with Bogdan’s own efforts, meanwhile, for Ieremie Movilă had been overthrown in May 1600

by Mihai Viteazul who offered to establish Bogdan as his military governor in the principality. The pretender's successful self-publicity served him well in this event:

“Michael ever persuadeth the Grand Signior by his letters that all he doth is for him, and if he please may appoint a Governour for Bugdania, whereof he is partly persuaded through the great Vesier he hath to make peace with him.” (57)

Unfortunately for Bogdan the Vizier did not trust Mihai:

“The long expected peace between Michaell and the Grand Signior... is out of hope by these. The Viceroy having found some double dealing in Michaell his promises, for revenge therof hath cut of the legs and arms of the messenger sent to him, as also they have put his agent In prison.” (58)

Mihai left his son as governor of Moldavia. In autumn 1600 the Poles mustered a large force and restored Ieremie, who had taken refuge in the Polish border fortress of Hotin. Moldavia now became the centre of Ieremie's attempts, backed by Poland, to install his brother Simeon in Wallachia. The Ottomans initially supported Radu Mihnea to rule in Wallachia since they were disinclined to allow Polish infiltration of the principalities to extend further, however they changed their allegiance to Simeon when Radu Şerban, a lieutenant of Mihai Viteazul, launched his own, eventually successful, bid to take Wallachia.

Bogdan probably spent his time in Venice pursuing his cause with his usual energy. However he seems to have exhausted the opportunities there and was no longer confident of further support from Venice. He returned to Constantinople where he threw himself upon the sympathy of the English embassy which hid him and gave him protection

from his enemies. Initially Henry Lello, who was ambassador at this time, appears to have had some sympathy for Bogdan's predicament, but later on, after a longer acquaintance, he developed a considerable animosity towards the pretender. It should also be remembered that Bogdan appears to have been regarded as Ieremie Movilă's unofficial chief rival and a front-running candidate for the Moldavian throne if Movilă were to be removed by the Ottomans. It may have been argued within the embassy that it might be in England's interest to be on friendly terms with Bogdan and to have his gratitude. It was at this time that opposition to Ieremie's rule crystallised into a request, by boyars hostile to the increased Polish involvement in the internal affairs of Moldavia and of those personally hostile to Movilă, to the Ottoman *Divan* to replace him with Bogdan. The latter even had the support of the *Kapu-kihaya* of Moldavia (the Prince's permanent Envoy in Constantinople). Unfortunately for Bogdan he was outbid by Movilă's supporters. (59)

Encouraged by his kind treatment at the hands of the English Embassy staff Bogdan decided to travel to England to seek the patronage of Queen Elizabeth I. Lello may have made it clear to Bogdan that he would not support his suit on his own initiative because it might be considered that he was extending his remit as ambassador by becoming too closely involved in Ottoman affairs to the detriment of his duties on behalf of the English mercantile community in the Levant. As we saw in Chapter III, Lello appears to have considered the role of the embassy in the same light as did the Levant Company, that is to promote

and protect the Company's trade. Bogdan therefore probably intended to force Lello to support him by obtaining the support of the English Crown, something which Lello could not ignore. The pretender left Constantinople in 1601 and arrived in England well informed enough to approach the Earl of Salisbury in the first instance; perhaps he had been so informed by Glover or John Sanderson. Ironically in his absence he was said to have been offered the Moldavian throne in November 1601.

The previous year, around February 1600, he had changed his name to Ștefan Bogdan; this was probably as a response to Ieremie's more and more extravagant claims of an illustrious ancestry and, as was explained earlier in this chapter, the pretender wished to strengthen his own claim to be a descendent of the original princely family in Moldavia.

I have already discussed the traditional method of succession in Moldavia. Ieremie Movilă deviated from this custom because he was not of "princely bone". His installation and the establishment of a right of succession exclusively for his sons and grandsons, confirmed but not upheld by the Ottomans, was an attempt to establish a new procedure explicitly based on primogeniture which overrode the old principle of election by the boyars. Succession based on primogeniture did not take root in the principalities until 1866 when Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was invited to ascend the throne of Romania. The Ottomans probably never intended to maintain the arrangement agreed with Poland; after Ieremie's death they installed his brother Simeon because his son Constantin was too young to rule in his own right. Constantin

attained the throne in his own right in 1608 but was removed by the Ottomans in 1610, with the excuse that he was late in paying his tribute. By this time Ottoman interests no longer dictated the need to maintain good relations with Poland. A major consequence of Ieremie's installation was to introduce a new family with a claim to rule since it was descended from former princes.

It was untrue to suggest that Ieremie was a mere puppet of the Polish Crown. He and his family were leaders of a strong faction in Moldavia which had aligned itself to Poland and which had held high office in the principality, where the Movilă were also major landowners; Ieremie enjoyed considerable respect amongst his fellow boyars both at home and in exile. He was put forward by King Zygmund III of Poland as an honest and capable ruler who would rule justly and, it was hoped, bring order to the principality thereby preventing it becoming a centre of disturbance in the region. Miron Costin described him thus:

“He was a man of integrity in all ways, not proud, not bloodthirsty, kind, God fearing.” (60)

He was wealthy in his own right and could draw on his own resources to support his household etc., rather than impose excessive taxes; his family were connected by kinship with influential individuals at home and abroad, including the Lapuşneanu family. He was a soldier and later showed himself as a skilled diplomat when he negotiated peace agreements between the Tatar Khan and Poland. It was hoped he might restore Moldavia to prosperity and greater peace than had been enjoyed for the last quarter century.

Nevertheless, admirable qualities did not give Ieremie a right to rule, although many of Moldavia's great boyars probably considered themselves more fit to rule than those whom the Ottomans had previously imposed on them, the "imaginary offspring of Moldavian Voievods". Ieremie was therefore presented as:

"an upright man who is blood of blood, the illustrious and magnificent Prince Ieremie Movila." (61)

His princely descent was through the female line, for his father had been Ioan Movilă, Grand *Logofăt* of Hudești in the district of Dorohoi, none of whose ancestors were the sons of princes. His mother was Maria, the daughter of Petru Rareș, and granddaughter of Ștefan Cel Mare. (62)

Ieremie was raised to the throne in 1595, probably with the consent of a considerable proportion of the boyar estate who may have expected a greater role in governing the principality and also a re-establishment of their influence in choosing a prince. The ideas inherent in the 'Noble Democracy' which existed in Poland-Lithuania were popular in Moldavia amongst many boyars because they embodied the concept of the King ruling only so long as he enjoyed the consent of the noble estate. The nobility also elected their ruler and had a comprehensive set of rights which the king could not violate without forfeiting his right to rule. However neither Ieremie nor King Zygmund had any intention of allowing the introduction of any such system in Moldavia, hence the promulgation of the Movilă succession in 1597. The hereditary system was intended to ensure Moldavia remained in Poland's orbit because the prince's position would be closely bound to

friendship with the state which guaranteed the succession and therefore his right to rule. In the interests of regional stability Moldavia briefly transferred the right to confirm rulers from Ottoman hands to Polish hands.

The expansion of Movilă power to Wallachia (1601-02) was part of an expansionist policy undertaken to strengthen Poland-Lithuania's position with relation to the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, as well as to make the Movilă family's tenure in Moldavia more secure. Mihai Viteazul had tried to secure his own position as a power in Eastern Europe by a personal union of the principalities of Wallachia, Transylvania and Moldavia, Ieremie attempted to strengthen his position through a dynastic union of Wallachia and Moldavia.

Although Ieremie's interests were bound up with Poland's foreign policy, he did exert himself against the heavy-handedness of his Polish masters. He was particularly concerned at the activities of the Jesuits in his principality; he requested Meletius Pigas, the Patriarch of Constantinople, to come to Moldavia in person to strengthen the resistance of the Orthodox church. His brother Gheorghe, the Metropolitan of Moldavia, engaged in correspondence with Pigas, with some suggestion that the Metropolitanate be raised to a quasi-Patriarchate, which would not only strengthen the Church's position but also increase the prestige of the prince. This may be seen in the light of the Movila's alleged Imperial descent from the Flavian dynasty of the Emperors of Constantinople. Ieremie regarded his rule as having been

established through the will of God. (63) Herein lies the reason for Bogdan's name-change and his insistence of direct historical links between himself and the house of Bogdan.

By the time he arrived in England in 1601, Ștefan Bogdan had established himself as Ieremie's foremost competitor. His previous experience had shown him that success was not guaranteed by an impressive genealogy and money for bribes. His difficulties in establishing himself as a prince stemmed from the wider political context of relations between the major powers in Eastern Europe and the particular circumstances of the war between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. His fate was dependent on larger considerations than his alleged right to rule.

CHAPTER VI: STEFAN BOGDAN AND HENRY LELLO BETWEEN THE YEARS 1601 AND 1606

Ștefan Bogdan left Constantinople late in 1600 with the intention of recruiting another foreign sovereign to his cause. The patronage of various Venetian *baili* since 1593 had failed to gain him the Moldavian throne, therefore a new approach was needed. At this time he still enjoyed good relations with the Doge of Venice but the energetic backing which his cause required seems no longer to have been forthcoming from that direction. The most useful backers for Bogdan's purposes were those sovereigns who maintained a permanent diplomatic presence in Constantinople. As Bogdan had already exhausted the possibilities of Venetian backing, France or England were the only likely candidates. As we know from Chapter IV, France had previously been the most attractive proposition for itinerant princes in search of a protector, however England under the ambassadorship of Edward Barton had superseded France in that respect. Even after Barton's death, Queen Elizabeth's reputation in the Ottoman capital still rode high. Bogdan was still optimistic about his chances of success; as we shall see, Henry Lello considered this optimism to have been extremely unrealistic.

Bogdan had in his possession letters of recommendation from various princes to pave his way to the Queen of England's presence, including a letter from the Doge of Venice, who attested to his princely status and to Venice's good opinion of him and confirmed that Bogdan

enjoyed the honour and respect of the Ottoman Sultan. On reaching Western Europe, Bogdan was presented with a further opportunity to win the Queen's favour, by serving in her forces in Flanders: he probably took part in the English defence of Ostend in July 1601. (1) This action seems typical of Bogdan, combining a sense of chivalry, an eye to what might forward his interests and a willingness to take decisive action even though considerable risk was involved. He was able to present himself to Queen Elizabeth asking for a favour with claims upon her gratitude. During his audience with Elizabeth he no doubt used all his charm to impress upon her the "unjustness" of his situation and his claim to the Moldavian throne:

"... descended of the Despots, ancient governours of that province... descende[d] from the auncient familie of Paleologies sometimes Emperours of Constantinople..."

Queen Elizabeth stated that she was moved to offer him help out of respect for a fellow prince in distressed circumstances and made him a gift of a thousand crowns.

Bogdan had originally intended to stay in England throughout the winter of 1601-2, but received letters from his mother asking him to return to Constantinople as soon as possible. The letters from Bogdan's mother probably refer to an offer of the Moldavian throne made in his absence, as mentioned in the previous chapter. In order to reassure Secretary of State Cecil that England was supporting a likely cause, Bogdan stated that he was confident that some agreement could be reached which would yield him the throne of Moldavia. (2) In reality he does not appear

to have been optimistic about his chances of reaching such an agreement and did not hurry his departure; he remained in England until after the Christmas festivities, leaving on 29th December, nearly a month after he had made certain of English support. Being a cosmopolitan individual he probably found the extravagant court festivities greatly to his taste and may even have been genuinely keen to linger in England just as he had lingered in Venice during his visits there; furthermore London offered a welcome respite from the dangers of Constantinople. The pretender's intelligence, forceful personality and his extraordinary experiences probably made him a popular figure at the English court. He was aware of the importance of making himself visible and of making as many friends as possible who might be useful to him later. Bogdan left England on December 29th 1601, travelling to Venice where his arrival, on March 5th 1602, was reported to Cecil by Anthony Tracy; this suggests that he broke his journey to Venice somewhere, since the quickest journey to Venice, by sea, did not take two months. Similarly he appears to have lingered in Venice, since he did not arrive in Constantinople until July 1602. (3) This gives rise to the suspicion that Bogdan was not anxious to return to Constantinople because he was extremely nervous of his reception there and furthermore that he could have been acquiring the support of parties whom he subsequently kept secret.

Robert Cecil's letter to Lello, requesting him to accord Bogdan his assistance, is very revealing of the nature of the support accorded to

Bogdan. Cecil was not fully convinced of the pretender's true status or claim to the Moldavian throne. He set out the pretender's credentials with the qualification:

“... this nobleman Stefan Bogdan, son as he pretendeth of Janicula Bogdan...”;

the phrase “as he pretendeth” is used in the sense of “as he claims”, nevertheless Cecil was determined to proceed with the utmost caution in this matter. The reference to Iancu Sasul as “Janicula Bogdan” suggests that Bogdan's explanation of his genealogy was deliberately confusing in order to reinforce his claim to be a true descendent of the house of Bogdan, the original ruling house of the principality.

Cecil set out the precise terms of Queen Elizabeth's favour towards Bogdan. The pretender had asked for the Queen's letter of recommendation to Lello:

“To the end that under youre [i.e. Lello's] favoure and proteccion he might there remaine in better safetie during the time of his expectancy.”

In other words Bogdan had convinced the Queen that his success was a foregone conclusion and he merely awaited the time of his preferment. We also know that Elizabeth agreed to help him out of sympathy; there was no question of a major English diplomatic undertaking to engineer Bogdan's appointment to the Moldavian throne in order to improve English commerce. Bogdan had approached the Queen having performed her a service and she had responded by according him protection whilst he awaited his preferment to his throne. Bogdan

probably presented himself to the English Court as a man who shared religious sympathies with the Queen of England and may indeed have led the Queen to believe that he was a Protestant. The fact that Ieremie Movilă was supported by the King of Poland, Zygmund III Vasa, a devout Roman Catholic, may have been presented by Bogdan as an additional argument for the Protestant Queen of England to support him. Cecil made it very clear to Lello that the English Embassy was not to get involved in tricky negotiations or in matters which were the internal affairs of a friendly state. Lello was told to investigate Bogdan's circumstances and proceed according to his own judgment, based on his knowledge and experience of Ottoman affairs. He should look after the prince's person and his affairs only:

“in suche sorte as the true state of them shall uppon due consideration had by you seeme to require and be fittinge for you as her Majestye's Agente to deale in.” (4)

Cecil and his colleagues in the Privy Council interpreted the Queen's instructions to her Ambassador to ensure that Anglo-Ottoman relations were not harmed by interference in matters which were none of England's business.

Only a small number of people in England were in any way concerned with foreign affairs. The importance of foreign travel in this period should not be exaggerated. Before 1604 the civil war in France and England's enmity with the Habsburgs reduced the prospects of private travel and most of those who did travel were unlikely to venture as far as the Balkans: men such as John Newberie or William Lithgow were

exceptionally adventurous travellers; the more usual destinations for those wishing to broaden their horizons were France and Italy, therefore very few people in England would have had any knowledge at all of Moldavia or indeed of the Ottoman Empire. Those professionally involved in foreign affairs were a small group unrepresentative of the English political community as a whole. Decisions were usually made by a small inner group of the Privy Council, which had no fixed rules to guide the transaction of business or to dictate who should take decisions. Day to day business and correspondence was dealt with by the Secretary of State, at this time Robert Cecil. It was to Cecil that the Ambassador in Constantinople sent his reports, therefore one expects that he was aware of the complicated status of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. He seems to have suspected that Ștefan Bogdan's assessment of his chance of being elected to the Moldavian throne did not accord with the true state of affairs, hence his cautious approach to involving the English Embassy in the pretender's affairs and his instructions to Lello to use his own judgment. (5) Thus while reiterating the Queen's keenness to help an unfortunate Prince, Cecil explicitly warned Lello that the Privy Council wished to maintain the utmost caution and suggested that it would not be appropriate:

“for you to followe or prosecute any of his [Bogdan's] desires that you find to be distastefull to the state where you remaine or in any sorte prejudicall to her Majesty's honor, nor to be at any extraordinary charges other than to protect him for a time from any violence that might be attempted against him by the malicious practise of his competitor.” (6)

This passage is particularly revealing: firstly it made clear that the protection accorded to Bogdan was intended only to be an aside to the normal business of the embassy and should not be allowed to interfere with that business or sour relations with the Ottomans. Secondly it shows that Cecil did not trust Bogdan. Furthermore, Lello was assured that whilst he was expected to offer Bogdan hospitality and protection at the embassy, he was not expected to support Bogdan's campaign with any money belonging to the embassy. He was expected to protect Bogdan against attempts against his life at the instance of Ieremie Movilă, but there was no duty to intervene between Bogdan and the Ottoman authorities. Finally protection was not accorded indefinitely. Essentially Cecil's letter was carefully worded so as to minimise the English Ambassador's obligations towards Ștefan Bogdan.

The phrase which advised Lello not to indulge in activities distasteful to the Ottoman Empire was particularly important to the English Ambassador; he drew attention to it in much of his correspondence concerning Bogdan and used it to justify his failure to secure the pretender's release from prison which was used by his enemies to cast doubts upon his integrity. Henry Lello acknowledged the Queen's desire to help an unfortunate and, although he would have been aware of the pretender's former identity as Bogdan Sasul, he was assiduous in referring to him as Ștefan Bogdan. There does not appear to have been any hostility between Lello and Bogdan but Lello was already intent on remaining aloof from the pretender's affairs; indeed in

his first communication on the matter, Lello made clear that Bogdan was unlikely to succeed in securing the throne of Moldavia. There was, therefore, from the very beginning, the potential for strained relations between the pretender and the ambassador because their respective perceptions of the embassy's projected role in Bogdan's campaign were fundamentally different: the pretender expected Lello to take on his suit as a major plank of English policy in the region. On the other hand Lello immediately wrote to Cecil of how he intended to proceed: he would assist Bogdan because the Queen's patronage was the unfortunate man's only hope, and he could do no less. However, as instructed, he would proceed only so far as he considered was compatible with the embassy's current priority of maintaining good Anglo-Ottoman relations; therefore, if he discovered that the Sultan did not wish to prefer Bogdan, which was considered the most likely scenario as we shall see, the issue would not be persevered with and he would consider his duty to extend only to obtaining the Sultan's assurance that Bogdan would be in no danger of the molestation and violence which had so troubled him before. England's diplomacy on behalf of Bogdan was therefore intended to be a very low-key affair, the whole matter was to be dealt with tentatively and Bogdan was not considered to be of great importance.

We must assume that Cecil was aware of the delicate balance of power in South-East Europe, since this had been dealt with quite comprehensively in previous correspondence from Constantinople, and his main concern was not to add to the difficulties of the Ottoman Empire

by provoking Poland to abandon her neutrality and join the Holy League against the Ottomans. England was not in favour of Ottoman expansion but equally she was not in favour of an expansion of Habsburg influence eastwards into Moldavia and Wallachia. Furthermore, whilst English merchants were in a favourable trading position in the Sultan's dominions their interests were best served by the maintenance of the *status quo* in the region. Therefore one may conjecture that the Privy Council's instructions to Lello, asking him to use his superior knowledge of the Ottoman Empire to decide how to proceed, were intended to elicit information which would justify a very guarded approach to the Queen's intention to support Ştefan Bogdan; if this was indeed their intention, they were successful.

Lello explained the difficulties facing Bogdan and asked that the Queen be informed of them in order that he might be protected from blame in the event of Bogdan's failure. He warned that the pretender had:

“made choice of a time very adverse to his said sute and preiudiciall to his person,”

because the Ambassador of the King of Poland was pressing for the confirmation of Simeon Movilă's occupation of the Wallachian throne and of Ieremie's rights as Prince of Moldavia. (7)

Mihai Viteazul had been executed on the orders of Georgio Basta, the Habsburg field commander in Hungary, on August 19th 1601, being considered guilty of treachery by offering to change his allegiance to the Sultan. The Ottomans intended to replace him on the throne of Wallachia

with Radu Mihnea, thereby returning the principality to the Ottoman orbit. Poland and Ieremie Movilă had other plans and when Radu attempted to enter the principality in December 1601, he was prevented from obtaining "quiete possession" of the throne and was driven out of Wallachia by Simeon Movilă. The Sultan was very aggrieved at this turn of events but was unwilling to risk a breach with Poland and appears to have prevaricated rather than impose Radu, who was eventually captured by Polish forces (February 1602). The Sultan was thus forced to accept Simeon as the prince and asked for Radu to be allowed to return to Constantinople. Simeon was not popular with many of the Wallachian boyars who attempted to overthrow him. (8)

In addition to demands for Ieremie and Simeon's confirmation, Poland was pressing the Sultan to relinquish control of four fortresses in Moldavia: Akerman, Killej (Chilia), Bender and Ismael. This demand was unacceptable to the Sultan who responded with delaying tactics. He refused to allow the Polish Ambassador to leave Constantinople with an answer whilst he awaited the outcome of the summer's campaign after which he would either be in a position to risk Poland's hostility and strike against the principalities to restore them to Ottoman control or be forced to accede to Poland's demands. For the moment the Ottomans were hardly likely to prefer Bogdan:

"being... in many bryars [i.e. having many problems] having their hands full on all sides, and therefore no reason further to intreague themselves," (9)

and if they were to overthrow Ieremie, Bogdan would not be assured of

success because he would be faced with the perennial problem encountered by all pretenders, that is of raising sufficient money to secure the nomination to the throne.

Bogdan's lack of financial support was likely to offer a major problem; the Polish Ambassador knew of his return to Constantinople and was spending a great deal of money in bribes to ensure that Ieremie was confirmed in Moldavia and that Bogdan was sent into perpetual exile. This outcome was deemed extremely likely by Lello because, whilst his competitors were "rich and mighty", Bogdan was poor and distressed, having lived three years in virtual banishment and narrowly escaping with his life. (10) Lello may have been over pessimistic about Bogdan's chances of success because he wished to distance himself from the project. Nevertheless for Bogdan the acquisition of English patronage was a step forward because it protected him from Ieremie's enmity rather than because it significantly improved his chances of gaining the Moldavian throne.

Lello's second communication with Cecil enlarged on the inherent problems in the pretender's suit: Bogdan had some support for his claim to the throne but none of his supporters were in a position to offer him useful assistance. Bogdan's anonymous supporters may have included a great many disgruntled Moldavian boyars and Lello informed Cecil that the pretender was in danger of becoming involved in dangerous intrigues against the Movilă princes and turning the English Embassy into a centre of intrigue; such behaviour would do much to hinder rather

than further his cause. The Ottomans apparently suspected Bogdan of assembling a coterie which plotted a course of action which would upset the Ottoman's current understanding with Poland. Such proceedings, if true, would be immensely damaging to Bogdan's protectors, including Lello, because they could also be suspected of being involved in Bogdan's plottings; any such involvement would be detrimental to the English commercial community's interest. Lello objected to having Bogdan's problems thrust upon him and began preparing the way for the pretender to be quietly persuaded to quit the Ottoman capital permanently.

It is likely that Bogdan was indeed flirting with the idea of subversive action against Ieremie Movilă: Lello reported that the pretender was pinning all his hopes on a breach occurring between the Ottomans and Poland which would allow him to press his claim to the Moldavian throne. Lello considered it more likely that such a breach would give the Ottoman army an opportunity to take the principality under direct rule. Lello's suspicions were probably well-founded: Moldavia and Wallachia had caused the Sultan so much trouble in the previous decade and direct annexation would ensure that the principalities could no longer form centres of intrigue. In any case Lello did not agree that a breach between Poland and the Ottoman Empire would take place: he reported that the fortresses which the King of Poland had requested the Sultan to cede were now in Habsburg hands and Poland would have to take them by force.

Meanwhile the Movilă brothers faced difficulties in their respective principalities, Wallachia was not willing to accept the:

“tyranny of Simion their prince nor willing any longer to be protected by 16 [the King of Poland] expelled Simion their cuntry and accorded with Georgio Basti: it is dayly expected that Bugdania will revolt allsoe...”

These developments threatened to allow the Habsburgs to infiltrate both principalities which would threaten both Poland and the Ottomans; such circumstances made it exceedingly unlikely that the Sultan would provoke Polish hostility in order to accommodate Bogdan; accordingly the Sultan confirmed Ieremie and Simeon on their respective thrones subject to their payment of tribute. (11)

Lello may have been guilty of overstating his case against Bogdan and, with hindsight, he was unwise to express his disquiet about Bogdan in such strong terms. When the pretender was imprisoned by the Ottomans, Lello was suspected of neglecting his orders to protect Bogdan; the latter accused his erstwhile protector of having betrayed him. The case against Lello was articulated in England by Gaspar Gratiani, Bogdan's servant and a man with considerable negotiating experience and formidable powers of persuasion, and Thomas Glover, who had much to gain from Lello's disgrace. Lello was forced to justify his conduct at length and his dislike of Bogdan, obvious from his letters, did not help his defence of his actions.

Relations between Lello and Bogdan had begun badly and deteriorated. The two men viewed the Queen of England's patronage in completely different terms. Bogdan expected to remain in the

ambassador's house until he was preferred to the Moldavian throne and expected his host to devote a large proportion of his time and energy to obtaining that object; Lello, however, considered that his primary duty was to protect Bogdan from attack or imprisonment at the hands of Ieremie Movilă and, although he had been ordered to help Bogdan's suit, his duty to do so only extended so far as his other duties as ambassador were not interfered with or hindered; therefore he went through the motions of pressing the Queen's recommendation upon the Sultan but was probably awaiting an opportunity to persuade the pretender to leave his residence, his protection and the Ottoman dominions for his own safety.

In a letter to the Earl of Salisbury Lello gave a detailed explanation of the circumstances which lead to Bogdan's imprisonment in the "Castle of Asia" on the Bosphorous. (He may have been referring to the fortress of Anadolu Hissar, although several castles were known as the "Castle of Asia"). It is unfortunate that Lello's version of these events is the only substantial source available; Bogdan's accusations against Lello only deal with the specific matter of his imprisonment. Lello's letter was written in November 1605 (some eighteen months after Bogdan's imprisonment, which took place in February or March 1604) after he had been given details of the accusations against him and after his receipt of Cecil's letter requesting an explanation of his conduct. It was a carefully prepared and extremely detailed justification of all his behaviour towards Bogdan, presenting the pretender in the worst possible light, as an unmitigated

scoundrel who had brought his imprisonment upon himself by his own foolish actions.

It should be noted that Thomas Glover, one of the chief protagonists in the campaign against Lello, was still in Constantinople when these events occurred. He left in December 1604, his arrival in London coincided with that of Gaspar Gratiani, indeed they probably travelled together, and it was at this juncture that rumours of Lello's ill-treatment of Bogdan surfaced. Glover and Lello parted on bad terms; Glover had not troubled to hide his contempt for his former master and he was aware of the hostility between Lello and Bogdan; if he had any suspicion that Lello's behaviour in the matter had been dishonourable he would surely have laid a complaint himself. It was Gratiani who testified that the ambassador had betrayed the late Queen's protégé; it seems likely that Glover seized on the opportunity presented to launch a campaign to secure Lello's removal from the embassy so that he could be his replacement. He was able to make use of his personal knowledge of bad relations between Bogdan and Lello to cast suspicion on the ambassador's behaviour, whilst making no accusations of misconduct himself. One should also take into account the fact that none of Lello's letters of 1603 contain any mention of his allegations concerning Bogdan, nor did he bother to inform Cecil of the pretender's imprisonment, which the latter had a right to expect. It appears that Lello had been careless as to the success of Bogdan's suit or as to what happened to him when he left the custody of the embassy. This is not to

say that Lello's whole version of events was a tissue of lies, but however much Bogdan may have abused Lello's protection, the latter's treatment of him left something to be desired.

One may infer from Lello's account of his dealings with Bogdan that his hostility stemmed from great irritation at the pretender's attempts to involve the English Embassy in his suit more than he wished it to be involved. Lello was adamant that he had done his best to press for Bogdan's installation in Moldavia, however his efforts followed strictly the instruction to proceed only so far as he did nothing to cause the English Embassy either to be distrusted or incur extra expense. Therefore one may conclude that Lello presented Queen Elizabeth's letters on Bogdan's behalf and upon being told that for the moment the Sultan was content to allow Ieremie to remain prince, he was content to leave the matter in abeyance, telling Bogdan that he should accept the situation. In any case, Lello knew that his advocacy of Bogdan would, on its own, achieve little, as he pointed out to Cecil:

“neither I nor no other Prince assigned her can obtain any sute without money or rewards, therefore they are farr from the truth that suppose any solicensing will obtain any business here without money...” (12)

Bogdan was also aware of this fact and, to his protector's annoyance, began offering money which he did not have to those closest to the Sultan:

“an in my [Lello's] absence he would not spare to pmyse his Matie [i.e. James I, (this must be after 4th June 1603 when Lello reported having heard of Queen Elizabeth's death)] should pforme yt and practised many devices to bring me in as confirmer of the same...” (13)

Bogdan and Lello found themselves greatly at odds; the former was obviously doing all he could to obtain loans of money elsewhere, as Aron had done years before. Many of those who might have been prepared to lend the pretender money would not be keen to do so when his chances of ascending the Moldavian throne were so bleak. Bankers in Constantinople would undoubtedly have been well-informed about the progress of the Sultan's war-effort and the situation in the principalities and therefore would have considered Bogdan a bad risk, particularly as Ieremie had the resources to outbid Bogdan. The pretender had suggested that the English Crown would act as guarantor of any loans and would also be prepared to pay bribes in return for its protégé's election to the Moldavian throne. Lello knew that this would never happen and was particularly concerned about these rumours because of his orders not to involve the embassy financially in Bogdan's campaign. Furthermore, Lello was aware that Edward Barton had become heavily in debt because he had been forced to act as guarantor of loans made to Aron *Vodă*, who had neglected to reimburse his creditors. Sensibly Lello soundly rebuffed Bogdan's suggestions that he stand surety.

Bogdan's counter-move was, so Lello alleged, to write letters and send agents into Moldavia to stir up the boyars to complain of the present prince. According to Lello's previous letters, there were plenty of disaffected Moldavians and Bogdan considered it advantageous to be in contact with them; Lello was seriously concerned that the man under his protection would be seen by the Ottomans as a troublemaker and a

subversive influence; he was strongly opposed to his embassy becoming embroiled in stirring up dissent in Moldavia, and seems to have attempted strong measures to curb Bogdan's actions.

Upon discovering what Bogdan was doing, the incumbent prince of Moldavia, Ieremie Movilă, asked the King of Poland to write to the Sultan and request him to banish Bogdan from Constantinople. However, the Vizier apparently wanted too much money to bring this about, so Ieremie instead asked for the pretender to be imprisoned; the Vizier was agreeable and arranged for a small force to remove Bogdan from Lello's house. Lello could not tolerate such an action since it was a violation of the privilege and status of the embassy and an insult to the memory of Queen Elizabeth who had ordered him to guarantee Bogdan's safety, therefore Lello warned the Vizier that his force would:

“find an unfriendly welcome.”

Lello was justifiably concerned at this state of affairs. Whilst living in his house Bogdan had taken advantage of his protection to conduct negotiations which threatened the integrity of the English Embassy. His presence there was no longer a mere irritation and it placed Lello and his staff in extreme difficulties in conducting their ordinary business. Lello's warning to the Vizier bore fruit because the latter was unwilling to carry out an attack on the English Embassy. Ieremie's plot to have Bogdan imprisoned was abandoned when the Vizier was deprived of his job. Lello felt that the incident justified him in abandoning his support for Bogdan's cause because to proceed would place the embassy at odds

with the Ottomans. Therefore he tried to persuade Bogdan that it would do best to leave Constantinople because his presence placed them both in danger. The Venetian Ambassador supported Lello's advice with his own: that Bogdan could expect trouble if he remained in Constantinople. He advised the pretender that his most sensible course would be to retire into Christendom. Lello anticipated that Ieremie would not desist in his efforts to avert Bogdan's challenge to his own position; he also argued that his own remit did not allow him to act in a manner which aroused the wrath of the Ottomans. However, Bogdan refused to leave:

"He answered me as though I were bound to provide for him, he could go nowhere unless I would give him money, holding my counsel rather to be an excuse in respect of the charge I was at of him than otherwise."

Bogdan then offered to quit the ambassador's house, saying that he would endure whatever happened rather than have Lello suffer any blame or trouble because of him. This appears to have been a ploy to excite Lello's pity so that he would persuade him to remain under the embassy's protection; if so this did not work. Bogdan remained in the embassy and Lello expressed himself very disappointed that the pretender did not keep his promise. Lello was hardhearted in his indifference to Bogdan's welfare. If Bogdan had indeed left as he had promised to do, he risked perpetual imprisonment or murder at the hands of Ieremie Movilă's agents. Lello was endeavouring to wash his hands of Bogdan's affairs and abandon him when he was extremely vulnerable. Bogdan, on the other hand, revealed a somewhat childish streak in threatening to put himself in danger in order to persuade Lello to treat

him with compassion, yet he was not so proud as to carry out his threat and remained in the English Embassy where he was patently unwelcome.

From the pretender's point of view, he could not afford either to leave Lello's protection, for obvious reasons, or to leave Constantinople, since this would have meant abandoning his hopes of obtaining the Moldavian throne. He had endured enormous hazards and difficulties during the previous ten years, suffering numerous disappointments. He therefore determined to cling to the only hope left which was to remain under Lello's protection. Lello later claimed that he wrote numerous letters to England asking for instructions, but received no reply; these letters, if they existed, have not survived in the State Papers.

Soon after this the old Sultan died, to be succeeded by his fourteen year old son Ahmet I [1603-1617] whose officers received new petitions from Ieremie. The Vizier approached Henry Lello asking him to deliver Bogdan to him so that he might:

“honour him and prefer him for the Queenes sake, for the 105 [the Sultan] is determynd to deprive Jeremia.” (14)

The English Ambassador did not trust the Vizier, thinking that this was a stratagem and:

“Desired him to deal playnly with me for yt would be to his dishonour and myne to execute any other designe upon him (being in my howse) he swore by God, his law and his Kings head (wch is there solempnest othe) that he determynd to prefer him.” (15)

Despite the Vizier's oaths, Lello had little confidence in what he was told;

he returned to his house, where he recounted the Vizier's proposals to the pretender, advising him that he expected the Vizier to practise some deception, and suggested that Bogdan should escape to safety in Christendom, leaving him to pacify the Vizier. Bogdan refused, saying he was prepared to go to the Vizier whatever happened to him.

Nevertheless the pretender did nothing for seven or eight days. It seems likely that Bogdan was in a quandary, afraid for his own safety, yet afraid also that he would regret not taking a chance, however small, to be preferred to the Moldavian throne. If he escaped from Constantinople he would lose any chance of gaining what he had been brought up to believe was his right. He spent a further week in Lello's house considering what to do, probably steeling himself to face possible imprisonment, whilst hoping that the Vizier was in earnest when he proposed to help Bogdan to the Moldavian throne. During Bogdan's difficult week of indecision the Vizier constantly pressed Lello for an answer and Lello in his turn called on Bogdan asking him what he intended to do. Eventually Bogdan decided to take hold of his courage; he told his protector that when the Vizier sent for him he would go. According to Lello, Bogdan left the safety of the English Embassy of his own accord, he was not led away as a prisoner and did not leave expecting to be ill-treated. One can imagine, however, that Lello's demeanour towards Bogdan left the latter in no doubt that his choice was between the Vizier's offer and exile in Christendom and that continued residence in the embassy was not on offer; it seems likely that Bogdan

was under great pressure to make a rapid decision.

Lello insisted that Bogdan was not ill-treated by the Vizier nor was he dragged out of the embassy and thrown into prison. He was lodged in the Vizier's house, although he was requested not to leave, and the Vizier daily promised that he would be preferred to the Moldavian throne. Lello insisted that he had devoted considerable time and energy to ensuring that the Vizier kept his promise. He argued that if the pretender had had any misgivings about his own safety, he had plenty of opportunity to quit the Vizier's residence. Bogdan was eventually sent to prison as a result of Ieremie Movilă's agents' bribery. Although Bogdan had been guaranteed English protection by Queen Elizabeth against the scheming of Movilă, Lello considered that his duty towards him had finished; Bogdan had brought his imprisonment upon himself. As we shall see, King James and Secretary of State Cecil disagreed with this interpretation of the ambassador's duty of protection

Lello appears to have been glad that the matter of Bogdan's long residence in his house had finally been resolved and he wanted nothing more to do with his former charge, therefore he did nothing to obtain Bogdan's release:

"And by cause himselfe hath now no meanes to excuse his former follyes and releve himselfe I recovered him not after he was imprysoned, wch was no tyme for me, in regard I had too many contencions wth the Vizerey about our corsaires... and other divers sutes of the marchants..."

The death of Queen Elizabeth had brought further difficulties, when the Ottomans refused to recognise the embassy; besides this he had been

ordered to do nothing which might damage relations with the host country. Lello considered that to interfere with the Vizier's conduct of policy towards one of the Sultan's vassal states at a time when the English community was not popular due to the activities of English pirates in the Mediterranean would only add to the Ottoman ill-feeling already in existence. Furthermore he had been requested not to put the embassy to great expense on Bogdan's behalf:

“wch I could not avoid beeing 2 yeeres and a half in my house wth 4 svants and daley recourse to him wch he supposed I was bound unto.”

Therefore he considered his time would be best spent:

“to preferre the business wherein I am here imployed then following the said Princes sute.”

Lello apologised for thus having misunderstood his government's instructions.

Almost immediately upon his imprisonment, Bogdan wrote to his protectors in England. We must assume he was fully aware that Lello was unlikely to make any efforts to obtain his release. The careless attitude of his former protector towards his safety fuelled the pent-up hostility which had evidently been burning in Bogdan during his two-year sojourn in the English Embassy. Furthermore, years of ill-treatment at the hands of others appears to have filled the pretender with paranoia, convincing him that he must have been betrayed by Lello; therefore in his letter of 7th March 1604, Bogdan launched a forceful attack on Lello, accusing him of plotting with Ieremie Movilă and his agents to obtain his

imprisonment:

“I am a prisoner in the castle of Asia, because of Henry Lello who had become close friends with my mortal enemy, Jeremia...” (16)

Bogdan alleged that Ieremie had sent agents to Constantinople to negotiate with Lello for his help against Bogdan and induced the ambassador to accept a sum of money in return for betraying Bogdan to the Vizier. Bogdan suggested that the ambassador was guilty of high treason: he argued that Lello had gone to the Vizier and offered to deliver Bogdan into his custody. He alleged that Lello had decided to act on his own initiative instead of following orders from the late Queen and justified his actions on the grounds that Bogdan was involved in a conspiracy with rebels in Wallachia against the Sultan's authority. The Vizier then, it is alleged, contacted Ieremie's agents who confirmed Lello's words. Soon afterwards, the Vizier sent three men to remove Bogdan from Lello's house, bursting into his quarters and beating him. Bogdan said that he had pleaded with Lello not to abandon him but his erstwhile protector had wished to know nothing about him. Bogdan was then placed in the Vizier's custody and was lodged in his house for many days before being sent to prison.

If Cecil received this letter soon after it was written he did nothing to help Bogdan. It is possible that he did not believe the accusations contained therein until he met with Gaspar Gratiani a year later and consulted Glover about Lello's attitudes and behaviour towards Bogdan. This scenario is possible since one may infer from Cecil's correspondence on the matter that he did not believe the English

Ambassador had been bribed by Ieremie Movilă to betray Bogdan; however it seems highly unlikely that Cecil would not have written to Lello on receiving this letter to ask for an explanation of the pretender's imprisonment. (17) Furthermore the tone of Cecil's letters to Lello after Gratiani's visit suggest that the charges of misconduct were completely new to him. Therefore it is most likely that Cecil was not aware of Bogdan's imprisonment and his disputes with Lello until June 1605 when Gratiani visited England, probably conveying Bogdan's letter with him. As we shall see below, Cecil initially believed that Lello had indeed delivered the pretender to the Ottomans.

Gratiani arrived in England some time before June 26th 1605 and wrote to Robert Cecil, now Earl of Salisbury, as an initial approach. In this letter he outlined the fate of his master, Ștefan Bogdan, reminding Cecil that Bogdan had received the express favour of Queen Elizabeth I and had been specially recommended to her Ambassador in Constantinople. Bogdan, and therefore Gratiani, were probably unaware that Cecil had been anxious that Bogdan's campaign be supported only with great caution. Gratiani refers to the Secretary of State as having been the pretender's "first protector". This statement suggests a certain ambiguity about Cecil's previous relationship with Bogdan, for he appears to have given Bogdan the impression that he was in favour of supporting his suit for the Moldavian throne, whereas Cecil's correspondence with Lello suggests that it was Queen Elizabeth who had decided to support Bogdan and that Cecil had great reservations about the project but had

been ordered to deal with the matter on her behalf. All this shows that Bogdan had misunderstood Cecil's behaviour towards him: no doubt the pretender had been treated kindly by him. Cecil had probably expressed his best wishes and ensured that Bogdan gained an audience with the Queen in order that, if Bogdan were to be successful in gaining the Moldavian throne, he would be well-disposed towards England's interests in the region. However, Cecil was more concerned to protect the English Embassy's standing in Constantinople and as we have seen recommended Lello to proceed in a manner which did not involve the embassy in such intrigue as would disrupt the Ottomans' relations with other states. Nevertheless, because Bogdan was confident of Cecil's friendship, Gratiani approached Cecil privately; this may be why Bogdan's letter is to be found in Cecil's private correspondence and not in the State Papers. (18)

Gratiani did not, in this letter, allege any improper conduct by Lello towards Bogdan:

"The latter [i.e. Lello] afforded him protection in his house from which the Prince was removed to the danger and damage of his Crown and to his personal damage."

There is no suggestion here that Lello had betrayed Bogdan; furthermore, Gratiani did not request Cecil to continue the campaign for Bogdan's election to the Moldavian throne; he merely asked that Lello be told to do all he could to ensure that the pretender was restored to health and liberty. (19) There followed a meeting between Gratiani and Cecil in which the former gave his assurance that Bogdan had not been plotting

against the Sultan, apparently the pretext upon which he had been imprisoned, and had therefore done nothing to justify his treatment. Bogdan was, so Gratiani alleged, delivered to the Ottomans by the practice of his enemies whilst under Lello's protection. Cecil did not at this time know of Lello's contention that Bogdan had left the English Embassy of his own accord and was naturally concerned as to how Bogdan had been removed from the embassy without Lello attempting to prevent this. Cecil ordered Lello to do all he could to obtain Bogdan's restoration to liberty:

"which he had when he was delivered by you out of your house," (20)

but, probably in order not to disrupt the work of the embassy, did not attempt to have Lello recalled. This is another indication that the project to support Bogdan was not a major undertaking in the eyes of the English Crown.

It is likely that Cecil consulted Thomas Glover, who had been employed at the embassy whilst Bogdan was there. There is no record of what Glover might have said but we know that he was privy to Cecil's suspicions about his conduct because he wrote to Lello to inform him of Cecil's displeasure. (21) It is unlikely that Glover would risk appearing disloyal to his former master by making his own allegations, but he did nothing to dispel the impression that Lello had been negligent of his duty. His previous employment at the English Embassy ensured that he would have been well-placed to testify of the hostility between Lello and Bogdan; any such testimony provided a powerful case against Lello.

For Salisbury and the English Crown the dispute over the circumstances of Bogdan's imprisonment was potentially damaging to the good name of the English Embassy: if Lello had indeed been party to the pretender's forced delivery he might have to be recalled in disgrace, having betrayed the late Queen's trust. If Lello were innocent of the allegations the implications for the status of the English Embassy were profound, for it meant that the Ottomans had scant regard for the rights of protection belonging to the English Crown.

King James I was informed of Bogdan's imprisonment and determined to intervene to secure the pretender's release, partly out of Christian charity and "princely commiseration" towards a Christian prince:

"who comes somewhat near to him in his profession of the Gospel."

Bogdan had been brought up and formally followed the Orthodox rite. On his visit to England he may have persuaded Queen Elizabeth that the Orthodox and Protestant faiths had much in common, but it is much more likely that he had allowed Queen Elizabeth to believe that he had adopted his father's Lutheran faith. In any case, religious faith was not, as we shall see, an important influence in Bogdan's life; he is unlikely to have allowed religious scruples to hinder him in furthering his own ends.

A second reason for the King's intervention was that Bogdan had placed himself under the protection of the English Crown and during the lifetime of Queen Elizabeth had not been disturbed:

"he [King James] holds himself a little engaged in reputation that any person, who upon confidence of safety from his Majesty's

predecessor put himself into the hands of that state, should presently upon her decease become a miserable prisoner: a matter wherein the world may justly not[e] an apparent difference of that respect towards his Majesty which was yielded to the late Queen.” (22)

The King had succeeded Elizabeth not only in her rights and dominions but also in her friendships with other princes, he therefore had a moral duty to continue England’s protection of Ștefan Bogdan. King James wrote a letter in his support, which has not survived but which, according to Cecil, showed how serious was the Crown’s concern over Bogdan’s imprisonment. A copy of Gratiani’s minute was enclosed in Cecil’s communication and Lello was warned that he was expected to do all he could to help Bogdan.

In a letter of 27th October 1605 Lello informed Cecil that he had received letters on the subject of Ștefan Bogdan and another prisoner, Sir Thomas Sherley. Lello did not take the allegations against him very seriously; he pointed out that he was at present greatly occupied with the matter of an English merchant captured by the Ottomans in Cyprus and therefore intended to wait until this matter was resolved before taking up Bogdan’s case. He insisted that Bogdan had placed himself in the hands of the Vizier of his own accord and that the pretender’s allegations were completely untrue. Furthermore he could not foresee success in obtaining the pretender’s release, (23) since it was Ottoman policy to hold hostages to the incumbent Prince’s good behaviour:

“yf I recover him, they will expecte I should be pledged he shall geve th other no disturbe, and lastly he is the 105 [the Sultan’s] subiecte and hath his pension and pay for many yeares.”

He was angry that “sinister” reports by Bogdan had damaged his reputation:

“... [Bogdan had been] emboldened to informe a prince and monarke such as his Matie is, wch untruthes wch he hath the rather apprehended because he obtayned her Mates deceased gracious lres wth the lyke by saing he was the son of one Despote and his mother of the Palliologies, and how the 10 [Emperor] sent for him, all untruthes.”

Lello thus showed his venom towards the pretender by casting aspersions upon the genealogy of which he was so proud. His attack on Bogdan’s claim to the Moldavian throne was not justified, there is plenty of evidence that Bogdan was the man he claimed to be; this serves to show how bad the relations between the two men had become.

Nevertheless Lello was compelled eventually to do his duty, but it was not until January 1606 that he delivered the King’s letters pertaining to Bogdan’s imprisonment. He received the following answer:

“he is a turke and therefore he is not to be license[d] to go out of the Countrey.” (24)

This was not an overt refusal to release Bogdan, but merely a delaying tactic; Lello continued to press for the pretender’s release, but was able to achieve nothing further because the Ottomans made the excuse that they were occupied with the defence of Hungary against the Habsburgs and with further troubles in Persia. (25) No progress had been made by May 1606, when Lello was told that the Ottomans would not release Bogdan and that the Sultan was writing to King James about the whole affair. (26) Lello concluded that the more he tried to obtain Bogdan’s release, the more determined the Ottomans were to keep him in prison.

Thomas Glover, on his arrival in Constantinople as Lello's successor, conducted an investigation into Bogdan's imprisonment and his subsequent escape. He implied that Lello's failure to protect Bogdan had nearly resulted in the latter's death: after two years in prison Ieremie had procured an order for his execution by strangulation. Two men were sent to the fortress to carry out the execution. Bogdan appears to have received advance warning because he had escaped two days before they arrived, dressed in the clothes of a Turkish woman probably supplied by the prison keeper's wife. The whole operation was very dangerous to all involved. Bogdan's powerful and manipulative personality enabled him to persuade people to help him at risk to their own safety. (27) Another facet of Bogdan's character is revealed by his subsequent behaviour. He displayed a sense of obligation to protect those who had helped him whilst also trying to lay a false trail for those in pursuit, an intelligent move which was also to cause immense difficulties for Henry Lello, the man he believed to have betrayed him:

“and after he was some 40 myles... out of danger wryteth a letter to the keeper of the castell, that he should not trouble any of his people for his escape, for none were consenting thereto, and yf he would have anything to say to him he should come to the Englishe Ambassadors house in Constantinople where he should find him.” (28)

It is inconceivable that Bogdan would have been so stupid as to return to Constantinople; in actual fact he escaped to Wallachia. He was making the most of the opportunity to wreak his revenge on Lello. The pretender's letter was brought to the Grand Vizier who sent for Lello,

having been incited to take action by Ieremie Movilă, and ordered him to deliver Bogdan. He would not listen when told that Lello knew nothing of the escape:

“when I sawe no reasion would prevaile wth him, byde him goe looke him for I was not his Jaylor.” (29)

The investigation of the pretender's escape was wide-ranging and severe; many people were questioned and some tortured to death. Lello suspected that if Bogdan were caught he would be executed. One of those tortured to death revealed the true manner of Bogdan's escape; unfortunately Lello did not see fit to dwell on this, preferring to enlarge on his own difficulties caused by the pretender. The Vizier now accepted that Lello had had no part in the escape, but still thought that he was hiding the fugitive in his house. Lello was told to deliver him over: if the Sultan, who had been kept in ignorance, should hear of it he would ransack the embassy to find Bogdan, being a “furious youth”. Lello's extreme irritation at the trouble he had been caused spilled over into his writing in a manner which is uncharacteristic of his correspondence:

“This I hope is the last trouble I shall have for him and yf I wheare wourthy to give advice herein his Matie should do well not to harken to these compterfitt and [dominating?] fellowes that give themselves names of Princes: they ruynated my predicessor and my self they have much troubled and hindered me in business: the Queenes Matie decease, his highness and Queene now is wth your honor not well used wth there sinister informacons wch god willing at my retorne I will make more manifest to yor honor.” (30)

Allegations about Lello's behaviour towards Bogdan were still being made a year later when he was recalled to England and forced to defend his conduct; by this time the affair had become part of the dispute raging

between Glover and Lello described in Chapter III. Lello's unsolicited advice above implies that the English Crown had little understanding of the realities faced by its Ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan. Furthermore, in Lello's view, involvement with pretenders damaged rather than furthered England's interests. This affair demonstrates that the Crown was prepared to ignore advice from those who had greater knowledge of Ottoman affairs and used the embassy for diplomatic purposes which did not further the commercial interests of the Levant Company.

Lello had been able to improve his relations with the Grand Vizier once it was realised that he was not sheltering Bogdan. Moldavian politics were further complicated, meanwhile, by the death of Ieremie Movilă, which initiated a dispute between Poland and the Ottomans over authority to choose his successor: the King of Poland sent a Chief Palatine in charge of an army to establish Ieremie's son Constantin in the Principality, warning the Ottomans that the authority to do so belonged to him. As we saw in the last chapter, the principle of securing a hereditary succession in Moldavia guaranteed by the King of Poland was central to the maintenance of Polish influence in the principality. The Sultan responded by creating Simeon Movilă, Constantin's uncle, Prince of Moldavia and sent him his authority. This was clearly intended to assert the Sultan's continued right to choose the Prince of Moldavia, whilst not being unnecessarily provocative, since Simeon was still a member of the Movilă dynasty and could be expected to maintain good relations with Poland. Meanwhile the Council of Austria decided to continue in arms

against the Ottomans; the result of this was that the Sultan could not afford to take a strong line against Poland in support of Simeon. The matter of the Moldavian succession was adjourned until the next year when a twenty-year peace between the Ottomans and the Austrian Empire was concluded, to take effect on 1st January 1607. The Ottomans were at last able to risk the King of Poland's hostility and stand firm against the succession of Constantin Movilă. Eventually Simeon ascended the Moldavian throne, thereby negating the principle of an hereditary succession by primogeniture. (31)

Meanwhile, Ștefan Bogdan had not given up hope of winning the Moldavian throne. He had escaped to Wallachia, relying upon the mercy of Prince Radu Șerban (1602-11); he is unlikely to have done this unless he was aware that Radu would be willing to help him: they may have been in contact before Bogdan was imprisoned. Radu had replaced Simeon Movilă as Prince of Wallachia, after the latter had been overthrown by force, he and the Movilă did not enjoy good relations, therefore Radu treated their enemy Bogdan in a manner befitting a prince. However, agents of Ieremie Movilă operating in Wallachia sent word to the Sultan as to the pretender's whereabouts: it must have been this news that persuaded the Grand Vizier that Lello was telling the truth about his lack of involvement in Bogdan's escape. The Sultan sent Radu orders that Bogdan should be returned to Constantinople in chains, an enormous humiliation, otherwise he would incur the Sultan's extreme displeasure. Radu's own agent in Constantinople was able to send

advance warning of the Sultan's intentions. Bogdan would have faced death if he had returned to Constantinople and Radu was willing to outwit the Sultan: he sent the pretender to the border of Podolia with a substantial guard and advised him to seek the help of one "Kniaz Vasil Palatinus Wollynie" and thereafter to shift for himself as well as he could. (32)

Radu laid plans to trick the Ottoman envoy into thinking that he had been holding Bogdan in custody ready to hand him over, but that the pretender had escaped in secret. In doing so he:

"called the walles of the wynde in the chamber where Stephano did lodge to be raggedlie broken".

This was the scene shown to the Sultan's messenger when he arrived. To further establish his innocence of the escape, Radu issued a proclamation throughout Wallachia:

"that who soever should intertayne, succour, hide or give any assistance for the escape of the said Stephano, such persons soe offendinge should be without any commiseration deprived of life, and their howses and faculties confiscated to the Prince, and to such as should find him out alive or dead should have fowre thousand chicquins for their rewards." (33)

The Ottoman messenger returned to Constantinople. Word came from Simeon Movilă, now ruling Moldavia (Ieremie having died), that Bogdan had collected a force of 30,000 men, including Cossacks, with the assistance of the *Knez* Vassilius and his adherents and friends in Poland, and intended to march on Moldavia. Simeon craved immediate Ottoman assistance, otherwise he said he would be forced to flee.

According to Sir Thomas Glover the Ottomans were not greatly

worried about Bogdan's planned campaign:

“[they] greatly doubt that the sayed Stefano will prove onto them another Michall Voyvoda...”

The Ottomans sent word to the *Beylerbeys* and *Sanjakbeys* on the Moldavian border, in particular those at Silistria, Akerman and Nicopolis, to stand by in case the invasion materialised; it did not. Glover was writing when the invasion was expected (May 1607). In April of that year Bogdan had solicited the aid of the Habsburg Emperor suggesting a campaign against the Ottomans. The Emperor, having just concluded a treaty with the Ottomans, rebuffed Bogdan's plans and the alliance with the *Knez* and his followers fell apart. In June 1607 the pretender was soliciting financial help from the Elector of Saxony for another journey to England.

There was nothing unusual about a man such as the *Knez* Vassilius becoming involved in an independent military operation: Polish magnates frequently conducted their own foreign policy. A well known example of this was the attempt by a private consortium of Polish and Lithuanian magnates to place pretenders on the Muscovite throne during the “Time of Troubles”. (34) However, foreign adventures such as this affair of the “False Dimitris” were only briefly successful and such success as was enjoyed was due largely to the protagonists being afforded the opportunity to exploit internal problems and were pressed to intervene by factions of powerful Muscovite boyars. (35) It would appear that *Knez* Vassilius and his adherents were not even able to expect help from boyars in Moldavia; Bogdan probably hoped for an uprising in the

principality in his favour; when this did not materialise his Polish supporters decided not to proceed.

Bogdan's brief sojourn in Wallachia under Radu's protection emphasises a point about the relationship between the Ottomans and their vassals: Radu was obliged and expected to obey the Sultan's orders or face the consequences of his displeasure; this shows the degree to which the princes in Wallachia and Moldavia were beholden to the suzerain power, for Radu was forced to concoct an elaborate charade to explain Bogdan's departure from his custody. It also demonstrates the extent to which the principalities and the princes' governments were penetrated by spies and conversely the efficiency of the Prince's own intelligence networks in Constantinople. Despite the fact that Radu's freedom of action was very much restricted by the Sultan's authority over him he was nevertheless prepared to defy the Sultan's authority in an attempt to undermine the position of his counterpart in Moldavia. He was not, of course, in any position to take up arms in Bogdan's favour, even if he had wished to: Bogdan did not have the resources, nor the military or organisational experience, which Mihai Viteazul had enjoyed. Moreover, Mihai's revolt took place during the war between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires which had allowed him to play off the various protagonists against each other to his own advantage; the Habsburg Emperor was not prepared to restart the conflict with the Ottomans merely to satisfy the ambitions of a wandering prince.

Bogdan was not inclined to accept defeat and decided to start his

campaign again with a journey to England where he hoped to obtain confirmation of the English Crown's support of him. Opinion in England was, to some extent, on his side: his version of his relationship with Henry Lello, in which he was cast as the injured party, was becoming well-known at the English Court, the story embroidered as it was retold; a letter noting Bogdan's arrival in London contains the following passage:

"There is also a Prince of Moldavia arrived wch was here in the Queens time to request her mediation to the Gran Sigr for his restitution to his inheritence. The Queen sent him to Sir Ambr Lello who during her life used him kindly and kept him at his owne table but as soo (some say) as he heard of her death, he sold him to some Turkes for 3000 checkins: fro whom since breaking prison he is now come wth the Emperors letters to gett himselfe righted..." (36)

The suspicion that Henry Lello had betrayed Bogdan was shared by Salisbury and King James. For a long time Lello was not in a position to defend himself, being on the other side of Europe, whilst his enemies in London had ample opportunity to turn opinion against him. The whole affair was used by Thomas Glover in his campaign to have Lello removed from the embassy and once Glover arrived in Constantinople as the new ambassador the dispute between him and Lello ensured that the campaign intensified. It was for this reason that Glover took it upon himself to ensure that Bogdan was not forgotten by investigating what had happened to him following his escape. Glover was careful not to make his own direct accusations against his enemy, instead he used the device of reporting what was "generall reporte" in Constantinople:

"The Prince of Moldavia who I think is known unto you Lordship for that he has bin in Englande two or three years agoe... was by Allie Bassa, then Vizerey takne out of my predecessor M. Lellos

house... whoe in lieve therof [of his duty as recommended by the Queen] as the said Prince hathe lefte a generall reporte her betrayed him to the agent of his adversary Jeremie... delivered him out of his house to the sayed Vizerey who imprisoned him... wth certain poor allowance for his sustenance whoe beinge so betrayed (as he thought by Mr. Lello)... sent his man of purpose into Englande not onlie to complaine of Mr. Lellos tradition but humblie craved his Maties favour... etc." (37)

When Bogdan arrived in England in August 1607, before the arrival of Lello in September, he was in a strong position to press his case for further English support because he was well-known and regarded with considerable sympathy, despite the fact that King James was well acquainted with Poland's reasons for opposing him so vigorously.

At the time of writing to the Sultan about Bogdan's imprisonment, King James had written a letter to the King of Poland, the text of which has been lost, in which he probably gave his reasons for endeavouring to procure the pretender's release. King Zygmund III Vasa of Poland replied in a letter dated 23rd May 1606 which arrived in England in August of that year. The English and Polish Crowns had regular and friendly relations at this time and maintained a correspondence on large number of matters. (38) Zygmund's letter was extremely courteous but endeavoured to explain at length that Moldavia was an area in which Poland was entitled by precedence to play an influential role and that the English Crown had been deceived by Bogdan. One may discern the tenor of King James' letter from this reply, for Zygmund refuted two arguments in favour of England's patronage of Bogdan. Firstly that it was the duty of a Christian Prince to help another prince in distress and

secondly that Bogdan was a legitimate claimant to the Moldavian throne denied his ancestral right by an usurper maintained on the throne with Polish help. The first section of Zygmund's letter argued that England was mistaken in perceiving Christian duty to point in the direction of supporting a pretender when political reality dictated another course: both Moldavia and Wallachia had in the past been under Polish protection and although these principalities had been annexed by the Ottomans, Polish patronage of Ieremie Movilă was recognised by the Ottomans and between them these powers had maintained peace and mutual trust in the area which was of great benefit to Christendom; furthermore, it was maintained that Ieremie was himself of princely lineage and therefore not an usurper.

Zygmund then went on to attack Bogdan's own claim to the throne through direct descent from Ștefan Cel Mare and Petru Rareș by claiming that Iancu Sasul had been an usurper. Bogdan had deliberately emphasised his descent from Ștefan and Petru as opposed to claiming a right to rule merely as a son of a former prince (Iancu) because this made his claim stronger. Furthermore, he had hoped to distance himself from his father's reputation. Iancu was the weak link in Bogdan's lineage because there had long been doubts cast on Iancu's claim to be the son of Petru Rareș; Zygmund revived these doubts by alleging that Iancu was a man of humble birth from a Saxon area of Transylvania and not of Moldavian blood at all; he accused Bogdan of being a fraud who made false claims about his ancestry. (39) Zygmund also revived the rumours

about Bogdan's conversion to Islam, arguing that not only was the man whom the English Crown supported a fraud but he was not even a Christian; this nullified any Christian duty to support him.

James I's letter probably included some reference to King Stefan Bathory's treatment of Iancu, for Zygmund dismissed the latter as a man of criminal tendencies, whose behaviour towards both Poland and the Ottomans resulted in an order for his removal and his subsequent execution, both of which were exactly what he deserved. Zygmund argued that now James was acquainted with the truth about Bogdan he could not consider him a worthy recipient of his favour. Furthermore he repeated his assertion that the appointment of Princes in Moldavia belonged by right to Poland and not to the Ottomans and if England continued to press the Ottomans to remove the Prince installed by Poland, this would damage the good relations between the two Crowns.

King James ignored this intervention: when the pretender arrived in London he was not dismissed as a fraud but received into the King's presence. Either King James and the Earl of Salisbury did not believe these allegations or else did not care if they were true. Nor were they worried that relations with Poland might cool over this issue. In addition to a perceived Christian duty to help a fellow prince in his campaign against usurpers, the King of England seems to have been keen to see Polish influence in the principalities reduced. King Zygmund was a devout Roman Catholic, closely associated with Polish Jesuits and anxious to promote the aims of the Counter-Reformation. He was in

dispute with the Swedish nobility, who were not keen to accept a Catholic proselytizer, over his claim to the Swedish throne. It is conceivable that the English Crown was disposed to be sympathetic to a pretender who opposed the continued influence of the Polish Crown over Moldavia, in order to impede the progress of the Roman Catholic Church in exerting influence and control over parts of Eastern Europe.

CHAPTER VII: STEFAN BOGDAN AND SIR THOMAS GLOVER: 1607-1612.

Towards the end of his involvement with Ștefan Bogdan, Henry Lello expressed the hope that the English Crown would not in future commit the English Embassy in Constantinople to supporting men such as Bogdan, whom he regarded as a conniving deceiver, because they brought only trouble to the ambassador and only served to hinder his dealings with the Ottoman State. This chapter will show that not only did the King and his ministers fail to heed this advice, but they had learned nothing from the experiences of Edward Barton and Henry Lello. Furthermore, they did not sufficiently comprehend how business with the Sultan and his officials was conducted and the complexity of involving the embassy in affairs which were none of its direct concern. Despite King James I's previous insistence that the English Embassy only existed to look after the English merchants' interests he was persuaded to renew Queen Elizabeth's support for Ștefan Bogdan. This was largely due to the persuasive skills of the pretender, who convinced King James, his wife and various members of his court that his failure to gain the Moldavian throne could be attributed to Henry Lello's lack of commitment to his cause and the intriguing of the Polish Crown and that, with proper backing, his attainment of the throne would be a relatively simple matter. He also successfully persuaded King James of the great benefits for England of having a client upon the Moldavian throne, to such an extent

that the King was persuaded to go further than his predecessor in supporting the pretender by lending him money.

The extent to which the English Crown could be hood-winked by somewhat exotic individuals is illustrated by the reception in England of one Mustapha, who claimed to be a *chiaus* or envoy from Sultan Ahmet I [1603-1617], when in fact he had no such status. Mustapha had left Constantinople in November 1605, accompanying de Breves, the French Ambassador, who was returning to France via Jerusalem and Egypt. He had managed to procure letters of recommendation from the Sultan to the French and English Kings whom he expected to reward him for his visit. At the time Henry Lello had protested that the Ottomans should send someone worthy of an Embassy to the King of England, (1) instead of such a "pettey fellow". Sir Thomas Glover also warned the Earl of Salisbury that the man was a charlatan. However, since Mustapha had a letter of recommendation from the Sultan and had also been received by the King of France, King James was not willing to risk offending the Ottomans by refusing to receive the man:

"we have here one Mustafa Aga an Ambassador from the Great Turk who hath this great while remained at Marseilles, his errand to his Majesty was to deliver some letters from the Great Turk to his Matie and to congratulate with him, of his Maties coming to this Crowne, wch as he said, though he came somewhat late to performe that office... that the principall cause of his stay was by default of the French king and his ministers who had almost 14 monethes detained him at Marseilles; he pretendeth to have some other things in charge, and to that purpose desireth another audience of his Matie; he is here defrayed by the merchants and the better used because the merchants might oblige him the more, at his return to doe good offices for them." (2)

The Levant Company did not welcome the burden of supporting Mustapha and his retinue, complaining that he was costing them nearly five pounds each day and he expected them to pay for everything, even the cost of mending his clothes. They requested that he be given an audience quickly so that he could be dispatched home as soon as possible. The Company Court acknowledged that it was to their advantage to ensure that Mustapha was entertained properly so that he would give the Sultan a good report of his reception in England. (3) When he finally left England on one of the Levant Company's own ships he was apparently angry that he had not managed to extract a present from either the King or the Company. It seems that by this time the English Court and the Levant Company were aware that Mustapha was not an official Ambassador from the Sultan but were still anxious that he should give a favourable account of his treatment in London. Therefore, because Mustapha would have no automatic access to Sultan Ahmet on his return to Constantinople, as an official Ottoman Ambassador would have had, the Earl of Salisbury instructed Sir Thomas Glover to ensure that Mustapha obtained an audience with the Sultan. Glover reported that Mustapha's account of his treatment in England and his report of the wealth and greatness of the English Court had created a very good impression amongst the Ottomans.

Mustapha's visit added a new word to the English language as the expression "to play the Chaush" or "to chouse" became a popular expression to describe an impostor, for the Levant Company had been

hoodwinked into entertaining a man of no importance as an Ambassador from the Sultan for several months at great expense. (4) He certainly created an impression in England:

“For the person of this Mustafa, hee seems to me and others that have visited him a man of goodly presence and a gallant spirit, sociable, affable and full of intertainment to all comers, and one who to give content to those that come to see him, is content to dispense with some of his Turkish fashions and to accustome himself to ours... for his own person he hath many changes of garments, very rich, and several turbants, and hath brought with him, either for presents or for a pledge in time of necessity, 21 pieces of cloth of gold and silver, valued at 1,000 marks.”

He had also pretended that he had been sent as an envoy before by the Sultan, twice to France, once to Persia and once to the Tatar Khan. (5)

The arrival of Mustapha and Ștefan Bogdan provided a diversion for the English Court when it was in a state of “complete quiet” as the Venetian Ambassador reported:

“... this is the sole topic which occupies their thoughts. A prince of Moldavia came to this court a few days ago. He is one of those many persons who claim a right to the government of that country... and it is thought he is now come here because of the cavass [i.e. Mustapha].” (6)

News circulated about Bogdan was usually linked to news about Mustapha. In fact Bogdan's arrival in England had nothing to do with the presence of Mustapha and indeed Bogdan must have been somewhat 'put out' to find Mustapha had already established himself in the affections of those whose support he hoped to gain since this 'ambassador' diverted attention away from himself. Indeed Mustapha's presence received more note; for our purposes, too, this is unfortunate

because there are no descriptions of Bogdan, his apparel or activities comparable to those devoted to Mustafa.

Bogdan nevertheless received attention from the moment of his arrival; the purpose of his visit was well-known and he became a familiar figure in London: he probably dressed in oriental-style robes, and as we know, he was a charming and handsome man, cultivated and of wide experience; tales of his adventurous and dangerous life must have made fascinating listening. His visit to London was remembered for years afterwards; indeed the playwrights Beaumont and Fletcher (7), requiring an exotic location for their play "The Knight of the Burning Pestle", set one scene in the Court of the "King" of Moldavia. The play is a parody of the heroic adventure plays popular at the time; part of the complicated plot concerns Pompiona, the King of Moldavia's daughter, who falls in love with the Knight of the Burning Pestle but is rejected by him. (8) As will be discussed later, there is also a reference to the Prince of Moldavia in Ben Jonson's play "The Silent Woman" written in 1610.

Whilst Mustapha was enjoying his social life Bogdan was energetically cultivating those who might be useful to his cause and working hard to persuade the King and his favourites to support him. Also, apparently unbeknownst to the Earl of Salisbury, Bogdan had approached representatives of the King of Spain for support. Before undertaking his journey to England, Bogdan had visited Don Guillen de San Clemente, the Spanish representative in Prague, seeking his recommendation to the King of Spain and offering his services in return.

Don Guillen wrote to Phillip III about Bogdan and gave Bogdan a letter of introduction to the Spanish Ambassador in England. Bogdan proposed a naval attack on the port of Larissa leading to the conquest of Greece and the eventual overthrow of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. He told the Spanish Ambassador that he had supporters in Greece who would help with the invasion and promised a force of 10,000 soldiers. He also promised that when he had control of Moldavia he would be prepared to place in Spanish hands two important fortresses at the mouth of the Danube; fortresses which were crucial to the safety and security of the Ottoman capital. He presumably referred to the fortresses of Kilia and Akkerman (Cetatea Alba) which, although on Moldavian territory, were garrisoned by Ottoman troops, such was their strategic importance. The pretender also wrote of his plans to the Viceroy of Naples, Don Juan Alfonso Pimentel de Herrera. When in London Bogdan contacted the Don Pedro de Zuniga, Spanish Ambassador to King James, to acquaint him with his proposals. The pretender's offer was taken seriously enough by the Spanish to be discussed at the Council of Councils in Madrid in January 1608. (9)

Bogdan still looked to the English Crown to be his main source of patronage because, as has been pointed out elsewhere in this thesis, the English Crown was much better placed to petition for the Moldavian throne on Bogdan's behalf since it maintained a permanently established embassy in Constantinople and had enjoyed good relations with three Ottoman Sultans. Bogdan's negotiations with representatives of the King

of Spain demonstrate that the pretender aspired to liberate Moldavia from Ottoman suzerainty, regarding himself as an heir to Mihai Viteazul. This may have been partly motivated by bitterness at his ill-treatment and imprisonment at Ottoman hands, but also probably had its roots in a vision of a restored Christian Empire centred on Constantinople, perhaps inspired by tales of Byzantium's glory told him in childhood. Ștefan Bogdan was aware that if he managed to obtain the Moldavian throne through the Sultan's favour he was unlikely to remain prince for many years whilst the throne remained in the Sultan's gift.

It is highly unlikely that Bogdan hinted at his intentions whilst pressing his suite to the King of England or mentioned his involvement with the King of Spain. Although England and Spain were now at peace and King James was endeavouring to improve Anglo-Spanish relations, Spanish shipping was a rival to English sea power in the Mediterranean. Moreover a plan which would rouse the Sultan's enmity would, without doubt, destroy England's favourable trading position in the Levant and probably result in the exclusion of the English merchant fleet from the entire area. Such a plan would not even have been considered and England's support of Bogdan would not have been renewed.

Bogdan appears to have been well-treated in England, although he did not receive the hospitality enjoyed by Mustapha. He seems to have supported himself out of his own pocket and the Earl of Salisbury expressed concern that the pretender's sojourn in England was a great burden upon his obviously limited financial resources. Bogdan probably

conducted much of his business with the Earl of Salisbury, who arranged for him to receive audience with the King, although he had to wait nearly a month for this to be arranged because of the monarch's frequent absences on hunting expeditions. Bogdan was eventually received by King James on September 20th 1607 and presented a very sanitised version of his difficult and dangerous campaign to be granted the Moldavian throne which impressed those who heard it very much. Despite James' often stated view that the English Embassy at Constantinople existed purely to promote the welfare of English merchants in the Levant, Bogdan managed to persuade him to give his support for a cause not directly related to England's commercial interests. Bogdan had prepared himself well for this audience: he offered to hold the principality of Moldavia "of his highness and to pay tribute", and had drawn up two versions of a model letter to be written by the King to Sultan Ahmet I; he also presented a petition for a grant of 1,000 pounds. (10)

The offer of allegiance and tribute was set down in writing; if Bogdan had succeeded in obtaining the Moldavian throne this document would have been of no use to the English Crown since it would have been unacceptable to the Ottoman Sultan to have his vassal owing allegiance and paying tribute to another sovereign. In any case it would be unenforceable. The pretender's petition placed great emphasis on his promises of gratitude and loyalty towards the English Crown when he became Prince of Moldavia and such an offer was a good method of

expressing this; it might also plant some sense of obligation in the conscience of King James so that his Ambassador would continue to support Bogdan whilst he was on the Moldavian throne. Bogdan set out his case by arguing forcefully for the legitimacy of his claim to the Moldavian throne by pointing to the genealogy showing his descent from Ștefan Cel Mare through Petru Rareș and Iancu Sasul; secondly he argued that he had already been appointed prince by a previous Sultan, only being prevented from attaining the throne through the actions of that Sultan's enemies. (11) He neglected to tell the King and Queen that this previous appointment was to the throne of Wallachia not to that of Moldavia. The model letters which Bogdan had prepared concentrated upon this point: that he had been granted the principality and had been sent to the Danube to overthrow the Sultan's enemies, Mihai Viteazul and Aron, and had been prevented from prosecuting the Sultan's service by the bad generalship of Mustapha Pasha and Sinan Pasha which had resulted in his defeat in battle and near loss of life. Bogdan cunningly made use of the presence of Mustapha by arguing in his letter that the King's hospitality towards this man was the evidence of the friendship and affection between King James and the Ottoman Sultan, which could be reciprocated by granting the English monarch's request that Bogdan be placed on the Moldavian throne.

Bogdan requested a grant of 1,000 pounds to provide for his journey to Constantinople because he did not wish to be indebted to any other than the King of England:

"... I hope in God that Your Majesty will remain most satisfied with

my service, with the view that one day that which I have promised to your Majesty will bear fruit without doubt.” (12)

It does not appear that this request was granted in full, but the Earl of Salisbury disbursed 300 pounds to Bogdan on the order of the King. (13) Bogdan's audience with the King was fruitful, the only bone of contention being a further request that the Levant Company should furnish Bogdan with 10,000 French Crowns to further this business. It appears that the Crown was to reimburse the Company because in all the correspondence in connection with this money it is referred to as the King's money. The Company seems to have been reluctant to become involved in any expenditure on Bogdan because they were not confident that they would be reimbursed. The matter was eventually resolved, after discussions with the Company and the Earl of Salisbury, and it was agreed that Bogdan should be provided with 10,000 Crowns under strict conditions; these conditions were to cause Sir Thomas Glover immense trouble. The papers concerning Stefan Bogdan were ordered to be sent to the Earl of Salisbury who was to handle the business on the King's behalf. They were dispatched to the Earl the day after the audience in order that he was fully aware of the King's decision in the matter. Bogdan also left Theobalds immediately for London in order to speak with the Earl and to ensure that the proper arrangements be made for his letters of recommendation to be drawn up. (14) The business proceeded slowly and Bogdan, whilst pressing for matters to be speeded up as much as possible, appears to have bided his time in London enjoying himself. During his stay in England he made the acquaintance of Lady Arbella

Stuart, King James' cousin, with whom he was greatly impressed, conducting some form of flirtation with her, possibly with the suggestion of marriage if he obtained his principality. (15) Lady Arbella (she always signed her correspondence as Arbella not Arabella, a latinization of her name) was a well-educated and intelligent woman who had led a very lonely and sheltered life. She appears to have been attracted to the pretender and, moved by his accounts of his usurped "birthright", promised to support him. Her brief involvement with Bogdan was to cause her much unhappiness in the future.

In order to provide for Ştefan Bogdan's passage as far as Venice, the Earl of Salisbury appointed a member of the Levant Company, Jonas Aldrich, to accompany him. Aldrich had business to conduct in Venice on behalf of the Company concerning the capture by Florentine galleons of three English ships. (16) Aldrich was involved in a dispute with the Levant Company; Cecil asked him to settle it quickly by arbitration, so that his departure would not be delayed and:

"the prince be not driven to protract his tyme any longer here, to his further charge then the present condition of his estate is well able to beare. Whereof not doubting but you will have due regard considereing that his Maties service dependeth on it." (17)

Two weeks later Bogdan had his second audience with the King in his private chamber, this time in the company of Mustapha, but it was not until over a month after Cecil's request to Aldrich and the Levant Company, that the pretender was finally able to depart. He left on a ship belonging to the Levant Company, but did not travel directly to Venice because he had business to deal with in Berlin with the Elector of

Brandenburg. Zorzi Giustinian, the Venetian Ambassador in England, reported his departure:

“The Prince of Moldavia has left. He takes with him letters of recommendation from the King both to assist him to recover a debt from the Marquis of Brandenburg, and to support his claim to be restored to his state. Before he left he professed great devotion to your Serenity.” (18)

The above mentioned debt consisted of 200,000 *galbeni* owed to Bogdan's ancestor Petru Rareș since 1542. The Elector refused to give Bogdan any money. Neither Salisbury or the King troubled to make any arrangements for Bogdan upon his arrival in Venice; essentially he was expected to make his own way to Constantinople; this and the somewhat leisurely attitude to issuing Bogdan with his credentials suggests that whatever Bogdan thought about his own importance, this project was not a major undertaking of the English Crown.

The pretender arrived in Venice in February 1608 and immediately provoked the dislike of the English Ambassador there, Henry Wotton:

“At his first aboard, he caused himself to be landed at my house, and in my absence took possession of it with a portmanteau or two.”

In England Bogdan did nothing that might jeopardise his chances of gaining English support; once he had secured the King's letters of recommendation, he developed an arrogant manner which did nothing to endear him to those with whom he came into contact. Wotton reported that Bogdan was using the King's name very freely around Venice:

“And although he had in this town of his own parentage [i.e. his sister] and also did not despair of honourable reception by the state which was acquainted both with his cause and with his person, yet being under his Majesty's support, and wholly his, he

thought it fitter to lodge in my house till the departure of the next frigate for the Levant.”

Wotton was astounded at this and did not at first know how to reply:

“I protest to your Lordship I knew not whether I should take it for a species of frenzy or Cozenage.”

Instead he replied that he was not in the habit of taking men into his house on such small acquaintance and therefore unless Bogdan could produce a letter of introduction from the King he would have to make other arrangements whilst he was in Venice. Bogdan was surprised and puzzled that no instructions or arrangements for his entertainment had been made in advance by his supporters in England, mentioning the Earl of Salisbury and Lady Arbella Stuart in particular.

Bogdan left Wotton’s house upset that those whom he had thought to be his friends did not think him sufficiently important as to concern themselves with his welfare once he left England; however he soon recovered his composure. Wotton was disposed to treat the whole incident as a “carnival accident” and related it to the Earl of Salisbury to entertain him; he went on to offer the following advice:

“Since, I have understood that he is not altogether a counterfeit, in the generality at least of his pretence to the Princedom, though void of all hope both by way of Poland and Turkey who have undertaken the backing of several pretendants.” (19)

Sir Henry Wotton was familiar with the politics of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and, thus confronted with one of the pretenders about whom he had heard so much, seems to have been unable to disguise his contempt for a man whom he considered a charlatan and a figure of fun.

This last attitude was common amongst many of the Englishmen who came into contact with Bogdan: Henry Lello developed an extreme distaste for the man whom he was charged with supporting and Sir Thomas Glover and his friend John Sanderson came to regard the unfortunate prince in a very unflattering light. Ștefan Bogdan's experiences do not appear to have brought out the best in him. His continually thwarted quest for position and status led to behave in a manner which turned his supporters against him, whilst the experience of being used by powerful nations and officials for their own purposes and dropped when they no longer foresaw success, undoubtedly made Bogdan bitter, sly and grasping. Bogdan had obtained English support largely by deceiving King James into thinking that it would be a simple matter to obtain his elevation to the Moldavian throne; the need to deceive stemmed from desperation. A pretender in Bogdan's position could do little else: he had no status, no money and few friends and had little choice but to make his way by using his wits and charm if he were not to end his life in poverty. English support which gave him so much hope of success declined when the difficulties and expense of supporting him became apparent. The English Crown eventually lost interest in the progress of Bogdan's suite.

Bogdan's conduct during his stay in Venice incensed Henry Wotton; the latter had no further personal contact with the pretender but was bombarded by news of him. Bogdan's presence in Venice prompted a great deal of comment, particularly when, on the strength of his letters

of recommendation, he attempted to exaggerate his own status by making up stories about his true reason for being in Venice. His behaviour scandalised many Venetians, including his sister's family:

“... I [Henry Wotton] understood he had at Chioggia assumed the title of Ambassr sent from his Matie to treat wth this state very secret affayres. This voyce bredd many constrictions uppon the place heere wth no small scandale of my poore credite; whereuppon if it had not been denied unto me by the Duke (who in favour of some Venetians wth whome the sayed pretendant is linked in affinitie was contented to conceale what the Potesta of Chioggia had written hither before his arrival) I should have preceeded somewhat uncivilly wth him.” (20)

Thus the prospect of a public row between the English Ambassador and Bogdan was prevented; now Wotton's amused contempt had been converted into unconcealed dislike and suspicion. On the grounds that most of what the pretender said in public was untrue, he suggested that Bogdan had forged the letters of recommendation and letters of exchange for forty thousand dollars which he had in his possession to be given to Sir Thomas Glover upon his arrival in Constantinople. There was a further series of scandalous rumours which Wotton felt compelled to report: the pretender had been hinting at a promise of marriage made to a woman in England; Wotton denied that he knew what manner of promise had been made or to whom, but it is likely that Bogdan was either hinting at, or mentioning the name of, Lady Arbella Stuart in this connection, for unless Bogdan's prospective betrothed was a woman of status, the ambassador would not have considered the matter sufficiently important to be mentioned. Wotton would naturally have hesitated to be the source of any speculation in England around the King's cousin. A

further rumour concerning Bogdan caused outrage:

“notwithstanding haveing besydes other places one wife at the least in this towne and some say twoe.” (21)

There is no evidence to confirm that Bogdan was a polygamist, but it is certainly true that he already had a wife in Venice. The question of his marital status was to surface on two occasions during the course of his involvement with the English Crown and will be discussed further later on. The pretender’s volubility and lack of discretion seems unfortunate in a man who above all must have known the importance of secrecy and discretion: either he spent much of his time in Venice drunk or he was an habitual liar. To the relief of Wotton and probably his sister’s family, Bogdan left Venice in March 1608, travelling overland to Constantinople, where he presented himself to Sir Thomas Glover.

Glover hid him in the English Embassy, trying to keep his presence secret until a suitable occasion occurred to begin the suit to obtain the Moldavian throne. (22) Glover had been informed of Bogdan’s arrival in England by the Levant Company and John Sanderson (23) and both he and Sanderson expressed themselves very well-disposed to the pretender and his suit:

“Nowe for the Christian Prince before named I wish all good and kind welcome of his Majestie; whereof he cannot faile if all his friends be fervent for him...”

Glover replied thus to Sanderson:

“I hope ere this our good friend the prince Jancolo hath obteyned his sute of our kinge and I doe longe to heare the issue...” (24)

Sir Thomas Glover was soon to change his mind about the wisdom of

supporting the pretender when he contemplated the difficulties involved:

“I am overburdened with [a] serious and a very tedious business, earnestly recommended unto me by his Majestyes own letter, the Queenes, the Earl of Salisburies and many of the Honourable Privy Counsellis, and others his Majesties favourites in the behalf of the Prince of Moldavia.” (25)

The impressive body of support collected by Bogdan made it imperative that Glover succeed, since if he failed to promote Bogdan’s cause his failure would be public knowledge in the most influential circles at Court. Furthermore, his old adversary Henry Lello had been vocal in expressing doubts at Glover’s ability to bring the matter to a successful conclusion.

Of particular difficulty to Glover was the decision to pay the 10,000 French crowns in support of the pretender’s cause. He sent an angry letter to Sir Thomas Lowe, Governor of the Levant Company, asking why the Company had allowed itself to be pressured into promising this money. He told Lowe that the whole affair might have come to nothing had the Company refused to make the money available, as it was he was now burdened:

“... [with] the inconvenience, trouble and expense which the Prince... [will] bring upon his place.”

of which he claimed he had warned the Company in advance. Sir Thomas Lowe replied in the Company’s defence that whereas Glover had written that they could have prevented the promise of money as well as the decision to support the pretender, in fact they were in no position to do so because:

“these matters were kept secret from us as a thing yt did not concern us and so it was impossible for us to prevent it, soe that what trouble and chardge soever shall happen thereby unto you

p'ceedeth from the King's pleasure wherein you may take what course you shall think fitt for you please. Ffor from us you are not [to] expect anything as a matter yt doth in no waye touch us." (26)

The Levant Company thus disassociated itself from any involvement with Bogdan because the project would bring them no advantages and would probably cost them money. The fact that the Crown did not discuss its support of Bogdan's cause with the Company until a decision was made suggests that the matter was not considered as being of the Company's concern. Glover's friend and adviser John Sanderson had also changed his mind about Bogdan, warning the ambassador:

"... Beware of Prince Yancolo. Ingadge yourself ther for no Prince..." (27)

and advised him not to enter into intrigue on the pretender's behalf. Unfortunately Sanderson did not mention what he had discovered about Bogdan to make him change his mind nor what dangerous intrigues Glover could expect to be embroiled. The question of the money to be advanced by the English "nation" in the Levant upon King James credit and to be reimbursed by him (28) afforded Glover an opportunity to delay proceedings until he received exact instructions as to how it should be spent. Furthermore, he outlined in a letter to the Earl of Salisbury the great risks involved in attempting to purchase the throne for Bogdan, suggesting to Sir Thomas Lowe that these "casualties":

"by yor wisdome may be so amplified and aggravated unto the Earl of Salisburie, that he maye happelie cause to withdraw this commission, as my self will doe what in me lies for the detration..."

Glover's strategy was to persuade Salisbury that if the money were paid

over to Sultan Ahmet, his Ministers and favourites, once Bogdan was appointed there was still a considerable risk that he would not succeed in taking possession of the throne: he might be overthrown by his enemies when attempting to enter the principality or he might meet with some accident upon the journey; then again the Sultan might change his mind and decide to replace him with another prince:

“as is often incident unto manie of his function by the inconstancie and instabilitie of theis. In such case whither his Matie will be contented to adventure this sume of ten thousande Crownes or not without any further caution or limitie, I desier to be resolved...” (29)

If this situation were to arise before Bogdan had a chance to raise the money to reimburse the King, the 10,000 crowns would be lost.

Glover requested Salisbury to advise the King of the difficulties involved in presenting what he called “this extrordinarily recommended service”, indicating that it was outside the normal embassy brief. He was careful to assure the Earl that he would conscientiously and dexterously handle the matter and had great confidence in his own abilities as a diplomat to do that which he had been requested. Meanwhile he concentrated his hopes on the investment of money in this cause being abandoned due to the pressure of the Levant Company and the revised judgement of the Earl of Salisbury, convincing the King that the risk of financial loss was too great. As we saw, the Levant Company refused to oppose the King’s decision and risk his displeasure and the Earl of Salisbury neglected to reply to Glover’s urgent request for further instructions. Glover had to proceed with the suit as ordered; his main

concern was that if the King's money were to be lost, he would be held responsible and fall into disfavour with the King; this could damage his prospects of advancement at Court after he retired from the Constantinople Embassy.

Glover viewed the whole business with increasing distaste; he was aware that close financial involvement in an affair of this nature had ruined Edward Barton financially and had led to severe criticism from the merchants, from Queen Elizabeth and her ministers that Barton had neglected his duties towards the English 'nation'. Yet knowing this he had still expressed his hope that Bogdan would succeed in his petition to King James and Sanderson had expressed similar sentiments. Glover's misgivings had surfaced only after the pretender's arrival at his house: one likely reason for his change of heart was that Bogdan had altered from the man he and Sanderson had known and liked when they were last in Constantinople. They showed the same antipathy towards the pretender as Lello had revealed; they had criticised Lello's hostility towards the pretender to great effect in previous years. Furthermore, once Glover had embarked on the task of pleading the pretender's case with the Ottoman *Divan* he must have realised what a difficult undertaking it was. This was something which he had not acknowledged before, having been so confident of his own superior abilities as a diplomat.

Glover began by approaching Ahmet I's principal ministers and favourites so that when the time came to present the King's letters he

could be confident of a favourable reception:

“in my opinion they beinge cheife persones that rule the Gran Signor and this Empire they will not fail to perform it...”

However, in gaining the support of these individuals Glover had promised gifts and rewards in return, yet suspected that once they had been paid they would no longer bother to support Bogdan. Therefore once again he requested exact instructions from the King about when the money could be used in order to give him the necessary authority to negotiate from a position of strength. Ahmet I's favourites promised to advise Glover of a suitable opportunity to present the King's letters to the Sultan and accordingly they made arrangements for him to meet the Sultan on his barge and deliver the King's letters translated into Ottoman Turkish. Glover made a speech in which he concluded that it was the religious duty of James I to protect and aid a distressed prince in obtaining his hereditary right. Ahmet replied that it was not yet a suitable time to change the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, but promised that when such a time arose he would grant the Moldavian throne to none other than Stefan Bogdan. This promise gave Glover some cause for optimism, but he was aware that delaying tactics were being employed and made enquiries in private of Sultan Ahmet's favourites as to when a suitable opportunity to change the Prince of Moldavia might occur. He was told that the suppression of a rebellion in Anatolia took priority and that the Sultan wished to wait until the tribute of thirty-two thousand *zecchini* had arrived from Moldavia.

As soon as an opportunity to invest Bogdan as Prince of Moldavia

arose, those close to the Sultan who had promised him their support in return for money would expect to be paid; they would not tolerate delays. Glover again reported that the prompt delivery to Bogdan's Ottoman supporters of the money promised by the King would be crucial to the success of the project, for this reason he needed exact instructions on how it was to be raised and spent. In the meantime he could obtain nothing but promises. (30) The progress of the pretender's suit was observed by Spanish adherents in Constantinople and reported to Madrid. As we shall see at the end of this chapter, Bogdan's clandestine contacts with Madrid continued possibly with the assistance of Gieronimo Meoli, Glover's secretary, in a manner which was to implicate the English Embassy in espionage.

Glover's letter which set out his doubts about the wisdom of supporting Bogdan was very slow in reaching the Earl of Salisbury. When he did reply, Salisbury gave few specific answers to Glover's questions; nevertheless he wrote of some of his own doubts, which appear to have been based on his reading of Glover's predecessors' comments on the Ottoman *modus operandi* : firstly that corruption might lead to Ottoman ministers taking money from Bogdan's supporters and from his adversaries:

“to procure his suppression or to cause him to be recalled again or even to put some practice against his person on his way to Moldavia or once he arrives there...”

Salisbury therefore suggested that the whole sum should be paid only when Bogdan had confirmed his possession of the principality. To ensure

the success of this provision Glover should send a trusted servant to travel with Bogdan who would bring back news of his success; then the money could be paid over. If Ahmet's ministers were unwilling to deal upon these terms without some ready money, then Glover could compromise by paying 2,000 Crowns upon the delivery of the "helmet", a ceremony which would mark Bogdan's elevation to the status of prince; the rest of the money would only be paid upon news of Bogdan's reception in Moldavia. In order for this to be carried out, he had issued instructions to the Levant Company to allow Glover to take up this money when it was needed, upon the aforementioned conditions. Salisbury reported that, whilst the King was willing to risk his money he was loath to suffer any "affront" by it, meaning that he wished to avoid being tricked into parting with his money to no purpose; furthermore, he was anxious not to place Bogdan in any danger. (31)

In October 1608, Glover was still awaiting the arrival of these instructions:

"It is above three monthes since wee had any letters out of England or of Venice... [the Sultan's officers] earnestlie followe the prince of Moldavia his business and still put in verie good hope to see a good ende therof, wich, by this tyme [they say] had bin finished to our desires it the monies according to promise were put in deposito." (32)

In the meantime he had energetically petitioned the Vizier "Logotemente" to do his best to procure the appointment of Bogdan before the arrival in Constantinople of the General Murat Pasha who was to replace him as Vizier, informing him that he would receive his fee of 20,000 dollars if he

brought this off. However, Glover confessed that he was not confident of the current Vizier's ability to bring about Bogdan's election:

“my hope is at the arrivall of Murat to accomlishe this business wth more facilitie then this ignorant...” (33)

Glover's efforts in this direction came to nothing. He finally received Salisbury's instructions in December and wrote back promising to do his utmost to follow the King's wishes. He pointed out that the reason for his failure thus far was that Constantin Movilă was, with the backing of the King of Poland, able consistently to outbribe him. Thus despite the fact that Glover had obtained the Sultan's promise to prefer Bogdan, Movilă's supporters blocked progress towards his appointment with bribes amounting to 50,000 *zecchini*.

Although Movilă was undoubtedly investing heavily to maintain his position as prince, it does not automatically follow, as Glover suggested to justify his failure, that Bogdan would have been preferred had Movilă not been spending this money. The Sultan's advisers were clearly unenthusiastic about appointing Ștefan Bogdan to occupy a position of such strategic and economic import as the Moldavian throne, although they were quite prepared to take his money. Similarly the threat posed by Bogdan to Constantin Movilă ensured that the latter would pay out a lot of money in bribes to counter this threat; therefore many of those close to the Sultan had a vested interest in ensuring that Bogdan's campaign was as protracted as possible. Glover's interpretation of his own failure to obtain Bogdan's appointment was one which cast no doubts upon his ability to carry out the appointed task. He ascribed his difficulties to

Bogdan's lack of sufficient financial backing. Glover expected a decision to be reached upon the arrival of Murat Pasha; in the meantime he was certain that he and his protégé were in danger from their opponents:

“There hath bin many conspiracies wrought underhande, boathe to apprehend him [Bogdan] by stratagem, and to make an ende of him or myselfe by ministry of poysonne...”

These alleged conspiracies had been thwarted in time, but Glover said that he was forced to take more precautions than he ever had before to protect his own life and property and the person of Ştefan Bogdan. (34)

By December 1608, Glover had turned his attention to Murat Pasha, requesting him to use his influence to favour Bogdan's cause. Murat undertook to do his best but asked Glover to wait some twenty or thirty days while he settled other more important business. Glover decided that his efforts should not be thwarted by delays in laying his hands on the money required for gifts and bribes; he began collecting the money authorised by the King to be raised from English merchants in Constantinople:

“... that it may be in readiness in all assayes and not when urgent need requireth I should stand in want thereof, wch might utterlie preiudice and overthrow the suite, for our adversaries doe extremely labour underhand, with great sumes of monies...”

He feared that despite his careful diplomacy and promises of reward, the financial resources available to Bogdan's opponents were much greater and were ready at hand whereas he could only make promises. He now invested all his hopes in Murat Pasha being an honourable man who would keep his promises and one who would not be persuaded by

Polish-backed bribery to oppose Bogdan's appointment. (35)

The Levant Company had issued instructions to its Treasurer in Constantinople, Anthony Abbdie, to furnish Sir Thomas Glover with 10,000 Crowns as the latter directed him. Abbdie was told to send bills of exchange to James Higgins in Venice who had been ordered to accept and pay them. It was this question of the raising of money which caused most difficulty for the Company which appears to have expected not to be called upon to provide a large sum of money until Bogdan had been installed as prince, or at least received his "helmet". However, as we saw above, Glover needed funds ready at hand. He called for 6,000 of the 10,000 Crowns immediately and the rest to be brought to him four days later. Having been advised of Salisbury's instructions to Glover, the Company had budgeted for the provision of only 2,000 Crowns at this juncture; they had planned to make the rest of the money available six months later, which they had been advised was the earliest possible date for Bogdan's installation as Prince of Moldavia.

This situation arose because the Crown and the Company did not appreciate the difficulties facing Glover, in particular that he needed to be able to act swiftly if the Ottomans indicated a readiness to replace Constantin Movilă with Ștefan Bogdan. The Crown and the Company were mainly concerned to minimise the risk of losing their money and avoid any expense until Bogdan had achieved his object, therefore they expected Glover to proceed with the utmost caution:

"Now yf you should not be able to effect it, judge you what an imputacion you have cast upon yourself and what a wrong you have done to us, his Majestie considering the money is not

otherwise to be [paid?] having [given] us noe other security of ye repayment of theis money then that they be disbursed but according to such cautions as his Majestie hath prescribed you..." (36)

In December 1608, the Company warned both Glover and Abbdie that they could be held liable for the repayment of the money taken up so far if Bogdan's suit should fail because they had deviated from their express instructions. The Company appears to have suspected that Glover had already paid bribes to the Sultan's ministers.

The Levant Company feared that its credit in Venice would be damaged. Abbdie's bills of exchange had been sent as instructed to James Higgins, who informed the Company that he might not be able to honour them given the shortage of money in Venice due to the devaluation of the *zecchini*. The Company was forced to hastily provide the 10,000 Crowns from its own reserves because of what they described as:

"[Glover's] speedie and unnecessary take up of soo great a some." Abbdie was the victim of the Company's conflicting instructions; he had been sent a copy of Salisbury's order to Glover which had specified that no more than 2,000 Crowns should be raised for the moment, but which also instructed him to raise 10,000 Crowns according to Glover's direction. Glover clearly bullied Abbdie into providing the entire sum immediately. The Company leadership had based its judgment of how to conduct the affair on the supposition that no more that 2,000 Crowns would be required for at least six months by which time it would have made additional arrangements. Abbdie was informed that in the

Company's opinion Sir Thomas Glover had exceeded his orders and, by implication, his authority as ambassador. (37)

The Company Court wrote to James Higgins in Venice to apologise for what had occurred and to ask him to accept Anthony Abbdie's bills of exchange; Higgins was sent a letter of credit which would enable him to do so. The Levant Company's chief concern was that the whole affair had damaged its reputation for trustworthiness in financial matters, because it had neglected to make proper arrangements to underwrite the King's financial support of Ştefan Bogdan.

Considerable damage had been done to Anthony Abbdie's creditworthiness and reputation when it became public knowledge that his bills of exchange had been questioned; therefore to spare him any further risk to his reputation the Company decided to raise money to support Ştefan Bogdan in a different manner. Glover was instructed to raise money upon goods belonging to all the English merchants present in Constantinople and to give them in return bills of exchange guaranteed by the Levant Company which were recoverable in London. By devising this alternative method of payment the Company transferred the burden of raising money for Bogdan onto the merchants in Constantinople. Glover was told that if some merchants were willing to invest more money than they were asked for, they should be allowed to do so and others might be excused taking part. The Company had received information that there were men in Constantinople who were willing to invest money in Bogdan's suite in the hope of handsome

returns if he was successful. John Sanderson was interested in the investment possibilities and instructed John Kitely in Constantinople to look after his interests for him:

“for your [...] interests I will procure you to be rewarded with some of the first fruit of Moldavia...” (38)

In another letter Sanderson referred to his acceptance of a voluntary offering of:

“The Princes frutes when God shall have preferred... him in that place; for his Lordship [probably Glover] I procured the 1/2 of all wch if good have may be recovered by his means of the said Prince of Moldavia and have advised thereof in sondry letters are at his Lps comand.” (39)

It would seem that Bogdan had been buying support with promises of repayment out of the taxes he would levy as prince. Considering the amount of money he would be expected to pay the Ottomans in gifts and tribute once he was installed, the tax burden which Bogdan expected to impose upon the principality was enormous; he clearly intended to exploit the principality's resources to the full.

In addition to finding himself in bad odour with his superiors in England Glover found his reputation amongst the Ottomans damaged by a set of unfortunate occurrences which he considered set Bogdan's cause back so far as to be nearly irrevocable. Glover had sought the support of the Tatar Khan who was ill-disposed to the King of Poland:

“... wherein he ferventlie exhorted the Gran Sigr wth all speed to sende from his Porte another Prince for Moldavia, for that Constantyne... did not yeeld that obedeince he ought but ruynated the province in such manner that in shorte tyme if the Gran Sigr did not give speedie remedie, the same presentlie would be soe exhausted that it will never be able to yeeld him any profite, and

concluded that it did not stande with his Mgties [i.e. the Sultan] honr that contrarie to former customes the Princes of that province should be placed by the Powles wch Ire indeed much furthered our suitee.” (40)

This argument carried great weight not only because it was offered by one of the Sultan Ahmet's's most important vassals, but also because, as touched upon in Chapter I of this thesis, the principalities were a major source of raw materials for the Ottoman core provinces.

In the meantime Stefan Bogdan had not been idle: he had arranged for two Moldavian noblemen, former office-holders in the principality (Great Treasurer and Gentleman of the Horse), to come to Constantinople with two hundred followers at Sir Thomas' expense and to demand a new prince. In particular, they intended to complain about Constantin's agent (*kapu-kihaya*) to the Porte, whom they alleged was chiefly responsible for the ruin of the Moldavian peasantry and the destruction of the land. Such destruction was probably a result of Constantin's need to pay bribes to the Ottomans in order to remain in power. The two noblemen, or Barons as Glover called them, were admitted to a public audience with the Viziers where the case on both sides was to be examined. The Barons managed to procure a verdict of guilty from the Grand Vizier and it was decided that the Moldavian Agent be taken to the house of a *Cadi* where he would be held until it was decided whether imprisonment or execution should be his punishment. Glover was furious at what occurred next:

“Theis sillie Barones wth the rest of their two hundred ignorant villanes, wthout witt discretion or any consideration; whether of ioye, that had convicted him, or greefe of harte for extraordinary

damages recd by his meanse from the Powles, had not pacience to carrie him away quietlie to the cheefe iudge, but as soone as he was delivered into their handes in the verie presence of the Vizeries in the place of iustice and in the King's [i.e. the Sultan] house... all in generall fell a buffetinge and beatinge him, woundinge his hande, pulde of most of his beard, and would have pulled him in peeces if they had not bin parted by the Turques."

This incident was a particularly great insult to the dignity of the Porte because it occurred in the presence of the Sultan. The Barons were committed to the Seven Towers fortress and a dozen of their noble followers and 40 of their attendants were sent to the galleys; the Agent was released and set to work to ensure that his enemies were put to death. Three of the Barons were sentenced to be thrown in the sea and drowned, Glover reported that he was doing all he could to obtain their pardon.

Bogdan's attempt to use a feud amongst the Moldavian nobility to his own advantage had backfired disastrously, when all the pent-up hostility, which had nothing to do with his suit, burst out into violence. He was, as Glover reported, appalled and dejected by the behaviour of those whom he had hoped to use; such an outrage committed in the presence of the Sultan not only warranted death or the galleys for the perpetrators but could cause Ahmet to turn against the whole idea of replacing Constantin. The pretender cheered up somewhat when Glover secured the release of the men sent to the galleys and obtained a promise that the Barons would be released.

The Grand Vizier Murat Pasha assured Glover that he would abide by his promise to install Bogdan in Moldavia but asked not to be pressed

further at this time. Rumours of the Emperor Maximilian's projected expedition against Poland reduced the likelihood that Constantin would be removed; the Ottomans would not wish to destabilise the area if this might lead to the Danubian Principalities falling to the Habsburgs. Glover informed Salisbury that he was attempting instead to obtain the principality of Wallachia for Bogdan:

“wch if I can purchase it will be as good unto him (and rather better in theis turbulent tymes there) then his pryncedome of Moldavia.” (42)

This last statement shows Bogdan's protestations that he only desired restoration to his father's throne by hereditary right, to be mere devices to obtain sympathy, moreover they suggest that English support was motivated by more than sympathy for a distressed prince and probably by a desire to increase England's diplomatic influence in the Ottoman Empire. Glover also suspected that Constantin would eventually be bankrupted, which would bode well for Bogdan, for the profuse distribution of financial favours amongst those close to the Sultan by Constantin's agent must soon come to a halt unless financial assistance from Poland was forthcoming. Therefore Glover was not completely pessimistic, but he appears to have become increasingly weary of the whole matter.

At the beginning of March 1609 the Tatars launched an incursion into Poland; whilst the Ottomans awaited news of the outcome they asked Glover to suspend his efforts on Bogdan's behalf, nor had Glover been given any further answer about the release of the Barons. He

suspected that the Ottomans would keep them in prison until Bogdan was preferred to Moldavia, probably in order to prevent any incidents with the Moldavian agent. He complained at the difficulties with which he was faced and the continual frustrations he endured:

“they are altogether variable and inconstante without resolution and subject to howerly mutations; I cannot insure yor honor in observance of their protestations untill I shall see the deede effected, which if not performed within this 20 or 30 dayes then there is small hope of presente installment, but the matter wilbe produced untill some insolent outrage of the Powles doe inforce a necessarie mutation.” (43)

In this letter Glover seems to have been extremely pessimistic about his chances of doing anything for Bogdan and was trying to prepare those in England involved in this affair for his failure. He laid his only hopes now upon a further deterioration in Turko-Polish relations, mentioning a Cossack raid upon three Ottoman vessels in the Black Sea, in which the booty obtained was divided equally between the Cossacks, the King of Poland and Constantin of Moldavia. This incident was said to have so enraged the Ottomans that they were to hold a general Council to decide upon retaliation.

At the beginning of April 1609 Glover again went to Murat Pasha to demand an “absolute answere of their determination” whether or not the Ottomans intended to install Bogdan in Moldavia. He also requested answers to King James’ letters written to Sultan Ahmet on the pretender’s behalf and appears to have told the Vizier that he could not continue to support Bogdan if the Sultan did not keep his promise and prefer the pretender soon. This seems a peculiar method of proceeding since in

normal circumstances any suggestion that Bogdan could not rely upon English support would weaken rather than strengthen his cause. Nevertheless, the Vizier assured Glover that, when a suitable opportunity was presented, Ștefan Bogdan would have his desire, if not in Moldavia then in Wallachia; Murat Pasha asked Glover to be patient and to assure the King and the Earl of Salisbury of his good intentions. (44) This exchange suggests that Glover was aware of Bogdan's usefulness to the Sultan: the Ottomans were using Bogdan's presence in Constantinople as a rival to Constantin Movilă to put pressure on Poland and Movilă to make concessions, offer bribes and behave in a conciliatory manner.

The King of Poland was extremely concerned that Bogdan might succeed in replacing Constantin Movilă; he therefore dispatched an envoy, Kochanski, to Constantinople with instructions to break his journey in Moldavia and assure Movilă of Poland's continued support. King Zygmund Vasa's orders to Kochanski emphasised the vital importance of maintaining peace inside the principality. Constantin was instructed to present gifts to Murat Pasha and others close to the Sultan in order to thwart the plottings of Sir Thomas Glover. Whilst in Iasi, Kochanski consulted Constantin's chief ministers about Glover's methods for procuring favours in order to discover the extent of the threat Bogdan posed to Constantin's position. When he arrived in the Ottoman capital Kochanski sought audience with the Sultan's ministers to convince them of the importance to Turko-Polish relations of maintaining Movila on the Moldavian throne. He reminded them of the behaviour of

Bogdan's father Iancu Sasul, dwelling on the latter's disloyalty to Sultan Murat III when he was prince, his ceaseless feuds with the Ottomans and with Stefan Bathory, King of Poland, and his plundering and embezzlement of the principality's treasure and resources in preparation for his escape from the Sultan's justice:

“We cannot doubt that his son will not only be lower than his father, but will wish to imitate his pranks.”

Kochanski assured the Ottomans that the King of Poland's only concern to keep a good and peaceful man on the Moldavian throne, who would not create incidents which would damage the good relations between Poland and the Sultan. He argued that the interests of both states lay in the continuance of the current state of affairs which was guaranteed by treaty and maintained that, since Constantin and his father Ieremie had held the throne through the Sultan's favour, it would be neither fair nor constructive to cast him out so carelessly when his family had given so much to the Sultan's predecessors and had showed them every goodwill. He insisted that Bogdan's only desire was to cause trouble between Sultan Ahmet and the King of Poland in order to serve his own interests, something which could not be tolerated in a vassal, and he should therefore be banished or imprisoned before he could present further difficulties. He also suggested that Sir Thomas Glover's behaviour in supporting Bogdan was entirely inappropriate to an ambassador to the Ottoman Empire and was motivated purely by a desire for personal gain.

Kochanski accused Bogdan of launching a conspiracy with the two Moldavian Barons, Barbă Albă and Ianache, to kill Constantin.

However, despite the supposed threat of assassination, Constantin's Polish guard, provided by the King of Poland to protect him from just this eventuality, was to be disbanded. This was a significant concession to the Sultan. Not only had the Polish guard been a major source of complaint amongst the Moldavian Boyars, it was also a continual reminder to the Ottomans that a rival power in Eastern Europe had a considerable influence over one of their own vassal states. The removal of the Polish guard from Moldavia shows that Ștefan Bogdan's continued favour with Sultan Ahmet was regarded as a significant threat to Constantin Movilă's rule. It also shows that the Ottoman policy of maintaining Bogdan in Constantinople as Movilă's chief rival was gradually reaping rewards. Frustrating as it was for Bogdan and Glover, the delay in making a final decision over the future of the principality allowed the Sultan and his Viziers to wait for an opportune moment to bring the principality under Ottoman control. We also learn from Kochanski's instructions that Gabriel Bathory, Prince of Transylvania was planning to intervene in support of Bogdan and had threatened to invade Moldavia.

The King of Poland had already written to King James and asked him to order Glover to discontinue his support of Bogdan. According to Antonio Foscarini, the Venetian Ambassador in France, the Marshall of Poland had visited England to complain about Glover's activities and alleged that the English Ambassador was urging the Grand Vizier to attack Poland. This may refer to the fact that, if Bogdan were to receive

Sultan Ahmet's nomination as Prince of Moldavia, he would have to overcome Constantin's resistance and take the throne by force of arms using Ottoman troops, thereby bringing about conflict between Ottoman troops and Polish troops sent to protect Constantin. (45) The King of Poland's efforts to persuade King James to reconsider his support for Bogdan were partially successful. However, as we shall see, James' eventual abandonment of Bogdan was in all likelihood precipitated by anger at his cousin Lady Arbella Stuart's romantic association with the pretender. Furthermore, the protracted length of the campaign on Bogdan's behalf seems to have blunted the King's interest in maintaining a protégé on the Moldavian throne.

Kochanski's mission to Constantinople was not fruitful: not only did his suit fail but, whilst he was present in Constantinople, Glover managed to procure the release of the two Barons arrested for their attack upon Movila's agent. This gave Movilá and his Polish supporters little confidence in the Vizier's friendly disposition towards them. (46) Upon being set free the Barons were warned to have no further contact with the English Embassy; they ignored this warning and continued to meet Bogdan on embassy property. The Grand Vizier was furious when informed of these visits by the prince's enemies; he ordered Glover to surrender the men at once; Glover denied that they were in his house at all:

"Words ran so high that the Vizier said the Grand Signor would send the Ambassador in chains to England to have his head taken off and added a heap of insults so that the Ambassador returned to his house quite upset and melancholy; and in truth I [the Venetian Ambassador] fear that as the Porte is tired of this affair, something

worse than words may befall the Ambassador.” (47)

To make promises which they did not fulfil, whilst delaying making any decision, was a typical tactic employed by the Ottomans when they did not want to take action. They were prepared to allow foreign ambassadors to present letters on behalf of men such as Bogdan and to petition on their behalf. Indeed certain advantages resulted from allowing such interventions as we have seen. However, they did not intend to allow Bogdan to precipitate internal disorder in the principality. The pretender had become tired of waiting patiently for preferment and was endeavouring to stir up discontent amongst Moldavian boyars, using the Barons as ‘provocateurs’ in order to organise a revolt. The Ottomans did not wish to lose all control over decisions concerning the the principality’s future. Glover was deemed to be in some way involved in secret plots against Movilă, because he appeared to have done nothing to prevent contact between the pretender and the Barons. As we shall see, Glover’s influence over the pretender was minimal, indeed it was Bogdan who was able to influence and indeed put considerable pressure on the English Ambassador by threatening to reveal certain information about him if he did not co-operate with all his schemes, however dubious.

By May 1609 Glover had become profoundly pessimistic about Bogdan’s chances of ascending the Moldavian throne. He wrote of his problems to John Sanderson; unfortunately only Sanderson’s reply has survived:

“I doe not yet thincke good to show to them [probably the Levant

Company] what your Lp. writeth concerning their hopes of recovery in Bugdania...”

Sanderson warned Glover that, despite his strenuous efforts on Bogdan's behalf, nobody would credit his efforts if the money invested in this project was lost:

“I tell you they be [...] incredulous and ungratefull...” (48)

In the meantime, in his other correspondence with the Crown and the Company, Glover tried to appear optimistic about the pretender's suit, knowing that he must persist in his efforts because he would be held liable for financial losses; however successful he might have been in other matters his diplomatic career would be ruined over this question.

Before the arrival in Constantinople of the Polish envoy Kochanski, Glover and Bogdan had been given new grounds for optimism in June of 1609 with the intervention of the Tatar Khan which Glover had procured through letters and presents. The Khan sent his Ambassador to Constantinople with presents for the Sultan and his favourites of slaves plundered from the King of Poland's dominions and with a commission to persuade Sultan Ahmet to install Bogdan in Moldavia. This development was important because the Tatars were powerful in the region close to Moldavia:

“wthout whose [the Tatars] advise and counsell in those partes, these never inovate anything.”

Glover promised that extra presents would be forthcoming in addition to his standing offer of “rownde somes” if the Sultan appointed Bogdan Prince of Moldavia immediately; he concluded:

“this business is freshe, verie earnestlie waged by speciall officers and cheefe favourites of the Grand Sigr.” (49)

As a consequence of the Khan’s intervention Kochanski left Constantinople with no assurances of Constantin Movilă’s continuance as prince and no promise that Bogdan’s suit would be rebuffed. However, Glover’s apparent optimism was once again brushed aside with the usual promises that the opportune moment to appoint Bogdan prince had not yet arrived. On 9th of September 1609 Glover wrote:

“Our suite about our Prince Stephano Bugdan lyeth in suspence untill the Vezereys entrance to Constantinople, with assured promise... of graunte of our desyres herin...”

His letter of two weeks later read thus:

“After Murat Bassias entrance into Constantinople I am agayne assured and asertayned by the principall magistrates that our Prince Stefano Bogdan shall obtayne his desyr...” (50)

Throughout October and November 1609 Glover received further promises concerning Bogdan’s preferment; the excuse for further delay was now that the Sultan was awaiting the arrival of the annual tribute before he could replace the Prince of Moldavia. Glover continued to write optimistic letters to England. Amongst the State Papers there is a set of notes, probably in the Earl of Salisbury’s hand, concerning the campaign’s progress; this suggests that the matter was discussed in government committees in late October 1609. The tenor of both Glover’s letters, and the notes written about them, suggest that by December of 1609 those concerned believed the matter to be reaching a crucial point. On December 15th it was reported that a General Council of Mufti and

Viziers had decided that Constantin should be removed from the Moldavian throne. Although there was another candidate (Ștefan Tomșa) protected by one of the Viziers (Georgi Mehmet Pasha, an eunuch) and lodged in his house, Glover did not consider him a serious rival to Bogdan. The *Beylerbeys*, *Sanjakbeys* and *Cadis* stationed around the borders of Moldavia were alerted to assist the new prince sent from Constantinople, since it was likely that Constantin would not surrender his throne without resistance and support from his patrons in Poland. Notification of the proposal to remove Movilă was sent to the Tatar Khan and the Prince of Transylvania; this gave Glover considerable cause for optimism since they had both indicated their support for Bogdan's candidacy. In letters to England Glover attempted to justify the length of time taken to bring Bogdan's campaign to this point, by pointing out that the role of the Prince of Moldavia in South-East European affairs meant that decisions concerning the principality could not be taken without great deliberation. He promised the Earl of Salisbury that once Bogdan's installation in Moldavia was achieved:

“... to what an exceeding glorie, honr and renowne of his most excelant Matie and the Crowne of England it will redowne...”

He assured Salisbury that he should not be angry about the Exchequer's temporary loss of 10,000 Crowns, since the greater part of this money was in deposit to be close at hand when the time came for it to be spent; much greater sums had already been spent by other friends of the pretender in Constantinople who were still confident of his success. (51)

Soon afterwards Glover was called to the presence of the Grand

Vizier Murat Pasha and interrogated (Glover's own description) about the amount of money, apart from the tribute, the prince would be prepared to give the Sultan before his departure from Constantinople. This was indeed the crux of the matter, for if Bogdan did not offer enough money he would not be given the appointment. Bogdan and Glover, both being men experienced in dealings with the Ottomans, had anticipated this by raising money from the Levant Company in advance; because of his foresight Glover could reply immediately that, upon kissing the Sultan's hand, Bogdan would present 30,000 dollars to Sultan Ahmet and 40,000 to the Vizier for his trouble. The Vizier objected that the Sultan's share was insufficient, Glover therefore replied that the Vizier could have 80,000 dollars to divide up as he wished, either to give it all to the Sultan or keep it all himself if he so wished, so long as the business was concluded as soon as possible. He reported that Murat Pasha seemed pleased with this suggestion and had told him to prepare the money. Murat promised that Bogdan's wish would be granted once the financial matters had been dealt with. It was arranged that upon production of the standard and helmet, the symbols of a Prince of Moldavia's authority, 100,000 *zecchini* would be furnished to pay the Sultan and Grand Vizier their rewards and the following sums of money to the other officials: ten thousand Crowns to the Treasurer; ten thousand dollars each to the second and third Viziers; ten thousand Crowns to the *Mufti* and the same amount to the Chancellor; one thousand Crowns each to the rest of the Viziers and five hundred dollars each to the secretaries and others.

Glover assured Salisbury that since this money had already been raised it was only necessary to await Bogdan's appointment. Glover could not resist pointing out to the Earl of Salisbury that:

“where such great sumes muste be layed out towards the preferment of such an important suite as the preferment of a prince, the small sume of 10V Crownes, let it not be thought too much preiudiciall, or too longe to be kept for some tyme out of his highes Exchequer and espetiallie not beinge any way indangered, howsoever this business should come to passe...” (52)

In January 1610 Glover was able to report further good news when the Prince of Transylvania's Ambassador confirmed that his master was still ready to support Bogdan. Glover and Bogdan sent the two Moldavian “Barones” to meet with the *Sanjakbey* of Buda whose arrival was awaited in Constantinople. Glover had now been told that he must wait until this Pasha's marriage had been solemnised before the Sultan would proceed with the matter of changing the Prince of Moldavia. These delays were yet another frustration for Glover and Bogdan, since they had already made what they thought were definite arrangements for Bogdan's investiture. They tried to remain confident, hence the dispatch of envoys to court the Pasha of Buda's favour. The Pasha had known Bogdan in 1594 when he was appointed Prince of Wallachia, before being defeated in battle by Mihai Viteazul; (53) Glover and Bogdan chose to regard this as a cause for optimism. Aside from reminding the Ottomans of their promise to install the pretender in Moldavia and ensuring that the money necessary for bribes was ready to be handed over, there were no more steps Glover could take to promote Bogdan.

The latter's fate now rested with Sultan Ahmet's ministers, the Prince of Transylvania and the Tatar Khan.

In England, meanwhile, the reputations of both Glover and Bogdan were suffering. As we saw in Chapter III, the Ambassador's enemies were spreading stories designed to blacken his name. When warned about this by John Sanderson, Glover wrote to the Earl of Salisbury to defend himself and regain Salisbury's good opinion. He knew that character assassination was particularly dangerous now that Salisbury had doubts about his competence in the conduct of Stefan Bogdan's affairs; therefore in the same letter he promised that he would soon be able to send his wife's brother to England bearing good news about the Prince of Moldavia. (54)

Unbeknownst to Glover, he had been under investigation by Henry Wotton, the English Ambassador in Venice. In 1607 Wotton had been informed by the Florentine representative in Venice that Glover was conducting a secret correspondence with various Christian princes. After enquiries, Wotton discovered evidence that the embassy in Constantinople was being used as part of a spy network set up by the Spanish Crown and clearly suspected that Glover was implicated in this espionage

“directly or obliquely”.

Glover employed Jeffrey Luther, an English resident in Venice, to deal with his correspondence as it arrived in Venice *en route* to other destinations. When questioned by Wotton, Luther admitted that Glover

occasionally sent bundles of letters to an apothecary in Venice which he had imagined were concerned with the drugs trade. Wotton made arrangements with Luther to intercept and open the next such bundle of letters which arrived. However, in January 1608 Luther died. Wotton acted quickly to ensure that Glover's letters were delivered into his hands before the latter was able to appoint a replacement for Luther. When the next packet of letters were given to Wotton, he received a visit from the aforementioned apothecary and an Italian merchant who begged to be present when the letters were read.

Amongst Glover's letters were two written in cipher, probably written by Glover's secretary, Gieronimo Meoli, to one Battista Pratti and a man named Camillo Bacea; the rest of the letters were in plain writing. The entire packet of letters was dispatched unread to the Earl of Salisbury. It is clear that the letters contained nothing to implicate Sir Thomas Glover in espionage, but they almost certainly showed that there was a Spanish spy in his embassy, because soon afterwards it was reported that Glover had interrogated Meoli at gunpoint about his secret correspondence with Spain. Meoli is alleged to have boasted of being a kinsman of the Habsburg Emperor's Chancellor and of having powerful connections within the anti-Ottoman forces of central Europe. Reports were released to show that Glover had summarily dismissed Meoli, who insisted that his dealings with Spain had done nothing to damage English interests. There is no evidence to show that Glover had been aware of the infiltration of his embassy. What is clear from subsequent

developments is that Meoli was not the only spy within the embassy. As we shall see, someone inside the embassy continued to supply information to Spain. One may also conclude that from now on Glover must have been aware that his embassy was compromised, yet there is no evidence that he took any steps to prevent another spy from operating inside the embassy. Wotton, and others who disapproved of Glover, remained sceptical about his loyalty, although nothing could be proved at this stage. Allegations that Glover was involved in espionage were to surface again in November 1611, when a remark, alleged to have been made by Ştefan Bogdan, was widely reported in England. John Sanderson reported having first heard of this from one Ed. Abbott, a member of the Levant Company with whom he did business, and later from Henry Lello who had also heard of the said remark from a foreign source: it was said that Bogdan believed he could lead Glover by the nose and that the ambassador did not dare displease him. The whole matter did nothing to improve Glover's reputation, because, if true, Bogdan was clearly privy to some secret misdoings of Glover; that:

“you have either reported some secrets or [did] in his sight som what that occasioneth him to use such speeches behind your backe; therefore counsell you [...] wth all convenience that you may to your creditt ridd your hand and your house of him...” (55)

When this report reached the ears of the Earl of Salisbury it inevitably revived the previous allegations about Glover's secret correspondence, since it was taken to imply that Bogdan had discovered some evidence of Glover's disloyalty to the English Crown which was sufficiently damning to make him vulnerable to blackmail. These allegations became so

widespread that, when Glover was denounced as a Spanish agent by Sir Anthony Sherley, an immediate decision was taken to replace Glover with Paul Pindar who was sent out to Constantinople to investigate his conduct, as we shall see.

The Earl of Salisbury does not seem to have believed that Glover was a Spanish spy. His prime concern in the whole Bogdan affair was to ensure that The King's money was spent wisely; he was not satisfied with Glover's explanations of the terms on which he had parted with the 10,000 Crowns and continually pressed the ambassador to give assurance that the money was recoverable whether or not Bogdan was installed on the Moldavian throne. He expressed himself surprised and angry at Glover's "owne levity and vayne conceit" at acting contrary to instructions. On other matters however he was pleased with Glover's industry and diligence on behalf of the merchants, particularly in the matter of obtaining the Sultan's passport for merchants trading in the East Indies. (56) At the same time as Sir Thomas Glover's reputation was under attack a second scandal erupted in England. On 29th December 1609 it was reported that James I's cousin, the Lady Arbella Stuart, had been committed to her chamber for "entertaining correspondence for marriage" to the Prince of Moldavia, Ștefan Bogdan.

Born in 1575, Lady Arbella (57) was the only child of Charles Stuart, Earl of Lennox, younger brother of Henry, Lord Darnley the second husband of Mary, Queen of Scots. Lennox, through his mother Margaret, Dowager Countess of Lennox, was the grandson of Princess

Margaret, the eldest daughter of Henry VII. Arbella's mother was Elizabeth Cavendish, daughter of the famous Bess of Hardwick, by her second husband William Cavendish. (58) Arbella was in the line of succession to the throne of England, after Mary, Queen of Scots and James VI of Scotland who became James I of England. (59) This proximity to the throne proved to be a great disadvantage for Arbella. In 1607, Nicolo Molin, the Venetian Ambassador in England described her as being:

“without mate and without estate”; (60)

this statement sums up Arbella's greatest difficulties throughout her life: she had little property to support her and was not allowed to marry. Both these problems derived from her birth and the attitudes of Queen Elizabeth and her successor James I; if Arbella married, an ambitious husband might press her claim or that of her offspring, to the English throne, thereby creating a focus of resistance against James I and his descendants. As for her 'estate', the Lennox estates in Scotland were seized by the Scottish Crown after the death of her father in 1576 and were never returned to her. (61) Throughout her life Arbella was dependent upon allowances from her grandmother, Bess of Hardwick, and from the Crown. This mattered particularly in the reign of King James. Whilst Queen Elizabeth was alive Arbella was rarely summoned to Court; during James' reign she was expected to spend much of her time at Court where the King could keep a close watch on her; she had no assets which could have brought her financial independence and life

at Court demanded money that Arbella did not have. She was constantly “penny-pinching”, incurring debts and writing to Robert Cecil for an increase with her pension or the grant of a state monopoly (62) which would help her maintain herself and a household suited to her position as the King’s cousin.

A number of books have been written about Arbella Stuart and she is often presented as a romantic heroine, in the manner of a nineteenth century romantic novel. Lady Arbella seems to have led a particularly tedious and restricted existence and must have been deeply unhappy much of the time. She was never allowed to marry and her own attempts to remedy this situation resulted in serious trouble for her and further unhappiness. (63)

She was brought up under the supervision of her grandmother, Bess of Hardwick, a particularly formidable woman, with the help of her aunt and uncle, Gilbert and Mary Talbot. There were various suggestions of possible suitors for her but all marriage plans came to nothing, largely due to the opposition of the Queen, or extremely bad luck. At some time before 1584, she was betrothed to Robert, Lord Denbigh, son of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, but the boy died in 1584 at the age of four years. (64) In 1581, Queen Elizabeth had considered betrothing her to Esme Stuart, the newly appointed Earl of Lennox, but he died in 1583. It was even proposed that she marry her cousin James VI of Scotland, but he married Anne of Denmark in 1589. Another rumoured suitor was Rainutio Farnese, son of the Duke of Parma, the Spanish Governor-

General of the Netherlands, proposed with a view to improving relations between England and Spain, but as usual this suggestion was not seriously pursued. There were other rumours that Arbella was the target of a Catholic plot to kidnap her and marry her to King Phillip of Spain who would then set out to overthrow Elizabeth in Arbella's favour. She had in fact been given a strict Protestant upbringing but suggestions that Arbella was a Catholic occasionally surfaced, as we shall see. These rumours about her religious sympathies aroused suspicions in both Elizabeth and King James, her successor. There were numerous other suggested suitors and it was even whispered that Robert Cecil was intending to marry her in order to become King. None of these suggested suitors received any consideration by the Queen, who had little interest in finding a husband for her cousin.

In 1600, at the age of 25 with her own household, she was still unmarried, and had no-one of her own age for company. Although Queen Elizabeth did not herself marry, in Elizabethan society unmarried women, particularly those without property, had little status. To Lady Arbella marriage seems to have represented a chance to escape from her tedious existence. In 1602, when she was 27 years old, Bess of Hardwick's chaplain James Starkey observed that she was very depressed. (65) In that year Arbella proposed marriage to Edward Seymour, grandson of the Earl of Hertford, whom she had never met and who was at that time only 16 years old. Seymour also had royal blood, since the Earl of Hertford had married Catherine Grey, grand-daughter of

Mary Tudor, the youngest daughter of Henry VII: any issue of such a marriage would have a strong claim to the throne and for Hertford's grandson to enter into such an arrangement without the Queen's permission would be politically very dangerous for the Earl's family. Furthermore, Arbella's lack of property did not make her a very desirable match, particularly as the Queen seems to have disliked her. Hertford revealed the proposal immediately to Robert Cecil and Arbella was made to sign a confession and an apology for her behaviour. (66)

Relations between Arbella and her grandmother became increasingly bad, but she was not allowed to leave the old lady's charge. Her behaviour became increasingly irrational as she made plans to gain her liberty. She invented a story of a secret lover who was high in the Queen's favour; she went on hunger-strike and finally tried to escape by enlisting the help of her uncle Henry Cavendish but was prevented. (67)

When the Queen died (24th March 1603) James VI of Scotland was immediately proclaimed King of England. During his triumphant progress through England he was petitioned upon Arbella's behalf and requested that she be given her freedom:

"from that unpleasant life which she hath lead in the house of her grandmother with whose severity and age, being a young lady [she] could hardly agree..." (68)

The new king liked to keep her near him at Court and recognised her as a princess of the blood, but only granted her a small pension. She lived much of her Court life in retirement. The new King did not regard her personally as a danger to his throne. Arbella did not enjoy her

attendance at Court; she made few friends there and regarded the games played by the Queen and her Ladies-in-Waiting as childish. Moreover, although her allowance from the King was increased she was not in a position to dress herself or furnish her quarters in a manner which could match that of those around her. She did, however, enjoy the Court entertainments such as plays and masques; she was a good friend of the Queen and found an ally in Robert Cecil: she was able to use her favour at Court to help her uncles: for example William Cavendish obtained a baronage. Nevertheless, although the king professed to hold her in high esteem and promised to restore her property, the Lennox estates, upon her marriage, no plans were made to find her a husband. In 1608 she bought herself a house in Blackfriars as a place to retire from the rigours of Court life. She bitterly resented her enforced spinsterhood, feeling that she was forced to live the life of a nun without having chosen that vocation. She wrote to her uncle Gilbert Talbot:

“For want of a nunnery, I have for a while retired myself to the Friars.” (69)

When Ștefan Bogdan visited England in 1607 he met Lady Arbella and was apparently greatly impressed by her. She had been described by the Venetian Ambassador in London as:

“not very beautiful but highly accomplished.” (70)

She had fair hair, a wide-mouth and a round chin; she was witty and charming and had very refined manners; she was also highly educated and, having a great fondness for study she was very knowledgeable about the classics; she spoke Latin, Italian, French and Spanish and

could read Greek and Hebrew. The education of noble women of the time demanded that she learn to dance, play the virginals and lute, to embroider and to write a firm and elegant hand. Lady Arbella was also said to have had a love of beautiful and rich clothes and expensive jewellery, a taste which she was not rich enough to indulge to any great extent. Bogdan's good opinion of her was no doubt encouraged by the fact that she was the King's cousin and therefore of some influence over him. For Arbella, frustrated at her dull and restricted life, Bogdan was probably a very attractive man. Not only was he apparently handsome and exotic looking, he was also cultivated, charming and courtly. He was well-travelled and had led a life of excitement, danger and adventure. Arbella and Ștefan Bogdan appear to have cultivated some sort of relationship in which marriage was hinted at as a possibility if Bogdan was successful in winning the Moldavian throne. That she took a personal interest in the pretender's petition is evident from his surprise upon reaching Sir Henry Wotton's house in Venice that neither Cecil nor Lady Arbella had sent Wotton any directions or instructions concerning his imminent arrival. That Bogdan mentioned Cecil and Arbella together suggests that she had been considerably involved in pressing the King to help Bogdan and had met the pretender on a number of occasions during which she had been friendly towards him. For Lady Arbella, the possibility of marriage to the prince of an exotic state on the other side of Europe promised escape and adventure. Furthermore, she does not appear to have been a woman who took Bogdan's cause nor her

friendship with him anything other than seriously. She is said have been serious by nature and was described as having a studious and “melancholic” character. Melancholy was thought of as a medical condition brought about by an excess of one of the major body fluids - “Melancholic” - someone with this condition had a passion for solitude and in extreme cases could become mad. The poor woman seems to have been desperate to marry; marriage represented status, liberty, as well as offering some form of companionship and the possibility of having children.

Ștefan Bogdan seriously contemplated marrying Lady Arbella Stuart; in November 1608 Sir Henry Wotton reported to Sir Robert Cecil, the Earl of Salisbury, that Bogdan had written to the Archbishop of Philadelphia, head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Italy to obtain his permission to dissolve a marriage of long standing with a Venetian woman (71) on the grounds that since he had found King James’ recommendation to be insufficient to obtain the Moldavian throne, he intended to go and live in Persia and did not wish to have the presence of a wife upon his conscience, preferring to leave her free to marry again if she wished.

This excuse of Bogdan’s was highly suspect, firstly because it would be completely out of character for the pretender to have abandoned his hopes so quickly, when before he had put up with great danger and persevered for years in the hope of achieving his desire. Secondly according to Glover’s reports nothing occurred to warrant such

an attack of pessimism. Few people can have known better that Bogdan was undertaking a difficult and lengthy task and had only entered upon the first stage of petitioning for him. Wotton put forward an alternative explanation for the pretender's conduct:

"The matter is come to the hearing of her friends who make no small noises at it and the matter for a certain report scattered here by the said pretendant at his last passage this way... of some motions that had passed between him and the Lady Arbella of marriage, to succeed when he should be settled in his Princedom; which now the friends of this woman affirm (out of conjecture) to have been not only the ground of that favour which he found in his Majesty's Court, but also the true cause of the letter written to written to the foresaid Archbishop, he may colourably prosecute the other." (72)

Wotton was concerned that Lady Arbella's reputation might be damaged; this incident also confirmed his former dislike of the pretender whom he had dismissed as a charlatan and reminded him of the hints dropped by Bogdan in 1607 of a relationship with a 'high-born' noblewoman at the English court. He tried to procure a copy of the letter and spoke to the Archbishop who confirmed the story of its contents but told Wotton that he had burned the original out of disgust and indignation. Wotton also wrote to Glover to suggest that he reconsider his support for the pretender; in a letter to Salisbury he implied that the English Crown should also reconsider its association with Bogdan since his behaviour towards his wife showed him to be a deeply unsavoury character.

Salisbury took no action upon this matter until over a year later when Lady Arbella was finally questioned about her association with Bogdan, nor did he send any alternative instructions to Glover nor ask for

an explanation from Bogdan. Glover knew of the relationship because the pretender had confided his marital ambitions upon his arrival at the English Embassy in Constantinople:

“... that if it shall please God to send him his place... the firste thinge that he would soe, he would by his letters and Ambassr, wich he purposeth to send unto England, become a humble suitor for the sayed Ladie.” (73)

Glover said that he had been extremely surprised at this suggestion which he regarded as impossible, but upon questioning Bogdan assured himself that Lady Arbella had not behaved improperly in any way and had made no promises of engagement to him, therefore Glover did not feel the need to report the matter to his political masters. Salisbury was also unwilling to stir up unnecessary scandal and did not immediately pursue the matter: Arbella was the King's cousin and in his favour and Salisbury was fond of her. Since there was no possibility of the marriage taking place because Bogdan already had a wife and, although they had no knowledge of Glover's own investigations, there was no evidence that Arbella had compromised herself, Salisbury and the King no doubt considered that there was no need to embarrass Lady Arbella by questioning her about her dealings with Bogdan, particularly since to do so would provoke comment and speculation about her at Court. However, events show that her movements were watched.

Matters came to a head at the end of 1609 when Lady Arbella was arrested on suspicion of attempting to escape from England to marry Stefan Bogdan; she was also accused of converting to Catholicism, through her association with Lady Skinner, whom one J. Beaulieu

described as “a great Papist”. (74) A massive public scandal erupted with numerous versions of her arrest reported. The Venetian Ambassador in London, Marc’Antonio Correr, wrote:

“Lady Arbella’s troubles are caused by a consignment of money which her Excellency made at Constantinople for a Moldavian Prince and by Douglas [her servant] intention to go to the Porte with instructions on the matter. The Moldavian was many months ago at the English Court, and, as hear, with the King’s consent negotiated about marriage with the Lady, the conclusion thereof to depend upon his making good his claim to his state... After he left England, it is now asserted he married in Venice... His Majesty has taken it all in good part and has order that she be repaid for the moneys remitted to Constantinople... All the same she is not satisfied, she claims the restoration of her patrimony and asks to be married or at least to depart and choose a husband.” (75)

Suspicious against her were aroused not only due to the intended departure of Douglas, but also because another servant of hers was discovered: “seeking a ship to pass the sea” which was later officially reported to have been for his own private business and unconnected to Lady Arbella’s affairs. Arbella had taken a house in Lincolnshire and was not often seen at Court; this was seen initially as a prelude to quietly disappearing from view in order to make her escape in secret; it was later publicly stated that the King had accepted that she had acted so in order to conserve her small financial resources, because she could not afford to cloth herself at Christmas according to her rank. Although it was officially accepted that she had not intended to do anything improper she:

“confessed the fault of her womanish credulity in the matter of love with the Prince of Moldavia and in the people’s opinion remains somewhat touched with the spot of popery. The discourse of her nearest servants would make one believe that she is rather given to the discipline of Geneva.” (76)

It is possible that Lady Arbella had heard rumours that Bogdan's suit was nearing a conclusion and had indeed planned to travel to join him. King James was clearly concerned at the turn of events and wrote to Thomas Glover requesting him to question Ștefan Bogdan in private about his involvement with Lady Arbella Stuart. He was fearful that Bogdan might lie or embroider his version of events, to the detriment of Lady Arbella's reputation; he may also have been fearful at what might be revealed about his cousin. To his credit Bogdan said nothing to compromise Lady Arbella; he spoke to Glover of her thus:

“findinge her a most virtuous and godlie Ladie, in his hate he wished she might be his wife, and rather she being of the blood royall and one forayne Princes adioyning here unto England he knew she should never be suffered to marrie for many respectes and therefore himselfe beinge a Prince and his hoped Princedom of that remote from England, he doubted not but to obtayne the same, at his Maties hands before any other Prince whatsoever, if shee were thereunto anyway assigned: soe yet noe other ingadgements than these and such like vayne imaginations I could find in him.” (77)

During his stay in England Bogdan had undoubtedly learned of Lady Arbella's difficult situation and had realised that she was attracted to him; he was attracted to her not only because of her personality and her accomplishments but it must also have occurred to him that if he married her when he became Prince of Moldavia the English Crown would be obliged to continue supporting him to ensure that he was not overthrown. Finally his mistaken view of the importance with which he was regarded in England led him to believe that his proposal of marriage would be acceptable to the King of England. Glover was of the opinion that Bogdan

laboured under a misapprehension of his own importance:

“beinge indeed a man, though of a reasonable superficall witt, yet of no deepe conceyte wisdom or substantiall inginitty [ingenuity]... and therefore his presumption herin to be the lesse made out of or esteemed thus...” (78)

Lady Arbella was cleared of all charges and released from custody. She was restored to her former favour and given gifts and money to pay her debts. However this was not the end of her troubles. She tried to put a brave face upon her humiliating treatment and reappeared in public. However, only a few weeks later she was once again questioned about a proposal of marriage from the second son of Lord Beauchamp, William Seymour. He told his interrogators that he had understood that she had permission to marry whom she liked. The matter was resolved as quietly as possible with Arbella’s promise not to proceed with any marriage plans without the King’s permission. She was again reinstated at Court, although not without comment:

“these Affectations of Marriage in her, do give some Advantage to the World of impairing the reputation of her constant and virtuous disposition...” (79)

Arbella’s misery was not over. That same month Ben Jonson’s play “Epicoene, or the Silent Woman” appeared containing an allusion to her as the mistress of the Prince of Moldavia. The play was suppressed but Arbella retired depressed and angry to her apartments and tried to seek retribution for those responsible through Parliament. (80) This further humiliation, after all she had suffered, persuaded Arbella to abandon all restraint; she must have been very shocked when told that Bogdan,

whom she had entertained hopes of marrying, had a wife whilst he was courting her favour; then after her interrogation on this matter, she found her main complaint, that she was forced to remain a spinster against her inclination, was still ignored. In addition to this she was now spoken of in an uncomplimentary manner and lampooned in a comedy play by a writer closely associated with the English Court. She took matters into her own hands and secretly married William Seymour on 22nd June 1610. Their marriage was not discovered for seventeen days, after which William was sent to the Tower of London and Arbella was held under arrest at the house of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Thomas Parry, in Lambeth. The two were kept strictly apart. A great deal of sympathy was accorded to Seymour, whom Dudley Carleton referred to as a "poor gentlemen", and the whole matter was generally felt to have been entirely a result of Lady Arbella's scheming:

"The ladies hot blood that would not live without a husband must be cooled in some remote place in ye countrie." (81)

Lady Arbella was never forgiven for disobeying the King and her letters of defence were ignored; she insisted on signing all her correspondence Arbella Seymour, a deliberate act of defiance. It was decided to send her to Durham in order to make contact with her husband difficult but she was too ill to travel and so the journey was never made. On June 3rd 1611 she escaped custody dressed as a man and tried to reach France where she had arranged to meet Seymour; he managed to get to France but she was captured in the English Channel. This time she was sent to the Tower of London where she was imprisoned without trial until her death

in September 1615. She appears to have loved Seymour: when he was in the Tower of London she expressed great concern about his health; upon her escape she delayed her departure from England in the hope that he might catch up with her so that she could be sure that they would be in France together, thereby bringing about her own detention. She supported him in exile with gifts of money although she had insufficient money to support herself; when she realised that there was no possibility of release she starved herself to death. Seymour was allowed to return from exile after her death and was forgiven by the King; in November 1616 he was created a Knight of the Bath. He married a second time to the daughter of the Earl of Essex, the favourite of Queen Elizabeth I. He had been genuinely fond of Arbella and called one of his daughters after her. (82)

King James' good opinion of Bogdan was soured by his involvement with his cousin and consequently he became disillusioned with the the pretender. This compounded his existing concern at the difficulty and expense involved in prosecuting Bogdan's campaign, his increasing awareness that it was uncertain of success and the implications for his relations with the Sultan and the King of Poland. He had anticipated a diplomatic triumph and instead was presented with an embarrassing and frustrating mire of complication from which he sought to distance himself. On 24th June 1610 he wrote to the King of Poland, Zygmund III, to apologise for giving Ştefan Bogdan letters of credence, arguing that it had only been his intention to help an unhappy prince and

not to cause displeasure to a sovereign friend. Since Zygmund's previous letters to King James requesting him not to support Bogdan had been ignored, this repudiation of the pretender represents a change of policy. Thereafter James lost interest in Bogdan. The only matter of importance in the opinion of the Earl of Salisbury was to ensure that the King recovered his money whether or not Bogdan was successful in gaining the Moldavian throne. It seems that King James had considered recalling Glover to England but was dissuaded by the Earl of Salisbury probably on the grounds that Glover should be given the chance to redeem the King's 10,000 French Crowns. No orders were given to Glover to cease his protection and support of Bogdan but James deliberately tried to disassociate himself from any trouble Bogdan had caused by pleading that he had only acted out of the most noble of motives. (83)

In Constantinople during the early months of 1610, Glover was anxiously awaiting the outcome of Gabriel Bathory, the Prince of Transylvania's military campaigns against Wallachia and Moldavia. Bathory entered Wallachia where he encamped whilst awaiting the arrival of Radu Șerban, who was to be the new prince there, from Constantinople, Bathory was determined to wait until Radu was firmly established in the Principality before moving into Moldavia. Glover was held in suspense awaiting news of the overthrow of Constantin Movilă; he obtained a *Hati-houmayoun* or declaration from the Sultan on behalf of Bogdan, and wrote:

"Nowe I must truste my infinit travayle about the Prince of Moldavia

ere long shall have one end, or other for if at this tyme this our longe suite be not obtayned, I must even cease to laboure in it any more..." (84)

One month later Glover still awaited news from Moldavia; by this time he appears to have been at the end of his patience:

"if within this 30 dayes at the furtheste... wee doe not obtayne our pretence herin, then I muste of necessitie give over my suite without any further protraction, for there shall remayne to us noe further hope of desiered succese..." (85)

Glover informed John Sanderson that he could no longer afford the great expense of supporting Bogdan. Yet Glover continued to support the pretender for another year despite threats to discontinue the suite altogether if no result were obtained soon. This was partly because he hoped to be able to recover the King's money, secondly Glover seems to have been unwilling to finally admit defeat. Glover's continued support of the pretender, despite his protestations to the contrary, was later interpreted by his enemies as evidence that Bogdan had some hold over him.

In June 1610 yet another obstacle to Bogdan's attainment of the Moldavian throne was presented: the Tatar Khan died and the *Hati-houmayoun* was recalled and the whole matter was once again held in abeyance until the new Tatar Khan had secured his throne. A further complication was anticipated in the shape of the new Khan's brother who, it was thought, would contest the throne. Glover and Bogdan could only await the outcome of the Tatar succession; if there was a conflict between the brothers Glover considered that Bogdan had no chance of

obtaining the Moldavian throne because Ottoman attention would be focussed on the Crimea and Sultan Ahmet would not risk destabilising Moldavia by making changes in its leadership. (86)

John Sanderson was of the opinion that Glover should abandon Bogdan and look to his own problems:

“Clear your hands of him by one meanes or other. Gather yourself together, that you may have welthe to defend you from your enemies, that malitiose of the wourld... Wourds will not be of weyght sufficient to repulse your adversaries for they are many.”

He informed Glover that the Earl of Salisbury had protected him when others had campaigned for his recall and warned him that he must work hard to retain Salisbury's patronage, suggesting that an expensive present would not go amiss. Glover was by this time deeply in debt and Sanderson regarded Bogdan's demands as the chief cause of Glover's financial difficulties and his bad reputation:

“... kepe [your consulage] from that lucklesse voyvods fingering...”

Whereas Lello had used his sojourn in Constantinople to amass a fortune from the Levant trade. Glover had little interest in involving himself in commerce. Glover insisted that he was a diplomat, not a merchant, and rarely acquired any goods in Constantinople to be sent to England and sold at a profit. (87) George Sandys, a visitor to Constantinople in 1610, reached the following conclusions about the cause of Glover's problems:

“surely his chiefest guilt hath been his misfortune in the too violent chargeable and successless solicensing of the restitution of the Prince of Moldavia (whom adversity hath [made] rather crafty than honest)...” (88)

This was a perceptive assessment of Bogdan's character: those who met the pretender in formal circumstances usually found him to be a charming man; after a longer acquaintance the less attractive side of his character was revealed. As we have seen, prior to his involvement with Bogdan, Sir Thomas Glover had liked him and wished him well; after the pretender and his family had been in residence at the English Embassy for only a few months, Glover had completely changed his opinion and ardently hoped that the King of England could be persuaded to change his mind and withdraw his support. Since this had not happened, Glover was obliged to support Bogdan until instructed to send him away. In his letters of 1610 he hinted that Bogdan was bound to fail and that his own financial circumstances would make it necessary to abandon the pretender. Glover found himself in a position where his diplomatic career and his professional reputation were in jeopardy in England and in Constantinople largely due to his forced involvement with Ștefan Bogdan. However, Glover could be said to have proceeded extremely foolishly in the matter of Bogdan's suit by not attempting to curtail the pretender's attempts at subversion in Moldavia as his predecessor, Henry Lello, had done.

In the course of this narrative Bogdan has emerged as a man prepared to use all means at his disposal to gain the Moldavian throne: he attempted to dispose of a wife living in Venice in order to ally himself with a woman whose connections were more useful to him; he was a liar and probably a blackmailer; Bogdan was greedy and selfish,

appropriating Sir Thomas Glover's money to further his own suit, yet he must have been aware that the ambassador was incurring debts in order to support him. Sandys' perceptiveness lies in his suggestion that Bogdan had learned to be selfish as a result of his experiences: his future was dependent upon his enjoyment of England's protection; without this protection he would have been one of many vagabond princes roaming around the Courts of Europe in search of a patron: this was the state to which Ioan Bogdan had been reduced. Most of Ștefan Bogdan's life had been spent in dangerous circumstances; he had narrowly escaped death on several occasions, his treatment at the hands of the Sultan and his Ministers had made him suspicious and paranoid. His long spell in prison, whilst he was supposed to have been under the protection of Henry Lello, had left him bitter and unwilling to trust his protectors, hence his apparent attempts to blackmail Sir Thomas Glover. Furthermore, having devoted his life to one end and having been constantly disappointed, he was determined to use whatever means came to hand to achieve his object, regardless of who might be hurt in the process; he had learned the *Realpolitik* of the Ottoman Empire at an early age.

Two other qualities emerged from Bogdan's behaviour: in the first instance, his unrealistic assessment of his own importance was attributed by Glover to his lack of real intelligence or wisdom; this had been evident in his relationship with Henry Lello. Bogdan had chosen to trust the Ottomans' veracity despite Lello's warnings and consequently found

himself imprisoned. On the other hand, at certain times he exhibited a sense of honour on occasions when honour was expected of a prince: this was true after his escape from the "Castle of Asia", when he sent a message to the Ottoman Grand Vizier giving his assurances that none of his servants had had any knowledge of his intention to escape. Similarly, when he was called upon to explain his involvement with Lady Arbella Stuart, he exonerated her of any behaviour inappropriate to a woman of her position. (89) It was this noble and courtly manner and the pretender's immense charm which initially attracted people to him; but as his struggle to obtain the Moldavian throne proceeded this manner became something of a facade.

In December 1610 Glover was still pressing Bogdan's case:

"By representations and by money he won over the Lieutenant Grand Vizier to present a memorial to the Sultan; it was sent but came out again without effect. His Majesty [i.e. the Sultan] remarked that this was not the time to raise such a question." (90)

Another Polish Ambassador arrived in Constantinople to protest at Sultan Ahmet even entertaining possibility of placing a man such as Bogdan on the Moldavian throne; he reportedly quarrelled violently with Glover. This incident was widely reported in Poland and the English Ambassador there sent a special messenger to London to acquaint King James with what had occurred. Whereas England's representatives in Poland had no knowledge or understanding of the English Crown's patronage of Ștefan Bogdan, the English Embassy in Venice was extremely well-acquainted with developments in Bogdan's suit. This suggests that, when he first accorded Bogdan his support, the King of

England did not perceive his patronage as having a bearing on relations between England and Poland. Although King James knew of the King of Poland's opposition to his patronage of Bogdan, he had proceeded to support the pretender, because he wished to protect and encourage England's influence in areas of Europe which were important to the commercial position of the Levant and the Muscovy Company, (91) and probably also to prevent the spread of the Roman Catholic Church's influence in Eastern Europe.

At the beginning of February 1611 events turned once again in Bogdan's favour when, according to Simon Contarini, the Venetian Ambassador, an order was issued which required the people of Moldavia to accept Ștefan Bogdan as their ruler. Bogdan still enjoyed the support of the Prince of Transylvania, Gabriel Bathory, and, as Contarini wrote, Bogdan's supporters anticipated that Bogdan would receive princely regalia and kiss the Sultan's hand as soon as the decision was taken to dismiss Constantin Movilă from the Moldavian throne. (92) The Prince of Transylvania reportedly made ready to invade Moldavia with 40,000 Ottoman troops and overthrow Movila. In April 1611 Sir Thomas Glover reported that Radu Mihnea (1611-16) had been placed on the throne of Wallachia by force, whilst the former prince, Radu Șerban, prepared to join with Constantin Movilă in resistance. Gabriel Bathory withdrew into Transylvania to collect reinforcements for use against Șerban and Movilă and allowed his men to offload the plunder they had collected in Wallachia. Glover received news that Șerban and Movilă had taken a

sacramental oath:

“either to vanquish Transylvania or to leave their corpses in the open fields to be devoured by the fowls of the Ayre.” (93)

Bathory decided against joining battle immediately and sent for Ottoman and Tatar reinforcements. An intense bout of diplomatic activity ensued:

“... the said Prince of Transylvania by his letters in particular adviseth both the Prince and myself [Glover] here of this his resolution and that he will the rather doe the same in respecte his Matie hath recomanded our Princes suite unto the Gran Signor, and beinge a Kinge of Orthodoxe religion [i.e. Protestant] as himself is he will for his love and sake performe the same and I thinke... to that end he writteth his lettre unto his Matie...” (94)

Supporters of Radu Șerban sought the help of the Habsburg Emperor against Gabriel Bathory and the “terreur des Turcs” promising to cede the principality to the Emperor in return for his support; the King of Poland, meanwhile wrote to King James I begging him not to encourage the violent overthrow of a prince. (95)

It had not been King James' intention to contribute to the development of a potentially serious conflict in Eastern Europe; James had always preferred to see himself in the role of a peace-maker not a provoker of wars. Yet Sir Thomas Glover had interfered upon his orders in the internal affairs of Eastern Europe to such an extent that armed conflict between the three great powers in the area seemed increasingly likely. When confronted with the likely outcome of his policy, King James seems to have been shocked and sought to distance himself from the results of his policy. Glover's replacement Paul Pindar had explicit instructions to confine himself to matters touching the welfare of English

merchants in Constantinople.

Bogdan's suit was now reaching its climax: Sultan Ahmet dispatched an army of 15,000 men under the command of Omer Pasha on May 20th 1611 and commanded all the *Beylerbeys* and *Sanjakbeys* on the borders of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania to have their forces in readiness in join with Omer on the Danube. He ordered the Tatars in the area of the Dobruja and those upon the Moldavian border to enter Moldavia and Wallachia to defeat Radu Șerban and Constantin Movilă. Radu Șerban was reported to be encamped at Bucharest with an army of Vlachs [Wallachians], Hungarians and Turks ready to join battle with Gabriel Bathory. He beat Bathory near Brașov and the Prince of Transylvania barely escaped with his life. Glover, avidly following this conflict, received a false report that it was Serban who had been routed; Ștefan Bogdan was overjoyed at this news, thinking that his time had finally come. Meanwhile Bathory had been forced to retire to Transylvania to regroup his forces; it was estimated that some 6,000 men had died at Brașov. (96)

Another Polish Ambassador arrived in the Ottoman capital with instructions to complain to the Sultan about Gabriel Bathory's attempts to overthrow the princes of Wallachia and Moldavia. He alleged that Glover was supporting Bogdan contrary to the will of King James. As far as the Ottomans were concerned, Glover still had the full support of his King. Neither Glover nor the Ottomans were aware of King James' loss of enthusiasm for Ștefan Bogdan. The Polish Ambassador asked that

Bogdan be handed over to him for punishment, offering a large bribe to bring this about. The Poles regarded Ștefan Bogdan as the only threat to Constantin Movilă, whereas in fact Bogdan had his own rival in the person of Ștefan Tomșa.

Not wishing to provoke direct conflict with Poland, the Ottoman government had tolerated the presence of Constantin Movilă on the Moldavian throne. Movilă had paid his tribute and the other financial exactions expected of him and had kept the peace in the principality, giving the Sultan no reason to replace him. The Sultan's reluctance to disrupt the *status quo* in Moldavia was the stumbling-block at which Glover and Bogdan's efforts always failed. However, when the Prince of Transylvania and the Tatar Khan put their authority behind the campaign to remove Movila, the Ottomans saw the opportunity to clear the principality of Polish influence without Ottoman forces becoming directly involved in Movilă's removal. During his second audience with Sultan Ahmet, after the Viziers had discussed how to respond, the Polish Ambassador found himself:

“so rebuffed and checked, not only for that his Mr. the King of Poland doeth ayde the Prince Serban, but alsoe for meddling with the Transylvanian and us, so that the Ambr was much amazed, and feared much to be that instant committed to the Towers...” (97)

The Polish Ambassador was allowed to leave Constantinople at the beginning of October 1611, certain that the Ottomans intended to proceed with the overthrow of Constantin and Radu Șerban. On October 20th 1611 H. Bilderbeck in Cologne mistakenly reported that Gabriel Bathory had secured the whole of Transylvania and most of Wallachia

under his control with Ottoman aid. Bathory sent an Ambassador to Constantinople demanding that Bogdan be proclaimed prince and installed in the principality. (98) This, and the false report of Bathory's military triumphs, persuaded the Ottomans to call a Council to consider whether it was convenient time to change the ruler in Moldavia. Glover lobbied Bogdan's supporters in the *Divan* ; a dozen Moldavian boyars and a hundred "commoners" sent a petition to the Sultan in support of Ștefan Bogdan. Orders were issued for the election of a new Moldavian prince. A council was called to discuss Constantin Movila's replacement; Ștefan Bogdan and Ștefan Tomșa were both present. Tomșa had the support of the Grand Vizier and two other unspecified Ottoman officials; Bogdan had the backing of the rest of the Viziers, the Mufti and the Cadis. The election was hotly contested with the debate lasting ten days amid allegations that Tomșa's supporters used bribes and false accusations to turn Bogdan's supporters against him. The length of the debate in the *Divan* suggests that Bogdan very nearly succeeded in his campaign for election, nevertheless Ștefan Tomșa was elected Prince of Moldavia. This decision dealt a final blow to the hopes of Glover and Bogdan. Had he finally succeeded in obtaining the throne for Ștefan Bogdan, Glover would have been hailed as a credit to his King and country and his tattered reputation in England and in Constantinople would have been restored; tarred by the brush of failure Glover now feared the loss of his job as ambassador and dreaded being called to account for the King's 10,000 Crowns. Bogdan now realised that he would never obtain his

desire; he decided to follow Glover's advice and retreat into solitude:

“not to seeke his promotion soe publicklye with drumes and Trumpets... but to retire himselfe privatelie into a secret place (of whose aboad, none shall knowe but myself)”;

so that it would be thought that he had left the Ottoman capital. Bogdan decided to approach the Grand Vizier privately to ask him for some assistance and advancement. If the Grand Vizier were to snub him he intended to retire to Transylvania under the protection of Gabriel Bathory, who, according to Glover, had promised to place him on the Moldavian throne by force, offering him his sister's hand in marriage.

The *Divan's* decision in favour of Ștefan Tomșa had several discernable motives: to have, after all Poland's opposition, installed their mortal enemy in Moldavia would have been seen as a provocative act. The declaration of Tomsa was intended to show that the principality was, as it had always been, a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, whilst acknowledging that Sultan Ahmet did not wish to destroy his relationship with the Polish Crown. Bogdan had had the support of the Tatar Khan, the Prince of Transylvania and a number of Moldavian boyars; by ignoring their wishes the Sultan signalled that these people could not expect to make demands of him. Finally, and most importantly, the decision emphasised that Sultan Ahmet did not welcome interference from foreign princes in the affairs of his Empire. It was this that carried most weight when the decision was made, for although the Sultan recognised that Bogdan had a lawful claim to Moldavia, his lengthy periods abroad in the Courts of Christendom and his connections in

these foreign Courts caused many within the Ottoman administration to question his loyalty to the Sultan. Bogdan's opponents had successfully argued, that, if Sultan Ahmet went to war against Christendom, Bogdan might be persuaded to revolt against him. Tomsa was seen as altogether more suitable because he had no connections with foreign Courts, and was likely to be more malleable. He was, in Glover's opinion:

“a syllie ould man, whollie brought up here in Constantinople and other parts of Turquie without any experience learninge, knowledge arte or language.”

Glover alleged that those who had backed Tomsa in the *Divan* were governed by bribes and spite. From the Ottoman point of view Tomsa was a particularly likely candidate for prince: he would owe his election entirely to his supporters within the *Divan*, he had no loyalties to foreign rulers and indeed had few connections outside the Ottoman Empire, therefore he could reasonably be trusted to remain loyal to the Sultan. Glover correctly predicted that Tomsa would not remain in Moldavia long: his reign lasted four years although he briefly regained the Moldavian throne in 1622. Glover also predicted that bloodshed would result from Tomsa's election and remarked that by giving aid to Stefan Bogdan England had begun a process whereby the choice of princes in Moldavia and Wallachia would be effected by the sword. (99) Although the Principalities had suffered a bloody history for many years and their princes were usually overthrown by force, Glover was correct in his observation that England's support of Bogdan had done nothing to promote peace in Moldavia and Wallachia.

Glover immediately reported the failure of Bogdan's suit; Bogdan also wrote to King James and the Earl of Salisbury to thank them for their favour, claiming that he had been frustrated by those whom he had supposed were his friends (i.e. the Viziers whom he had lobbied and bribed). He also expressed the belief that Ștefan Tomșa would not be accepted or recognised by the Moldavian nobility, the King of Poland or the Prince of Transylvania and said he hoped one day to have another chance to regain his patrimony. Bogdan was aware how much his suit had cost Glover and how the ambassador's reputation had suffered when the matter had been prolonged for so many years. He also knew that Glover would be called to account for the King's 10,000 French Crowns. Bogdan offered a plea on his former protector's behalf, emphasising that the ambassador had loyally carried out the King's orders to protect and promote his affairs, and that, due to his presence in the English Embassy, Glover had incurred a personal debt of 30,000 *zecchini* ; Bogdan asked the King to pay this debt for him. He asked King James to take pity on him, a poor prince, since he could not repay the 10,000 Crowns granted him. He pleaded that neither he nor Glover should be held responsible for this money and promised one day to repay the King for his kindness and generosity. (100) Bogdan knew that he could expect no more help from the English Embassy, therefore he left Glover's residence secretly, telling no-one where he was going. This was not to be the last that the English community was to hear of Bogdan; his departure from the embassy provoked outrage:

“Yesterday as the Sultan was going to the old serraglio, Ștefan

Bogdan, the man who was so much supported by the late English Ambassador, approached and in the formula these scoundrels use, he professed himself a Turke; a step which shows the kind of fellow he always was. The Sultan gave him the Sanjak of Pistrina in Albania." (101)

Dudley Carleton enlarged upon the conversion of Bogdan and his three children to Islam. It was said that the night before his conversion he had spent an entire night in private discussion with Glover and continued to visit the ambassador afterwards. It was suspected that he was trying to persuade Glover to accept Islam and seek some preferment from the Sultan:

"These temptations assailing a discontented man of a ruined fortune and perhaps not too well grounded in ye faith [Glover had grown up in Constantinople] maye make us justly feare ye issue especially considering he useth no diligence neither in ye compounding of his debts nor providing for his departure." (102)

Bogdan had the support of Ottoman officials in attempting to persuade Glover to abandon his country and religion. The Grand Vizier, who had supported Ştefan Tomşa, was said to have promised Glover a substantial reward if he agreed to convert. Bogdan, "observing his vanity", also suggested that Glover send to Venice for his bastard son. The pretender promised to adopt the boy and to campaign for his election to the throne of Moldavia. This report was later confirmed by Paul Pindar in Constantinople. These schemes, although far-fetched, were of great concern to Dudley Carleton and Paul Pindar, because of the enormous scandal which would ensue if a former Ambassador of the King of England defected to the Ottoman Porte. Everything possible was to be done to remove Glover from temptation; yet Carleton could not resist a

cruel joke at Glover's expense:

"in the mean time ye young Prince is here in an Apothecaries shop, little thinking of such a fortune intended him, on who I shall always have a strict eye." (103)

Sir Thomas Glover had emerged from his dealings with Ștefan Bogdan very unpopular with the English merchants in Constantinople. Not knowing that he was to be replaced he attempted to improve relations with his fellow countrymen: as soon as Bogdan had left his house he called the merchants before him to apologise for neglecting their affairs whilst fulfilling the King's orders on behalf of the Prince of Moldavia. Glover wrote a short speech, read to the merchants by the embassy Secretary, in which he asked them to write letters to the Levant Company explaining the problems he had experienced whilst undertaking Bogdan's suit:

"and of his [Glover's] forwardness hereafter to do them any service, and that the Prince was the cause of much mischief, for that so long as he was here my lord never respected his merchants nor their affairs." (104)

These attempts to make amends were too late; Paul Pindar was already on his way to Constantinople as his replacement. Pindar's departure and the reason for his journey were intended to be kept secret. The Levant Company was not informed of the reason for Glover's recall, only that he was to return to England,

"upon some speciall occasion of service." (105)

News of Pindar's journey reached Venice well in advance of his arrival. The English Ambassador in Venice, Dudley Carleton, was ordered to

prevent news of Pindar's journey reaching Glover's ears but in reality he could do very little, as he explained, for had he succeeded in preventing the departure of English ships bound for Constantinople in order to delay news of Pindar's journey, Italian ships would still have been available to convey letters. The only way to delay the departure of such vessels until Pindar had a "head-start" would have been to persuade the College of Senators to issue an appropriate order, and, as Carleton pointed out, this would be counter-productive because it would excite speculation about Pindar's journey to Constantinople. In the event it had become well-known in Venice that Pindar was Glover's successor as Ambassador in Constantinople, indeed there was considerable annoyance that he neglected to pay a courtesy visit to the Doge, in an effort to keep a 'low-profile'. Pindar's main task was to ensure that Glover returned to England as soon as possible. On arriving in Constantinople he told the Venetian Ambassador, Simon Contarini, that King James had decided to replace Glover at the request of the King of Poland because he was:

"not pleased that his Ambassador here should make such long insistence at the Porte for the restoration of Prince Stephan Bogdan to Moldavia, as this disgusts the Grand Turk and his Ministers."

This version of events was put about in order to disguise the real reason for Glover's recall, which was that he had been denounced by Sir Anthony Sherley as being,

"more a Minister of Spain than of England." (106)

Glover was unaware of the seriousness of the allegations against him:

"he heares nothing of any matter conceyved hier against him,

feares only the calling to account of the King's money..." (107)

Glover was accused of being a Spanish agent:

"[he] entertayned a correspondence with other princes that might easily produced dishonour to his Majestie from the wch he held place and authoritie and very important [augor] to the state and person of our nation residing, and trafficking into the Turquish dominions." (108)

This was a charge for which there was considerable circumstantial evidence. Dudley Carleton and Paul Pindar were charged to investigate the extent of Glover's involvement with the King of Spain. A Dominican Friar had been detected making enquiries of Englishmen living in Venice as to whether Glover was to be replaced as Ambassador in Constantinople. When he was assured that Glover would remain, the Friar passed on a letter to be delivered to Sir Thomas Glover in Constantinople. Pindar, awaiting a ship to take him to Constantinople, gained possession of this letter and opened it to find that it contained 'certain information' about Glover's negotiations with foreign princes. Carleton also contacted the Dominican friar in the course of his enquiries; he discovered that the friar had been engaged in a correspondence with Glover and was also closely associated with the Spanish Ambassador in Venice. The friar was placed under surveillance and was seen visiting the Spanish Embassy in Venice daily to ask for news of Glover's secretary who was in Madrid. Glover's secretary was known as Gasparo; upon his arrival in Venice from Madrid he was also placed under surveillance. This Gasparo can almost certainly be identified as Gaspar Gratiani, a former servant of Ștefan Bogdan, as we

shall see in Chapter VIII. (109) Investigators collected evidence proving that Glover been for some years secretly in correspondence with the King of Spain not only through the friar but also through Gieronimo Meoli, his former secretary, and Gasparo, his current secretary.

A letter in the Venetian State Papers reported that Glover had been involved in initiating peace negotiations between Spain and the Ottoman Empire without the knowledge of King James at the request of the Grand Vizier in office at that time. (110) Glover had used Gieronimo Meoli and the Dominican friar to send letters to Spain through the Spanish Ambassador in Naples and had later sent his secretary Gasparo to Madrid to conduct negotiations directly. These secret negotiations were probably initiated in 1607, since this was when rumours of Glover's correspondence with other princes first surfaced in Florence; if the Vizier in question was acting on his own initiative and he risked Sultan Ahmet's disapproval should the plan misfire since great caution was needed in negotiations with an enemy of the Sultan. If this version of events is true then it is understandable that Glover was not anxious to allow news of his involvement with Spain to leak out, as he was involved, without his sovereign's consent, in clandestine contact with an enemy of his host country. Furthermore, King James is unlikely to have approved of his Ambassador appearing in any way to represent the Infidel in negotiations with a Christian State. However it is possible that this was not the extent of Glover's involvement with Spain.

As we have seen Glover had sacked Meoli, whom he had

employed to establish a communication network with the King of Spain and his agents, for spying on behalf of Spain, but clandestine contacts, which were not connected with any peace negotiations, continued through Meoli's replacement Gasparo. Both Meoli and Gasparo were certainly Spanish agents. It seems unlikely that Glover was so incompetent as to have allowed his embassy to be infiltrated over several years without his knowledge; either he knew what was going on, but was unable to root out the spies in the embassy, or he had made a scapegoat of Meoli in order to divert attention away from his own activities. Sir Anthony Sherley's denunciation of Glover as a Spanish agent must have been based on enough evidence to convince King James, and the Earl of Salisbury, Glover's erstwhile protector, that he was sufficiently compromised to warrant his immediate removal. Paul Pindar was sent to Constantinople to sort out the embassy and conduct further investigations into Glover's activities. When informed of the allegations against him, Glover blamed Bogdan completely for everything of which he was accused. This gave credence to the allegations that Glover had been blackmailed by his erstwhile protégé.

Bogdan had strong connections with Spain, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter. He had remained in correspondence with the Spanish Ambassador in Prague and the Viceroy of Naples. In 1610 he had renewed his offer to co-operate with a Spanish attack on Constantinople once he was in possession of the Moldavian throne. (111) As we shall see in the next chapter, Gaspar Gratiani, Ștefan

Bogdan's servant, was to become involved in a "Christian Militia" which sought the removal of the Infidel from Europe: this "Christian Militia" was only one of numerous conspiracies in existence in the 17th century and Ştefan Bogdan was an obvious target for recruitment to the anti-Ottoman cause. It is likely that Bogdan, with the assistance of Meoli and Gasparo, used the diplomatic channels, established by Glover to facilitate peace negotiations between Spain and the Ottomans, to pass intelligence about Ottoman naval defences to the Viceroy of Naples and the Spanish Crown. If this man was indeed Gaspar Gratiani, it would seem that he had been recruited by those working for the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire much earlier than historians have hitherto suspected. Pindar's investigations seem to have concentrated on discovering the grounds upon which Bogdan had blackmailed Glover into allowing his embassy to be used for nefarious purposes; that is whether Bogdan had discovered that the ambassador was already implicated in espionage and had used an already existing spy network for his own advantage or whether he had discovered something completely unconnected with espionage about the ambassador which was sufficiently serious to persuade him to assist Bogdan's espionage by allowing him to use the embassy's resources to build up his own spy network.

Pindar discovered that Glover had been in correspondence with the Viceroy of Naples: the man who had acted as intermediary between them contacted the English Consul of Scio, producing letters addressed to Glover which were sent on to Pindar. Glover demanded the letters be

given him but Pindar refused, informing him that correspondence with other princes without the King's permission was a very serious matter and one which he had been directed to investigate; he suggested to Glover that he consider what excuse he might offer to answer accusations of disloyalty, and worse, and to throw himself upon the King's mercy. Glover did not admit to Pindar that he had done anything wrong, he merely asserted that he had a cipher in his possession which had been left in his custody by Gieronimo Meoli, his former secretary, which he thought might belong to the letters. The cipher and the letters were sent unread to London along with Glover's explanation of his embassy's involvement in espionage which has not, unfortunately, survived. Pindar did not open the letters because he suspected that they were related to a naval attack on the Ottoman fleet planned for the summer, (an attack on the Ottoman fleet had been one of Ştefan Bogdan's proposals to the King of Spain). If the attack materialised Pindar did not wish to have had prior knowledge of it or be accused of concealing the contents of the letter.

The existence of this correspondence suggests that Glover was involved with supplying covert information to the Sultan's enemies. Pindar forbade the intermediary or spy to come to his house or to presume any acquaintance, telling him to leave the country as soon as possible. He told Glover to pretend that he was leaving Constantinople soon and made him tell the spy to meet him outside the Ottoman Empire to discuss these letters, in order that the spy would not know that they

had been intercepted.

Pindar was anxious to prevent the Ottomans discovering the extent to which the English Embassy had been compromised by espionage. It was probably for this reason that Glover was never placed under arrest. Pindar was well aware that the pretender had some malevolent influence over the former ambassador. This explains his anxiety to send Glover away from the Ottoman Empire out of reach of the Sultan. Pindar also feared that Glover would succumb to Bogdan's pressure to convert to Islam, a fear which was compounded by some words uttered in Pindar's presence by the aforementioned Dominican Friar:

“that Sir Thomas Glover was soe worthie a man as he discerned rather to be a Prince himselfe than Agent for another.” (112)

In addition to spending time with Ştefan Bogdan, Glover received a number of visits from the Grand Vizier and various other “Turkes” who promised him that if he changed his religion he would be made a *Beylerbey* and later perhaps a Vizier! Pindar was convinced that Glover feared Bogdan and feared his eventual fate if he returned to England. In the meantime his enquiries had concluded that Glover had been implicated in espionage; Pindar reported that Bogdan told Glover that if he returned to England he would be hanged. Bogdan had also threatened that if Glover remained at the English Embassy his implication in espionage might be discovered and he would undoubtedly be hanged by the Ottomans. Bogdan's suggested solution was to convert to Islam and seek some preferment from the Sultan. Pindar was extremely

worried that Glover might decide to do this. He was thus extremely anxious to remove Glover from the influence of Bogdan and the Ottomans. He concluded that the former ambassador's soul, as well as his person, was in danger whilst he remained in the Sultan's dominions:

“For assuredly had those thinges been discovered in tyme of his employment himselfe wth the whole state of our nation in these domynions had irredemable miscarried. And now if anie notice should be geaven, I feare we should be incombred wth unsupportable charges and inextricable trouble.” (113)

The perceived danger to Glover persuaded Pindar to raise money from the English merchants without the permission of the Levant Company.

In his letters to England Pindar was careful to express no opinions which might damage Glover's chances of defending himself against any charges brought. On the other hand he had a duty to report his progress in arranging Glover's departure and in particular that the former ambassador had no desire to go home. Pindar attributed Glover's behaviour to the evil influence of Bogdan, who had done the unthinkable and changed his religion for material gain. An alternative explanation is that Glover, confronted with the ruins of his diplomatic career, had become so depressed that he was unable to make any plans for his own future, preferring to remain in the English Embassy under Pindar's protection.

Pindar's efforts to arrange Glover's journey home to answer the charges against him were hindered by the dire state of his finances. Glover may have prolonged his stay in Constantinople hoping to be reimbursed the rest of the money owed him. (114) Glover had incurred

enormous debts whilst Bogdan was under his protection: he had spent his entire capital, amounting to 30,000 *zecchini*, on the pretender as well as the King's 10,000 French Crowns: 6,000 Crowns had paid for presents for Viziers, the Prince of Transylvania and the Tatar Khan, their noblemen and ambassadors; other expenses included providing transport for Glover's daily journey into Constantinople to press Bogdan's case and porters' fees at the gates of the Viziers' and other officials' offices. Further large expenses were incurred in employing messengers to send to Moldavia to recruit boyars to Bogdan's cause and to Transylvania and the Khan to secure further support. Glover feared being called to account for the King's money with good reason: the Earl of Salisbury had prepared a letter in which he expressed his anger at Glover's failure to adhere to his instructions for the spending of this money and demanded restitution:

“wch if you can assure me of, I shall have noe cause to say you have done contrary to your instructions, wch If you have I would knowe also what satisfaction you can make...” (115)

Salisbury had thought better of sending this harsh letter, perhaps because Glover's fear of punishment might cause him to take some action to avoid returning to England.

Pindar hoped that the Levant Company would advance money to discharge these debts but characteristically the Company refused to help in any way:

“[we] by no meanes conceive that the companie or the Nation [i. e. the English merchants in Constantinople] are any waies to be charged wth his debts either to Turkes, Christians or others neither will we disburse anie somes for the clearing him from hence...”

Pindar suggested that a sum of 5,000 dollars would be sufficient although 15,000 dollars was owed; the Company was anxious not to set a precedent of bailing out ambassadors who had incurred financial difficulties. They were also of the opinion that Glover's creditors would not be satisfied with 5,000 dollars if they knew that more might be forthcoming and would demand the entire sum owed; the Company feared that they would then be expected to pay all Glover's debts and therefore ordered Pindar not to spend any of their money. The Levant Company had opposed the enterprise from the beginning and had only become involved upon the King's insistence; they therefore had some justification in refusing to help Glover. Eventually Pindar raised 5,000 dollars, with the assistance of the English merchants in Constantinople, to pay part of Glover's debts. (116) Glover did little to assist these attempts to resolve his financial difficulties because he wished to delay his departure, consequently it took a full six months to settle his affairs sufficiently to allow him to leave. According to William Lithgow, Bogdan repaid half his debt to Glover before his departure.

If one looks at Bogdan's conversion from his point of view one can see that for an ambitious man facing the alternatives of a life of poverty wandering Europe in search of a benefactor or being offered a position in the Ottoman Empire which would bring wealth, power, fame and influence, the latter course was an inevitable choice. We have seen that Bogdan had been prepared to accept the throne of Wallachia if he could not be enthroned in Moldavia, because his main concern had been to

gain wealth, power and status in life. We have also seen that Bogdan's quest for power and wealth did not leave room for considerations of appropriate religious or moral behaviour; on several occasions he probably presented himself as a Lutheran in order to win support. According to Pindar, Bogdan had admitted to being an atheist and explicitly denied the existence of God, angels or an afterlife. His lack of religious conviction enabled him to proceed in ways which suited his purposes best. He also told Pindar that he had consorted with witches and sorcerers and had spoken with the devil, selling his soul with a contract written in blood. According to some people with whom Pindar had spoken he had taken part in ritual human sacrifice, murdering several people with his own hands and other,

“moste execrable doynge.” (117)

Most of Bogdan's utterings did not bear even a nodding acquaintance with the truth. It is probable that the above statements were made largely to shock and annoy Pindar and the English community. However since Bogdan had always been prepared to explore every avenue to gain his ambition, it is not inconceivable that he sought supernatural intervention. In Paul Pindar's eyes this interest in the occult confirmed his fears about Bogdan's evil influence over Sir Thomas Glover. On the other hand, it is possible that, by the end of the campaign, Glover had begun genuinely to like his erstwhile protégé and regretted his failure to secure his election. The tone of Glover's letters immediately after the decision to appoint Ștefan Tomșa as Prince of Moldavia suggest

that he was genuinely sympathetic towards Bogdan after their shared disappointment. Although he had previously resented the burden of supporting Bogdan's household, something in their relationship must have changed and the two men seem to have become friends.

Pindar was shocked at Bogdan's proselytising zeal as a new convert to Islam; he reported that two young Moldavians had been seduced into converting and Bogdan had even tried to persuade Pindar's dragoman to do the same whilst he was attending to embassy business at the Vizier's house. (118) It was not until April 1612 that Glover was freed from Bogdan's attempts to persuade him to defect by the latter's departure from the Ottoman capital. Bogdan had initially been granted the Sanjak of Pistrina in Albania but, not content with that, successfully obtained appointment as *Sanjakbey* of Bursia in Asia Minor (Anatolia) and had finally left Constantinople.

In his new position as *Sanjakbey* of Bursia Bogdan behaved as a tyrant:

"... in Tyranny and oppression of the people hanging and killing and confiscating their estates under pretence of severity in Justice yt need be some fearfull end must befall him that hath led a life so wicked and abominable as is ever odious to be recompted..." (119)

Every damning report of Bogdan's wickedness was gleefully relayed to England. Had his suit succeeded, Bogdan would have been hailed in England as a great prince and protector of English interests in the East.

This campaign against Bogdan served to help Glover defend himself against the charges levelled against him. He left Constantinople in August 1612 in an atmosphere of great disapproval but, "without

reproch to our nation.” The accepted version of Glover’s disgrace was that he had been led astray:

“how vainly and weakly he had suffered himself to be abused by those wicked instruments about him...” (120)

He seized on this excuse for his behaviour and pleaded that his involvement in espionage was not of his own making but that he had been an unfortunate victim of other’s intrigues. Fortunately for Glover, his plea that he was innocent of any ill-intent was accepted in England and the charges against him were eventually dismissed. (121)

Bogdan’s eventual fate is not known, although he was not completely forgotten by the English; there are references to him in Richard Knolles’ *Generall Historie of the Turkes* published in 1621, in Thomas Gainsford’s *Glorie of England* (1615) and William Lithgow’s *A most delectable and true discourse of an admired and Painfull Peregrination from Scotland to the most famous kingdomes in Europe. Asia and Affricke* published in 1614. Lithgow had met Bogdan in Constantinople:

“this Moldavian Prince stole earely away in the morning over to Constaninople; and long or midday turnd Turke and was circumsised, contenting himself onely for all his Dukedom, with a palace, and a yearely pension of 12 thousand chickens of gold during his life. Which when he heeard, the Ambassadour and we wre all amazed and discontented... or my leaving Galata I went twice over with Sir Thomas and saw him, and found him attended with a number of Turkes, who when he saw me, tooke me kindly by the hand, for when we had been two monethes familiar in the Ambassadour’s house before.” (122)

Lithgow clearly had no knowledge of the scandal surrounding Glover, nor is there any mention of this in any of the reports of his return

to England. Great care was taken to keep the accusations against him out of the public domain. Glover's departure from Constantinople marked the end of an era; henceforth the English Embassy avoided intervention in the affairs of the principality. Paul Pindar was now left to repair the damage that Glover's activities had done:

"my predecessor endeavoured by such meanes as exceedingly distasted the whole state here, and not satisfied with such refusall as weare from tyme to tyme discretlye insinuated unto him by the cheife of the government... continued his course of sollicitatione in their despighte, wherby he procuered to himself there displeasure, and in the end deadlie hatred, and for his sake malicious enmitie, to our nation... wch we still suffer much in our occasions." (123)

Pindar reported that England's trade had been greatly damaged with the result that:

"The Turke will permit us noe more to trade in the redd sea." (124)

He clearly believed that this was a direct result of the Bogdan affair. Pindar had been instructed to do all he could to mend relations between the English Embassy and the Ottoman Porte, particularly with regard to the protection of English commerce in the Levant. Glover's preoccupation with Bogdan's affairs and the diplomatic business attached to it had led him to neglect the protection and promotion of the English community's privileged trading position.

Glover's failure to pull off a diplomatic triumph had created many difficulties for the business of the embassy. Pindar was charged with improving the reputation of the King of England which had, it was feared, been compromised by too close an association with Ottoman affairs in opposition to the interests of a Christian prince, i.e. the King of Poland

and to some extent those of the Habsburg Emperor. Pindar spoke thus to the Venetian Ambassador:

“Although I am not a Papist... I charge you to assist in every way the needs of Christendome.” (125)

In doing so, not only was he aligning the English Embassy with the interests of Christendome in opposition to those of the “infidel”, he was also trying to persuade Contarini that if he were to interfere with the affairs of the troubled embassy in order to gain some brief advantage, he might provoke Glover to defect to the employ of the Sultan. To placate the Ottomans, Pindar pretended that Glover’s actions in support of Stefan Bogdan had been undertaken entirely upon his own initiative. This was an exercise in damage limitation as the English Crown sought to distance itself from failure in order to protect its influence in Eastern Europe. England’s support of Ștefan Bogdan was only one of a number of ingenious schemes designed to expand English influence in Eastern Europe.

One such ambitious project, discussed in 1612, sought to establish an English protectorate over northern Russia and to place King James I of England on the Russian throne. As we have seen, England had since the 1550’s enjoyed commercial relations with Russia and the prospect of Poland or Sweden conquering the country or placing their own candidates on the Russian throne was viewed with dismay. The project was presented as tending to England’s commercial advantage, the maintenance of English naval power and the honour of the King. Furthermore, it was asserted that the people of Russia, facing hostility

from Poland and Sweden, were anxious to maintain and strengthen ties with England.

For the Crown and Company the protection of English commerce in Muscovy was crucial because the goods acquired there were of immense use to the English navy. The project also offered opportunities of expanding English commerce into untapped areas. There were even possibilities that the Muscovy Company could even tap into the Eastern trade in luxury goods, currently monopolised by the Levant Company:

“which now we have by the way of Turkey at a deere rate and with infinite hazard of pirats and ennemies, especially yf we should have any differences with Spaine”

The proposers of this project suggested that the Muscovy Company might become the “Staple” of Eastern commodities, controlling their supply into France, Germany and the Low Countries and Denmark. If Poland or Sweden conquered parts of Russia, England’s privileged trading and customs position might be revoked in favour of the Dutch who had already made approaches and offers to the King of Poland for trading privileges there. A shift in the relative trading positions in Russia against England and in favour of the Dutch would effect not only customs receipts but also the relative strengths of their respective navies. This and the increased wealth which would undoubtedly follow from Dutch supremacy in the Baltic trade would make the Dutch very dangerous to their neighbours.

The Muscovy Company merchants had long advocated strong political links with Russia, something which Queen Elizabeth had

neglected to take up. The appearance of foreign candidates to the Russian throne was a threat to the Company's commercial position and it occurred to them that the solution lay in bringing Russia into a position of dependence on England with James I ruling by means of a deputy. The plan was formulated not only to protect English commerce in Russia but also to expand the Muscovy Company's activities into new markets particularly at the expense of the Levant Company.

James I was amenable to being put forward as a candidate for election and was fairly confident of success, however caution was needed in any such scheme. Sir John Merrick and Sir William Russell was sent as commissioners to the Russian nobility to propose:

“that his Majestie would be their Emperor and protector, wick they in generall did imbrace with much thankfulnes and sent there ambassador with great presents unto the Kinge to negotiate all things with his Magestie for the further confirmacion therof.”

Merrick and Russell appear to have returned to Russia with instructions to treat on King James' behalf, arriving there in time to congratulate Michael Romanov on his succession as Czar. Sensibly they did not mention the original purpose of their visit. Anglo-Russian relations proceeded much as they had before. (126)

In Ștefan Bogdan's case the English Crown had blundered into supporting him without understanding the difficulties inherent in such a project. Sir Thomas Glover was ordered to support the pretender but was not provided with the necessary financial backing to facilitate his efforts. Furthermore, the conditions set down for payment of King James' contribution of 10,000 French Crowns were so strict and so impracticable

that Glover was forced to ignore his instructions, thus incurring the wrath of his political masters. When Glover's support of Bogdan became politically embarrassing and began to damage England's relations with the Sultan, the King of Poland and the Habsburg Emperor, King James withdrew his support and responsibility was shifted onto Glover so that the Crown's reputation would not be besmirched.

In 1607, when Glover took up Bogdan's case, the Ottomans had no intention of replacing the Prince of Moldavia. For this reason excuses were continually put forward which were intended to show Glover that he was wasting his time. Initially the ambassador conveyed these excuses to England hoping that the King would abandon the project but Glover was forced to proceed because he received no new instructions from England and gradually found that the cost of supporting Bogdan was placing him in more and more debt. The only way of recouping this money was to ensure that Bogdan was elected Prince of Moldavia, hence the increasing urgency of his solicitations. Glover even embezzled the money given him by "Turks" to redeem Ottoman sailors from the Duke of Florence. (127)

For several years none of Glover's efforts succeeded in obtaining more than vague promises. It was the intervention of the Prince of Transylvania and the Tatar Khan which persuaded Sultan Ahmet and his Ministers to consider replacing Constantin Movilă with Ștefan Bogdan and thereby strike a blow against the influence of the King of Poland in Moldavia. The intervention of Bathory and the Khan resulted in a Council

being convened to decide upon Constantin Movilă's replacement and ensured that Bogdan was one of the candidates under consideration. Previously the desire not to provoke conflict with Poland had held the Ottomans back from overthrowing the Movilă dynasty. Although it is likely that the Ottomans would in any case have eventually removed Movilă, it was Gabriel Bathory who precipitated his overthrow with his letters to the Sultan, Ahmet I.

Nevertheless, it was with Glover's support that Bogdan was able to recruit Bathory, the Prince of Transylvania, to his cause. Ștefan Bogdan came very close to obtaining the Sultan's nomination as Prince of Moldavia. The Council, lasting 10 days, gave his claim serious consideration. For Glover and Bogdan, however, the closeness of the contest was no compensation for their ultimate, very public failure. Furthermore, Thomas Glover's support of Bogdan indirectly contributed to a period of great instability and bloodshed in Moldavia and Wallachia.

Pindar reported the likelihood of a breakdown in relations between Poland and the Ottomans over the right to nominate the Prince of Moldavia:

"... that this turbulent successe, upon the change of that prince [was caused by] the incessant solicitations of Sir Thomas Glover (as the Vizier pretendeth)..." (128)

The relationship between Poland and the Ottoman Empire remained tense throughout the rest of the decade, finally leading to a brief war in 1620. At this time, Gaspar Gratiani successfully persuaded Poland to

support him in battle against the forces of the Porte on the grounds that internal difficulties would prevent the Ottomans from taking the field with all their forces. Unfortunately, the problems were overcome when the Ottomans were able to recruit Tatar support after all, with disastrous results for both Gratiani and the Poles.

During Paul Pindar's embassy Ottoman treatment of the permanent foreign embassies, as we saw in Chapter III, became an increasing matter of concern for the major Western trading nations represented there. Conversely, Ottoman concern over the role played by the embassies in their dominions, particularly with regard to their dealings with the Sultan's non-moslem subjects, had some justification, as we have seen in this chapter. Using the authority of the English Embassy as protection, Ştefan Bogdan, Gieronimo Meoli and Gaspar Gratiani have been clearly shown to have engaged in business which aimed at overthrowing the Ottoman Empire in Europe. Furthermore, again under England's protection, Bogdan attempted to stir up a revolt in Moldavia which, if it had succeeded, could have damaged the peace between the Sultan and the King of Poland.

Sir Thomas Glover has also been shown to have abused his position as ambassador by being involved in, or allowing his embassy to be used as a base for, plots by a third power to bring about the destruction of the Sultan's power in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. The special status of the ambassadors and the foreign embassies' rights of patronage and protection were vital if they were to carry out their duties

successfully but were clearly open to abuse, even as they are in the twentieth century.

CHAPTER VIII: GASPAR GRATIANI - DRAGOMAN AND PRINCE OF MOLDAVIA (1619-20)

The relevance of the career of Gaspar Gratiani to the purposes of this thesis is twofold: firstly as an example of how an ambitious man of relatively humble origins through service, cunning and skill managed to achieve what Ştefan Bogdan could not. Secondly, Gratiani's early career in Constantinople and his success in bringing himself to the notice of the Ottomans owes a great deal to the English Embassy in Constantinople. Furthermore he is of interest because he was a man whose career has many similarities to that of Bartolomeo Brutti, who also deliberately insinuated himself into the favour of the English Ambassador in the hope of gaining some further advancement.

Gaspar Gratiani was not strictly a pretender to the Moldavian throne, since he made no claim to the principality by hereditary right and made no attempt to justify his ambitions towards the throne as anything other than the desire to receive a valuable reward for services rendered to the Ottoman Empire. He was a man of immense ambition, seeking advancement to the most powerful positions in the gift of those whom he chose to serve. As we shall see, it was his overweening ambition that gave rise to his ultimate downfall. He succeeded in gaining the Moldavian throne by making use of the trust he enjoyed amongst the Sultan's closest advisers and then betrayed that trust in an attempt to enlist foreign assistance to free himself from the Sultan's suzerainty.

Gratiani was not even of Romanian origin. He was a Vlach, that is to say a descendent of the Latin speaking population of the Balkan peninsula which predated the migration and settlement of the Slavs in the sixth and seventh centuries. He was born in the town of Gradatshac near Karlstadt in Croatia, of a family which had fled from an area inhabited by Vlachs in the borders of the Dalmatian mountains. Gradatshac may have been a centre of *Morlahi* and *Uscoc* peoples and so perhaps Gratiani belonged to one of these nations. Romanians regard these peoples as “Black Romanians of the Adriatic”, which is to say they are claimed as being a branch of the Romanian nation, but at the time when Gratiani became prince he was not considered by Moldavians as anything other than a foreigner. The Chronicler Miron Costin referred to him as a “Frank”, (1) that is to say a Western European. Nicolae Iorga has pointed out that Gracac was the name of an old *Morlahi* town in Bosnia; therefore Gradatshac may have been derived from Gracac; Gaspar’s surname, Gratiani, may have been a latinization of a name derived from Gradatshac, all of which may suggest that Gaspar was indeed a *Morlahi*. Iorga also pointed out that the Christian name Gaspar was a Slavonic name, suggesting that Gratiani’s family may have intermarried with the local Slavonic population. (2)

Gratiani was taken as a child from his village and became a servant to the Castelan of Sussed. According to Thomas Gainsford, Gaspar’s brother and sister were enslaved by the Ottomans and converted to Islam. (3) This appears to have been a reference to the

Ottoman *devshirme* system whereby Christian children were selected and enslaved by the Ottoman authorities; the boys taken as part of the *devshirme* were educated to enter the Ottoman administration or the Jannissaries. Gaspar left service at Sused and, it is said, went to Venice where he entered the service of an English diplomat, who has been identified by Paul Cernovodeanu as Sir Henry Wotton, accompanying him to London when he was recalled and then went to Constantinople in the company of Paul Pindar who arrived in the Ottoman capital in December 1611. He was employed there as Pindar's Dragoman. As we shall see there is evidence to show that Gratiani entered English service in Constantinople much earlier than this and not through employment by Henry Wotton.

Unlike Bartolomeo Brutti or Marc'Antonio Borisi, the Chief Dragoman of the Venetian Embassy, about whom more later, Gratiani was not descended from a distinguished family of Dragomans. Since the fourteenth century the Venetians had recruited Dragomans from the Albanian community in Istria; the Brutti family had been long established in the region and had in 1361 ceded the the Lordship of Durazzo to Venice. The French and English Embassies organised themselves along the same lines as the long established Venetian Embassy when they set up in Constantinople.

The Borisi family, from Antivari, was related by marriage to the Brutti family: Marc'Antonio Borisi was Bartolomeo Brutti's nephew. Marc'Antonio and his brother Bernardo were taken under the protection

of their uncle in order to be trained as Dragomans. Gratiani's family seems to have been a very obscure one in comparison with the Brutti and Borisi families. As we have seen, he left his village as a youth to enter the service of a provincial military and administrative governor but left this household when he was a young man and went to Venice. What he did between arriving in Venice and becoming Dragoman to Paul Pindar is less clear. It is very unlikely Gratiani was taken into Henry Wotton's employ, as Paul Cernovodeanu has suggested, before bringing him to England because this would mean that Gratiani did not visit Constantinople before 1611. This would have meant that Gratiani had been employed as Pindar's Dragoman having no experience of the Ottoman *Divan* and apparently no knowledge of the Court language. He would therefore have been of limited use as Dragoman to Paul Pindar. Furthermore the duties of a Dragoman were not limited to acting as an interpreter: he needed to understand Ottoman institutions, politics and Islamic law and custom as well as diplomatic etiquette. In order to prosecute his duties successfully a Dragoman needed to know the balance of power in the *Divan* at any given moment, the ideas and policies most in favour there and which individuals were in favour at any given time. Therefore, Dragomans at one of the "Frankish" Embassies usually served a long apprenticeship or "giovane di lingue" during which they were immersed in all aspects of the embassy's business, learning through experience and example until they were experienced enough to take their place in the hierarchy of Dragomans at the embassy. (4) Many

“giovane di lingue” worked as the ambassador’s secretary before becoming fully accredited as a Dragoman to the embassy.

There is further evidence that Gratiani was in Constantinople long before 1611. Firstly, in 1605 he was in England petitioning for Bogdan’s release and explicitly referred to himself as Ștefan Bogdan’s servant; he must have entered the latter’s service before his imprisonment in 1604 because he was particularly knowledgeable about Bogdan’s suit. Gratiani associated himself with Bogdan hoping for advancement, just as Bartolomeo Brutti had attached himself to Bogdan’s father Iancu Sasul. It cannot have been Henry Wotton whom Gratiani was said to have taken up with in Venice. Wotton spent a number of years in exile in Italy until the death of Queen Elizabeth I when he returned to England; he then served as English Consul in Venice between July 1604 and 1612. Thus when Wotton returned to England from Italy, Gratiani would have been in Constantinople and when Wotton went to Venice as Consul, Gratiani was preparing to go to England to secure Royal assistance to obtain Bogdan’s release from the Castle of Asia.

An account of Gratiani’s life written by Ioan Iancovici in 1655, suggests that he spent some time in Venice with an English diplomat with whom he went to England, after which he travelled to the Ottoman Empire as Dragoman to another English diplomat. (5) However, this account was written thirty five years after Gratiani’s death and can be shown to be inaccurate. The visit to England, undertaken by Gratiani, mentioned in this document was the one conducted on behalf of Ștefan

Bogdan in 1605; Richard Knolles' *Generall Historie of the Turkes* confirms that the English diplomat with whom he travelled was Thomas Glover, who left Constantinople in October 1604 with letters of recommendation from Henry Lello. Gratiani had been in Glover's service for some time and under his patronage had learned Ottoman Turkish.

In May or June 1605, with Glover's assistance, Gratiani persuaded King James I to take up Bogdan's case because the pretender had enjoyed the protection of Queen Elizabeth and was thus entitled to the protection of her successor. Gratiani argued that the imprisonment of a protégé of the late Queen was an affront to the King. His petition provided valuable material for Glover's campaign to obtain the embassy for himself, because Lello's indifference to Ştefan Bogdan's imprisonment lent weight to allegations that he was not competent to remain at the Constantinople Embassy.

Upon Glover's recommendation, Gratiani returned to Constantinople in 1605 as a servant of the English Crown, accompanying King James' letters to Henry Lello concerning Bogdan and Sir Thomas Sherley. According to Knolles, Gratiani was instrumental in obtaining Sherley's release from an Ottoman prison in December 1605. Having secured Sherley's release Gratiani accompanied him to Venice, but upon hearing that Glover had been appointed ambassador, he left Sherley to enter Glover's service in Constantinople where he was employed to obtain the release of Christian slaves.

As we have seen Gratiani almost certainly became heavily

involved in secret negotiations with Spain whilst employed as Glover's secretary. Yet Gratiani remained in the service of the English Embassy as Paul Pindar's Dragoman, after his return from Spain in 1611, despite having apparently been implicated in espionage. Glover had placed all the blame for any charges against him and his servants at the door of Ştefan Bogdan. In the meantime Gratiani's intelligence and skill were to prove so useful to the English Embassy that he was held in great esteem and friendship there. However, for a man of Gratiani's ambitions, further promotion was something to be sought assiduously. He used his visits to Ottoman Viziers on embassy business to promote his own career. So impressed were they at his grasp of politics that eventually he was asked to accompany the Ottoman party to Vienna in 1615 and left Pindar's employ. Although he had no official position within the Ottoman government he was a man of immense influence in the Empire. He was able to travel to Vienna without exciting suspicion about his activities there and like Bartolomeo Brutti acted as a 'freelance diplomat' on behalf of a number of major figures in South-East European politics. He also used his favoured position in Constantinople to enrich himself to such an extent that eventually he was wealthy enough to make a successful bid for the Moldavian throne.

Gratiani already spoke German and Italian and evidently taught himself Ottoman Turkish. His employment as Dragoman to the English Ambassador, Paul Pindar, brought him into contact with the Ottoman authorities who were impressed, according to the traveller Peter Mundy,

by the quickness of his wit and tongue. In 1614 Gratiani was also in contact with an agent of the Habsburg Emperor who trusted Gratiani to arrange the despatch of a report to the Imperial Court. In 1615 he was employed by the Ottomans to accompany the Ottoman Ambassador Achmet Kechasia, (a former Envoy of the Pasha of Buda) to the Court of the Emperor Matthias as Dragoman in order to renew the Treaty of Zsitvatorok. As Dragoman for the Ottoman delegation Gratiani play a much wider role than merely acting as an interpreter; he had full diplomatic credentials and played an influential part in negotiations. Gratiani signed letters addressed to the Emperor Matthias in the name of Ahmet, Envoy of the Pasha of Buda, and in the name of Sultan Ahmet I's Ambassador Kechasia. (6) William Lithgow met the Ottoman party in Vienna in 1616 after they had accomplished their mission:

“At Vienne in Austria... I found a Turkish Ambassadour, going downe the Campion Danubis of Europe, for Constantinople; and with him one Gratianus, a Greeke, his Interpreter, to whose familiar love I was much obliged and with whome I imbarked down the River to Presburge and from thence discending the River to Komoron, the Downe most Towne the Emperour retayneth on Danube I left my noble Interpreter, and traversed the Champagne Countrey.” (7)

Gratiani performed so well during the negotiations that on October 12th 1616 he was rewarded by Sultan Ahmet I with the Islands of Naxos and Paros. It would appear that Gratiani acted as an adviser to Sultan and his successors on foreign affairs and was a favoured courtier and intermediary involved in sensitive negotiations on behalf of the *Divan*. Whilst employed in this capacity, he acted as a double agent working in

the interests of Christian powers in central Europe. Upon his preferment as Duke of Naxos and Paros, Gratiani wrote to Charles Gonzaga, the Duc de Nevers, asking for his protection and assuring him of his friendship towards France; this correspondence with the Duc was to continue. De Nevers, a descendent of the Palaeologus dynasty, entertained the idea of restoring the Byzantine Emperor through a Crusade against the Ottomans; naturally he expected to be crowned Emperor in the event of this plan succeeding. (8) The same year in Constantinople Gaspar Gratiani acted as an agent for Radu Șerban, former Prince of Wallachia (1602-11), who was preparing a campaign, with the support of the Emperor Matthias, to regain the Wallachian throne. According to Constantin Rezachevici, Gratiani, Radu Șerban and Nicolae Pătrașcu, son of Mihai Viteazul, took an active, although necessarily extremely secret part in the creation, in 1618, of a Chivalrous Order known as the "Christian Militia" which aimed to throw the Ottomans out of Europe. According to Elvira Georgescu, when Șerban and Pătrașcu met the Comte D'Altan, a prominent figure in this order, in Vienna in 1618, Gaspar Gratiani was a member of Șerban's party; furthermore on another visit to Vienna, in November 1618, Gratiani was a frequent visitor to the Comte's house where he dealt with emissaries of Father Joseph a servant of Count Richelieu. (9) Gratiani acted as an intermediary between Father Joseph and the Duc de Nevers.

In 1618 Gratiani offered to lead an expedition on behalf of the Sultan against the Cossacks in Moldavia probably hoping that he would

be rewarded with the Moldavian throne if successful, but he could not at this time support his ambitions with money. He won the confidence of the all-powerful Vizier Iskender Pasha and it was with his support, in addition to a lavish distribution of gifts, that he was appointed Prince of Moldavia in February 1619. The first document dated as being during his rule is from 11th April 1619.

Gaspar Gratiani was so ambitious, that he managed to alienate many people whose support he was attempting to enlist. It was always apparent that his primary motivation was the furtherance of his career. Marc'Antonio Borisi, the Chief Dragoman of the Venetian Embassy:

“called Gratiani a false man, who was paid by other Princes and had done things against the Republic [Venice].” (10)

He was probably referring to Gaspar Gratiani's connections with the Christian Militia and his apparently pro-Habsburg sympathies; with regard to his anti-Venetian activities, this could refer to a continued connection with Spain, a commercial rival of Venice in the Levant. According to contemporary information, Habsburg diplomats also pressed for Gratiani's nomination as Prince of Moldavia in the knowledge that they could enjoy friendly relations with him. Constantin Rezachevici has described Gratiani's history of good relations with the Habsburg Empire notably his involvement in peace negotiations and his friendship with Radu Șerban, who had strong Habsburg sympathies. The Chronicler Miron Costin wrote that Gaspar obtained the rule of Moldavia enjoying the favour and trust of Sultan Osman III but mounted the throne with his loyalty towards the Christians. (11)

Gratiani had been quarrelling with Borisi but had reconciled the quarrel; he asked for the hand of Borisi's daughter in marriage. Gratiani requested Hassan Pasha and the *Mufti* to intervene on his behalf and they advised Borisi to accept the proposal.

The desire to gain the support of the Venetian Embassy for his elevation to the throne of Moldavia was not Gratiani's chief motive for asking for a marital alliance with the Borisi family. The Borisi, nephews by marriage of Bartolomeo Brutti, had strong links with Moldavia and Wallachia. Marc'Antonio and his brother Bernardo had gone to Moldavia in the entourage of Bartolomeo Brutti. Bernardo served Radu Mihnea in Wallachia and Moldavia becoming *Postelnic* in Wallachia, between April 1613 and July 1616 and in Moldavia from November 1616 to December 1618, undertaking a number of missions in Transylvania and Constantinople on behalf of his master. In the meantime Marc'Antonio had become Dragoman and confidante to the Venetian Bailo. Marc'Antonio spoke many languages including Romanian, Albanian, Greek, Slavonic, Persian and Ottoman Turkish; his Ottoman was so good that it is said he was able to command the attention of the Viziers and all the dignitaries of the Porte. Furthermore, he had considerable social prestige in Constantinople as a descendent of a distinguished line of Dragomans. There could have been an element of 'social climbing' in Gratiani's wish to marry into the Borisi-Brutti family. Gratiani owed his success to his wits, having apparently humble origins. Borisi's daughter on the other hand was a member of a dynasty with extensive business

interests in South-Eastern Europe and the Levant and family connections, as we have seen, with many rich and influential people in the Levant and Eastern and Central Europe. It is possible that the Borisi and their associates regarded Gratiani as a 'parvenu' and an adventurer for all his apparent wealth and influence; if this were true he was probably trying to gain some social acceptance by marrying into an established family; this would also explain Marc'Antonio Borisi's reluctance to approve the match. Another obviously powerful motive for Gratiani's proposal was the influential presence of Bernardo Borisi in Moldavia; one may surmise that he hoped to cement Bernardo's loyalty in advance by marrying his niece. (12) When Gratiani became Prince of Moldavia it was to Bernardo Borisi, already a powerful figure in the principality, that he turned for support and loyalty, appointing him *Hatman* of Moldavia.

News of the "engagement" between Borisi's daughter and Gaspar Gratiani was made public before Borisi had given his answer. Borisi had no wish to give his daughter in marriage to a man such as Gratiani, whom he despised. He made the excuse that, as a public servant of the Venetian Republic, he needed to seek the consent of his political masters. He informed Francesco Contarini and Almorò Nani of Gratiani's offer and asked them for advice on how to proceed. He felt sure that Gratiani's only interest in his daughter was a means to:

"advance his pretension to the Principality of Bugdania."

They decided that the matter was sufficiently important to be referred to

the Council of Ten and praised Borisi for telling them of Gratiani's advances.

Gratiani was putting a great deal of pressure on Borisi to give his consent to the marriage. Gratiani met Borisi again at Hassan Pasha's house and renewed the request; Borisi again made excuses for his delay in making any decision. Nani and Contarini's report on Gratiani's marital ambitions was considered at the Council of Ten in Venice on March 20th and referred to the *Collegio* for their consideration; if necessary it would also be considered by the full Senate. Strict secrecy was to be enforced. (13) Gaspar Gratiani's attempts to cajole Borisi into making a decision were extremely offensive to the Venetian Embassy. Almore Nani told the English Ambassador Paul Pindar that Borisi was a man who was well able to look after his own interests and could make his decision on the matter best if left to make up his own mind. Nani and Contarini had themselves refrained from giving him any advice on whether or not to accept Gratiani's proposal because to interfere in matrimonial matters was always a mistake and people generally refrained from involving themselves. Pindar agreed and said:

“he had even declined to advise his brother about the marriage of one of his daughters because many people judge things by the event and one is blamed for a wrong opinion although given on good grounds.” (14)

Pindar had himself been a reluctant advocate of Gratiani's suitability as a husband. He told Nani that Gaspar had even tried to persuade the Imperial Ambassador to make representations to the Venetian Ambassador, but Pindar had dissuaded him with the suggestion that

such a delegation arriving at the Venetian Embassy might be taken badly by the ambassador and Borisi, whereas if he, Pindar, went on his own as a good friend of Venice his representations would be well received. Pindar's visit was a token effort, undertaken more to prevent Gratiani pestering him further, than as a serious effort to influence Borisi. Nani reported:

"I think that he only wished to be able to tell Gratiani that he had done what he had asked." (15)

That shortly afterwards Gratiani was appointed Prince of Moldavia did nothing to help Borisi make up his mind. If he considered Gratiani to have any chance of remaining Prince of Moldavia for a long period Borisi would probably have been prepared to marry his daughter to the ruler of an important principality. That Borisi was extremely reluctant to agree to an alliance between his family and a Prince of Moldavia and that the Venetian Embassy and the Senate were unenthusiastic about the match suggests that contemporary opinion of the occupants of Moldavia and Wallachia's thrones amongst the West European embassies in Constantinople was so low that little importance was now attached to establishing useful relations with them.

Given the extreme insecurity of the Prince of Moldavia's position and his own knowledge of Gratiani's personality and ambitions, Borisi seems to have expected Gratiani to be removed from the Moldavian throne after only a short rule. Not only would this place his daughter in danger, but the family's interests in the principality might also be imperilled. It seems that Borisi wished to have the matter taken out of his

hands altogether by referring it to the Doge and Senate, probably hoping that they would refuse permission for the marriage to take place. Gratiani departed Constantinople to take up his throne long before any decision was reached in Venice, although it is possible that the marriage went ahead anyway for Marc'Antonio Borisi was arrested and executed by the Ottomans for treason in 1620, apparently because of his connection with Gaspar Gratiani.

Gratiani's election as Prince of Moldavia was not greatly welcomed by Venetians. Polo Minio reported to Contarini:

"The choice of Gasparo Gratiani as Prince of Moldavia has alarmed me because I have my family in that province." (16)

Gratiani was not it seems regarded as likely to be an influence for peace and tranquillity in the principality. Minio may have suspected that the new prince would try to rebel, which could result in the Sultan attempting once more to place Moldavia under direct rule. If this were to happen Minio and the Borisi and other families like them would lose their property and their business interests in the principality. Moreover Gratiani's greed made it probable that the taxes levied on his subjects would be exorbitant. (17) Nevertheless Minio went to congratulate Gratiani, out of regard for his great influence with the Ottomans, and out of concern for the interests of his family in Moldavia. He was also asked to use his influence at the Venetian Embassy in the matter of Gratiani's marriage proposal.

Gaspar Gratiani had used his position amongst the Ottoman ruling circles to enrich himself. As a favourite of the Sultan and a friend of

Iskender Pasha he was in an excellent position to demand gifts and bribes for his intervention on behalf of foreigners or the Sultan's subjects in their dealings with foreigners. For instance Almoró Nani drew attention to Gratiani's involvement in the release of Turkish prisoners in Italian hands. Gratiani collected the ransom money to pay over to their captors and no doubt collected a commission for his trouble. Nani reported that there had been a considerable delay between Gratiani's collection of the ransom and the release of some of the captives; this suggests that Gratiani had used the money for some project of his own. Gratiani was also involved in arranging the return of the prisoners although by the time their ship arrived in Constantinople he had been in Moldavia for some months:

“This Berton [a ship] was to come under the English flag, so Gratiani wrote to the English Ambassador recommending it to him.” (18)

Gaspar Gratiani was a man who liked to have his finger in every pie, as if he could not resist the chance of involving himself in the affairs of others. Nor could he resist patronising the English Ambassador by drawing attention to his elevated status as Prince of Moldavia.

Immediately after his election to the Moldavian throne, on 13th February 1619, Gaspar Gratiani persuaded Paul Pindar to lend him some of the money necessary to pay for the gifts promised to his supporters in the *Divan*, particularly Iskender Pasha, who had procured his election to the Moldavian throne. In April 1620 the debt still had not been repaid and Pindar demanded that the money be reimbursed,

therefore a contract was drawn up for Gratiani to sign, guaranteeing payment, and was sent to the Moldavian agent in Constantinople, Mihai Stanzer, who was obliged to agree to stand surety for the debt. According to the contract signed and witnessed on 17th April 1620 this was a loan of six thousand six hundred *zecchini* which was to be paid back in full in four months time without interest. Pindar then left Constantinople to return home to England.

Pindar's motive in lending Gratiani the money was not to make a direct profit out of his support for Gratiani. It would appear that the ambassador, who was a very rich man, was pleased to assist Gratiani's installation in Moldavia. Pindar was probably aware that Gratiani had been given the task of negotiating a peace treaty between Poland and the Ottomans which would ensure that England's trade in the Balkans and the Danube region was not interrupted by conflict. Secondly, Gratiani was a personal friend and former colleague, a man whose talents as a diplomat had served the interests of the English Embassy and mercantile community well in the past and could be expected to be useful in the future. Pindar was entirely unaware of Gratiani's pro-Habsburg sympathies and his membership of the Christian Militia and may have expected him to remain on the Moldavian throne for a number of years. As we have seen, the Ottomans also put great trust in Gratiani, seeing in him a faithful servant of their interests. Gratiani, with the additional status of Prince of Moldavia, would therefore have been a useful ally for the English Embassy to call on if necessary to intervene with the Sultan on

matters pertaining to England's interests. Pindar therefore probably considered that he had much more to gain than lose by supporting Gratiani in a private capacity out of friendship and goodwill. There is no evidence to suggest that Paul Pindar had involved himself any further in Gratiani's campaign for the Moldavian throne. (19)

By the time the four months designated in the contract were up, Gratiani was at war with the Sultan and was not therefore in a position to pay his debt. A copy of the contract was sent to England by Robert Salter in 1622. It shows that the transaction was witnessed by Marc'Antonio Borisi and Cristoforo Brutti, a nephew of Bartolomeo Brutti. Clearly Gratiani had not kept his bargain and repaid the loan after four months, nor Pindar been reimbursed by the time he left the Embassy to return to England. He left his affairs in the hands of Robert Salter who spent nearly three years seeking some means to achieve payment. Eventually half of the debt, 3600 *zecchini*, was received, travelling by Caravan from Poland to Constantinople. Presumably Salter despaired of ever wresting the rest of the money from Stanzer or his heirs and successors who were liable, according to the contract, for this debt.

The naming of a foreigner, ignorant of the language of the country which he was to rule, as Prince of Moldavia was a logical extension of the system of nomination to the throne which had been in existence for some time, whereby the throne went to those who had served the Ottoman *Divan* most and who could afford to pay the highest bribes. The Ottomans were keen to place on the Moldavian throne a man whom they

thought they could trust implicitly, particularly as relations with Poland were difficult. They wanted to prevent the King of Poland's interference in the principality and thought that Gratiani would remain loyal to the Sultan and Iskender Pasha who had done so much to promote him. Unlike Iacob Eraclide Despot, a Greek who had ruled Moldavia between 1561 and 1563, and who had been distantly related to the Moldavian ruling house, Gratiani had absolutely no connection with the principality and his appointment broke all the traditional agreements contained in *hati-serifs* previously given to the principality.

That Gratiani did not pretend to be a Moldavian prince appears to have made him more acceptable to some of the Moldavian boyars than if he had been a charlatan; the unpopularity of those perceived as charlatans was alluded to when Ieremie Movila was proclaimed Prince of Moldavia. It has been said that many Moldavian boyars had been concerned at Greek penetration into the powerful positions in the principality (20) and because of Gaspar Gratiani's lack of Greek associations they were prepared to receive him well; they may also have thought that the handicap of not speaking Romanian would make him more malleable and reliant on their help to rule. However, an additional reason for the Moldavian boyars' good disposition towards their new prince was that he was charged with negotiating peace terms between Poland and the Ottoman Empire and they were anxious that he should succeed. Had war broken out between Poland and the Ottomans, Moldavia would have constituted the main theatre of war. The Cossacks

and Tatars were likely also to have been drawn into the hostilities. Their entry into Moldavia was particularly feared because they would regard the war as an opportunity to plunder the principality and carry its population off into slavery. A war between Poland and the Ottomans would devastate the principality, and so the boyars were anxious to facilitate any attempts to maintain the peace.

The *Caimacam* or deputy sent to prepare for Gratiani's arrival was well received and the new prince was met at Adrianople by twenty major boyars and accompanied to Iași by many thousand men. Having experienced the rapacity of ethnic Romanian pretenders, the boyars were not concerned at the accession of a foreigner unless he was to be one who would reward foreigners with land and powerful positions in competition with them. Unfortunately Gratiani had brought 500 *Uscochs* (Latin speakers) with him as a personal guard, because he did not feel confident of his safety amongst the Moldavian boyars. He also maintained some 15 or 20 Ragusans in his household. Nor was he content to rely on Moldavian boyars to help him rule. Peter Mundy, accompanying Paul Pindar on his return to England in 1620, made mention of a Greek called Stano who had formerly been Pindar's Dragoman and was now going to Moldavia to enter the service of Gaspar Gratiani. (21)

Gratiani had already established friendly relations with important men in Poland, with, for example, Thomas Zamoyski, the *Voivode* of Podolia, who was responsible for guarding the Moldavian frontier and

Samuel Korecki a relation of the Movilă family and a member of the Christian Militia; the plans of the Militia included a general Balkan rising. The mission to negotiate a continuation of peace between Poland and the Ottoman Empire was very useful to Gratiani because it brought him into direct contact with agents of the Polish Crown. Gratiani also tried to win the loyalty of pro-Polish boyars who were former adherents of the Movila princes, by returning their land confiscated by Ștefan Tomșa. Although it cannot be said for certain that Gratiani was planning to revolt against Ottoman rule, it is reasonable to assume that Gratiani was preparing himself for the possibility of conflict between the major powers in Eastern Europe and had even before he had been chosen prince, considered taking up arms against the Ottomans if such a conflict arose. Once he was Prince of Moldavia, Gaspar Gratiani recruited an army of mercenaries, many of whom were former followers of Radu Șerban or were from Western Europe. (22)

The peace negotiations between Poland and the Ottomans were very nearly successful. Gratiani with the help of the Moldavian boyar Constantin Bacioc prepared a peace treaty and all that was necessary was confirmation from both sides. In the spring of 1620 the King of Poland sent an envoy, Ieremie Otwinowski, to Constantinople to confirm the peace treaty, but the Prince of Transylvania, Bethlem Gabor [Gavril Bethlen] persuaded the new Sultan Osman II that it would be in his best interests to go to war. The Polish envoy was ill-treated and war was declared. Gratiani, faced with hostility amongst his boyars in Moldavia

and ambitious to throw off Ottoman suzerainty, supported Poland in secret. He intercepted letters to the Tatar Khan from Bethlem Gabor, the Sultan's ally, and communicated their contents to the King of Poland. Gaspar wrote letters to the Habsburg Emperor in an endeavour to prevent the agreement of an armistice, for which Gabor was working, between him and the Sultan. He also tried to persuade the Poles to support Nicolae Patrascu *Vodă*, son of Mihai Viteazul, in his struggle against Gabor. Two boyars, the *Vornic* Bucur and the *Vistier* Vasile Lupu, tried to thwart Gaspar's efforts to betray the Ottomans; in the meantime Gratiani attempted to involve both Gavril Movilă, Prince of Wallachia, and Bethlem Gabor, Prince of Transylvania, in an alliance against the Ottomans but he was rebuffed. (23)

News of Gaspar's treachery was communicated by Bethlem Gabor to the Sultan, who was furious. He sent a *Capugi* to capture Gratiani but the Prince of Moldavia was ready and ordered the massacre of the *Capugi* and 300 Ottoman soldiers accompanying him. He retreated to Hotin where he called upon Poland, the Pope and the princes of Europe to support him; only Poland responded. Gaspar also sent a gift of 30,000 gold coins to the Polish *Hatman* Stanislaw Zolkiewski to obtain the support of the Cossacks. It was also reported that, in order to gain the support of a Polish army, he promised that after a victory against the Ottomans he would undertake a campaign to annex Wallachia and Transylvania and unite them under his rule. (24)

Gratiani assured Zolkiewski that the Ottomans would only be able

to muster a small army because the Tatars were preoccupied with a quarrel between the Khan Djambele Ghirai II and his brother Calgai. Unfortunately for Gratiani that quarrel was soon resolved and a large force of Tatars entered Moldavia; the combined force of the Ottoman and Tatar armies was such that Gratiani and the Poles were out numbered two to one. The Ottoman commander Iskender Pasha refused a proposal of peace and did battle at Tutora, killing much of the Polish force gathered there. Gratiani's army had already fled. Zolkiewski was himself killed whilst trying to retreat across the Dniester. Gaspar fled towards Transylvania and was pursued and killed by two Moldavian boyars, *Hatman* Septilici and the *Postelnic* Dimitru Goia whilst asleep in a field near the town of Branistea in the district of Bacau in Moldavia. (25)

As we have seen, it was Gratiani's service in the interest of the Sultan Osman III, and his predecessors, which proved vital to the realisation of his ambition to be Prince of Moldavia. He was able to insinuate himself into the Sultan's favour in a way which Ştefan Bogdan had not been able to do. Whereas Bogdan had been seen by the Ottomans as a disruptive influence on the Sultan's relations with other States, Gratiani came to be regarded as a man who would be useful to the Sultan's foreign policy. Thus when the decision to remove Radu Mihnea from Moldavia was made, Gaspar Gratiani was able to persuade those who advised Sultan Osman that he was a suitable candidate. His record of service and the esteem in which he was held, in addition to a liberal offering of expensive gifts, overrode any reservations about his

lack of any connection with the principality or experience which suited him to govern the principality.

As a footnote to Gratiani's career: in October 1622 a man pretending to be Gaspar Gratiani, accompanied by bandits from the district of Mures, entered Moldavia and proceeded to steal sheep and horses. Ștefan Tomșa, Gratiani's successor as Prince of Moldavia, sent out a force to capture him. The false Gratiani escaped to the mountains and Tomșa requested the people of Bistrița to search for him and bring him to justice if they could. (26) Thus the late prince even succeeded in fostering a pretender, although not one with the ambition, persistence or sense of style of a Ștefan Bogdan.

Pindar's interest in Gratiani's elevation to the Moldavian throne seems to have been based largely on personal friendship and cannot be attributed to any desire to involve himself in the affairs of the Principality. Pindar's correspondence preserved in the State Papers makes no mention of any official contacts between the two once Gratiani became prince and Pindar's interest in Gratiani extended only so far as his attempts to secure the repayment of his loan. Pindar understandably refused to involve himself in Ottoman affairs in the way that Glover had been forced to do so, nor had he been intent on emulating Edward Barton's diplomatic successes.

After the departure of Paul Pindar, the English Embassy seems to have had no further contact with any princes of Moldavia. Pindar was succeeded by an agent for the Levant Company. The next English

representative in Constantinople to enjoy the status of ambassador was Sir Thomas Roe (December 1621 to June 1628). During Roe's Embassy attention shifted completely away from the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia onto Transylvania. English Ambassadors in Constantinople had frequently enjoyed good relations with a number of princes of Transylvania, as we have seen in this thesis, particularly in connection with the English Embassy's interest in Moldavia and Wallachia, however, with the build up to and the outbreak of the Thirty Years War, Transylvania took on a new significance whilst Moldavia and Wallachia were marginal to this conflict. Sir Thomas Roe became heavily involved in negotiations with the Transylvanian Prince Bethlem Gabor because the English Crown, in order to protect King James' daughter Elizabeth's position in Bohemia, shared the Transylvanian's interest in opposing the Habsburg Empire's domination of Central Europe. (27)

The episode of Gaspar Gratiani's successful but brief attainment of the throne of Moldavia provides a postscript to the discussion of the English Embassy's interest in the Principality. Pindar had arrived in Constantinople with express instructions to confine himself to protecting the English merchant community in the Ottoman Empire, which he had obeyed. In any case the example set by Sir Thomas Glover's involvement with Bogdan was hardly one to encourage Pindar to follow a similar course. Furthermore, after the public failure of Bogdan's suit, pretenders no longer sought the support of the English Embassy in Constantinople for their causes. Edward Barton's successes on behalf of

Aron and Mihai Viteazul had encouraged Bogdan to approach the English Crown; Glover's failure to achieve the same result for Bogdan ensured that the patronage of the English Embassy was not greatly coveted by other pretenders. Gratiani succeeded where Bogdan failed because he was able to refer to his loyal service to the Sultan and his potential usefulness in the future. Bogdan, on the other hand had little to recommend him to Sultan Ahmet I other than his genealogy which, whilst it gave him a claim to Moldavia through tradition and custom, did not persuade the Sultan and his ministers that he would behave as a loyal servant of the Porte.

The Ottomans primary concern when appointing a prince was to ensure that the principality was placed in the hands of a man who would fulfil the increasing demands required of the prince of Moldavia; that is to follow Ottoman foreign policy, maintain internal peace and maintain the flow of money and raw materials to the centre of the Ottoman Empire. That Gaspar Gratiani did none of these things reflects the dilemma of all princes of Moldavia in this period: co-operation with the suzerain power did not guarantee that they would not be removed in favour of another candidate; to break away from Ottoman control necessitated persuading other powerful princes to intervene militarily in the principality provoking a swift armed response by the Ottomans and their allies. That so many princes of Moldavia and Wallachia were prepared to defy the Ottomans is itself a reflection on the type of men who were appointed prince. The long and difficult campaign involved in securing election ensured that only the

most ambitious, persistent and cunning men were ever sufficiently successful to be heard of or even seriously considered for appointment by the Sultan.

CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to discuss a specific topic, that is the nature of English support for an individual pretender to the throne of Moldavia, Ștefan Bogdan, and to compare this support with that accorded to other pretenders by the English Crown and the English Embassy in Constantinople in its formative years. As one of the earliest permanent English Embassies, the Constantinople Embassy was established in a period when English interests abroad were expanding. The process of looking at the work of this particular embassy in the context of the expansion of English foreign policy in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries has been instructive about the development of an English diplomatic institution. Questions have been asked and answers sought with regard to the nature of English diplomatic policy in this period, not only in respect of the growth of the Embassy as a diplomatic institution but also the uses for which it was designed and the assumptions made about it. This thesis has also sought to illuminate the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and one of its European satellite states.

The English Embassy was originally set up as a result of a specific need: that of providing aid and succour to the Levant Company's interests in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore it has been necessary to ask questions about the relationship between diplomatic and commercial policy of the period and particularly about how clearly they were defined

and separated. The relationship between the embassy and the English Crown is of further importance as are the different assumptions made by both parties at various times about the embassy's function. As the English Crown sought to expand its influence in Europe eastwards, assumptions about the role it wished to play were made and tested. This thesis sheds light on a process by which England tried to build itself a role in Eastern Europe where it had not had one before. Whilst the English Crown was intent on establishing its presence in the Ottoman Empire and expanding its own interests, other states were doing the same in competition with England. As a new institution, the English Embassy was creating a role for itself and the function of a permanent ambassador to the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire had no clear definition.

The problems facing Anglo-Ottoman diplomacy in this period has been one of the main themes of this thesis. One of the greatest problems faced by the ambassador in Constantinople was the long delay in obtaining instructions from the Secretary of State who performed an enormous number of tasks and was therefore not in a position to devote great attention to the Embassy. The duties of the Secretary of State included acting as Foreign Minister and supervising the seventeenth century equivalent of a security police force which performed counter-intelligence activities. The Secretary of State was also expected to concern himself with any matter the Privy Council might discuss or any document which the sovereign might have to sign. The Secretariat was not an organised Foreign Office as such; there was no English diplomatic

service nor was there a separate office dealing exclusively with foreign affairs which would have had the opportunities and resources to build up the necessary expertise in Ottoman affairs. There was no corporate system of record-keeping to maintain archives of previous correspondence or official documents which could have been referred back to when decisions were made, as a result official papers were often mixed up with the private papers of the Secretary of State. Within the Secretariat there were no opportunities for individuals to specialise in the affairs of particular countries. Decisions about England's policy towards the Ottoman Empire were not necessarily based upon either the ambassador's advice or expert advice from other quarters, including the Levant Company which financed the embassy.

The relationship between the Levant Company, the Crown and the embassy was in itself very complicated. The evidence put forward in this thesis leads one to the conclusion that there was no clear separation into areas defined purely as foreign policy or economic and commercial policy. Commercial and diplomatic expansion went hand in hand; when English merchants operated successfully in foreign parts, this was seen as enhancing the reputation of the English Crown. Business-men often played a central role in England's diplomatic expansion: one may see this in the Baltic, in Russia, in the East India Company and in Thomas Sherley's attempts to 'kick-start' diplomatic relations between England and Persia. Economic influence in a region facilitated the exertion of political influence, and *vice versa*. This does not mean that commercial

considerations were the dominant factor in England's relations with other states; as we shall see there were a number of assumptions made about the institution of a permanent embassy in Constantinople.

When the English Embassy in Constantinople was established it had three basic functions, none of which was less important than any of the others: it existed to maintain the honour of the English Crown, to protect English interests in the Ottoman Empire and to act as channel of information and communication. (1) The vanity of Queen Elizabeth was fed by good relations with powerful rulers in the east and the extension of areas of the world where her name and reputation was known. The granting of ambassadorial status to William Harborne, the giving and receiving of presents and royal correspondence enhanced the Queen's magnificence and asserted her importance in the world in relation to rivals such as Spain, Venice and the Kingdom of France. William Harborne's commission as ambassador makes specific mention of his brief to nourish and deserve the affection of good princes towards Queen Elizabeth, to affirm the Queen's league of friendship with the Sultan, to do "good offices" for the Sultan and to do all in his power to ensure that a "noble traffic" was allowed to flourish. (2) In 1592, George Gifford argued that the Ambassador's role was vital in maintaining and conserving the Sultan's friendship:

"the general state of Christendom standing as it doth".

The ambassador's presence in Constantinople enabled the Queen to do "good offices" for her friends and "displeasure" her enemies

as others who did not maintain an ambassador in Constantinople could not. Despite the doubts of some about the desirability of league with the Sultan, it could not be denied or ignored that he was a major power in Europe and therefore influence with him led to influence upon the politics of Europe. England's interests, which were to be protected by the ambassador in the Ottoman Empire, could not be clearly defined at this early stage.

In theory the establishment of a permanent ambassador in Constantinople should have allowed England to pursue an informed foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire which was flexible enough to deal with any difficulty or opportunity and which could foil an opponent's diplomacy effectively. The ambassador's role was to try to influence the Ottoman government to adopt policies or attitudes which were favourable to the English Crown's own foreign policy and to the interests of the Levant Company. In practice, however, England's diplomacy towards the Ottomans was not nearly as well developed as this. Foreign policy in this area was opportunist with no overall plan and, it would seem, no generally accepted ideas about England's interests with regard to the status and aspirations of the Ottoman Empire. The ambassador resident in Constantinople found himself in the position of interpreting English interests for himself, often without specific instructions and with no guarantee that his interpretation would be approved of in London. His expert advice was frequently ignored. On behalf of the Levant Company the ambassadors discussed in this thesis were successful in promoting

trade by seeking and winning concessions, achieving a degree of co-operation between the English community and Ottoman officials and their representatives, and by taking charge of disputes in order to deal with them through official channels. The ambassador's diplomatic role caused much greater difficulties because the limits of this role were not agreed upon by the Ottoman or the English Crown.

Another salient question is the role played by patronage as a political force in foreign affairs and whether it had as large a role in such matters as it played in domestic policy. Therefore at the core of this thesis are questions about the motivation behind the English Crown's offer of patronage to Ştefan Bogdan and how that patronage was won and then lost. Thomas Gainsford emphasised the role of patronage as a central tool of foreign policy in his *Glorie of England* (3) when he referred to the importance of sovereigns adhering to the principle of supporting the innocent and distributing justice. He claimed that the English Crown's status amongst the other Crown's of Europe was enhanced because it was alone in taking this role seriously when it accorded its support to Ştefan Bogdan. As we have seen, in Constantinople the French and Venetian ambassadors had previously accorded patronage to a number of pretenders on behalf of their sovereigns. William Lithgow concurred with Gainsford's view that Thomas Glover had acted to support an 'innocent' and assist him in obtaining 'justice' from the Sultan. He insisted that Bogdan should have shown gratitude for Glover's help but neglected to do so. (4)

Bogdan and the other pretenders discussed in this thesis relied upon the patronage of powerful individuals in the Ottoman Empire and from other states to protect their life and liberty and to take up their pleas that they had been deprived of thrones which were theirs by right. The tendency of West European states to extend their concept of patronage beyond their own borders was exploited by these pretenders until the foreign rulers in question realised the difficulty and futility of exercising this role as patron in the Ottoman Empire. The King of France and the rulers of Venice did so first but the English Crown was made to realise that the Sultan did not welcome interference in what he regarded as his domestic policy by foreign princes nor did he recognise that any foreign prince had any such right to exercise his role as patron within Ottoman spheres of interest.

The support which foreign states were able to give these pretenders was limited. In fact one of the major grounds for the Sultan's eventual refusal of Ştefan Bogdan's claim to be Prince of Moldavia was that he was too involved with foreign princes to be considered a trustworthy candidate. Edward Barton succeeded in obtaining the Moldavian throne for Aron whilst the English Crown failed to do the same for Ştefan Bogdan. The reason for this was that Barton had *de facto* authority in Constantinople because the Sultan valued his advice and had in the past made use of his diplomatic skills. The English Crown enjoyed no such authority with the Sultan since he did not recognise it as either equal in status to his or having any significant role in his empire

beyond protecting the rights of English subjects.

We saw in the introduction that there is little evidence to support the idea that English patronage of pretenders was motivated by any specific policies directed towards gaining commercial advantages in the Levant. Support for pretenders would appear to have had more to do with an interest in the status of the principality and the relative strengths of the powerful states surrounding it. The embassy had a diplomatic role from its inception. The ambassadors faced a very difficult task not only in maintaining good relations with the Ottomans but also in making decisions about the best way to proceed in carrying out English policies. The favour of the Sultan and of his favourites was greatly sought after by the foreign embassies. Involvement with pretenders was risky because by its sensitive nature it could backfire and damage the relationship between the embassy and its host government. The ambassadors themselves shaped the embassy's role in Constantinople in accordance with their personal conceptions of what that role should be. All the ambassadors were ambitious and wanted to make a success of their embassy. As we have seen in this thesis Barton, Lello and Glover found their embassy threatened as a result of the activities and ambitions of the pretenders to whom they accorded support.

The embassy had a specific function with regard to the Levant Company which has been set out in this thesis and which in various instances crystallised into a clearly defined diplomatic role, for example, in negotiations to obtain Ottoman support against Spain in the 1580's

and negotiations to maintain peace between the Ottoman Empire and Poland, undertaken at the request of Queen Elizabeth, both of which were linked directly to England's maritime interests and to Edward Barton's anti-Spanish policy. In a letter of February 1592, Sultan Murat III asked Queen Elizabeth to write and inform the King of Poland that the Sultan had granted him a peace treaty only because Edward Barton had pleaded for it in her name; he also asked her to urge King Zygmund to peace, friendship and obedience to the Ottoman Porte. The Sultan assured Queen Elizabeth that as long as she remained a faithful friend to him and kept him informed of her actions and policy towards him, her requests would always be granted, beyond any prince in league with the Porte, and her ships and merchants could trade freely in the Ottoman lands. This implies that Sultan Murat was keen to use friendly nations as agents of his foreign policy. (5) This was certainly true of Barton's accompaniment of Sultan Mehemet III to battle with the Habsburgs in 1596.

As we have seen, there was considerable argument as to whether Barton had exceeded his remit as ambassador. The official reason for the Sultan's request that Barton accompany him to war was that it was thought that he could be useful in peace negotiations. However, his critics argued that he embarrassed Queen Elizabeth when he joined the Sultan's retinue. The Levant Company was particularly vehement in asserting that Barton's mission was totally unnecessary. Barton's insistence that he had gone as a disinterested party to assist negotiations

for peace and obtain the release of Christian prisoners of war was not accepted by all his critics who asserted that the interests of Christendom had been compromised by his association with Sultan Mehemet's party; this led to accusations that Barton's good relations with the Sultan were maintained by Barton communicating secret information about the anti-Ottoman activities of Roman-Catholic countries. England's adversaries were jealous of Barton's influence with the Sultan and probably hoped to shame Queen Elizabeth into ordering her Ambassador to limit his activities to purely commercial matters. The Levant Company was concerned at the time and money which Barton spent on diplomatic activities which they regarded as unnecessary. It was even less clear to the Levant Company merchants how the support of pretenders served either England's interests or those of Christendom. In 1592 George Gifford reported that Barton gave himself wholly to matters of State which the merchants disliked because they wanted him to be rather:

“in the nature of a factor than of an Ambassador”. (6)

Lord Burghley and Sir Francis Walsingham were interested in the possibilities of using princes of Moldavia and Wallachia as agents of English influence but did not wish to become financially involved, and so their letters of support for Petru Cercel and Ioan Bogdan were of no practical help. The English Embassy built a relationship with Moldavia in a different manner, through correspondence and agreements with Petru Șchiopul and Bartolomeo Brutti. However, although Brutti showed himself particularly anxious to build up a personal relationship with the

English Crown, his offers of service were ignored by the Queen who does not seem to have shared her ministers' enthusiasm for the principalities.

Edward Barton's influence with the Sultan was greatly sought by pretenders. As we have seen, Edward Barton was initially prepared to lend his influence to both Aron and Mihai Viteazul only because he did not intend to become closely involved with either of them. It was essentially bad-luck which forced Barton to become closely involved with Aron. This involvement harmed his reputation with Queen Elizabeth and other European princes but does not appear to have done any lasting damage to his relationship with the Sultan. However, Barton's example warned other ambassadors of the dangers of financial involvement with pretenders.

Henry Lello was vehemently opposed to supporting Bogdan and made his forebodings clear in his correspondence with the Secretary of State. The latter, Cecil, was also wary of associating the embassy too closely with Bogdan for fear of damaging its favour with the Sultan; he advised Lello to beware involving the embassy in the Prince's campaign beyond protecting his person and his freedom and advancing his cause along official channels only. Lello was steadfast in refusing to be drawn into Bogdan's affairs, despite the pretender's best efforts to involve the embassy in stirring up dissent in Moldavia and in discrediting the agent of the reigning prince resident in Constantinople. Thus Lello spared himself the trouble which befell Sir Thomas Glover. He was fortunate in

that he had been ordered not to involve the embassy financially in the fate of the pretender. Lello's steadfast refusal to be duped into supporting Bogdan's underhand dealings against his rival, suggests that in many ways he was stronger and cleverer than Glover, contrary to the latter's public image. Lello failed to gain the Moldavian throne for Bogdan, as he knew he would, because the English Crown was the pretender's only principal supporter and remained so. Lello was unable to procure Bogdan the genuine support of an individual of major influence upon the Sultan, either through bribery or, more importantly because no person of sufficient influence considered Bogdan a worthy protégé. Although bribery was important in obtaining decisions at the Porte, decisions were naturally still made based upon analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of any course of action

As we have seen, Sir Thomas Glover initially seems to have welcomed the Crown's decision to support Bogdan, but changed his mind once the pretender arrived in the Ottoman capital, probably because he had been made aware of the his unsuitability as a protege. He then tried desperately to have the King's letters of recommendation revoked. Bogdan was eventually defeated by another pretender, Ștefan Tomșa, who was less compromised by foreign associations. One should not forget that Glover was very nearly successful but in the end his influence in the Ottoman capital was shown to be no greater than that of any other of the foreign ambassadors there. Such influence existed only with regard to specific matters which were acknowledged by the

Ottomans as being of legitimate concern, whereas Barton had had a particularly special relationship with Sultans Murat III and Mehemet III who trusted his advice. Thus he was permitted to interest himself in matters outside what the Ottomans normally considered as ambassadorial business.

The English Crown's conception of its ambassador's role in Constantinople was not the only matter of importance. Ultimately the Sultan and his ministers could choose to ignore the ambassador's requests or indulge them. Although both the Sultan and the English Crown placed value upon their diplomatic relations, for both parties this relationship was an experiment which had advantages and disadvantages. The Ottomans, the English Crown and the Levant Company sometimes questioned the desirability of continuing this diplomatic relationship. Furthermore, it had still not been established exactly what this relationship ought to be. Relations between England and the Ottoman Empire were not universally disapproved of amongst the political community in England despite probable religious scruples. More importantly, both Sir Francis Walsingham and Robert Cecil regarded such relations as valuable. In his introduction to the first edition of *Principall Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation*, published in 1589, in a piece dedicated to Walsingham, Richard Hakluyt the younger declared that the establishment of Anglo-Ottoman relations was one of the great achievements of the Queen's reign, that her status and her subjects interests were advanced by the presence:

“at Tripolis in Syria, at Aleppo, at Babylon, at Balsara”

of English Agents and Consuls. Hakluyt continued to support the maintenance of friendly Anglo -Ottoman relations in the second volume of his second edition in a piece dedicated to Robert Cecil countering criticisms that alliance with the “Turke” betrayed Christian aims. He pointed out the value of the trade in the Levant which was supported by these friendly relations and the advantages gained by the maintenance of the capitulations. He also emphasized the value of Christian Embassies in Constantinople to other Christian States connected with the Ottoman Empire, Poland in particular. Edward Barton’s mediation of peace between Poland and the Ottomans in 1590 was mentioned by Hakluyt as being of particular significance and brought great honour to England. The text of letters from the Grand Vizier to the Queen, dated 1590 and from the Sultana to the Queen, dated 1594 were published by Hakluyt. (7)

Paul Wittek (8) has concluded that Sinan Pasha’s letters were published at the request of the government, as part of a propaganda exercise to silence critics in England and abroad of England’s Embassy in Constantinople and draw attention to Queen Elizabeth’s influence with the Sultan. Hakluyt not only obliged the Crown by publishing documents which reflected favourably upon its foreign policy, he added his own arguments to silence the English Crown’s critics. Hakluyt had been English Ambassador in France until 1588 when he returned to England; it is possible that he began the preparation of his *Voyages* on

Walsingham's instructions and in his employ. His editorial line was that England was not the only country which maintained friendships and alliance with the Sultan: the King of France and his ambassadors in Constantinople had a similar relationship to the Sultan; the King of Poland was another case in point, and:

“even the Emperour of Christendome hath had league with the Turke, and pay'd him a long while a pension for a part of Hungarie.”

Hakluyt argued that England's diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire were no different from those enjoyed by other Christian nations, therefore no blame should be apportioned to a state which was merely exerting its influence and authority amongst the other powerful Christian nations of Europe.

Richard Knolles' *Generall Historie of the Turkes* dealt with the history of Moldavia and Wallachia in the context of Ottoman history, in particular Ottoman relations with Poland. Knolles attributed Bogdan's failure to gain the Moldavian throne to Constantin Movilă's exploitation of Ottoman corruption. (9) The Ottoman *Divan* was undoubtedly corrupt but the reasons for Bogdan's failure were more straightforward than this: it had been very difficult to persuade the Sultan to risk damaging relations with Poland by overthrowing the Movilă dynasty in Moldavia. When Sultan Ahmet I was eventually so persuaded, Bogdan's supporters were unable to convince a sufficient number of the his counsellors that their protégé was the most suitable candidate for the principality because few of his supporters inside the *Divan* were sufficiently committed to his

cause. Furthermore, to concentrate on Constantin Movilă's use of corrupt practices to oppose Bogdan's suit ignores the fact that Bogdan made extensive use of the same methods to obtain consideration of his suit. His supporters in the *Divan* had, as we know, been offered substantial gifts and bribes. Nor were Bogdan's supporters innocent of involvement in espionage, violence and 'black propaganda'.

Nicolae Iorga was the first of those writing about Bogdan to do so in the context of Romanian history and Anglo-Romanian relations, as opposed to Anglo-Ottoman relations. (10) He regarded Anglo-Romanian relations as uncoordinated and not the result of a concerted English policy. As we have seen attempts were made under Petru Șchiopul, through the efforts of Bartolomeo Brutti, to put Moldavian relations with England on a stable footing through correspondence with the English Ambassador and the Queen of England and by granting trading privileges in Moldavia to English merchants in 1588. However, these efforts were less successful than he had hoped: there was no direct correspondence between the Queen of England and Petru Șchiopul and Brutti's efforts to bring about a proper diplomatic relationship with the English Crown did not bear fruit. Nevertheless, good relations with Petru Șchiopul and the expertise of Bartolomeo Brutti were particularly useful to Edward Barton in 1590 when he negotiated a maintenance of peace between the Sultan and the King of Poland. Relations between the English Embassy and princes of Moldavia probably continued to be of some use to Edward Barton for the gathering of intelligence. It is unlikely

that Barton would have neglected to maintain a correspondence with Brutti and later with Aron *Vodă*'s advisers; such a correspondence would have been invaluable in providing information about matters concerning the status and integrity of Moldavia.

Much of the ambassadors' correspondence with the Secretary of State's office was concerned with reports about significant developments within the Ottoman Empire which the ambassador concerned considered to be of interest to his political masters in London. Particular attention was paid to the Sultan's foreign policy, both in Europe and the Middle East; a frequent topic of these letters was the state of relations between Poland and the Ottomans not only to do with Moldavia and Wallachia but also with regard to the Tatars and the Cossacks. As we have seen, the ambassadors wrote often, for example Henry Lello sent dispatches once a fortnight; the length of the letters and the obvious concern for detail therein is an illustration of the importance of the ambassador's role as intelligence collector and analyst. From the embassy's inception it was clear that accurate information was vital if it was to fulfil its functions properly. Accurate intelligence was also important for the English merchants in the conduct of their trade. William Harborne also had to contend with attempts by the French and Venetian Ambassadors to wreck his chances of establishing a permanent embassy to protect English trade and the persons and property of English subjects in the area and he needed to establish fruitful relationships with the Sultan's advisers and Ministers. To achieve this he had to know how to approach these

individuals and how to persuade them that he was to be taken seriously.

However, the greatest impetus to setting up an intelligence gathering network came about because Harborne was given the task of procuring Ottoman naval support against Spain. If he were to carry out this task he could not rely merely on official sources of information. He needed to discover which individuals close to the Sultan were sympathetic to English interests and which were hostile. He wished to discover how the Sultan could be persuaded to enter into alliance with England. He also required information about what the King of Spain's envoys, supporters and spies were doing to counter him.

The ambassador, his secretary and his Dragomans formed the core of the intelligence network and cultivated all possible sources of information. Official channels of information included such things as the audiences which the ambassador attended at the Sultan's palace and the embassy Dragomans' attendances on day to day business of the embassy. Friendships and acquaintanceships were cultivated in order to obtain useful information unofficially. Items of political information and gossip could be traded on a *quid pro quo* basis. This sort of intelligence exchange could be particularly useful, if conducted properly, because it helped to build up an atmosphere of co-operation and trust between the Ottomans and the English Embassy. Paul Pindar, when secretary to Henry Lello, attracted the attention of Sultan Mehemet III's mother, an immensely influential woman at the Ottoman court; Pindar was encouraged by Lello to cultivate a friendship with her which could be of

great advantage to the English Embassy. The giving of gifts to highly-placed officials and of bribes to them and their servants has been referred to many times in this thesis. The ambassador and his staff also probably traded favours with people outside the Ottoman establishment who might have useful connections or information. Hospitality at the Embassy was, as we have seen, another instrument of intelligence gathering. Some of this activity occupied a grey area between a legitimate 'need-to-know' and espionage. We also know that numerous spies were employed by the ambassador and his staff on an unofficial basis and their connections with the Embassy carefully concealed.

The English Embassy's intelligence network increased in size under Edward Barton. The merchants complained about the size and cost of his staff and the fact that he employed men such as Thomas Wilcox and Paolo Mariani at all. Barton maintained a wide range of acquaintances, extending from Meletius Pigas, Patriarch of Alexandria, to Moshe Benevisti and David Passi, who were alleged to have been spies. Meletius Pigas became Patriarch of Constantinople, and his friendship provided Barton with a useful entree into the Greek Orthodox establishment which was responsible for the whole of the Orthodox Christian community within the Empire. Its members included bankers and merchants with connections all over the Empire and beyond its borders. As we have seen Mariani, Passi and Benevisti were executed on charges of espionage on behalf of Spain; if these charges were true these men's usefulness to Barton must have been immense, because he

could tap into their intelligence networks too. It is impossible to say how much of Barton's intelligence network remained in operation under Henry Lello; we have seen that Sir Thomas Glover employed spies and agents many of whom were subsequently also found to have substantial Spanish connections.

The ambassador's right to accord his protection to foreign nationals was, as we have seen, jealously guarded for practical reasons, in that it discouraged intimidation of Embassy staff and servants by Ottoman officials and their associates and allowed the ambassadors to intervene on behalf of, enslaved Christians. The right of protection or 'extra-territoriality' gave the embassies a special status within the Empire. It was this right which attracted Petru Cercel, Ioan Bogdan and Ștefan Bogdan to approach the French, English and Venetian governments for their support and letters of recommendation. It was also inevitable that some individuals enjoying this protection took advantage of the freedoms it endowed to involve themselves in activities, including espionage, which the right of protection was not intended to facilitate. Inevitably the 'Frankish' Embassies were targeted as sources of employment by spies because they offered some protection against Ottoman wrath. We know that Paolo Mariani was the subject of allegations of espionage whilst in the employ of the English Embassy. We also know that Ștefan Bogdan tried to use the English Embassy, whilst under Henry Lello's protection, as a base from which to conduct operations to stir up revolt in Moldavia against Ieremie Movilă. Lello used these activities as evidence to support

his argument that Bogdan was an unsuitable object of English patronage and reported that he was very careful to ensure that Bogdan was prevented from conducting his operations under the roof of the embassy. Sir Thomas Glover was not so scrupulous: not only did he fail to prevent Bogdan's covert activities he also appears to have actually participated and financed these operations. Discovery by the Ottomans of Glover's complicity would have seriously undermined the embassy's effectiveness, if it did not destroy the embassy altogether, for such activities were understandably viewed by the Ottomans as an abuse of the embassy's rights of protection of Christians. As we saw in Chapter III, the Ottomans were aware of the potential for abuse inherent in this right and tried during Paul Pindar's Embassy to remove clauses relating to 'extraterritoriality' from the Capitulations of England and France.

We have also seen that covert operations against the Movilă princes of Moldavia were not the limit of Bogdan's secret anti-Ottoman activities whilst under the protection of the English Crown. He was also committed to promoting Spanish interests, perhaps as a member of an organisation dedicated to the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, similar to the Christian Militia which recruited Gaspar Gratiani, a man who also enjoyed English protection. There is also evidence that Sir Thomas Glover was involved or at least implicated in Bogdan's espionage on behalf of Spain. Glover's association with Bogdan eventually so compromised him that Paul Pindar was sent in secret to Constantinople to take over the Embassy and investigate the exact

nature of the pretender's influence over the ambassador and the extent of Glover's involvement in activities which could discredit the embassy and anger the King. If King James were to become disenchanted with the English Embassy in Constantinople, because of Glover's secret and unauthorised dealings with the King of Spain, he might decide to discontinue diplomatic relations with the Sultan. The Earl of Salisbury, Henry Wotton, Paul Pindar amongst others were anxious to prevent this. Furthermore, if the Ottomans had obtained evidence that an accredited ambassador of a foreign sovereign was personally implicated in spying on behalf of a country hostile to the Sultan, they would have been given an instrument with which to curtail the rights of foreign embassies severely. Once the English Crown discovered how vulnerable its Embassy was to such abuse, it was decided that henceforth ambassadors should curtail the activities of their servants and associates.

Ştefan Bogdan won the support of the English Crown because he was a superficially attractive individual who argued very persuasively that the English Crown would benefit if it supported a successful campaign for the Moldavian throne. He 'proved' to Queen Elizabeth's satisfaction that he was a legitimate prince who was the victim of injustice at the hands of an usurper. The concept of legitimate title was very important to the English Crown. We do not know what was said during Bogdan's audiences with the Queen, however from what little we know about the English government's perceptions of Bogdan's plight it is

probable that he led the Queen to believe that he was a Protestant, as his father had been. The Queen may also have been persuaded that due to the influence of a devoutly Roman Catholic King of Poland, Moldavia was at risk of falling under the control of the forces of the counter-reformation. The King of Poland, Zygmund III Vasa, was also involved in a struggle with the Protestant nobility in his native Sweden over the succession. (11) Moldavia had previously been “saved” from Jesuits due to the intervention of Edward Barton in the name of Queen Elizabeth in 1593. The important role of the English Crown in dispensing patronage, to support the innocent and distribute justice, could be brought to bear both against the creeping influence of the Pope and against the Ottoman Sultan’s infidel disregard of the important concept of legitimacy. As we have seen, the English concept of legitimacy, in reality, had little relevance to the principality of Moldavia.

King James I upheld Queen Elizabeth’s decision to accord the pretender her protection and assistance and was persuaded to commit himself to Bogdan’s cause in return for Bogdan’s promise for allegiance. The pretender even promised to hold the principality of Moldavia as a client of the English Crown. It was expected that the presence of an English client on the Moldavian throne would enhance the status of England in the East and increase its influence and that of all Protestant princes in opposition to the Catholic powers in the area. It would also enhance the status and influence of the English Embassy in Constantinople, since the ambassador might be called upon to act as

intermediary between the Sultan and the Prince The ambassador would also have privileged access to intelligence about Poland, the Tatars, the principalities and the Habsburgs.and he would have a further tool with which to press the case for access for English ships to the Black Sea. It could only serve to assist English trade in the area to have a grateful prince on the throne. English travellers, businessmen and embassy agents could enter and cross the principality with the assurance that they would receive assistance and protection. Finally an outpost of English influence in the area would ensure that the English Crown would have an important role to play in Eastern Europe and enjoy greater influence there than the King of France.

James I aspired to be an influence for peace in Christendom. His conviction that Christian states could live in peace with one another had earned him the oft-quoted nickname of “the wisest fool in Christendome”. However this does not mean that he was not keen to extend his influence to the outer edges of Europe.Indeed, his oft-stated distaste for relations with the Ottoman Empire has been shown in this thesis not to have prevented him making use of his official relationship with the Sultan to pursue this foreign policy.

Much has been written in this thesis about the status of Moldavia in this period, particularly when viewed in terms of the struggle for control conducted between Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Long before an English Embassy had been established in Constantinople, the role of the prince was reduced to that of caretaker and tax-farmer under the tutelage

of a stronger power. The period under discussion was one in which the struggle for control was played out between Poland and the Ottomans. By 1620 it was clear that Poland could no longer seriously aspire to influence or control the election of princes; it was the Sultan, and he alone, who controlled appointments. The prince was now little more than an officer of the Sultan, although he still had the trappings of an autonomous prince. Developments of the eighteenth century, when the Sultan abandoned completely the idea that rulers should be natives with some royal connections, had their roots in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In 1721 the Prince became a Pasha, official confirmation that he was little more than the Sultan's employee.

The principalities had remained under the rule of Christian princes because it was more profitable for the Sultans to leave them in that state than attempt to rule them directly. They were on occasion embroiled in resistance to Ottoman rule because they were ruled by Christian princes who usually resented their dependent status and were amenable to attempting to break away from his control. The principalities were also areas of great interest to other Christian rulers in Europe because of their position as buffers between the Ottoman Empire and Christendom. Their usefulness to an anti-Ottoman campaign was obvious. This thesis has shown that their importance in Eastern Europe was not lost on England, a country which had no direct interest in the principalities but had, from the inception of the embassy in Constantinople, acknowledged the importance to Christendom of their continued autonomy. The embassy

perceived a need to provide the English Crown with intelligence about the principalities' strengths and weaknesses, their alliances and alignments. The earliest official Anglo-Romanian relations were, as we have seen, of some importance to the politics of the area and attest to the special status of the principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Collections of State Papers held in the Public Record Office in London will be abbreviated, for example, to: SP [State Papers] 97 [Papers relating to the Ottoman Empire and Turkey] 5 [bundle number] f [folio number]

Collections in the British Museum Manuscripts Library will be abbreviated to, for example: BM Lansdowne Manuscripts 241

Richard Hakluyt, *The Principall Navigation, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* [Glasgow 1904] will be abbreviated to *Hakluyt*.

Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts relating to English Affairs, existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice 1610-13 will be *Cal S.P. Venetian 1610-13*

Calendar of State Papers Domestic from the reign of Elizabeth preserved in the State Paper department of the Public Record Office 1547-1580 [or James I 1611-18] will be *Cal S.P. Domestic 1547-1580 [or 1611-18]*

Calendar of State Papers Foreign Series of the reign of Elizabeth preserved in the Public Record Office, 1584-5 will be *Cal. S.P. foreign 1584-5*

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NOTES

INTRODUCTION

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2. To be strictly correct, Istanbul was the new name for the capital of the Ottoman Empire; it was called Constantinople when it was the capital of the Byzantine Empire. However this city is usually referred to, in both Romanian and English histories, as Constantinople; furthermore in the seventeenth century the English used the old name for the city, thus the English Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire was referred to as the English Ambassador to Constantinople.

3. Nicolae Iorga, *Anglo-Romanian Relations* [Bucharest, 1931] pp 5-30; Ludovic Demeny and Paul Cernovodeanu, *Relațiile Politice ale Angliei cu Moldova, Țara Românească și Transilvania în secolele XVI-XVIII*. [Bucuresti, 1974] p 283.

4. Paul Cernovodeanu, 'England and the Question of Free Trade in the Black Sea-a general survey' in *Revue Romaine d'Histoire* (1967) pp 15-22; 'Privilegiul Comercial acordat Neguștorilor Englezi în Moldova la 1588 și răsuretul său politic în anii unirii principatelor' in *Revista de Istorie* (1978) pp 1041-49; *English Trade Policy in the Levant 1660-1714* [Bucharest, 1972] pp 141; also 'Aventuroasa Viață a lui Stefan Bogdan un Princip Moldovean la Curtea regelui Iacob I Stuart' in *Magazin Istoric* Anul IX, nr. 4 (96), [March 1975], pp 20-22 and Nr.4 (97), [April 1975], pp 50-54.

5. William Lithgow, *A most delectable and true discourse of an admired and painful peregrination from Scotland to the most famous kingdoms in Europe, Asia and Affricke* etc. [London 1614] an account of Lithgow's extensive and very eventful travels, henceforth will be referred to as Lithgow, *Rare Adventures*.

6. Thomas Gainsford, *Glorie of England* [London 1618] p 192; see also, 'Thomas Gainsford (d.1624?)' in (ed.Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee), *Dictionary of National Biography* [Oxford University Press, since

1917], Vol.VII, p808.

7. *Public Record Office State Papers 97 (Turkey) bundles 5 and 6.* Henceforth references to the contents of the State Papers in the Public Record Office will be written as, for example: *SP 97/5* plus the number of the folio or folios which will be written *f* or *ff*.

8. The Grand Vizier was the Ottoman Sultan's Chief Minister. (see Appendix 2 for list of Grand Viziers of the period).

9. Richard Knolles, *Generall Historie of the Turkes* [London 1st edition, 1603; 2nd edn., 1613; 3rd edn., 1621] p 1205.

10. *ibid.*

11. *ibid.*

12. *ibid.*

13. Nicolae Iorga, 'Pretendenți domnești în secolele al XVI-lea' in *Memorille Academie Românei (XVI)* [1897], pp 251-9.

14. (ed. E. de Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitoare Istoria Romanilor* [Bucuresti, 1897 onwards] Since the collections of documents edited by Hurmuzaki will be cited often in this thesis, this collection will henceforth referred to as *Hurmuzaki*.

15. Ion Botez, 'Două comedii vechi engleze' in *Viața Românească* [1913] Vol.XXIX, pp 319-24; 'Odiseia unui Prinț Moldovan' in *Viața Românească* [1913] Vol.XXX, pp 279-84.

16. Beaumont and Fletcher, *The Knight of the Burning Pestle*, Act VI, scenes i and ii; Ben Jonson, *The Silent Woman*, Act V scene i.

17. Henry Weber, *The Works of Beaumont and Fletcher* [London 1812], Vol I p 239. Weber assumed that the character in *The Knight of the Burning Pestle* was a reference to the stories of Don Quixote which were very popular in England at this time. Whilst Frederick Gard Fleay in *A Biographical Chronicle of the English Drama* [London, 1891] pp 184-85, refers to him as being a Turkish Ambassador to the English Court in November 1607, based on the existence of a document published by John Nichols in *The Progresses of James I* [London, 1928] vol. II p 157:

"On 7th November Rowland Whyte writes to the Earl of Salisbury:

The Turk and the Prince of Moldavia are now going away.”

The visit of a Turkish Agent to London will be dealt with in Chapter VII.

18. Marcu Beza, ‘English travellers in Romania’ in *English Historical Review* (Vol.32) [1917] pp 277-8.

19. Nicolae Iorga, *Anglo-Romanian Relations* [Bucharest, 1931] p 17.

20. *ibid.*, p 22

21. *ibid.*

22. *S P 97/ 5 and S P 97/6.*

23. Elvire Georgescu, ‘Le sejour d’un Prince Moldave à la court de Jacques I er, roi d’Angleterre’ in *Mélanges de l’ecole Roumaine en France* (Vol.XII) [Paris, 1934], pp 1-32.

24. Marcu Beza made a further short contribution in 1938 in an article entitled ‘Vechi Legături cu Anglia’ in *Memoriile Secțiunii Literare* (Seria III, Tom. VIII, Mem. II), [1938] p 253, which consists of a few documents discovered in British Archives. It contains a number of inaccuracies, for example Ioan Bogdan, who visited England in 1592, was identified as Stefan Bogdan. This mistake was probably prompted by the discovery of a letter written in 1607 by Sir Edward Hoby, whilst Ștefan Bogdan was in England, which mentioned the latter’s previous visit in the reign of Elizabeth I. This first visit of Ștefan Bogdan to London took place in 1601.

25. Demény and Cernovodeanu, *Relațiile Politice* etc. p 43-53.

26. Paul Cernovodeanu, *English Trade Policy in the Levant, 1660-74*, p 43.

27. Cernovodeanu, ‘Privilegiul comercial acordat Neguștorilor Englezi în Moldova la 1588’ in *Revista de Istorie* [1978] pp 1041-49

28. Cernovodeanu, *English Trade Policy*. p 58-61.

29. Demeny and Cernovodeanu, *Relațiile Politice*, p 44.

30. Cernovodeanu, *English Trade Policy*, pp 58-61.

31. Demény and Cernovodeanu, *Relațiile Politice*, p 20. The Muscovy

Company was formed in 1555 by Sebastian Cabot and various London Merchants who had been granted the monopoly of Anglo-Russian trade. It was the first English joint-stock company in which capital remained regularly in use. In 1553 Sir Hugh Willoughby and Richard Chancellor had sailed to seek out the North-East passage to China and the East Indies. Willoughby's ship had been lost but Chancellor reached Archangel on the White Sea and established trade links with Moscow. The Muscovy Company was formed to exploit these contacts and continue the search for the North-East passage. Exports to Russia included woollen cloth and mediterranean goods. English traders brought back hemp, wax tallow, cordage and other Russian products. Between 1557 and 1560 Anthony Jenkinson travelled from the White Sea to Moscow and then to the Caspian Sea and so to Bukhara, thus reaching the old East-West trade routes by a new way. Soon attempts to find a passage to China were replaced by efforts to divert the trade of the ancient silk-routes from their traditional outlets on the Black Sea to northern outlets on the White Sea. Thus when the Turkey Company was formed it found itself in competition with some of the aims of the Muscovy Company.

32. John Newberrie was a London merchant. Returning to England after a visit to the Holy Land he went from Constantinople into the Black Sea and shipped up the Danube. Disembarking he travelled through Wallachia and Moldavia to Poland. He wrote a description of his journey, mentioning local customs he had observed as well as some of the inhabitants of the principalities, he also described several towns visited in the course of his journey. Newberrie took the opportunity to trade the merchandise he had brought with him and in his account he described the various customs duties payable on goods. He also remarked that several times during the journey horses were stolen from his caravan. See *Purchas His Pilgrimes* [Hakluyt Society Publications] Vol. VIII, pp 449-50 and 476-81. Henry Austell left a short description of his journey through Moldavia, during which he visited Iasi, the capital, where he was given hospitality from the Prince at his Court and was given safe conduct. See Richard Hakluyt, *The Principall Navigations Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (henceforth will be written as Hakluyt, *Voyages*) [Glasgow 1904] Volume V, p 325.

33. 'The Privilege of Peter the Prince of Moldavia graunted to the English Merchants.' in Hakluyt, *Voyages* [Glasgow, 1904] Volume VI, pp 59-60.

34. Cernovodeanu, 'Privilegiul Comercial acordat Neguștorilor Englezi în Moldova la 1588.' in *Revista de Istorie* [1978], pp 1041-49.

35. Tappe, *Documents* no.64, Letter of Bartolomeo Brutti, Postelnic of Moldavia to Queen Elizabeth dated 1 June 1587.

36. Cernovodeanu, *English Trade Policy in the Levant*, pp 49-50.

37. *ibid.*, c.f. Cernovodeanu, 'England and the question of Free Trade in the Black Sea in the seventeenth century, A general survey' in *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* [1967], pp 15-22. Grand Dragoman of the Porte: a Dragoman was officially an interpreter. At the Ottoman Court, official business was conducted in Ottoman Turkish, an artificial language based on Turkish, Persian and Arabic. Officials at the Sultan's court did not usually learn foreign languages and employed interpreters to deal with the representatives of other rulers; Dragomans came to have a great deal of influence on foreign policy. The foreign embassies also employed Dragomans to conduct their business.

38. *English Trade Policy in the Levant 1660-1714* pp 47-52.

39. Tappe, *op. cit.*, no 208 Letter of John Sanderson to Nicholas Salter, dated 15 November 1600.

40. Tappe, *Documents* no.63 Letter of Giorgio Calvo Caressi to William Harborne dated 26 October 1585; no.64 Letter of Bartolomeo Brutti to Queen Elizabeth dated 1 June 1587; Petru Șchiopul, Prince of Moldavia [1574-77, 1578-79, 1583-91].

41. M. Maxim 'Ottoman Documents concerning the Wallachian Salt in the Ports on the Lower Danube in the second half of the Sixteenth Century' in *Revue des Etudes Sud-est Europeenes* Vol.XXVI (1988), p 122.

42. Cernovodeanu, 'Privilegiul Commercial acordat Neguștorilor englezi în Moldova la 1588 și Răsuretul său politic în anii Unirii Principatelor' in *Revista de Istorie* (1978), pp 1043-5.

43. Cernovodeanu, *English Trade Policy in the Levant*, pp 49-50.

44. Tappe, *Documents* no.123 Letter of Thomas Wilcox to Sir Thomas Heneage, dated Elbing 28 May 1595.

CHAPTER I THE PRINCIPALITY OF MOLDAVIA

1. Dennis Deletant, 'Moldavia between Hungary and Poland, 1347-1412' in *Slavonic and East European Review* Vol. 2, [1986] pp 189-211; E.H.Lewinski, *Political History of Poland*, [New York,1917] p 71.
2. Gibb, *Islamic Society and the West* Vol.I [London 1957], pp 101-2; Halil Inalcik, 'Ottoman methods of Conquest' in *Studia Islamica* Vol.II, [1954] pp 103-129.
3. Peter Sugar, *South Eastern Europe under Ottoman rule 1354-1804* [Washington, 1977] pp 113-132.
4. R.W. Seton Watson, *History of the Roumanians* [1934] p 50.
5. According to Mihai Maxim, no original texts of medieval agreements between the Ottomans and Moldavia exist. But there are references in other historical sources to the existence of ancient privileges. Dimitrie Cantemir, the 18th century Moldavian Prince and historian, stated that various treaties, diplomas etc. existed in the Public Archives of Moldavia. N.V. Repnin, who finalised the treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarca in 1774 on behalf of Russia, accepted that despite the non-existence of the original document, such treaties conformed with the payment of tribute and included the confirmation of ancient privileges. The Treaty of Adrianople (1829) recognised that Moldavia and Wallachia entered under Ottoman suzerainty following the issuing of Capitulations. At the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 when pressed by Poland to cede the principalities, the Ottomans replied that they could not do so because the Capitulations conferred only a right of suzerainty. Finally, Karl Marx pointed out that in accordance with the Ottoman theory of sovereignty, the Principalities could not become an object of mediation between the great powers because the Ottomans could not cede land over which they had no sovereignty. M. Maxim, 'Din nou pe urmele vechilor tratate ale Moldovei și Țării Românești cu Poarta Otomană' in *Revista de Istorie* [February 1987] pp 157-61.
6. D.E. Pitcher *An Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire*, [London 1968] p 109.
7. Sugar. *South Eastern Europe under Ottoman Rule* pp 113-132.
8. Halil Inalcik. 'Boghdan' in *New Encyclopaedia of Islam I*, (Ed. H.A.R. Gibb et al) [London, 1960] Volume I, p 1252, Tappe, *Documents* no.71. Letter of Edward Barton to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 12 June 1589;

see also Bogdan Murgescu, 'The Ottoman Military Demand and the Romanian Market, A Case Study 1672' in *Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Europeenes* Vol.XXVI (1988). pp 305-13.

9. Tappe, *Documents* no.92 Letter of Edward Barton to Lord Burghley dated 3 February 1594; Sugar, *South Eastern Europe under Ottoman Rule*, p113-132; M. Maxim, 'Ottoman Documents concerning the Wallachian Salt in the Ports on the Lower Danube in the second half of the Sixteenth Century' in *Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Europeenes* XXVI (1988), pp 113-122.

10. Sugar. *op. cit.*; R.W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p 60; Tappe, *Documents* no.69 Letter of Edward Barton to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 1 February 1589; no.75 Barton to Walsingham 7 February 1590. See also I. Caproșu, *O Istorie a Moldovei prin Relațiile de Credit pîna la Mijlocul secolului al XVIII-lea* [Iași, 1989]. Chapters I and III and Abstract pp 167-172.

11. Sugar, *op.cit.*; E.H.Lewinski, *Political History of Poland* [New York, 1917] pp 192-223.

12. Akerman:

“a castle of great importance as well for the strength as especially for the commodity of the Tatars to passe into Christendome, being the place of passage when they would forage into Poland, Bugdania, and by which the last yeare passed to go through the confines of Bugdania and Transylvania into Hungary; and is now possessed by Aron and the Tatars thereby hindered, if not of the commodity ,wholy to passe the river Nister [i.e. Dniester] yet of the facility and security to doe the same, being in that place moe commodious and secure for then than any other”

Tappe, *Documents* no.122 Letter of Barton to Burghley dated 24 May 1595.

13. Gibb, *Islamic Society and the West* Vol.I pp 9-10; Tappe, *op. cit.* no.123 Letter of Thomas Wilcox to Sir Thomas Heneage dated Elbing 28 May 1595.

14. Janissaries were Ottoman infantry and slaves to the Sultan. By the end of the sixteenth century they were the most important section of the standing army.

15. Gibb, *Islamic Society and the West* Vol.I pp 291-313.
16. Princes not of Romanian origin: Petru Cercel [Prince of Moldavia 1583-5] was suspected of being a Greek from the Morea although as we shall see in Chapter IV there is evidence to suggest that he was the son of Pătrașcu the Good [1554-7] as he claimed. Ștefan Bogdan's father Iancu Sasul (the Saxon) [1579-82] claimed to be the son of Petru Rareș although it was rumoured that he was the son of a Saxon businessman by a Romanian woman. He was said by contemporaries to be more German in speech and inclination than the Moldavian prince he claimed to be. Gaspar Gratiani [1619-20] was a *Morlahi* (a Vlach, or Latin speaker originating from Dalmatia) who was born in Croatia; he did not even claim to be a native Moldavian. A Pole was appointed Prince of Moldavia in 1626 and a Greek in 1630.
17. H Inalcik, 'Boghdan' in *New Encyclopaedia of Islam* Vol. I, p 1252; Tappe, *op. cit.* no.135 Letter of Edward Barton to Sir Thomas Heneage dated 22 November 1595. See also I Caproșu, *O Istorie a Moldovei prin Relațiile de Credit* p 170.
18. C. Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus* [New York University Press, 1972] p 134.
19. R.W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians* p 59-60; (ed. A. Otetea), *History of the Romanian People* [Bucharest, 1970] p 230. See also Caproșu, *op. cit.* pp 58-61.
20. V.Ciobanu, *Țările Române și Polonia Secolele XIV-XVI* [București, 1985] Resumé, pp 210-15.
21. "The term Bogdania or Bugdania appears to have been used in two senses firstly, for some portion of the modern Bessarabia, then a part of Moldavia and secondly, for the old province of Moldavia itself." see (ed.Lt.Col.Sir Richard Carnac Temple), *The Travels of Peter Mundy Volume I Europe 1608-1628* [Hakluyt Society Series II, Volume XVII,1907] p 51, note 2.
22. Tappe, *Documents* no.110, Letter from Barton to Lord Burghley dated 13th December 1594.
23. (ed.I.Corfus), *Documente Privitoare la Istorie României culese din arhivele Polone Secolului al XVI-lea.* [București, 1979] Volume I Document no.199 Instructions given to Stanislaw Golski, Castelan of Halici, Grand Envoy of the Polish King in Turkey dated 1597; *ibid.*

Secolului al VII-lea Volume II, Document no.27 Instructions from Cracow to the Nobleman Grigore Kochanski, Secretary of the Polish King in Turkey dated 29 April 1609; C.M.Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation*, p 235.

24. Mihai Viteazul in Wallachia and Stefan Răzvan in Moldavia.

25. Tappe, *Documents* no.134 Letter of Edward Barton to Lord Burghley dated 9 November 1595.

26. V.Ciobanu, *Țările Române și Polone Secolele XIV-XVI* p 210-15.

27. Tappe, *op. cit.* no.110 Barton to Burghley dated 13 December 1594.

28. C. Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism* p 8; Tappe, *op cit.*, no.110; *ibid.*, no 114 Letter of Barton to Lord Burghley dated 12 February 1595.

29. (ed. Corfus), *Documente... Polone* Volume I no 199 Instructions to the Castelan of Halici dated 1597; N Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland Volume I The Origins to 1795* [Clarendon Press, Oxford 1982] p 57.

30. Tappe, *Documents* no 72 Intelligence from Venice, J. Wrolle to Sir Francis Walsingham, dated 14 June 1589; no.92 Letter of Barton to Burghley 3 February 1594.

31. *ibid.* no.130 Letter of Barton to Burghley 4 October 1595.

32. *ibid.* no.135 Letter of Edward Barton to Sir Thomas Heneage dated 22 November 1595; no.140 The Sultan Mohammed III to Sigismund III, King of Poland dated February 1596. For a full treatment for this incident see Kortepeter, *op. cit.* pp 143-152, p181.

33. The Cossacks, who might be described as the Orthodox Christian equivalent of the Tatars, living by looting and plunder, were subjects of the King of Poland. See (ed Corfus), *Documente ... Polone* Vol.I no.187 Letter of Petru Schiopul to Stefan Bathory, King of Poland dated June 1584; no.199 Instructions to the Castelan of Halici dated 1597; *ibid. Sec.XVII* Vol.II, no 29 Instructions to Constantin Movila, Prince of Moldavia from the Polish Sejm dated 16 October 1611.

34. *ibid* Vol.I no 198 Inhabitants and nobles of Podolia to Jan Zamoyski dated Camenita 2 February 1594; c.f. no.199.

35. *ibid.* Volume II no.23 Instructions to Adam Stadnicki of Zmigrod, Castellan of Premysyl, Polish Envoy in Turkey dated 3 April 1606.
36. Tappe, *Documents* no 108, Letter of Edward Barton to Lord Burghley dated 14 July 1594.
37. *ibid.*no 198 Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 29 May 1600.
38. *ibid.*, no.218 Lello to Cecil dated 24 October 1601; C. Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism* p 181. The Movila were of royal blood (but not directly descended through the male line; they were a powerful Moldavian noble family. The Polish connection continued in the seventeenth century with Piotr Mohyla (1596-1647) the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev who was the nephew of Ieremie. In 1632 he founded the Mohyla Academy, which swiftly became an outstanding centre of Orthodox learning; see Davies, *God's Playground*, p 175; also H.F. Graham 'Peter Mogila, Metropolitan of Kiev' in *Russian Review* (XVI 4) [1955], pp 345-356.
39. *Documente... Polone op.cit.* Vol.I no.197 Jan Zamoyski to Ieronim Doliva Rozrazewski, Bishop of Cuiava dated 12 January 1594; Tappe, *Documents* no205 Letter of Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 4 October 1600.
40. *Documente... Polone* Vol.II no 29.
41. V.J.Parry, 'The Ottoman Empire 1566-1617' in *New Cambridge Modern History Vol.III The Counter-Reformation and Price Revolution 1559-1610* [Cambridge 1968] p 362.

CHAPTER II THE ENGLISH EMBASSY AT CONSTANTINOPLE

1. Edward Osborne: a member of the Clothworkers' Company, succeeded to his wealthy father-in-law's estates and business. He was prominent in the Spanish trade and also the Eastland Company trading in the Baltic, before establishing the Levant Company. He was Lord Mayor of London in 1584 and a member of Parliament, he also achieved a Knighthood, see *Dictionary of National Biography* (ed. Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee), [Oxford University Press, since 1917] Vol.XIV, pp 1178-9.

Richard Staper: Active in the Spanish trade, and the Barbary Company

and helped to lay the foundations of trade to India and the Far East; he was also involved in trade to Brazil. Staper died in 1608, his epitaph in St.Helen's Church Bishopsgate described him as the greatest merchant of his time and the chief actor in the discovery of trade to Turkey and East India. See A.C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* [Oxford 1964] p 7.

2. A.C. Wood, *op. cit.*, pp 3-6.

3. Christopher Marlowe, *Tamburlane*; Kyd, *Suleiman the Magnificent and the Fall of Rhodes*

4. M. Epstein, *The Early History of the Levant Company* [London, 1908] pp 1-19, 239-245; 'Anthony Jenkinson (d.1611)' in *Dictionary of National Biography* Vol.X pp 744-6; 'The safeconduct or privilege given by Sultan Solyman the Great Turke, to Master Anthony Jenkinson at Aleppo in Syria, in the year 1553' in Hakluyt, *Voyages* Vol.V p 109; see 'A compendious and brief declaration of the Journey of M. Anthony Jenkinson' in Hakluyt, *op. cit.*, Vol.III, pp 15-38; Halil Inalcik, 'Imtiyazat' in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* [Second edition, 1960] Volume III, p 1184.

5. 'The renewing and increasing of an ancient and commodious trade unto divers places in the Levant Seas. by the means of Sir Edward Osborne, Alderman and M. Richard Staper marchant of London' and 'The letters sent from the Imperial Musulmanlike highnesse of Zuldan Murad Can, to the sacred regal Majestie of Elizabeth Queene of England, the fifteenth of March 1579, conteyning the grant of the first privileges' in Hakluyt, *Voyages* Vol.V p167-9; 'The answer of her Majestie to the aforesaid Letters of the Great Turke, sent the 25 of October 1579...' in *op. cit.*, p 175; 'The Charter of the privileges granted to the English and the league of the great Turke with the Queenes Majestie in respect of traffique, dated in June 1580' in *op. cit.*, p 178. See also S.A. Skilliter, *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey 1578-1582* [Oxford,1977] pp 7-12; p 23.

In 1557 Anthony Jenkinson was sent as agent of the Muscovy Company to Moscow for three years thus he presumably did not take full advantage of the Sultan's trading privileges granted to him. Perhaps his departure from Constantinople contributed to the decline of the English trade alluded to by Hakluyt. Jenkinson undertook several journeys to Russia on behalf of Queen Elizabeth and the Muscovy Company and was very active in trying to open a trade with Persia; see (ed. E.A. Bond) *Russia at the close of the sixteenth century* [Hakluyt Society Publications Vol.20, London, 1856] pp iii-iv, xiv, xx-xxv, xxx; pp 173, 180; (ed.G.Delmar Morgan and C.H. Coote), *Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and*

Persia by Anthony Jenkinson and other Englishmen [Hakluyt Society Publications Vols.72-3, London 1886], *passim*.

6. A. C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* p 8; c.f. A.L. Hornicker, 'William Harborne and the beginning of Anglo-Turkish diplomatic and commercial relations' in *Journal of Modern History* Volume XIV [1942] pp 286-316. For William Harborne see Institute of Historical Research, London, *Corrections and Additions to the Dictionary of National Biography* [Boston, Massachusetts, 1966] pp 97-8.

The capitulations allowed for English merchants to travel unhindered by land or sea in the Sultan's dominions; to buy and sell provided they paid the lawful customs of the Ottoman Empire and to observe the laws and customs of their own country. Any Englishman imprisoned in the course of his dealings was to be set free immediately. English ships were permitted to arrive at and depart from Ottoman ports and purchase victuals for their crew without impediment. Ottoman subjects were to give aid to English ships during storms or when shipwrecked, and any goods recovered were to be returned to their owners. No Englishman was to be arrested for the crime or debt of another unless he had stood surety. Any English subject who died in the Sultan's dominions was to have his will respected. Disputes between English parties were to be settled by their own Consul according to English law or custom. English merchants were not liable to pay Ottoman poll-tax; any who were enslaved were to be released immediately, provided that if they were sold the purchase price was restored to the buyer, see 'The interpretation of the letters and privileges of the most mightie and musulmanlike Emperour Murad Can granted at the request of Elizabeth. of England, France and Ireland Queene confirming the peace and league betwixt the said princes and their subjects' in Hakluyt, *Voyages V*, pp 183-189.

Halil Inalcik has argued that the French capitulations in fact dated from 1569 not 1536. Sultan Selim I confirmed the capitulations given by Mamluk Sultan to the Consul of the Catalans and French in 1517. Suleyman I renewed them at his accession to the throne. The capitulations which were negotiated between Ibrahim Pasha, Grand Vizier, and Jean de la Forst, Francis I's Envoy to the Sultan in 1536, were never confirmed by him. So there were no capitulations of 1536. The first Ottoman capitulations granted to the French were concluded in 1569; see Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire* [London 1973] p 228, Note 1.

7. (ed. R.B. Wernham MA), *Calendar of State Papers: Foreign 1589* [1950], p 112 Letter of William Harborne to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 17 February 1589.

8. A. C. Wood, *op. cit.* p 11; 'The Letters Patent or privileges granted by her Majesty to Sir Edward Osborne, Master Richard Staper and certain other Marchants of London for their trade into the dominions of the Great Turke 11 September 1581' in Hakluyt, *Vovages* Vol.V, pp 192-202.

9. "A Consideration of trade into Turkey 1580, by Mr.Secretary Walsingham" in (ed.R.Lemon), *Calendar of State Papers: Domestic. Elizabeth 1547-1580* [1850] Vol.144, Document no.70; also contained in Epstein,*The Early History of the Levant Company* Appendix VIII no.2 p248.

10. A. L. Horniker, 'William Harborne and the beginning of Anglo-Turkish diplomatic and commercial relations' in *Journal of Modern History* [1942] p 289.

11. *ibid.* pp 302-3.

12. (ed.Horatio Brown), *Calendar of State Papers: Venetian 1603-1607* [1900] Document 91, Letter of Giovanni Scaramelli, Venetian Secretary in England to the Doge and Senate dated 10 July 1603:

"That Company alone and its sole charges maintained the English Ambassador in Constantinople, the Crown contibuting nothing but credentials "

See also (ed. R.Lemon), *Calendar of State Papers: Domestic 1581-1590* (henceforth will be written as *Cal.S.P. Dom*) [1865] Vol.CLI, p37, no.33, Memo of Edward Osborne, Richard Staper and William Harborne on the Levant Company dated ?1581.

13. *Cal.S.P. Dom.* 1595-97 [1869], Vol.CCLIII (p 102) no.118. Declaration of the charges of establishing and continuing the Turkey trade dated September? 1595.

14. A. C. Wood, *History of the Levant Company* p 13; William Harborne's Commission and letters of recommendation to the Sultan, Hakluyt, *Voyages* Vol.V., pp221-8; R.Mantran, 'Foreign Merchants and the Minorities in Istanbul during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries' in (ed. B.Braude and B.Lewis), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire Volume I The Central Lands* [1982], pp 129-32.

15. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1592-1603*, no.959 Letter of Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate dated 20 February 1601; see also H.Inalcik,'Imtiyazat'

in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* Vol III, p 1184.

16. *ibid.* no.950 Letter of Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate dated 21 January 1601.

17. *ibid.*; for the *Diwan-i Humayun* see 'Diwan' in *New Encyclopaedia of Islam* Volume 2 [1965] pp337-9.

18. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1592-1603*, no. 224, Matheo Zane, Venetian Ambassador to the Doge and Senate dated 15 October 1593. There is some ambiguity in the fact that in Harborne's original commission the word Ambassador is not used, although in his letters of credence he is expressly referred to by that title. It was possible that the title was avoided until precedent had been firmly established that the Company was responsible for his payment. Royal Ambassadors were normally reimbursed by the Crown.

19. *Cal. S.P. Venetian 1581-91* p xxxviii, p 192.

20. "A consideration of trade into Turkey..." in Epstein, *Early History of the Levant Company* pp 145-51; Skilliter, *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey*, pp 23-7.

21. *ibid.* p 246.

22. *S.P. 97/1* f 114 An undated letter from the period between 1580 and 1582.

23. Sir C.Petrie, *Earlier Diplomatic History 1492-1713* [London 1949] pp 204-5.

24. Edwin Pears, 'The Spanish Armada and the Ottoman Empire' in *English Historical Review* Vol.8 [1893] pp 439-66; A.L.Horniker, 'William Harborne and the beginning of Anglo-Turkish diplomatic and commercial relations' *op. cit.*, p 306.

25. E.Pears, 'The Spanish Armada and the Ottoman Empire' *op. cit.*

26. (ed.R.B.Wernham), *Cal.S.P. Foreign (1589)* [1950], pp 87-9, Letter of Edward Barton to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 1 February 1589.

27. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1603-7* Letter of Octavio Bon, Venetian Ambassador at Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 1 February 1606.

28. A. L. Horniker, *op. cit.* p 30.

29. *Cal. S. P Foreign (1589)* p 348 Letter of Edward Barton dated 27 June 1589; *ibid.*, p 112 Letter of William Harborne to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 17 February 1589; see also 'The Interpretation of the Grand Turkes letter to Queen Elizabeth, Constantinople dated 12 June 1590' in *Travels of John Sanderson* (henceforth will be referred to as: Sanderson, *Travels*) [Hakluyt Society series II, vol. LXVII] p 279

30. Sanderson, *Travels* p 61.

31. 'Interpretation of the Grand Turkes letter...' in Sanderson, *Travels* p 279; 'The letters of Sinan Bassa cheife counsellour to Sultan Murad Can the Grand Signior, to the sacred Majestie of Elizabeth Queene of England, shewing that upon her request, and for her sake especially, hee graunted peace unto the King and Kingdome of Poland' [June 1590] in Hakluyt, *Vovages* Vol. VI, p69.

32. C. Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus* [New York, 1972] p134; Tappe, *Documents* No.85 Letter of G.Gifforde dated 8 February 1592.

33. 'The Journey of Edward Barton Esquire, her Majesties Ambassador with the Grand Signor, otherwise called the Grand Turke, in Constantinople, Sultan Mahumut Chan. Written by Sir Thomas Glover, then Secretarie to the Ambassador and since employed in that Honourable Function by his Majestie, to Sultan Achmet.1596' in *Purchas His Pilgrimes* Vol.VIII Chapter X p304-21; see also Sanderson, *Travels* Introduction p xix:

"The campaign lasted six months and had an indeterminate ending, for although the fortified town of Erlan was captured by the Sultan's forces, in a later battle with the Imperial troops the Turks sustained severe losses and narrowly escaped defeat. Mehmet returned to his capital in January 1597 accompanied by Barton"

see (ed. J.T. Bent), *Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant* [Hakluyt Society 1892] Introduction p xi Sultan Mehemet III wrote to Queen Elizabeth I in 1598 concerning Edward Barton:

"he having been enjoined by us to follow our Imperial camp without having been enabled previously to obtain your Highness's permission to go with my Imperial staff, we have reason to be

satisfied, and to hope that also you Highness will know how to appreciate the services he has thus rendered to us in our Imperial camp.”

For the background to Barton's attendance of the Sultan see Paul Cernovodeanu, 'An English diplomat at war: Edward Barton's attendance of the Ottoman campaign in Central Europe' in *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* Vol. XXVIII [1989], pp 429-49. See also *Cal S. P. Venetian 1592-1603* no. 524 Letter of Marco Venier, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 24 Dec 1596.

34. *Cal. S. P. Venetian 1592-1603* no.655 Letter of Girolamo Capello to the Doge and Senate dated 28 January 1598; *The Fugger Newsletters 1568-1603* [Second Series] Letter no.617 'Overtures for peace between Turkey and the Empire' dated Gran 1 February 1598.

35. *Cal. S.P. Venetian 1592-1603* no.1055 Letter of Agostino Nani, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate dated 13 February 1602.

36. *ibid.*, no.806 Letter of Girolamo Capello, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople dated 21 August 1599.

37. *Cal. S. P. Venetian (1603-7)* no.175 Letter of Nicolo Molin, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate dated 25 December 1603.

38. *ibid.*, no.654 Letter of Nicolo Molin to the Doge and Senate dated 3 January 1606.

39. *ibid.*, no.739 (p519) 'Report on England presented to the Government of Venice by Nicolo Molin, Ambassador there' dated 1607.

40. *S.P. 97/5*, f 24 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 28 July 1605.

41. *Cal. S.P. Venetian 1592-1603* no.950, Letter of Agostino Nani, Venetian, Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 21 January 1601.

42. *Cal. S. P. Venetian 1603-7*, no.77 Letter of Ottavio Bon, Venetian Ambassador at Constantinople dated 24 February 1609.

43. *Cal. S. P. Venetian 1607-10*, no.447 Letter of Simon Contarini,

Venetian Ambassador at Constantinople dated 24 February 1609.

44. A.C.Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* pp 87-88.

45. *Cal. S.P. Foreign (1589)*, p 112 Letter of William Harborne to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 17 February 1589; *ibid.*, p 348 Letter of Edward Barton to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 27 June 1589.

46. *S.P. 97/4*, f 231 Henry Lello to the King dated 12 November 1603.

47. *ibid.*, also f 224 Letter of Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 4 June 1603.

48. *S.P. 97/5*, f 66 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 12 June 1606; *ibid.*, f 76 James I to Sultan Ahmet dated 16 August 1606.

49. *S.P. 105/110*, f 57 Letter of the Levant Company to Paul Pindar dated 27 November 1611.

50. A.C. Wood, *History of the Levant Company* p 84. Eyre, the Agent remained at Constantinople for one and a half years until the Embassy was revived.

51. Wood, *op. cit.*, pp 225-7; see *Cal. S.P. Venetian* no.821 Letter of Girolamo Capello, Venetian Ambassador at Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated October 1599. Capello reported that an ignorant Dragoman had allegedly misinterpreted one of Lello's statements and caused a great deal of trouble with the Vizier; c.f. *Cal.S. P. Venetian 1592-1603* no.89, Letter of Matheo Zane, Venetian Ambassador to the Doge and Senate dated 10 July 1592; no.950 Letter of Agostino Nani, Venetian Ambassador at Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 1 January 1601:

“had commisioned... [Borisi] to find out whether the English Ambassador had really presented his memorial to the Sultan when he was at the Kiosk.”

Borisi had the necessary information.

52. *H.M.C. 9 Salisbury XXIV addenda (1605-1668)*, p 23 Gaspar Gratiani to the Earl of Salisbury undated but before 26 June 1605; see also Richard Knolles, *Generall History of the Turkes* [London, 1621] p 1361; William Lithgow, *Rare Adventures* [London, 1614] p 239; Thomas Gainsford, *Glorie of England* [London, 1618] p 192; ‘Record of a bargain

heretofore made to Sir Paul Pindar, sometime Ambassador resident at this Porte by the Prince of Moldavia' dated 13 February 1619 in *S.P. 105/109 Journal of Affairs during Sir Thos Roe's Embassy* entry dated August 1622'.

53. *S.P. 101/94*, f 220 Newsletter from Constantinople dated 30 September 1623:

"The Vizier sent solemnly to the 4 resident Ambrs. to borrow 30,000 chequins, as the friends and allies of the Port, to whom in confidence they durst open their secrets."

In 1601 Henry Lello was in such bad favour that his only direct source of information from the Ottoman court was the 'Chief Gardner' see *Cal. S.P. Venetian 1592-1603*, no.950 Letter of Agostino Nani, Venetian Ambassador at Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 1 January 1601.

54. *S.P. 101/94*, f 218 Newsletter from Constantinople dated 14 December 1622.

55. *ibid.*, f 201 Newsletter from Constantinople dated 24th March 1614.

56. Ottoman Turkish was the artificial court language of the Ottoman State. It was a mixture of Turkish, (a Turkic language); Persian (an Indo-European language) and Arabic (a Semitic language) and therefore somewhat complicated to master.

57. This will be discussed concerning Henry Lello and Sir Thomas Glover in Chapters III and VII.

58. *SP. 97 /4*, f 231 Letter from Henry Lello to the King dated 12 November 1603. The Ottomans:

"supposing the same to be done by sufferance, or order as not regarding their friendship...wch report will not be removed out of their heads wthout your Majesties royall letters."

59. *S.P. 105/109* f 33 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to Sir Thomas Lowe, Governor of the Levant Company dated 17th July 1608. Glover complained that his letters had not been answered when their business required "speedie answer".

Sir Thomas Lowe: Governor of the Levant Company from 1605 until his

death on 11 April 1623 .He was a prominent London merchant, an alderman from 1594, Sheriff in 1595-6 and Lord Mayor of London in 1604-5. He was seven times Master of the Haberdashers' Company and he represented London in Parliament for many years. From Sanderson, *Travels*, p 241

60. *Cal.S. P. Venetian 1592-1603*, No. 950 Letter of Agostino Nani, Venetian Ambassador to the Doge and Senate dated 21 January 1601. Lello said that his letters had been excessively delayed by way of Venice.

A table showing examples of the travelling times of letters from London to Constantinople, or *vice versa*.

A table showing examples of the travelling times of letters from London to Constantinople, or vice versa.				
LETTER	FROM/TO	DATE SENT	DATE RECEIVED	NO. OF DAYS
SP 97 4 f162	Lello to Cecil	2 March 1602	21 July 1602	111
SP 105 110 f4	Levant Co. to Pindar	17 Dec. 1606	before 27 Feb 1607	c.72
SP 105 110 f11	Levant Co. to Glover	16 Apr. 1607	before 20 June 1607	c.65
BM.La.241 f250	Glover to Sanderson	2 Apr. 1610	7 August. 1610	76
SP 105 110 f47	Levant Co. to Glover	14 Jul. 1610	19 Sept. 1610	67
SP 105 110 f52	Levant Co. to Glover	29 Dec. 1610	29 Mar. 1611	157
SP 105 110 f59	Levant Co. to Pindar	1 Mar 1612	c 29 Apr 1612	c.60

61. *Cal. S.P. Foreign (1589)* p 348 Letter of Edward Barton dated 27 June 1589. Barton wrote that he had been wont to write double copies every fourteen days and at the end of every month to send copies of the previous fortnight's letters. He had sent letters overland concerning recent occurrences dated 27 June 1589 and annexed copies of them to this letter. This is a specific example but this method is evident throughout the correspondence in the State Papers.

62. *S. P. 105/109* f 33 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to Sir Thomas Lowe dated 17 July 1608.

63 . 'Dallam's Voyage' in *Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant*

[Hakluyt Society 1893] ppl-99.

64. *S.P. 99/5* [Venice] f 8 Letter of Sir Henry Wotton to the Earl of Salisbury dated 15 January 1608; c.f. *S. P. 99/8*, f 225 Letter of Sir Dudley Carleton to the Earl of Salisbury dated 1 November 1611.

65. *Cal. S. P. Foreign (1589)*, p348 Letter of Edward Barton dated 27 June 1589; Tappe, *Documents* no.86 "Concerning Thomas Wilcocks travelling via Moldavia to England to clear Barton's name and his own against wicked and malicious rumours" dated 26 August 1592; c.f. "A letter from the Sultan and Sultana sent via Moldavia and Poland to England with Edward Bushell and William Aldridge in 1595" in Hakluyt, *Voyages* Vol.IV pp 94-113.

66 A.C.Wood, *A History of the Levant Company*, p 221.

67. The Secretary at first was not paid by the Company; see Sanderson, *Travels* p 219 Letter of Henry Lello to the Levant Company dated May 1601:

"Whereas Thomas Glover had supplied the place of Paul Pinder ever since his departure from hence, and for his wages and stipend I have not allowed him anything, depending upon your Worship's orders herin. whereunto no answer hath been given."

Lello had to pay Glover maintenance money out of the Company treasury to keep him in a manner similar to other Ambassador's secretaries. Glover was a very competent secretary and gave good service. Lello therefore decided to give him 100 *zecchini* from the Treasury and thereafter 200 *zecchini* a year from January 1606.

68. 'Part of a letter from Syria and Aleppo by William Biddulph' in *Purchas His Pilgrimes* Vol VIII [1905] pp 248-304, esp. p 259.

69. H.G.Rawlinson 'The Embassy of William Harborne to Constantinople 1583-88' in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* (4th series) Vol.V [1921] pp 1-27.

70. *Cal. S. P. Venetian 1603-7*, No.190 Letter of Nicolo Molin, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 18 February 1604. When the Company dissolved itself in 1604, complaining that it could no longer afford 4000 pounds a year, King James took it upon himself to levy the tax on currants.

71. Rawlinson, *op. cit.* p 15.

72. *Cal.S.P. Foreign (1589)*, p350 Letter of Barton to Walsingham dated 29 June 1589.

73. 'Dallam's Voyage' in *Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant*, p 80.

74. *ibid.*, p 66. Dallam was allowed into the Sultan's presence. Lello, on hearing this remarked that if he had known he would have paid out 30 or 40 pounds in suitable apparel for him.

75. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 242 Letter of John Kitley, the Ambassador's physician at Constantinople, to John Sanderson in London dated November 1607.

76. *S.P. 97/5*, f 156 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 2 May 1607.

77. *Dallam's Voyage*, pp 64-5.

78. *Cal.S.P. Venetian (1583 addenda)*, no.733 Dated April 1583. Harborne presented gifts to the Sultan and his officers with a total cost as follows:

	pounds	s	d
Sultan	914	2	10
Vizier	205	10	1
Admiral of the Fleet	155	11	2
Janissary Aga	107	7	6
3 Pashas	88	7	6 each
Dragoman	50	5	0
<hr/>			
Total	1,913	19	1

79. *Dallam's Voyage* Introduction p x.

80. *Cal. S.P. Venetian 1592-1603*, no.814 Letter of Girolamo Capello to Doge and Senate dated 18 September 1599:

"The present consists of an organ very cunningly designed, which serves as a clock and can play several airs of itself, of a carriage and fittings for the Sultana, of some silver vases and many suits of cloth which they say are all mouldy and ruined."

On another occasion Glover reported that the Sultan was very pleased with a gift which he presented:

“Casting his greedie eye being overwhelmed with the earnest desire thereof.”

See *S. P. 97/5*, f 92 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 14 January 1607; also ‘Edward Barton’ in *Corrections and Additions to the Dictionary of National Biography*, p 19; ‘A description of a voyage to Constantinople and Syria begun the 21 of March 1593 and ended the 9 of August, wherein is shewed the order of delivering the second present by Master Edward Barton, her Majesties Ambassador, which was sent from her Majestie to Sultan Murad Can, Emperour of Turkie.’ in Hakluyt, *Voyages* Vol.VI pp 94-113; see also *Dallam’s Voyage op. cit* pp xv-xix.

81. *S.P.97/5*, f 102 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 14 February 1607.

82. *Dallam’s Voyage*, p 64.

83. *ibid.*

84. *Cal. S. P. Venetian 1592-1603* no.806 Letter of Girolamo Capello to the Doge and Senate dated 21 August 1599.

85. *ibid.*, no.825 Girolamo Capello to the Doge and Senate dated 30 October 1599.

86. *S.P. 97/3*, f 271 Letter of Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 3 September 1598.

87. *ibid.*, f 245 Letter of Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 3 June 1598.

The “ould Empress” is the Queen Mother, Sultana Valide, a Venetian by birth, enslaved to the Sultan Murat III when young and became his wife. She was an extremely powerful influence over both her husband and her son. c.f. *Cal. S. P. Venetian 1592-1603* no.950 Letter of Agostino Nani dated 21 January 1601, concerning the intrigues of the Sultana and the Chief Eunuch:

“owing to their secret influence with the Grand Vizier, everything is arranged to suit them.”

88. C. Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation*, p 219

89. *S.P. 97/3*, f 271 Letter of Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 3 December 1598.

90. *Dallam's Voyage*, p 63.

91. Tappe, *Documents* no.74 Edward Barton to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 16 October 1589. Also in pursuing the cause of Stefan Bogdan, Glover complained that he had not received an answer to his queries concerning the money to "gratify the Sultan's officers who were supporting the business of the Prince of Moldavia and held out great hope of success in the matter". See *S. P. 97/5*, f 286 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 15 October 1608.

92. E. Pears, 'The Spanish Armada and the Ottoman Empire' in *English Historical Review* (8) [1893] pp 439-66; c.f. *Cal. S. P. Foreign (1589)* p348. Letter of Edward Barton dated 27 June 1589 in which Barton stated that the Spanish had spent 300,000 ducats a year in bribes.

93. Sanderson, *Travels*, pp 85-6. Spahies were Ottoman cavalry who held the use of land direct from the Sultan in return for military service.

94. 'News from Turkie; or a true relation of the passages of the right honourable Sir Thomas Bendysh, baronet, Lord Ambassador with the Grand Seigneur at Constantinople, his entertainments and reception there. Also a true discourse of the unjust proceedings of Sir Sackville Crow, former Ambassador there, against the English merchants, his contest with the present Lord Ambassador, and Sir Sackville's imprisonment, and in his return his betraying of the Captain of the ship and some English merchants at Alicant in Spain, to the Inquisition, lastly his commitment to the Tower of London where he is now.' in *The Thomason Tracts*, British Library Printed Books E358. Bendysh's private papers are in the Essex County Record Office, Chelmsford.

95. Sanderson, *Travels* p 61: the "Hoggie" was the famous Ottoman historian *Khoja Efendi sa'd al-Din* who held the post of Imperial tutor (*Khoja-i sultani*) to both Murad III and Mehemet III.

96. *Dallam's Voyage* p 63.

97. *S. P. 101/94* f 199 Newsletter from Constantinople dated 8 Oct. 1614.

98. A.C.Wood, *History of the Levant Company* p 230.
99. *Dallam's Voyage*, p 72.
100. A.C. Wood, *op. cit.* p 230.
101. *Cal S.P. Venetian 1592-1603*, no.960 Letter of Agostino Nani, Venetian Ambassador to the Doge and Senate dated 20 February 1601.
102. *ibid.* no. 925, Letter of Girolamo Capello, Venetian Ambassador to the Doge and Senate dated 30 October 1599.
103. *ibid.*, no 890,Capello to the Doge and Senate dated 17 June 1600
104. *ibid.*, no.806, *ibid.* to *ibid.* dated 21 August 1599.
- 105.*ibid.* no.950, Letter of Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate dated 21 January 1601.
106. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 242,Letter of John Kitley in Constantinople to John Sanderson dated November 1607.
107. *Cal.S P. Venetian 1607-10*, no.609 Letter of Simon Contarini to the Doge and Senate dated 5 September 1609.
108. A.C.Wood, *History of the Levant Company*, p 82; the use of allusions to pigs in order to insult has already been mentioned.
109. 'Bendish of Steeple Bumstead' in *Burke's Extinct and Dormant Baronetcies* (ed.J.Burke and J B Burke) (2nd edition) [1838] pp 55-6 the baronetcies were created 29 June 1611.
110. *S.P. 101/94* f 189, Newsletter from Constantinople dated 3 February 1614; *ibid.* f 218 Newsletter dated 14 December 1622.
111. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1592-1603*, no.959 Letter of Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate dated 20 February 1601.
112. *ibid.*, no.950 Letter of Agostino Nani to the Doge and Senate dated 21 January 1601.
- 113.*ibid.*

CHAPTER III BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF ENGLISH AMBASSADORS

1. (ed.Foster), *Glover's Visitation of Yorkshire* [1875] p 5.
2. 'A survey of the Condition of Europe at the End of the 16th Century. Being unpublished Chapters of Fynes Moryson's Itinerary (1617)' in *Shakespeare's Europe* (ed. Charles Hughes), [New York 1967], p 24; (ed. S.C.Lomas), *Calendar of State Papers Foreign Series 1584-5*, [1916] p 168; Sanderson, *Travels* p 126.
3. 'Letter of the English Ambassador to Edward Barton dated 1584; The Commandments obtained of the Grand Signior by her Majesties ambassador Mr.William Harborne for the quiet passing of her subjects to and from his dominions, sent in An. 1584 to the Viceroyes of Algiers, Tunis and Tripolis in Barbary' in Hakluyt, *Voyages* [Glasgow, 1904] Volume V pp. 275-285.
- 4 'A voyage made to Tripolis in Barbarie in the yeere 1583 with a ship called the Jesus...' in Hakluyt, *Voyages*, Volume V p 306; 'The Turkes letter to the King of Tripolis in Barbary commanding the restoration of an English ship called the Jesus...' in Hakluyt, *op. cit.*, p 314-5
5. *ibid.*
6. (ed. C.Hughes), *Shakespeare's Europe*, pp 28, 30.
7. Sanderson, (*Travels*) p 10; R Mantran, 'Foreign Merchants and the Minorities in Istanbul during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire Volume I The Central Lands* [1982] pp 127-135.
8. A.C.Wood, *History of the Levant Company* [Oxford, 1936] pp 240-45.
9. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 10; *Cal. S.P. Venetian 1592-1603*, no. 289 Letter of Marco Venier, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 20 June 1594..
10. 'Edward Barton' in *Corrections and Additions to the Dictionary of National Biography cumulated from the Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research covering years 1923-63* (Institute of Historical

Research) [Boston, Massachusetts, 1966], p 19. In 1607 one Mustapha, who was pretending to be an envoy of the Sultan, reminded the English court how in 1596:

“Mr.Barton was in the army when Raabalies Suverin was won from the Christians.”

(ed.Sir Henry Ellis), *Original Letters Illustrative of English History* [London, 1846] Volume III p87; This refers to Barton's accompaniment to the seige of Agria, (Eger,or Erlau) for a full account of which see Paul Cernovodeanu, 'An English diplomat at war: Edward Barton's attendance of the Ottoman campaign in Central Europe (1596)' in *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* Volume XXVIII [1989] p 429-449; c.f. (ed.C. Hughes), *Shakespeare's Europe* p 29; Fynes Moryson wrote that on the return of the Sultan's army from the campaign:

“Mr.Barton being to goe to his house, the Emperor [i.e. the Sultan] stayd on horseback till he came to kiss the hem of his garment, and till he retourned to his horse and was mounted,at which time he answered his wonted reverence with bowing of his body, and so rode into the Citty, not without the wonder of all his army, that he should do such honor to a dog (for so they call and esteem all Christians).”

11. *Shakepeare's Europe*, (ed.C.Hughes), p 29; see 'The journey of Edward Barton Esquire, her Majesties Ambassador with the Grand Signior, otherwise called the Great Turke in Constantinople, Sultan Muhamet Chan, written by Sir Thomas Glover, then secretarie to the Ambassador and since employed in that Honourable function by his Majestie to Sultan Achmet, etc.' in *Purchas His Pilgrimes* Volume VIII esp. pp 307, 314-16.

12. *Shakespeare's Europe* p 29.

13. *ibid.*; 'Part of a letter of William Biddulph from Aleppo dated 1600' in *Purchas His Pilg rimes* VIII pp259-60.

14. *ibid.*; also *Purchas His Pilgimes* Volume IX p 484-5.

15. *ibid.* Volume VIII p 259, 'Part of a letter of Master William Biddulph etc.'; Volume IX p 484-5.

16. *Shakespeare's Europe* p 30-1.

17. *ibid.*, p 28.

18. 'A description of a voyage to Constantinople and Syria, begun the 21 of March 1593 and ended the 9 of February 1595 wherein is shewed the order of delivery of the second present by Master Edward Barton her Majesties Ambassador, which was sent from her Majestie to Sultan Murat Can, Emperour of Turkie.' in Hakluyt, *Voyages* Volume VI, p 96-7.

19. Sanderson, *Travels* p 10; *ibid.* p 149 Letter of John Sanderson to Thomas Cordell dated June 1596; *ibid.* p 159 Letter of John Sanderson to the Levant Company dated 25 September 1596; c.f. *Cal.S.P. Domestic 1591-94*, p 89, Notes by Lord Burghley, dated 14 August 1591. *Cal. S.P. Venetian 1592-1603*, no. 276 Letter of Marco Venier, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 4 May 1594.

20. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 281 'Inventory of Edward Barton's property at his death'. Barton was admitted to membership of the Levant Company in January 1592.

21. *ibid.*, p 175 Letter of Elizeus Sotheren at Aleppo to John Sanderson dated 21 March 1598; p 174, Letter of Henry Lello to John Sanderson and Anthony Marlow dated 15 February 1598; c.f. 'Edward Barton' in *Dictionary of National Biography* p 1263; and entry in the *Corrections to the Dictionary of National Biography* . p 19.

22. 'Letter of Master William Biddulph from Syria and Aleppo.' in *Purchas His Pilgrimes* Vol.VIII, pp 259-60:

"[Barton]...for his wisdome,good government,policie and Christian carriage, hath left an immortal fame behind him in those countries to this present day and hath buried at an lland of the Greekes,within twelve miles of Constantinople, called Barton's lland to this day.";

Purchas His Pilgrimes Vol.IX p435. The Latin Inscition on Barton's grave was inscribed as follows:

"Eduardo Barton, Illustrisimo Serenissimae Angolorum Reginae Oratori, viro praestantissimo, qui post reditum a bello Ungarico, quo cum invicto Turcor imperatore profectus fuerat, diem obiit pietatis ergo, aetatis anno XXXV, Sal vero MDXCVII XVIII Kal Jamar."

in *B.M. Add.Mss 22914* f20-21, 'Dr. John Covel's Diary 16 February 1667-7 Our Voyage to Nicomedia. Nicaea etc'. also published in 'The Diary of John Covel' in *Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant* [Hakluyt Society Publications Volume 87, 1892] p 282.

According E.S. de Beer all the published versions of this epitaph are inaccurate, see *Corrections and Additions to the Dictionary of National Biography* p 20.

23. Patent Rolls 43 Elizabeth I part V in *Select Charters of Trading Companies 1530-1707* (ed.C T Carr), [Selden Society Publications, Vol 28 [1913] p 31.Lillo is an alternative spelling of Lello.

24. T. K.Rabb, *Enterprise and Empire: Merchants and Gentry Investment in the Expansion of England.1575-1630* [Harvard 1967] p 334.

25 'Letter of William Biddulph...' in *Purchas His Pilgrimes* Vol.VIII p 259-61; Lello also acquired the skills of a horseman, see Sanderson, *Travels* p14 Sanderson, *Travels* p 237, Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 18 May 1607:

"The Christian Ambassadors they no doubt toke him for an angel, by his excellent discourse in Italian."

26. *ibid.* p 166-7 Letter of the Levant Company to John Sanderson dated 9 March 1597.

27. (ed.Horatio Brown), *Calendar of State Papers: Venetian 1610-13* [London 1905] (henceforth will be abbreviated to *Cal. S. P. Venetian*) no.383 Letter of Antonio Foscarino, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate dated 2nd December 1611.

28. Sanderson, *Travels* p 175 Letter of Elizeus Sothren at Aleppo to John Sanderson dated 21 March 1598.

29. *Cal. S.P .Venetian 1592-1603* no.901 Letter of Girolamo Capello, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 15 July 1600:

"He added that the English Ambassador was a man of no importance, and quite ignorant of how to treat the Pasha properly."

30. *Dallam's Voyage* p 79.

31. William Biddulph, 'Part of a letter....' in *Purchas His Pilgrimes* Vol.VIII p 259.

32. Sanderson, *Travels* p 264 Letter of John Kitley at Constantinople to John Sanderson in London dated 6 May 1609.

33. *ibid.* The Bishop of Salonica is Meletius Pigas who was overthrown as Patriarch of Constantinople after the death of Edward Barton, Lello being unable to protect him from his enemies. Prince Jancolo is Stefan Bogdan; this refers to his imprisonment by the Ottomans whilst under Lello's protection. "Brevis" is Francois Savary de Breves, the French Ambassador, who bested Lello in the matter of the "Merchant-Forestiers" and over the question of precedence. The "Mary Rose" was an English merchant ship burnt by pirates in the port at Cairo. It is hard to see how Lello can be held responsible for this. see Sanderson, *Travels* p 259 Letter of John Sanderson to John Kitley dated 17 and 18 July 1609. Biddulph's writings were published under the title: *Travails of Divers Englishmen into Africa by Theophilus Lavender* in 1609 .[Details from Biddulph's book were published in *Purchas His Pilgrimes* Volume VIII pp 248-304. Kitley commented:

"a sweet and virtuous name, and yet the booke stinkes of lies and foolerye."

34. Sanderson, *Travels* p 242 Letter of John Kitley at Constantinople to John Sanderson in London dated November 1607.

35. *Corrections and Additions to the Dictionary of National Biography* (Institute of Historical Research), p 20; *Cal. S. P. Venetian 1592-1603* no. 821 Letter of Girolamo Capello, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 16 October 1599: Lello was described as a man more practical than speculative.

36. *Dallam's Voyage* p 77: "My Lord did speak to friendly and nobly unto me";

see Sanderson, *Travels* p 242, letter of John Kitley to John Sanderson dated November 1607; *ibid.* p 249 Memorandum of 1608; *S.P.* 97/5, f 70 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 17 July 1606 see also William Biddulph 'Part of a letter..' in *Purchas His Pilgrimes* Vol.VIII p 259.

37. Orhan Burian, *The Report of Henry Lello Third English Ambassador to the Sublime Porte* [Ankara, 1952] pp 1-80; Halil Inalcik , 'Imtiyazat' in

Encyclopaedia of Islam [Second Edition, 1960] p 1184; c.f. Sanderson, *Travels* pp 282-7.

38. 'Sir Thomas Sherley' in *Dictionary of National Biography* [Oxford, 1912] Vol.XVIII pp 138-9. Sir Thomas Sherley (1564-1630) was an adventurer involved in a privateering expeditions to attack Spanish shipping. At the end of 1602 he equipped two ships for an expedition against the Ottomans, encouraged in Florence by the Duke of Tuscany, but was captured by the Ottomans on 15th January 1603 and on 25th July was carried a close prisoner to Constantinople. King James I appealed to the Sultan to release him. Lello was given the task of obtaining his release and made strenuous efforts on his behalf. Sherley was set free on December 6th 1605 after 1100 dollars was paid. In September 1607, he was imprisoned in the Tower of London on a charge of illegal interference with the operations of the Levant Company. It was said that he had overburdened himself with the traffic of Constantinople, to have brought it to Venice and the Florentine territories.

39. Sanderson, *Travels* p 249 Letter of John Sanderson to John Kitley dated 22 February 1608; *ibid.* p 255 Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 1 November 1608; p 235 *ibid.* to *ibid.* dated 4 March 1607; *ibid.* p 237 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated May 4th 1607:

“He hath manifested his malitiose hart,of which you know I have had much experience.”

40. *S.P.* .97/5 f 95 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 15 January 1607; *S.P.* 97/5 f 207 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to Sir Thomas Sherley dated 25 August 1607:

“Lello [is]... a most fraudulent and deceytfull hypocryt who ever under pretexte of puritanisme and godlines sought all meanes possible to cutt his neighbours throate and to defraude them of their goods.”

Glover also hinted that Sherley should spread damning stories about Lello all over London.

41. *S.P.* 97/5, f 95 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 18 March 1607; *ibid.* f 82 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to Henry Lello dated November 1606.

42. *ibid.*, f 105 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 15 February 1607.

43. *ibid.* f 135 Copy of a letter to the Council and Turkey Company concerning Henry Lello dated 15 April 1607; Sanderson, *Travels* p 234-5 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 31 March 1607; *S.P.* 97/5 f 168 Letter of the Earl of Salisbury to Henry Lello dated 10 June 1607; Sanderson, *Travels* p 235 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 18 March 1607; see also A. C. Wood, *History of the Levant Company* Appendix I, pp 250-52.
44. Sanderson, *Travels* p 246 Letter of John Sanderson to John Kitley dated 20 February 1608.
45. *ibid.*
46. Sanderson, *op. cit.* p 255 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 1 November 1608.
47. *ibid.* p 273 Letter of *ibid.* to *ibid.* dated 7 February 1611.
48. *ibid.* p 270 Letter of *ibid.* to *ibid.* dated 23 October 1610.
49. *ibid.*, p 247 note 2.
50. Guildhall Record Office *Prerogative Court of Canterbury 24. Wingfield* Will dated 9 March 1609. Proved 27 March 1610.
51. Isaac D'Israeli, *Curiosities of Literature* [1866] p 826.
52. William Lithgow, *Rare Adventures and Painfull Peregrinations* [1906, Edition] p 127.
53. *Notes and Queries* 3rd Series Vol I p182; 2nd Series Vol.IX p385. Robert Glover was a Protestant Martyr burnt at the stake in the company of a Mrs.Lewis. He was from Newborn Grange in Leicestershire, his wife Mary appears to have been the niece of Bishop Latimer. There is an article on Robert Glover in the *Dictionary of National Biography* Vol.VIII pp 7-8.
54. *Grantees of Arms* [Harleian Society Publications, 1915] Vol.LXVI p 101 .
55. The Register of St .Michael's Church, Cornhill in London, notes the burial of one Thomas Glover, son of John, on 1st August 1588; (ed. G.Delmar Morgan and C.H.Coote,) *Early Voyages and Travels to Russia*

and Persia by Anthony Jenkinson and other Englishmen [Hakluyt Society Publications, London 1886] 2 vols.pp xxxiii, lxvii, lxx-lxxii; pp 155, 207, 217, 219, 222; pp 274, 278, 282, 295, 304, 323, 330, 340, 378, 380, 382, 390.

56. (ed.E.A.Bond), *Russia at the close of the Sixteenth Century* [Hakluyt Society Publications (20) London, 1856] p 184; see note 1 "As early as 1567 Queen Elizabeth complained to the Tsar of this conduct of Glover and his associates, and that they had married Polish wives.Glover was banished from Russia in 1573."

57. Lithgow, *Rare Adventures. op. cit.*, p 127; c.f. Sanderson, *Travels* Introduction pp xxxii, xxxv-vii; p 11 note 2.

58. 'The Journal of Edward Barton Esquire...' in *Purchas His Pilgrimes* Vol. VIII, p306; Sanderson, *Travels* p 11.

59. Sanderson, *op. cit.* p 188 Letter of John Sanderson at Pera to the Levant Company in London dated 1 December 1599.

60. *ibid.*

61. *ibid.* p 219 Letter of Henry Lello at Constantinople to the Levant Company in London dated May 1601; p 224 Letter of John Ker at Scio to John Sanderson in London dated 9 August 1603.

62. *ibid.*, p 188, Letter of Sanderson to the Levant Company dated 1 December 1599.

63. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 222 Letter of John Sanderson at Scanderoon to Thomas Glover in Constantinople dated 16 April 1602.

64. *ibid.* p 227 Letter of John Sanderson to John Kately in Constantinople dated 26 May 1604.

65. *ibid.*

66. *ibid.*, p 225 Letter of John Ker at Scio to John Sanderson in London dated 16 April 1603.

67. *ibid.*, p 222 Letter of John Sanderson to Thomas Glover dated 16 April 1602.

68. *S.P.* 97/4 f 239 Letter of Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 11

December 1603; Sanderson, *Travels* p 224 note 2 and p 225 Letter of John Ker to Sanderson dated 9 August 1603.

69. Sanderson, *op. cit.* p 226 Letter of John Sanderson in London to Robert Barton in Constantinople dated 26 May 1604.

70. *ibid.*, p 225 Letter of John Ker at Scio to John Sanderson in London dated 9 August 1603.

71. *ibid.* p 224 Letter of John Sanderson in London to Robert Barton in Constantinople dated 10 May 1604.

72. A.C.Wood, *History of the Levant Company* p 221.

73. Sanderson, *Travels* p 241 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 8 September 1607.

74. *Calendar of State Papers Domestic 1603-10* [London, 1857] p 311 An anonymous letter to the Levant Company asking them for an allowance of 100 pounds for this years stipend to Thomas Glover and asking that it may be paid at once to further his petition to the King; *S.P.* 97/5 f 76 James I to Sultan Ahmed dated 16 August 1606. Ambassadors often maintained an agent at the English Court to promote their interests there and send information to Constantinople about their favour with the Monarch and his Ministers.

75. (ed.W.A.Littledale), *Grantees of Arms* [Harleian Society Publications, 1915] Volume LXVI, p 101.

76. *Historical Manuscripts Commission Publications* (henceforth will be abbreviated to *H.M.C.*) 75 *Downshire III* p 238 Letter of Sir Thomas Lake to the Earl of Salisbury dated 17 August 1601:

“...Mr Glover according to your pleasure signified yesternight was presented to his Majesty this morning and used with good favour, and by the Lord Chamberlain’s commendation knighted...”

77. *H.M.C.* 9 *Salisbury XVIII*, p 181 Letter of Dr.William Bruce to the Earl of Salisbury dated 28 June 1606; *S.P.* 97/4 f 280 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 7 December 1604.

78. Sanderson, *Travels op. cit.* p 234 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 13 February 1607:

“...Master Lillo had gotten the copies of your letters, by which he perceived your proceeding against him.”

The letters had been written by Glover to Robert Barton several years previously; *S.P. 97/5* f 85 Letter of Thomas Glover to Henry Lello dated November 1606:

“ I... thoght good to make a motion to some of my friends to move the question [of the Embassy] on my behalf”

79. *S.P. 97/5*, f 41 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 14 November 1605; Sanderson, *Travels* p 264 Letter of John Kitely at Constantinople to John Sanderson in London dated 6 May 1609; *H.M.C. 9 Salisbury XXIV addenda 1605-1668*, [London 1676] p 277 Letter of Gaspar Gratiani to the Earl of Salisbury undated (before 26 June 1605); *S.P. 97/4*, f 252 The Prince of Moldavia to my Lord from the Castle of Asia where he is prisoner dated 7 March 1604.

80. *S.P. 97/5*, f 66 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 12 June 1606; *S.P. 105 143 [Royal Letters]*, ff 5-6 Glover's letters of appointment dated April 1606.

81. *H.M.C. 75 Downshire III* p 238 Letters of Sir Thomas Lake to the Earl of Salisbury dated 17 August and 18 May 1606.

82. *S.P. 97/5*, f 85 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to Henry Lello dated November 1606; Sanderson, *Travels* p 233 Letter of John Sanderson in London to Robert Barton in Constantinople dated ?28 August 1606:

“Sir Thomas Glover carrieth with him all sorts of instruments and exelent men in musique... the trayne he hath be very great.”

c.f. S.P. 97/5, f 105 Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 15 February 1607:

“my successor hath carried such a traine and retynue with him that he is already grown weary of some of them...”

83. *S.P. 97/5* f 89 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 29 December 1606; *ibid.*, f 92 Glover to Salisbury dated 14 January 1607.

84. *S.P. 97/5*, f 101 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 14 February 1607.

85. *S.P. 97/5*, f 111 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 18 March 1607; *ibid.* f 95 Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 15 January 1607.

86. *S.P. 97/5*, f 101 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 3 March 1607.

87. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 256 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 15 December 1608:

“Master Fenton telle me that one Stracie is making a booke against you, which yf it should be so, it peradventure may cost him both ears.”

c.f. *Times Literary Supplement* dated 3 July 1930 p 554.

88. *S.P. 97/5*, f 123 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 1 April 1607.

89. *S.P. 97/5*, f 113 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 3 March 1607:

“For whereas on our capitulations is specified *Englitera Kirali* to witt the King of England, and in the French Capitulations *Franza Padishahi Padishahi* to witt the Frenche kinge of kings or Emperour for that is the signifiacion of Padishahi and the signification of Kirali is but a playne Kinge. I thought it a great indignitie that his Maties title should be abased wch by our adversaries is wispered unto theis ignorant peoples eares to be inferiour to the Ffrench kinge, wch thing hath made me bestir myself.”

90. *S.P. 97/5*, f 139 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 16 April 1607; *ibid.*, f 154 Copy of f 139 Postscript.

91. *S.P. 97/5*, f 135 A testimony of a number of people on behalf of Henry Lello regarding the dispute with Sir Thomas Glover dated 15 April 1607.

92. *S.P. 97/5*, f 166 Letter of the Earl of Salisbury to Sir Thomas Glover dated 10 June 1607; f 168 Letter of the Earl of Salisbury to Henry Lello dated 10 June 1607; *S.P. 105 110*, f 9 Levant Company to Sir Thomas Glover dated 9 June 1607; *ibid*, f 11 Levant Company to Anthony Abbdie

dated 9 June 1607; *ibid.*, f 10 Levant Company to William Biddulph, the Embassy preacher dated 9 June 1607.

93. *S.P. 97/5* f 164 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 20 May 1607; *BM Lansdowne Manuscripts 241 The Diary and CommonPlace Book of John Sanderson*, f 90 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 23 August 1607.

94. *S.P. 97/5* f 164 Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 20 May 1607.

95. *S.P. 103 [Treaty Papers] 540* Original Capitulations granted to the English Nation, as confirmed by Sultan Ibrahim I to Sir Sackville Crow dated 28 October 1641.

96. William Lithgow, *Rare Adventures* p 127; *Cal.S.P. Domestic 1611-18* [London 1958] p 170 Letter dated 12 February 1613: "Sir Thomas Glover.boasts his services as rescuing 300 christians from slavery"

97. *Purchas His Pilgrimes* Vol.VIII p 170; *S.P. 105 [Levant Company Letters] 110*, f 52 Levant Company to Sir Thomas Glover dated 29 March 1611.

98. Lithgow, *op. cit.* pp 60-1.

99. *H.M.C. Downshire III*, p 183 Letter of Richard Church to Thomas Newport dated 16 November 1611; Sanderson, *Travels*, p 271 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover 29 November 1610.

100. *S.P. 105 110*, f 106 Letter of Levant Company to Mr. Stringer dated 26 March 1619.

101. Sanderson, *op. cit.*, p 254 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 20 August 1608.

102. *ibid*; p 252 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 6 July 1606.

103. Sanderson, *op. cit.*, p 247 Letter of John Sanderson to John Kitley dated 20 February 1608; p 276 Glover to Sanderson dated 9 March 1611:

"It is reported in London that I have stroken Master.Ed.Abbot.If ever I have done soe or used him otherwise in wordes and deedes at his being here, then lett God damn me for ever."

104. Sanderson, *op. cit.*, p 273 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 7 February 1611; *ibid.*, p 270 Letter of Sanderson to Glover dated 23 October 1610.

105. *ibid.*, p 171 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 25 October 1610; p 276 Glover to Sanderson dated 9 March 1611.

106. Sanderson, *Travels* p 242 Letter of John Kitley to John Sanderson dated November 1607; Lithgow, *Rare Adventures* p 127.

107. Sanderson, *op. cit.*, p 241 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 8 September 1607.

108. *ibid.*, p256 Letter of Sanderson to Glover dated 16 September 1608.

109. *ibid.* p 233 Letter of John Sanderson to Robert Barton dated ?28 August 1606.

110. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 258 Letter of John Sanderson to John Kitley dated 17 and 18 January 1609.

111. A.C.Wood, *History of the Levant Company*, p 243; c.f. William Forde, *A sermon Preached at Constantinople in the Vines of Pera, at the Funerall of the Virtuouse and Admired Lady Anne Glover, sometyme Wife to the Honourable Knight Sir Thomas Glover and then Ambassador Ordinary for his Maiesty of Great Britain, in the Port of the Great Turke By William Forde Batchelor in Divinity.and lately Preacher to the Right Honourable Ambassador, and the rest of the English Nation there Resident.* London: Printed by Edward Griffin.For Francis Constable etc. Quarto. pp 82.1616: The Sermon was delivered:

“instead of a fair Temple, in a pleasant garden, under a lofty Cypress Tree, in a goodly assembly of divers Nations English, French, Dutch, German, Italian, Polish, Hungarian, Transylvanian, Moldavians, Russes, Greeks, Wallachians, Armenians, Bedounes, Turkes, Jewes.”

The sermon is extremely long and tedious, as is true of many Jacobean funerals.

112. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 274 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated February 1611; *S.P. 99 [Venice] 9*, f 222 Paul Pindar to Sir Dudley Carleton dated 13 February 1612; *S.P. 99/5*, f 89 Letter of George Rooke to ? dated 20 April 1608; *S.P. 99/9*, f 192 Sir Dudley

Carleton to Sir Wingfield Digby dated 13 April 1612. Glover had perhaps spent some time with the boy, hence the latter's knowledge of Italian and Turkish.

113. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 247 Letter of John Sanderson to John Kitley dated 20 February 1608.

114. *ibid.*, p 273 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 7 February 1611.

115. *ibid.*, p 258 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glove dated 16 November 1608; *ibid.*, p 268 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 9 January 1610.

116. *Cal.S.P. Domestic 1623-25* [London, 1860] p 248 'Sir Thomas Glover's interpretation of the treaty made when he was Ambassador at Constantinople; in reference to the privileges of the Scots.' ?1624.

117. *Cal.S.P. Domestic 1611-18*, p 257 Grant to Sir Thomas Glover of the office of collector of Fines in Ecclesiastical Causes for life, dated 13 October 1613; *Cal S.P. Domestic 1619-23* p 433 Grant to Sir Thomas Glover of the office of searching leather transported dated 30 July 1622; *Cal S.P. Domestic 1623-5* p 19 no 27 Court News, letter dated 6 May 1625.

118. (ed.N.E.McClure), *Letters of John Chamberlaine* [Philadelphia 1939] Vol.II no. 472 Letter of John Chamberlaine to Sir Dudley Carleton dated 6 May 1625; *Register of St .Olave.Hart Street, London 1563-1700* p 155.

119. 'Paul Pindar' in *Dictionary of National Biography* Volume XV pp 1196-8.

120. *The Gentleman's Magazine* [1787] pp 1491-3.

121. Sanderson, *Travels* p 185 Letter of John Sanderson to William Aldrich dated 18 November 1589; p 193 Levant Company to John Sanderson dated 1 March 1600; *H.M C. 9 Cecil X* p 248 Letter of Paul Pindar to Michael Hicks dated 28 July 1600. Sir Robert Cecil was approached to petition the Queen, who did not wish to reimburse Pindar. Cecil was quite sympathetic but Pindar resigned himself to abandoning the suit; *ibid.* p 334 Letter of Paul Pindar to Michael Hicks dated September 1600.

122. Sanderson, *Travels* p 191 Letter of Nicholas Salter in London to John Sanderson in Pera dated 23 February 1600; *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1592-1603* no.821 Letter of Girolamo Capello, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 16 October 1599.

123. *H.M.C. 9 Cecil X* p 334 Letter of Paul Pindar to Michael Hicks dated September 1600.

124. *ibid.* p 248 Paul Pindar to Michael Hicks dated 28 July 1600.

125. *ibid.*

126. *H.M.C. 9 Cecil XV* p 197 Letter of Paul Pindar to Michael Hicks dated 17 July 1603.

127. Sanderson, *Travels* p 222 Letter of Paul Pindar at Venice to John Sanderson dated 15 February 1602.

128. *Cal. S.P. Domestic 1601-3* p 166, Letter of John Blount to Secretary Cecil dated March 27 1602.

129. *H.M.C. 9 Cecil XV* p 378 Letter of William Hichs to Lord Cecil dated 1603.

130. *S.P. 105/143* f 12 Appointed 6 November 1606; c.f. A.C.Wood, *History of the Levant Company* p 217; figure of salary from 1616.

131. Sanderson, *Travels* p 252 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 6 July 1608:

“Mounsure Paul Pindar.wilbe rich, yf God prosper [him] lustely and standeth out for one Mthew (as he reporteth) 20,000 dollars.”

see also N.Steensgaard, ‘Consuls and Nations in the Levant’ in *Scandanavian Economic History Review* XVI/ 1-2, [1967] pp 13-55.

132. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1607-10* no.281 Letter of Ottavio Bon, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 12 July 1608.

133. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1610-13* p xxxiii.

134. Sanderson, *Travels* p 273 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 7 February 1611.

135. *Northamptonshire Notes and Queries* [1886] Vol.I p 160.
136. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1610-13* no.276 Letter of Antonio Foscarini, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate dated 14 July 1611; *ibid.*no. 316 Foscarini to the Doge and Senate dated 2 September 1611.
137. *ibid.* no.371 *ibid.* to *ibid.* dated 18 November 1611.
138. *ibid.* no.381 Resolution of Doge and Senate dated December 1611; *ibid.* no.383 Letter of Antonio Foscarini to the Doge and Senate dated 2 December 1611.
139. *Cal. S.P .Venetian 1610-13* no. 492 Foscarini to the Doge and Senate dated 19 April 1612.
140. *ibid.*
141. *ibid.* no 386 Letter to the Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople from the Doge and Senate dated 5 December 1611; see also *ibid.* no 405 Letter of Simon Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 31 December 1611. Contarini ascribed Glover's mood of dejection to pressure from his creditors and the fact that he was dismissed from his post.
142. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1610-13* No. 444 Letter of Simon Contarini to the Doge and Senate dated 25 February 1611.
143. *ibid.* no 405 Letter of Simon Contarini to the Doge and Senate dated 25 February 1612.
144. *ibid* no 444 Simon Contarini to the Doge and Senate dated 25 February 1611
145. *Cal S.P. Venetian 1610-13* no.458 Letter of Simon Contarini and Cristoforo Valier, Venetian Ambassadors in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 10 March 1612; *ibid.* no.509 Letter of Christoforo Valier to the Doge and Senate dated 6 April 1612; *ibid.* no 631 *ibid.* to *ibid.* dated 7 September 1612.
146. *ibid* no. 458 and no. 509.
147. *Cal. S.P. Venetian 1613-15* no. 210 Letter of Christoforo Valier,

Venetian Ambassador to the Doge and Senate dated 21 March 1612; *ibid.* no. 217 Christoforo Valier to the Doge and Senate dated 16 April 1614; *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1615-17* no. 497 Letter of the Doge and Senate to the Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople dated 4 November 1616.

148. *ibid.* no.113 Letter of Almoro Nani, Venetian Ambassador at Constantinople to the Doge and Senate; *ibid.* no. 114 *ibid.* to *ibid.* both dated 8 December 1617.

149. *ibid.*

150. *Cal.S.P Venetian 1615-17* Letter of Almoro Nani to the Doge and Senate dated 8 September 1616; *ibid.* no. 437 and no.438 Letter of Almoro Nani to the Doge and Senate dated 18 September 1616; *ibid.*no. 452 Letter of Almoro Nani to the Doge and Senate dated 4 October 1616; *ibid.*no. 728 Letter of Almoro Nani to the Doge and Senate dated 15 April 1617.

151. *Cal. S.P. Venetian 1613-15* no. 135 Letter of Cristoforo Valier to the Doge and Senate dated 8 November 1613; *Cal S.P. Venetian 1615-17* no. 419 Letter of Giovanni Battista Lionello, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate dated 11 May 1617.

152. *Cal. S.P. Venetian 1617-19* no. 461 Letter of Almoro Nani, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 22 July 1618.

153. *Purchas His Pilgrimes* [Glasgow 1905-7] Vol IX p 409 Letter written 1618.

154. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1619-21* no. 457 Letter of Francesco Moresini, Count and Captain of Spalato to the Doge and Senate dated 25 July 1620; *ibid.* no. 586 Letter of Girolamo Lando, Venetian Ambassador in London to the Doge and Senate dated 16 October 1620; (ed. Nichols), *Progresses of James I* Vol. IV p 61.

155. 'Paul Pindar' in *Dictionary of National Biography* Vol. XV pp 1196-8; *The Gentleman's Magazine* [1787] pt. 1 pp 491-3; *Northamptonshire Notes and Queries* [1886] (1) pp 159-60; *Visitation of London 1633* [Harleian Society, 1883] Vol. 2, p 166.

156. *Purchas His Pilgrimes* IX p 321 with reference to Robert Withers c.1620.

157. *Northamptonshire Notes and Queries* (1886) (1) p160

158. *Dictionary of National Biography* Vol XV pp 1196-8; *The Gentleman's Magazine* (1887) pt. 1 pp 491-3; *Northamptonshire Notes and Queries* (1886) pt.1 pp159-60.

159. *Dictionary of National Biography op. cit.*; *Thornbury's Old and New London* Vol. II p 151,

160. *Notes and Queries* 4th series Vol. XII p 287; 6th series Vol. XI, p 445; XII p 10, p 116. a copy in manuscripts of Nehemiah Rogers' funeral oration, said to contain a number of interesting biographical details, was at one time preserved in the 'Religious Tract Society' which was absorbed into the 'United Society for Christian Literature' in 1935. The Archives of this Society, currently held in the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, suffered extensive bomb damage during World War II and most of them did not survive. On enquiring at S.O.A.S., I was told that the manuscript in question is not to be found.

161. *The Gentleman's Magazine* (1887) pt.1, pp 491-3.

CHAPTER IV EARLY CONTACTS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE PRINCIPALITIES OF MOLDAVIA AND WALLACHIA

1. In 1579, the year that Petru Cercel first approached England for assistance, William Harborne was negotiating with the Ottomans for the granting of Capitulations.

2. Vlachs: Latin speakers, said to be descendents of the original Latin-speakers of the Balkans before the migration of the Slavs in the 6th and 7th centuries.

3. Paul Cernovodeanu, 'The Remotest Anglo-Romanian Contacts. 14th-16th Centuries' in *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* [1975], pp 315-326.

4. Andrei Pippidi, *Tradiția Politică Byzantină în Țările Române în Secolele XVI XVII* [București, 1973] pp 109 10.

5. Eric Tappe, *Documents concerning Romania in the British Archives 1427-1601* [The Hague 1964], Doc. no.58, Letter from William Harborne to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 27 January 1584.

6. Ștefan Pașcu, *Petru Cercel* [Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională din Cluj, 1940], pp 1-277.
7. 'A Summary of the charge committed to Sieur de St. Bonnet by the Prince of Valaquie to be delivered unto the Queen of England Most Excellent Majesty' in Nicolae Iorga, 'Rătăcirile unui Pretendant Român Ioan Bogdan' in *Academia Română. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice* Seria III, Tomul VIII, Mem II [1928]; hereafter referred to as '...Iorga, 'Rătăcirile...'
8. *H.M.C. 9 Cecil II*, p 357, Doc. no. 918, dated 1580: 'Showing the descent of Demetrius, Prince of Wallachia from Raoul, who lived in the time of the Emperor Bayezit (AD 1510) and who was five times conqueror in the wars against Selim and Solyman, but in the sixth war was defeated and taken captive to Constantinople.'
9. Tappe, *Documents*, no. 53, Letter from Cobham to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 9 April 1590; no. 54, Cobham to Walsingham dated 3 May 1580.
10. *ibid.*
11. Tappe, *op. cit.*, no. 52 Letter from Petru Cercel to N. Wolleys [Sir John Wolleys, the Queen's Latin Secretary] dated 1580?
12. Tappe, *op. cit.*, no. 60, Letter from William Harborne to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 15 September 1584.
13. Ștefan Pașcu, *Petru Cercel* pp 12-21; A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Trăiană* Vol III Ediția a IV-a (ed. Nicolae Stoicescu și Maria Șimionescu), [București, 1988], pp 29-39, 408-10, 504-6.
14. Tappe, *Documents*, no. 88, Notes in Lord Burghley's hand dated Autumn 1592?.
15. *ibid.*, no. 64 Letter of 1587 Bartolomeo Brutti to Queen Elizabeth dated 1587; 'The Privilege of Peter the Prince of Moldavia granted to the English Merchants' in Hakluyt *Voyages* Volume IV, p 59.
16. Nicolae Iorga 'Pretendenți Domnești în Secolele al XVI-lea' in *Memoriile Academiei Române* XVI [1897], pp 229-234; *Cal. S.P. Foreign, 1586-66* p 688, A letter to Elizabeth I signed "Ioan Bogdanovich, Moldaviae princeps" dated 4/14 August 1587, John Bogdanovich to Sir Francis Walsingham, (an English translation of a letter in Latin, previously published by Nicolae Iorga in 'Rătăcirile...')

17. Tappe, *Documents* no.68 Intelligence from Venice dated 14 January 1589.

18. *ibid.*, no.74 Letter from Edward Barton to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 16 October 1589.

19. *ibid.*

20. Nicolae Iorga, 'Rătăcirile unui Pretendant Roman, Ioan Bogdan'; also *British Museum Manuscripts No.36774* f 1 A 'Safeconduct for John Boydan, Prince of Moldavia from Queen Elizabeth' dated August 1591.

21. Ludovic Demeny and Paul Cernovodeanu, *Relațiile Politice ale Angliei cu Moldova, Țara Românească și Transilvania în Secolele XVI-XVIII* [București, 1974], p 24.

22. 'A Summary of the charge committed to Sieur de St.Bonnet by the Prince of Valaguie to be delivered to the Queen of England, Most Excellent Majesty' in Iorga, 'Rătăcirile...'

23. *ibid.*

24. Michael: There was no Michael, Prince of Wallachia at this time, Pătrașcu was replaced by Peter the Young (1559-68)

25. Ștefan Pașcu, *Petru Cercel* pp 12-21.

26. Tappe, *Documents* no.56 Letters from William Harborne to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 15th and 28th July 1583; no.58 Letter from William Harborne to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 27 January 1584; no.61 Letter from Harborne to Walsingham dated 2 April 1585.

27. P .P .Panaitescu, 'Originea lui Petru Cercel' in *Extras din Omagiu Profesorului D.Gusti* (Știința și Reformă Socială Anul XIV [1936 Vol.II]), for Petru Cercel's sons see M.Ciuntu, *Pretendenți Domnești în Secolul XVII* (Doctoral Thesis) [București, 1940], pp 20-21, 24.

28. Tappe, no.58, *op. cit.*

29. Tappe, *Documents* no.53 Letter from Henry Cobham to Sir Francis Walsingham dated Paris 9 April 1580.

30. Tappe, no.74 Letter of Edward Barton to Sir Francis Walsingham

dated 16 October 1589; Translation of a letter of John Bogdanovich, Prince of Moldavia to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 4/14 August 1587 in *Cal. S.P. Foreign 1586-88* (ed. R.B. Wernham), [London, 1950], p 688

31. Tappe, *Documents* no.70 Letter of Edward Barton to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 14 March 1589.

32. This is attested to by the notes in Lord Burghley's hand concerning Cercel and Bogdan see Tappe, *Documents* no.88 Notes in Burghley's hand dated Autumn 1592?; 'The Turkes passeport or safeconduct for Captaine Austell and Jacomo Manuchio' in Hakluyt *Voyages* Vol. V p 328.

33. Instructions for Principle Secretary, for Edward Wotton by Robert Bale dated 1592 in 'A treatise of the office of Principal Secretary and Chancellor to her Majesty' published in Conyers Read, *Mr Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth* [1925] Volume I Appendix pp 432-3; see also A.W Ward, 'The Empire under Ferdinand I and Maximillian II' and 'The Empire under Rudolf II' in *The Cambridge Modern History Volume III Wars of Religion* [1903], pp 166-172 and pp 696-735 respectively, especially pp167-70 and pp 700-1; c.f. J.W. Burgon, *Life and Times of Sir Thomas Gresham* [1839], Volume I p 90; see also Tappe, *Documents* no.54 Letter from Henry Cobham to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 3 May 1580.

34. Tappe, *Documents* no.78 Letter from Edward Barton to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 14 July 1590; c.f. no.79 Letter from Bartolomeo Brutti to Queen Elizabeth dated Warsaw 29 August 1590.

35. Tappe, *Documents* no.86. Extracts of Barton's letters dated 26 August and 9 September 1592; no.102 Letter of Thomas Wilcox to Lord Burghley dated 21 April 1594; *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1592-1603* no294 Letter to the Venetian Ambassador, dated [?June] 1594..

36 R.W.Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians* [Cambridge, 1934], p60; I.Caproșu, *O Istorie a Moldovei prin Relațiile de Credit pîna la mijlocul secolului al XVIII-lea* [Iași, 1989] p 61. As well as the customary tribute, Aron gave extraordinary gifts of 450,000 Italian *Scudi* to the Sultan and Grand Vizier two or three times per year. He also gave gifts to other persons of influence including, apparently, to Edward Barton.

37. Tappe, *Documents* no.94 Letter from Judas Fatim, servant of Don Solomon to (?) dated London 19 February 1594; no.96 Letter to Fatim: answers to Questions about Barton and Aron dated 1 March 1594.

38. Tappe, *op. cit.*, no.102 Letter of Thomas Wilcox to Lord Burghley dated 21 April 1594.

39. *ibid.*, no.86 Extracts of Barton's letters dated 26 August and 9 September 1592. *PRO Chancery Records C2/ 110* f 58 Answer of Henry Lello to the Complainant Mary Locke 22 January 1607,

40. *ibid.*, no.55 Letter of Blois Cobham to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 10 December 1580.

41. Travels of John Sanderson (ed.Sir William Foster) [Hakluyt Society] Series II Volume LXVII, [London,1931] pp 13 and 61; c.f.*Cal.S.P. Venetian 1592-1603* no. 276 4 May 1594 Letter of Marco Venier, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople, to the Doge and Senate; *ibid.*, no.524 Letter from Venier to the Doge and Senate dated 24 December 1596; see also Tappe, *Documents* no. 96 Fatim: Answers to Questions about Barton and Aron dated 1 March 1594; no.85 Letter from G.Gifforde dated 8 February 1592.

42. Ion Podea, 'A Contribution to the Study of Queen Elizabeth's Eastern Policy 1590-1593' in *Mélanges d'Histoire Generale Publiés par Constantin Marinescu* [Bucureşti, 1938] pp 423-476. (ed. Wernham, *List and Analysis of S.P. Foreign June 1591-April 1592* nos 935-938.

43. Tappe, *Documents*, no.85 Letter from G.Gifforde dated 8 February 1592; *Fugger Newsletters* (1596-1605) (ed.V. von Klarwill, tr. L.R.S. Byrne) [Second Series London, 1926] no. 456, Letter dated Constantinople 19 September 1592.

44. Sanderson suspected Mariani of having poisoned Monsieur de Planca: Sanderson, *Travels op. cit.* pp 13, 61; Sanderson described Mariani as a Roman Catholic corrupter; p 129 Paolo Mariani first came to be employed by the English Embassy in Edward Barton's house; the French accused him of having committed murder and other heinous crimes in Cairo; he was also an enemy of Sinan Pasha, p 277; In 1585 John Sanderson had been appointed to be his Vice-Consul in Cairo. See also *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1592-1603* nos 134; 276-7; 289-295; 298; 302; 341; 354; 524.

45. Tappe, *Documents* no.85 Letter from G.Gifforde dated 8 February 1592.

46. Ion Podea, 'A Contribution to the Study of Queen Elizabeth's Eastern

Policy (1590-1593)' *op. cit.* p 247 This was particularly true after 1593 when Zygmund Vasa claimed the Swedish throne, see Norman Davies, *God's Playground - A History of Poland Volume I The Origins to 1795* [Clarendon Press, Oxford 1982] p 436. There are in existence in the Public Record Office in London 6 letters from 1595 from Charles Parkins, the English Ambassador in Poland concerning the possible fate of Transylvania which add an interesting new slant to Barton's activities. It was greatly feared that Transylvania would fall under either Austrian or Ottoman rule. In Transylvania there was a neutralist party lead by the cousins of the Prince Stefan and Andreas Bathory. They were in contact with Parkins to try and secure Queen Elizabeth's intervention to aid them in maintaining Transylvania's autonomy:

"..theyr humble request is that yt will please hyr Matie to geve order to hyr Embr at Constple to inguier of the Turkes intentione towardes Transilvania, the wch yf he shall fynde purpose to revdge then they beseech hyr Matie...she will indevor to conserve the same wth comendatione of Earl Stephen who wilbe ready to com in p'sence and humblye sue for the same..."

Parkins sent the letter of 18 November 1595. In a letter of 19 November Parkins writes:

" .the sequel must needes be that Transilvania become either Turkishe or Austrian, as eyther shall prevail. In the meane ceason the Bathories sue to hyr Matie that, by her Protectione it may remayne Christiane yet not Austrian but newtrall offeringe thereunto som yearly tribute to hyr Matie as both the Battories have in speeche together declared unto me.."

There is no evidence that Queen Elizabeth did intervene but further investigation is required on this matter which is outside the scope of this thesis. *PRO State Papers 46 Bundle 125* folios 210, 214, 219, 221, 223 and 225. These are published in *Res Polonicae Elisabetha Angliei Regnante conscriptae ex Archivis Londoniarum* (ed.C.H.Talbot) [Roma] 1961.

47. Tappe, *Documents* no.100 Edward Bushell to Edward Barton dated Giurgiu 1 April 1594; c.f. I.Podea, 'A Contribution to the Study of Queen Elizabeth's Eastern Policy' in *Mélanges d'Histoire Generale Publiés Par Constantin Marinescu* [Bucureşti, 1938], p 459.

48. Tappe, *Documents* no.97 Letter of Edward Barton to Sir Thomas Heneage dated 20 March 1594.

CHAPTER V. IANCU SASUL, HIS SON BOGDAN AND IEREMIE MOVILA: CONCERNING THE INSTALLATION OF PRINCES ON THE MOLDAVIAN THRONE IN THE LAST QUARTER OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

1. See A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor Din Dacia Trăiană*. Volume III. (4th edition. Ed.Nicolae Stoicescu and Maria Simionescu). [București, 1988]. p 96, note 82.
2. *Hurmuzaki* III (i) no.XVI p 24 Letter of Sinzendorff to the Austrian Emperor, dated 7th December 1579.
3. Xenopol, *op. cit.* pp 97-8.
4. I. Miculescu-Prăjescu, 'New Data Regarding the Installation of the Movilă Princes' in *Slavonic and East European Review*. XLIX no.115. [1971] 221.
5. R.W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians* [Cambridge University 1934] p 28.
6. The Lăpușneanu Family:

Petru Rares	→	daughter	→	daughter	→	Alexandru	→	Bogdan
						Lăpușneanu		Lăpușneanu
7. A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Trăiană* Vol.III, p 98; A.Pippidi, 'Quelque Drogmans de Constantinople au XVIIe Siecle' in *Revue des Etudes Sud-est Europeenes* X (1972) No.2 pp 231-233.
8. Nicolae Iorga, 'Pretendenți Domnești în secolul al XVI-lea' in *Memoriile Academiei Române*. (XVI) [1897] p 251; C.Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus* [New York, 1972] Appendices II, III and IV.
9. Nicolae Stoicescu, *Sfatul Domnesc și Marii Dregători din Țara Românească și Moldova, secolele XVI-XVII*. [București, 1968] especially pp 263-70; Andrei Oțetea, *History of the Romanian People* [Bucharest, 1970] pp 181,194.
10. Xenopol, *op. cit.* p 98.

11. *ibid.* pp 98-99.
12. Stoicescu, *op. cit.* pp 189-204, p 217, p 227, pp 252-262.; R.W. Seton-Watson, *op. cit.* p 66, note 1; A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Trăiană* p 373.
13. I .Miclescu-Prăjescu, 'New data regarding the installation of Movilă Princes' in *Slavonic and East European Review* XLIX no.115 [1971] p 220. c.f. F. Constantinescu, 'De la Mihai Viteazul la Fanarioti' in *Ștudii și Materiale de Istorie Medie* Volume VIII [București, 1975] pp 111-114.
14. Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland: Volume I. The Origins to 1795* [Clarendon Press,.Oxford] p 426; (ed.I Corfus), *Documente Polone* Volume I Document no.185 Letter of Stefan Bathory to Murad III dated Feruary 1583.
15. Corfus, *op. cit.*, no.185.
16. *ibid.* no.183,Letter from Murad III to Stefan Bathory, dated 1582; *Hurmuzaki*, Vol.III (i) Document No.LXIX Report about Iancu Sasul written by Bericht in Moldavia, dated 15th October 1582.
17. A.D.Xenopol, *op. cit.* p 99.
18. N.Davies, *God's Playground* p 426.
19. Cyril Mango, 'The Phanariotes and the Byzantine tradition' in *The struggle for Greek Indenendence* (ed. Richard Clogg) [Macmillan 1973] p 43. Alexander Palaeologus was the Tatar Khan's envoy to Prague in 1598; in 1599 he was described as being in charge of all the Khan's revenues by land and sea.He was said to be sympathetic to Poland and a Christian, see C.M.Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation* pp 164, 166, 168, 170 and 185; A Pippidi, 'Quelques Drogmans de Constantinople au XVIIe Siecle' in *Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Europeen* X (1972), No. 2, pp 227-255.
20. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Trăiană* III (4th edition) p 99; *Hurmuzaki*, VI (2), p 117 no XLIV Letter of Francesco Moresini to the Doge and Senate dated 9 August 1583.
21. N.Iorga, 'Pretendenți domnești în secolul al XVI-lea', *op. cit.*, p 252.
22. *Documente...Polone* Volume I secolele XVII-lea, no.27, Instructions

from Cracow to Grigore Kochanski, Secretary to the Polish King in Turkey, dated 29 April 1609.

23. Eric Tappe, *Documents* no.135. Letter from Edward Barton to Thomas Heneage, dated 22 November 1595; N.Davies, *God's Playground* p 226.

24. Iorga, 'Pretendenți...', *op. cit.* p 252.

25. A.Pippidi, *Tradiția Politică Byzantină în Țările Române Secolele XVI-XVIII* [București, 1983] p 190, note 238.

26. *Hurmuzaki* IV (2), p 174, document no.CXXXVI, Letter of Archduke Maximilian to the Doge dated 21 March 1593.

27. *ibid.* III (2) p 31, XLVI Letter from a Pretender to the Doge dated 6 May 1593.

28. *ibid.*, document XLVII, An order of the Doge to the Venetian Commander at Ragusa dated May 1593; *ibid.*, document LXVIII, An Order of the Doge to give a Pretender to the throne of Moldavia 25 ducats dated May 1593.

29. *Hurmuzaki*, III (2), document XLIX Letter of Marco Venier Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge of Venice dated 2 June 1593.

30. N.Iorga, 'Pretendenți domnești în Secolele al XVI-lea' in *Memoriile Academiei României* XVI [1897], p 252.

31. *Hurmuzaki*, III (1), p 457-8 document no. XXIII, Letter of Mateo Zane to the Doge dated 6 September 1593.

32. *ibid.*

33. *Hurmuzaki*, III (I), p 507, LXVII, Marco Zenier to the Doge dated 21 August 1596.

34. Iorga, 'Pretendenți...' p 253.

35. R.W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians* p 63; Tappe, *Documents* no. 109, Letter of Edward Barton to Lord Burghley dated 30 November 1594.

36. Tappe, *op. cit.*, no.110, Barton to Burghley dated 13 December 1594; no.124, Letter of Edward Barton to Lord Burghley dated 6th June 1595.

37. Tappe, *Documents* no.110, Barton to Burghley dated 13 December 1594.
38. *ibid.* no.115, Barton to Burghley dated 22 February 1595.
39. *ibid.* no.124, Letter of 6 June 1596; no.125 Letter of Barton to Heneage dated 7th September 1596.
40. *Hurmuzaki* III (1) document LXVII Letter of Marco Venier to the Doge dated 21 August 1596.
41. Richard Knolles, *Generall Historie of the Turkes* [London, 1621], p 1081.
42. C.M.Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation* p 145.
43. Tappe, *Documents* no.135.Barton to Heneage dated 22 November 1595.
44. *ibid.*
45. Tappe, *op. cit.*, no.141.Letter of Edward Barton dated 16 March 1596.
46. *Hurmuzaki*, III (1) document LXVII Raport despre petrecerea lui Iancu Voda In Polonia si despre refuzul Regelui Poloniei de a-l da pe mina Turcilor [dated 1582]; Dan Simionescu, 'Cronica lui Balthasar Walther despre Mihai Viteazul în raport cu cronicile contemporane.' in *Ştudii şi Materiale de Istorie Medie* Vol.III [1959], pp70-2.
47. Tappe, *Documents* no.160, Letter from Barton to Sir Robert Cecil dated 25 October 1597.
48. *ibid.*; *Hurmuzaki*, III (1) Document LXX, Letter from Girolamo Capello to the Doge dated 5 November 1597; Simionescu, 'Cronica lui Balthasar Walther...', pp 70-2.
49. I. Miculescu-Prajescu, 'New data concerning the installation of Movilă princes.' in *Slavonic and East European Review* [1971], p 217.
50. The Ottomans failed to respect this agreement after Ieremie's death; moreover Ieremie maintained his tenure of the Moldavian throne partly through bribery.

51. Simionescu, 'Cronica lui Balthasar Walther...' in *Studii si Materiale de Istorie Medie* Vol.III [1959], p 72.
52. *ibid.*
53. *Hurmuzaki*, III (1), document LXX, Letter of Capello to the Doge dated 5th November 1597.
54. Simionescu, 'Cronica lui Balthasar Walther', p 72.
55. Iorga, 'Pretendenti domnesti in secolul al XVI-lea.' in *Memoriile Academiei Romane* XVI [1897], p 254.
56. *Hurmuzaki* III (1), Doc.XCVI, Letter of Girolamo Capello to the Doge dated 26 December 1599; c.f. *Hurmuzaki*, IV (2) (1600-1650), pp 241-247, Documents.CCVIII, Letter from Homer Aga to the Doge dated 23 December 1599; CCXIII, Petition of Elena Cievatelli to the Doge asking for more aid dated 15th December 1599. Elena complained that Iusuf-Bey had now cut off her allowance and had refused to provide her with the necessary dowry to enter to convent of *Corpus Domini* therefore she intended to enter a closed convent. The Doge agreed to help her. See *Hurmuzaki* IV (2), Document CCXIV, The decision of the Venetian Senate regarding Elena Cievatelli dated 19 February 1600; also *ibid* Letter of 7 April 1600.
57. Tappe, *Documents* no.200, Letter of Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 5 July 1600.
58. *ibid.*
59. Iorga, 'Pretendenti...', p 255.
60. Miculescu-Prajescu, 'New data...', *op. cit.* p 218.
61. *ibid.* p 221; c.f. A.D.Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor* (ed. Stoicescu and Simionescu) Vol.III p 179.
62. Miculescu-Prăjescu, *op. cit.*, p 234.
63. Diocanul Nicolae I Serbanescu, 'Legăturile Patriarhului Meletie Pigaș cu Țările Române.' in *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* [LXIV no.7-9] (1946) pp 352-72; Andrei Pippidi, *Tradiția Politică Bizantină* p 191.

CHAPTER VI STEFAN BOGDAN AND HENRY LELLO BETWEEN THE YEARS 1601 AND 1606

1. Ludovic Demény and Cernovodeanu, *Relațiile Politice ale Angliei cu Moldova, Țara Românească și Transilvania în secolele XVI-XVIII* [Bucharest 1974] pp 44-45.

2. *Acts of the Privy Council of England 1601-1604* (ed.J.Roche Dasent), [London 1907] p 407 A letter to Henry Lello dated 1st December 1601.

3. *Calendar of State Papers: Domestic 1601-1603* Volume CCLXXXII p 135, Letter no.48 dated 29th December 1601; p 160, Letter no.50 Anthony Tracy to Sir Robert Cecil dated 5/15 March 1602; *S.P. 97/ 4* f 176, Letter of Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 10 July 1602.

4. *Acts of the Privy Council.* p 407.

5. J.R.Jones, *Britain and Europe in the 17th Century* [London, 1966] pp 3-12.

6. *Acts of the Privy Council* p 407, A letter to Henry Lello dated 1 December 1601.

7. *S.P. 97/4* f 176, Letter of Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 10 July 1602.

8. *S.P. 97/4* f 151 Letter of Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 2nd January 1602; *ibid.* f156 Letter of Lello to Cecil dated 1 February 1602; *ibid.* f 158 Letter of Lello to Cecil dated 16 February 1602; *ibid.* f 162 Letter of Lello to Cecil dated 2 March 1602; *ibid.* f 170 Letter of Lello to Cecil dated 1 May 1602.

9. *S.P. 97/4* 176, Letter of Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 10 July 1602.

10. *ibid.*

11. *S.P. 97/4* f 181 Letter of Henry Lello to Sir Robert Cecil dated 7 August 1602.

12. *S.P. 97/4* f 181 7 August 1602 Lello to Salisbury; *S.P. 97/5* f. 41 14th November 1605 Lello to Salisbury.

13. *ibid* f 41.

14. *ibid*.

15. *ibid*.

16. *S.P. 97/4* f 252 Letter from the Prince of Moldavia to the Earl of Salisbury dated 7 March 1604:

“...I am a prisoner in the Castle of Asia because of Henry Lello who has made close friends with my mortal enemy Jeremia...”

17. The King's letters sent to Venice were not transported to Constantinople because the merchants there did not want the expence of sending them on: instead they were entrusted to a Jew who did not bother to send them to Constantinople. see *S.P. 97/4* f 254 Letter of Lello to Cecil dated 5 April 1604.

18. *H.M.C. 9 Salisbury XXIV addenda 1605-1668* Letter of Gaspar Gratiani to the Earl of Salisbury undated but before 26 June 1605.

19. *ibid*.

20. *H.M.C. 9 Salisbury XVII* p 277 Letter of the Earl of Salisbury to Henry Lello dated 26 June 1605.

21. *S.P. 97/5* f 41 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 14 November 1605; c.f. *S.P. 97/5* f 158-9 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 2 May 1607.

22. *H.M.C. 9 Salisbury XVII* Letter of the Earl of Salisbury to Henry Lello dated 26 June 1605.

23. *S.P. 97/5* f 30, Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 27 October 1605.

24. *S.P. 97/5* f 41 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 14 November 1605; f 50 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 2 January 1606.

25. *S.P. 97/5* f 53 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 25 January 1606.

26. *S.P. 97/5* f 63 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 10 May 1606.

27. *S.P. 97/5* ff 158-9 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 2 May 1607.

28. *S.P. 97/5* f 68 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 1 July 1606.

29. *ibid.*

30. *ibid.*

31. *S.P. 97/5* f 70 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 17 July 1606 ; *S.P. 88 [Poland] 2* f 34 Letter of Dr. Wm Bruce to Lord Cranbourne dated 15 August 1606; *S.P. 97/5* f 79 Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 22 October 1606; see also V.J Parry, 'The Ottoman Empire 1566-1617' in *New Cambridge Modern History Volume III The Counter Reformation and Price Revolution 1559-1610* [Cambridge, 1968] p 364. This war showed the Ottomans that they could not break Habsburg resistance. The location of the peace conference on neutral ground at Zitava-Zorok showed how much the relative balance between Austria and the Ottomans had changed since Suleiman the Magnificent to the Emperor's advantage. Hithertoe Austria had been forced to send ambassadors to Constantinople to sue for peace or gain an agreement. This peace did not appear as an act of grace or favour from the Sultan to a supplicant foe. The Emperor yielded no more tribute to the Sultan.

32. *S.P. 97/5* f 158-9 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 2 May 1607; Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor* pp 324-334.

33. *ibid.*

34. Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland Volume I The Origins to 1795* [Oxford, 1982] p 456; Cernovodeanu, 'Aventuroasa Viață a lui Ștefan Bogdan un Princip Moldovean la Curtea regelui Iacob I Stuart' in *Magazin Istoric* [Anul IX] (March 1975) pp 20-22 and (April 1975) pp 50-54.

35. *ibid.* p 455.

36. *British Museum (Cotton Collection) Nero Bxi* f 245a Letter "To the Honourable Sir Edward Hoby Kt at his house in Upley in Kent" dated the

Strand August 1607.

37. *S.P. 97/5* f 158-9 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 2 May 1607.

38. *H.M.C. 9 Salisbury XVIII* p 255 Letter of Sir Thomas Lake to the Earl of Salisbury dated 27 August 1606:

“I have received back the Latin Letters whereof three are from the King of Poles...”

c.f. *S.P. 88/2* f 139 Letter of Sigismund III, King of Poland to James I dated 13/23 May 1606.

39. *ibid.*

CHAPTER VII STEFAN BOGDAN and SIR THOMAS GLOVER: 1607-12.

1. *S.P. 97/5*, f 41, Letter of Henry Lello to the Earl of Salisbury dated 14 November 1605; Sanderson, *Travels* p 244.

2. *S.P. 99 [Venice] 4*, f 156, Letter of the Earl of Salisbury to Sir Henry Wotton, English Ambassador in Venice dated 18 September 1607.

3. *S.P. 105/110 [Outgoing letters of the Levant Company]*, f 12, Letter of the Levant Company to the Earl of Salisbury dated ?20 January 1607; Sanderson, *Travels* p 243, Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to John Sanderson dated December 1607:

“I hope ere this our good friend Prince Jancolo hath obteyned the suite of our King and doe longe to heare the issue etc. I doubt not but Mustafa his counterfett ambassie is already at an end;for which at his arrivall heare...[he] shall have that rewaurd as he shall goe very neere to lose his head...I doe greatly mervaile of his soe good entertaynment in Inghland, being of long tyme notise geven by myselfe and others both unto My Lord of Salisbury and the Company what manner of man he was and to what end his employment intended.

4. Sanderson, *Travels*, Introduction p xxxv.

5. *British Museum Cotton Collection Nero Bxi*, f 245a, Letter addressed to Sir Edward Hoby dated August 1607.

6. *Calendar of State Papers Venetian 1607-10* no.50, Letter of Zorzi Giutinian, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate dated 22 August 1607.

7. Francis Beaumont (born 1584?, died 6 March 1616) collaborated with John Fletcher (Dec.1579-August 1625) on a number of plays; D.C. Brown, *Dictionary of Literary Biography* [London, 1959], pp 43 and 237.

8. Act IV line 77:

Lady: "Welcome Sir Knight unto my father's Court, King of Moldavia; unto me Pompiona, his daughter deere."

9. *HMC 9 Salisbury XIX* p 252 Letter of Sir Thomas Lake to the Earl of Salisbury dated 21 September 1607; (ed.A.Gioranescu), *Documente Privitoare la Istoria Românilor culese din Arhivele din Simancas* [Bucharest, 1940] No.CDLXI Letter from Don Guillen de San Clemente to Philip III dated Prague 5 July 1606; *ibid.*, No.CDLXV Letter of The Spanish Ambassador in London to Philip III dated 20 November 1607; *ibid.*, No.CDLXVIII Minutes of the Council of State in Madrid dated 10 January 1608.

10. *British Museum Manuscripts Add. Ch. 44, 660* Grant of Land in Moldavia dated 1607; *S.P. 97/5* ff 221, 223 Form of Letter to the Sultan desired by the Prince of Moldavia and form of the same dated 20 September 1607; f 217 Petition of the Prince of Moldavia to James I for 1,000 pounds,undated.

11. *S.P. 97/6* f213, Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 24 February 1610.

12. *S.P. 97/5* f 217 Petition of the Prince of Moldavia to King James I for 1,000 pounds undated; f 220 is another version of this petition in which Bogdan expressed his earnest desire to be of service to King James when his ambitions had born fruit.

13. *H.M.C. 9 Salisbury XIX* p 309 Warrant dated October 1607:

"to the Prince of Moldavia 3001"

Calendar S.P. Domestic 1603-10 p 376,Warrant to repay to the Earl of

Salisbury 9001 disbursed by him viz 3001 to the Prince of Moldavia dated 26 October 1607.

14. *ibid.*, p 252, Letter of Sir Thomas Lake to the Earl of Salisbury dated 21 September 1607.

15. *H. M.C. 75 Downshire II* p 215, Letter of J Beaulieu to William Trumbull dated 12 January 1610.

16. *S.P. 99/4* f 175 Letter to Sir Henry Wotton dated 12 October 1607.

17. *S.P. 105/109* [Archives of the Levant Company], f 32, Letter of the Earl of Salisbury to Sir Thomas Lowe dated 9 October 1607.

Sir Thomas Lowe: Governor of the Levant Company from 1605 until his death on 11 April 1623. He was a prominent London merchant, an Alderman from 1594, Sheriff 1595-6 and Lord Mayor 1604-5. He was seven times Master of the Haberdasher's Company and represented London in Parliament for many years.

18. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1607-10* no.117 Letter of Zorzi Giustinian to the Doge and Senate dated 21 November 1607.

19. *Sir Henry Wotton. Life and Letters* (ed. L.P. Smith) [1907] Vol. I p 414, Letters of Wotton to the Earl of Salisbury dated 21 November 1607 and 22 February 1608.

20. *S.P. 99/5*, f 84. Letter of Sir Henry Wotton to the Earl of Salisbury dated March 1608.

21. *ibid.*

22. *Sir Henry Wotton. Life and Letters*, pp 437-8, no.140, Letter of Wotton to the Earl of Salisbury dated 7 November 1608; *S.P. 97/6* f 28 Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 31 May 1608; see also N.Iorga, *Anglo-Romanian Relations* [Bucharest, 1931], Appendix: letters 4, 5 and 6 from Stefan Bogdan to King James, Queen Anne and the Earl of Salisbury dated 16 June 1608.

23. 'John Sanderson's Diary and Commonplace Book', *British Museum Lansdowne Manuscripts 241*, f 90 Copy of a letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 21 August 1607; Sanderson, *Travels*, p 239, Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 18 August 1607.

24. Sanderson, *op. cit.*, p 243, Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to John Sanderson dated December 1607.

25. *ibid.*, p 253, Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to John Sanderson dated 17 August 1608.

26. *S.P. 105 109* f 33 Letter of Sir Thomas Lowe to Sir Thomas Glover dated 17 July 1608; *S.P.105 110*, f 28, Letter from the Levant Company to Sir Thomas Glover [dated ?22 September 1608]; f 23 The Company to Sir Thomas Glover dated 13 July 1608, note in margin:

“ye Prince of Moldavia concerns not the Company.”

27. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 254, Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 20 August 1608.

28. *S.P. 105 109* f 33 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to Sir Thomas Lowe dated 17 July 1608.

29. *S.P. 97/6* f 28 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 31 May 1608.

30. *S.P. 97/6*, f 65 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 1 September 1608; f 52, Letter of Glover to Salisbury dated 17 August 1608.

31. *S.P. 97/6* f 62 Letter of the Earl of Salisbury to Sir Thomas Glover dated 16 September 1608; *Calendar S.P. Domestic 1603-10*, p 58, Warrant to the Governor of the Levant Company for 30001 to further the restitution of the Prince of Moldavia dated 25 September 1608.

32. *S.P. 97/6* f 73 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 15 October 1608.

33. *S.P. 97/6* f 79 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 17 November 1608.

34. *S.P. 97/6* f 82 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 2 December 1608.

35. *S.P. 97/6* f 58 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 17 December 1608.

36. *S.P. 105 110* f 27 Letter of the Levant Company to Anthony Abbdie

[dated ?22 December] 1608; see also f 30 Letter of the Company to Sir Thomas Glover dated 23 February 1609.

37. *S.P. 105 110* f 32 Letter of the Levant Company to Anthony Abbdie dated 23 February 1609: Letters of credit no longer to be sent to James Higgins for the full amount; see also f 37, Letter of the Company to James Higgins at Venice dated 2 March 1609.

38. 'John Sanderson's Diary and Commonplace Book', *B.M. Lansdowne Manuscripts 241*, f 98, Letter of John Kately at Constantinople to John Sanderson in London dated 1608.

39. *ibid.*, f 198 Letter of John Sanderson to [?Thomas Glover].dated 18 January 1609.

40. *S.P. 97/6* f 93 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 23 January 1609.

41. *S.P. 97/6* f 103, Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 12 February 1609; see also *Cal. S.P. Venetian 1607-10*, no. 47, Letter of Simon Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 24 February 1609.

42. *ibid.*:

"I have learned from a very safe quarter that the English Ambassador here has offered to the Grand Vizier to bring a considerable number of galleons from England to reinforce the projected Turkish Armada, which is to fight the enemies of the Empire on condition, however, that the booty of these vessels shall remain the property of the English and that wherever they may go inside the Turkish Empire English subjects may mix freely with the Turks. The Ambassador promises to write at once to England on the matter and to have answer immediately. On this account the Pasha in his desire to please the Ambassador, has at his request, set free about fifty Vlachs who some days back were condemned and arrested in Divan, while supporting the cause of the Pretended prince. His cause is in a bad way betwixt disgrace and danger. Many of his followers are in the Tower."

43. *S.P. 97/6* f 107 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 17 March 1609.

44. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 262, Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to John

Sanderson dated 5 April 1609.

45. (ed.I.Corfus), *Documente... Polone* Volume II no.27, The instructions of Gh. Kochanski, envoy to the Porte dated Cracow 29 April 1609; *S.P.* 97/6 f 114 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 7 May 1609; the suite was delayed whilst the arrival of the Polish Ambassador was awaited; *ibid.*, f 23, Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 15 July 1609: the Polish Ambassador arrived in Constantinople on 12 July 1609; *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1607-10*, no.611 Letter of Antonio Foscarini, Venetian Ambassador in France to the Doge and Senate dated 9 September 1609.

46. *S.P.* 97/6 f 127 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 29 July 1609.

47. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1607-10*, no.609, Letter of Simon Contarini to the Doge and Senate dated 5 December 1609.

48. 'John Sanderson's Diary and Commonplace Book', *BM Lansdowne Manuscripts 241* f 251b Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 24 May 1609.

49. *S.P.* 97/6 f 119 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 24 June 1609.

50. *S.P.* 97/6 f 131 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 9 September 1609; *ibid.*, f 134, Glover to Salisbury dated 23 September 1609.

51. *S.P.* 101/94 f 118 Notes concerning letters from Constantinople dated 22 October 1609:

"He makes nor doubt that the Prince of Moldavia shall obtayne the principality in four dayes."

52. *S.P.* 97/6 f 143 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 15 December 1609; c.f. *S.P.* 101/94 f 118 *op. cit.* dated 30 December 1609:

"In this letter he writes...of the promise of Muratt Basha the cheife viceroy for restoring the prince the contract 80 thousand dollars, that money and more to the sum of 200 thousand chequins (every chequin 8 sterlings) is all ready for them in the towne and he setts down all this to be disbursed."

53. *S.P. 97/6*, f 149 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 13 January 1610.

54. *S.P. 97/6*, f 152, Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 10 February 1610.

55. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 273 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 11 February 1611; c.f. 'John Sanderson's Diary and Commomplace Book', *BM Lansdowne Manuscripts 241*, f 245 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 22 February 1611; *H.M.C. 9 Salisbury XX* [see list of abbreviations] p 802 Points of Jieronimo Meoli's letters.

56. *S.P. 97/6*, f 219 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 7 April 1611.

57. Although often referred to as Lady Arabella, she always signed her letters Arbella and this is the name used by her contemporaries and family .

58. *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol.I, p 525; D.N.Durant, *Arbella Stuart a rival to the Queen* [London 1978], pp 1-2.

59. James had the advantage of being descended on his mother's side (i.e. Mary ,Queen of Scots) from Margaret Tudor (the daughter of Henry VIII) by her first husband, James V of Scotland; and on his father's side from Margaret Tudor by her second husband Archibald Douglas, sixth Earl of Angus. c.f.Durant *op. cit.* p 8. However as Elizabeth I of England grew older and the subject of the succession had become more immediate there had been some speculation that Arbella's title was preferable even to that of James as she had been born on English soil whereas he was considered an alien and therefore, being disqualified from possessing land in England, was also disqualified from wearing the Crown. *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol.I, p 525.

60. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1603-7*, no.739 (p 514), Report on England by Nicolo Molin to the Doge and Senate dated 1607.

61. The lands had been granted outright to Charles Stuart and his heirs in perpetuity.

62. In 1608 and 1609 Arbella was begging for grants of English and Irish monopolies, see *Dictionary of National Biograghy*, Vol.I, p525.

63. *Notes and Queries*, 10th series x, pp 46, 93, 156; *ibid.* 1st series, vi, p 555.
64. Durant, *Lady Arbella Stuart*, pp 32, 34.
65. *ibid.*, Chapter II.
66. *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol.I, p 252.
67. Durant, *op. cit.*, Chapter II.
68. *HMC 9 Salisbury XV*, Introduction p4.
69. E.T.Bradley, *Arbella Stuart* (2 vols), [London 1889], p 254.
70. *ibid.*
71. Wotton had previously reported that Bogdan had a wife. See also *S.P. 99/5*, f 8 Letter of Henry Wotton to the Earl of Salisbury dated 5 January 1608.
72. *Sir Henry Wotton Life and Letters* (ed. L.P. Smith) Letter of Henry Wotton to the Earl of Salisbury dated 7 November 1608; see also *S.P. 99/5*, f 191 Letter of Henry Wotton to the Earl of Salisbury dated 7 November 1608.
73. *S.P. 97/6*, f 159 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated April 1610.
74. *HMC 75 Downshire II* (Papers of William Trumbull), p 211 Letter of J.Beaulieu to William Trumbull dated Blackfriars 29 December 1609; c.f. *B.M. Add. Manuscripts 32,092*, f 220 Letter of Lady Arbella Stuart to the King.dated 1612.
75. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1607-10*, no.774, Letter of Marc'Antonio Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate dated 1610.
76. *H.M.C. 75 Downshire II*, p 219, Letter of John More to William Trumbull dated 18 January 1610.
77. *S.P. 97/6*, f 159 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 22 April 1610.

78. *ibid.*

79. *Memorials of the Affairs of State in the reigns of Queen Elizabeth and King James I* (ed.E.Sawyer) Vol.III p 117 Letter of Mr. Chamberlaine to Sir Ralph Winwood dated 15 February 1610.

80. Ben Jonson, *Epicoene.or the Silent Woman* Act V, Scene I,

line 21:

“La Fook: No he has his box of instruments.

Clement: Like a surgeon!

La Fook: For the mathematiques and to draw maps of every place
and person where he comes.

Clement: How, maps of persons!

La Fook: Yes sir, of Nomentack, when he was here
and of the Prince of Moldavia and of
his mistris, Mistris Epicoene.

also *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1607-10*, no.794, Letter of Francisco Contarini and Mar'Antonio Correr, Venetian Ambassadors in England to the Doge and Senate.

81. *B.M Stowe Manuscripts 171*, f 290 Letter of Dudley Carleton to the Earl of Salisbury dated 13 July 1610.

82. *Notes and Queries*, series I no.i, pp 11-11; see also *B.M Add. Manuscripts* ch.17,357, Account of Lady Arbella Stuarts custody; Biographical notes: *B.M. Add.Manuscripts 4173* f 32; *ibid.* 4223 ff 306-16; *ibid.* 4244 f 21b; Letters when imprisoned in the Tower of London: *ibid. Add. Manuscripts 32,092*, ff 220-22; Letters concerning custody and attempted escape of (1611) *B.M. Add.Manuscripts 43,727*, ff 10-16; see also *B.M. Cotton Collection, Vespasian Manuscripts Fiii 35*; *B.M. Lansdowne Manuscripts* Letter MCCXXXVI 39; CIXV 7; *Stowe Manuscripts 155* f 18; *ibid.* 171 ff 290, 296, 307; *ibid.* 172 ff 61,81; *ibid.* 142 ff 30; *ibid.* 158 f 31. *Harleian Manuscripts 28,451* f 41; see also *Cal.S.P. Domestic 1603-10* see index; *ibid 1610-13* pp 54, 75, 113, 168, 183, 242, 401, 436.

83. *Hurmuzaki*, Vol.IV/2, p 319, no.CCCXVII, Letter of King James I to Sigismund III of Poland dated 24 June 1610; Sanderson, *Travels*, p 271, Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 29 November 1610.

84. 'John Sanderson's Diary and Commonplace Book', *B.M.*

Lansdowne Manuscripts 241, f 411 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to John Sanderson dated 9 March 1610; *S.P. 97/6*, f 150 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 24 March 1610; *S.P. 101/94* f 120, News from Constantinople dated 14 March 1610.

85. *S.P. 97/6*, f 159 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 22 April 1610; Sanderson, *Travels*, p 269, Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to John Sanderson dated 22 April 1610.

86. *SP. 97/6*, f 168 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 16 June 1610.

87. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 271 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 29 November 1610; *ibid.* p 270 Letter of John Sanderson to Sir Thomas Glover dated 23 October 1610.

88. George Sandys, *Travaillies*, [1610], p 66.

89. Nicolae Iorga, *Anglo-Romanian Relations* [Bucharest, 1931], Appendix, letter 2, Stefan Bogdan to King James dated 23 April 1610.

90. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1610-13*, no.134, letter of Simon Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople, to the Doge and Senate dated 11 December 1611.

91. J.K. Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century* [1980] pp 10-11.

92. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1610-13*, no. 173, Letter of Simon Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 5 Febraury 1611.

93. Sanderson, *Travels*, p 275 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to John Sanderson dated 9 March 1611; *S.P. 97/6*, f 216, Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 6 April 1611; *ibid.* , ff 157-167, Glover to Salisbury dated 15 June 1611.

94. *S.P. 97/6*, f 216 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 16 April 1611; N.Iorga, *Anglo-Romanian Relations Appendices 9 & 10*, Deposition of Vincentio Marino in the presence of the Prince of Moldavia 30 November 1610 and Copy of a letter of the Prince of Transylvania given to Stefan Bogdan dated 12 May 1611.

95. *S.P. 99/7*, f 228 Letter from Prague dated 2 May 1611:

“Il y a icy des Valaquis qui demandent seccours pour leur Vayvode Radul contre le Prince de Transylvanie Gabriel Battori Sigismond cousin de cestuicy qui possedda auis fois ceste Province l'a avec terreur des Turcs; el qui l'a cedda a l'Empereur ainsi que vous [savet]”;

see also *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1610-13*, no. 239 Letter of Simon Contarini to the Doge and Senate dated 28 May 1611.

96. *S.P. 97/6*, ff 239-242 Letters of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 14 July 1611; c.f. (ed.Stoicescu și Simionescu), A.D.Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Trăiană* Vol. III, Editia IV [Buchuresti, 1988], p 360, note 27.

97. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1610-13*, no.318 Letter of Simon Contarini, Venetian Ambassador to the Doge and Senate dated 3 September 1611; *H.M.C. 75 Downshire III*, p 137 News from Constantinople dated 7 September 1611; *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1610-13*, no.344 Letter of Simon Contarini to the Doge and Senate dated 1 October 1611.

98. *H.M.C. 75 Downshire III*, p 158 Letter of H.Bilderbeck to William Trumbull dated Cologne 20 October 1611; *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1610-13*, p 368, Letter of Simon Contarini to the Doge and Senate dated 12 November 1611.

99. *H.M.C. 75 Downshire III*, p 183 Letter of Richard Church to Thomas Newport dated Constantinople 16 November 1611; *S.P. 97/6*, ff 265-68 and ff 276-78 Two letters from Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 15 November 1611.

100. N.Iorga, *Anglo-Romanian Relations*, Appendices 11 and 12, Letters of Stefan Bogdan to the King and the Earl of Salisbury dated 16 November 1611.

101. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1610-13*, no 445 Letter of Simon Contarini to the Doge and Senate dated 25 February 1612.

102. *S.P. 99/9*, f 192 Letter of [Sir Dudley] Carleton to [Sir John] Digby dated 13 April 1612.

103. *ibid.*

104. *H.M.C. 75 Downshire III*, p 183, Letter of Richard Church to

Thomas Newport dated Constantinople 16 November 1611.

105. *S.P. 105/110 [Outgoing letters of the Levant Company]*, 54, Letter from the Company to Sir Thomas Glover dated 17 September 1611; *S.P. 99/8*, f 162, The Earl of Salisbury to Sir Dudley Carleton dated 9 October 1611; *ibid.* 225 Letter of Sir Dudley Carleton to the Earl of Salisbury dated 1 November 1611; (ed .N.E. McClure), *Letters of John Chamberlain* [Philadelphia, 1939] Vol.I p 313 no.125 Chamberlaine to Sir Dudley Carleton dated London 13 November 1611; *S.P. 105 110* f 58 Letter of the Levant Company to the Nation at Constantinople dated 27 November 1611.

106. *CalS.P .Venetian 1610-13* no.405 Letter of Simon Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 25 February 1612.

107. *S.P. 103/72 [Treaty Papers]*, f 4, An Abstract of Mr Pindar his Ambr at Constantinople dated 1 March 1612, item 2.

108. *B.M. Manuscripts, Nero Bxi*, f 280a Letter of Paul Pindar to my Lord dated 30 August 1611.

109. *S.P. 97/6*, ff 262-3 Letter of Paul Pindar to the Earl of Salisbury dated 8 November 1611; Knolles, *Generall History of the Turkes* [1621], p 1385-6.

110. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1619-21*, no.375 Letter of Almoro Nani, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople to the Doge and Senate dated 13 October 1620.

111.(ed.A.Gioranescu), *Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor culese din Arhivele din Simancas*, [Bucharest, 1940], No.CDLXXVII, Letter of Gieronimo Combi to Philip III of Spain dated 11 September 1610.

112 *S.P. 97/6* ff 262-3 Letter of Paul Pindar to the Earl of Salisbury dated 8 November 1611.

113. *S.P. 99/9*, f 220 Letter of Paul Pindar to Sir Dudley Carleton dated 25 April 1612.

114. *ibid* ; see also *S.P. 97/6*, ff 262-3 Letter of Paul Pindar to the Earl of Salisbury dated 8 November 1611.

115. *S.P.* 97/6, f 261 Letter of the Earl of Salisbury to Sir Thomas Glover dated 11 September 1611.

116. *S.P.* 105/110 f 59 Levant Company to Paul Pindar dated 30 April 1612; *B.M. Manuscripts, Nero Bxi*, f 280a, Letter from Paul Pindar to my Lord dated 30 August 1611; William Lithgow, *Rare Adventures* [London 1614], p 127; see also *S.P.* 105/110, f 58, Levant Company to the Nation at Constantinople dated 27 November 1611.

117. *S.P.* 97/6, f 279 Letter of Sir Thomas Glover to the Earl of Salisbury dated 30 November 1611: the Pasha of Buda was expected;

“at whose cominge our distressed Prince hopeth of some good alteration if not in his time that at the great Vizereys coming but if that should allsoe fayle then he must repayre to the Prince of Transylvania wch must be his last refuge”;

see also *S.P.* 97/7, f 1 Letter of Paul Pindar to the Earl of Salisbury dated 1 March 1612.

118. *ibid.*

119. *B.M. Stowe Manuscripts 172*, f 250 Letter of Paul Pindar to [Dudley Carleton?] dated 25 April 1612; William Lithgow, *Rare Adventures* p 179.

120. *S.P.* 99/10 f 243 Letter of Sir Dudley Carleton to other Ambassadors dated 1 September 1612.

121. (ed. McClure), *Letters of John Chamberlain*, p 412 no.162 Letter of John Chamberlaine to Sir Ralph Winwood dated 29 January 1613; *Cal.S.P. Domestic 1611-18*, p 175 Letter of John Chamberlain for Dudley Carleton dated 11 March 1613.

122. Richard Knolles, *Generall Historie of the Turkes* [London, 1621] p 1205; Thomas Gainsford, *Glorie of England* [London, 1618] p 192; Lithgow, *op. cit.* p 179.

123. *B.M. Manuscripts, Nero Bxi*, f 280a Letter of Paul Pindar to My Lord dated 30 August 1612.

124. *S.P.* 103/77 [*Treaty papers*], f 4 An abstract of Mr Pindar his Ambr at Constantinople dated 1 March 1612, item 9; *S.P.* 105/110, f 59, Letter from the Levant Company to Paul Pindar dated 30 April 1612:

“We understand the great disgrace our Nation is in there by the ill-govmt of Sir Thomas Glover, whereuppon the French and Venetians take advantage to raise many fraudulent and slanderous suggestions against us wch wee doubt not but your Lp.... shall in a little space easilie weare out praying you therefore not to be dismaied therein for you maie safelie alleadge that neither the French nor the Venetians have held better correspondence wth that nation either by lres or otherwise then his Matie hithertoe hath done..”

Cal S.P. Venetian 1610-13, no. 405 Letter of Simon Contarini Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople, to the Doge and Senate dated 25 February 1612; *ibid.*, no 386 Letter of the Doge and Senate to the Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople dated 5 December 1611.

125. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1610-13*, No.405 Letter of Simon Contarini to the Doge and Senate 31 December 1611.

126. I.Lubimenko, ‘A Project for the Acquisition of Russia by James I’, in *English Historical Review* XXIX [1914] pp 248, 254-6; C.S.L.Dunning, ‘A letter to James I concerning the English plan for military intervention in Russia’ in *Slavonic and East European Review* Vol.I 69 No 1 [January, 1989] pp 94-105; C.S.L. Dunning, ‘James I, the Russia Company and the plan to establish a Protectorate over Northern Russia’ in *Albion* [1989] pp 206-219.

127. *S.P. 97/6*, f 283 Letter of Paul Pindar to Sir Dudley Carleton dated 30 December 1611.

128. *B.M. Manuscripts, Nero Bxi*, f 280a Letter of Paul Pindar to my Lord dated 30 August 1612.

CHAPTER VIII. GASPAR GRATIANI - DRAGOMAN AND PRINCE OF MOLDAVIA (1619-20)

1. A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Trăiană* Vol. III (Editiãa a IV-a. ed.Nicolae Stoicescu și Maria Simionescu) [București 1988], p 384; see also Nicolae Iorga, *Ștudii și Documente cu privire la Istoria Românilor* Volume XX [1910] p 3; c.f. Ludovic Demeny and Paul Cernovodeanu, *Relațiile Politice ale Angliei cu Moldova, Țara Românească și Transilvania în secolele XVI-XVIII.* [București, 1974], p 53.

2. Iorga, *op. cit.* p 3.
3. Thomas Gainsford, *Glorie of England* [London, 1615] p 192.
4. A.Pippidi, 'Quelque Dragomans de Constantinople au XVIIe Siecle' in *Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Europeen* X [1972] no.2 p232; A. Cunningham, ' "Dragomania": The Dragomans of the British Embassy in Turkey.' in *St.Anthony's Papers*, XI [1961], pp 82-3.
5. 'Viața lui Gaspar Gratiani, voevodul Moldovei între 1619-20, scrisă de Ioan Iâncovici, prieten și tovarăș al lui Grațiani, la 1655.' in *Călători Străini despre Țările Române* (ed. Maria Holban, M.M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Paul Cernovodeanu) Vol. IV [1972], p 553; c.f. Knolles, *Generall Historie of the Turkes* [1621], 1385.
6. Nicolae Iorga, *Studii si Documente cu privire la Istoria Romanilor* Volume XX p 5. Constantin Rezachevici, 'Politica Internă și Externă a Țărilor Române în primele trei decenii ale secolului al XVII-lea' in *Revista de Istorie* (1985) Number 1, p 24. Also Elvira Georgescu, 'Trois Princes Roumaines et le projet de croisade du Duc de Nevers.' in *Revue Historique du Sud-Est Europeen* [1934] pp 337-341.
7. William Lithgow, *Rare Adventures* [London, 1614] p 239; c.f. Richard Knolles, *Generall Historie of the Turkes* [London 1621]. p 1361.
8. Georgescu, *op. cit.* p 341. Letter from Gratiani to the Duc of Nevers dated 5th October 1618; see also N.Iorga, *Ștudii și Documente cu privire la Istoria Românilor* Volume IV [1902], letters XXI-XXIII.
9. C.Rezachevici, *op.cit.*, p 24; also M.Ciuntu *Pretendenți domnești în secolul al XVII-lea* .[București, 1940] p 109 concerning Radu Șerban and Nicolae Pătrașcu. For Gratiani's visits to Vienna see Georgescu, *Trois Prince Roumaines...*' in *Revue Historique du Sud-est Europeen* [1934], pp 337-341. For the 'Christian Militia' see C. Gollner, 'Beziehungen der Rumanischen Wojewoden Radu Serban, Nicolae Petrascu und Gaspar Gratiani zur "Milice Chretienne." ' in *Revue des Etudes Sud-est Europeenes*. [1968] pp 71-84. For Gratiani's activities as a double agent working in the interests of the Habsburgs see A.Pippidi, 'Quelques Drogmans de Constantinople au XVIIe Siecle' in *Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Europeen* X [1972] no.2 p 243.
10. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1617-19* p 502-3 letter no.799. Dated 1st February 1619. Francisco Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in Constantinople and Almorò Nani, Venetian Bailo in Constantinople, to the Chiefs of the

Council of Ten.

11. C.Rezachevici, *op. cit.*, p 24.

12. A.Pippidi, 'Quelque Drogmans..' in *Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Europeen* X [1972] no.2 p 242.

13. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1617-19*, .(p 502) Document no. 798 In the Council of Ten, dated 20th March 1619.

14. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1617-19* (p 502-3), no.799, Letter of Francisco Contarini and Almore Nani to the Council of Ten dated 1st February 1619.

15. *ibid.*

16. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1617-19* (p. 471). no. 748 Letter of Polo Minio to Francesco Contarini and Almore Nani dated 16th February 1618..

17. *Cal.S.P. Venetian 1619-21*,. no. 17 Letter of Almore Nani to the Doge and Senate dated September 1619

18. *ibid.*

19. *SP 105/103 [Journal of Affairs during Sir Thomas Roe's Embassy]* Record of a Bargain made to Sir Paul Pindar sometimes Ambassador Resident at this port by ye Prince of Moldavia. 3/13 February 1619. Wkitten on 13th September 1622 at the request of Robert Salter.

20. A.D. Xenopol, *op. cit.* p 384.

21. *The Travels of Peter Mundy. Volume I Europe 1608-1628* [Hakluyt Society Series II Vol. XVII] p 50

22. C.Rezachevici, 'Politica Internă și Externă...' in *Revista de Istorie* (1985) Number 1, p 24.

23. A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Trăiană* Volume III, p 385.

24. 'Viata lui Gratiani' in (M.Holban, M.M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Paul Cernovodeanu), *Călători Străini despre Țările Române* Volume IV [1972], p 553.

25. Xenopol, *op. cit.*; see also Rezachevici, *op.cit.* and Mesrobeanu,

Diplomaticarum Italicum Volume II [1930] Documents XVII-XXXI written in Warsaw between October 1619 and October 1620 to and about Gaspar Gratiani.c.f. I.Corfus, *Documente privitoare la Istoria României culese din Arhivele Polone* Volume II Secolele al XVII-lea Letters no. 43-47 dated between March and September 1620, Letters to and from Gaspar Gratiani and the King of Poland, Hatman Zolkiewski and Toma Zamoyski and from Luca Miaskowski to his brother Adalbert written at the camp at Tutora.

26. *Hurmuzaki*, Volume XIV (ii) p 380 Letter of Almorô Nani to the Doge and Senate dated 18 August 1619.

27. Ludovic Demény and Paul Cernovodeanu, *Relatiile Politice ale Angliei cu Moldova, Ţara Româneasca si Transilvania în secolele XVI-XVIII*, [Bucureşti, 1974], pp 56-74; The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe, [London, 1740], pp 75-100 and the Preface: "...The delays he [i.e. Bethlen] met with from the Princes allied against the house of Austria ,and the irresolution of the English Court for a considerable time at first together with the levity of that of France, greatly contributed to justify as well as to lose him "

See also 'Sir Thomas Roe' in *Dictionary of National Biography* [1973] vol.XVII, pp 89-93; A.Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses* [1813-20] pp 1149; (ed.Joseph Foster), *Alumni Oxonienses (1500-1714)*, [Oxford, n.d.] Volume III, (L-R), p 1272.

CONCLUSION

- 1.G.Mattingley, *Renaissance Diplomacy* [London,1955] pp 240-54.
2. R.Hakluyt, *Voyages* vol. VI, pp 221-28; vol. VI, pp 116-8; *S.P.* 97/2 f 161 George Gifford's report dated 8 February 1592.
3. Thomas Gainsford, *Glorie of England* [London, 1615], p 192.
4. William Lithgow, *Rare Adventures* [London,1614] p 239.
5. *Cal.S.P. Foreign Vol III June 1591-April 1592 List and Analysis* [1980] p 500 no. 930 Letter of the Sultan to Queen Elizabeth dated February 1592.
6. *S.P.* 97 2 f 161 George Gifford's report dated 8 February 1592.
7. 'The Letters of Sinan Bassa cheife counsellour to Sultan Murad Can

the Grand Signior, to the sacred Majestie of Elizabeth Queene of England, shewing that upon her request, and for her sake especially, hee graunted peace unto the Kinge and Kingdome of Poland.' [June 1590] in Hakluyt *Voyages*, VI p 69; 'A letter written by the most high and mighty Empresse the wife of the Grand Signior Sultan Murad Can to the Queenes Majesty of England in the yeere of our Lord, 1594' in Hakluyt *Voyages*, VI p 114.

8. Paul Wittek, 'The Turkish Documents in Hakluyt's Voyages' in *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* (19) [1942-3], pp 121-39

9. Richard Knolles, *Generall Historie of the Turkes* [1921] pp 1057-8, pp 1079-86.

10. Nicolae Iorga, *Anglo-Romanian Relations* [Bucharest, 1931] p 22.

11. Norman Davies, *God's Playground - A History of Poland* Vol.I pp 435-9.

APPENDIX 1

Notes on Coins

Asper: a Turkish silver coin with the approximate value of an English halfpenny

Sultanine: a Turkish gold coin with the approximate value of a Venetian *zecchino* (chequin), a Spanish ducat, or a Hungarian gold dollar. 1 Sultanine was equal to 180 aspers (1 asper being one halfpenny) also equal to 7 shillings and 6d. A Hungarian dollar was approximately equal to 5s sterling.

For payment in gold merchants tended to use foreign currency especially *zecchini*, *Sultani* (Sultanine), Hungarian gold dollars, the Italian Scudo and the Spanish Ducat all of which had similar value. John Sanderson lumped them altogether as 'gold ducats'. The term 'silver ducat' was used to refer to the Spanish *rial*, German *Thaler*, Italian *piastre* and French Crown. Three silver ducats were approximately equal to two gold ducats.

The value of Turkish coinage did fluctuate due to debasement. Relative values of these coins to English money are uncertain. In 1590 one gold ducat equalled 6s 8d [see SP 97 2 f 14 and f 21] In 1599, according to Thomas Dallam (*Dallam's Voyages* p 88) one *zecchino* was valued at 9s. In 1610 according to William Lithgow the gold ducat was worth 7s 6d. According to John Sanderson [*Travels* p 267] the exchange value of the *zecchino* was over 7s.

[see Sanderson, *Travels*,. pp 294-5]

APPENDIX II

Grand Viziers: [the Sultan's deputy and Chief Minister]

a) during the reign of Murad III [1574-1595]

Dec. 1582 - July 1584: Kanijeli Siyavus
July 1584 - Oct. 1585: Ozdemiroglu 'Osman
Dec. 1585 - April 1586: Hadim Mesih
Apr. 1586 - April 1589: Kanijeli Siyavus
Apr. 1589 - Aug. 1591: Koja Sinan [commander in Yemen and Tunis]
Aug. 1591 - Apr. 1592: Ferhad [commander in Persia]
Apr. 1592 - Jan. 1593: Kanijeli Siyavus
Jan. 1593 - Feb. 1595: Koja Sinan

b) during the reign of Sultan Mehemed III [1595-1603]



Feb. 1595 - July 1595: Ferhad
July 1595- Nov. 1595: Koja Sinan
Nov. 1595 - Dec. 1595: Lala Mehemed (died)
Dec. 1595 - Apr. 1596: Koja Sinan
Apr. 1596 - Oct. 1596: Damad Ibrahim
Oct. 1596 - Dec. 1596: Jigalazade Sinan
Dec. 1596 - Nov. 1597: Damad Ibrahim
Nov. 1597 - Apr. 1598: Hadim Hasan
Apr. 1598 - Jan. 1599: Jerrah Mehemed
Jan. 1539 - July 1601: Damad Ibrahim
July 1601 - Oct. 1603: Yemisci Hasan, a protege of Koja Sinan
Oct. 1603 - July 1604: Yavuz Malkoc Ali

c) during the reign of Ahmet I [1603-17]

Aug. 1604 - June 1606: Lala Mehemed
June 1606 - Dec. 1606: Dervis (Bostanji Basi)
Dec. 1606 - Aug. 1611: Kuyuju Murad
Aug. 1611 - Oct. 1614: Nasuh Pasa
Oct. 1614 - Nov. 1616: Okuz Mehmed
Nov. 1616 onwards: Halil

Other influences on the Sultan were people such as his mother, his wives, his sisters and their husbands, Court poets and historians, Court physicians, Army and Navy commanders as well as his favourites, people whose company he enjoyed and whose advice he respected.

ȘTEFAN CEL MARE




APPENDIX III genealogy showing Ștefan Bogdan's descent from Ștefan cel Mare and his relation -ship to numerous other pretenders and Princes of Moldavia

Note: the symbol = is used to denote marriage or that the woman in question was a mistress. Vertical lines denote children.


"Chiajna, later the wife of Mircea Ciobanul and daughter of Petru Rares could not have been the daughter of Elena Brancovici, as was pretended later in 1607 by Ștefan Bogdan." [quoted from S. Gorovei in 'Familia lui Petru Rares' in Petru Rares (București, 1978) pp266-70]

John Glover of Baxterley
resided at Mancetter (Warwickshire)




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APPENDIX IV genealogy of Sir Thomas
Glover



APPENDIX V: Genealogy of the Brutti
and Borisi families

APPENDIX VI A map showing the Principality of Moldavia's position in relation to Poland, Wallachia and Transylvania



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