

# **Examining Experience**

**Gabriel John Taylor Lakeman**

**UCL**

**PhD**

I, Gabriel John Taylor Lakeman, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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# Abstract

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I think visual experiences are *intentional*. And I think that different philosophical views about visual experience may be understood in terms of what they say about the intentionality of visual experience. In this thesis, I evaluate different views of experience and experiential intentionality by examining connections between experiential intentionality and further phenomenological, doxastic, epistemic and content-fixing features present in cases of perception and hallucination. I argue from consideration of such connections that visual experiences are intentionally directed on material objects with sensory qualities in their subject's environments. And I argue that there are some intentional features which are not constituted by *experiential relations* between the subject and such material objects with sensory qualities actually present in the subject's environment. For such features, we should accept a *representational* view of experiential intentionality.

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# Introduction

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I think visual experiences are intentional. And I think that different philosophical views about visual experience may be understood in terms of what they say about the intentionality of visual experience. I shall come to that later. But first I should say what I mean by claiming that visual experiences are intentional.

The notion of intentionality, as it is used in contemporary philosophy, traces its roots back to some famous remarks of Brentano. In a much quoted passage, Brentano claims that

[e]very mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.<sup>1</sup>

Here Brentano makes a series of claims about the intentionality of mental phenomena. He claims that *every* mental phenomena is intentional—as it has been more recently put, that intentionality is the *mark* of the mental.<sup>2</sup> And he claims that intentionality involves something he terms *inexistence*.<sup>3</sup> I am not concerned with either of these two claims. I am interested in three further claims we can distinguish in this passage. First, Brentano claims that intentionality involves mental phenomena being *directed*. Second, Brentano claims that intentional mental phenomena are directed at *objects*. And third, Brentano claims that mental phenomena are intentional in different *ways*. With respect to this first claim, I think we can put the point by

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<sup>1</sup> Brentano 1973 p.88

<sup>2</sup> See Crane 1998 for a defence of a version of this claim.

<sup>3</sup> See Crane 2006 for discussion of how many contemporary philosophers have misunderstood this claim.

saying that intentional mental states are *of* things. <sup>4</sup> To put it another way, they have ‘of-ness’. With respect to this second claim, for now, we can take the notion of an object of an intentional state to be characterised in terms of what the state is directed at, or of.

So what does it amount to for a mental state to be directed at, or of, objects, and in what way or ways are mental states intentional? One obvious way to provide a relatively *neutral* characterisation of intentionality is in linguistic terms. Thus we might say that a mental state is intentional iff it may be *correctly* characterised in terms of being of, or about, or directed on something or other. By this linguistic criteria for intentionality, it seems right that experiences are intentional. For example, seated at my desk, it seems correct to characterise my experiential position by saying that I have an experience of a brown desk, and so on.

Providing such a linguistic characterisation of intentionality is not yet to say anything about what it is *amounts to* for an experience to be intentional, or about the ways it may be so. Plausibly, intentionality is not a linguistic phenomena.<sup>5</sup> Rather, what we are interested in is how experience is in virtue of which it is correct to characterise experience in these ways. But I think attention to the ways we characterise experiential states as intentional is highly suggestive of two claims we might want to hold onto in an account of experiential intentionality. On the one hand, the objects we are happy to characterise experiences as being of, or directed on, just seem to be ordinary everyday material objects and their sensory qualities. Characterising my experience as being of a brown desk is such an example. But on the other hand, we characterise experiential intentionality in seemingly *relational* constructions. I experience a brown desk. So naively, we might suppose that an experience being such as to be correctly characterised in such terms is just a matter of that experience being one in which its subject is *experientially related* to such ordinary everyday material objects and their sensory qualities.

I think there is something very attractive about such an approach to experiential intentionality. But it faces a problem. Insofar as we have some rough grasp of the conditions under which it is correct to characterise experience in intentional terms, we have some grip on the conditions under which an experience may be intentionally directed at whatever it is directed at. But we are happy to characterise a subject’s experience in intentional terms, as for example, one in which she experiences a brown desk, in cases of *hallucination*. In cases of hallucination, the subject is not experientially related to any such material objects with sensory qualities in her environment. A subject may hallucinate when there are no such objects present, and yet the holding of

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<sup>4</sup> On the relevant notion of a mental state, mental processes and events count as mental states. Experiences, being *events*, thus count as mental states in the relevant sense.

<sup>5</sup> See Anscombe 1965 for an opposing view.

experiential relations requires the presence of the relata. So it looks as if understanding experiential intentionality in terms of relations to material objects in the subject's perceptual environment cannot be correct for cases of hallucination. At this stage, one might suppose that experiential intentionality is *non-relational*. That what it is for a subject to have an experience of such-and-such is not a matter of her standing in an experiential relation to such things in her environment. For example, one might suppose that having an experience of such-and-such is merely a matter of the subject being in a state which non-relationally *represents* the presence of such-and-such in her environment. Alternatively one might hold onto the idea that experiential intentionality is relational by denying that the intentional objects are *material objects* in the subject's environment. For example, one might suppose that *really* the subject is experientially related to non-material objects, and so the absence of material objects is no problem.

But this is too quick. Remember, Brentano talked of mental phenomena as being intentional in different *ways*. If we assume that experience is intentional in the *same* way across perceptual and hallucinatory cases, the above options seem exhaustive as accounts of what it is for experience to be intentional in that way.<sup>6</sup> But we should not assume that experience is intentional in the same way across such cases merely from the fact that we are happy to characterise it in the same terms. And so one can hold onto the idea that the intentionality of experience in *non-hallucinatory* cases *is* a matter of the subject being experientially related to material objects with sensory qualities in her environment. One simply needs to deny that hallucinatory cases involve the presence of intentionality in just the same way.

How do we decide between these views? I think that simply reflecting on how we characterise experience as intentional is unlikely to decide between them. I think the best the way to give content to the dispute is to connect the intentionality of perceptual and hallucinatory experiences to various other features associated with such features. And this is what I shall do in this thesis.

In Chapter One, I consider the relation between experiential intentionality and the *phenomenal character* of experience. First, I argue that reflection on what philosophers might mean by 'phenomenal character' supports the idea that the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by its intentional properties. Second, I argue that introspective attention to the phenomenal character of experience reveals not only is the phenomenal character of experience constituted by its intentional properties, but that the intentional objects of experience are ordinary everyday material objects with various sensory qualities. Third, I argue that further reflection on the phenomenal character of experience and of sensory imagination does not

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<sup>6</sup> Although not mutually exclusive.

decide between relational and non-relational views of this experiential intentionality.

In Chapter Two, I consider the relation between experiential intentionality and the *doxastic role* of experience. I claim that having an experience of material objects with various sensory qualities inclines one to believe that there are such objects with such qualities present in one's environment. And I claim that *matching* perceptual and hallucinatory cases have common doxastic features. I discuss how a relationalist might attempt to account for such common features in terms of a *disjunctive* explanation of the presence of such common doxastic features. I argue that such an explanation faces a charge of *explanatory complexity*. I discuss how a disjunctive explanation may respond to such a charge, by explaining the common doxastic features in terms of the *indistinguishability* of hallucination from perception. I consider what I take to be the most plausible version of such an explanation, but argue that it undercuts the ability of the relationalist to resist appeal to phenomenological considerations in support of common non-relational intentional features.

In Chapter Three, I consider the relation between experiential intentionality and the *knowledge potential* and *justificatory role* of experience. I claim that *perceptual* experience affords knowledge, whereas hallucination does not. But matching perceptual and hallucinatory cases seem equally to provide justification for believing some claims. However, I argue that reflection on the *indistinguishability* of hallucinatory cases from matching perceptual ones provides an explanation of why such cases are associated with justification. This allows for a *disjunctive* explanation of the presence of such justification in terms of the knowledge affording role of *perceptual* experience. And furthermore, this explanation meets the explanatory constraints discussed in Chapter Two. Thus the relationalist *is* well placed to explain the justificatory role of experience.

In Chapter Four, I consider notions of *appearance*. I think such notions provide support for representational views of experience. This may be resisted by claiming that notions of appearance are in some way *comparative*. I argue that attempts to characterise appearance in comparative terms fail.

Finally, in Chapter Five, I consider the relation between experiential intentionality, phenomenology, and the role experience plays in making available *experientially dependent thought* about sensory *qualities*. I argue that hallucinatory and *illusory* experience makes available thought about sensory qualities in just the same way as perceptual ones do. Thus, an experience being such as to make available such thought cannot be a matter of experience being one in which the subject is experiential related to material objects with such sensory qualities.

I therefore conclude that there is *some* reason to suppose that *some* intentional features of experience are not constituted by relational properties. Such intentional features should

plausibly be understood in representational terms.

# Chapter 1

## Phenomenology

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### §1 Introduction

As I have suggested in my introduction, accounts of experience can be classified depending on (i) whether, according to them, experience is intentional; on (ii) whether experiential intentionality is relational or non-relational, and on (iii) whether the intentional objects of experience are material objects with their sensory qualities, or not. But I've also suggested that one strategy to give content to the disagreement is to consider how the intentionality of experience relates to other experiential features. In this chapter, I shall pursue part of such a strategy, considering how experiential intentionality relates to experiential *phenomenology*—to the conscious character of experiences.

I shall start in §2 by considering the kinds of locutions used to talk about phenomenological character. The notion of phenomenal character is often introduced in terms of the 'what it is like-ness' of experience. But this expression is rarely expanded upon. I'll suggest that we can understand uses of this expression as an attempt to talk about features of experiences which are connected to their providing their subjects with a perspective on the world. On this view what we are talking about when we talk about phenomenal character is constituted<sup>7</sup> by the intentional properties of experience.

In §3 I shall move to consider what we find when we attempt to introspectively attend to our phenomenal character. I shall argue that what we find again supports the claim that the phenomenal character of experience should be understood in terms of experiential intentionality. Not only this, but in terms of intentional directedness to *material* objects and properties. But I shall argue these considerations do not resolve the debate between the relational and non-relational accounts of experiential intentionality.

Finally, in §4, I'll consider a further argument for relational accounts that relates the phenomenological considerations discussed in §3 to the doxastic role of experience and visual imagination. I'll argue that this also fails.

I aim to show that phenomenological considerations support an intentional account of

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<sup>7</sup> The relevant notion of *constitution* is characterised in §2.2.1.

experiential phenomenology, on which (i) experiences is intentional, (ii) the intentional objects of experience are material objects with their sensory qualities, and (iii) the phenomenal character of an experience is constituted by its intentional properties. But consideration of phenomenology does not decide between relational and representational accounts of such experiential intentionality.

### §2 Talking about Phenomenology

#### §2.1 Introduction

[F]undamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to *be* that organism—something it is like *for* the organism.

We may call this the subjective character of experience.<sup>8</sup>

Since Nagel's 'What it is like to be a Bat?', philosophers have enthusiastically taken up describing the phenomenal (or subjective) character of experience in terms of what it is like to undergo it for its subject, and to talk of the 'what-it-is-like-ness' of experience. The notion of phenomenal character is a philosophical term of art—so we might think characterising it in terms of 'what it is like' is intended to be elucidatory. But philosophers are often more reticent when it comes to explaining what they mean by these locutions. We are rarely told what it is for there to be something it is like for a subject to undergo an experience.

This reticence is present in Nagel's original paper. There, Nagel does not do much to tell us much about what it amounts to for there to be something it is like for a subject to undergo an experience. This is in part because he spends much of that paper arguing that there are limitations on what we can grasp about what an experience is like for its subject. For example, he claims that we, as humans, *can't know* what it is like for a bat to be undergoing various kinds of experience unique to bats, and so presumably any attempt to spell out what it is like to undergo an experience of such a kind will be at best unintelligible to us. But Nagel clearly does think that we can know what it is like for organisms of the kind *we* are to undergo experiences of the kind we do. Unfortunately he doesn't tell us what this amounts to.

Why is this? One thought is that grasping the concepts required for understanding talk of the phenomenal character of an experience requires one has undergone experiences with that kind

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<sup>8</sup> Nagel 1974, p.436. Nagel here is talking about what it is like *to be* an organism for that organism, rather than what it is like *to undergo an experience* for that organism. But talk of 'what it is like' is naturally applied to undergoing experiences (indeed, Nagel talks of undergoing *processes*).

## Phenomenology

of phenomenal character. And if one hasn't had such experiences, one is simply not in a position to understand talk of what it is like. Hence no elucidation of the notion is possible. On the other hand, if one has had such experiences, one *is* in a position to understand talk of what it is like, and so no elucidation is required. Such a thought is present when Block, talking about qualitative, or phenomenal properties, approvingly quotes Armstrong on Jazz - "If you got to ask, you ain't never gonna get to know",<sup>9</sup> again suggesting inquiry for elucidation of phenomenological notions is, if required, destined for failure.

This reluctance to specify what is meant by talk of 'what it is like ...' is therefore partly theoretically motivated. But it has made some philosophers suspicious as to whether it fixes onto philosophically interesting aspects of experience. On such a view, the pervasiveness of use of such talk must be attributed to other sources.<sup>10</sup> I'm more optimistic. I think notions of phenomenal character and what it is like to undergo an experience do fix on philosophically interesting aspects of experience. But contrary to the impression one may get from Nagel and Block, I think we can say more to elucidate them. Examination of our ordinary use of notions of character, and of what it is like, can help us understand the phenomenological aspects of experience that such notions fix on.<sup>11</sup>

In the rest of this section, I shall proceed by investigation of the various ways we ordinarily make use of talk of what it is like, and consider what we could be getting at when we apply such notions to experience. I am not going to offer much in the way of a formal account of their semantics. What we are interested in is what exactly philosophers could mean when *they* use it, and for that project it is not clear that such a semantics would be helpful.<sup>12</sup> But before we begin,

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<sup>9</sup> Louis Armstrong, quoted in Block 1978 p.281. There are a variety of unsourced versions of this Louis Armstrong quote. A similar quote—"Lady, if you got to ask, you ain't got it"—is attributed to Fats Waller when asked to what rhythm is, which suggests the converse principle, that knowledge of swing jazz rhythm (or phenomenal character) is self-intimating.

<sup>10</sup> For example, Hacker 2002 thinks that it is only because philosophers are both conceptually confused, and ignorant of the semantics of the locution, that they are inclined to think it illuminating. According to him a proper understanding of the phrase shows that it is not relevant to 'unlocking the mysteries of consciousness'. Alternatively, Lycan 1995 attributes the problem to the ambiguity of the expression itself. According to him 'It is long past time to recognise ... that the phrase "what it's like" is now worse than useless: it is positively pernicious and harmful, because nothing whatever is clarified or explained by reference to it' (p.77).

<sup>11</sup> This is of course consistent with thinking that need to have had experiences to be in a position to understand what it is like to undergo them.

<sup>12</sup> Although I shall talk of 'senses' of the expression, such senses just correspond to the kinds of uses of it we make, and should not be taken to carry any further more semantic implications.

an objection. I have said that phrases ‘phenomenal character’ and ‘what it is like ...’ (and variants) are *terms of art* in modern philosophy of perception. But if that’s true, why should we expect general investigation into what we ordinarily mean by such expressions to be relevant in understanding the specialised uses philosophers make of them?

For one thing, as I have pointed out, philosophers often don’t spend much time elucidating the uses they are making of them, and so it is unclear how else we can proceed. But it is also the case that part of the reason why philosophers have embraced such phrases in the first place is that they seem apt to capture something important about phenomenology but yet be readily accessible to the layperson.<sup>13</sup> Hence they cannot be being used in a way radically disconnected from the ways we ordinarily use notions of character and what things are like.

Finally I should add that, in this section, investigation of the notion is going to give us a way of thinking about phenomenal character that will be supported by *introspective observations* in §3. So even if my discussion of the locutions does not convince you that phenomenal character should be understood the way I propose to do so, this section can just be taken simply to be offering *one* plausible way of understanding such talk which will be supported by the considerations in §3.

### §2.2 What is Phenomenal Character?

We can start with the notion of phenomenal character of experience. There are two issues here: (i) what is meant by *character*, and (ii) what is meant by *phenomenal* character. I shall discuss each in turn

#### §2.2.1 What is a *Character*?

When we talk about the character of something, we are often just interested in a set of features, or properties of that thing. For example, we might describe the character of a wine by saying it is has a complex texture and is peppery. Or we might describe the character of a room by saying it is homely and comfortable. So it looks like on our ordinary notion, the character of something is a set of features, or properties. Thus objects will *have* a character iff they instantiate the relevant set of properties. This makes it appropriate to talk of character as *constituted* by such properties. In the rest of this chapter, when I talk of phenomenal character as being *constituted* by such and such, this is what I mean.

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<sup>13</sup> That this is so can be seen from the preponderance of Nagel’s paper ‘What it is like to be a Bat?’ on introductory philosophy of mind reading lists.

## Phenomenology

Does just any collection of features of something constitute a character? When talking of the character of a red wine, or a room, or so on, we are not interested in just any properties it has. Rather, the properties we are often interested in seem to be ones that are both *easily recognisable*, and which are *distinctive* of things of that kind.<sup>14</sup> In the case of, for example, *red* wine, this will include particular chromatic, olfactory and gustatory properties. But it won't include redness, as being red is not a feature distinctive of a red wine as such. And nor will it include its chemical composition, as this is not easily recognisable.

This of course does not establish that characters can *only* be constituted by such recognisable kind-distinctive features. It may be that any set of features constitutes a character, but we are simply only interested in the characters constituted by sets of recognisable kind-distinctive features. The claim being made is simply that when we *talk* about characters, we are often interested in such recognisable kind-distinctive features.

### §2.2.2 What is *Phenomenal* Character?

So what are we talking about when we talk about the *phenomenal* character of an *experience*? Given what we are often interested in when talking about character, it can be expected that we are interested in properties of the experience that are both readily recognisable, and which are distinctive of experiences. But we have got more to go on than this—it is specified that the relevant characters are *phenomenal* ones. So what is it for a character to be *phenomenal*?

We can restrict character talk to different kinds of character. Returning to our previous example, we can distinguish and talk about the olfactory, gustatory or chromatic character of a wine. The olfactory character of a wine is determined by its olfactory properties; the gustatory character by its gustatory properties, and so on. So different types of character correspond to different types of character-constituting properties. And the phenomenal character of an experience is going to correspond to the *phenomenal properties* of an experience. But what are these?

Here we reach an impasse. The term 'phenomenal' as applied to characters or properties is often elucidated in terms of 'what it is like'. For example, Chalmers writes:

[O]ur specific mental states, such as perceptions and thoughts, very often have

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<sup>14</sup> See, e.g., *The Oxford English Dictionary* 'A *distinctive* mark, evidence or token; a feature, trait, characteristic. [emphasis added]' character, n.8.a. 1989

a phenomenal character: there is something it is like to be in them.<sup>15</sup>

So it's here that we must turn to investigate notions of *what something is like*.

### §2.3 What is what-it-is-like?

#### §2.3.1 Comparative what-it-is-like

The very first thing to point out is that the notion we're interested in is *not* comparative, despite the use of the term 'like' in characterising it.<sup>16</sup> There is a comparative notion that can be expressed in such terms, but this isn't the one we are interested in. For example, we might say 'this wine is like something', and thus express something true just if there is something which the wine is in some ways the same as, or similar to. Perhaps this wine is like dish-water—it has a similar flavour or colour.

In contrast, we often ask about what some particular thing is like (e.g. 'this apple is not ripe; what is that one like?'), and about what things in general are like (e.g. 'what is it like where you are?' to someone on the end of a long distance telephone call), where such questions are *not* to be answered by listing things that are similar to that which is in question. Such questions are to be answered by specifying how the thing in question, or the general situation, *is* (e.g. 'that apple is ripe'; 'around here it is cold'). So what we are interested in seems to be just *how the thing in question is*. Now, how something is is just a matter of the *way*, or *ways*, it is. So what something is like in the relevant sense is a matter of the way, or ways, that it is.

This fits neatly with the notion of character. Remember, the character of something is constituted by a collection of properties, or features, possessed by that thing. But ways that things are correspond to properties that things have—for example, one way that a green apple is *green*, and this corresponds to a property of the apple, that of *greenness*.

So perhaps when saying that a character of something is a matter of what it is like, we are noting that the character of the thing is constituted by a set of properties it instantiates, which correspond to the ways it is. This understanding 'what it is like' also makes sense of the fact some philosophers talk of 'what it is like-ness'. The suffix '-ness' is used to generate nouns referring to properties. For example, 'greenness' is a noun referring to the property that things have when they are correctly described by the adjective 'green'. 'what it is like-ness' can be taken to be a noun referring to the phenomenal character constituting properties.

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<sup>15</sup> Chalmers 2004 p.153.

<sup>16</sup> This is independent of whether one takes 'what it is like' talk to *express* comparative or relational claims. As I have noted, I am not interested in providing an account of the *semantics* of what-it-is-like-talk here.

### §2.3.2 What-it-is-like-ness as how the experience is.

When philosophers talk about the ‘what it is like-ness’ of experience, it’s natural to take the ‘it’ as referring to the experience, and thus to take them as talking about the ways *the experience* is. They seem interested in some of the properties the experience has. But *which* properties are these?

It is here that we again run into a problem. When we talk about what something is like, we’re often interested in recognisable and distinctive features of that thing. This corresponds to the fact that when we talk of the character of something, we’re interested in the recognisable and distinctive features of that thing. But the point of examining the notion of ‘what it is like’ in the first place was to elucidate what *kinds* of property we are interested in when we talk about *phenomenal* character. So far we don’t have that. And there is reason to suppose that the current notion cannot provide any such elucidation.

As stated, when we talk about what something is like, we’re often interested in features recognisable and characteristic of that thing. Such features are certainly apt to constitute characters. But it’s not obvious that there are any further restrictions on the kinds of ways something is that we’re interested in when we talk about what something is like. And so this normal everyday notion of ‘what it is like’ is not restricted to any particularly philosophically interesting set of features of experiences

For example, consider a house. We can talk about what it is like. What it (the house) is like may be: roomy, untidy, cold. We can also take the properties corresponding to these ways to constitute the character of the house. Such properties are certainly characteristic of houses as such. Yet houses do not possess *phenomenal* properties, or a *phenomenal*, character. There being something the house is like is not a phenomenological matter.

So, we have an idea of some ways that things are which constitute their character. But for the notion to be elucidatory of *phenomenal* character, we need to know which kinds of ways the experience is constitute its phenomenal character. After all, the phenomenal character isn’t just any old way the experience is, but rather some particular philosophically interesting way the experience is that is. But just considering ‘what it is like-ness’ in terms of how the experience is doesn’t provide us with this. It is relatively uninformative.

### §2.3.3 Subject-Relativised What-it-is-like.

However, talking of the ‘what it is like-ness’ of experience leaves out a crucial part of Nagel’s, original phrasing—he relativises talks about what it is like to subjects, and is interested in what it

is like *for a subject* to undergo an experience. So does such *subject-relativisation* help us in understanding the notion?

When we ask what it is like to  $\phi$  *for a subject*, we can be interested in *relational* features of the thing in question. For example, consider asking what was it like for a subject, *s*, to visit Bangkok in winter. An acceptable answer could be that it was too hot (for *s*). And this is consistent with Bangkok itself not being hot, if, for example, *s* is overly sensitive to heat. Applying this relational notion of what-it-is-like to experience and phenomenal character will get the result that the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by relational properties that hold between the subject and the experiential state. But again, many relational properties do not have phenomenological consequences, and so do not constitute phenomenal characters. So merely noting that there is such a relational notion of ‘what-it-is-like’ doesn’t provide us with any more elucidatory an account of what kinds of properties are constitutive of phenomenal characters.

It is sometimes suggested that when we deploy subject relativised notions of ‘what it is like’ there is something special about what an experience is like for the subject of *that experience*, as opposed to for anyone else. The relational notion of what it is like discussed in the previous paragraph is not specially restricted to talk of what something is like for the person who underwent it. For example, we can talk about how *s* losing a leg was for *s*, and how *s* losing a leg was for *s*’s husband. In both cases, in asking how it was for *s* or for *s*’s husband, we’re interested in the ways that *s* losing a leg was in relation to, and in ways that affectively impacted on, *s* and *s*’s wife respectively. So this relational notion is not the right notion to capture this subjective aspect of what-it-is-like. But how else can we understand the notion?

### §2.3.4 A Suggestion

In his paper, Nagel argues one reason we can’t know what its like to be a bat is that our experiences are insufficiently similar. It is this that is the bar for us knowing what it is like to be a bat. But equally he claims that we don’t know what it is like to be a bat because we don’t occupy the *viewpoint* of a bat. So it seems that a further way of understanding talk of what-it-is-like comes from connecting what it is like to undergo an experience with the subject’s *viewpoint*, or *perspective*, on the world.

According to Nagel, the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by the viewpoint of the organism on that experience—‘After all, what would be left of what it was like to be a bat if one removed the viewpoint of the bat?’<sup>17</sup> But why does Nagel bring viewpoints in at all? It’s

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<sup>17</sup> Nagel 1974.

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not presented as a substantive further thesis. Rather, for Nagel, the perspectival nature of phenomenal character seems to be something we're meant to get just from agreeing there is something it is like for a subject to undergo an experience. Yet so far, we've no reason to suppose that there's a use of 'what it is like' that picks out perspectives, or viewpoints. So how do viewpoints, or perspectives, get in the picture?

Consider again the question 'What was it like to visit Bangkok for you?'. If, analogous to the suggestion in §2.3.2, we take the 'it' to refer to the event or process of you visiting Bangkok, we'll naturally take the question to be answered by citing recognisable and distinctive features of that event or process. But we do not have to interpret it this way. For example, one could take the 'it' to refer to *Bangkok*, which is a city, and not an event or process. Rather, it is a *constituent* of an event or process which the subject has participated in. Taking the 'it' to refer to Bangkok, one can reformulate the question in the following terms: 'What was Bangkok like to visit for you?'. This second 'what is it like' question is answered by specifying ways Bangkok itself was. As discussed in §2.2.1, it is likely that in asking this question, we'll be interested in distinctive and easily recognisable features of cities: such are apt to constitute the character of a city. But I think we can say something more than this. Suppose that one of the characteristic easily recognisable features Bangkok has is that it is extremely busy. But suppose further when one visited Bangkok, one did not venture out into the streets, and so did not pick up on this in visiting it. In that case, it would be inappropriate to answer the question 'What was Bangkok like to visit for you' by claiming that it was busy. An obvious suggestion here is that only features of Bangkok recognisable *in visiting it* are relevant to what it was like *to visit*—to how one *found it*. I think another way to put this is that the relevant features are those which Bangkok had *from the perspective* the subject has in virtue of visiting it.

Such an approach is also available when the 'it' is taken not to refer to anything in particular. For example, consider now the question 'what is it like for one to be French?'. One could take this to be asking how being French is—a question answered by citing features characteristic of things that are French. But equally, one can take the 'it' to be referring to things in general, and the question to be asking after the impression, or perspective on *things in general*, that one gets in virtue of being French. Such a question can be answered in part by specifying how things are according to the views one has in virtue of being French (if there are any such views).

So this gives a clear sense in which talk of 'what it is like' *is* perspectival—one specifies what it is like, on this sense, by specifying how things are from a perspective on them. And it is also *subjective*—the relevant perspective is that the subject to which the 'what it is like' is relativised. And the relevant perspective is one the subject occupies in virtue of being a participant in the state, process, or event under consideration.

## §2.4 Back to the what-it-is-like-ness of experience

I've claimed that there is a way of understanding what it is like for *s* as a matter of *s*'s perspective on things. Naturally, we might take it that what it is like for *s* to have an experience is a matter of *s*'s perspective on how *her experience* is. That is, it is a matter of how *s* finds her experience to be.<sup>18</sup>

But it is far from clear that we should take the 'it' in 'what it is like for *s* to undergo an experience' as referring to *s*'s experience. When we talk about 'what it is like for *s* to ...', it's not obvious that the 'it' is referring to anything other than *s*'s general situation. Recall—we can both talk about what particular things are like (how those things are), and what things *in general* are like (how things are in general). And this is often the case when we're talking about what it is like for *s* to undergo some process or event.

On this interpretation, what it is like for *s* to undergo an experience is a matter of *s*'s perspective on *things in general* in virtue of undergoing that experience. What it is like for *s* to undergo an experience is to be understood in terms of *s*'s perspective. Not her 'higher-order' perspective on her experience, but rather the perspective on the world that *s* occupies in virtue of undergoing the experience that she does. So a particular way of understanding phenomenal character can be extracted from reflection on the notion of 'what it is like for a subject'.

Combining this perspectival notion of what it is like with the earlier one in terms of the way experience is, we get the idea that the phenomenal character of an experience is a matter of how an experience *is* in ways that constitute the perspective the subject has on *the world* in virtue of undergoing that experience. But the notion of a perspective is connected with that of *intentionality*; perspectives are perspectives *of* things—they have subject matter.<sup>19</sup> To be in a state in which one has a perspective on something just is to be in an intentional state, and the perspective one has is constituted by the intentional features of that state. So the phenomenal character of an experience is similarly constituted by these intentional features. So this way of understanding talk of 'what it is like' suggests the phenomenal character of an experience is

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<sup>18</sup> This way of putting it fits nicely with to Higher Order Representation theories of consciousness. According to Higher Order Representation theories of consciousness (e.g. Rosenthal 1986), a subject's experience is conscious only if the subject has some further 'higher-order' mental representation of her experience. *s* having a take on, or perspective on, her experience requires that *s* have some mental representation of her experience. Assuming *s*'s experience does not represent itself, *s* must have some distinct 'higher-order' representation of her experience. And it is in virtue of her having this that she has a conscious experience.

<sup>19</sup> For further support of this claim, see Crane, *Elements of Mind* 2001 pp.4-8.

constituted by how the experience presents things as being, i.e. by its intentional properties.

### §2.5 Conclusion

I should finish by noting these considerations are relatively weak. If I'm right, we *can* understand phenomenal character, and what it is like-ness, in such intentional terms. But there may be a variety of different ways of understanding the notions. Perhaps the naysayers are right, and part of the longevity of such locutions is a consequence of the fact they can be put to many uses—hence different philosophers have been able to use them to mean different things. But I do not think I am just adding to the confusion. My way of understanding it makes sense of some intuitively appealing aspects of what-it-is-like talk. And in the next section, I shall bolster this idea by consideration of what we find when we *introspectively* attend to our experiences.

### §3 Attending to Phenomenology

So what do we find when we introspectively attend to our experiences, and their phenomenal characters? Here, I want to focus on the claim that introspective attention to experience is associated with a phenomenon of *transparency*, or *diaphanousness*.<sup>20</sup> This phenomenon has been taken to support the idea that the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by its intentional properties, and that the intentional objects of experience are just ordinary material objects such as tables, chairs, and so on (or their surfaces).

I think there is something right right to this. But I also think some recent discussion of the phenomenon can be confusing. In §3.1 I outline some attempts at articulation of the phenomenon. In §3.2, I discuss how it has been taken to impose constraints on accounts of the phenomenal character of experience, and argue that Transparency, as construed in §3.1, does not impose such constraints. In §3.3, I provide an alternative way to understand the phenomenon, which does suggest the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by its intentional properties, and the intentional objects of experience are material objects.

#### §3.1 An Initial Attempt to Understand Transparency

Here's Moore's characterisation of the phenomenon of Transparency:

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<sup>20</sup> Moore 1903 is the first to make claims about the diaphanousness of experience. Similar claims re-enter recent philosophical discussion with the publication of Harman 1990, and are then developed up by Tye in a series of pieces— Tye 1992, Tye 2000 and particularly Tye 2002. For more recent discussion see Martin 2002 and Stoljar 2004.

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When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous.<sup>21</sup>

Here's Harman:

When you see a tree, you do not experience any features as intrinsic features of your experience. Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree, including relational features of the tree "from here."<sup>22</sup>

And here's Tye:

When you introspect your visual experience, the only particulars of which you are aware are the external ones making up the scene before your eyes. You are not aware of those objects *and* a further inner object or episode. Your awareness is of the external surfaces and how *they* appear. The qualities you experience are the ones the surfaces apparently have. Your experience is thus transparent to you. When you try to focus upon it, you 'see' right through it, as if it were, to the things apparently outside and their apparent qualities.<sup>23</sup>

In this way, your visual experience is transparent or diaphanous. When you try to examine it, you see right through it, as if it were, to the qualities you were experiencing all along in being a subject of the experience, qualities your experience is of.<sup>24</sup>

These discussions of transparency all involve claims about what one is aware of when one introspectively attends to one's experience (or attempts to). For Tye, this claim seems to be that when we introspectively attend to our experience, we are aware of, and only of, external particulars and their qualities. For Harman, the claim is something more like that when we introspectively attend to our experience, we are aware of objects like trees and their qualities, and not aware of features of mental items. For Moore, the issue is more difficult. Immediately after the passage above, which Tye approvingly quotes, Moore goes on to say that a seemingly diaphanous element '*can* be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know that

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<sup>21</sup> Moore 1903 p.450.

<sup>22</sup> Harman 1990 p.39.

<sup>23</sup> Tye 2002 p.139.

<sup>24</sup> Tye, *Qualia* 2009.

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there is something to look for'.<sup>25</sup> So it seems that Moore does not endorse transparency as it is stated by Tye and Harman. For this reason, I shall bracket discussion of the views Moore actually held until §3.3 (however, in discussing how Tye understands the thesis, I will have cause to mention how *he* interprets Moore.)

There is a difference here between Tye and Harman's characterisation of the *kind* of object introspective awareness is of (or of the features of), which I'll return to in §3.2.2. But for now, I want to note that Tye and Harman's transparency claims are both presented as claims *about* introspection, rather than as claims we are expected to come to know on the basis of introspection. So we might ask, why should we accept them?

One view might just be that when we reflect on our introspection, some such transparency claim is just obvious. Some sections of Tye 2002 paper suggests this. But in other places there seems to be more to it. For example, Tye says 'None of the qualities of which you are directly aware in seeing the various surfaces *look* to you to be qualities of your experience. You do not experience any of these qualities *as* qualities of your experience.'<sup>26</sup> On the face of it, this seems to be a claim about what we are aware of in *experience*, rather than introspection—when we undergo an experience, we are aware of qualities as qualities of surfaces, and not as qualities of experiences.<sup>27</sup> But we can connect it to what we are aware of in introspection with a further claim—when we introspectively attend to our experience, we are aware of just those qualities we are aware of when undergoing it. To put it another way, there is *no shift* in the objects of awareness between undergoing an experience and introspectively attending it. If experience is presenting the qualities as they in fact are, then it follows from *no shift* that when introspectively attending to experience, we are aware of qualities of surfaces, and not qualities of experience. Harman can be read in a similar way. In the first sentence I have quoted him on, he makes a claim about how we experience properties—we don't experience them as (intrinsic) properties of experiences. In other places, he talks about experience of properties presenting them *as*

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<sup>25</sup> Moore 1903 p.450.

<sup>26</sup> Tye 2002 p.138.

<sup>27</sup> There is a complication here. Tye 2002 says that when 'you are attending to how things *look* to you, as opposed to how they are independently of how they look, you are bringing to bear your faculty of introspection' (p.139). So the claim is perhaps something like: in experience, we are aware of various qualities, and in introspection, we are aware of them *as* qualities of external surfaces and not as qualities of experiences. Thus, if they are qualities of experience, *introspection* is in error, rather than experiences itself. It is difficult to square this with his claim that to suppose they are features of experience is 'convict such *experiences* of massive error [emphasis added]' (p.139). Even if we do read Tye this way, we can still raise the question I do at the end of this section, namely, how do we know experience is of qualities?

properties of objects like trees. And Harman too seems to endorse something like the *no shift* claim. When you try to attend to features of your experience of a tree, you just find the same features of the tree you were experiencing as features of the tree all along.

On this way of understanding the Transparency claim, what reflection on introspectively attending to an experience reveals is that in introspection one is aware of just what one is aware of in undergoing the experience. It is the experience which presents those features as features of external, or material objects. This raises an interesting possibility. One could deny Transparency by denying that experience is *getting it right* in presenting features as features of external, or material objects.<sup>28</sup> But I want to just raise a slightly different worry. Suppose it is right that experience *is* of external, or material, features. How would we know this? One might think that we would know it by introspection. But if that's right, wouldn't introspection have to be revealing something about experience after all, namely that experiences are of, or present, features of external or material objects? I think this is the key idea behind Transparency. I shall return to it in §3.3. But for now let's see what consequences the claims of Tye and Harman have for views of the phenomenal character of experience.

### §3.2 How does this count for or against various views on phenomenal character?

There is a fairly obvious line of reasoning here. The idea is that insofar as various accounts of the phenomenal character are committed to, or suggest, claims about what one is aware of in introspection, they are liable to be either inconsistent with transparency, or at least face an explanatory challenge from it. But why exactly do they face such a challenge?

#### §3.2.1 Qualia Views

I'll start with the consideration of qualia views. There is some dispute about how qualia are to be characterised. But they are often introduced as (i) properties of experience which (ii) constitute phenomenal character, are (iii) non-intentional<sup>29</sup> and (iv) are accessible to introspection. And this is how I shall take them to be.

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<sup>28</sup> And I think this is response which motivates Tye 2002 to say that to suppose features of experience is 'convict such experiences of massive error', which 'is just not credible' (p.139).

<sup>29</sup> Qualia are sometimes characterised as *intrinsic* properties (e.g. Block 1990 p.53). But this does not obvious that intentional properties as qualia on a non-relationalist view of intentionality. Hence, such a characterisation leaves a qualia view consistent with, e.g., representationalism. But qualia views are often taken to provide an account of phenomenal character inconsistent with that provided by a representationalist one. Hence they are better characterised as non-intentional properties.

Given (i) and (iv), it follows that on the qualia view, non-intentional properties of experience are accessible to introspection. Plausibly, if a property of an experience is accessible to introspection, introspective attention to the experience should involve awareness of it.<sup>30</sup> Thus introspective attention to experience should involve awareness of non-intentional properties of experience. But according to the transparency claims, introspective attention does not involve awareness of properties of experience. Hence transparency considerations rule out a qualia view.

### §3.2.2 Sense-datum Views

With respect to sense-datum views, the issue is more complex. Harman employs transparency considerations against sense-datum views. But Tye explicitly states that Transparency does *not* in itself rule out sense-datum accounts of perception.<sup>31</sup> And he interprets Moore's discussion of diaphanousness in the 'refutation of idealism' as a perfectly sensible endorsement of the phenomenon of transparency by a sense-datum theorist.<sup>32</sup> So what's going on?

On a sense-datum account of experience, experience has a relational structure. When one undergoes an experience, one is related to things with various sensory qualities. These objects, which the subject is related to in undergoing the experience, are the experience's sense-data. This can be applied to give a relational account of phenomenal character. On a relational account of phenomenal character, an experience having the phenomenal character it does is just a matter of the experience being one in which one is related to various things with various sensible qualities. (Such a relational account of phenomenal character can be seen as a combination of an intentional account of phenomenal character, and a relational account of experiential intentionality.) Experiences thus differ in their phenomenal character when one is related to things with different sensible qualities, and share phenomenal character when one is related to things with the same sensible qualities. So a sense-datum account of phenomenal character simply combines a relational account of phenomenal character with the further claim that the things to which one is related are *sense-data*. But this is not yet to say anything about what kind of thing sense-data themselves are.

When the term was originally introduced, 'sense-data' was just a catch-all term for whatever

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<sup>30</sup> 'accessibility' is often understood in terms of *knowledge*. Thus, qualia are properties of experience we know the presence of on the basis of introspection. The relevant kind of awareness will therefore be epistemic. I discuss whether introspective awareness is epistemic in §3.2.4 and §3.3.

<sup>31</sup> Tye 2002, p. 146 'But the sense-datum possibility, on my view, is ultimately eliminated on further grounds [than those provided by transparency]'.

<sup>32</sup> Tye 2002, p. 139 'Thus, it should come as no surprise to find G.E. Moore, one of the chief advocates of the sense-datum theory, drawing our attention to the phenomenon of transparency?'

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objects one is related to in undergoing an experience. So understood, the term carries *no* commitment with respect to what kinds of things sense-data are, or whether they are distinct from the objects and surfaces we ordinarily take ourselves to be aware of in undergoing an experience. But various sense-datum theorists *have* accepted the further claim that sense-data are distinct from the objects and surfaces we ordinarily take ourselves to be aware of in undergoing an experience. This is often put in terms of sense-data being of a particular *kind*, where this kind is taken to be one which the ordinary objects and surfaces we are aware of are not. So, Harman claims that on a sense-datum view, sense-data are *mental* objects, whereas Tye claims they are *immaterial* objects. Over time, as people have used the term, such further commitments have become taken to be part of the theory that people mean when they talk of sense-datum views.

Given this, we can see how Transparency considerations might be taken to motivate an argument against sense-data, so construed. Remember, on the qualia view, phenomenal character is constituted by non-intentional non-representational properties. Transparency counts against qualia views because introspective attention to one's experience does not reveal such properties. On the sense-datum view, phenomenal character is constituted by relational properties—properties of the experience being one in which the subject is related to sense-data which such-and-such sensible qualities. Transparency will presumably count against sense-datum views, in just the same way as it counts against qualia views, if introspective attention to one's experience does not reveal such relational properties.

This seems to be the thought motivating Harman. According to him, introspection does not involve awareness of mental objects and their properties. But for him sense-data are mental objects. Thus, it introspection is not revealing what it should on a sense-datum view. In comparison, Tye thinks that introspection reveals awareness only of 'external' objects. So in thinking this consistent with sense-data, he presumably has a view on which sense-data, if there are such things, are external objects. It seems that all an object being 'external' rules out is it being an *experience*, and of course sense-data are not experiences. So for Tye, the fundamental claim is that introspection does not involve attention to *experiences* and their properties. It thus counts against qualia views, but not sense-datum views, of phenomenal character.

But we can already see a potential problem. On the sense-datum view of phenomenal character, phenomenal character is *constituted* by relational properties—properties of being related to sense-data with various sensible qualities. But the sensory qualities of the sense-data should not be identified with the phenomenal properties. Phenomenal properties are properties of the experience, whereas sensory qualities are properties of sense-data, and sense-data are not to be identified with experiences. So why should introspective attention reveal sense-data and their qualities?

On the sense-datum view, an experience having the phenomenal character it does is a matter of it being one in which its subject is related to sense-data with various sensible qualities. So we might think that successfully introspectively attending to the phenomenal character of an experience will involve attending to its being one in which the subject is related to things with various sensible qualities. The issue then is this—does being aware of the experience's being one in which the subject is related to things with various sensible qualities require that one is aware of those things, and their sensible qualities? If it does, we can see how on a sense-datum account, successful introspective attention to the phenomenal character of an experience should reveal sense-data and their qualities.

It does not obviously follow from a property being constituted by relations to various things that awareness of it involves awareness of the things it is constituted by relations to. For example, suppose one thought that the property of being red is simply the property of being such as to appear red to ordinary observers in normal conditions. It does not follow from this that attending to something being red involves awareness of ordinary observers, or of normal conditions. On the other hand, there do seem to be cases in which attending to relational properties *does* seem to involve attending to the relevant relata. For example, consider a case in which a red square is positioned to the right of a green circle. In attending to the relational properties of the green circle, it does seem that one is aware of red square, and that it stands is to the right of the green circle.

One difference seems to be that simply attending to the colour of a red object does not *reveal* that its redness is a relational property of it. This is often put by saying that colours are experienced as *intrinsic* properties of objects. So we might say that even if colours are constituted by relational properties, we are not aware of them *as* relational when we ordinarily attend to them. On the other hand, when we attend to relational properties of the green circle, we are aware of the green circle *as* being to the left of the red square, and this involves some awareness that there is a red square. So we might restrict the claim, and add that it is because introspection should be expected to reveal the phenomenal character of experience *as it is*, it should reveal its relational nature, and hence involve awareness of the sense-data with their various properties.<sup>33</sup>

### §3.2.3 A problem with the argument

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<sup>33</sup> This is not to say that introspection itself reveals that the sense-data *are* sense-data. Rather, it should involve awareness of objects which as a matter of fact are sense-data. As discussed earlier, Harman seems to think it is experience which speaks for the claim that the relevant objects are not mental, and hence not sense-data.

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It seems that the Transparency considerations of Tye and Harman count against qualia and perhaps also sense-datum views of phenomenal character. But there is a fundamental problem with the argument. We can introduce this problem by asking why *should* introspection involve awareness of the features that qualia and sense-datum views take to determine the phenomenal character of experience?

With respect to the qualia view, that qualia are available to introspection is built into their characterisation: it is one of the conditions which qualia must fulfil. But although qualia may be standardly characterised in terms of both their phenomenological and introspective roles, insofar as transparency considerations count against them it is their phenomenological role which must be challenged, not their role in introspection. But it is their introspective accessibility which transparency considerations challenge. So, on the face of it, a proponent of a qualia view could side-step the argument by holding that there are non-intentional properties of experience which determine phenomenal character, but which are not accessible to introspection. Such properties may or may not deserve the name 'qualia'. But they do provide an account of phenomenal character consistent with transparency.

The case is even clearer for sense-datum views. There is no such introspective condition commonly attached to them, and the thesis that relations to sense-data constitute phenomenal character is itself independent of any thesis about whether introspection should involve awareness of these relational properties as relational properties, and hence awareness of the sense-data themselves. So again, why does the lack of introspective awareness of sense-data threaten their presence?

The obvious move to make here is to claim that our capacity for introspection *just is* a capacity which, by exercising, we come to know about our mental states and their features. In the case of introspection applied to experience, introspection should therefore be the capacity by which we come to know about the phenomenal character of our experiences. This is of course not to say that introspection involves the exercise of an infallible capacity to know what phenomenal character our experience has.<sup>34</sup> Rather, introspection is a capacity which when exercised *successfully* results in knowledge about the phenomenal character of our experience.

So if qualia are non-intentional properties which constitute the phenomenal character of experience, introspection should involve *epistemic* awareness of such properties. Successful exercise of our capacity for introspection should provide knowledge about our experience having such properties. And this is threatened by the Transparency claims, as according to it

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<sup>34</sup> See Williamson, *Knowledge and its Limits* 2000 Chapter Four for an argument against such a claim.

introspective attention to experience does not involve awareness of non-intentional properties at all. Similarly, if the phenomenal character of an experience just is a matter of the experience being one in which one is related to sense-data with various sensory qualities, one might expect introspective attention to experience to result in knowledge about our experience having such properties. Again, according to Harman's construal of the negative transparency claim, it does not do this, as it does not involve any awareness of the sense-data, and therefore does not present our experience as having such relational properties.

But this line of thought is not obviously open to a proponent of Transparency as characterised. According to the Transparency claims, in introspection we are aware of, and only of, external or material objects and their properties. Phenomenal properties are properties of experience. But neither external objects nor their properties are properties of experience. *A fortiori* they are not phenomenal properties. So in introspection we are *not* aware of phenomenal properties. And this seems in tension with the claim that introspection is that capacity which, by exercising, we come to know about the phenomenal character of our experiences. The phenomenal character of experience is constituted by its phenomenal properties. So coming to know about the phenomenal character of experience surely requires awareness of it as having the phenomenal properties it does.

The claims of Transparency *themselves* seem to be in tension with the view about introspection which does the work in the above arguments against qualia and sense-datum views. If introspection does not involve awareness of the phenomenal properties of experience, why should its failure to find such phenomenal properties as should be there qualia, or sense-datum, views constitute a problem for such views?<sup>35</sup>

### §3.2.4 Tye's Response

Tye 2002 has a response to this kind of worry. He claims that introspective attention to one's experience does in fact reveal the phenomenal features of experience. He reconciles this with the Transparency claims by distinguishing between two *kinds* of awareness associated with introspectively attending to experience. First, there is *direct-awareness-of* objects and properties. Secondly, there is *awareness-that* something is the case.

According to him, the transparency considerations in §3.1 apply only to direct-awareness-of. They show that in introspectively attending to one's experience, one is directly-aware-of external objects and properties, and not directly-aware-of the experience and its properties. Hence he

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<sup>35</sup> See Byrne and Logue 2008 p.83 for further discussion of this claim.

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accepts that as far as direct-awareness-of goes, it does *not* reveal phenomenal character. In contrast, awareness-that *does* reveal phenomenal character. In introspectively attending to our experience, we become aware-that an experience with a certain phenomenal character is present, and thus the phenomenal character of the experience is revealed to us.

Furthermore, as talk of ‘directness’ suggests, Tye claims there is a relation between these forms of awareness. One’s introspective awareness that is dependent on one’s direct awareness of. And Tye suggests a mechanism by which this is so. Subjects possess *recognitional concepts* of phenomenal character, which they are able to apply simply on the basis of their direct awareness of external objects and properties. On the relevant notion of a recognitional concept, a concept is recognitional if possession of the concept requires ‘an ability to recognize at least some things that fall under the concept as things that fall under the concept’.<sup>36</sup> It is then *this* claim, which does the work. This raises two issues. First, I shall just note a way of interpreting the relation between direct awareness and awareness-that, which I shall return to in §3.3. But secondly, I shall argue that Tye’s claims about the relation between awareness-that and direct awareness undermine his argument from transparency.

We can distinguish between what one is aware of in virtue of *undergoing* an experience, and what one is aware of in virtue of *introspectively* attending to an experience (or trying to). But presumably it is a condition on one introspectively attending to an experience, *e*, that one is also undergoing *e*. And hence that one is experientially aware of various things. So one extremely straightforward way of interpreting Tye’s claims about direct-awareness-of is simply to interpret them as claims about *experiential awareness*. The overall claim is then this: in experiential awareness we are aware of various external objects and properties. When we introspectively attend to what our experience is like, we gain *epistemic* or *cognitive* awareness about the phenomenal character of that experience. And this awareness is based upon our experiential awareness. I think that there is much to be said for this way of looking at transparency, and shall return to it in §3.3.

But bracketing this for now, how does Tye’s further claim that introspection provides awareness concerning phenomenal character *by* the exercise of recognitional concepts provide constraints on accounts of phenomenal character? This is a claim about *how* introspection operates when it is giving us introspective awareness *concerning phenomenal character*. It is not a claim about *what* introspection is awareness of (or that) *when* it is giving us introspective awareness concerning phenomenal character. So why suppose it imposes constraints on phenomenal character?

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<sup>36</sup> Fodor 1998 p.1.

It is not clear that it does. Successful exercise of a capacity to recognise the experiential presence of phenomenal properties on any occasion does of course require that the relevant properties are present. On the qualia view, such properties are non-intentional properties of experience. Do we have any reason to suppose that such properties are not present? It seems not. According to Tye, we are not aware of non-intentional phenomenal properties in direct awareness. So that they don't turn up is to be expected.

According to Tye the capacity is exercised *on the basis of* our being in a state in which we are directly aware of external objects with various sensory qualities. Does this provide a reason to suppose such a capacity cannot be the capacity to recognise the experiential presence of non-intentional phenomenal properties? If exercise of a capacity to recognise something can only be exercised on the *basis* of it, it would follow that our undergoing an experience with particular phenomenal properties is just a matter of our being in a state in which we are directly aware of external objects with various sensory qualities.<sup>37</sup> But again, it does not seem right that a capacity to recognise something can *only* be exercised on the basis of what one recognises in exercising it. For example, one may have the ability to recognise when mice are present (as mice), which one can exercise on the basis of various signs of mice, such a nibbled packet of cornflakes, or a rustling sound behind the cupboards. One does not have to exercise it on the basis of the presence of the mice themselves. So why can't the relevant recognitional capacities just be like this?—ones by which we recognise the presence of, say, non-intentional qualia on the basis of undergoing an experience of various external objects and qualities. And if the relevant recognitional capacities do not require the presence.

### §3.3 An Alternative Way to Understand Transparency

I think that there is an alternative way to understand Transparency, which respects the idea that introspective attention to experience involves awareness of external, or material, objects and properties, but allows us to hold onto the idea that introspection is simply that faculty by which we know about our experiences and their phenomenal characters. The key thought is that the awareness of external objects and properties involved in introspective attention to phenomenal character does not feature as a *part* of our introspective awareness by means of which we are able to pick up on phenomenal character. Rather, it is what introspection *reveals*, or *seems to*, in revealing phenomenal character. We can put this as follows:

When one introspectively attends to one's experience, it seems to one as if one is

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<sup>37</sup> Note this argument would require that the state of direct awareness just is an *experience*, i.e. that direct awareness is *experiential* awareness.

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experientially aware of material objects and their qualities.

So, when I look at the grey roof of the British Embassy, and turn my attention to my visual experience, what I *find* is my *awareness* of the roof. When we introspect our experiences, we are of course still undergoing them, and so still aware of such external objects and properties. But this awareness is experiential, rather than introspective. It is something that introspection *reveals*. If we want to talk of introspective awareness at all, introspective awareness is awareness of experiential awareness of material particulars and qualities. To put it another way, awareness of material objects and qualities is the *object* of introspective awareness, rather than introspective awareness itself. I think this way of characterising *Transparency* captures much of the intuitive force of the considerations which Tye and Harman appeal to. But it also explains a few of the puzzles one has in interpreting them.

For example, it explains why the transparency phenomenon is often characterised in terms of *perceptual verbs*. Remember, Tye says that ‘you ‘see’ right through it, as it were, to the things apparently outside and their apparent qualities’, and Moore says ‘all we can see is the blue’. My claim is that this is appropriate because introspection seems to reveal experiential awareness of ‘things apparently outside’, and of ‘the blue’. And such experiential awareness may be characterised in terms of perceptual verbs. The use of a perceptual verb is apt to characterise not our introspective access, but rather the experiential awareness introspection reveals.

I think this construal of transparency also captures a claim present in Moore, but neglected by later discussion. Remember, in the passage Tye appeals to, quoted from above, Moore goes on to claim when we *carefully* introspectively attend to our experience, another element ‘*can* be distinguished if we look enough, and if we know that there is something to look for. [my italics]<sup>38</sup>. This other element is, according to Moore, a consciousness, or awareness of that the experience is of. In fact, it seems that the key point for Moore is that when we carefully introspect our experience, we pick up on the fact that the experience is an awareness of blue: ‘To be aware of the sensation of blue is not to be aware of a mental image ... is to be aware of an awareness of blue’. So according to Moore, careful introspective attention to our experience *reveals* an (experiential) awareness of that the experience is of.

Now, of course if one thinks, as Tye seems to, that Moore is a sense-datum theorist *for whom* sense-data are distinct from material objects like tables, chairs and so on, one might suppose he cannot endorse the introspective claim of *Transparency* as I have characterised it. This is because I have claimed it seems as if we are experientially aware of material objects, and hence

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<sup>38</sup> Moore 1903 p.450.

not sense-data (so construed). Now, it is not clear that Moore *does* construe sense-data as distinct from material objects. But even if one does, there is a further complication here, however. It is not clear to me that introspection *itself* which suffices to tell us the experiential awareness of objects is just awareness of plain old material objects like tables, chairs and so on, or not. I think that it is only once we bring further knowledge to bear that this becomes apparent. One way of putting this would be to say that experience itself just puts us in a position to *demonstratively* think about the objects and qualities experience is of, and it is only with the extra knowledge that, for example, ‘*that* is a chair’ that it introspectively seems to us as if we are experientially aware of a *chair*. Without this, it might just seem to us as if we are experientially aware of *that* thing and its qualities. So a sense-datum theorist could endorse this, but claim we go wrong when we identify *that* thing, which is actually a sense-datum, with an object like a table. Crucially, the mistake would not be one of introspection *per se*, but rather in the knowledge we bring to bear when introspecting. Nevertheless, I think that given that we *do* have the ability to recognise things like chairs visually, it does introspectively seem to us as if we are experientially aware of such things other than sense-data.

Lastly, if we assume that introspective awareness is *cognitive awareness*, or *awareness that*, this construal captures the distinction between direct-awareness of and awareness-that which I discussed in §3.2.4.. The ‘direct-awareness of’ is simply the experiential awareness that introspection reveals, the awareness-that is simply the introspective awareness of one’s experiential awareness.

### §3.3.1 Transparency and Sense-data/Qualia Views

How does this construal of transparency pose a problem for qualia and sense-datum views? Given my characterisation of Transparency, we no longer have to deny that, in revealing awareness of such objects and their properties, introspection is revealing the phenomenal character of experience. We can accept that introspection just is a capacity which when exercised successfully on the basis of experience results in knowledge about the phenomenal character of our experience. According to Transparency, when introspecting it seems as if one is experientially aware of material objects and their qualities. So if introspection is revealing the phenomenal character, and all it reveals is that the experience is one in which one is aware of material objects and their qualities, it follows that the phenomenal character of an experience is just a matter of it being one in which the subject is experientially aware *of* material objects and their sensory qualities. To put it another way, the phenomenal properties of the experience are just certain intentional properties of *being of* such objects and their sensory qualities, and the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by such intentional properties.

According to the qualia theorist, phenomenal character is constituted by non-intentional properties. So either introspection is *not* after all revealing the phenomenal character of experience, or how things seem to us in introspection is not how they in fact are. Similarly, the sense-datum view maintains that the phenomenal character of an experience is constituted its being one in which the subject is related to various sense-data and their properties. So one would expect that introspective attention to the phenomenal character of experience should reveal that the experience is an awareness of sense-data with such-and-such properties. But it does not do this—it reveals only an awareness of material objects such as tables, chairs, and so on, and their sensory qualities. These objects are distinct from sense-data. So, introspective attention to the phenomenology of experience does not reveal the phenomenal features the sense-datum theorist claims are present. Again, either introspection is not after all revealing the phenomenal character of experience, or how things seem to us in introspection is not how they in fact are.<sup>39</sup>

### §3.3.2 Transparency and Intentionalism

*Transparency* favours an intentional account of the phenomenal character of experience, combined with the view that the intentional objects of experience are material objects and properties. On such a view, the phenomenal properties of experience are properties of being of, or about, material objects and their properties. When one introspectively attends to what an experience is like, one is attending to the phenomenal properties of the experience. But when one attends to the phenomenal character of experience, one picks up only on intentional properties of the experience—properties in virtue of which it is an experience of mind-independent objects and properties. So those intentional properties must, at the very least, determine the phenomenal properties.

But does this provide reason to favour Tye's representationalist view of phenomenal character? In contrast to sense-datum and qualia views, such a representationalist *is* able to explain this transparency of experience. For such a representationalist, an experience having the phenomenal properties it has is just a matter of it having various representational properties—properties of representing such and such material objects and properties. But it is by instantiating these representational properties that an experience is an experience *of* such external objects and properties. So, the experience having the phenomenal properties it does is

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<sup>39</sup> As I have noted in §3.1, one might question whether it is *introspection*, rather than other considerations, which is the source of the claim that the objects and properties we pick up on the awareness of are not sense-data. Nevertheless, the fact that introspection seems to reveal awareness of objects like tables and chairs counts against the sense-datum view.

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just a matter of it being an experience of such objects and properties. And this is what Transparency seems to reveal.

However, Tye's representationalism combines a *non-relational* view of experiential intentionality with the claim that the objects of experience are just ordinary material objects with their sensory qualities. On a non-relational view of experiential intentionality, an experience being one in which one is experientially aware of objects and their sensory qualities does not require that the subject stand in experiential relations to such objects with such sensory qualities. Experiential awareness is thereby construed non-relationally. So on Tye's view, an experience being one in which one is aware of objects like tables, chairs, and so on does not require that one is related to tables, chairs, and so on. The sense-datum account offers a *relational* view of experiential intentionality. But it combines this with the claim that the objects of experience are sense-data, as opposed to objects such as tables, chairs, and so on. It was this second claim—that the objects of experience are sense-data—which Transparency counts against. So on the face of it, one can combine a relational view of experiential intentionality with the claim that the objects of experience are just everyday material objects. This generates a view inconsistent with Tye's, but consistent with Transparency. All Transparency gets us is that the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by intentional properties, and that the objects of experience are ordinary material objects. It does not determine whether intentionality is relational or not.

So why does Tye think Transparency counts for his non-relational view? The reason for this comes from consideration of hallucination. A subject may undergo a hallucination when she is not experientially related to any ordinary material objects and their sensory qualities. This is most obvious in cases in which the subject undergoes a hallucination when there are no such objects in her environment. As relations require the existence of their relata, and experiential relations to ordinary material objects may be taken to require the presence in the subject's perceptual environment of ordinary material objects, such cases cannot involve experiential relations. Nevertheless as Tye says, we can perform exactly the same introspective operation on our experience when we are merely hallucinating, rather than having a genuinely *perceptual* experience.<sup>40</sup> We can try to attend to the phenomenal character of our experience. And yet the deliverances of introspection are exactly the same as in the genuinely perceptual case. But if introspection is successfully revealing the experience is one in which one is experientially aware of various material objects and properties, such experiential awareness cannot be relational. And this is best explained by the supposition that the phenomenal character of experience is a matter of its representing such external objects and properties.

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<sup>40</sup> Tye, 2002, p. 140: 'The points made thus far do not require that your visual experience be veridical. Indeed, the case could be one of complete hallucination.'

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The relationalist can respond to this denying that what introspection seems to reveal in hallucination is actually the case. But this seems to put the relationalist in a similar position to the sense-datum or qualia theorist. But I think the situation here is different. What is problematic about qualia and sense-datum views is that they must say that we get it wrong in *all* cases. I think this is just *prima facie* implausible. Surely we get it right *sometimes*. Unlike the qualia and sense-datum theorist, the relationalist does *not* have to deny that how experience seems to introspection in genuinely perceptual cases is how it is. They just have to deny this for hallucinatory cases. So the issue for them is this: is it implausible to suppose when introspecting in hallucinatory cases, we get it wrong? Or do we have independent reason to suppose that introspection is going right in cases of hallucination, independent of any prior commitments to relational or non-relational views.

In his discussion of Transparency, Tye connects Transparency to a view of introspection articulated by Dretske in his *Introspection*.<sup>41</sup> On Dretske's model, introspection is a special form of *displaced perception*, in which one comes to learn that something is a certain way by perceiving something *else* as being a way. An everyday example of displaced perception is: one comes to learn that the mice are back by perceiving the cornflake packet as nibbled. Dretske claims that introspection operates in a similar way, in that one may come to learn facts about oneself by perceiving something else as being a way. But crucially, introspection has a difference from ordinary displaced perception. It is not subject to the same *Veridicality Constraint*. In ordinary displaced perception, if one gets it wrong perceptually, one doesn't come to have knowledge. If the cornflake packet is *not* nibbled, and so I get it wrong, I do not come to know that the mice are back. Error at the level of perception results in a failure to come to know. In contrast, Dretske claims that when introspecting, error at the level of perception does not result in a failure to come to know. One can experience the cornflake packet as nibbled, and on this basis come to know that one experiences the cornflake packet as nibbled, even though it in fact is not. So Dretske's model allows that introspection gets it right even though experience does not. So *if* introspection of experience is like displaced perception, and is not subject to the Veridicality Constraint, we don't have any reason to suppose that perceptual error will result in introspective error.

I think reflection on experiential introspection favours a *broadly Dretskean* account. Call an account broadly Dretskean iff it is one on which one arrives at introspective knowledge on the basis of experiential awareness of whatever one's experience is of.<sup>42</sup> Supposing that

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<sup>41</sup> Dretske 1994.

<sup>42</sup> Tye's account of introspection in terms of the deployment of recognitional capacities on the basis of experiential awareness thus counts as broadly Dretskean, as do accounts on which one makes an *inference*

introspection gets it right sometimes, experiential awareness is awareness of material objects and their surfaces. And on the basis of this, it seems that we come, through introspection, to be aware that we have experiences which are of material objects and their surfaces. But why think that such experiential introspection is not subject to the Veridicality Constraint? If experience is a state which represents material objects as being a certain way, and may do so independently of whether there are material objects which are that way in the subject's environment, then in simply reframing how things are experienced in belief, as the belief that one experiences things as being that way, one will *never get it wrong*—at least insofar as one exercises one's capacity to so reframe the content of experience successfully. This lack of possibility of error thus seems to vindicate that the claim that relevant capacity is one which, when exercised successfully, results in introspective knowledge in such cases. But this reasoning *assumes* that experience is a state which represents material objects as being a certain way, and may do so independently of whether there are material objects which are that way. This is not a problem for Dretske. He explicitly accepts this assumption in his discussion of introspection, and is just interested in providing a model of introspection given it. But without it, we don't have reason to think the Veridicality Constraint does not hold. And thus we don't have reason to suppose that introspection is insulated from experiential error.

Compare this to what one might say about belief. Suppose one arrives at the belief that one believes  $p$  on the basis of  $p$ . Perhaps one infers as follows: ' $p$ , therefore I believe  $p$ '. Successfully following such an inference seems apt to grant one knowledge of the conclusion, as if one accepts the premise, then one believes  $p$ , and hence the conclusion is true. But suppose one infers as follows: ' $p$ , therefore I know  $p$ '. Here one's inference is liable to error, as one may accept the premise without knowing  $p$ . And so such an inference cannot grant knowledge of the conclusion in cases in which one gets it wrong with respect to  $p$ . It can at best grant knowledge only in cases in which one gets it right in respect of  $p$ .

So on Dretske's model of introspection, whether one gets it right in introspection will depend on whether one views experience as relationally or non-relationally intentionally directed at material objects and their properties. Considerations of Transparency seem to favour a broadly Dretskean model of introspection. So considerations of Transparency do not provide support for either a relational or non-relational view of experiential intentionality. And even if one does not accept a broadly Dretskean model of introspection, I hope I have shown that it is just not pre-theoretically obvious that the deliverances of introspection get it right in cases of hallucination. Whilst *prima facie*, we might suppose that we get it right in *some* cases of introspection, we don't have much in the way of pre-theoretic reason to suppose we get it right

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from what is revealed in experiential awareness to a claim about what one experiences.

in cases of hallucination.

### §3.4 Conclusions

So considerations of Transparency do count for something about phenomenal character. They tell us that phenomenal character is constituted by intentional properties, and that the intentional objects of experience are material objects with their sensory qualities. But they don't count in favour of relational or non-relational views of this experiential intentionality. Thus they do not decide between representationalist and relationalist views. But is there more to experiential phenomenology than this? In the next section, I shall consider a final phenomenological argument related to transparency which does promise to decide between these views. I shall argue that it fails.

## §4 Phenomenology and Sensory Imagination

### §4.1 Introduction

In this section, I shall discuss a further argument for relational accounts that relates the phenomenological considerations discussed in §3 to cases of visual imagination—that provided by Martin in ‘The Transparency of Experience’. I'll argue that this also fails, although it does suggest connections between the *doxastic role* of experience and its phenomenology that I shall exploit in Chapter Two.

### §4.2 The Immediacy of Experience

Martin starts by identifying a *further* phenomenological feature of experience. According to him, experiences possess a phenomenological feature he terms *Immediacy* (or non-neutrality). This Phenomenological Immediacy is connected to visual experiences having the *doxastic role* that they do. Experiences are associated with *inclinations* to form beliefs concerning material objects having sensible qualities in the subject's environment. A state is phenomenologically immediate only if its subject is inclined form such beliefs.

But the doxastic role of experience is connected to its *intentionality*. Plausibly, when one has an experience of various material objects with sensible qualities, the relevant doxastic inclination is one to believe that such material objects with such sensible qualities are present in the subject's environment. Given this, we can characterise this phenomenological immediacy by saying that when the subject undergoes an experience, it is for her as if that her experience is of is actually present in her environment. So construing Immediacy shows that it is not inconsistent with Transparency—what is revealed by introspection is that experience is of material objects and properties, and it is so in a way which inclines one to belief.

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An account of the phenomenology of experience must therefore account for this immediacy. So any account of the phenomenology of experience must be such that being in a state with experiential phenomenology requires one be in a state with this cognitive role.

The representationalist can do this by making an analogy to belief. Beliefs are states of a kind that involve taking what is represented as the case. By claiming that experiences are also states of a kind that involve taking what is experienced as the case, the representationalist allows for them to have the cognitive role that they do, and hence the phenomenology of immediacy. The relationalist, on the other hand, seeks to explain the cognitive role and phenomenology of experience in terms of its being a state that makes ‘manifest’ that things are as they are experienced, in part because things being as they are experienced is a condition on the subject having the experience in the first place. Given the subject’s commitment to believing what is the case, she will consequently feel under an obligation to believe that things are as they are experienced, and hence be in a state with the doxastic role, and consequent phenomenological immediacy, we have described.<sup>43</sup>

I’ll return to evaluating these accounts of the doxastic role of experience in Chapter Two. But for now we can move on to consider the phenomenological objection Martin takes them to raise, when we consider visual imagination, or *visualising*.

### §4.3 The Immediacy of Visualising

Visualising is that kind of distinctive sensory imagining that corresponds to visual experience.<sup>44</sup> Part of the way in which it corresponds to visual experience is that it has a similar phenomenology. Visualising is transparent, which Martin puts by saying that ‘[r]eflecting on what one’s act of visualising [a blue ocean] is like, one can attend only to the blue expanse that one visualises and nothing else. No surrogate or medium for the water or for the blue are evident to one in so imagining’.<sup>45</sup> However visualising is not immediate in the same way that visual experience is. When one visualises a blue ocean, it is not the case that it is for one as if there is a blue ocean present in one’s environment. Despite this, visualising does possess something analogous to the immediacy of visual experience—when one visualises, it is the case that it is for one as if there is a blue ocean present in one’s *imagined* environment. As Martin puts it, ‘[v]isualising the water puts you in a position of not being neutral with respect to the

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<sup>43</sup> Martin 2002 pp.399-400.

<sup>44</sup> Martin 2002, p.403.

<sup>45</sup> Martin 2002, p.413.

imagined' situation.<sup>46</sup> 'This analogue of immediacy corresponds to a doxastic role distinct from, but analogous to, that of experience. Visualising has 'consequences for the attitude we actually have towards the *imagined* situation, namely that it contains the kinds of objects which we imagine the experience of [emphasis added]'.<sup>47</sup>

Now, just as for visual experience, there is a coincidence between the analogues of phenomenological immediacy and doxastic role. One cannot be in a state with the phenomenology of visualising without being inclined to believe the imaged situation contains the objects and properties one visualises. The challenge is to account for this. According to Martin, the relationalist can, whereas the representationalist cannot.

### §4.4 The Relationalist's Account.

According to the relationalist, perceptual experience is a relation to the things that it presents. So, if the perceptual experience presents things as a particular way, then things are that way. Now, suppose, as is plausible enough, that visualising something involves imagining experiencing it. On the relationalist view, in imagining an experience which presents things as a particular way, a subject committed to imagining a situation in which things are that way. As our subject is imagining a situation in which things are as the imagined experience presents them, she will naturally take it that the imagined situation is as she visualises it. Hence she is in a state with the phenomenology and cognitive role of visualising outlined above

### §4.5 The Non-Relationalist's Account

So how should the representationalist respond to this challenge? According to the representationalist, undergoing a perceptual experience which represents things as being a particular way is consistent with things not being that way. Hence, imagining an experience in which things are presented as being a particular way is not sufficient for imagining a situation in which things are that way. In contrast to the relationalist, the representationalist cannot explain the immediacy and doxastic role of visualising merely in terms of visualising involving imagining an experience.

The most obvious response is for the representationalist to just bolt on the extra claim that when we visualise, and imagine experiencing, we *also* suppose that the imagined experience is perceptual. An experience is perceptual only if that it is an experience is of is present in the environment in which the experience takes place. So imagining an experience, and supposing it

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<sup>46</sup> Martin 2002, p.414.

<sup>47</sup> Martin 2002, p.414.

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is perceptual, commits one to the presence in the imagined environment of that the experience is of. Hence, we get a commitment to the presence in the imagined scene of that which is visualised.

Such an add on is not motivated independently of the claim that visualising commits us to the presence of what is visualised. But I don't see that this is a problem. The project is one of giving an account of the nature of visualising, given that it has various features such as that of carrying cognitive commitment. And this is exactly what the suppositional strategy aims to do.

Such a view is articulated by Peacocke, as follows:

[W]e are asked not just to imagine the sort of experience one has when one sees a tree, but to imagine a tree, really there in front of us. What this last involves, I have argued, is that the imaginer not merely imagine from the inside an experience as of a tree, but also that he S-imagines as a condition on the same imagined world that the experience is a perception of a tree. So when he imagines a tree, the S-imagined conditions entail that, in the imagined world, some tree is perceived.<sup>48</sup>

On this view, then, when the subject visualises an tree, she engages in two acts of imagination. She (i) imagines 'from the inside' an experience as of a tree. But she also (ii) supposes the imagined experience is a perception of a tree. Such a view can explain why visualising has the cognitive role it does. According to (ii) we suppose the imagined experience is a perception. In supposing this, we are committed to the imagined scene containing that the experience is of. Hence we naturally take the imagined scene to contain a tree. So what is wrong with such a strategy?

The suppositional view fails to explain the connection between the cognitive role of visualising, and its phenomenology. Recall, according to Martin, the phenomenological non-neutrality of visual experience is reflected in its phenomenological role. It is 'inconceivable that one should be in a mental state phenomenological just the same as ... a perceptual experience and yet not feel coerced into believing that things are the way that they are presented as being'. Martin claims a similar coincidence between phenomenology and cognitive role in the case of visualising. Presumably, it is going to be inconceivable that one should be in a mental state phenomenally just the same as a state of visualising, and yet not feel coerced into believing that things in the imagined scene are the way that they are visualised as being. But, merely supposing

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<sup>48</sup> Peacocke 1985, p.28. Quoted in Martin 2002, p.416.

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that something is the case doesn't add anything to the *sensuous* phenomenological character of a subject's state.<sup>49</sup> It is not the case that there is anything it is sensorily like merely to *suppose* an imagined experience is perceptual. Given this, the distinctive phenomenology of visualising must be constituted by the act of 'imagining from the inside' an experience of a tree. So on the suppositional strategy, the cognitive role and phenomenal character of visualising are constituted by distinct acts. If that's the case, we'd expect there not to be a connection between the phenomenology and cognitive role. It would be conceivable that by imagining an experience 'from the inside', but not adding the extra supposition that the experience be perceptual, we should be in a situation phenomenally just like visualising, but which doesn't cause us to believe that the imagined world is as our imagined experience has it. *Ex hypothesi*, this is not conceivable. So the suppositional strategy fails.<sup>50</sup>

However, on the face of it, the representationalist can avoid the problem for the suppositional strategy by claiming that imagining an experience is *not* sufficient for being in a state with the phenomenology of visualising. Rather whatever it is that fixes the cognitive role of visualising is also necessary for being in a state with the phenomenology of visualising.

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<sup>49</sup> Although there may be cognitive phenomenology associated with such an act of supposing.

<sup>50</sup> Is this Martin's objection to such a strategy on pp.416-417? Martin seems to have such a view in mind when he quotes Peacocke on p.416. But he then moves to considering a view on which 'the visualising [is] neutral about what objects the imagined situation is taken to contain' and yet 'this counts as imaging the objects being so [because of] the intellectual context of the imagining'. He claims that on such a view, visualising a scene won't commit us to imagined scene containing what is present. On the view I've presented, visualising does commit us to what is present, but visualising is constituted by two distinct acts of imagining, one which so commits the subject, and one which carries the phenomenology of visualising. I think the difference is mostly terminological - Martin is identifying visualising with the act that carries the phenomenology - the act of 'imagining 'from the inside' an experience as of an ocean. This act doesn't commit us to the imagined scene containing what is present. On this picture, the act of supposing that the imagined experience is perceptual is simply part of the background cognitive context of the visualising.

In response to this, the defender of the suppositional strategy could switch to identifying visualising not with the act of imagining an experience from the inside, but with the state one is in when one both does this and supposes the experience is perceptual. Thus the extra supposition is necessary for visualising, not simply part of the cognitive backdrop.

However, this re-categorisation of 'visualising' does not touch the underlying problem, that on the suppositional strategy the cognitive and phenomenological aspects of the subject's state are explained by distinct and separable aspects, and so not necessarily connected. The argument I have given in demonstrates why this is so.

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This rules out adding an additional act of supposition. But why don't we say that when the subject visualises, she is in a state that involves *both* imagining an experience, and being in a kind of state that is committal with respect to the imagined presence of what the experience is of. This could involve an extra attitude over and beyond imagining an experience, similar to supposing that the imagined experience is perceptual in that it commits the subject to the imagined presence of what the experience is of, but different from supposing in that it is not *phenomenally idle*. Or we could say that there is just one attitude one takes to experience when visualising, and this attitude commits us not only to the imagined presence of an experience, but also to the imagined presence of what one imagines an experience of. Either way, the phenomenology and cognitive role of visualising will both be grounded in the subject being in the kind of state(s) which she is.

It might seem *ad hoc* to appeal to such a novel kind of state in accounting for the phenomenology and committedness of visualising. Accepting that there are such states may seem to be under motivated—we have no reason to posit such states independent of their giving an adequate account of visualising consistent with the representationalist account of visual experience. But it seems to me there are such states, and so they are not entirely novel. Consider states of endorsement. I can endorse someone's assertion that, e.g., the sky is blue. Such a state *prima facie* seems to involve an attitude (of endorsement) to another contentful state (assertion). And yet in addition to committing one to the presence of such an assertion, it also commits one to the asserted content. So why not simply characterise the kind of attitude as similar to endorsement in that it is an attitude one takes to a contentful-state that commits one to the content of that state. But in any case, there is no need for independent reason for accepting the presence of such states. As I have said, all that is required is that we can give an *adequate* account of visualising *consistent* with the representationalist account of visual experience. If the above approach does this, it allows for an adequate representationalist account of visualising.

This brings us to a second objection - that the above account does not provide a *substantive* explanation of the phenomenology or cognitive role of commitment, as it simply claims that there is a kind of state necessary for such phenomenology and sufficient for such commitment, without explaining why this is the case. It is true that the above account is pretty thin on explanation. All that's really been claimed is that the phenomenology and commitment are connected to the kind of attitude one has when one visualises. But that is a substantive claim, and so the above account does do more than simply re-iterate the phenomenon. And in any case, if such an account in terms of attitude kinds is acceptable in explaining the commitment and phenomenology of visual experience, one can hardly object when such an account is offered of visual imagination.

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But there is a further objection to this kind of account. In §4 of *The Transparency of Experience* Martin repeatedly talks about the problem posed for the representationalist as one of explaining ‘the coincidence of an *imagined* phenomenological property of an imagined experience with one’s actual attitude towards the imagined situation containing that imaginary experience [emphasis added]’, or alternatively that of explaining how ‘*imagined* immediacy has consequences for the attitude we actually have towards the imagined situation [emphasis added]’. It seems that for Martin, the coincidence we’re looking for is *not* simply between phenomenological and cognitive features of visualising, but between cognitive features of visualising, and phenomenological features of what is *imagined*. In general, Martin seems to think that it’s sufficient to be in a state with the phenomenology of visualising that one imagines ‘from the inside’ experience of what one visualises, complete with its *experiential* phenomenology. This would explain why he thinks that one is restricted to what is involved in imagining an experience from the inside in accounting for the commitment.

The suppositional strategy above was forced to accept this assumption, because the added extra act of supposition was phenomenally idle. But the revised representationalist strategy does not accept this assumption. It claims that it is a necessary condition on being in a state with the phenomenology of visualising that one be in a state that commits one to the imagined presence of what is visualised. But it is not a necessary condition on merely *imagining* an experience ‘from the inside’ that one is so committed. And so merely imagining an experience from the inside is not sufficient for being in a state with the phenomenology of visualising.

Why does Martin think that imagining an experience is sufficient for visualising? Martin motivates this claim by considering sensorily imagining an itch. Plausibly such a state is certainly in some ways phenomenally similar to the state one is in when one has an itch. But being in a state with the phenomenal properties of an itch is *sufficient* for having an itch. Imagining ‘from the inside’ an itch is *not sufficient* for having an itch. So imagining ‘from the inside’ an itch does not have the same phenomenal properties as an itch.

So how do we account for the phenomenally similarity between imagining an itch and having one? Martin claims we can explain this by holding that although the phenomenal properties that correspond to the phenomenal character of itchiness are not *instantiated* by the act of imagining an itch, they are the *intentional objects* of such an act of imagination—they are part of what is imagined. We imagine an itch with the phenomenal properties of itchiness, and thus are in a state in which those phenomenal properties are before the mind despite their not being instantiated.

Martin claims that there are phenomenological properties that are similarly before the mind in

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cases of visualising, but again cannot be instantiated. These are perspectival properties—properties of presenting what the visualising does as to a point of view, e.g. to the left, or to the right. Martin claims that such perspectival properties fix the location of what is presented by a state in relation to a point of view of the subject of that state. If they are possessed by the state of visualising, they would fix the location of what is visualised as some location in the subject's environment. But when we visualise things, we visualise them as located in an *imagined* environment. Hence such perspectival properties cannot be instantiated in the state of visualising. Again, the solution is to say that in visualising, such properties feature in what we imagine. And we do this by imagining an experience which has those properties. But if imagining such an experience is to explain how we are in a state phenomenologically similar to visual experience with respect to its perspectival properties, imagining such an experience must be sufficient for being in a state with the phenomenology of visualising, insofar as this phenomenology relates to perspectival properties.

At this point, it's tempting to generalise, and explain every respect in which visualising is phenomenologically akin to visual experience in terms of imagining a visual experience with the relevant phenomenological properties. Hence visualising has the phenomenology of immediacy only insofar as in visualising, we imagine a visual experience that has the phenomenology of immediacy. But as we've seen, on the representationalist picture doing this is not sufficient for being in a state that is committed to the imagined presence of what we imagine visually experiencing. And so for the representationalist, it is conceivable that one be in a state with the phenomenology of visualising but not the doxastic role. And so much the worse for the representationalist.

But such a generalisation is not warranted. At best all that is warranted for any respect in which visualising is phenomenologically akin to visually experiencing, *and* for which we have reason to suppose the relevant phenomenological property cannot be instantiated when we visualise, our explanation of the way in which visualising is phenomenologically akin can only be in terms of that property being part of what we imagine. But we don't have any reason to suppose that phenomenological immediacy must be such a property. For all that's been said, perhaps it's being for us as if what we visualise is present in our imagined environment is just part of what it is like for us when we visualise. But if this is true the representationalist can give the above account of the coincidence of the phenomenology and cognitive role of visualising.

### §5 Conclusions

I have argued that consideration of experiential phenomenology supports the idea that the phenomenal characters of visual experiences are constituted by their being intentionally directed

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on material objects with sensory qualities in their subject's environments. But considerations of experiential phenomenology do not decide between relational and non-relational views of such intentionality. In §4, I discussed how such phenomenological character of experience is connected to its propensity to incline subjects to belief. In the next chapter, I shall further consider how the intentionality of experience is connected to its doxastic role.

## Chapter 2

# The Doxastic Role of Experience

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### §1 Introductory

Once we recognise that experiential intentionality is connected to other features of perceptual experience, accounts of experiential intentionality can be assessed in terms of how well they account these other features. In this chapter, I shall be considering how experiential intentionality is connected to the doxastic consequences of experience; to the ways in which experiences give rise to belief.

In section §2 of this chapter, I shall specify how I take experiential intentionality to be connected to the doxastic role of experience. I shall do this by consideration of belief analyses of experience. Belief analyses ultimately fail as accounts of experience, but not because they mischaracterise the ways in which experiences incline us to believe. Although they confuse experience with its doxastic consequences, belief analyses get right the way in which experiences are connected to inclinations to believe.

In section §3, I shall consider how the connections between experience and belief pose a problem for relational accounts of experience. Consideration of the doxastic role of experience reveals that perfectly matching veridical and hallucinatory visual experiences can have common doxastic consequences. Subjects undergoing experiences, whether genuinely perceptions or perfectly matching hallucinations, are similarly inclined to believe claims about material objects with sensory qualities present in their environment. But once this is realised, relational account of veridical and hallucinatory experience can appear committed to needless complexity. Put simply, relational accounts are committed to disjunctivism about experience, and may therefore seem to be committed a needless complex account of how experiences of both perceptual and hallucinatory kinds give rise to belief. Through reflection on the role of simplicity in theory selection, I shall argue that while relational accounts are not committed to needless complexity, there are constraints on the kind of explanation of the doxastic role of hallucinatory experience the relationalist may offer.

In section §4, I shall show these constraints cannot be met, by explaining the common consequences of perceptual and hallucinatory experiences in terms of indistinguishability. What

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I aim to show in this chapter is merely that the relationalist is committed to providing a more complicated explanation of the doxastic role of experience than the representationalist.

### §2 The Doxastic Role of Experience

So what doxastic role does experience have? And, continuing our approach of connecting various features of experience to experiential intentionality, how does the doxastic role of experience connect with experiential intentionality? A very straightforward account of the connection between experience and belief is offered by belief analyses of perceptual experience,<sup>51</sup> and so provides a natural starting point for investigation.

#### §2.1 Belief Analyses

On a belief analysis, experiences are to be understood in terms of beliefs, and their features are accounted for in terms of features of such beliefs. However, beliefs are *states*; whereas experiences are *events*. So a belief analysis cannot simply identify experiences with beliefs. Rather, experiences are identified with, or constituted by, some event *involving* beliefs. And features of experience are accounted for in terms of features of the beliefs such events involve. In this section, I shall develop what I take to be the most plausible version of a belief analysis. I shall argue that this analysis fails to provide an adequate account of experience, and of its relation to belief. However, it does capture much of our ordinary thinking about the relationship between experience and belief.

On the simplest of belief analyses, experiences might be identified with events of *acquiring* beliefs. Specifically, on such a view all it is to undergo an experience in to acquire a belief. And all it is for one to be *experientially aware* of various material objects and their sensory qualities is to acquire a belief that there are such objects with such sensory qualities. Thus the intentionality of experience is accounted for in terms of the intentionality of belief. However, this analysis is clearly overly simplistic. There are many ways of acquiring beliefs. The belief analysis must provide a restriction on the ways of acquiring beliefs with which it identifies experiences. I'm going to allow this problem is reasonably easy to overcome, by restricting the relevant events to ones involving *use of the relevant sensory faculties* (in fact, I think the problem cannot be so easily overcome, and I shall discuss it further in §2.1.2). For now, I want to note that a different problem arises from the fact that if an experience is the acquiring of a belief, a subject already with the relevant belief cannot acquire it, and hence cannot undergo the experience. Acquiring a belief involves a transition from lacking belief to having it. A subject who does not lack the

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<sup>51</sup> See Armstrong 1988 for a belief analysis.

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relevant belief cannot do this. But one clearly can have an experience when one already believes things are as experienced.

In response to this, the belief theory should be modified to identify experiences with some other doxastic occurrence that does not require a prior lack of the belief in question. A successful belief theory should identify experiences with doxastic events compatible with the prior possession of belief. Are there any such events? Well, plausibly, there are events similar to judgement, but which do not require a transition from lack of belief to belief. One can *reaffirm* a belief that one already possesses. This is most obvious when one's prior belief that  $p$  was not reached through rational judgment—a subject saddled with an unexamined belief that  $p$  can examine it, and go on to reaffirm it or not. Plausibly, in reaffirming a belief, one is recommitting oneself to the proposition which one believes, and placing it for use in doxastic deliberation, ready to serve as input in reasoning.<sup>52</sup> So in reaffirming a belief, one is undergoing an event involving a belief, but one compatible with its prior possession. However, the notion of reaffirmation, like judgement, carries the implication of an event that a subject actively initiates. In contrast, experiences not such events: they are events that *impinge* upon a subject. Furthermore, reaffirmation requires not the prior lack of belief, but rather the prior presence of it. Reaffirming the belief  $p$  requires that one believes  $p$  prior to reaffirming it. But undergoing an experience is *neutral* with respect to prior belief. I shall therefore help myself the notion of 'activation' of a belief. Activation of belief is an event which is not actively initiated by its subject, but which is otherwise similar to either acquiring or reaffirming belief.<sup>53</sup>

We might therefore revise the belief analysis to:

B1.  $s$  undergoing an experience as of  $p$  is just a matter of a belief that  $p$  being activated in  $s$ .<sup>54</sup>

However, even with this reformulation, it still follows that if  $s$  undergoes an experience as of  $p$ , then  $s$  believes that  $p$ . This is because if a belief that  $p$  is activated in  $s$ , then  $s$  believes that  $p$ . But there seem to be cases in which a subject may undergo an experience without believing.

First, there are cases in which a subject has some background reason to lack trust in their

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<sup>52</sup> cf Tye's notion of *poised* content in Tye 2000.

<sup>53</sup> See Williamson 1990 for a similar notion of activating knowledge.

<sup>54</sup> There are two aspects to this claim. On the one hand, the experiential event is *identified* with the belief activation event. But furthermore, the *intentional features* of the experiential event are constituted by the intentional features of the belief acquisition event. Experiential intentionality is therefore construed in terms of propositional content, and hence we can talk of undergoing an experience 'as of  $p$ '.

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senses, and therefore to hold back from believing that things are as they are experienced. Such cases are of interest when discussing the *defeasibility* of perceptual *justification*, and shall be considered in Chapter 3. But for now, we can just note that in such cases, a subject will often not *form* a belief on the basis of their experience. For an example of such a case, consider the following:

*s* is participating in an experiment about which she has told, by a reliable neuroscientist, that when she opens her eyes, a hallucination will be induced in her, which will perfectly match a perceptual experience of a tea cup before her. *s* opens her eyes, and has an experience of a tea cup before her. *s*'s prior information about the experimental set up gives her reason to distrust her senses, and she holds back from believing that things are as she experiences them. *s* does not believe that there is such a tea cup before her.

This kind of case may be one of genuinely perception, or of hallucination. It may be that there really is a tea cup before her when she opens her eyes. Nevertheless, given her prior reason to not trust her senses, she does not believe things to be as she experiences them.

Second, there are cases in which the connection between experience and belief specified in B1 would commit subjects to *inconsistent beliefs* when undergoing various illusory experiences. Experiences involving motion after-effects provide examples. When one fixates on a moving stimulus for some time, such as a waterfall, and then looks at a stationary stimulus, such as some nearby rocks, one has a peculiar kind of perceptual experience which can be described by saying the stationary stimulus both appears to move, and appears stationary.<sup>55</sup> One has both an experience of the rock as moving, and as not moving. On a belief analysis, a subject in such a case would be activating inconsistent beliefs, and would hence have inconsistent commitments. But typically, subjects in such situations do *not* have inconsistent commitments. Hence they do not have the relevant beliefs.<sup>56</sup>

Third, there are cases in which experiences may be indistinct, and so don't provide sufficient information on which to base beliefs. The following provides an example of such a case:

*s* is lost in the fog, seeking the car park from which she has started her walk.  
Through the haze, *s* seems to indistinctly see a grey shape before her. *s* has an

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<sup>55</sup> See Crane 1988 for further discussion of this illusion.

<sup>56</sup> An explanation for why subject don't form the relevant beliefs is that they recognize the inconsistency in doing so, and this gives them a reason to distrust their senses. If that is right, such cases are also ones in which a subject doesn't form the relevant beliefs because she has reason to distrust her senses.

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experience of a grey thing before her, but *s* does not believe that there is a grey thing before her.

Again, the subject does not form the relevant belief. However in this case, there does not seem to be any background belief at work in causing her not to do so.

Finally, there are cases in which subjects may simply *fail to doxastically respond* to their experience. For example, a subject might fail to notice that *p* upon looking, perhaps because she is concentrating hard on other matters. But this does not seem to rule out her having an experience as of *p*. On a belief analysis, this is ruled out.

Such kinds of case provide counter-examples to B1. But they also suggest a natural way to reformulate the key commitment of a belief analysis. Such cases are naturally described as situations in which subjects fail to form a belief that they are *inclined to* in the circumstances.<sup>57</sup> When *s* has reason to be suspicious of her senses, she represses a natural inclination to believe that things are as she experiences them. When *s* undergoes conflicting experience, *s*'s inclinations act against each other, and thus fail to result in belief (and *s* may, in reflecting on this, then have further reason to distrust her senses). When *s* undergoes an indistinct experience, *s* has a small degree of inclination to believe, but one not sufficient to result in belief. And when *s* fails to respond to experience, background features about *s*'s cognitive state prevent the inclination resulting in belief.

So we can reformulate the belief analysis in terms of such inclinations:

B2. *s* undergoing an experience as of *p* is just a matter of an inclination to believe *p* being sensorily activated in *s*.

Activation of inclination to believe is a matter of an inclination to believe being acquired or maintained. And for now, we may assume an inclination to believe *p* is *sensorily* activated in *s* iff *s*

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<sup>57</sup> The situation differs here from that with respect to the *justificatory role* of experience. In some of the cases I have described, subjects plausibly *are not justified* in believing. I claim that they still have the relevant inclinations. Alternatively, one could regard the inclinations as *absent* in such cases. On such a view, experiences have a slightly different doxastic role from that I claim they have. This raises complications for the current argument, as one must then consider the further conditions which determine the presence of absence of belief. However, I think that even if one accepts this claim, one can provide an argument structurally identical to that I provide with respect to justification in Chapter Three to account for common, if slightly different, doxastic features in hallucination and genuine perception in terms of indistinguishability.

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acquires or maintains, by use of her senses, an inclination to believe  $p$ . B2 entails the following biconditional:

B3.  $s$  undergoes an experience as of  $p$  if and only if  $s$  is inclined to believe that  $p$ .

Crucially, the presence of such an inclination is *consistent* with the lack belief, and thus consistent with the counter-examples to B1 mentioned above.

So what is wrong with the belief analysis? I think our revised belief theory does correctly capture the *logical* relation between experience and belief in B3. So I do not think that we are going to find much in the way of counter-examples to the belief analysis. But the belief analysis of B2 is not *explanatorily adequate*. It does not account for the phenomenal character of experience, it cannot account for the difference between experiential and non-experiential activation of inclination to belief, and it does not vindicate our practices of explaining presence of belief in terms of experience. This final problem affects even a more moderate belief theory which denies experiential are identical with events involving beliefs, but which still seeks to account for the *intentional features* of experience in terms of the intentionality of belief. I shall now discuss these problems in turn.

### §2.1.1 Phenomenology of Inclinations to Believe

As discussed in chapter one, experiences have a distinctive sensory phenomenology. Events in which inclinations to believe are activated do not in of themselves have any distinctive *sensory* phenomenology.<sup>58</sup> So the presence of sensory phenomenology in experience cannot be accounted for simply in terms of experiences being (or being constituted by) the activation of inclinations to believe. As it stands, the belief analysis is incomplete. So the belief analysis must claim that there is something special about the experience-constituting activations of inclinations to belief—they are ones which have phenomenal character. But the presence of such sensory phenomenology cannot be accounted for simply in terms of their being activations of inclinations to believe.

This still leaves a core motivation of the belief theory intact. The *intentional* features of experience may still be explained in terms of the content of the belief the experience is an inclination to form. However, in Chapter One, I connected the phenomenology of experience to its intentionality. Plausibly, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by its intentional properties. If the intentional properties of experience are accounted for in terms of the intentional properties of belief, it is hard to see how this can be so. Inclinations to believe

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<sup>58</sup> This claim is independent of whether such events have some other kind of phenomenology.

do not have any distinctive sensory phenomenology. One can have a belief, or an inclination to believe, unconsciously, and without there being anything it is like to have it. It may be that there is something it is like to be *conscious* of a belief. But such conscious beliefs have at best a *cognitive* phenomenology which is not appropriately related to their intentional properties. What it is like to consciously entertain the belief that  $2 + 2 = 4$  does not seem different from what it is like to consciously entertain the belief that  $2 + 3 = 5$ , or that Paris is the capital of France. Yet the intentional properties of such beliefs differ. And so such cognitive phenomenology associated with belief is not constituted by the intentional properties of beliefs.

### §2.1.2 Sensory Activation of Inclinations to Believe

In originally formulating the belief analysis, I noted that experiences cannot be identified with just any activation of inclination to believe. The belief analysis must claim the inclinations are activated *sensorily*—i.e. through the use of the relevant senses, or sensory apparatus. But there are many ways of using one's sensory apparatus to activate inclinations for beliefs. One could, for instance, activate an inclination to believe that an object is hard by pressing it against one's eyeball.<sup>59</sup> But in doing so, one is not undergoing a visual experience of that object. The belief theory seems to need some further restriction; perhaps to inclinations activated through the use of one's sensory apparatus *in the right way*.

Unfortunately, the obvious way to do this is unavailable to the belief analysis. It is plausible that the inclinations we most straightforwardly associate with visual experiences are just those ones that are activated by undergoing an experience of things as we are inclined to believe them to be:

- B4. An inclination to believe that  $a$  is  $F$  is *sensorily* activated in  $s$  if and only if it is activated in virtue of  $s$  undergoing an experience of  $a$  as  $F$

But the belief analysis cannot offer such an account of experience. It would be circular, as the notion of experience figures in the analysis.<sup>60</sup> So it looks like the belief analysis cannot

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<sup>59</sup> See Armstrong 1988

<sup>60</sup> An alternative would be to claim that the belief analysis does not need to characterise the right way. One could just 'point' to an inclination to belief of the appropriate kind, and say the relevant activations of inclinations are those activated in *that* way, thus picking out the relevant kind of activation in a way similar to that Grice 1988 uses to fix the relevant causal relations for his *Causal Theory of Perception*. Obviously, such an approach is in tension with given a *conceptual* analysis, as it allows we do not possess the concepts necessary to specify the relevant way of activating belief. But I think it is also hostage to empirical facts in a problematic way. It might turn out that there are a variety of ways in which the

correctly characterise the connections between experience and doxastic dispositions without doing so in a way incompatible with analysing experience in terms of those doxastic dispositions.

### §2.1.3 Explanation

I think what §2.1.1 and §2.1.2 suggest is that we ordinarily think of perceptual experiences as *explaining* our inclinations to believe that things are as presented. We are inclined to believe because we have an *experience* with a certain intentional properties (plausibly constituting the *phenomenal character* of that experience). And it does seem right that we may explain the presence of such inclinations in terms of experience. When I form the belief that there is a tea cup before me, on the basis of my experience, I can explain this belief by saying that I had an experience of a tea cup before me. Even if I don't go on to form this belief, I can explain why I was inclined to it by similarly citing my experience. But if experiences just are the activation of such inclinations (in the right way), it is hard to see how they can explain their presence. What does the explaining is just what is to be explained. I shall return to this point in §3.

### §2.2 Consequences

So the belief analysis is inadequate. Nevertheless, the doxastic connections the belief theory trades in do seem correct. And we are happy to explain why we believed something to be the case in terms of our having an experience of it as being the case, suggesting we do regard experiences as the causal grounds for our doxastic dispositions. And as discussed in Chapter One, visual experiences seem to have a authoritative presentational phenomenology. If an experience is authoritative, it inclines us to believe that things are as presented by it. As experiences are authoritative, they incline us to believe that things are as presented by them. Hence

B5. If  $s$  undergoes an experience of  $p$  then an inclination to believe that  $p$  is activated in  $s$ .

### §3 Simplicity: Constraints on Explaining the Doxastic Role of Experience

Consider a case in which a subject,  $s$ , is perceiving her environment,  $c_p$ . In such a case, various inclinations to believe are activated in  $s$ . Some of these inclinations to believe will be inclinations to believe propositions concerning the *particular* objects in her environment. For example, seeing a red cupcake, she may be inclined to believe that *that is red*. This belief concerns the particular

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relevant inclinations to believe may be activated. I think what unifies these ways is that they are ways in which it is activated *by experience*. Again, this cannot be appealed to by a belief analysis.

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red cupcake she sees. And some of the inclinations will be inclinations to believe propositions not concerning the particular objects in her environment. For example, she will be inclined to believe that *something is red*.

If we consider *matching* perceptual and hallucinatory cases, we can see that there is something in common amongst the inclinations to believe which are activated in such cases. In a matching perceptual cases, a subject will also be seeing something red. And will be inclined to believe that *that is red*, where the ‘that’ refers to whatever particular it is she sees, which may be distinct from the red cupcake in  $c_p$ . And the subject will *equally* inclined to believe that *something is red*, just as she is in  $c_p$ . Similarly, in a matching hallucinatory case, a subject may be equally inclined believe that *something is red*. So in matching cases, there are common inclinations to believe.

I think the dialectical position here is different to that in the debate over experiential phenomenology. In that debate, it is open to question whether perceptual and hallucinatory experiences have exactly the same kind of phenomenology. There are reasons to suppose that introspective attention to the phenomenal character of experiences may be misleading in cases of hallucination. But I think it is implausible to suppose that matching perceptual and hallucinatory experiences don’t equally involve activation of (some of) the same inclinations for belief. Any adequate account of the doxastic role of experience must therefore account for the presence of the same experiential inclinations in both cases of hallucination and genuine perception.

As such inclinations are common to matching hallucinatory and perceptual experiences, the relationalist cannot simply account for their presence as the upshot of undergoing an experience with the relational structure she claims genuine perceptions have, in which how things are in the subject’s environment are made manifest to her. As discussed in my introduction, the relationalist cannot offer a similar account of hallucination, as in hallucination one is not experientially related to material objects and their properties. But any adequate account of the doxastic role of experience must explain why such inclinations are present in hallucinatory cases. So, if the relationalist is to offer an adequate account of such common doxastic features, she has a choice.

On the one hand, she might hold on to the idea that the subject’s being experientially related to material objects with sensory qualities *does* explain the presence of doxastic inclinations *in perceptual cases*. But she is therefore committed to the presence of the *same* doxastic inclinations in *matching hallucinatory cases* being explained in terms of *something else*. She is therefore committed to a *disjunctive* explanation of the presence of such common doxastic inclinations across matching perceptual and hallucinatory cases. An explanation of a feature,  $F$ , common to some set of

cases, *C*, is disjunctive iff the presence of *F* is explained in one way in some cases in *C*, and another way in other cases of *C*. On the other hand, she might hold on to a *non-disjunctive* explanation of the doxastic inclinations—one on which the presence of such inclinations is explained in the *same* way. But this commits her to denying that the presence of experiential relations does work in explaining the presence of doxastic inclinations in perceptual cases.

This second options is not attractive. It seems to leave the distinctive account the relationalist gives of perceptual experience and intentionality as entirely *explanatorily idle* in accounting for the doxastic consequences of perception. This is theoretically unsatisfying. Furthermore, in chapter one we saw that the intentionality of experience is plausibly connected to its phenomenology, in that the phenomenal character of experience in perceptual cases is constituted its intentional properties, and these in turn are, for the relationalist, constituted by experiential relations between the subject and material objects with various sensory qualities in her environment. Given this, we might expect that for the relationalist, the relational account of experiential intentionality should do double duty in accounting for both experiential phenomenology and doxastic inclinations. But on the current view, this must be denied.<sup>61</sup> If the distinctive claims about perceptual experience the relationalist makes are to do substantive work in an account of experience which respects this connection, the relationalist must offer a disjunctive explanation of the common doxastic consequences of matching perceptual and hallucinatory cases.

So I think the relationalist should accept a disjunctive account of such common doxastic features. In perceptual cases the doxastic consequences of experience are the upshot of undergoing an experience in which one is experientially related to material objects with various sensory qualities, and such objects being as they are is made manifest to her. Hence, given her interest in believing what is the case, she is inclined to belief that things are as she experiences them.<sup>62</sup> In hallucinatory cases, the subject is not experientially related to material objects with various sensory qualities, and so nothing about how such objects are is made manifest to her. That she is equally inclined to believe requires *further* explanation.

### §3.1 Disjunctive Explanation and Simplicity

But offering a disjunctive explanation appears to have a different problem—it seems needlessly

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<sup>61</sup> Alternatively, the Relationalist could maintain the connection between experiential phenomenology and doxastic role by claiming that the phenomenal character of matching perceptual and hallucinatory experiences is the same, even though perceptual experiences have a relational structure and hallucinatory ones do not. In this case, it is hard to see what content there is to the relationalist view, as *everyone* excepts that there is something relational present in cases of perception.

<sup>62</sup> See Martin 2002 for further discussion of this claim

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*complex*. In contrast, a non-relationalist is *not* committed to a disjunctive account of the common doxastic features. For example, a *representationalist* can give the same account of hallucinatory and perceptual experiences, in terms of experiences being representational states which are not constituted by relations to what they are of. The representationalist can then explain the common doxastic consequences of matching perceptual and hallucinatory experiences in terms of their having the same representational content and being the kind of representational state which grounds inclinations to endorse this content in belief. In contrast it may appear as if the relationalist will have to say that the common consequences of veridical and hallucinatory experiences are the result of subjects undergoing experiences which are different ways, but just so happen to result in the same doxastic consequences. But should we not prefer an explanation of why it is that such experiences have the consequences they do in terms of a single experiential feature, which results in such consequences, common to matching cases of veridical and hallucinatory experience? And if we can explain the common consequences in terms of a single experiential feature, is not the relationalist's disjunctive explanation needlessly complex?<sup>63</sup>

Now it is not the case that the simplest account of some phenomenon is always true. A simple explanation may well turn out false. But simplicity is often said to be an explanatory virtue. How so? First, simplicity in a theory is attractive—in general we prefer simpler accounts of some phenomena to more complex ones. Second, simplicity is also said to have normative significance in theory selection—we should prefer, or value, simpler theories over more complex ones, and refrain from ‘multiplying entities beyond necessity’. And third, simplicity may be taken to have methodological significance—the correct methodology when thinking about how to account for some phenomenon is to start with the simplest explanation, and move on to more complicated ones only when simpler explanation are shown to be inadequate. So if we have *already* accepted that genuine perceptual cases involve a feature which give rise to certain doxastic consequences, it is over complicating the matter to claim that in hallucinatory cases some further feature is present, yet this feature plays exactly the same role in bringing about the same consequences. It looks like the simplest account of how hallucinatory experiences have the consequences they do is that the same feature is present in such cases.

I think this explains the sense of unease we may feel about relationalist accounts. If we prefer accounts we take to be simpler than those we take to be more complex, and it seems to us that the representationalist account is simpler than the relationalist account, then we will naturally prefer the representationalist account to the relationalist account. Similarly, if simplicity has methodological significance, given that the representationalist account has not been shown

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<sup>63</sup> See Sturgeon 2000 Chapter 1 for an argument for a common factor account of experiential justification.

inadequate, we should concentrate on it at the expense of the relationalist account in our thinking about visual experience. This is consistent with holding that the relationalist account may in the end turn out to be true—the simplest theory is not always the true one. But if the representationalist account is genuinely simpler than the relationalist account, it is obtuse to favour the representationalist account over it.

This charge of explanatory complexity can and should be avoided. But doing so imposes some severe constraints on the kind of explanation the relationalist can offer of the presence of the same doxastic consequences of perceptual experiences in hallucinatory cases. In the rest of this section, I shall outline exactly how the disjunctive explanation the relationalist is committed to is seemingly more complex than the common factor account the representationalist can offer. I shall consider what I take to be the most promising explanation the relationalist can offer which avoids this charge of explanatory complexity. I shall argue that it fails.

### §3.2 Kinds of Simplicity

So how *exactly* is the non-disjunctive account seemingly simpler than the disjunctive one? Both accounts will explain doxastic features of hallucinatory and perceptual cases in terms of features of those cases, and principles linking the presence of such features to presence of the doxastic inclinations.<sup>64</sup> Given this, we can distinguish between two different criteria for simplicity: parsimony and elegance.

*Parsimony* is a matter of how many different kinds of features an account is committed to:<sup>65</sup>

An account  $A$  is less parsimonious than an account  $A'$  iff  $A$  is committed to fewer features than  $A'$ .

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<sup>64</sup> We can take a *feature* to be a property of a case, such as the property of being a case in which the subject undergoes an experience in which she is experientially related to material objects with various sensible qualities is a feature, or the property of being a case in which the subject undergoes an experience which represents material objects with various sensible qualities.

<sup>65</sup> Quantitative and qualitative parsimony are sometimes distinguished, the former being a matter of how many things a theory is committed to, and the latter a matter of how many different kinds of thing. My notion of parsimony is similar to qualitative parsimony, except I am concerned with features of cases, rather than kinds of entities. *If* we assume that hallucinatory cases involve experiences, and the doxastic inclinations in hallucinatory cases are explained in terms of kinds of experience, the argument in this section could be recast in terms of qualitative parsimony. However, it is not obvious to me that the relationalist should conceive of hallucinatory cases as involving an experience with features which do such explanatory work.

*Elegance* is a matter of how many principles an account employs in its explanation of some phenomena.

An account  $A$  is less elegant than an account  $A'$  iff  $A$  is committed to fewer, or simpler, principles than  $A'$ .<sup>66</sup>

We can now ask how disjunctive and non-disjunctive accounts fare in relation to these two criteria for simplicity.

### §3.3 Qualitative Parsimony

The non-disjunctive account is less parsimonious only if it involves a commitment to *fewer* features than the disjunctive account. Now, the disjunctive account is certainly committed to explaining the common consequences of matching perceptual and hallucinatory experiences in terms of distinct features, whereas the non-disjunctivist theorist is not. So it looks like the disjunctivist is committed to a less parsimonious explanation.

But this is too quick. Suppose that the disjunctive account explains the presence of doxastic inclinations in hallucinatory cases in terms a feature which both the non-disjunctivist and disjunctivist must *already agree* is present in such cases. That is, suppose the relevant feature the disjunctivist takes present in hallucination,  $F_h$ , is one that the non-disjunctivist already *agrees* is present in such cases. And now suppose that  $F_h$  is a feature which does not explain the doxastic consequences in genuinely perceptual cases. In that case, the disjunctivist theorist is *not* in fact committed to more features than the non-disjunctivist, and so avoids the charge of failing to be parsimonious, even though she *invokes* more kinds of feature in her explanation of the common doxastic consequences. The situation would be as follows:

Both the disjunctivist and non-disjunctivist accept that there are two features present in matching perceptual and hallucinatory cases. They both agree that hallucination involves the presence a feature—call it  $F_h$ . And they both think there is some further kind of feature present in genuinely perceptual cases— $F_p$ . The difference between them is only that the disjunctivist thinks that  $F_h$  does explanatory work in, and only in, the hallucinatory cases, and the further feature  $F_p$  is present in, and does explanatory work in, only the genuinely perceptual cases. In contrast, the non-disjunctivist thinks that  $F_p$  is present in, and does explanatory work in, *both* hallucinatory and perceptual cases. Disjunctivist and non-disjunctivist alike accept that  $F_h$  is present in cases of

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<sup>66</sup> See Baker 2010 for discussion of such principles

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hallucination. It is just that the non-disjunctivist does not put  $F_h$  to work in explaining the presence of doxastic inclinations in that case. But both accept there are at least two features in the cases. And so both accounts are equally qualitatively parsimonious. They just differ in which of these features they appeal to in explaining the doxastic consequences of hallucinatory and perceptual experiences.

So, parsimony challenges the disjunctivist to find a feature uncontroversially present in hallucinatory cases to use in explaining the presence of doxastic inclinations in such cases.

### §3.4 Elegance

This doesn't yet resolve the issue of explanatory elegance. And it might seem that even if the worry from qualitative parsimony can be disposed with, the disjunctivist account is less elegant. After all, although both sides accept multiple features are present in matching cases of perception and hallucination, the disjunctivist holds that the *explanation* of the doxastic consequences differs across such cases, in terms of different features in each one.

The non-disjunctivist simply requires a connection between the presence of  $F_p$  and inclinations to belief. In contrast, the disjunctivist requires connections between  $F_p$  and belief in perceptual cases, and  $F_h$  and belief in hallucinatory cases. So *prima facie*, this will require either two principles, each relating the presence of different feature in the different cases to belief (or one complex principle, relating the presence of either feature). So it looks like the disjunctivist requires more, or more complex, principles than the non-disjunctivist. Hence the disjunctive account will be less elegant.

To see how the disjunctive theorist can resist this charge, we must recognise a distinction between

1. The principles that an account of some phenomena is *committed* to—those that the account entails.

and

2. The principles that an account of some phenomena *exploits* in its explanation of that phenomena - those that the account actually employs in its explanation of the phenomena.

It is true that the disjunctivist must *exploit* more, or more complex, principles in its explanation of the doxastic consequences of experience. The disjunctivist must explain the doxastic

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consequences of perceptual and hallucinatory cases in terms of principles connecting the two different features to such consequences. The non-disjunctivist, on the other hand, need only employ principles connecting one the presence of one feature to belief.

But this doesn't establish the disjunctivist account is *committed* to more principles. If one of the two principles the disjunctivist employs in his explanation is also a commitment of the non-disjunctivist (and not equivalent to whatever principle the non-disjunctivist employs in her explanation of belief), the disjunctivist is not more committed, and so can avoid the charge of inelegance.

In effect, the disjunctivist can avoid the charge of inelegance by making exactly the same move as that which avoids the charge of parsimony. The lesson from consideration of parsimony is that the disjunctivist should explain the doxastic consequences of hallucinatory cases in terms of the presence of a feature the non-disjunctivist theorist is already committed to. The lesson from consideration of elegance is that the disjunctivist should explain the *connection* between that feature and its doxastic consequences in hallucinatory cases in terms of principles that again the non-disjunctivist is already committed to.

### §3.5 Meeting the Constraints—General Terms Formulation.

So can the relationalist provide an explanation which meets these constraints? Can we identify feature which is uncontroversially present in hallucinatory experience, and which is explanatory of the doxastic consequences of such experience in a way that a representationalist should also accept?

Relative to a perceptual case, matching hallucinatory cases have the feature of being *indistinguishable*, in some sense, from such a perceptual case. Relationalists and representationalists agree that hallucinations are indistinguishable, in some sense, from veridical perceptions. So *if* the relationalist can exploit this feature to explain the doxastic consequences in hallucinatory cases, using only plausible principles the representationalist should accept, the relationalist is not postulating some further kind to do explanatory work in hallucinatory cases. But how should such an account go?

### §4 Indistinguishability Explanations

So how can the disjunctivist appeal to indistinguishability to explain the common doxastic consequences of matching perceptual and hallucinatory experiences? We can start by examining a suggestion offered by Martin in 'The Limits of Self Awareness'. There, Martin writes

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For we can also see that the fact that a perfectly matching hallucination is indiscriminable from a veridical perception is a fact potentially explanatory of several of the features of a situation. Why did James shriek like that? He was in a situation indiscriminable from the veridical perception of a spider. Given James's fear of spiders, when confronted with one he is liable so to react; and with no detectable difference between this situation and such a perception, it must seem to him as if a spider is there, so he reacts in the same way.<sup>67</sup>

There are a several ways to interpret this passage, but it suggests the following line of thought which offers an attempt to met the explanatory constraints discussed in §3.5.

First, Martin claims that hallucinatory cases are *indiscriminable* from matching perceptual ones. But of course, hallucination cases are not *indistinguishable tout court*. For example it may be that a hallucinating subject is able to distinguish his situation from one in which he is perceiving because, e.g., he has been told by a neuroscientist that he will be suffering from a hallucination, and so has testimonial knowledge sufficient to distinguish his situation from one in which he is perceiving. In response to this kind of worry, Martin places a restriction on the *way* in which the relevant distinction is to be effected, namely that the situations cannot be told apart *by introspection or reflection*. So,

1. In a hallucinatory case, the subject is not in a position to distinguish, through introspection and reflection, her case from one of genuine perception.

What is it for the subject to distinguish her case from one of genuine perception *by introspection or reflection*? To answer this question, we have to see how indistinguishability is connected to knowledge.

Suppose that there is some feature absent when a subject is hallucinating, but which is present when the subject is undergoing a matching perceptual experience. Suppose furthermore that the subject is in a position to *know* that the feature is absent. In such a case the subject has *grounds* for distinguishing her situation from one in which she is perceiving. One way to construe this is to say that the subject knows something from which she is *in a position to know* that her situation is not one in which she is perceiving. She could, for instance, *infer* that she is not perceiving (assuming that the presence of the feature in cases of veridical perception is something that the subject is in a position to know when hallucinating). The subject could reason: "If I am perceiving, then *F* is present. But *F* is not present. Therefore I am not perceiving. My situation

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<sup>67</sup> Martin 2004 p.68

is not one of genuine perception." The subject has thereby managed to distinguish her case from one of genuine perception.<sup>68</sup>

So the indistinguishability claim in (1) suggests the following epistemic claim (where 'know by introspective attention to experience' is abbreviated to 'introspectively know'):

2. In a hallucinatory case,  $c_h$  the subject is not in a position to introspectively know that her case is not a matching perceptual one.

In this way distinguishability is connected to knowledge of distinctness.<sup>69</sup> The ways of distinguishing mentioned in (1) just correspond to *ways of coming to knowing* the relevant non-identity claim.<sup>70</sup> Now, it is not obvious to me that the hallucinations *are* indistinguishable from matching perceptual cases in the way stated by (2), at least on the relationalist's picture. It may be that some hallucinations are such that their subjects are in a position to know that they are not perceiving. So the relevant notion of indistinguishability may be weaker than that stated by (2). But for now, I shall allow that (2) is correct. As I shall argue, the indistinguishability explanation fails even with (2), so *a fortiori*, it will fail if the notion of indistinguishability appealed to is weaker than that stated by (2).

We are now in a position to see how the indistinguishability might account for the presence of features in hallucinatory cases which are present in matching perceptual cases. Where  $F$  is a feature,  $c_h$  is a hallucinatory case, and  $c_p$  is a matching perceptual case, suppose that:

3. In  $c_p$ ,  $F$  is present.
4. In  $c_h$ , the subject is in a position to know that in  $c_p$ ,  $F$  is present.
5. In  $c_h$ , if  $F$  is absent then the subject is in a position to know that  $F$  is absent.

From 3 and 4, it follows that in  $c_h$ , the subject is not in a position to know that  $F$  is absent. Assume for *reductio* that the subject is in a position to know  $F$  is absent. Given that she is in a

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<sup>68</sup> 'if veridical perception gives rise to rational judgement about the environment, then an hallucinating subject will be equally inclined to judgement as a perceiving one. A propensity to make a judgement is one, one can normally detect through reflection on the situation. If an agent had no propensity to judge that a lavender bush is present when having the hallucination of one, then the absence of inclination here would be a detectable difference from the case of veridical perception and hence a ground for discriminating the two situations.' Martin 2004 p.67

<sup>69</sup> See Williamson 1990

<sup>70</sup> Such ways of coming to know are just the kinds of thing one appeals to in answering questions about how one knows something or other. See Cassam 2007

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position to know that in  $c_p$ ,  $F$  is present, she is in a position to know that her case is not  $c_p$ . Given that her case is indistinguishable from  $c_p$ , she is not in a position to know that her case is not  $c_p$ . This is contradictory. Therefore

6. In  $c_h$ , the subject is not in a position to know that  $F$  is absent

Now, either  $F$  is present in  $c_h$  or it is not. If it is present, then it is not knowably absent. Hence from 6 it follows that

7. In  $c_h$ , either  $F$  is present, or  $F$  is absent, but  $s$  is not in a position to know that  $F$  is absent.

However, according to 5, the second disjunct is ruled out. Hence

8. In  $c_h$ ,  $F$  is present.

So we can see how indistinguishability offers a potential explanation of the presence of features in hallucinatory cases. If suppositions (3)-(5) hold when  $F$  is an experientially activated inclination to believe, it follows that the inclination to believe is present in hallucinatory cases. I have argued in §2 that inclinations to believe are present in perceptual cases. So the relevant issue is whether (4) and (5) hold for such inclinations.

### §4.1.1 Supposition 4—Access and Active Indiscriminability

Let's start with the second question. Is it plausible that a hallucinating subject is in a position to know that in cases of matching perception, the subject is inclined to believe that, e.g.,  $pF$ ? If the subject did *not* know this, the subject would not be in a position to know that her situation is not one of perceiving merely from knowing that an inclination to believe that  $p$  is absent. Hence the absence of the inclination would be consistent with the indistinguishability of her case from one of perception.

I think there are two things one can say in response to this. First, one can just maintain that the relevant conditional *is* knowable, perhaps through *a priori* reflection on the connections between visual experience and belief. There is something to be said for such a claim—in Chapter One §4.2, I claimed that introspective attention to the phenomenology of experience reveals inclinations to belief, in addition to revealing what experience is of. Think back to the standard transparency example, that of having an experience as of a blue ocean. In introspectively attending to the phenomenal character of this experience, one sees that the experience inclines one to believe that there is a blue ocean before one. So plausibly there are some conditionals connecting doxastic inclinations to perception which are knowable through reflection on

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experiential phenomenology. These are the doxastic features that are phenomenologically salient, and are features possessed by all experiences that have the phenomenal character in question. If that is right, then it is plausible that the conditionals linking, e.g., having a perceptual experience of a tea cup as before one and being inclined to believe that there is a tea cup before one, are also knowable by reflection and introspection.

But in any case we can do without assuming knowledge conditionals. We can move from explaining the common doxastic consequences of perception and hallucination in terms of knowledge of non-identity to explaining them in terms of *access-indistinguishability*.<sup>71</sup> A case,  $c_1$ , is access indistinguishable from a case  $c_2$ , if and only if the subject in  $c_2$  is not in a position to know any proposition that is false in  $c_1$ . To put it another way, any proposition that is knowable by the subject in  $c_2$  is *true* in  $c_1$ :

$c_1$  is access indistinguishable from  $c_2$  iff any proposition knowable by the subject in  $c_2$  is true in  $c_1$ .

And again, restricting to ways of knowing, we can define a notion of access indistinguishability relative to ways of knowing. Accordingly, a situation,  $c_1$ , is *introspectively access indistinguishable* from a situation  $c_2$  if and only if the subject in  $c_2$  is not in a position to know by introspection and reflection any proposition that is false in  $c_1$ .

Plausibly, hallucinatory cases are access indistinguishable from matching cases of genuine perception with respect to what is knowable by introspective attention to experience. That is:

9. In hallucinatory cases, the subject is not in a position to introspectively know anything false in matching perceptual cases.

Given this, for any feature,  $F$ , present in the perceptual cases matching a hallucinatory case, then in the hallucinatory case,  $F$  is not knowably absent by introspective attention to her experience. If it was introspectively knowably absent, the subject is be in a position to introspectively know something false in matching perceptual cases, and hence the cases would not be access indistinguishable. Hence 6. Thus assumption 4 is inessential to the indistinguishability explanation.

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<sup>71</sup> I call this notion of indistinguishability '*access-indistinguishability*' to both differentiate it from the one at work in §4, and because it has much in common with Williamson's notion of epistemic accessibility. Williamson 2000 I shall discuss this notion in more depth in chapter three §5.2. Particularly, a complication for it arises from knowledge of indexically specified propositions, such as '*this* case obtains'. Such complications are dealt with in §5.2.

### §4.1.2 Supposition 5—Detectability

I have formulated the relevant indistinguishability claims in terms of what is knowable by *introspective attention to experience*. So, for the argument to go through, it must be plausible that in cases of hallucination, *if* the appropriate inclination to believe is present, it is knowably so through introspective attention *to experience*. But plausibly, we do not *generally* know of our inclinations to believe by introspecting our experience. So why think that the *relevant* inclinations will be so detectable in this case?

An obvious suggestion comes from the discussion of *Phenomenological Immediacy* in Chapter One. There, I claimed that experiential inclinations to belief have some phenomenological presence. When we attend to how our experience is, we pick up on it being experientially for us as if what our experience is of is actually present in our environment. In picking up on this, we become aware of an aspect of the phenomenal character of experience which is constituted by such inclinations. So one might suppose that the relevant inclinations to believe are just those we pick up on in introspective attention to our experience.

But this conflicts with the idea that hallucinatory situations are *normal* with respect to our ability to pick up on the relevant doxastic inclinations. In viewing the doxastic inclinations as present in experiential phenomenology, we immediately run into the question of whether it is plausible to suppose that introspection *goes right* with respect to the phenomenology of experience in hallucinatory cases. In Chapter One, I argued that this is not obviously the case. If one thinks of the phenomenology of experience as constituted by the experience being one in which the subject is related to material objects and properties, it is plausible that introspective attention to the experience is going wrong in cases of hallucination. So on the relationalist picture it looks like we *do* have reason to doubt whether introspection gets it right. In which case, the relationalist is not entitled to appeal to the claim that we get it right with respect to experiential inclinations to believe in hallucinatory cases. Supposing that we do seems to uncut the ability to resist an appeal to introspection to support a common factor account of experiential phenomenology.

An alternative option is claim that the relevant inclinations are not present *in* experiential phenomenology, but rather are happenings distinct from the experience and its features, and are detectable by general introspection to one's cognitive position, rather than only detectable by introspection to one's experience *per se*. We might then claim that *normally*, one is in a position to know about such inclinations by general introspection to one's cognitive situation. And there is no reason to suppose that when hallucinating, a subjects general capacities for introspecting belief are impaired. Although it is *consistent* with hallucinating that the inclinations are not

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detectable, there is nothing in the notion of hallucination to make us suppose that our general capacity to detect such inclinations goes wrong in hallucinatory cases, and hence we have no reason to suppose the subject would not be able to detect their absence if they are.

But the introspectively knowable absence of such inclinations is *consistent* with the indistinguishability of hallucination by introspective attention to one's experience. To rule it out, one must claim that hallucinations are indistinguishable by introspective attention to one's cognitive situation in general. And this does not seem plausible. Suppose that, in contrast to most people, for me hallucinations are correlated with my having a funny feeling, or being disposed to judge that something is not quite right, whereas genuinely perceptual situations are not. Such funny feelings, or dispositions to judge something is not quite right, are normally introspectively detectable, and so provide a ground for me distinguishing my situation when hallucinating from a perceptual one. But such a possibility seems consistent with our ordinary notion of hallucination. So hallucinations are not indistinguishable from matching genuinely perceptual cases in the way required for the current argument.

### §5 Concluding Remarks

There are tight constraints on the kind of explanation the relationalist can give of the doxastic role of hallucination, in order to avoid the charge of explanatory complexity, if the relational features of experience are to do work in explaining the presence of such doxastic inclinations in genuinely perceptual cases. I have argued that the most promising way for the relationalist to avoid the charge of explanatory complexity is to explain the presence of such doxastic features in hallucinatory cases in terms of such cases being indistinguishable from ones of genuine perception. However, for such an argument to work, the relationalist must claim that introspective attention to the phenomenology of experience generally gets it right in cases of hallucination. This creates a problem—in the last chapter, we saw that the relationalist should claim that introspection goes wrong in cases of hallucination. So either the relationalist cannot provide an explanation of the common doxastic features of experience in cases of hallucination which avoids the charge of explanatory complexity, or the relationalist must accept there is introspective reason to suppose that matching perceptual and matching hallucinatory cases are phenomenologically identical.

## Chapter 3

# The Epistemic Roles of Perceptual and Hallucinatory Experience

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### §1 Introduction

In this chapter I consider the relation between experiential intentionality and the *knowledge potential* and *justificatory role* of experience. In §2, I outline the idea that *perceptual* experiences are of kinds that put their subjects in a position to visibly know various claims about their environments. In §2.1 I discuss various ways in which this knowledge potential may be taken to depend on various conditions concerning the subject's cognitive condition, and on various non-doxastic conditions. I finish in §2.2 by providing a model for thinking about the epistemic role of perceptual experience.

In §2.2 I consider the *justificatory* role of perceptual experiences and corresponding hallucinations. I argue that in perceptual and hallucinatory experiences in which a subject fails to be in a position to visibly know claims that equivalent subjects in favourable perceptual cases are in a position to visibly know, they are nonetheless *justified* in believing such claims. As subjects in a position to visibly know such claims are also justified in believing them, corresponding perceptual and hallucinatory experiences have an identical justificatory profile.

In §4 I discuss how this similar justificatory profile lends support to the idea that perceptual and hallucinatory experiences are of a common type in virtue of which they have a common justificatory role, and that this common type involves the subject being in an experience which has content.

In §5 I discuss the general relations between knowledge and indistinguishability, and argue that if a subject is in a situation indistinguishable from one in which she knows a claim, then she is in some sense justified in believing it. Furthermore, that she is in some sense justified in believing it follows purely from plausible claims about indistinguishability, and the exculpatory role of *ignorance*. It does not require postulation of content.

In §6 I apply this to the perceptual case, and argue that the indistinguishability of hallucinatory cases from perceptual ones which ground knowledge suffices to explain why it is that subjects in such cases are justified in believing what they are. This undercuts the motivation for common

factor and common content accounts discussed in §4.

I conclude in §7 with some reflection on different *kinds* of explanation of epistemic features.

## §2 Perceptual Experience and Knowledge

Consider an ordinary case of perceptual knowledge,  $c_p$ :

A normal subject is standing before a cakeshop window containing a selection of cupcakes, one of which is white, another blue, and so on. She sees the scene before her. Conditions of illumination and so on are normal. External conditions are favourable for knowledge—there are, for example, no fake cardboard cupcakes in the vicinity. Our subject has appropriate capacities to cognitively respond to her experience. And so our subject *sees that* there is a blue cupcake before her.

In such a case, the subject knows that there is a blue cupcake before her. If  $s$  sees that  $p$ , then  $s$  knows  $p$ ,<sup>72</sup> and our subject sees that there is a blue cupcake before her. But this knowledge is in some way *visible* knowledge. This is why it is appropriate to characterise it in terms of the perceptual verb ‘sees’. Plausibly, it is so because  $s$  *comes to know* it visually. Seeing that  $p$  is a way of coming to know that  $p$ —the paradigmatic *visual* way of doing so.<sup>73</sup> But noting that she visually knows such things does not yet exhaust the epistemic contribution her experience makes.

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<sup>72</sup> Of course there are cases in which a subject sees a scene in which  $p$ , without thereby knowing  $p$ . I claim such cases are not cases of seeing that  $p$  (see Williamson 2000, p.38 and Cassam 2007 for defence of this claim).

<sup>73</sup> See Cassam 2007 for defence of this claim. Given this, we might suppose that  $s$  sees that  $p$  iff  $s$  *visually* comes to know  $p$ . This explains some of the temporal aspects of seeing that  $p$ . If a subject sees that  $p$  at  $t_1$ , and retains her knowledge of  $p$  over a period of time to  $t_2$ , it does not follow that the subject sees that  $p$  at  $t_2$ . It also explains why we are reluctant to attribute seeing that  $p$  to subjects who already know  $p$ —it may seem that such subjects, in virtue of already knowing that  $p$  cannot come to know  $p$ . However, on reflection I think that a subject who already has prior knowledge of  $p$  *can* come to know  $p$ . This involves her undergoing an event in which her knowledge of  $p$  receives a visual basis. For this reason it may be inappropriate to attempt to analyse seeing that  $p$  as *judging*  $p$  on the basis of vision. Perhaps judging  $p$  requires that one does not have prior knowledge of  $p$ . I am not sure whether this claim about judging is correct. But let us assume that it is. In that case, we may analyse seeing that  $p$  in terms of *activating knowledge* of  $p$  on the basis of vision. Activating knowledge of  $p$  on the basis of vision is an event like judging  $p$  on the basis of vision, but which does not require prior absence of knowledge of  $p$ .

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For one thing, *s* may visually know claims because she has come to know them visually at a prior time. If we are concerned with the epistemic contribution present in  $c_p$ , we must restrict ourselves to considering what the subject comes to visually know at the time of  $c_p$ . For another, we are inclined to say that the subject of  $c_p$ , is *in a position* to come to visually know various further propositions concerning the perceived scene, such as that there is a white cupcake before her. Trivially, if one comes to visually know  $p$ , then one is in a position to come to visually know  $p$ . But the converse does not hold—it is consistent with being in a position to come to visually know  $p$  that one does not in fact know  $p$ . The subject may, for example, happen not to judge that there is a white cupcake before her, or judge it on some entirely different basis (perhaps she believes it because she has been told that there is). Such a subject fails to come to visually know that there is a white cupcake before her. Thus being in a position to come to visually know  $p$  is independent of whether or not the subject does *actually* come to visually know. But there is a clear sense in which such visual knowledge is *available* to the subject in  $c_p$ , even though she has failed to capitalise on its availability.

One might try to characterise this in terms of counterfactuals. For example, one might say that *if* the subject *were* to judge that there is a white cupcake before her, on the basis of her experience, then she would come to visually know that there is. But such counterfactuals are inadequate for the task, for familiar reasons. Suppose that the nearest world in which the subject judges this is one in which the subject perceives an entirely different scene, or none at all. Perhaps it is one in which she is looking upwards at the sky, or perhaps it is one in which she sees nothing at all. In such worlds the subject does not visually know that there is a white cupcake before her. But nevertheless, there seems a clear sense in which the subject's current situation makes knowledge of the presence of a white cupcake perceptually *available* to her. Such counterfactuals fail to capture this way in which knowledge potential is associated with  $c_p$ . Plausibly they fail to do so in part because they do not specify that the subject is undergoing an experience which matches that in  $c_p$ . And this is irrelevant to the general epistemic contribution made by undergoing an experience such as that in  $c_p$ .

So what is important in evaluating the experiential epistemic contribution in a particular case, such as  $c_p$ , is what the subject comes to visually know in other matching cases. I suggest that we should ask what, in *matching cases* she comes to visually know. By considering such cases, we can determine the knowledge enabling *role* having an experience of this type has in perceptual cases.

In matching cases, there are various factors which play a role in determining what she visually comes to know. We have already noted one—whether she comes to visually know that  $p$  depends on whether she has judged  $p$ . In those cases in which the subject does not judge  $p$ , she does not visibly know that  $p$ . However, a failure to know  $p$  due to the fact that the subject

simply happens not to judge  $p$  is not particularly interesting in considering the epistemic role of experience. Because of this I shall bracket such failures, and instead discuss what factors determine what the subject is *in a position* to come to visually know. On the relevant notion of being in a position to come to visually know, if a subject is in a position to visually know  $p$ , and the subject has done what she is in a position to do to decide whether  $p$  is true, then she visually knows that  $p$ .<sup>74</sup> As one may fail to do what one is in a position to do to decide whether  $p$  is true, being in a position to visually know is consistent with not knowing. We can now ask what further factors affect what a subject is in a position to come to visually know.

### §2.1 Knowledge Potential in Matching Cases

The most straightforward way to connect experience types to visual knowledge potential in matching cases is to maintain that in *perceptual* matching cases, there is some set of *claims* concerning her environment the subject is in a position to visually know. I talk of *claims* rather than *propositions*, because plausibly in matching perceptual cases, the subject is in a position to know propositions about particular objects, such as that *that* is white. In matching perceptual cases in which the subject perceives numerically distinct objects, the subject will be in a position to know propositions about different particulars. And on some views of propositions, the propositions the subject knows about particulars will be different. Nevertheless, I think there are two things in common. Where the propositions do not concern particulars, there is no obstacle to saying the same propositions are knowable. For example, in  $c_p$ , the subject is in a position to visually know that *there is a white cupcake*. That proposition is knowable in other perceptual cases matching  $c_p$ . But furthermore, in matching perceptual cases, plausibly the different particular propositions the subject is in a position to know will have something in common. They are expressible in terms of demonstratives. So in  $c_p$ , the subject, in knowing that *that* is white, knows a proposition distinct from that a subject in a matching perceptual case of seeing a distinct cupcake knows in knowing that *that* is white. But I think there is a reasonably intuitive notion of something common to what is known. And I shall put this by saying they both know the same claim—the claim that that is white (in §5.2 I have more to say about this kind of issue).

So on the current view, there is some set of claims that it is *sufficient* for one being in a position

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<sup>74</sup> This conditional is an adaption of that in Williamson 2000 restricted to visual knowledge. I allow that the failure of a subject to be *capable* of judging  $p$  may influence whether she is in a position to know  $p$ . In particular, in §2.1.3, I shall consider how psychological capabilities to respond to experience in judgement may be taken to influence what is visibly knowable. See footnote 73 for the connection between visual knowledge and judgement.

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to visually know that one is in a matching *perceptual* case. Across matching perceptual and *hallucinatory* cases, the only condition necessary for being in a position to know is that one is not hallucinating. I think this is *prima facie* implausible. There certainly *seem* to be various *further* conditions which determine what a subject is in a position to visually know over and above her undergoing an experience of a particular type. In this section, I shall consider various ways in which such perceptual knowledge appears to be affected by such conditions. Of course, in any case in which perceptual knowledge seems to be unavailable in virtue of the obtaining of such a further condition, someone *might* argue that the relevant cases are not in fact matching. I shall not evaluate in detail whether such a move is generally plausible (although I shall note how plausible it is relative to various putative defeating conditions). My purpose in considering such further conditions is to put me in a position to develop a model relating experience types to visible knowledge potential *consistent* with such conditions influencing knowledge potential. I shall do this in §2.2. However, the model I shall offer is also consistent with taking such further conditions to *not* in fact play any role in influencing knowledge potential.

In §2.1.1 I consider how a subject's background knowledge influences what she is in a position to *inferentially* visually know. In §2.1.2 I consider how, even restricted to non-inferential knowledge, the obtaining of various further doxastic and non-doxastic *defeating conditions* influences what a subject is in a position to visibly know. In §2.1.3, I discuss a kind of non-doxastic defeating condition involving how a subject's *recognition capacities* may be taken to influence what the subject is in a position to visibly know.

### §2.1.1 Inferential Knowledge

Consider a perceptual case just like  $c_p$  but for the fact that the subject knows white cupcakes are chocolate. A subject in such a case is in a position to know that there are chocolate cupcakes before her. Plausibly, she is in a position to know this *because* she is in a position to know claims which stand in logical relations to this claim. She is in a position to know there are white cupcakes before her, and in a position to know white cupcakes are chocolate. From this it follows that there are chocolate cupcakes before her. And hence she is in a position to know this.

Such knowledge potential is *inferential*.  $s$  is in a position to inferentially know  $p$  iff  $s$  is in a position to know  $p$  *because*  $s$  is in a position to know various other propositions which stand in *inferential relations* to it. For example, if the subject knows that white cupcakes are chocolate, she is in a position to inferentially visually know that there are chocolate cupcakes before her. The content of this inferential knowledge follows from her visual knowledge that there are white

cupcakes before her, and her knowledge that white cupcakes are chocolate.<sup>75</sup> But such inferential knowledge potential is not thereby potential for *non-visual* knowledge. We are quite happy to say that a subject in such a case can *see that* there are white cupcakes before her. Plausibly, this counts as visual knowledge because at least one of the claims from which it is inferable is visually known.

So what claims a subject can inferentially know depends on what other claims she knows. What claims are knowable is entirely independent of whether the subject is in a case matching  $c_p$ . The claim that white cupcakes are chocolate seems one such example. So here is a way in which what is visibly knowable seems to be clearly dependent on the subject's background epistemic state.

Now one *could* claim what inferential visual knowledge potential is present determines whether the case matches  $c_p$ . I think this claim is particularly implausible. Whilst there may be cases in which we want to say that what a subject knows influences their experiential state, for the most part background knowledge seems independent of this. A defender of perceptual indefeasibility is better off restricting the claim to *non-inferential* visual knowledge.

Is there also *non-inferential* visual knowledge potential? I think it is plausible that there is, and furthermore that some of the non-inferentially knowable propositions *concern the subject's environment*, in that their truth depends on and only on the subject's environment being a particular way. The claim that there are white cupcakes before her seems to me to have a good claim to being non-inferentially knowable. One does not seem to know because one knows other claims that entail it.<sup>76</sup> We should note, however, that the claim non-inferential knowledge is available does not entail that the condition necessary for such knowledge is that one is not hallucinating. Even if we restrict consideration to perceptual cases, there are further reasons to suppose that further factors affect the availability of such knowledge.

### §2.1.2 Doxastic and Non-Doxastic Defeating Conditions

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<sup>75</sup> It seems to me that inferential knowledge potential is *visible* iff some of the knowable propositions it stands in inferential relations to, and because of which it is potential for knowledge, are *visibly* knowable.

<sup>76</sup> Of course, one could claim that this is knowable because one knows that there are white cupcake shaped things before one, and that white cupcake shaped things are often cupcakes. But even if one does this, the claim that there are white cupcake shaped things before one again seems to be an example of a non-inferentially knowable proposition concerning one's environment. One could perhaps say this in fact counts as knowable because stands in inferential relations to the knowable claim that there *seem* to be white cupcake shaped things before one. This claim does not concern one's environment (in the way I have defined this). I shall consider this move in more detail in §4.1.

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There are at least two further factors which affect the availability of such knowledge. On the one hand, there seem to be further *non-doxastic* conditions, over and above the condition of hallucinating, the obtaining of which makes it that a subject is not in a position to know. On the other hand, there seem various are *doxastic* conditions which prevent knowledge.

As said, if the subject is in a matching *hallucinatory case*, it is plausible that she is not in a position to non-inferentially visually know that there are cupcakes around her. But furthermore, if a subject is in a matching perceptual case, but in an area surrounded by fake cardboard cupcakes fit only for display, she is plausibly not in a position to non-inferentially visually know that there are cupcakes around her. Similarly, if a subject is in a matching perceptual case, but has impaired abilities to cognitively respond to her experience, she is equally not in a position to non-inferentially visually know that there are cupcakes around her. Such conditions are *defeating conditions* for knowledge. If they obtain in a matching perceptual case, then the subject is not in a position to come to visually know. The defeating conditions I have just considered are sometimes called ‘external’. Whether this is correct depends on what one means by ‘external’. Some such defeating conditions may concern the subject’s cognitive abilities to respond to her experience. (I shall discuss such conditions further in §2.1.3.) I shall call them *non-doxastic*, to contrast with doxastic defeating conditions which involve the presence of *justification to believe*. For example, consider if a subject *is justified in believing* that she is in fake cupcake country, or that she is cognitively impaired, or that she is hallucinating. Plausibly such a subject is not be in a position to non-inferentially visually know that there are cupcakes around her. These are *doxastic defeating* conditions. Plausibly, a doxastic defeating condition obtains iff the subject has justification for believing that a non-doxastic defeating condition obtains. Hence, if no doxastic defeating condition obtains, then the subject does not have justification for believing that any non-doxastic defeating conditions obtain. This has a consequence which shall be important for the argument in §6. Plausibly, if *s* is in a position to know *p*, then *s* has justification for believing *p*. Hence, if no doxastic defeating conditions obtains, *s* is not in a position to know that any non-doxastic defeating condition obtains.

As I am conceiving of them, the obtaining of defeating conditions is *sufficient* for the subject in a matching case not being in a position to non-inferentially visually know. This might be questioned—one might suppose, for example, that a subject in fake cupcake country, or with the justified belief that she is in fake cupcake country, may still be in a position to visually know that there are cupcakes around her *provided* she *knows* that the shop before her is not one which contains fake cardboard cupcakes. I accept this. But I think such visual knowledge is not *non-inferential* visual knowledge. Its status as knowledge depends on it standing in inferential relations to other things the subject knows.

Now, one could maintain that the presence of such defeaters is incompatible with the subject undergoing a perceptual experience of the type the subject is in when she is in a position to visually know. This would allow that the subject's non-inferential visual knowledge is indefeasible. Perhaps some of the seeming defeating conditions I have mentioned may plausibly be thought of as conditions on being in a case matching  $c_p$ .<sup>77</sup> But it seems to me implausible to apply this to *all* putative defeating conditions. In the following argument, I shall allow that the non-inferential visible knowledge potential is defeasible. The argument does not, however, depend on this assumption.

### §2.1.3 Responsive Capacities

When discussing defeating conditions, I allowed that a subject's capacity to respond to her experience affects what she is in a position to come to non-inferentially know on the basis of it. Why think this? Plausibly,  $s$  comes to visually know  $p$  only if  $s$  judges or activates knowledge that  $p$  on a visual basis (see footnote 73 for discussion of activating knowledge). A subject unable to judge or activate knowledge that  $p$  on the basis of vision is therefore not in a position to visually come to know  $p$ . Hence such a subject, in doing all they are in a position to do to decide  $p$  does not visually know  $p$ . If  $s$  is in a position to visually know  $p$ , and  $s$  has done everything she is in a position to do to decide whether  $p$ , then  $s$  visually knows  $p$ . So such subjects are not in a position to visually know  $p$ .

Again, I take it that there is some plausibility in maintaining that whether a case is a matching one is *determined* by her recognitional capacities. We might suppose that subjects with greater powers of experiential discrimination undergo different experiences as compared to subjects with poor powers of discrimination. Perhaps those with greater discriminatory powers undergo experiences which capture more of the fine-grained detail of the colours with which they are presented. The idea here is to construe a capacity for fine-grained experiential shade discrimination as a capacity operational *in* experience, and thus one which results in a different experience as compared to a subject without such a capacity presented with the same scene.

I think there is some plausibility in maintaining that there are experiential capacities like this. But it does also seem that we can distinguish such capacities from capacities to cognitively *respond* to experiences. Such capacities will be operational when a subject forms a belief on the basis of an experience. It is these capacities which affect the knowledge potential of a perceptual experience type. So I shall allow that such capacities do affect the knowledge potential. But again, my argument does not depend on this assumption.

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<sup>77</sup> Perhaps some fake-barn-country cases are like this

## §2.2 Modelling The Epistemic Potential of $c_p$ -matching Cases

So, we have seen how various factors affect the availability of non-inferential visual knowledge. Given this, I suggest the following is true:

In a  $c_p$ -matching cases, there is some set of claims,  $P$ , such that for each member of  $P$ ,  $p$ ,  $s$  is in a position to non-inferentially come to visually know  $p$  iff it is not the case that doxastic or non-doxastic defeating conditions for  $p$  obtain.

## §3 The Justificatory Role of Corresponding Hallucinations

In §2 I considered the epistemic role of a type of experience in perceptual cases. In this section, I shall consider the *justificatory* role of such perceptual experiences, and *corresponding perfect hallucinations*.

I shall not assume much in the way of substantive thesis about what is involved in a subject being justified in believing a proposition. Rather, I think we can fix on a way in which it is *epistemically acceptable* for the subject to believe various things in cases of perception and hallucination. It is then open to say something more about what it is for a subject to be justified *in this sense*. In §5 and §6, I shall say something more about what it is for a subject to be justified in this sense, and indeed provide an explanation of why she is when she is. But for present purposes, no such claims are needed.

Now, I assume that if a subject,  $s$ , is in a position to non-inferentially visually know  $p$ , then  $s$  is non-inferentially justified in believing  $p$ . So in all those perceptual cases in which a subject is in a position to visually know a claim, she is justified in believing it. But the converse does not hold. So how should we extend this provide to a full account of what the subject is justified in believing in corresponding perceptual and hallucinatory cases?

An initially attractive idea is that subjects in matching cases are non-inferentially justified in believing all those claims which in such cases, the subject is in a position to come to visually know if defeating conditions do not obtain. Consider, for example, a subject just like that in  $c_p$ , in a matching perceptual case, but in fake cupcake country. Such a subject is not in a position to non-inferentially come to visually know that there is a cupcake before her. But plausibly, she is non-inferentially *justified* in believing this. On the relevant sense of being non-inferentially justified in believing, if  $s$  is non-inferentially justified in believing  $p$ , then if  $s$  believes  $p$ ,  $s$ 's belief is justified. And if our subject believed that there is a cupcake before her, this belief would be justified. Similarly, a subject just like that in  $c_p$ , but hallucinating, is also plausibly justified in

believing this.

But there are two problems for this view. First, some of the claims concerning *particular* objects are plausibly not available to subjects in hallucinatory cases. For example, in a subject may not be in a position to entertain the thought that *that* is white, as there is no thing to which ‘that’ refers (or *s* is not perceptually connected to anything in a way required for her to understand such a use of ‘that’). But for now, I shall just bracket such claims about particulars.

Second, the obtaining of *some* defeating conditions seems to undermine *s* being justified. For example, in a matching case in which *s* is justified in believing that she is hallucinating, *s* is not non-inferentially visually justified in believing that there is a cupcake before her. Generally, the obtaining of *doxastic* defeating conditions is incompatible with the presence of such justification. Now, one might want to say that the subject still *has* some justification for believing this claim, where having justification for believing *p* is consistent with not being justified in believing *p*. But it is clear that the subject is not justified.

With non-doxastic defeating conditions, the issue is more complicated. When considering defeating those conditions which obtain if one is in fake cupcake country, or if one is hallucinating, the obtaining of such defeating conditions seems consistent with being justified. But when we consider the case of a subject with limited recognitional capacities, it seems that the obtaining of the relevant defeating condition does remove justification. I think we can distinguish between mental and non-mental non-doxastic defeating conditions. Whereas the former are inconsistent with justification, the latter are not.

So, I want to suggest that, excepting claims about particulars, the following is true, where P is the set of claims which the subject is in a position to know provided defeating conditions to not obtain (see §2.2),

In a  $c_p$ -matching cases, there is some set of claims, P, such that for each member of P, *p*, *s* is non-inferentially justified in believing *p* iff it is not the case that doxastic or non-doxastic *mental* defeating conditions for *p* obtain.

#### §4 From Common Justificatory Profile to Common Content

In §2, I characterised the visual knowledge available in a class of cases matching one in which a subject is perceiving. In §3, I claimed that in such cases subjects are justified in believing relative to doxastic and non-doxastic mental conditions what a subject in a *perceptual* case in which the *same* doxastic and non-doxastic mental condition is in a position to visually *know* given non-doxastic non-mental conditions obtain.

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This structurally similar justificatory profile seems to require something in the way of *explanation*. There are different ways in which one can explain some phenomenon. But an obvious way to explain the presence of justification in a case is in terms of the experience *being such* as to make it the case that the subject is, in virtue of undergoing that experience, justified in believing various things relative to any aspects of her background cognitive situation which one takes to play a role in determining what justification is available. This thought can then be combined with the claim that matching perceptual and hallucinatory experiences involve an experience which is the *same way* in those respects which play a justificatory role. The task is then to give some account of what it is for an experience to be this way. This yields a *non-disjunctive* explanation of the presence of justification in such cases (see chapter two §3 for more discussion of such explanations).

This approach can then be extended to account for the knowledge enabling role of *perceptual* experience. The subject, in virtue of having an experience which is this way, together with her meeting various cognitive conditions, meets the *internal mental* conditions *necessary for knowledge*. She thus is in a position to know given further *non-internal* conditions are appropriate—that she is related to world in the right way,<sup>78</sup> and non-relational external conditions are appropriate. Being related to the world in the right way can then be taken to be a matter of *perceiving* it, and the non-relational external conditions being appropriate is a matter of no further *non-doxastic non-mental defeating conditions* obtaining. This thus nicely connects nicely with some internalist views of justification, one is justified in believing *p* iff one meets the internal conditions necessary for knowing *p*.

### §4.1 Common Epistemic Role Determining Features to Common Content

Once we have settled on a common factor explanation of a common epistemic role, the appeal to content can do further explanatory work.

Recall that in §2.1.1 I made a distinction between *inferential* and *non-inferential* perceptual knowledge and perceptual justification. And I claimed that it is plausible that some propositions concerning *the subject's environment* are visibly known, or experientially justified, non-inferentially. A claim, *p*, concerns a subject's, *s*'s, environment iff *p* is true if and only if *s*'s environment is a particular way. For example, the claim that there is a white cupcake before one concerns one's environment because it is true only if one's environment is a particular way, namely that way it is when it contains a white cupcake.

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<sup>78</sup> Williamson 2000 argues against factorising knowledge into internal and external states. However, his arguments do not apply to factorising knowledge into internal states, and relational states .

## The Epistemic Roles of Perceptual and Hallucinatory Experience

If we are to explain why in a case the subject is visually justified in believing a proposition, we must explain why it is that *this* proposition, rather than any other, is visually justified in the case in question. So long as we restrict ourselves to considering *perceptual* cases, we might try to explain why the subject has non-inferential visual justification for believing that there is a cupcake before her in terms of the subject *perceiving* her environment being a particular way—in terms of her seeing a white cupcake being before her. We might explain why it is that *this* proposition is justified in terms of the subject perceiving an aspect of her environment which *makes true* the proposition in question.<sup>79</sup>

I think this kind of explanation appears promising. But it is ruled out by a common factor account. On a common factor account, the explanatorily relevant element is common to both cases of perception and hallucination. Hence the presence of this element cannot require the occurrence of a state which makes true the subject's belief, at least insofar as that belief concerns the subject's *external* environment. Although *perceiving* one's environment does impose restrictions on the state one's external environment is in, *hallucinating* does not. *Ex hypothesi*, the element is present in hallucinatory cases. Hence its presence does not impose restrictions on the state the subject's environment is in. Such an account must therefore provide a *disjunctive* explanation of the presence of justification across matching perceptual and hallucinatory cases, and runs risk of being explanatorily complex, as discussed in chapter two §3.

Of course the presence of the common element does involve the obtaining of a state which makes true *some* propositions—it makes true propositions concerning the presence of this element. But such propositions are consistent with the subject's environment being *any* particular way, and so they seem to at best provide, in conjunction with further beliefs, only *inferential* justification for propositions concerning the subject's external environment.<sup>80</sup> But the subject has non-inferential justification for believing propositions concerning her environment.

An alternative is to claim that in virtue of the presence of the common element, one simply has non-inferential justification for believing particular propositions concerning one's external

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<sup>79</sup> See Pryor 2005 for discussion of this kind of claim.

<sup>80</sup> There is of course the suggestion that a subject could, via inference to the best explanation, arrive at beliefs about the external world solely from beliefs about his experiential states (see, e.g., Ayer 1973). Again, this seems to mischaracterise our justification for believing claims about the external world. But in any case, such an account would explain only our justification for believing that there is an external world which accounts for our experiences. Particular beliefs about how the world is formed on the basis of particular experiences would still be inferential, in that they would require us to believe that there is an external world, and this belief is not gained simply by undergoing those particular experiences.

## The Epistemic Roles of Perceptual and Hallucinatory Experience

environment. But as the presence of the common element does not determine the truth of such propositions, it is hard to see how this can involve anything other than the stipulation of arbitrary justificatory relations which determine which propositions a subject has justification for believing. It is this challenge that a common factor *representationalist* view provides a response to.

On a representationalist view, experiences have content, and corresponding perceptual and hallucinatory cases have the *same* content. And one can fix what propositions a given experience *non-inferentially* justifies in terms of relations between that content and the non-inferentially justified proposition.

If one thinks that experiential contents have *truth-conditions*, the relevant relations will simply be logical relations—experience provides non-inferential justification for those propositions which are entailed by the experiential content. Alternatively, if one thinks that experiential contents have *veridicality*, or *accuracy* conditions,<sup>81</sup> where these are not understood as truth-conditions, the relevant relations will require a slightly different account. One must say that the non-inferentially justified propositions are those which are true if the experiential content is veridical, or accurate.

If we now add the claim that the experiential content *concerns the subject's environment*, in that it is true (or veridical or accurate) only if the subject's environment is a particular way, we allow for non-inferential experiential justification of those propositions concerning the subject's environment which are true if and only if the subject's environment is that way.<sup>82</sup>

So, returning to our cupcake case, we might suppose that the perceptual experience has a content true (or veridical or accurate) only if there are white cupcakes before her. In those cases in which the subject has no further relevant beliefs, and an appropriate capacity to respond to her experience, and so on, she is non-inferentially justified in believing that there are white cupcakes before her, as this proposition is entailed by the content of the experience.

One has inferential justification for believing various claims when one is justified in believing because one has experiential justification for believing a proposition which, together with other propositions one has justification for believing, stand in inferential relations. So, in those cases in which the subject has the further belief that the white cupcakes are chocolate, she thereby has

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<sup>81</sup> See, e.g., Siegel 2010 for such a view.

<sup>82</sup> Of course, some of the propositions it non-inferentially justifies may not concern the subject's environment, such as if the experiential content is true only if a white cupcake is before one, and one believes on that basis that there is something white.

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justification for believing that there are chocolate cupcakes before her, as this belief is entailed by the content of her experience together with her background belief. And so on.

This allows the common factor content theorist to account for a wide variety of the beliefs we pre-theoretically take to be justified in different cases relative to the subject's background cognitive conditions.

Cases in which the subject's background beliefs are inconsistent with her experiential content provide a different challenge. Suppose we have a case in which the subject has an experience with the content that there are white cupcakes before her, but also believes that there are no cupcakes in her vicinity. In such a case, we might say that the experience does not put the subject in a position to be justified in believing that there are white cupcakes before her. What to say about such a case depends on how we conceive of the connection between an experience *providing* justification for  $p$ , and a subject *being* justified in believing that  $p$  on the basis of her experience. We might say that in such a case the experience provides 'prima facie' justification for  $p$ , where its doing so does not render the subject justified in believing  $p$  on this basis given her background beliefs. Alternatively, we might simply say that in such a case the experience does not provide justification for  $p$  given her background beliefs. But either way, we are still exploiting logical connections between experiential content and that of background beliefs.

Differences in a subject's responsive and recognitional capacities may also affect how able the subject is to *properly ground* beliefs on her experience. On such a view, a subject with limited recognitional capacities is unable to *doxastically respond* to, e.g., finer aspects of colour figuring in her experiential content in belief, and thus unable to believe propositions about finer aspects of colour *on the basis* of her experience, and thus unable to be justified in believing them. And again, one can say the experience still provides justification the subject is unable to take up. Alternately, one can say the experience does not provide justification in such a case.

Finally, we must consider cases in which the subject believes that something is untoward, such as when she believes she is in fake cupcake country, or that she is hallucinating. Such beliefs call into question experience as a source of information, and so we need to allow that they prevent the subject in being justified in endorsing her experiential content in belief. Again, there are different ways to do this depending on how one conceives of the relation between an experience providing justification, and the subject being justified.

### §4.2 Conclusions

So, the representationalist has an explanation for the fact that perceptual and hallucinatory cases have common justificatory features, and equally provide non-inferential knowledge of

propositions concerning the subject's environment. This explanation is in terms of the subject undergoing an experience which has the same representational content. I think that once we have accepted the need for such a common-factor explanation, the representationalist's is the best one going. However, I think that there is no need for such an explanation in the first place. If we accept that genuinely perceptual experience has the knowledge potential it does in perceptual cases, we can explain the presence of common justificatory features in terms of uncontroversial indistinguishability relations between perceptual experience and hallucination. Such an explanation meets the explanatory requirements discussed in relation to the doxastic role of experience in Chapter Two §3. Hence the representationalist view is not supported via inference to the best explanation of the presence of common justificatory features in perceptual and hallucinatory cases. I will present such an account in §6. However, before doing so I must say something about the relation between indistinguishability and justification. I do so in next section.

### §5 Epistemic Obligation and Epistemic Blamelessness

#### §5.1 Introductory

In §5.2 of this section, I characterise a notion of indistinguishability, similar to a notion of epistemic accessibility Williamson uses to characterise the relation between sceptical and non-sceptical cases.<sup>83</sup> I think this notion captures something of a reasonably intuitive pre-theoretic notion of indistinguishability. In §5.3, I characterise epistemic blamelessness. In §5.4 I connect epistemic obligation to knowledge, claiming if one knows  $p$ , one is not epistemically obliged to not believe  $p$ . In §5.5 I connect indistinguishability to epistemic obligation, arguing if a case  $c_1$  is indistinguishable from a case  $c_2$ , and one knows  $p$  in  $c_1$ , one is not in a position to know that one is epistemically obliged to not believe  $p$  in  $c_2$ . In §5.6 I connect this ignorance to *epistemic blamelessness*, and argue if one believes  $p$  in  $c_2$ , one is *epistemically blameless* in believing  $p$  in  $c_2$ . This provides a sense in which one is *justified* in believing  $p$  in  $c_2$ .

#### §5.2 Indistinguishability

I shall start by considering a general notion of indistinguishability. This notion is as follows:

Case  $c_1$  is indistinguishable from case  $c_2$  iff every proposition the subject of  $c_2$  is in a position to know at the time of  $c_2$  in  $c_2$  is true in  $c_1$ .

Here, a *case* is just a centred possible world, and so consists of a world, a subject and a time.

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<sup>83</sup> Williamson 2000

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This notion of indistinguishability is related to Williamson's notion of *epistemic accessibility*. Williamson uses that notion to characterise the relation between *sceptical scenarios* and the corresponding cases such scenarios putatively undermine the presence of knowledge in. I think that my notion of indistinguishability captures the sense in which sceptical scenarios are *indistinguishable* from the cases they putatively undermine presence of knowledge in. And I think my notion also captures an intuitive notion of indistinguishability we have, which we can recognise as applying in such cases, and more mundane ones.

So, according to Williamson

Relative to a subject,  $s$ , and a time,  $t$ , world  $w_1$  is *epistemically accessible* from world  $w_2$  iff every proposition  $s$  knows at  $t$  in  $w_2$  is true in  $w_1$ .<sup>84</sup>

Epistemic accessibility concerns whether what is *known* by a subject at a time in a world is true in another. My notion of indistinguishability is also characterised in terms of knowledge, but as we are concerned with *indistinguishability*, the relevant analysis is *not* merely in terms of whether what is *known* in a case is true in another. Rather, it is in terms of whether what is *knowable* in a case is true in another—whether what one is *in a position* to know in a situation is true in another. And unlike epistemic accessibility, indistinguishability is not relative to subjects and times, but concerns the subjects and times of the cases in question.

So, consider a sceptical scenario of a envatted brain which is supposed to undermine the knowledge of the empirical world you have in your case. Plausibly, the relevant envatted case is one which is indistinguishable from your case. And what that amounts to is that the envatted subject is not in a position to know anything false in your case. She cannot, for example, know that she does not have hands, as this proposition is true in your case. Similarly, consider two situations in each of which an identical subject is identically positioned in an identical white room. There seems a clear sense in which these situations are *indistinguishable* for their subjects. And again, this plausibly is a matter of neither subject being in a position to know anything which is false in the other case (when dealing with non-identical subjects in identical rooms, we might restrict the relevant *class* of propositions knowable, so as to allow, e.g., the subjects to know things about their own mental states which are not true in the other case, but not know anything about the rooms they are in).

However, there is a complication for my notion of indistinguishability. As Williamson notes, we may allow that a subject may in a case,  $c$ , be in a position to know the content 'This case obtains'

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<sup>84</sup> Williamson 2000 p.224

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expresses in  $c$ . But this content is true only in  $c$ . Given the above definition, it follows that no case but  $c$  is indistinguishable from  $c$ . Yet if we are to capture something of our pre-theoretical notion of indistinguishability, it better not be that a case counts as distinguishable from all others merely because its subject is in a position to know the proposition expressed by ‘this case obtains’. Similarly, the subject in one white room may know ‘*This* room is white’. But that doesn’t seem sufficient for him to have distinguished his case from that of his identical counterpart.

Williamson suggests that we can modify our definition to allow some cases are accessible on the grounds that ‘This case obtains’ expresses true contents in those cases. Such a modification is surely required. But articulating it raises complications. Williamson talks of by the content expressed by a sentence as uttered in a case.<sup>85</sup> When dealing with sentences containing indexicals such as ‘I’, and ‘now’, the proposition expressed by a sentence containing such an indexical is relative to who uttered it, and the time of the utterance. But of course, in some cases, nothing is uttered. However, given that a case is in part constituted by a subject and a time, we should take ‘the proposition expressed by a sentence as uttered in a case’ as the proposition expressed by that sentence *assessed relative* to the time of that case in the world of that case.<sup>86</sup> And there is another way in which the proposition expressed by a sentence in a case is relative—what proposition a sentence expresses is relative to a language. The same sentence uttered in a case may express different propositions relative to different languages in that case. Suppose that in some other case,  $c$ , the language of the subject is different such that she expresses relative to that language an entirely different proposition by her use of the sentence ‘This case obtains’—perhaps the proposition expressed in your case by ‘There is a teapot orbiting Saturn’. It is absurd to think that all cases indistinguishable from your case are ones in which *that* proposition is true. What we are interested in is not whether whatever in  $c$  the proposition the subject expresses by the same words is true. Rather, we are interested in whether in  $c$  the proposition the subject would express by ‘This case obtains’ *understood as it is in English* is true.

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<sup>85</sup> Williamson 2000 p.166

<sup>86</sup> There may be further complications from other kinds of context sensitivity here. For example, one might suppose that the proposition expressed by a sentence depends on one’s interests in uttering it. I would have to deal with this differently, holding the relevant interests *constant* across the cases, rather than relativising to the interests of the subjects in the cases. I shall, however, assume that such further kinds of context sensitivity do not raise insurmountable problems for my argument. I hope my notion of indistinguishability is sufficiently clear for one to see how such potential technical problems could meet with technical solutions.

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To simplify this, one could introduce the notion of a *corresponding proposition relative to cases  $c_1$  and  $c_2$* . Proposition  $p$  corresponds to proposition  $q$  relative to  $c_1$  and  $c_2$  if and only if  $p$  is expressed in English by sentence  $s$  assessed relative to the subject of  $c_1$  at the time of  $c_1$  in  $c_1$ , and  $q$  is expressed in English by  $s$  as assessed relative to the subject of  $c_2$  at the time of  $c_2$  in  $c_2$ . With this notion of a corresponding proposition, we can characterise indistinguishability adequately for the purposes of my argument as follows:

Case  $c_1$  is *indistinguishable* from case  $c_2$  iff for every proposition the subject of  $c_2$  is in a position to know at the time of  $c_2$  in  $c_2$ , the corresponding proposition relative to  $c_2$  and  $c_2$  is true in  $c_1$ .

However, for simplicity, I am going to ignore this complication for now. For convenience, I shall just talk in terms of what propositions are known in a case being true in another. But I shall specify what is known in cases in terms of present tense that clauses containing indexicals such as ‘one’ which refer to the subject of the case. The present tense corresponds to the fact such that clauses must be assessed relative to the time of the case. The same that clause may express different propositions in different cases, but such propositions will be *corresponding* as per my definition. Thus, my argument may be interpreted according to the more complicated notion of indistinguishability in terms of corresponding propositions specified above. With this tolerably clear notion of indistinguishability in hand, we may now consider how indistinguishability relates to justification. But first, we must investigate the notion of *epistemic obligation*.

### §5.3 Epistemic Obligations

Obligations concern to what one ought to do—a subject,  $s$ , is obliged to  $\varphi$  iff  $s$  ought to  $\varphi$ . Epistemic obligations are obligations of a particular sort—*epistemic* obligations. Correlative to the notion of an epistemic obligation, there is a notion an epistemic kind of ought—an *epistemic ought*. A subject,  $s$ , has an epistemic obligation to  $\varphi$  iff  $s$  epistemically ought to  $\varphi$ .

*Doxastic* obligations are obligations that concern what one ought to *believe*. Relative to a subject,  $s$ , and a proposition,  $p$ , we can say that

1.  $s$  has a *doxastic* obligation to believe that  $p$  iff  $s$  ought to believe that  $p$ ,

and likewise that

2.  $s$  has a *doxastic* obligation to not believe that  $p$  iff  $s$  ought to not believe that  $p$ .

(1) is a *positive* doxastic obligation—an obligation to believe a proposition. (2) is a *negative*

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doxastic obligation—an obligation to not believe a proposition.

Perhaps there are *non-doxastic* epistemic obligations—obligations to do things other than believe or not believe a proposition. For example, there may be epistemic obligations concerning one's belief forming practices, one's actions, and so on. I am not concerned with such obligations here. I shall restrict my discussion to doxastic epistemic obligations. The doxastic *epistemic* obligations a subject, *s*, has with respect to a proposition *p*, are the *epistemic* obligations *s* has to believe that *p*, or to not believe that *p*. The doxastic epistemic obligations a subject has *simpliciter* is set of epistemic obligations that subject has relative to every proposition.

I am not going to do much in the way of arguing that there *are* doxastic epistemic obligations. As Sutton (2005) notes, 'such a task seems as fruitless as arguing that there are moral obligations'.<sup>87</sup> Rather, I shall attempt to provide a rough characterisation of them, and a description of a case, which should allow the reader to bring to bear her ordinary understanding to recognise the relevant kind of obligation. I assume that there are such epistemic obligations. Some writers have argued against them on the grounds that there we do not have voluntary control over our beliefs in a way required for there to be doxastic epistemic obligations. I shall assume that such arguments are unsound—that the relevant way in which our beliefs are not under voluntary control does not preclude our being subject to doxastic epistemic obligations.

We can characterise the doxastic epistemic obligations a subject, *s*, has with respect to a proposition, *p*, as those obligations *s* has to believe *p*, or to not believe *p*, which arise in relation to factors such as whether *p* (or  $\sim p$ ), is true, false, knowable, evident, or whether *s* possess evidence for *p* (or for  $\sim p$ ), *and so on*. The subject's doxastic epistemic obligations *simpliciter* is just the collection of all the obligations to believe or to not believe the subject has relative to every proposition. But this characterisation of doxastic epistemic obligations, in terms of an open ended list, does not provide an exhaustive specification of the obligations in question. Rather, the reader should apply her ordinary understanding to the list in order to fix on the kind of obligation in question.

Consider the following case, adapted from one of Feldman (1988):<sup>88</sup>

Smith is a poor student, about to take an exam poor students have a very low chance of passing. It is in his own self-interest to pass the test. But his chances of passing are increased if he believes himself to have a high chance of passing

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<sup>87</sup> Sutton 2005 p.364

<sup>88</sup> Feldman 1988 p.235.

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(the extra confidence this will instil in him will increase his chances). They are not, however, increased sufficiently to make it true that he has a high chance of passing. And Smith is aware of all this.<sup>89</sup>

In this case, we can recognise that there is a *sense*<sup>90</sup> in which he ought to believe he has a high chance of passing. Give what is in his interest, it is *prudent* for him to believe he has a high chance of passing, and so he ought to believe this. Smith thus has a prudential obligation to believe he has a high chance of passing. Nevertheless, we can also recognise, based in the above description of the case alone, that he *ought not* believe that he has a high chance of passing—he is aware that poor students have a very low chance of passing, and he recognises that he is a poor student. This obligation is not a prudential obligation—it is an obligation to do something which does not serve his interests. And nor is it a moral obligation—no moral issues have been specified as hanging on what he believes, or on his passing the test, and so we should not be able to recognise any moral obligations governing his beliefs based purely on the description of the case given above.<sup>91</sup> This is an epistemic obligation.

The Smith case concerns a *negative* doxastic epistemic obligation—an obligation *not* to believe a proposition. It is sometimes suggested all doxastic epistemic obligations are negative—that there are no positive epistemic obligations *to* believe propositions. Alternatively, it is suggested that the presence of negative doxastic epistemic obligations is more readily apparent, or easier to establish, than the presence of positive epistemic obligations. It seems to me that there are positive epistemic obligations—for example, that a normal subject in ordinary conditions who can see that a red ball is in front of him ought to believe that there is. But I shall not rely on this claim in the following argument. My argument concerns only negative doxastic epistemic obligations.

On a *deontological notion of justification*, epistemic obligations are connected to justification via the following biconditional:

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<sup>89</sup> This case is of course similar to James's case of the mountaineer (James 1979), who has excellent prudential reasons for believing he will make a difficult leap. But that case is different. According to James, the jumper's belief *makes true* the claim that he will make the leap. Plausibly, in such cases it is epistemically acceptable to form such a belief. What is interesting about such cases is that the connection between the belief and its truth-maker is the reverse of what is normally the case. Such cases seem similar to Anscombe, Intention 1963 discussion of intention and knowledge of action.

<sup>90</sup> I take no position on whether this difference in sense corresponds to a lexical ambiguity of 'ought' in English.

<sup>91</sup> I am assuming that epistemic obligations are not a subset of moral obligations

3.  $s$  is justified in believing that  $p$  iff  $s$  believes that  $p$  and it is not the case that  $s$  ought not believe that  $p$ .<sup>92</sup>

In this section, I am not concerned to connect epistemic obligation to our ordinary notion of justification in this way. As it happens, I think that there is an *ordinary* notion of justification that is connected to epistemic obligations as per (3), but I do not take any stance on whether this notion is apt for any particular role required for such a notion in epistemological theorising.

### §5.4 Epistemic Obligation & Knowledge

I believe there is the following connection between knowledge and epistemic obligation: if a subject,  $s$ , knows a proposition,  $p$ , it is not the case that  $s$  epistemically ought to not believe  $p$ . In the parlance of §5.3, if  $s$  knows  $p$  then it is not the case that  $s$  has a negative doxastic epistemic obligation relative to  $p$ .

1.  $s$  knows  $p \rightarrow \sim s$  epistemically ought to not believe  $p$

I think that this claim is just apparent on reflection of epistemic obligation and on cases in which subjects have epistemic obligations. I am not sure that there is much to offer much in the way of *argument* for this claim—rather, I do not have much grip on the notion of epistemic obligation if it is false, at least insofar as epistemic obligation is something recognisable given our ordinary understanding of things.

It may appear that there are cases in which one is epistemically obliged to not believe something that one knows. For example, we might describe a case in which a subject,  $s$ , knows  $p$ , but has a large collection of evidence for  $\sim p$ , and suppose that given this body of evidence,  $s$  epistemically ought to not believe  $p$ . But on reflection, I believe that if  $s$  has evidence *sufficient* for it to be the case that she epistemically ought to not believe  $p$ , this evidence undermines any putative knowledge, and she does *not* in fact know  $p$ . Of course, one can have *a* body of evidence for  $\sim p$ , and yet still know  $p$ . But in such a case one's evidence does not suffice for negative doxastic obligation—for example, perhaps one has a distinct body of evidence which outweighs the evidence for  $\sim p$ .

If one is a *non-particularist* about epistemic obligation one can offer *something* in the way of argument for (1), as it follows some plausible specifications of the conditions necessary for epistemic obligation, and necessary for knowledge. On a *non-particularist* account of epistemic obligation, there are *principles* governing epistemic obligation. In the case of negative doxastic

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<sup>92</sup> Steup 2010.

epistemic obligation, such principles will plausibly be represented by bi-conditionals of the form:

2.  $s$  epistemically ought to not believe  $p$  if and only if ...

where ‘...’ is replaced by a specification of the condition necessary and sufficient for the relevant epistemic obligation, which may be (partly or fully) in terms of features of  $s$  and of  $p$ . My claim is that the *correct* condition *necessary* for negative doxastic epistemic obligation for  $s$  with respect to  $p$  will *not* be met *if  $s$  knows  $p$* . But if these conditions are not met, it follows that it is not the case that  $s$  epistemically ought to not believe  $p$ .

To see that this is plausible, recall that in §2 I characterised epistemic obligation as those obligations which ‘arise in relation to factors such as whether  $p$  (or  $\sim p$ ), is true, false, knowable, evident, or whether  $s$  possess evidence for  $p$  (or for  $\sim p$ ), and so on’. For the non-particularist, it is *these* factors in terms of which the conditions necessary and sufficient for epistemic obligations will be specified. Putative plausible such principles may include, for example,

3.  $s$  epistemically ought to not believe  $p$  if and only if  $p$  is false, *or*
4.  $s$  epistemically ought to not believe  $p$  if and only if  $s$  does not possess sufficient evidence  $p$ , *and so on*.

But of course, if  $s$  knows  $p$ , then  $p$  is true (as knowledge is factive). Likewise, if  $s$  knows  $p$ , then  $s$  possesses sufficient evidence for  $p$ . So plausible specifications of the conditions necessary for negative doxastic epistemic obligation are not met if  $s$  knows  $p$ . Of course, this does not establish that the *correct* condition necessary for negative doxastic epistemic obligation is not met when  $s$  knows  $p$ . My hope is that reflection on what kinds of necessary conditions are plausible will show that the general constraints on the correctness of such a principles, in virtue of which they count as plausible, are such that (1) is true.

### §5.5 From Indistinguishability to Ignorance of Epistemic Obligations

Suppose we have two cases,  $e_1$  and  $e_2$ , such that

1. Case  $e_1$  is indistinguishable from case  $e_2$

And furthermore, in  $e_1$  the subject of  $e_1$  knows a proposition,  $p$ :

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2. In  $e_1$ , the subject knows  $p$ <sup>93</sup>

Applying the principle relating knowledge to negative doxastic obligation, it follows that:

3. In  $e_1$  it is not the case that the subject epistemically ought to not believe  $p$

Now, as  $e_2$  is indistinguishable from  $e_1$ , it is not the case that the subject in  $e_2$  is in a position to know anything false in  $e_1$ . Hence

4. The subject of  $e_2$  is not in a position to know she ought to not believe  $p$ .

### §5.6 Epistemic Obligation to Epistemic Blamelessness

Finally, I want to argue that, where  $s$  is a subject, and  $p$  a proposition,

1.  $s$  is *epistemically blameless in believing  $p$*  if  $s$  believes that  $p$  and it is not the case that  $s$  is in a position to know that she ought not believe  $p$ .

Given the argument in §5.5, from (1) we may conclude that

2. If case  $e_1$  is indistinguishable from case  $e_2$ , and in  $e_1$  the subject knows  $p$ , in  $e_2$  the subject is epistemically blameless in believing  $p$ .

The argument for (1) this is as follows:

3.  $s$  is epistemically blameless in believing  $p$  if  $s$  believes that  $p$  and  $s$  is *non-culpably ignorant* that she ought not believe  $p$ .
4.  $s$  if  $s$  is not in a position to know she ought not believe  $p$ ,  $s$  is non-culpably ignorant that she ought not believe  $p$ .

(3) and (4) entail (1).

The argument for (3) is structurally identical to that offered in for the *moral* principle

5.  $s$  is morally blameless in  $\phi$ -ing if  $s$   $\phi$ s and  $s$  is non-culpably ignorant that she ought not  $\phi$ .

Morally blamelessness concerns whether an agent has been trying *her* best. One idea if  $s$  does

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<sup>93</sup> For convenience, I have omitted explicit reference to times. The relevant times are just the times of the cases.

not regard herself as under a moral obligation to not  $\phi$ ,  $s \phi$ -ing is consistent with  $s$  trying her moral best—do to what she morally ought to do—and so  $s$  should not be morally blamed for  $\phi$ -ing.<sup>94</sup> Applying this to the epistemic case, we can say that where  $s$  is non-culpably ignorant of an epistemic obligation to not believe  $p$ ,  $s$  believing  $p$  is consistent with  $s$  trying her *epistemic best*—to do what she epistemically ought to do—and so  $s$  should does not exhibit an epistemic failing in believing that  $p$ .

The argument for (4) concerns the relation between epistemic culpability and what one is *able* to know. Put simply, I claim that it is not fair to blame someone for failing to do something that they *can not do*. Hence, as  $s$  is not in a position to know  $p$ , it is not fair to blame them for not knowing  $p$ .<sup>95</sup>

### §6 Indistinguishability, Epistemic Blamelessness and Hallucination

So we've seen a way in which if a case,  $c$ , is indistinguishable from one in which the subject knows a proposition,  $p$ , then the subject of  $c$  is justified in believing  $p$ . But hallucinations and perceptions are indistinguishable from perceptions. And perceptions afford knowledge. So it seems we have a way of accounting for the presence of justification in hallucinatory and perceptual cases. Given the characterisation of experiential knowledge, all we need to do is articulate the relevant indistinguishability relation, and characterise a notion of experiential epistemic blamelessness correlative to experiential knowledge as epistemic blamelessness is to knowledge *simpliciter*. With this, we can bring to bear the machinery of §5 to account for the justification present in corresponding hallucinatory cases.

The argument for this is as follows.

1. In a  $c_p$ -matching cases, there is some set of claims,  $P$ , such that for each member of  $P$ ,  $p$ ,  $s$  is in a position to non-inferentially visually know  $p$  iff it is not the case that doxastic or non-doxastic defeating conditions for  $p$  obtain.

Now, suppose that in a  $c_p$ -matching case, the doxastic defeating conditions for non-inferentially knowing  $p$  do not obtain. It follows that in such a case, the subject cannot know that they *do* obtain, as this is false. i.e.

2. In a  $c_p$ -matching case in which  $s$  is not in a position to non-inferentially visually know  $p$ , and

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<sup>94</sup> See Rosen's (1988) explanation of moral blamelessness in terms of *fairness* in 'Culpability and Ignorance'.

<sup>95</sup> I should note that the relation between non-culpable ignorance and knowability is *synchronic*. A subject,  $s$ , is non-culpably ignorant of  $p$  at  $t$  if  $s$  is not in a position to know  $p$  at  $t$ .

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in which doxastic defeating conditions for  $p$  do not obtain,  $s$  is not in a position to know that doxastic defeating conditions for  $p$  obtain.

Furthermore, as I argued in §2.1.2, if in a case, the subject meets the doxastic conditions for knowing  $p$  (i.e. doxastic defeating conditions do not obtain), the subject is not in a position to know that *non-doxastic* defeating conditions obtain. i.e.

3. In a  $c_p$ -matching case in which  $s$  is not in a position to non-inferentially visually know  $p$ , and in which doxastic defeating conditions for  $p$  do not obtain,  $s$  is not in a position to know that non-doxastic defeating conditions for  $p$  obtain.

Combining these two claims, we get

4. In a  $c_p$ -matching case in which  $s$  is not in a position to non-inferentially visually know  $p$ , and in which doxastic defeating conditions for  $p$  do not obtain,  $s$  is not in a position to know that any defeating conditions for  $p$  do not obtain.

In perceptual cases in which such defeating conditions do not obtain, the subject *is* in a position to non-inferentially visually know  $p$ . Now, suppose the subject is not in a position to non-inferentially visually know that she is not perceiving. That is:

5. In a  $c_p$ -matching case,  $s$  is not in a position to non-inferentially visually know  $s$  is not perceiving.

I think this captures a way in which hallucinatory cases are indistinguishable from perceptual ones. In a  $c_p$ -matching case in which  $s$  is perceiving, and defeating conditions for  $p$  do not obtain,  $s$  is in a position to non-inferentially visually know  $p$ . So, in any case, if  $s$  is not in a position to know that  $s$  is not perceiving, and  $s$  is not in a position to know that defeating conditions for  $p$  do not obtain,  $s$  is not in a position to know that  $s$  is not in a position to non-inferentially visually know  $p$ . Hence:

6. In a  $c_p$ -matching case in which  $s$  is not in a position to non-inferentially visually know  $p$ , and in which doxastic defeating conditions for  $p$  do not obtain,  $s$  is not *thereby* in a position to know that  $s$  is not in a position to know  $p$ .

We can now introduce a notion of *visually epistemic blamelessness*, whereby  $s$  is visually epistemically blameless in believing  $p$  iff  $s$  is epistemically blameless in believing  $p$  on the basis of what  $s$  is in a position to non-inferentially visually know. Thus:

7. In a  $c_p$ -matching case in which  $s$  is not in a position to non-inferentially visually know  $p$ , and

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in which doxastic defeating conditions for  $p$  do not obtain,  $s$  is visually epistemically blameless in believing  $p$ .

And applying the connection between epistemic blamelessness and justification, this entails:

8. In a  $c_p$ -matching case in which  $s$  is not in a position to non-inferentially visually know  $p$ , and in which doxastic defeating conditions for  $p$  do not obtain,  $s$  is visually justified in believing  $p$ .

So, in hallucinatory  $c_p$ -matching cases, the subject is visually justified in believing those claims which they would be in a position to know in  $c_p$ , given relevant doxastic defeating conditions do not obtain. Thus, given the indistinguishability claim articulated by 5, the justificatory role of matching cases may be explained in terms of their indistinguishability from perceptual cases which afford knowledge.

### §7 Conclusions

So, given that in perceptual cases, subjects are in a position to come to visually know various claims given defeating conditions do not obtain, we can explain the presence of justification in matching perceptual and hallucinatory cases in which the subject is not in a position to come to visually know. So where does this leave the debate between the relationalist and the non-relationalist?

If the relationalist can account for the knowledge enabling role of perceptual experience in terms of such experiences being such that the subject is related to material objects with sensory qualities in her environment, she therefore has an explanation of the common justificatory features of matching hallucinatory and perceptual experience, which meets the explanatory constraints discussed in Chapter Two. In §3, I hinted at how such an explanation might go, in terms of the subject being related to a state which makes true the claims the subject is in a position to know. I have not shown how such an account would go. However, I have shown that if such an account may be provided, the common justificatory features of matching hallucinatory and perceptual cases do not count for a common factor, and hence representationalist, explanation of such features.

# Chapter 4

## The Logic of Looks

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### §1 Introduction

In §1, I discuss some of the characteristics of so-called *phenomenal* senses<sup>96</sup> of ‘looks’, and how consideration of these characteristics motivates substantive theses in the philosophy of perception. In §2, I articulate and defend an account of a distinct *comparative* sense of ‘looks’. In §3 I raise the question of whether the comparative account of looks can be extended to cover putative cases of phenomenal looks. If so, this would undercut the motivation phenomenal looks provide for substantive theses in the philosophy of perception. In §4 and §5, I develop a test to determine whether some sentences containing ‘looks’ are comparative. In §6, I apply this test, and argue there are cases in which the comparative analysis fails. I conclude in §7 that it is open such cases involve phenomenal uses of ‘looks’.

### §2 Phenomenal Looks<sup>97</sup>

According to many philosophers, ‘looks’ has a non-comparative phenomenal sense, or use. On this use, where *a* is an object of a kind we pre-theoretically take ourselves to experience, and *F* an observational property, a sentence such as

1. *a* looks *F* (to *s*)<sup>98</sup>

characterises an aspect of the phenomenal character of *s*’s experience; an aspect of what it is like for *s* to undergo that experience (or, alternatively, of how undergoing that experience is for *s*). Furthermore, it does so in terms for properties we ordinarily take to be instantiated by what we pre-theoretically take to be objects of the kinds we experience. For example, such a sentence might characterise how *a* looks in terms of the property *redness*, a property we (at least pre-philosophically) take to be instantiated by things like tables, chairs, walls, and so on, all of which we pre-theoretically take to be kinds of object we may experience. Furthermore, such phenomenal looks sentences are taken to correctly characterise an experience even if the

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<sup>96</sup> Talk of ‘senses’ should not be taken too seriously. Consideration of ambiguity tests shows it is not plausible that ‘looks’ has a distinct phenomenal meaning. I shall not discuss such issues here.

<sup>97</sup> In this section, I am not arguing for a phenomenal use of ‘looks’.

<sup>98</sup> Sentence (1) is *relativised* to a subject. Such subject-relativisation raises very interesting and complicated issues for a full analysis of looks-sentences. I shall not discuss such issues here.

relevant properties are not actually instantiated by the object (we pre-theoretically take) the subject to be experiencing in things looking that way. So, for example, it may be that in a case of illusion, a surface looks red to a subject, but is not red. As it is the surface that looks red, the surface is the object that the subject experiences in it looking red to her.<sup>99</sup> Despite this, it still seems that the claim ‘the surface looks red to *s*’ characterises how *s*’s experience is for her. These features of phenomenal ‘looks’ may be explained if we take it that a property, F, may feature in the phenomenal character of *s*’s experience, and may do so independently of whether F-ness is actually instantiated by an object *s* experiences. It is this aspect of experience that phenomenal looks sentences concern.

In the past, that thought might have been taken to motivate accounts of experience which hold experiences involve the presence before the mind of an F object which is *distinct* from those objects we pre-theoretically ourselves to experience. Because in cases of illusion, the object we pre-theoretically take ourselves to experience is not-F, any experienced F object must be some further object distinct from that one.<sup>100</sup> Generalising the conclusion to non-illusory cases results in the claim that even in cases of veridical perception, the F object is also distinct from those we pre-theoretically take ourselves to experience.<sup>101</sup> More recently, such thoughts are taken to motivate accounts of experience which hold experiences involve the phenomenologically salient *representation* by experience of F-ness. Representation allows for the possibility of misrepresentation: an object may be represented as being F even when it is in fact not. On such accounts, it is this which occurs in cases of illusion.

Both views are often developed as *common factor* accounts of perception and illusion, which hold that matching veridical perceptions and illusions involve experiences of fundamentally the same kind. It should be noted that the claim that matching veridical perceptions and illusions involve the same properties featuring in the phenomenal characters of the experiences does not in itself entail a common factor account, as this is consistent with the experiences not being of fundamentally the same kind. For example, one might hold that the way in which the properties feature in the phenomenal characters is different, that there are further phenomenological differences, or that experiences of fundamentally different kinds may have the same phenomenology. Nevertheless, it does put some pressure on non-common factor accounts. It is at least *prima facie* plausible that experiences, as conscious events, are kind-individuated by their phenomenology, and so if it is true that matching veridical perceptions and illusions are

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<sup>99</sup> If *a* looks F to *s*, then *s* visually experiences *a*, and in my example it is the surface which looks red to *s*.

<sup>100</sup> Given the contrapositive of Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernability of Identicals:  $\neg \forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \rightarrow \neg x = y$

<sup>101</sup> Of course, this generalising step may be resisted. See Austin 1962.

experiences in which things phenomenally look the same way, this is suggestive of their having the same phenomenology.<sup>102</sup>

So consideration of the phenomenal sense of looks has been taken to motivate, or be explained by, various substantial metaphysical theses about the nature of visual experience. Given this, it is important to evaluate whether ‘looks’ actually has a phenomenal sense. But this is not obvious, as it may appear that a further, *comparative* account can be given of putatively phenomenal looks sentences. In the remainder of this chapter, I shall argue that the comparative account fails for some (putatively phenomenal) looks sentences.

### §3 Comparative Looks

Following Chisholm (1957), Jackson (1977) claims ‘looks’ is used comparatively when it occurs in a sentence of the form of

2. *a* looks like an F

Jackson claims that (2) expresses the proposition that

3. *a* looks the way Fs normally look

‘*a* looks like F’ therefore expresses a *kind-comparative claim*, one that relates a way *a* looks to how a *kind* of thing (normally) looks. The predicate ‘F’ simply serves to specify this kind.

Just as there are kind-comparative claims, so too are there comparative sentences which relate how *a* looks to how another particular object, *b*, looks, such as

4. *a* looks like *b*

Extending Jackson’s account, such a sentence expresses a claim relating the way *a* looks to how *b* (normally) looks. It is equivalent to the claim expressed by:

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<sup>102</sup> I realise that a lot more needs to be said in defence of this claim; one background idea is that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhaustively characterised by how things phenomenally look. This claim is itself motivated by the idea that the best way to specify the phenomenal character of an experience is to state how things look to the subject undergoing it. There are interesting connections to Strawson 1988 description thesis here, according to which experiences may only be characterised in terms used in the perceptual judgements it would be natural to make on their basis. Claims about how things look involve use of terms for properties it would be natural to ascribe on the basis of the experiences in which things look those ways.

5. *a* looks the way *b* normally looks

There is a lot to say about the precise details of Jackson’s analysis. In particular, it does not seem plausible to me that the restriction to how *Fs* (or *b*) normally look(s) is correct. Suppose, for example, that a subject is presented with two balls of different colour, in abnormal such that the subject cannot tell the colours apart (perhaps the balls are presented in conditions of low illumination such that the subject is operating on night vision).<sup>103</sup> In such conditions, it seems appropriate to say that *a* looks like *b*, even though *a* does not look the way *b* normally looks. Similarly, it seems appropriate in abnormal conditions to say ‘*a* looks like an *F*’ when it is the case that *a* looks the way *Fs* do in such conditions, irrespective of whether *a* looks the way *Fs* do in normal conditions. What is plausible is that comparative looks claims may be *relativised* to various circumstances, times, and so on. For example, it might be that *a* in circumstances *C1* looks like *b* in circumstances *C2*, but *a* in circumstances *C3* does not look like *b* in circumstances *C4*. In situations in which a subject is experiencing an object, it is plausible that the relevant conditions are just those the object is currently in, and the relevant time is just that at which the experience occurs. For simplicity, in what follows I shall not explicitly include relativisation to circumstances, times, and so on.

Jackson’s analysis also builds in the assumption that comparative claims relate how *a* looks to a *unique* way *Fs*, or *b*, do(es). This is because it includes a definite description; Jackson analyses them in terms of *the* way *Fs* (or *b*) normally look(s). Hence, the comparative claims expressed are true just if there is one, and only one, way that *Fs* (or *b*) look(s), and *a* also looks that way.<sup>104</sup> Again, this is not plausible. Suppose, for example, that a subject, *s* is presented with two different shapes, *a* and *b*, of the same colour, in normal conditions. In such conditions, it seems appropriate to say ‘*a* looks like *b*’, as *a* looks a way that *b* does—they have the same chromatic appearance. But there is also a way that *b* looks that *a* does not, as *b*’s spatial appearance is different from *a*’s. So it is not the case that there is a single way that *b* looks, and *a* looks that way. Rather, there are many ways that *b* looks, and *a* shares at least one of them.<sup>105</sup> And this is

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<sup>103</sup> In conditions of low illumination, retinal cone cells are not operative, and vision is dependent on only one kind of photoreception, rods, with a single frequency sensitivity function. This results in monochromatic vision.

<sup>104</sup> I am assuming a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions here. Such a claim is therefore equivalent to:

$\exists w1 [a \text{ looks } w1 \ \& \ (Fs \text{ (normally) look } w1 \ \& \ \forall w2 (Fs \text{ (normally) look } w2 \rightarrow w1 = w2))]$

<sup>105</sup> ‘Way’-talk is highly flexible. In general, it is plausible that if there are two ways, *w1* and *w2*, such that *a* looks *w1* and *a* looks *w2*, there is some further way, *w3*, such that *a* looks *w3* and any object that looks *w3* also looks *w1* and looks *w2*. We can talk of entailments between ways of looking as follows: way of looking *w1* entails way of looking *w2* iff everything that looks *w1* also looks *w2*. Given this, we can talk of

sufficient for the truth of the comparative claim. Similarly with kind comparisons; there may be many ways that things of a kind look, and again, it is sufficient for the truth of a kind-comparative claim that an object looks one of these ways.<sup>106</sup>

So, for present purposes, I shall treat a sentence such as

6. *a* looks like *b*

*if comparative* as expressing the proposition that *a* looks a way that is just the same way as one *b* does: i.e. that there is a way of looking such that *a* looks that way, and *b* looks that way. Making explicit such quantification over ways of looking, and say that *a* looks like *b* if and only if there is some way of looking, *w*, such that *a* looks *w* and *b* looks *w*.<sup>107</sup> Alternatively, we can put this in terms of *a* and *b* sharing a look, where looks are individuated in terms of ways of looking, such that for any way of looking, *w*, there is a look, *l*, such that *a* has *l* if and only if *a* looks *w*.<sup>108</sup>

Similarly, I shall treat a sentence such as

7. *a* looks like an *F*

the *total* way that something looks, where this is the way it looks which entails every other way it looks. Each object has only *one* unique total way of looking (although extending this notion to kinds more complicated, as different members of a kind may have different total ways of looking). But it is not plausible that comparative kind claims of the sort considered here compare total ways of looking. Of course, one can make such a claim, by, e.g., saying '*a* looks *exactly* like *b*'. But sentence '*a* looks like *b*' does say that *a* looks exactly like *b*.

<sup>106</sup> This raises a further question—is it sufficient for the truth of a kind-comparison claim that *a* looks a way that *some* *F* look? Or must *a* look a way that *all* *F*s look? Neither option is promising. Kind-comparison claims are *general* claims. The claim that dogs have four legs is not to be simply analysed as the claims some or all dogs have four legs. I take it that whatever the correct account of such general claims is, it may be applied to kind-comparison claims.

<sup>107</sup> i.e.

$\exists w [a \text{ looks } w \ \& \ b \text{ looks } w]$

I am here assuming that talk of 'ways', when applied to looks, involves quantification over the complement predicate position. This is a substantive assumption, but not implausible. What is specified by the complement predicate is just a property; thus talking of ways of looking is just quantifying over such properties (although, as mentioned in footnote 105, 'way'-talk is highly flexible, and in other contexts may quantify over other kinds of entity). This assumption is supported by the fact that it may be the case that an object, *a* looks the way *it is*. The way something is is just a property it has.

<sup>108</sup> In footnote 105, I introduce the notion of a *total* way of looking. It seems to me that when we nominalise, and talk of 'looks' we often have in mind the total ways of looking of objects. But it does not seem to me that it is only legitimate to talk of 'looks' in this way.

*if comparative* as making the claim that *a* looks a way that is just the same as a way Fs do, i.e. that there is some way of looking, *w*, such that *a* looks *w* and Fs look *w*.<sup>109</sup> Again, this can be alternatively put by saying that *a* shares a look with Fs, or has an F-look (where an F-look is just a look that Fs have).

One consequence of this account is that comparative looks relations are symmetric; *a* looks like *b* if and only if *b* looks like *a*. Similarly, they are reflexive over the domain of objects which look some way, as everything which looks a way looks a way it does. But it may appear that the relations attributed by sentences of form (7) are both non-symmetric and non-reflexive.

For example, suppose David Cameron cannot attend Prime Ministers Question time, but must keep this fact secret from the house. To aid this deception, Nick Clegg makes himself up such as to take on all the (visible) characteristics of the leader of the Conservative Party—he dresses as Cameron, puts on makeup, and so on. Thus he is able to fool the house. In such a case, we might say ‘Nick Clegg looks like David Cameron’. But in such situations, even if we were in on the deception, we would not normally say ‘David Cameron looks like Nick Clegg’, or indeed ‘Nick Clegg looks like Nick Clegg’.

There are three sources of the plausibility of such cases, of which I shall discuss two.<sup>110</sup> First, such cases may be handled by taking them to involve some implicit relativisation to circumstances or times. I have already discussed how it is plausible to take some uses of comparative looks sentences as expressing relativised claims. And relativising to particular circumstances or times can account for the current case. For example, Nick Clegg, standing before the house today, looks like David Cameron looked standing before the house last week. But Nick Clegg, standing before the house today, does not look like Nick Clegg looked getting out of the shower this morning. And David Cameron does not now look like Nick Clegg

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<sup>109</sup> i.e.

$\exists w [a \text{ looks } w \ \& \ Fs \ \text{look } w]$

<sup>110</sup> The third involves analysing the claim in terms of *epistemic* looks, which I do not discuss in the body of this chapter. An epistemic account of looks is often offered for looks statements of the form of ‘It looks as if *p*’, which are analysed in terms of there being a body of visual evidence for the proposition *p*. Extending this to statements of the form ‘*a* looks like *b*’, or ‘*a* looks like an F’, we might take them to be equivalent to the claims that there is a body of visual evidence for the proposition that *a* is *b*, or that *a* is an F. (Depending on one’s views on propositions, care must be taken with how *a* is specified in this proposition, as this may depend on how the subject is thinking about it. Plausibly the relevant proposition is that the subject entertains when thinking about *a* using a perceptual demonstrative.) In the case we are considering, members of the house would naturally take there to be evidence for the claim that *that* [Nick Clegg] is David Cameron, and no evidence for the claim that *that* [Nick Clegg] is Nick Clegg.

looked getting out of the shower this morning. So we may be able to account for the case by taking the simple looks sentences as expressing such claims.

But this is not sufficient. Even if we explicitly relativise, it may still seem in some way natural to say that ‘Nick Clegg, standing before the house today, does not look like Nick Clegg standing before the house today’, or that ‘David Cameron, standing before the house last week, did not look like Nick Clegg as he is standing before the house today’. This is because we *associate* a particular way of looking, or various particular ways of looking, with David Cameron. A sentence such as ‘*a* looks like David Cameron’ may be used to *communicate* the claim that *a* looks some of *those* particular ways. Likewise, a claim such as ‘*a* looks like Nick Clegg’ may be used to communicate the claim that *a* looks those ways we associate with Nick Clegg. When Nick Clegg dresses as David Cameron, the various ways he looks are those that we associate with David Cameron, and not those that we associate with Nick Clegg. Hence, a claim we may communicate by saying ‘Nick Clegg looks like Nick Clegg’ is false, as is one we communicate by saying ‘David Cameron looks like Nick Clegg’. And so here is another reason why it is natural to say that he does not look like himself, but does look like Cameron.

It is then a further question whether such claims are expressed by comparative looks sentences, or conveyed by utterances of them. In what follows, I shall assume that such claims are conveyed, but not expressed<sup>111</sup>. It seems to me that strictly speaking, when Nick Clegg dresses as David Cameron, it is true that David Cameron looks like Nick Clegg, and that Nick Clegg looks like Nick Clegg. This is because comparative looks sentences carry empirical commitments. Suppose we discover that David Cameron cannot attend PMQs because he is off elsewhere impersonating Nick Clegg (say, at the Liberal Democrats’ party conference), and so has dressed himself as Nick Clegg. If we were to discover this, we would no longer have those grounds for saying that Nick Clegg looks like David Cameron.<sup>112</sup> But it is still true that Nick Clegg looks the ways we associate with David Cameron.

#### §4 Are There Phenomenal Looks?

In the above discussion, I have followed assumed that comparative looks sentences involve the expression ‘look *like*’. But this assumption can be relaxed. ‘Like’ just is one of the English words by which we express comparative claims, but one can extend the comparative analysis to sentences which do not contain it. So one can provide a comparative analysis of sentences such

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<sup>111</sup> However, this assumption is not essential for the argument. With minor adjustments, what I say holds even if one takes such characteristic looks to be attributed by comparative looks sentences.

<sup>112</sup> Of course, there may still be *some* ways in which they look the same.

as ‘*a* looks F’, treating it just as one would treat the sentence ‘*a* looks like an F’. So, a question arises—can the comparative analysis be extended to cover putatively phenomenal looks sentences?

If it can, this would undercut the motivation to explain phenomenal looks in terms of substantive claims about the metaphysics of experience—in terms of claims about properties figuring ‘before the mind’ in experience, irrespective of their instantiation in the subject’s environment. We would have an explanation for why looks claims are expressed by sentences containing a term for a property, and may be true independently of whether that property is actually instantiated by the experienced object—an experienced object may look a way that Fs do, even though it is not F. How the experienced object looks is characterised in terms for a property, F, but there is no reason to suppose that the property figures in the subject’s experience, let alone may figure in the subject’s experience in cases in which it is uninstantiated in her experienced environment.

Philosophers have often argued for phenomenal looks by finding cases in which the truth-values of a putatively phenomenal sentence come apart from those of corresponding comparative claims. But such arguments are hard to make. In any given case, a large variety of comparative claims, relativised to different times, circumstances, and so on, will have differing truth-values. So although it is easy to find a comparative claim with a different truth-value from the claim in question, it is hard to show *no* comparative claim has the same truth-value. And so philosophers making such arguments are often open to the charge that they have just picked the *wrong* comparative claim. In what follows, I shall develop and apply a different test, concerning the logical relations between different looks sentences.

## §5 Intra-modal Looks Inferences and Comparative Looks

Suppose we have two objects, *a* and *b*, and the following two sentences are true:

8. *a* looks F.

9. *b* looks F.

Do (8) and (9) entail:

10. *a* looks like *b*.

If (8) and (9) are comparative looks sentences, and comparative looks sentences are to be

analysed as discussed in §2, (8) and (9) express the claims that

11. There is some way,  $w$ , such that  $a$  looks  $w$  and Fs look  $w$ .
12. There is some way,  $w$ , such that  $b$  looks  $w$  and Fs look  $w$ .

Likewise, as (10) is explicitly a comparative (containing the expression ‘looks *like*’), it expresses the claim that

13. There is some way,  $w$ , such that  $a$  looks  $w$  and  $b$  looks  $w$ .

It is clear that (13) doesn’t follow from (11) and (12). If any of the ways of looking that  $a$  and Fs share were identical to those  $b$  and Fs share, then it would follow that  $a$  and  $b$  share a way of looking. But it is consistent with (11) and (12) that no way of looking that  $a$  and Fs share is identical to a way of looking that  $b$  and Fs share. For example,  $a$  and Fs may share just one way of looking,  $w1$ , and  $b$  and Fs may share another,  $w2$ , and  $\neg w1 = w2$ . So comparative sentences (8) and (9) do *not* entail the corresponding comparative (10). Hence, if in a case we can infer (10) solely from (8) and (9), (8) and (9) are not comparative looks sentences. And so, by examining whether such inferences are valid, we can test for whether the sentences are comparative.

At this stage, we should note that a Jacksonian comparative analysis of (8) and (9) would entail (10). On my account, there is no entailment because the common ways of looking sufficient for the truth of (8) and (9) may be non-identical. But Jackson’s account, with its assumption of uniqueness, does not allow for this. On his account, (8) and (9) expresses the claims that

14. There is some way,  $w$ , such that  $a$  looks  $w$ , and Fs uniquely look  $w$ .
15. There is some way,  $w$ , such that  $b$  looks  $w$ , and Fs uniquely look  $w$ .

From (14) and (15), it follows that the look that  $a$  shares with Fs, and that  $b$  shares with Fs, is just the same look, as Fs have only one look to share.<sup>113</sup> But such an account is inadequate—it is implausible to suppose that comparative look claims entail that there is *no* difference in look between  $a$  and Fs.<sup>114</sup>

But at this stage we should remember that comparative look sentences such as (8) and (9) may communicate that objects have the *characteristic* looks Fs have. There may be only one, or a few,

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<sup>113</sup> A minor complication—this is consistent with  $a$  and  $b$  differing in further looks. So if the uniqueness assumption is built into ‘ $a$  looks like  $b$ ’, as expressing that there is some way,  $w$ , such that  $a$  uniquely looks  $w$ , and  $b$  uniquely looks  $w$ , it would not follow from (13). Similarly, if the claim is restricted to the *total* looks of Fs to guarantee uniqueness (although see footnote 105), it is consistent with (7) and (8) that the total looks of  $a$  and  $b$  are distinct.

<sup>114</sup> Or, more accurately, that there is no way that  $a$  looks that Fs do not.

of these, *all* of which are attributed by the communicated claim. Suppose that we associate only one way of looking, *m*, with Fs. If so, (8) and (9) will communicate the claims that

- 16. *a* looks *m*.
- 17. *b* looks *m*.

And these claims do entail that there is a way, *w*, such that *a* looks *w* and *b* looks *w* (where *w* = *m*). I have presented a reason for scepticism about analysing comparative kind sentences in terms of such particular characteristic looks; doing so does not capture the ways in which kind comparative look statements are subject to empirical falsification. But, by taking claims such as (16) and (17) as conveyed by sentences (8) and (9), the seeming validity of an inference to (10) can be explained in terms of (10) being entailed by the conveyed claims. So a proponent of the comparative analysis can account for the seeming validity of an inference from (8) and (9) to (10).

### §6 Inter-modal Looks Inferences and Comparative Looks

In §4, I considered an inference to an *intra-modal* comparative sentence—'*a* looks like *b*', which I took to express a claim concerning appearances in just one sensory modality: that of vision. Such comparative claims concern the visible appearances, or looks, objects share. But there are also *inter-modal* comparative appearance sentences, which express relations between sensory appearances of different modalities, such as vision and touch, or smell and taste. Just as a sentence such as

- 18. *a* looks like *b*.

may typically be taken to express the intra-modal comparative claim that there is some way that *a* looks, and that *b* looks, so too a sentence such as

- 19. *a* look like *b* feels.

expresses an inter-modal comparative claim concerning the relation between the visible appearance or look of *a*, and the haptic appearance, or feel, of *b*.

That there are such inter-modal comparative claims can be overlooked. This is perhaps partly explained by the fact that the sentences by which we typically express intra-modal comparative claims, such as (18), often do not explicitly state the comparison is being made to *b*'s visible appearance, and so obscure the fact that one may specify the relevant modality of *b*'s appearance in question, and indeed specify a *different* modality from that of *a*. Once we have noticed this, we can see that (18) may be taken as elliptical for

20. *a* looks like *b* does.

or

21. *a* looks like *b* looks.

which do make this explicit (by anaphora in the case of 20).

Now, suppose we have a case in which

22. *a* looks F.

and

23. *b* feels F.

If (22) and (23) are comparative, do the claims entail (24)? –

24. *a* looks like *b* feels.

As discussed, on the straightforward comparative analysis, (22) is equivalent to

25. There is some way, *w*, such that *a* looks *w* and Fs look *w*.

If (23) is to be treated analogously, it is equivalent to

26. There is some way, *w*, such that *b* feels *w* and Fs feel *w*.

Just as a plausible comparative analysis of (22) will treat it as specifying a relation between the visible appearances of *a* and Fs, so too will a plausible comparative analysis of (23) treat it as specifying a relation between the haptic appearances of *b* and Fs. It is implausible to suppose, for example, that (23) expresses a claim concerning the relation between *b*'s haptic appearance, and an appearance of Fs in another sensory modality.<sup>115</sup>

Now, (24) is equivalent to

27. There is some way, *w*, such that *a* looks *w* and *b* feels *w*.

It is again clear that (27) does not follow from (22) and (23). Again, (25) and (26) are consistent

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<sup>115</sup> Perhaps one can come up with cases in which sentences such as (22) and (23) would be used to express inter-modal comparatives. But such cases involve much scene setting, and are far removed from those considered in this chapter. Plausibly, if unspecified, by default a comparative looks claim is intra-modal.

with *a* and *b* sharing only *distinct* ways of looking or feeling with Fs, and hence compatible with the falsity of (27).

Furthermore, in contrast to the intra-modal case, the entailment is not present even on the Jacksonian comparative analysis. Even if we build in the assumptions that *a* looks a way that Fs *uniquely* look, and *b* feels a way that Fs *uniquely* feel, it is open that the single way that Fs look, and the single way that Fs feel, are distinct.

Does appeal to characteristic looks help? Here the issue is harder. Suppose again that there is only one, or a few, way(s) that Fs characteristically look, and only one, or a few, way(s) that Fs characteristically feel. It is consistent with this assumption that the characteristic looks of Fs and the characteristic feels are distinct. But suppose that this is not the case—that way(s) Fs characteristically look and the way(s) Fs characteristically feel are the same. For example, suppose that Fs characteristically look the single way *m*. And Fs characteristically feel the single way *m*. Then (22) and (23) will communicate the claims that

- 28. *a* looks *m*
- 29. *b* feels *m*

and from this it follows that there is a way, *w*, such that *a* looks *w* and *b* feels *w* (where *w* = *m*). So (24) will follow from the claims conveyed by (22) and (23) only if Fs characteristically look and feel exactly the same ways.

## §7 Putting the Test into Practice

It is now time to put the test into practice. Do we have cases in which it is plausible that appearance claims in different modalities entail corresponding intra-modal comparatives?

Consider the following example. Suppose that a normal subject is visually presented with one circular piece of card, *a*, and haptically presented with another, *b*, in perfectly ordinary conditions. The following two sentences would be true in such a case:

- 30. *a* looks circular.
- 31. *b* feels circular.

From this, does (32) follow? -

- 32. *a* looks like *b* feels.

It seems to me that it does. For example, one is in a position to know (30) simply on the basis

of knowledge of (30) and (31) (assuming that knowledge of (32) is not undermined by other knowledge the subject has).<sup>116</sup>

But the comparative analysis might handle such cases in terms of characteristic looks. It is common knowledge that circular objects look as they feel (for the relevant ways of looking and feeling). And so we characteristically associate with circular objects a common particular way of looking and way of feeling. Hence (30) and (31) convey claims to the effect that *a* looks that way, and *b* feels that way, and these conveyed claims entail (32), thereby accounting for the apparent knowledge grounding entailment.

To provide a challenge for the comparative analysis, what is needed is a case in which we do not characteristically associate any common way of looking and feeling with a type of object. Plausibly, we do not characteristically associate any particular way of looking or feeling with more complex shape properties. For example, consider a 57 sided object; a pentacontakaiheptagon. Suppose a subject is presented with two cards, *a* and *b*, such that

- 33. *a* looks pentacontakaiheptagonal
- 34. *b* feels pentacontakaiheptagonal

Again it seems that (33) and (34) entail

- 35. *a* looks like *b* feels.

Yet it is a substantive claim that pentacontakaiheptagons look as they feel, or that we associate a common way of looking and feeling with them. Given the limited acuity of haptic perception, it is a claim we should be agnostic about. Hence the comparative analysis cannot account for the entailment of (35) by (34) and (33).

A further example is provided by the Ebbinghaus illusion. In the illusion, two equally sized circles are placed near to each other. One is surrounded by smaller circles, and the other by larger ones, as shown in figure 1.

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<sup>116</sup> For example, it may be that the subject knows, or believes, some further proposition, *p*, that counts against knowledge of (32). Such a subject, on recognising that (32) follows from (30) and (31), might reject one of (30) and (31), instead of embracing (32).




Figure 1—the Ebbinghaus illusion

This results in a relative visual size illusion; the circles look to be different in size. But the illusion is restricted to vision. There is no corresponding haptic illusion, and the circles do not feel different in size. Although it is true that

36. *a* looks composed of two different sized circles, respectively surrounded by larger and smaller circles.

The corresponding claim for touch is not true, as

37. *a* feels composed of two *equal* sized circles, respectively surrounded by larger and smaller circles.

Suppose we modify the Ebbinghaus stimuli, presenting two circles of *different* sizes, the larger surrounded by smaller circles, and the smaller surrounded by larger circles, so as to compensate for the relative size illusion. The resultant stimuli, *b*, will be such that

38. *b* looks composed of two equal sized circles, respectively surrounded by larger and smaller circles.

From this, it is plausible that we can derive the claim

39. *b* looks like *a* feels.

For example, knowledge of (37) and (38) seem sufficient for the subject to be in a position to know (39).

Yet it is not the case that an object actually composed of two equal sized circles, respectively surrounded by larger and smaller circles, looks as it feels (for the relevant ways of looking and feeling). So even if we add this extra claim, we do not have a sound argument for (39). Reference to characteristic looks and feels does not help either. We do not characteristically

associate a common way of looking and a common way of feeling with two equal sized circles, respectively surrounded by larger and smaller circles. Before hearing about the Ebbinghaus illusion, it is unlikely that one associates *any* particular way of looking or feeling with this stimulus configuration.<sup>117</sup> And after hearing about the Ebbinghaus illusion, one should if anything associate *distinct* ways of looking and feeling with it. So it is implausible that (37) and (38) convey claims which entail (39). Such inferences are valid, and the validity of them cannot be accounted for in terms of the comparative analysis. The comparative analysis is therefore incorrect as an account of the relevant look sentences.

## §8 Conclusions

I have presented two examples in which the comparative analysis of sentences involving ‘looks’ fails, as it is unable to account for the logical relations between such sentences and intra-modal appearance comparatives.

This does not establish that such cases involve phenomenal uses of ‘looks’. That would require substantive further investigation. But a phenomenal analysis of them is now back on the table. It is suggestive that in the discussed cases the relevant looks are characterised by terms for observational properties, just as many philosophers take to be characteristic of phenomenal uses of ‘looks’.

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<sup>117</sup> One might associate different ways of looking with components of the stimulus configuration, but association is not compositional, and such ways of looking will not in virtue of this be associated with the entire stimulus configuration.

# Chapter Five

## Experience and Thought

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### §1 Introduction

In this chapter I consider the relation between experiential intentionality, phenomenology, and the role experience plays in making available *experientially dependent thought* about sensory *qualities*. In §1 of this chapter, I identify a particular way of thinking about properties, and examine the *experiential* conditions for thinking about a property in this way. Specifically, I argue that we have a particular way of entertaining thoughts about properties that is *experientially dependent* in the following way: one is in a position to entertain a thought about a property, *F*, in this way only if one is having a visual experience in which *F*-ness figures to determine an aspect of the phenomenal character of that experience.

In §2, I examine the *worldly* conditions for thinking about a property in this way. I argue that it is not a condition for thinking about a property in this way that the relevant property be instantiated in the subject's environment, as subjects are in a position to think about properties in this way in cases of illusion.

In §3, I conclude by combining these two results to yield a substantive claim about the worldly conditions for having an experience in which a property figures to determine an aspect of the phenomenal character of that experience: it is not a condition on having such an experience that the property be instantiated in the subject's perceived environment. I conclude by considering the consequences of this for relational accounts of experience

### §2 Experience Dependent Thought

In this section, I shall defend the following Experiential Dependency Thesis, a thesis about a particular way we have of thinking about properties, *w*, which we can recognise subjects as being capable of in various cases.

EDT A subject, *s*, is in a position to think about a property, *F*, in way *w*, only if *s* is having a visual experience, *e*, of *F*-ness such as to determine an aspect of the phenomenal character of *e*.

Depending on how one individuates the relevant way of thinking about a property, the experiential dependency thesis might appear at risk of triviality. If we simply define one way of

thinking about a property as just thinking about it on the basis of a current visual experience which is of it in the relevant way, then it trivially follows that one can entertain a thought about a property in this way only if one is having a visual experience of it in the relevant way.<sup>118</sup> The thesis I shall defend is not trivial. This is because we have some independent grasp of the particular way of thinking about a property in question, which we can recognise to be employed in particular cases. It is a substantive claim that there are such experiential conditions on this way of thinking about a property. My strategy will therefore be to describe cases in which we can recognise that the subject is thinking about, or attempting to think about, a property in a particular way, and demonstrate that the subject is only able to successfully think about a property in *this* way in those cases in which she experiences the property in question, and the property figures in the experience to determine an aspect of the phenomenal character of the experience. The experiential dependency thesis is a thesis about this way of thinking, supported by abductive inference from such cases. Nevertheless, we can provide some initial characterisation of the way of thinking in question. However, the purpose of doing so is *not* simply to define a particular way of thinking about a property for which EDT is true. Rather it is to characterise a way of thinking about a property that we can recognise subjects as employing, or attempting to employ, in various cases. The way in question is that way of thinking about properties we employ when we successfully attempt to think about a property by casting our attention *outwards* to the visible world, holding a property in attention, and forming a thought about it.

In §1.1, I argue for EDT by consideration of the role of experience in enabling thought about a properties. In §1.2 I provide further argument for EDT by consideration of the role of visual attention in enabling thought about properties. In §1.3 I contrast thinking about a property in the way EDT concerns to making linguistic reference to a property by use of a demonstrative *expression*, in order to undermine reservations one might have concerning EDT. In §1.4 I compare the relevant capacity for thinking about a property in the way EDT concerns to various views on demonstrative *concepts*, providing further elucidation of the thesis, but also distancing it from substantive views on demonstrative concepts. Finally, in §1.5 I provide a theoretical account of how it is that experience enables thought about properties in the relevant way, in terms of enabling knowledge of the individuating internal relations observational properties stand in.

## §2.1 Experience and EDT

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118 Although it would then be a substantive thesis that this way of thinking about a property is one we employ in any particular case.

In this section, I motivate EDT by consideration of the role of *experience* in enabling thought about the world. In §1.1.1, I describe a relatively ordinary case, to argue the claim that thinking about a property in the way in question requires experience of it. In §1.1.2, I connect this the claim that there are phenomenological conditions on the relevant way properties may figure in experience to thus enable thought about them by consideration of cases of blindsight. In §1.1.3, that there are phenomenological conditions as per EDT is argued for by consideration of monochromatic vision.

### §2.1.1 An Everyday Example, and the Explanatory Role of EDT

Consider the following case:

A subject looks at a colour swatch of a particular shade of red, *r*, in ordinary light, and casting her attention outwards thinks to herself ‘that colour is Caravaggio’s favourite’, or forms the intention to paint the walls of her living-room ‘that colour’.

In such a case, the subject exercises a capacity to think about a property. And when she does this, her concern just the particular red shade of the swatch, *r*, that she is looking at. Her belief is true just if *r* is Caravaggio’s favourite colour, and her intention is satisfied if and only if she paints the walls of her living-room *r*.

But now suppose that the subject had been presented with a swatch of a different shade—a shade of green, *g*. If she had thought about ‘that colour’ in exactly the same way, by turning her attention outwards as she does, her thoughts now would have concerned *g*, and not *r*. Yet in both cases she would have been exercising the same general capacity to think about a shade in the same way. So in the different cases, the subject is able to entertain two distinct thoughts concerning two distinct properties, by exercise of the same cognitive capacity.

It follows from this that whether a subject is in a position to think about a *particular* property is not determined merely by whether she possesses this general capacity. In the original swatch case, what explains why a subject with this capacity is able to think about a property *r*, and not able to think about a property, *g*, is not explained merely by the fact that she has a general capacity to think about properties by visually attending to them on the basis of perceptual experience. That on an occasion, an exercise of this capacity results in a thought about *r*, or not about *g*, is something that requires further explanation.

In the swatch case, it seems plausible that the correct explanation of why it is that the subject’s thoughts concern *r*, and not any other chromatic property, is that she has an experience of *r*,

and not any other chromatic property. The reason why her thought does not in fact concern  $g$  is that she is not experiencing  $g$ , and thus  $g$  is not available to be the object of her thought. Such an explanation is vindicated if it is a general condition on our being in a position to think about a property in this way that we are undergoing an experience of it. That this is a condition on being in a position to think about a property in this way explains why it is that in cases in which a subject is not having a visual experience of  $g$  the subject is not in a position to think about  $g$  in this way. By citing the fact that the subject is not experiencing  $g$ , we show that the subject does not meet a necessary condition for thinking about  $g$  in this way, and hence that she is not in a position to think about  $g$ . Similarly, by citing the fact that the subject *is* experiencing  $r$ , we remove an obstacle to her thinking about  $r$  in this way, and hence explain how it is that the subject is able to think about  $r$ .<sup>119</sup> Hence, EDT provides an explanation of the cognitive capabilities of the subject in the swatch case.

### §2.1.2 Blindsight

In this section, I connect the experiential condition argued for in §1.1.1 to phenomenological considerations, by consideration of blindsight. Blindsighted subjects lack visual experience of an area of the visual field, and to objects and properties presented in that area, or at least lack visual experience of that area, and of properties and objects presented in that area, in a way which contributes to the phenomenological character of their experience. Blindsighted subjects are unable to think about objects and properties presented in that area. This is both highly suggestive of EDT, and of a further phenomenological constraint on the way in which a property must figure in experience in order to enable thought about it in the way EDT concerns; that the experience must not only be of the property, but it's being of that property must determine an aspect of the phenomenological character of the experience.

In subjects with a human visual system, blindsight may be caused by damage to the areas of the occipital lobe responsible for early visual processing, particularly area V1 of the posterior occipital lobe. This results in visual field defects known as scotomas—regions of the visual field which subjects are in some sense 'blind' to. Nevertheless, under some circumscribed circumstances, subjects are able to respond to stimuli presented in the region of their visual field occupied by their field defect. For example, subjects will perform above chance when forced to guess between the shape of a stimulus from one of two options (cross or circle), and correctly

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119 Is it *sufficient* for the subject to be able to think about  $r$  that she possess the general capacity to think about properties by casting her attention outwards, and that she have an experience of  $r$ ? It seems to me it is not. It is also a requirement on her being in a position to successfully think about  $r$  that she be able to fix her attention on  $r$ . This condition is discussed in §1.2

orientate their hands to reach for and grasp stimuli. Yet they have low confidence in the accuracy of their responses, and deny that they have any visual awareness of the stimuli.

Blindsight is often characterised in terms of the subjects lacking visual *awareness* of stimuli presented in the affected region, or alternatively being unable to visually *attend* to them. It is plausible that visual attention has a special role in the enabling of thought about a property in the way which EDT concerns. But consideration of the role of attention is inessential to the current line of thought. This is because on the relevant notions of visual awareness and visual attention it is presumably a condition on being visually aware of, or visually attending to, something that one visually experiences it. But is not obviously sufficient for being visually aware of, or visually attending to, something that one experiences it.<sup>120</sup> And so one might suppose that it is open that blindsight patients have experiences of stimuli in the affected area, but simply lack awareness of what they experience. But this leaves something out. Blindsighted subjects do have a general capacity for being visually aware of, or visually attending to, things they experience. What explains the fact they are not in a position to be visually aware of stimuli presented in their field defect is that they don't have experiences in the first place, or at least, that they do not have visual experiences with the distinctive phenomenological character that such experiences have in us, corresponding to their presentation of the relevant area. That is it what it is for them to be 'blind' to this region of the visual field. And this conforms to both the subjects' introspectively grounded descriptions of their situations, and the neural basis of their condition.<sup>121</sup>

Despite lacking experience of the region occupied by their field defect, blindsighted subjects perhaps fulfil some of the conditions one might take to be involved in linguistic demonstrative reference to properties presented there. Properties presented in their field defect are instantiated in their environment, appropriately positioned relative to the subject, and subjects are able to direct behaviour towards them. And so it may seem that we can interpret a blindsighted

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120 It is clearly not sufficient for visually attending to something that one visually experiences it. The situation with visual awareness is more complicated—one might simply understand visual awareness in terms of visual experience, and so the two could not come apart. However, one might understand visual awareness as akin to visual attention in that only some experienced items enter awareness.

121 Sufficient damage to V1 results in a complete blindness in normal humans, suggesting that V1 is necessary for ordinary human visual experience. Visual processing in V1 is highly spatially organised—neurons in one area of V1 respond predominantly to one area of the visual field. Hence partial damage to V1 plausibly results in a lack of visual experience of the area of visual field neurons in that area of V1 respond to. In contrast to blindsight, the neural basis of disorders of visual attention, such as visual neglect, involves damage to distinct regions of the brain such as the parietal cortex (Kandel, Schwartz and Jessell 2000).

subject's utterances of complex demonstrative expressions as referring to them. For example, suppose a blindsighted subject, presented with a cross shaped stimulus, attempts turn her attention outwards and form a judgement about it, uttering "That way of being shaped is my favourite".<sup>122</sup> An observer might interpret her utterance as having a content true if and only if being cross shaped is her favourite way of being shaped, particularly if the observer does not know the speaker is blindsighted. But the subject's thoughts do not concern the relevant property. When the subject attempts to think, by casting her attention outwards, that 'that way of being shaped is my favourite', it is not the case that the subject has succeeded in thinking something true just if being cross shaped is her favourite way of being shaped.

There are several reasons to accept this, of which I shall mention two. First, supposing otherwise does not fit with how we think about the subject's other mental states, and overall cognitive situation. For example, suppose the subject also believed that being circular was her favourite way of being shaped. If she succeeded in forming a judgement about the property presented in her field defect, she would have inconsistent beliefs. But she does not have inconsistent beliefs. Hence she does not succeed in forming such a judgement. Second, it doesn't respect the way thoughts about properties connect with action. Suppose the subject attempts to form an intention to sculpt a piece of clay 'that way of being shaped'. The subject is not, when presented with clay, and suitable free time, going to go on to shape it cross-shaped (or if she did, her doing so would be purely accidentally connected with this supposed intention). Given this, it is hard to see that she should be attributed the intention in the first place. Therefore blindsighted subjects are not in a position to think about the property presented in her visual field defect in the way we are considering.

So, to recap, for subjects with a human visual system, it is sufficient to cause blindsight in an area of the visual field that one alter the areas of the brain that are necessary for visual experience of that area of the visual field, such that the subject does not have visual experience of that area. If one does this, one brings it about that the subject is not in a position to think about properties presented in that area of the visual field by turning her attention outwards. This is explained if, for subjects with a human visual system, it is a necessary condition on being in a position to think about properties presented in that area that the regions of the brain necessary for visual experience of that area are such as to enable visual experience of that area. And this in turn suggests that for subjects with the human visual system, it is a necessary

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<sup>122</sup> In fact, blindsighted subjects will not spontaneously make such demonstrative utterances. This supports the idea they are not in a position to express judgements by means of them, a fact also explained by EDT together with the idea that the way of thinking to which EDT applies is that deployed by subjects when making linguistic demonstrative reference.

condition for being in a position to think about properties by turning one's attention outwards that one have visual experience.

So consideration of blindsight cases shows fulfilment of the conditions sufficient for an observer to interpret a blindsighted subject's utterances as being about properties is not sufficient for thinking about those properties in the relevant way. Visual experience is essential. This is highly suggestive of the experiential dependency thesis, but is not sufficient to establish it. Blindsighted subjects lack *any* phenomenological experience of the affected region. Although thinking about a property may be dependent on having a phenomenological experience, it is consistent with this that the subject need not have an experience in which the relevant property figures to determine an aspect of the phenomenal character of that experience. To motivate that thought, we need consider a further case.

### §2.1.3 Night Vision and Monochromatic Colour Blindness

In this section, I argue by that monochromatic visual experience is not of determinate hue properties in a way which determines aspects of the phenomenal character of the experience, and that subjects undergoing monochromatic visual experience are not in a position to think about properties in the relevant way. This is explained if it is a condition on thinking about a determinate hue property in the relevant way that it figures in what one's experience is of in a way which determines an aspect of the phenomenal character of the experience. Generalising to other properties yields EDT.

Monochromatically colour-blind subjects cannot visually distinguish between different determinate hues on the basis of their visual experience of them.<sup>123</sup> We all have some experience of such monochromatic vision, as human vision is monochromatic in conditions of low illumination, such as at night. The phenomenon is not mysterious to us. Although there is a

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123 One must be careful here. Monochromatic colour blind subjects can distinguish between differently coloured objects if they differ in luminance. For example, they can distinguish between a dark blue and light red in normal light, as the former colour is less intense than the latter. The colours that humans perceive stand in a variety of relations to each other, some of which can be represented in a three dimensional colour space, with differences in position along the three dimensions corresponding to differences in hue, saturation, and intensity. Monochromatic colour blind subjects are unable to distinguish between colours of equal intensity, but which differ in hue and saturation; they lack information about these two dimensions on the colour space. Plausibly, differences in intensity correspond to differences in colour. Hence Monochromatic colour blind subjects are not blind to all chromatic differences, and have some experiential grip on colour properties. What they are 'blind' to is differences in hue and saturation properties. But such properties do not exhaust the nature of the colours.

sense in which subjects undergoing monochromatic experience may experience differently hued objects—they may experience objects that *in fact* differ in hues—plausibly they don't experience the different hues, or at least not in a way which determines aspects of the phenomenal character of the experience. There are at least two reasons for this.

First, for normal subjects there is a distinctive phenomenological *shift* associated with changing from conditions of normal illumination to conditions of low illumination. The experience becomes, as it were, phenomenologically *impoverished* as conditions change. This phenomenological shift is correlated with a shift in what properties are revealed by introspective attention to one's experience. As one moves to low illumination conditions, hue properties drop out of the experiential awareness such introspective attention reveals. Plausibly, introspective attention just is revealing what is responsible for the shift in phenomenological character corresponding to such changing conditions. Hue properties cease to figure in experience in a way which determines aspects of phenomenological character of that experience, experience comes to lack the phenomenological aspects corresponding to experience of such properties, and the phenomenological character of the experience is thus impoverished.

Second, monochromatic experiences differing only in that objects of different hues are presented plausibly does not differ in phenomenological character. For example, suppose a subject is presented with a red and a green ball of equal luminance and saturation in conditions of low intensity illumination. Introspective attention to the phenomenal character of such experience will not reveal them differing in experiential awareness of hue. Plausibly this is because the experiences do not differ in their presentation of hue in a way which determines phenomenological character. Insofar as the experiences do present colour in a phenomenologically salient way, they present the balls as both having the *same* colour, where this is a *coarse grained* colour property that they both in fact do have. For both balls look exactly the same way with respect to colour to the subject.<sup>124</sup> But neither experience is *illusory* with respect to the colour of one or other of the balls. And so neither ball is experienced being of a colour that it is not. It follows from this that the experiences, if they present colour in a phenomenologically salient way at all, present the balls only as being a colour they both in fact are. They could perhaps do this by presenting the balls as some determinable colour or which both red and green hues are determinates. But the reasoning generalises whatever colour the balls are, and so the experiences of monochromatic people can at best present objects as being a colour that is consistent with being any (determinate) hue.

In such a case, just as with blindsight, although we may choose to interpret a subject's

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124 Plausibly, this is a phenomenological look.

demonstrative utterances as about the hues the balls in fact are, it is not plausible to suppose that the subject is in a position to think about these hues, or about fine-grained colour properties that determine different hues. The reasoning for this is parallel to that in the blindsight case. Consider again the subject presented with a red or a green ball. Such a subject is not in a position to exploit experience of either colour to form an intention satisfied only if his wall becomes red, or green, when he focuses his attention on the one or other ball and attempts to form an intention for his walls to be ‘that hue’, or ‘that colour’. For the subjects purposes, focusing on either ball in forming this intention will do for the purposes of his cognitive activities. And so, at best the subject forms a thought satisfied if his wall comes to instantiate a coarse grained colour property consistent with either hue. Yet the subject does have experience of the balls—what is lacking is phenomenologically salient experience of the hue properties. It is a condition on thinking about a determinate hue property in the relevant way that it figures in what one’s experience is of in a way which determines an aspect of the phenomenal character of the experience.

But there is nothing special about colour properties, as opposed to other properties we may think about in this way. Although not common, one can induce equivalents of colour blindness for other observational properties which one may think about in this way.<sup>125</sup> Identical reasoning to that above holds for such properties. Generalising, a subject, *s*, is in a position to think about a property, *F*, in way *w*, only if *s* is having a visual experience, *e*, of *F*-ness such as to determine an aspect of the phenomenal character of *e*.

## §2.2 EDT and Visual Attention

We can provide further reason to accept EDT by consideration of the relation between visual *attention* and visual experience, and thought about a property. In §1.2.1 I argue that thinking about a property in the relevant way requires attending to it. In §1.2.2, I connect visual attention to visual experience and experiential phenomenology to provide a further argument for EDT

### §2.2.1 Visual Attention and Thinking about Properties.

In my description of the original swatch case, I described the subject as ‘casting her attention outwards’. I provided this gloss in order to help the reader fix on the relevant capacity exercised in the swatch case, but did not make explicit use of it in the subsequent argument. But that such a characterisation of what the subject is *doing* when she thinks about a property in this way

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125 For example, one can induce orientation blindness by transcranial magnetic stimulation of the orientation responsive neurons in the visual cortex.

suggests a substantive feature of the relevant cognitive capacity, namely that exercise of the a cognitive capacity is connected to visual exercise of *attention*.

That there is a connection is required to explain cases in which the subject thinks about only one of several experientially presented properties. For example, consider the following description of a case:

A subject is presented with a set of colour swatches of different shades, *r*<sub>1</sub>, *r*<sub>2</sub>, *r*<sub>3</sub>, in ordinary conditions, and turning her attention outwards thinks ‘that colour is lighter than that one’, or ‘that colour is more saturated than that one’.

It is very easy to make sense of such a case confirming to this description by supposing that the subject’s thoughts, which I have repeated characterised by use of the same expression ‘that colour’, in turn concern different shades from amongst those presented. Plausibly, what is going on here is that the subject is visually attending to different shades on different occasions, and the capacity she is exercising is connected to visual attention in the following way: when exercised, the property that she thinks about just is the property that she is visually attending to. The relevant capacity just is a capacity to think about the property which one is visually attending to.

It strikes me as extremely plausible that in these cases, visual attention is in some sense *explanatorily prior* to thought about a property. That is, a complete explanation of why it is that the subject thinks about what she does will make reference to the subject visually attending to what she does. On some views, visual attention is not explanatorily prior to thought about a property, as visually attending to an item is itself thought to require, or be explained by, the fact that one is in a position to single it out in thought in just the way involved in thinking about it.<sup>126</sup> The current argument does not presuppose either view. All it requires is that there is the following logical connection between thinking about a property in the relevant way, and visually attending to it—a subject, *s*, thinks about a property, *F*, in way *w* only if *s* is visually attending to *F*. That there is this logical connection is consistent with either view of the direction of explanation.<sup>127</sup>

### §2.2.2 Visual Attention and Phenomenology

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126 See Eilan 2001 and Brewer 2001 for discussion of this point.

127 Indeed, one can characterise the different views as both accepting the biconditional claim that a subject, *s*, thinks about a property, *F*, in way *w* if and only if *s* is visually attending to *F*, but differing in the direction of explanation they associate with it.

Given that the relevant capacity is thus connected to visual attention, we can now ask about the relation between visual attention and visual experience. I want to suggest that it is a condition on visually attending to a property that one is undergoing a visual experience of it. This claim should be relatively uncontroversial. It strikes me that we do not have much grip on what visual attention is if it is simply not attending to visually experienced items. We may attend to various items, experienced in various sensory modalities. Visual attention is just such attention ‘cast outwards’ to items in the visible world.<sup>128</sup> As such, an item may be visually attended to only if it is present in the visible world. But an item is present in the visible world only if it is experienced. So an item may be visually attended to only if it is experienced.

But we can say something more about *how* a property must figure in experience for it to be something that one can visually attend to. Here, I want to suggest that the property must figure in experience in a way that determines an aspect of the *phenomenal character* of the experience, as discussed in Chapter One. In that chapter, I argued for the claim that aspects of the phenomenal character of the experience are determined by properties presented in the experience. Here, I am claiming that the properties one can attend to on the basis of visual experience are just those that are presented in the experience in this way—a way which determines phenomenal character.

Why think this? Visual attention is a *conscious process*, in the sense that there is something it is like to visually attend to something. It has a phenomenal character, in just the same way visual experience does. But further more, visual attention exhibits *transparency*. Just as visual experience is transparent, so too is visual attention—when we reflect on what it is like to visually attend to something, what we find is characterised in terms of the items we visually attend to. So aspects of the phenomenal character of visual attention are determined by the items we visual attend to.

But when we visually attend to something that we are also experiencing, it does not seem right to say that there are two distinct occurrences, each of which has its own separable phenomenal character determined by the same presented properties. The phenomenal characters of the experience and the attending are not entirely separable. Rather, it seems that the phenomenal character of the attending is in some way constituted by the phenomenal character of the experience. The property one attends to determines what it is like to attend to it by determining the phenomenal character of experience in which it figures, and on which one’s attention is deployed.

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128 Indeed, this is why I talked of visual *exercise* of attention, as opposed to visual attentions simpliciter. Talk of visual attention should not be taken to commit one to the idea there is a distinctive kind of attention associated with vision.

In fact, supposing that the phenomenal characters of visual attention and visual experience do not come apart provides further diagnosis of what is going on in appeals to the transparency of *experience*. In Chapter One, I argued that in his discussion of the transparency of experience, Tye confuses his introspective awareness of the experience with the experiential awareness one has in undergoing the experience. But we can now see there is more to the confusion than this. One thing that Tye finds remarkable about the transparency of experience is that when he tries to *attend* to his experience, all he finds is the world. On the current line of thought, he is thus confusing visual attention with introspective attention to the world. But in doing so, Tye motivates substantive claims about *experiential* phenomenology. If the phenomenology of visual attention is derivative of the phenomenology of experience, we can account for this. The attentional phenomenology that Tye finds reveals something about experiential phenomenology because it is constituted by it.

Of course, there is more to say about the phenomenology of visual attention than that of the visual experience. For one thing, attention can *alter* the character of an experience. And it also seems that visually attending to an item involves the phenomenological aspects of one's experience of that item becoming especially *salient*—for example, they may become more influential in one's stream of consciousness. But none of this is to deny the underlying point that properties figure in determining the phenomenal character of visual attention by determining the phenomenal character of the visual experience on which one deploys one's attention.

In fact, these way in which visual attention can alter the character of an experience provide more support for the claim that one can visually attend to properties only insofar as those properties figure in visual experience to determine the phenomenal character of that experience. A particularly prominent way in which changes in visual attention correspond to changes in experiential phenomenology is that connected to the phenomena of *aspectual shift*, or *seeing-as*. For example, consider a stimulus such as Figure 1.




Figure 1 - Superimposed Horizontal and Vertical Sine Wave Gratings

Figure 1 consists of two gratings, one horizontal and one vertical. If one looks at Figure 1 for a short period of time, it is likely one's experience will undergo particular kind of aspectual shift. At some times, the horizontal gratings are prominent, at other times the vertical ones are. The experienced stimulus seems to 'shift' between these two configurations, and at any one times only one configuration is prominent. This shift is associated with a phenomenological change in experience. Plausibly, how prominent the horizontal or vertical grating is is connected to how great a role it plays in determining the phenomenal character of the experience. When the horizontal grating is prominent, introspective attention to the phenomenal character of the experience reveals the horizontal grating and its properties. When the vertical grating is prominent, introspective attention to the phenomenal character reveals primarily the vertical stimuli and its properties.

However, this phenomenological aspect shift it is connected with differences in what is available for visual attention. One can attend to the horizontal grating only when it and its properties are determining the phenomenal character of the experience, and likewise to the vertical grating. This is not to deny that one is *in some sense* able to attend to the horizontal grating when the vertical one is present. Attempting to voluntarily attend to the horizontal grating may in some cases produce the aspectual shift, thereby causing it to become prominent.<sup>129</sup> But that is not to deny that if one is visually attending to one or other grating, then that grating is figuring in one's experience in a way that determines the phenomenal character of the experience. One meets the experiential conditions necessary for visually attending to a property such as to enable thought about it only if that property figures in one's experience in a way that determines the phenomenal character of the experience. And hence one is in a position to attend to a property, in the sense that one meets the experiential conditions necessary for attending to it, only if that property figures in experience in such a phenomenal character determining way.

### §2.3 EDT and Linguistic Demonstrative Reference.

I've characterised the subject's thoughts by using the complex demonstrative expression: 'that colour'. But it is at least *prima facie* plausible that a subject can utter demonstrative expressions

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129 There is much debate in the psychological literature about the precise role voluntary attention has in influencing aspectual shift. This connects with whether the neural processes underlying aspectual shift involve influence of areas of the brain responsible for later stages of visual processing influencing earlier ones, or vice versa. Exercise of voluntary attention involves 'top down' neural processes, and hence the influence of voluntary attention on aspectual shift is dependent on the degree to which the phenomenon is governed by such processes. Plausibly, one can at least influence the extent of the time for which a given stimulus configuration is salient by exercise of voluntary attention.

which refer to properties present in her environment when it is not the case that she experiences them. Perhaps it is sufficient for a subject's utterances of 'that colour' to refer to a particular shade of red that that shade of red be appropriately positioned with respect to the subject in her environment, or that her behaviour is suitably directed towards it, or that she intend to refer to it, or some such. Similarly, one might suppose that it is enough for the subject in our case to be counted as *thinking* about a shade that such conditions be fulfilled—that the shade be appropriately present in her environment (perhaps by being instantiated at a location the subject is looking at), or that her behaviour be directed at the shade in question, and so on. And if fulfilment of such conditions is sufficient, having the experience cannot be a necessary condition on entertaining a thought in the way the subject does.<sup>130</sup> Hence EDT is false.

Such accounts may be acceptable when dealing with linguistic reference.<sup>131</sup> But they are inadequate when extended to cover what the subject is thinking about when the subject thinks about a property in the way she does in our case. That this is so can be illustrated by considering cases similar to the present one, in which a subject attempts to think about a property in the same way, such further conditions are fulfilled, but the subject lacks the relevant visual experience. In such cases, subjects are not in a position to think about properties in the same way.

## §2.4 EDT and Demonstrative Concepts

My talk of a context dependent capacity to think about a property on the basis of experience brings to mind various views about *demonstrative concepts*. It is therefore appropriate that I relate the relevant capacity to views on demonstrative concepts. My purpose here is twofold. On the one hand, it will serve to illuminate various features of the capacity in question, in a way that will provide the material to rebut various possible objections to subsequent argument. On the other hand, I wish to distance my argument from various theses about demonstrative concepts that are not essential to it. That we have a capacity to think about objects on the basis of experience does not require adherence to any controversial views about demonstrative concepts.

What are demonstrative concepts? Philosophers have provided various accounts of

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<sup>130</sup> Assuming it is not a necessary condition on the fulfilment of these conditions that she has an experience of the property. This may be a necessary condition for some conditions offered as grounding linguistic reference—for example having an intention to refer to a property grounded by an experience of it plausibly requires an experience of it (Siegel 2002). But if having an experience is a necessary condition on the fulfilment of such conditions, the experiential dependency thesis is not threatened.

<sup>131</sup> Evans's notion of *understanding* reference is useful here (see, e.g. Evans 1982 Chapter Six).

demonstrative concepts of the sort connected to experience, which build in various substantive commitments about conditions for possession and deployment of such concepts. But we may give a broad characterisation demonstrative concepts, which captures what is common to these views. A plausible way to do this is in terms of *demonstrative expressions*. English contains many demonstrative expressions, both simple—‘this’, ‘that’, ‘there’—and complex—‘this car’, ‘that colour’, and so on. Demonstrative expressions have been much discussed in the philosophical literature. A key point about demonstrative expressions is that what referent they have is *context-dependent*: they have a referent only in a context of use, and what referent they have can vary in different contexts on which they are used. The same demonstrative expression may be used in different contexts, and in those contexts have different referents.

The idea that there are demonstrative *concepts* is the idea that there is a distinctive *kind* of concept associated with such demonstrative expressions—it is the kind of concept expressed by uses of such expressions in contexts in which they refer, and is one which a subject must possess in order to understand such uses. Such concepts are also *context-dependent*, although not in the same way as demonstrative expressions. Whereas in different contexts a subject may use the *same* demonstrative expression, and have it refer to different referents, *which* demonstrative concepts are available to a subject is determined by her context, and so in different contexts *different* demonstrative concepts are available. Nevertheless, there may be something in common on the subject’s part in those different contexts. We can then characterise a demonstrative *way of thinking* about a property, F, as follows—a subject, *s*, thinks about F demonstratively when *s* thinks about F in virtue of exercise of a demonstrative concept that refers to F. The general capacity to think about a property in this way is therefore just identified with the general capacity to think about properties by use of demonstrative concepts.<sup>132</sup>

Concepts are sometimes connected with conceptual capacities in a different way. On one such line of thought, a subject possess a concept only if that subject possesses a capacity to think about that particular thing to which the concept refers, a capacity which may be exercised in a number of thoughts, all about that to which the concept refers.<sup>133</sup> Such capacities are in part individuated in terms of the particular things to which the concepts refer; capacities *c* and *c'* are distinct if *c* is a capacity to think about *a*, *c'* is a capacity to think about *b*, and *a* ≠ *b*. A general capacity to think about things demonstratively is not individuated in this way; the same capacity may be exercised on different occasions to think about distinct items. Therefore the general

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132 Such a capacity may itself require the subject possess a concept of the *kind* of property in question. For example, the capacity to think about colour properties by use of concepts of ‘that colour’ would require the subject possess the concept of a colour. See McDowell 1994 pp.56-60.

133 See Evans’s on the *Generality Constraint* (Evans 1982 p.100).

capacity to think about a property demonstratively should not be identified with *these* conceptual capacities. However, they are connected. If concepts are related to such specific capacities, the general capacity is just the capacity to exercise one or other of these more specific capacities given further conditions are met.

I have characterised the way of thinking for which the experiential dependency thesis holds in terms of demonstrative expressions. But I have also emphasised that the relevant capacity on the subject's part is a *general one*. It might appear that it should be simply identified with the general capacity to think about a property in virtue of exercise of a demonstrative concept which refers to the property, given further conditions are met. My argument in this section would then be an argument for the claim that it is a condition on a subject being in a position to deploy this general capacity to exercise a specific capacity to think about a property, F, that she is experiencing F. But this would mischaracterise the relevant capacity, as is shown by consideration of thought about properties presented in other modalities, and on the basis imagination and memory.

The capacity I am concerned with is characterised in terms of its connection with *current* experiential uptake. Plausibly, if one has the conceptual resources for thinking demonstratively about a property of a particular kind, one may deploy the capacity to in order to think about such a property not solely on the basis of current visual perceptual experience. Arguably, the same ability may be exercised on the basis of experiences in different modalities. And even confining ourselves to one modality, the same ability may be exercised on the basis of different kinds of sensory happenings in that modality, as occur in episodic memory, or sensory imagination.

Starting with the first point, one may, for example, think demonstratively about a shape property on the basis of both visual and tactual experience. Plausibly, one is exercising the same demonstrative capacity to think about 'that shape' in both cases. This claim is not uncontroversial; it seems to presuppose a positive answer to Moylneux's question as to whether a subject able to recognise shape presented in one modality is thus in a position to recognise shape presented in another modality.<sup>134</sup> But if we think that possession of a concept such as SHAPE requires that one is able to apply the concept on the basis of experiences in different modalities, there is no obstacle to supposing that a subject with a capacity to employ complex

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134 If we assume that a subject restricted to one sensory modality may acquire the same demonstrative capacity to think about 'that shape' that we have. Such an assumption may be questioned—for example, one might claim that the subject is unable to acquire the same concept SHAPE that we employ in our complex demonstrative concepts.

demonstrative concepts involving this concept—concepts of ‘that shape’—has a single capacity that may be exercised on the basis of experiences in different modalities.

Now for the second point. As discussed in Chapter One, the notion of a ‘visual experience’ may be used in different ways. On the one hand, it may be used to refer to those distinctive sensory events subjects undergo in cases of visual perception, misperception, and visual hallucination—the kind or kinds of event one undergoes something *looks* some way or other to one, or one undergoes visual hallucination. On the other hand, it may be used more broadly, to encompass not only such events, but also those distinctive sensory happenings associated with *visual episodic memory*, and *visual imagination*.

Plausibly, a subject who possesses a general capacity to demonstratively think about a kind of property on the basis of visual experience of it may deploy the *same* capacity to think about a property on the basis of visual episodic memory of it, or on the basis of visually imagining it. That is, they have a capacity which may be deployed on the basis of visual experience, where this is understood in the *broad* sense. Yet the capacity which I am concerned with in this chapter is one that may be deployed only on the basis of visual experience, understood in the more restrictive sense.

Yet anyone who accepts we have a general capacity in the broad sense should accept we have one in the restrictive sense too. Given that we have a restrictive notion of experience, we can just characterise my capacity as the broad capacity, *deployed on the basis of experience*, where this is understood in the restrictive sense. And I think it is plausible that we recognise at least some cases in which the broad capacity may be so deployed. There is a distinctive kind of mental action, that of casting one’s attention *outwards*, that just is deploying one’s attention on the basis of experience, in the restrictive sense.<sup>135</sup> When subjects are in a position to think about a property by doing this, they can only be thinking about it *on the basis of experience* in the restrictive sense. And we can recognise when subjects are in a position to do this.

### §3 Experience Dependent Thought and Uninstantiated Properties

In this section, I argue that it is not a condition for thinking about a property in the way discussed §1 that the relevant property be instantiated in the subject’s environment, as subjects are in a position to think about properties in this way in some cases of illusion when the relevant property is not instantiated in the subject’s environment. So, I argue that there are

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135 To think about a property on the basis of visual episodic memory, one must case one’s attention backwards. It is not so clear that we have a pre-theoretic grip on where one’s attention is directed in cases of visual imagination, but it is plausibly not directed outwards to the visible world.

possible cases of illusion in which

1. a subject,  $s$ , is in a position to think about a property,  $F$ , in way  $w$ ,


and yet

2. there is no instance of  $F$ -ness in  $s$ 's environment.

I think (1) and (2) hold in a variety of cases of illusion. But I'm going to focus on a particular colour illusion produced by a device known as Benham's top. This is purely because the Benham top illusion seems to me to provide a particularly clear case in which something appears a particular colour, without in fact being that colour.

### §3.1 The Benham Top Illusion

Benham's top consists of a disc, divided into two differently coloured semi-circles, one white, and one black. The white semi-circle is marked with circular arcs of black (as in figure one). When spun rapidly, the arcs take on coloured appearances. So, for example, when the top is spun clockwise at around 5 Hz - 10 Hz, the innermost set of arcs will take on a reddish appearance, the next set a greenish appearance, the next bluish, and the outermost purplish. The colour of the arcs is dependent on background illumination conditions, and the direction and speed in which the top is spun<sup>136</sup>.



*Benham's top*

I shall argue that subjects presented with the spinning Benham top are in a position to think about these colour properties by turning their attention outwards, despite there being no actual instances of such colour properties in their environment. Specifically, I shall argue in §3.3 that a

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136 Campenhausen 1995.

subject attending to the innermost ring of a clockwise spinning Benham top can think in this way about redness. But, as I shall argue in §3.2, when a subject is presented with a spinning Benham's top there need be no red thing in her environment. Hence the Benham top illusion provides for the possibility of a case in which (1) and (2) hold.

### §3.2 Benham's Top & Uninstantiated Properties

Suppose a subject is presented with a spinning Benham's top in a white room. Why claim that there is no red thing of which the subject is aware? On some sense-datum accounts of illusion, the subject presented with the spinning Benham top is aware of some red object distinct from it. But sense-data are not plausibly located in a subject's environment. Hence if there is something red in the subject's environment, Benham's top is the only plausible candidate object for being this thing. So if it can be argued that Benham's top is not red, it follows that there is no red thing in the subject's environment.

Now, the innermost arc of the spinning top looks red. Going on appearances, one might suppose that it is. But there are two reasons to accept that it is not. Intuitively, the spinning top presents an illusion. It looks red, but its so looking is illusory. But illusions just are cases in which something looks F and is not: if something looks F, and its so looking is illusory, then it is not F. So Benham's top is not in fact red.

Furthermore, to suppose that the spinning top is red is to leave it mysterious why it does not appear this way when stationary. It is implausible to suppose that the top changes colour when spun. One can, for example, produce the illusion by spinning the subject relative to a stationary top, but one cannot change the colour of something simply by spinning oneself. If the spinning top is red, so too is the stationary top. But the stationary top does not look red. It is sometimes claimed that something is red just if it is disposed to look red to normal observers in normal conditions.<sup>137</sup> The conditions in which the top looks red are not normal: they involve a highly contrived experimental set up. In normal conditions, when not spinning, the top does not look red. But there is no reason to suppose that in such conditions, a disposition to appear red is being blocked: if the top did have such a disposition, the disposition would be manifest, and it would appear red. Yet it does not. So even if one rejects the view that colours are constituted by dispositional properties, it is difficult to explain why, if the stationary top really is red, it does not appear this way. The simplest explanation is that it is not.

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<sup>137</sup> See, e.g., Evans 1986. Although I endorse this conditional, I do not endorse the corresponding account of what it is to be red in terms of looking red.

### §3.3 Benham's Top & Experientially Dependent Thought

Why suppose that the subject in the Benham Top illusion is in a position to form experientially dependent thoughts about redness? Suppose a naïve subject encounters the spinning top, and is taken in by the illusion. She has no reason to suppose that things are not as they appear, and takes the innermost arc of the top to really be red. She turns her attention outwards, and attempts to think, in the way discussed in §1, that '*that* is a beautiful colour', or form an intention to paint her wall '*that* colour'. The naïve subject will naturally take herself to be thinking about redness. She will, for example, regard the judgement as true just if a particular shade of red is a beautiful colour, and the intention as fulfilled just if she paints her wall that shade of red. But this only shows that the subject regards her thoughts as being about a particular colour property, not that they in fact are. Just as the subject is mistaken about the colour of the innermost arc, it might be claimed that she is mistaken about the content of her judgements and intentions—that they are not actually about redness, but merely seems to her to be.

But the subject is not mistaken about the contents of her thoughts. To show this, we can compare the Benham top case to another case in which a subject plausibly *is* mistaken about what his thoughts concern. Suppose a subject, *s*, mistakenly thinks he sees Jones in the distance.<sup>138</sup> In fact, *s* sees Smith. *s* makes the demonstrative judgement '*that* man is raking leaves'. In such a case, *s* will naturally regard his judgement as being about Jones. But in contrast to the Benham Top case, *s* is wrong to do so. His judgement is about the man he actually sees, i.e. Smith. The reason for this comes out in what happens if *s* subsequently learns that he in fact saw Smith, and not Jones. If *s* learns this, his mistake with respect to what he sees is corrected. But it seems that this does not give him grounds for rejecting his earlier judgement that '*that* man is raking leaves'. Rather, he should simply correct his belief about which person his earlier judgement concerned.

Why is this? In the Smith and Jones case, it is plausible that *s*'s judgement is about Smith in part because he sees him. Smith meets the condition for being the object of *s*'s judgement because he is seen. But *s* believes that he sees Jones. So from *s*'s perspective, it is Jones, and not Smith, that meets the condition for being the object of his judgement. This is why *s*'s false belief concerning what he sees leads to a false belief concerning the content of his judgement. When *s* learns that he in fact saw Smith, he learns that Smith meets the condition for being the object of his judgement. Hence he should correct his error concerning what he is thinking about.

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138 This example is adapted from one discussed by Kripke 1977 with respect to semantic reference.

In contrast, our subject viewing Benham's top may learn that the red appearance is illusory, and yet continue to regard her demonstrative judgements as concerning redness. She should of course no longer accept the claim 'the innermost arc is red'. But one can be fully aware of the illusion and still regard a judgement such as 'I shall paint my wall *that* colour' as satisfied only if one paints one's wall red. The subject knows that the top is not really red. But the subject does not thus have grounds for correcting her belief about her thoughts concern. And so from the subject's perspective, any condition on her thoughts being about redness is met. But the subject knows that the top is not really red, and that there is nothing red in her environment, and this constitutes part of her perspective. Hence any condition on the subject thinking about redness is not violated by redness not being instantiated in her environment. Generalising, a subject may be in a position to think about a property in the way in question even when that property is not instantiated in her environment.

### §3.4 Objections

I've claimed that reflection on some cases of visual illusion shows that in those cases,

- (a) The subject is in a position to think about a property, F, in way *w*, and F-ness is not present in her environment.

I have argued for this by claiming that reflection on those cases shows that a subject is in a position to think about a property in way *w*, and that consideration of the satisfaction conditions of the various thoughts available shows they concern properties uninstantiated in the subjects environment. There are at least two ways this could be challenged.

First, one might grant that the subject is thinking in way *w* about a property, F, and her thoughts do concern just this property. But one might go on to claim that F-ness actually is instantiated in her environment. For example, in the Benham Top case, I've said the subject may form an intention simply to have her wall be '*that way*', where '*that way*' refers to a property of being a particular shade of red, which isn't instantiated in her environment. Now, it is highly implausible to claim that any shade of red actually is instantiated in the subject's environment. But it might be objected that the subject's thoughts about '*that way*' in fact concern a *different* property—such as the property of *appearing red*. This appearance property plausibly is instantiated in the subject's environment as after all, the Benham Top does appear red. So the subject, in forming an intention to have her wall be '*that way*', is simply forming an intention to have her wall appear a particular shade of red.

In response to this objection, it should be admitted at the outset that subjects may form judgements about appearance properties in cases of illusion, and may do so *in some sense* on the

basis of their experience. However, it is not clear to me that one can think about them in the relevant way, by turning one's experiential attention outwards to what is experienced, and thinking about that. As I have argued in Chapter 3, on my view an object having the property of appearing F to a subject is a matter of the object being *experienced* as F. Being aware that one is experiencing F-ness requires turning one's *introspective* attention 'inwards' and reflecting on one's experiential state, rather than turning one's *experiential* attention 'outwards' to the experienced world. Given the discussion of transparency in Chapter 1, such introspective awareness does of course require that one is experientially aware of F-ness. But this experiential awareness should not be confused with the introspective awareness of the fact that one is experiencing F-ness. And so thinking on the basis of experience about an appearance property of, e.g., *appearing F (to me)*, involves exercise of *introspective attention* to one's experiential state. Hence one does not think about appearance properties in way *w*.

But for now I shall grant that one may think about appearance properties in way *w*. The current objection suffers from a more fundamental problem—it does not correctly capture the satisfaction conditions of some of the thoughts the subject may thus entertain. It seems clear that the subject may, on the basis of her experience, thinking in way *w*, form an intention about how her walls will be that is satisfied only if the walls are actually made to *be* a particular shade of red, and not merely appear that shade. When the subject intends for her walls to be 'that way', her intention is *not* satisfied if we merely bring it about that her walls appear red, but, e.g., painting them white and shining red light on them. So although a subject may have available to her the experiential grounds for forming an intention to have her walls merely appear red, she *also* has available to her the experiential grounds for forming an intention to have her walls actually be red. Similarly, the subject may, on the basis of her experience, thinking in way *w*, question whether the Benham Top, is *really* 'that way'. If, in so thinking, the subject is only able to form a thought about an *instantiated* property, there would be no point in wondering. So long as the subject has not made an error of misidentification, the object will always be the way it is thought of as being: this question could never receive a negative answer. But it seems perfectly sensible to wonder whether the Benham Top really is 'that way', and indeed for it to turn out that it is are not. Hence the thought can only concern a property the Benham Top does not in fact have. The strategy of finding a property actually instantiated in the illusion cases, and re-interpreting the subject's experientially dependent thoughts as concerning that property, is not be successful. So the simple objection does not work

But this brings us to a second more complex objection that allows the subject's thoughts *in some sense* concern an uninstantiated property, and do so via her thinking about a property in way *w*, without it being the case that the subject thinks about an uninstantiated property in way *w*.

How is this to be done? I've construed the subject's thoughts as involving simple and complex experientially dependent concepts, which I've specified by use of demonstrative terms—'thus', 'that way'; 'that colour', and so on. And I've assumed that such concepts figure *directly* in the subject's thoughts in the following way—it is these concepts that are predicated of, for example, the subject's wall when she forms an intention for her wall to be thus, and of the Benham Top when she wonders whether the Benham Top is really red, and so on. In contrast, it might be claimed that although the subject does employ such an experientially dependent concept, but that this concept is embedded in a descriptive element thereby picking out a distinct uninstantiated property.<sup>139</sup> So, for example, when our subject forms the intention which is satisfied only if her wall be a particular shade of red, her intention is not best construed as an intention for her wall to be *thus*, where 'thus' refers to that shade of red. Rather, her intention should be construed as something like the intention for her wall to be *the colour such as to appear thus in normal conditions*. The colour which meets this descriptive condition is a particular shade (or shades)<sup>140</sup> of red. And so in this way, the subject's intention is satisfied only if her wall is painted red. Similarly, when the subject wonders about how the Benham Top is, she is wondering whether the Benham Top *is the colour such as to appear thus in normal conditions*, or something similar. The strategy with such an approach is to (re-)interpret the subject's thoughts as having descriptive contents, whilst still allowing that they involve an experientially dependent element (which is represented by the use of a demonstrative expression involved in specifying the descriptive thought content), such as to get the correct satisfaction conditions.

However, some care must be taken over the precise descriptive condition the subject's thought involves. For example, a subject presented with two lines of equal length may form an experientially grounded intention to draw two lines *with the Muller-Lyer wedges* that way. Such an intention is satisfied only if the subject draws two wedged lines that actually are equal in length.<sup>141</sup> Wedged lines that are equal in length do not appear equal in length in normal conditions, and do not appear the way equal length lines do in normal conditions. So the

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139 The property is *denoted* by the description. See Russell 1905

140 As 'normal conditions' include a range of conditions, it may be that there is a finite range of shades of red that, in some conditions included in this range, appear the relevant way.

141 Of course, the subject may also form an intention to draw two wedged lines that appear as the equal lines do. A graphic designer, interested in matching the spatial appearance of the equal line might form such an intention. As I've discussed, such thoughts are available, although they may require more introspective engagement with how things appear. But for the current case, we are not interested in that thought. Rather, we're interested in the simple thought a subject may entertain by turning her experiential attention outwards to what she experiences. And this thought is satisfied only if the subject draws wedged lines that are equal in length.

subject's intention cannot be an intention to draw her wedged lines *the length such as to appear thus in normal conditions*. That intention is satisfied only if she draws her wedged lines *unequal* in length. But the subject's intention does not have these satisfaction conditions.

Perhaps her intention is the something like the intention to draw her lines *the length those lines must be such as to appear thus in normal conditions*, where 'those lines' refers to lines of the kind she experiences, i.e. without wedges. This would get the satisfaction conditions right. And there is still a broad sense in which the thought is experientially dependent; the description is specified by use of the demonstratives 'those lines' and 'appear thus', both of which refer to what she experiences. But now suppose the subject is presented with a different stimulus: wedged lines of unequal length which appear equal in length. And in this case our subject forms an intention to draw *non-wedged* lines that way. Such an intention will be satisfied only if she draws lines that are actually equal in length. But she is experiencing wedged lines, and wedged lines of equal length do not appear equal in length. Rather, wedged lines must be unequal to appear equal in length. So her intention cannot be the intention to draw her lines *the length those lines must be such as to appear thus in normal conditions*. So the current proposal fails to give the correct satisfaction conditions when extended to this case.

Perhaps in both cases her intention is something like the intention to draw her lines *the length non-wedged lines must be if they are to appear thus*. Non-wedged lines must be equal in length to appear the relevant way, and so we get the right satisfaction conditions in both cases. In general, it seems to me that this is no reason why one cannot formulate a descriptive so as to match with the intuitive satisfaction conditions for the relevant thoughts.<sup>142</sup> But to do so we have to attribute to the subject thoughts with an extremely complicated descriptive content. And this is problematic for three reasons.

The first concerns the *structure* of the descriptive contents. Intuitively, the relevant thoughts are intuitively extremely simple. It *seems* as if we can just, e.g., attend to the Benham Top, and form an intention to paint our walls simply *that way*, and is so doing form an intention satisfied only if our walls are a particular shade of red. On the current proposal, to we must attribute a more complex structure. It is sometimes said that we should not place undue emphasis on intuitions about the complexity of thoughts subjects have. There is some truth to this—a well motivated theoretical account of thought content may require us to revise our pre-theoretic intuitions about what the content of subjects thoughts are. But in this case there is also reason to suppose that subjects do have some introspective grip on how they are thinking; the relevant thoughts are grounded by the exercise of experiential attention, something which has an impact on the

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142 Such descriptions may have to be rigidified to avoid modal worries.

conscious life of the subject, and so something we can be supposed to have some introspective access to the use of. And so if possible, we should avoid introducing such complex descriptive contents.

The second concerns the concepts required for the descriptive thoughts. The descriptive contents involve exercise of further concepts, of normal conditions, or different kinds of objects, of appearance, and so on. Again, intuitively the relevant thoughts do involve exercise of such concepts, so again the current approach entertaining the relevant thoughts involve exercise of extensive conceptual capacities.

Finally, the third concerns the generality that goes with attributing to the subject the conceptual capacities discussed in the first two. If a subject has concepts of various kinds of objects and conditions, and of appearance properties, then surely the subject is in a position to entertain a *variety* of descriptive contents similar to, but distinct from, those we are attributing to her. For example in the Benham Top case, instead of forming an intention for her wall to be *the colour a wall must be such as to appear thus in normal conditions*, our subject is also in a position to form an intention for her wall to be *the colour a card must be such as to appear thus in conditions of pink illumination*, or *the colour the sun must be such as to appear thus in dusty conditions*, and so on. But plausibly, when the subject turn her attention outwards and forms her intention, she does not form any such intentions. Intuitively, when viewing the Benham Top the subject's intention is satisfied just if her wall comes to be red, that is, if it comes to be the way the Benham Top appears. Any plausible description for the form 'the colour an F must be such as to appear thus in conditions C' will get the satisfaction conditions of her intention right only if Fs appear *red* in conditions C. Saying that the subject entertains a descriptive content does not explain why this is.

Finally it might be objected that we could take which property the subject's thought concerns to be fixed by a descriptive condition without taking this descriptive condition to be explicitly specified in the content of the subject's thought. Perhaps the subject simply forms the intention for her wall to be *that way*, where the reference of the concept 'that way' is fixed by the appropriate descriptive condition without that condition figuring in an explicit specification of the thought content. If it can be maintained that the subject may have such a thought without actually exercising the concepts required to specify the appropriate descriptive condition,<sup>143</sup> such an approach may be able to avoid the above objections. But the virtue of taking the subject's

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143 It is not clear to me this is plausible. This approach requires the postulation of complex conceptual capacities that are plausibly best explained by taking them to involve the exercise of the concepts required to specify the appropriate descriptive condition.

thoughts to descriptive *contents* is that this captures the fact that the subject actually *does* think about a property by exercise of an experientially dependent concept. It is just that this experientially dependent concept concerns an instantiated appearance property, and is embedded in a complex descriptive thought. If we deny that the subject explicitly exercises the concepts involved in specifying the relevant descriptive condition, we must give this up. And so we must deny that the subject is exercising an experientially dependent concept to think about what she experiences. But it certainly seems that in such cases, the subject may exercise such a concept in forming the relevant thoughts. And so again, this approach does not do justice to the fact that in such cases it seems as if the subject is thinking about a property by use of such a concept.

#### §4 Conclusions

In §1 I argued that we have of thinking about properties, *w*, such that

EDT A subject, *s*, is in a position to think about a property, *F*, in way *w*, only if *s* is having a visual experience, *e*, of *F*-ness such as to determine an aspect of the phenomenal character of *e*.

In §2, I argued that there are cases in which

1. a subject, *s*, is in a position to think about a property, *F*, in way *w*,

and yet

2. there is no instance of *F*-ness in *s*'s environment.

From EDT and (1), it follows that in such cases

3. *s* is having a visual experience, *e*, of *F*-ness such as to determine an aspect of the phenomenal character of *e*.

From (2) and (3), it follows that

4. it is not the case that if *s* is having a visual experience of *F*-ness such as to determine an aspect of the phenomenal character of *e*, then there is an instance of *F*-ness in *s*'s environment.

(4) is inconsistent with some relational accounts of visual experiential phenomenology. For example, it is inconsistent with the claim that

(R) if *s* is having a visual experience of F-ness such as to determine an aspect of the phenomenal character of then there is some instance of F-ness in *s*'s environment which *s* experiences.<sup>144</sup>

And hence rules out any relational account of experience which entails (R), such as the view that having a visual experience of F-ness consists in being experientially related to an instance of F-ness in one's environment

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144 This principle is entailed by a thesis close to Robinson's Phenomenal Principle together with the claim that one may only be experientially related to objects in one's environment (Robinson 1994).

## Conclusions

In this thesis, I have investigated various ways in which the intentionality of experience is connected to various other features of experience, such as its propensity to give rise to belief, its phenomenal character, and the ways in which it justifies, and makes knowledge and thought available. And I have done so with a view to deciding how we should think about experience being such as to have these further features. I think that reflection on some of the reasons most often taken to support non-relational views of experience shows they fail to do so. In Chapter One, I argued that phenomenological considerations do not decide between relational and non-relational views, despite the fact that it seems to us in introspection as if hallucinatory experience are of material objects and their sensible qualities just as perceptual ones are. And in Chapter Three I argued that common justificatory properties can be explained in terms of indistinguishability. But on the other hand, reflection on other features of experience does support a non-relationalist view. In chapter Two, I argued that a relationalist must offer a relatively complex account of how it is that we are inclined to believe in hallucinatory and perceptual cases, when compared to the non-relationalist. And in Chapter Five, I argued that experience makes thought about sensible qualities available even in cases in which such properties are not present in a subject's environment.

So what should we conclude about the prospects for a relationalist account of experience? One important point to note is that the common features discussed in Chapters Two and Five, and which count against non-relationalist views do not concern experience being of *particular* material objects. They concern the ways in which experience give rise to claims not about particular objects, and the ways in which experience makes available thought about sensory qualities. So I think they count for the idea that an experience being of *something* having sensible qualities is not constituted by experiential relations to a material object with such sensible qualities. But this leaves open that for an experience to be of a *particular* material object, it must be such that the subject is experientially related to that object. So the resultant view is this: there are *some* intentional features of experience which partly constitute the phenomenal character of experience, which make thought about sensory qualities available, and incline subjects to believe general claims about their environment. Such intentional properties are not constituted by experiential relations to material objects with sensible qualities in the subject's environment. But this leaves open that there are *further* intentional features of experience which are constituted by experiential relations to material objects in the subject's environment.

Are there such features? I think deciding this would require investigation of the way in which experience provides knowledge concerning particular objects, and enables demonstrative

thought about them. But that is a task for another day.

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