Hyman, John;
Kiener, Maximilian;
(2025)
Responsibility and the Special Question “Why?”.
Philosophy
(In press).
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Abstract
Anscombe defined intentional action in terms of what she called ‘the special question “Why?”’ In the first part of this article, we present four objections to defining intentional action in this way. Then, in the second part of the paper, we show that Anscombe’s special question can instead be used to define a much broader category of conduct, namely that for which an agent is responsible. We thereby repurpose one of the most influential ideas in 20th philosophy of action within a novel theory of responsibility.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Responsibility and the Special Question “Why?” |
| Publisher version: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author-accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10216933 |
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