only in the most cynical analysis), rather than in the renewed enfranchisement in European affairs of even Europe's most-self-governing regional populations, it seems the future of Europe lies in the profound, further Europeanisation of a new tranche of élite political actors.

Börzel has chosen Germany and Spain due to the considerable resources available to what are among Europe's most autonomous regions (although relative regional power in Spain varies historico-linguistically from north to south), and draws attention to the 'alternative' models of German coöperative federalism and Spanish competitive regionalism in informing the differing regional strategies for getting their voices back in Europe. In both cases, substantial lack of institutional 'fit' between European and national institutions led to adaptation, either reinforcing or fundamentally transmogrifying in nature; whereas in the German case the disempowerment of the *Länder* led to straightforward institutional and procedural adjustments premised on cost-sharing which fundamentally reinforced the territorial *status quo*, the Spanish strategy of litigation and attempted bypassing of the central government so as to participate autonomously in Brussels led to a generalised rebuff of the *Comunidades Autónomas*. Their subsequent, substantial enhancement of relations and cooperation with the Spanish central government was, as the author notes, inspired by the costs of non-cooperation and the success of the German strategy. In turn, through exploring the case of European environmental policy in particular detail in a later chapter, Börzel crucially highlights the present conundrum of 'pay without say' likely foisted on other European regional administrations when faced with the costly implementation of EU policies formulated without their participation.

Though Börzel's argument is a convincing one, this reviewer craved throughout a tripartite, comparative study which included analysis of Belgian federalism for greater generalisability of the author's more-or-less bipartite theory of regional-institutional adaptation—an omission, indeed, to which the author herself admits in her conclusion. As well, though some attention is paid to the Austrian *Länder* and Italian *Regioni* in their capacities as the EU's other autonomous regions (as well as smart and due consideration given to the applicability of her theory to the case of highly centralised European states like France and to the meso-level muddle which is the UK), broader material would have perhaps made for more vibrant reading. While the author's well-crafted and concise introduction and conclusion, as well as useful summaries at the start and end of every chapter and section of the book, will provide more time-constrained readers with a rapidly ingestible version of Börzel's argument, they do make for occasionally tedious reading for those readers who are going the distance with her (though, to be fair, humdrum repetition is sadly the convention of much political science writing in general). Overall, Börzel's latest work is well-worth a read for scholars of Europeanisation—wherein it will likely form a canonical contribution—and portends great things for the author's future, if not for participatory democracy in the EU.

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The Nation-State in Question
By T. V. Paul, G. John Ikenberry, and John A. Hall, eds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003

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The 1980s and 1990s was a period of intense academic investigation into the relationship between nations and states, and into the 'nation-state' as a form of political community. This is perhaps unsurprising for the final decades of a century

that saw the break-up of the European empires that ruled most of the globe in 1900 and the end of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; the growing influence of the idea of a right to national self-determination; the development of global and regional rule-making institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU); the growth of 'multi-national' companies with considerable power to influence state actions; and an enormous (and potentially catastrophic) increase in global environmental degradation, which will undoubtedly require intense inter-sate cooperation to correct. In the light (or dark) of these developments, and the plethora of attempts to explain and theorise them, the fourteen different essays in this book all seek to address the same question, i.e. "what can states do now?"

Each author approaches the central question from a different angle, with the contributions subsumed under four different themes addressing i) national questions, ii) state security, iii) state autonomy and iv) state capacity. In spite of these different themes, there is an underlying consensus amongst the contributors that those who had previously proclaimed the 'crisis' or even the 'end' of the nation-state were largely premature in their judgements. To borrow Michael Mann's phrase, the authors generally agree that nation-states are diversifying and developing, but not dying (Mann 1993).

Part One of the book focuses on the 'nation' element of the nation-state compact, or, more specifically, at nationalism and questions relating to how states can manage national and ethnic conflict. Part Two looks at security issues and the state's role in international relations, where, T. V. Paul argues, realist perspectives remain of great relevance, with world politics still organised around centres of power dominated by nation-states. Part Three deals with state autonomy. In a particularly interesting essay for students of the EU, Francesco Duina assesses the powers and functions of nation-states within the EU and Mercosur. Duina's findings suggest that rather than necessarily emasculating state power, "the arrival of common markets may be giving rise to an enduring division of labour between the supranational and the national levels" (184). Duina's suggestion is that political authority, responsibility and decision-making evolves in both horizontal and vertical directions, and that whilst nation-states will have to adapt, they still have a significant role to play. Christopher Hood's article on the state's extractive capacity finds that the modern state still has significant capacities to raise revenues from citizens, in spite of increased 'exit' options. And, continuing the overall 'developing and diversifying' theme, John Campbell writes on how states, with regard to both the economic actors and the institutions that comprise them, are having more of an impact in terms of mediating, responding to and, hence, shaping global economic forces than is currently recognised. Part Four ends the book by looking at broader perspectives on state capacity, focusing on post-communist states and the lessons that can be learned from them, and on how China's current regime and its rapid economic transformation is undermining state capacity there. The collection of essays is aimed primarily at an academic audience rather than the general reader, but ranges across a wide subject area and is mercifully free of some of the more obscurantist academic jargon.

It is not possible in this short space to explain or critique in any detail the varied arguments advanced in this book. However, there are two central essays in Part One on 'National Identities' that warrant further exploration on account of the fact that they raise issues of some considerable importance to thinking about Europe's future.

Bernard Yack's powerful and provocative essay on 'Nationalism, Popular Sovereignty, and the Liberal Democratic State' looks at the way in which the modern conceptualisation and practice of popular sovereignty has contributed to the development and potency of nationalism. Yack's argument is that the modern notion of popular sovereignty exercised through representative government -- as

distinct from the ancient one where citizenship is defined by participation in government -- contributes to the development of nationalism by bringing about both the nationalisation of political community, and the politicisation of the national community.

The central premise of modern representative government is that although the people themselves should not rule directly, ultimate sovereignty lies with them and the institutions and system of government is brought into being because the community has willed this to be so. Social contract theory rests upon this idea. But if a political community wills the state into being, then we logically need to say something about the pre-political community. Yack argues, persuasively, that the idea of nation here comes into play, with its association of historical longevity, collective memory, shared culture and shared language, providing a bridge between pre-political and political community; between, in social contract theory, the state of nature and civil society. By this process the political community becomes 'nationalised'.

This strengthening of the idea of national community then experiences 'politicisation'. The theory of popular sovereignty, by using the idea of 'national community' to establish a link between pre-political and political community, encourages the idea that groups with a common history, language and culture have the right to disestablish and reconstruct the authority of the state: that is, they have a right to self-determination. The national community has willed a state into being that governs over an explicitly defined territorial space. This new understanding of popular sovereignty "teaches us to think of states as masters of territory and peoples as masters of states … it teaches us that states are the means that people establish in order to exercise their mastery over given territories." Crucially, this mastery is based on the state's singular structure of authority and is thus, by definition, exclusive (43-44). The politicisation that comes with this assertion of exclusive control over a given area by a given people brings with it the problem of inter-state competition over contested boundaries. It also leads to intra-state competition, i.e. between the dominant national group and minority groups who contend the dominant's right to define the boundaries of the political community. The minority group may in turn seek their own state, where they alone have control over the state's apparatus.

If the modern conception of popular sovereignty really does connect liberal democratic politics and institutions to nationalism via the 'nationalisation of the political community', Yack's theory has some important implications for the evolution of the EU. It raises doubts over whether liberal ideals and institutions can enervate the threat of nationalism as some more optimistic analysts think they can. According to Yack, nationalism has developed "because of features of modern life and politics that we now hold dear and/or indispensable" -- it is not brought into being by "passing phenomenon based on values and ideals that we are ready to discard" (50). The suggestion is that nationalism is integral to the condition of democratic modernity, and thus aggressive nationalism even in Europe's older democratic nation-states cannot be ruled out; moreover, it is likely to be a feature of politics in the newly democratised states brought into the EU by eastward expansion.

The implications of the 'politicisation of the national unit' are also potentially grave. Democracy operates on the basis of majority rule, and the acceptance by a corollary minority of that rule. Robert Dahl once reflected that in democratic theory "the majority principle itself depends on prior assumptions about the unit: that the unit within which it is to operate is itself legitimate and that the matters on which it is employed properly fall within the jurisdiction of that unit." By implication, "whether the scope and domain of majority rule are appropriate in a particular unit depends on assumptions that the majority principle itself can do nothing to justify. The justification for the unit lies beyond the reach of the majority principle and, for that

matter, mostly beyond the reach of democratic theory itself" (Dahl 1989: 204). Democratic systems thus have great difficulty in addressing the problem of ethnic conflict because democracy itself presupposes the legitimacy of the political unit that ethnic nationalists call into question. The politicisation of the democratic unit that Yack outlines only tends to further accentuate the problem of legitimacy. Thus, given that many of the states due to join the EU on 1st May 2004 contain minority ethnic groups that could begin, under democratic conditions, to assert their own claims to self-determination, we can expect secessionist and irredentist claims to bring further ethnic conflict inside the EU's fence.

The theme of ethnic conflict management is picked up by Brendan O'Leary is his article on constitutional statecraft -- 'What States Can Do With Nations'. O'Leary re-examines the work of Ernest Gellner on nationalism and, further, re-examines some of his own and other criticisms previously levelled against Gellner's theory that under the conditions of modernity, states must choose between either nationalising or homogenising their populations, or else face great instability (see, for example, Gellner 1983). Empirical observation of the persistence of poly-ethnic federal systems such as Canada, Belgium and Switzerland -- though more the exception than the rule -- seem to disprove Gellner's analysis. However, O'Leary argues that Gellner's position is in fact more nuanced. O'Leary suggests that stable federal systems of government must have a 'staatsvolk', who, though not necessarily an absolute majority of the population, are demographically and electorally dominant, and who must also be the co-founders of the federation. The theory that stable majoritarian federations can be created under these conditions is based on the assumption that "in a majoritarian federation, an ethno-national group with a decisive majority of the federal population has no reason to fear federation" (69). This, O'Leary argues, is consistent with Gellner's theory of nationalism, though clearly inconsistent with liberal cosmopolitanism and radical multiculturalism.

O'Leary's argument has strong implications for European federalists who would like to push the EU onwards from confederation to federation: the fact that the EU lacks a staatsvolk (even prior to enlargement, the largest national group, the Germans of Germany, make up only one-fifth of the EU population) implies that any such federation would not be stable, unless it has strong consociational features. The implication is that "calls to have a fully fledged European federation, with the classic bicameral arrangements of the United States, or to have a directly elected and powerful EU president … may be a recipe for institutional disaster". In fact, "only a European Union constructed from secure nation-states cooperating within either confederal or consociational federal format has reasonable prospects of development and maintenance as a democratic political system" (78).

O'Leary's examination of the importance of the staatsvolk seems to be of particular importance in the EU context, but the theory may in fact be developed on an overly rigid understanding of the nation as a primary and fixed repository of identity. For example, (leaving aside for now the difficult question of whether religion is an adequate substitute for 'nation' in this context) O'Leary's citing of India's Hindus as a staatsvolk (68-76) reveals some of the problems of assuming that attachment to a particular identity is static and objective, rather than shifting and contextual. It is implausible that Indian Hindus should necessarily see their religion as a primary order of identity, as opposed to their language, or their regional culture. Certainly Bengali Hindus, immersed in Kolkatan cultural heritage may feel little connection to the supposedly mercantilist Gujaratis. Similarly, southern Indians from Tamil Nadu or Kerala may feel that their common Hindu religion is a very weak measure of their connection to the caste ridden northern states of Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar. At the same time, Maharashtrians may feel stronger bonds with UP Hindus that they didn't necessarily feel in previous eras on account of the current development of a militant 'Hindu nationalist' discourse. All of these groups have felt a different sense of identity in the post-Independence Nehruvian era. Similarly, the absence of the

'fear factor' that O'Leary sees as allowing dominant groups to accept federation is also highly likely to be contextual. For example, the Rwandan genocide was against a minority group that had previously been dominant. The Hutu's demographic and potential electoral dominance does not suggest that they would necessarily be 'unafraid' of federation. O'Leary posits that a staatsvolk is a real, objective category that can be used to measure the potential stability of federal arrangements. However, it may instead be the case that a staatsvolk is a necessary precondition for stable federation only under specific historical conditions.

By rejecting a constructivist epistemology in favour of a positivist case for the objective reality of nations and national identities, O'Leary's predictions about the future of the EU may be misplaced. If we allow that group identities (and individual identities) are in fact more fluid and changing, and that they are shaped by historical economic, political and societal circumstances, we may then consider the possibility that the citizens of European nation-states can develop identities outside of the nation-state framework that could facilitate the development of a truly 'European' polity, as opposed to merely a collection of distinctly and persistently national ones. Bernard Yack's analysis differs from O'Leary's in that he allows for the construction of the 'imagined community', but he may also be failing to recognise that nationalism might be only a historically contingent, rather than inherent, feature of the modern conceptualisation of popular sovereignty.

As John A. Hall points out in his introduction to the book, 'European states had sought, between 1870 and 1945, to be complete power containers, unitary and in possession of markets and secure sources of supply. The fact that this led to complete disaster produced humility - which is not to say for a moment that the state somehow lost its salience. Rather, states discovered that doing less proved to give them more … [or] put differently that breaking the link between nationalism and imperialism enhanced rather than undermined state capacity' (15). Greater cooperation between states may be allowing for the blurring of the 'absolute' relationship between state and nation, and between state and citizen; this presents new possibilities for identity formation and, potentially, for changes in group attitudes towards the idea of federation.

The ideas advanced by Yack and O'Leary on national issues in '*The Nation-state in Question'* are thought provoking and challenging. They may even persuade many of the need to adopt a 'go-slow' policy with regard to further European integration, for even if identities are constructed, they tend to be so over long periods of time. Nevertheless, perhaps Europe's future is a little brighter than their arguments imply.

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