Gonçalves, Duarte;
Friedman, Evan;
(2023)
Quantal Response Equilibrium with a Continuum of Types: Characterization and Nonparametric Identification.
Games and Economic Behavior
10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.002.
(In press).
![[thumbnail of revision.pdf]](https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/text.png) |
Text
revision.pdf - Accepted Version Access restricted to UCL open access staff until 26 August 2026. Download (611kB) |
Abstract
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a statistical generalization of Nash equilibrium, is a standard benchmark in the analysis of experimental data. Despite its influence, nonparametric characterizations and tests of QRE are unavailable beyond the case of finite games. We address this gap by completely characterizing the set of QRE in a class of binary-action games with a continuum of types. Our characterization provides sharp predictions in settings such as global games, volunteer's dilemma, and the compromise game. Further, we leverage our results to develop nonparametric tests of QRE. As an empirical application, we revisit the experimental data from Carrillo and Palfrey (2009) on the compromise game.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Quantal Response Equilibrium with a Continuum of Types: Characterization and Nonparametric Identification |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.002 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2307.08011 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | Quantal response; Bayesian games; global games; compromise game; nonparametric analysis |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10206782 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
