

Perception and Affectivity in Twelfth-Century  
Cistercian and Victorine *De anima* Treatises

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I, Jack Ford confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

## Abstract:

This thesis offers the first systematic examination of the theories of perception and affectivity in treatises *De anima* ('On the Soul') written by individuals of two pan-European reforming religious communities in the twelfth century: the monks of the Cistercian Order and the canons regular of the Abbey of Saint-Victor in Paris.

Affectivity, emotional states directed at God, human beings and objects, was a key doctrine among Cistercian and Victorine theologians. For both groups, the emotions were essential to the human activities of loving/willing and thinking. *Libri de anima* explain the structure of the soul and the body; in these texts perceptions from the bodily senses (*sensus*) are inextricably connected to the will's powers of affectivity (*affectus*) and the intellect's capacity of understanding (*intellectus*). They are an underexplored source for understanding the wider anthropological visions of love constructed by these two religious groups because the cultivation of monastic/canonical discipline and virtue is conceived by these treatises as the ordered relationship between body and soul. These psychological texts were significant to these communities, I argue, since they were not simply theoretical but complemented daily practices of cultivating friendships, meditation, and contemplating God.

In making this argument, this thesis first contextualises the *De anima* genre and psychological treatises. Part one 'Between Theory and Practice: Ordering Reason and Love in Cistercian and Victorine Experience', intervenes into a historical debate that has considered the Cistercians and Victorines as proponents of radically different Christian worldviews or 'anthropologies'. Cistercian and Victorine authors, I claim, saw affectivity (*affectus*) and understanding (*intellectus*) as two complementary powers of the soul required for acquiring lasting habits of virtue necessary for the love and contemplation of God. I argue this first by outlining the psychological schemas in *De anima* treatises and spiritual writings produced by these groups, and then showing how understandings of this psychology was not purely a theoretical exercise but was explicitly designed for practical application – to aid Cistercian and Victorine monks and canons in developing virtuous ways of thinking, feeling and acting in their communities and in society.

Part 2, 'Image and Likeness', develops the argument of part 1 by offering a further analysis of how Cistercian and Victorine psychological writing explore the theological consequences of the soul's creation in the image and likeness of God. This fundamental doctrine of Christian doctrine initially appears unimportant, yet in chapter 4 I argue that

Cistercian and Victorine authors, especially, drew on this passage in Genesis to understand the soul's powers of *intellectus* and *affectus*. These two capacities are understood as made to the image and likeness of God, and subsequently became corrupted following original sin. Cistercian and Victorine image and likeness theology, I argue, was a key part of the anthropological views of both groups, and is significant because it helped to crystallise the importance of cultivating both thinking and feeling in Cistercian and Victorine practices. Chapter 5 then extends this shared conceptions of the soul as made in the image and likeness to explore *how* the soul undergoes spiritual change during experiences of perception, emotion and cognition. With their focus on how the senses and imagination mediate the processes of body and soul, *De anima* treatises reveal the permeability of man's outer and inner self. In the process both groups, I suggest, utilise understandings of physical sense perception as a form of assimilation as a model for their understandings of spiritual perception. This analogy enables Cistercian and Victorine authors to depict the act of the divine union as the soul changed into the image and likeness of God through its affectivity and intellect.

Part 3 of this thesis is entitled 'Affectivity, Self-Knowledge and Practice'. Chapter 6 provides a much-needed investigation of the reception of the phrase 'know yourself' within Cistercian and Victorine spiritual literature aimed at promoting self-examination. For both Cistercians and Victorines, this involves fostering a dialogue between the soul and the 'self', as it did for Augustine, as well as cultivating the affective response of humility in reaction to original sin and God's grace for mankind. Chapter 7, however, explores the different usages of this theme within *De anima* treatises themselves. I suggest that each community placed their own distinctive spin on communicating this theme. For the Cistercians, self-knowledge is tied up with symbolism derived from the cosmos and the Song of Songs. Victorine self-knowledge is more philosophical in nature, with self love considered to be the corresponding action to the canonical mission to love thy neighbour. I conclude by arguing that, in some cases, *De anima* treatises and spiritual writings on psychology should not be considered solely as individual texts but rather as a part of a wider corpus of writings that indicated a programme of spiritual reform. In this programme, the knowledge of the soul offered by a *De anima* treatise often constituted the first step of the individual's ethical and spiritual conversion.



## Impact Statement

This study provides the first systematic examination of the theories and practices related to perception and affectivity in Cistercian and Victorine *De anima* (*On the Soul*) treatises – a genre of psychological texts popular in the twelfth century. This thesis offers a granular assessment of the language relating to psychology: notably the terms *affectio* (‘affection’) and *affectus* (‘affectivity’). To perform this careful reading of Latin texts and manuscripts, I employ a distinctive methodology, combining the methods and theoretical approaches of sensory and emotional history. These two disciplinary approaches reinforce one of the central arguments of this research. Psychological activities such as sensing, thinking, remembering and feeling are not isolated but deeply interconnected in medieval understandings of experience. Cistercian and Victorine *libri de anima* reveal the diversity of this experience. Affections are fleeting, ephemeral feelings. But they are also lasting dispositions and attachments of the soul to things, people and God, capable of shaping permanent habits of thinking and willing. Over 800 years after some of these treatises were composed, the disciplines of neuroscience and neurobiology are still seeking to understand the nature of affect; affect theorists predominantly argue that affectivity is pre-conscious, pre-linguistic and unlearned. While we cannot perform the same experiments on medieval people, the theories, practices and experiences of Cistercian monks and Victorine show that affectivity is much broader and all-encompassing than we understand it today.

The research conducted for this thesis was presented at several conferences between May 2019 and December 2021. In the United Kingdom, parts of this thesis were presented at the *Thinking with Mysticism* and *New Voices in Medieval Studies* conferences both held at the University of York (2019), the *European History 1150-1500* seminar series at the Institute of

Historical Research, London (2020), the *International Medieval Congress (IMC)* at the University of Leeds (2021) and the *Quo Vadis* conference at University College London (2021). The final stages of this research were completed utilising a Thornley Junior Research Fellowship from the Institute of Historical Research where aspects of this research were presented and discussed at the *IHR Fellows' Seminar* (2021-2022).

Further, the themes of this thesis – bodily identity, the senses, emotions and religious orders – led to cross-disciplinary collaboration with other researchers in the form of public history initiatives and conferences. I compiled an entry on ‘The Victorines’ for *The Database of Religious History* in 2020 in addition to the production of a poster entitled ‘Models of the Mind’ with Vanessa da Silva (UCL History) and Genevieve Caulfield (UCL History) for a UCL competition (2021). Conferences I organised relating to this doctoral research include: ‘(Un)Bound Bodies’ (2020), co-organised with Lauren Rozenberg (UCL Art History); ‘Cistercian Worlds’, co-organised with Emmie Rose Price-Goodfellow (Department of History, University of York); and ‘Senses and Affects in the Middle Ages’ (2022), co-organised with Aistė Kiltinavičiūtė (Faculty of Medieval and Modern Languages, University of Cambridge).

Finally, parts of this research have been published. My paper presented at the Institute of Historical Research, ‘Jacob’s Family as a Symbol of Affectivity in Cistercian and Victorine Psychology’ was published as volume 18 (2021) of *Archa Verbi: Yearbook for the Study of Medieval Theology*, pp. 39-91. The papers of the Cistercian Worlds conference are in the process of being edited by myself and Emmie Rose Price-Goodfellow for a special edition of the journal *Cîteaux – Commentarii Cistercienses*. In this volume I contribute a general introduction to the conference as well as an article: ‘Healthy Body, Healthy Mind: *Eucrasia* and *sanitas* in the Medical Approaches to Affectivity of William of Saint-Thierry and Richard of Saint-Victor’.

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Support from family and friends has always been forthcoming during the writing of this dissertation. To use Aelred of Rievaulx’s language, my brother, Ben, my father, Gary, and my grandma, Pat, and wider family have all demonstrated their ‘natural affection’ (*affectus naturalis*) when asking “What’s your thesis on”, “How’s it going?” and, increasing towards the end, “Have you finished yet?”. My replies – “medieval emotions”, “It’s going” and “nearly” – have elicited far more “wow” than “why” from curious and caring aunts, uncles and cousins than I would have ever expected. Not only affection but endless support, encouragement advice and, at several points, welcome distraction, have been provided in particular by Oli Palethorpe, Rajitha Mudannayake, Maialen Maugars and Tamsin Hilliker. Since the very start, I have been fortunate to have Vanessa Baptista da Silva as my *Doktorschwester*: your friendship, both intellectually and personally, has been a constant presence over the course of this research – thank you for sharing in the rhythms of research joy and angst over the past few years.

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# Table of Contents

<b>List of Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>25</b>
THE CISTERCIAN ORDER.....	26
THE ABBEY AND ‘SCHOOL’ OF SAINT-VICTOR.....	31
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CISTERCIANS AND VICTORINES TO INSTITUTIONAL HISTORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES.....	44
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CISTERCIAN AND VICTORINE PSYCHOLOGY TO INTELLECTUAL HISTORY .....	48
THE PLACE OF SENSE, SENSIBILITIES AND PERCEPTION IN SENSORY HISTORY .....	61
THE PLACE OF AFFECT, AFFECTIVITY AND <i>AFFECTUS</i> IN EMOTIONS HISTORY.....	64
AFFECTIVITY: SENSE, EMOTION AND EXPERIENCE .....	68
THESIS STRUCTURE .....	73
<b>Prologue - Authority and Innovation: Perception and Affectivity in the <i>De anima</i> Genre and Twelfth-Century Augustinian Psychology .....</b>	<b>76</b>
SAINT-AUGUSTINE .....	76
AFTER AUGUSTINE I: THE SOUL IN LATE-ANTIQUITY .....	85
AFTER AUGUSTINE II: BEDE AND THE ANGLO-SAXONS .....	91
AFTER AUGUSTINE III: THE CAROLINGIAN RENAISSANCE.....	95
AFTER AUGUSTINE IV: ANSELM AND THE EARLY TWELFTH-CENTURY.....	96
PSYCHOLOGY IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY .....	98
DO THE TWELFTH-CENTURY <i>LIBRI DE ANIMA</i> CONSTITUTE A GENRE? .....	106
TREATISES <i>DE ANIMA</i> I: TRADITIONAL TEXTS .....	108
TREATISES <i>DE ANIMA</i> II: NATURAL SCIENCE AND MEDICINE.....	112
LETTERS.....	119
SERMONS .....	122
<i>LIBRI SPIRITUALES</i> : SOILOQUIES, LOVE, GRACE, FAITH, HEXAMERA AND MYSTICISM.....	122
ANONYMOUS AND PSEUDONYMOUS TEXTS .....	123
CONCLUSION.....	124
<b>PART 1 - THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF REASON AND AFFECTION IN CISTERCIAN AND VICTORINE EXPERIENCE .....</b>	<b>126</b>
HOW SIMILAR WERE CISTERCIAN AND VICTORINE ANTHROPOLOGIES?.....	127
ARGUMENT OF PART 1 .....	134
<b>CHAPTER 1 – THE COMPLEMENTARY SIGNIFICANCE OF LOVE AND REASON IN CISTERCIAN PSYCHOLOGY.....</b>	<b>137</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	137
BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX.....	137
AELRED OF RIEVAULX .....	145
WILLIAM OF SAINT-THIERRY .....	149
HELINAND OF FROIDMONT.....	158
ISAAC OF STELLA AND ALCHER OF CLAIRVAUX .....	159
BALDWIN OF FORDE .....	162
CONCLUSION: LOVE, THE SONG OF SONGS AND MARIAN DEVOTION.....	164
<b>CHAPTER 2 – THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF REASON AND LOVE IN VICTORINE PSYCHOLOGY....</b>	<b>169</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	169
HUGH OF SAINT-VICTOR.....	172

ACHARD OF SAINT-VICTOR.....	184
RICHARD OF SAINT-VICTOR.....	187
WALTER OF SAINT-VICTOR.....	194
GODFREY OF SAINT-VICTOR.....	195
CONCLUSION.....	199
<b>CHAPTER 3 - THE DIMENSIONS OF AFFECTIVITY .....</b>	<b>201</b>
HABITUS AND AFFECTIVE WORDPLAY: AFFECTUS, EFFECTUS, DEFECTUS AND PROPECTUS.....	215
CONCLUSION.....	218
<b>PART 2 – IMAGE AND LIKENESS.....</b>	<b>222</b>
<b>Chapter 4 – Cistercian and Victorine Image and Likeness Theology .....</b>	<b>223</b>
VICTORINE IMAGE AND LIKENESS THEOLOGY .....	223
SPATIAL IMAGE AND LIKENESS: REGIO DISSIMILITUDINIS AND REGIO SIMILITUDINIS .....	225
THE RESTORATION OF IMAGE AND LIKENESS AS MEDICINE IN VICTORINE THOUGHT .....	227
IMAGE AND LIKENESS THROUGH ALLEGORY: BEATITUDE, MICROCOSMISM, CELESTIAL HIERARCHY AND GENDER .....	228
CISTERCIAN IMAGE AND LIKENESS THEOLOGY .....	233
GOD AND THE SOUL AS LOVE .....	234
COSMOLOGICAL AND ANGELIC SYMBOLISM.....	237
IMAGE AND LIKENESS IN AELRED OF RIEVAULX’S ANTHROPOLOGY .....	239
CONCLUSION.....	241
<b>Chapter 5 – <i>Motus animae</i>: Affectivity and Movement in Bodily and Spiritual Perception .....</b>	<b>242</b>
<i>MOTUS ANIMAE</i> : AFFECTION AND KNOWLEDGE AS QUALITIES OF THE SOUL.....	242
HUGH OF SAINT-VICTOR AND RATIONAL MOTION .....	242
THE DIFFUSION OF A VICTORINE MODEL OF SPIRITUAL CHANGE .....	245
VICTORINE CHANGE AFTER HUGH: ACHARD, RICHARD AND GODFREY OF SAINT-VICTOR.....	250
THE CISTERCIANS AND SPIRITUAL CHANGE .....	252
MEDIATED PERCEPTION: THE BLURRING OF SENSATION, AFFECTION AND THOUGHT .....	255
PERCEPTION AS MEDIATION .....	256
“ONLY LIKE KNOWS LIKE”: PERCEPTION AND AFFECTIVITY AS ASSIMILATION.....	259
<b>PART 3 - AFFECTIVITY, SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE .....</b>	<b>268</b>
<b>Chapter 6 – “Know Yourself”: Self-Knowledge as an Affective Practice.....</b>	<b>269</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	269
“KNOW YOURSELF”: SELF KNOWLEDGE AND CHRISTIAN SOCRATISM.....	270
SELF-KNOWLEDGE AS A PRACTICE.....	273
SPIRITUAL EXERCISES.....	275
SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOUL .....	282
CONCLUSION.....	288
<b>Chapter 7 - Combining Theory and Practice: Self-Knowledge in Cistercian and Victorine Psychology .....</b>	<b>292</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	292
CISTERCIAN PSYCHOLOGY AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE.....	294
VICTORINE PSYCHOLOGY AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE .....	300
CISTERCIAN AND VICTORINE SELF-KNOWLEDGE AS A PROGRAMME OF REFORM.....	314
BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX AND ‘CONSIDERATION’ .....	315
<i>DE DUODECIM PATRIARCHIS</i> : A VICTORINE PROGRAMME OF REFORM? .....	320
<i>DE SPIRITU ET ANIMA</i> : A CISTERCIAN PROGRAMME OF REFORM?.....	323
CONCLUSION.....	324
<b>Epilogue – The Legacy of ‘Augustinian’ Affectivity and Perception .....</b>	<b>328</b>

<i>DE SPIRITU ET ANIMA</i> AND TRINITY COLLEGE CAMBRIDGE, MS O.7.16.....	328
<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>337</b>
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS .....	337
FUTURE DIRECTIONS .....	340
<b>Appendix</b>	
APPENDIX 1: TRANSCRIPTION AND TRANSLATION OF TRINITY MS O.7.16 (FF. 46v-47r).....	343
APPENDIX 2: DIVISIONS OF THE COGNITIVE FACULTY .....	347
APPENDIX 3: TRANSLATION OF <i>DE UNIONE CORPORIS ET SPIRITUS</i> .....	349
APPENDIX 4: TRANSLATION OF <i>DE VERBO DEI</i> .....	358
<b>Glossary .....</b>	<b>370</b>
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>375</b>

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

### GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS

ADHDLA	<i>Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age</i> (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1926–).
AMN	Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia (Namur: Editions Godenne, 1950–).
ASOC	<i>Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis; Analecta Cisterciensia</i> (Rome: 1945–).
BV	Biblioteca Victorina (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992–).
CCCM	Corpus Christianorum series. Continuatio Medievalis (Turnhout: Brepols, 1971–).
CFS	Cistercian Fathers Series (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1970–).
CMSV	Community of St Mary the Virgin.
<i>Coll.</i>	<i>Collectanea cisterciensia</i> (Belgium: Abbaye de Scourmont, 1965–).
CS	Cistercian Studies Series (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1969–).
CSEL	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum.
<i>CSQ</i>	<i>Cistercian Studies Quarterly</i> (Gethsemani, 1966–).
CVI	Corpus Victorinum, Instrumenta series (Hugo von Sankt Viktor Institut, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2005–).
CWS	Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1978–).
DOML	Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010–).
<i>DS</i>	<i>Dictionnaire de Spiritualité</i> (Paris, 1932–).
EPM	Études de philosophie médiévale (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1911–).
FC	Fathers of the Church, ed. R. J. Deferrari (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1947–).
LCL	Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1912–).



OCSO	Ordo Cisterciensis Strictioris Observantiae.
OSB	Ordo Sancti Benedicti.
PIMS	Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (Toronto, Ontario: 1929–).
<i>PL</i>	Patrologia cursus completus, series Latina, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, 221 volumes (Paris, 1844–1864).
<i>RD MAL</i>	<i>Revue du Moyen Age Latin</i> (Lyon: Université de Strasbourg, 1945–).
<i>SBO</i>	<i>Sancti Bernardi Opera</i> , 9 vols., ed. J. Leclercq, C. H. Talbot and H. M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957–1998).
SC	Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Cerf, 1942–).
TPMA	Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Age (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958–).
VTT	Victorine Texts in Translation: Exegesis, Theology and Spirituality from the Abbey of St Victor, 10 volumes (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010–2022).

### SPECIFIC ABBREVIATIONS

- \* The asterisk before the abbreviated title indicates a disputed work.

### CISTERCIAN WORKS

#### BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX

<i>Apologia</i>	<i>Apologia ad Guillelmum abbatem</i> (PL 182, 895-920; SBO 3, pp. 80-108).
<i>Dil. Deo.</i>	<i>De diligendo Deo</i> (PL 182, 973-1000; SBO 3, pp. 119-154; tr. R. Walton, OSB, <i>Bernard of Clairvaux: Treatises II</i> , CFS 13, 1980).
<i>Consideratione</i>	<i>De consideratione ad Eugeniam papam tertiam libri quinque</i> (PL 182, 727-808; SBO 3, pp. 393-493; tr. J. D. Anderson and E. Kennan, <i>Five Books on Consideration: Advice to a Pope</i> , CFS 37, 1976).
<i>Conv.</i>	<i>Sermo de conversione ad clericos</i> (PL 182, 833-856D; tr. M-B. Saïd, OSB, <i>Sermons on Conversion: On Conversion, A Sermon to Clerics. Lenten Sermons on the Psalm 'He Who Dwells'</i> , CFS 25, 1981, pp. 31-79).

<i>Gratia</i>	<i>De gratia et libero arbitrio</i> (PL 182, 1001-1030; SBO 3, pp. 165-203; tr. D. O'Donovan, OCSO, <i>The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux: Treatises III</i> , CFS 19, Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977).
<i>Grad.</i>	<i>De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae</i> (PL 182, 951-972; SBO 3, pp. 12-60; tr. M. A. Conway, OCSO, <i>Bernard of Clairvaux: Treatises II</i> , CFS 13, 1980, pp. 51-111).
<i>Parabola</i>	<i>Parabola</i> (PL 183, 757-772).
<i>*Int. domo</i>	(Ps. <i>De interiori domo, seu de conscientia aedificanda</i> (PL 184, 507-552).
<i>*Med.</i>	<i>Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis</i> (PL 184, 485-508).
<i>*Petis</i>	<i>Tractatus de conscientia ad religiosum quemdam ordinis Cisterciensis [Petis a me]</i> (PL 184, 551-560).
<i>SCC</i>	<i>Sermones in Cantica Canticorum</i> (PL 183, 785-1198; SBO 1-2; tr. K. J. Walsh and I. M. Edmonds, <i>On the Song of Songs</i> , 4 vols., CFS 4, 7, 31, 40; 1971-83).

#### AELRED OF RIEVAULX

<i>Dial. an.</i>	<i>Dialogus de anima</i> (ed. C. H. Talbot, in <i>Aelredi Rievallensis Opera Omnia I: Opera Ascetica</i> , eds., A. Hoste, OSB and C. H. Talbot, CCCM 1, 1971, pp. 685-754; tr. Talbot, <i>Dialogue on the Soul</i> , CFS 22, 1981).
<i>Iesu</i>	<i>De Iesu puero duodenni</i> (ed. A. Hoste, OSB, in <i>Aelredi Rievallensis Opera Omnia I: Opera Ascetica</i> , eds., A. Hoste, OSB and C. H. Talbot, CCCM 1, 1971, pp. 249-278; tr. T. Berkeley, OCSO, in B. M. Pennington, <i>Aelred of Rievaulx: Treatises &amp; Pastoral Prayer</i> , CFS 2, 1971, pp. 3-39).
<i>Inst. inc.</i>	<i>De institutione inclusarum</i> (ed. C. H. Talbot, in <i>Aelredi Rievallensis Opera Omnia I: Opera Ascetica</i> , eds., A. Hoste, OSB and C. H. Talbot, CCCM 1, 1971, pp. 635-683; ed. and trans. B. L. Venarde, <i>Aelred of Rievaulx: Writings on Body and Soul</i> , DOML 71, 2021, pp. 205-319).
<i>Mira.</i>	<i>De quodam miraculo mirabili</i> (ed. and trans. B. L. Venarde, <i>Aelred of Rievaulx: Writings on Body and Soul</i> , DOML 71, 2021, pp. 175-203).

<i>Orat.</i>	<i>Oratio pastoralis</i> (ed. A. Wilmart, in <i>Aelredi Rievallensis Opera Omnia I: Opera Ascetica</i> , eds., A. Hoste, OSB and C. H. Talbot, CCCM 1, 1971, pp. 755-763; Also ed. and trans. B. L. Venarde, <i>Aelred of Rievaulx: Writings on Body and Soul</i> , DOML 71, 2021, pp. 2-17).
<i>Sermo</i>	<i>Sermones</i> ([Sermons 1-46] ed. A. Hoste and G. Raciti, <i>Aelredi Rievallensis Opera Omnia II</i> , CCCM 2A, 1989; [Sermons 47-84] ed. G. Raciti, <i>Aelredi Rievallensis Opera Omnia III</i> , CCCM 2B, 2001; [Sermons 85-1820, ed. G. Raciti, <i>Aelredus Rievallensis Opera Omnia IV</i> , CCCM 2C, 2012; tr. T. Berkeley, <i>The Liturgical Sermons: The First Clairvaux Collection</i> [Sermons 1-28], CFS 58, 2001; [Sermons 29-46] tr. M. A. Mayeski, <i>The Liturgical Sermons: The Second Clairvaux Collection</i> , CFS 77, 2016; [Sermons 47-84] tr. K. Krug, L. White, and the Xatena Scholarium <i>The Liturgical Sermons: The Durham and Lincoln Collections</i> , CFS 80, 2018).
<i>Spec. car.</i>	<i>De speculo caritatis</i> (PL 195, 501-621; ed. C. H. Talbot, in <i>Aelredi Rievallensis Opera Omnia I: Opera Ascetica</i> , eds. A. Hoste, OSB and C. H. Talbot, CCCM 1, 1971, pp. 3-161; tr. E. Connor, OCSO, <i>The Mirror of Charity</i> , CFS 17, 1990).
<i>Spir. am.</i>	<i>De spirituali amicitia</i> (ed. and tr. B. L. Venarde, <i>Aelred of Rievaulx: Writings on Body and Soul</i> , DOML 71, 2021, pp. 20-173).

#### WILLIAM OF SAINT-THIERRY

<i>Aen. fid.</i>	<i>Aenigma fidei</i> (PL 180, 397-441; tr. J. D. Anderson, <i>The Enigma of Faith</i> , CFS 9, 1973).
<i>Ep. frat.</i>	<i>Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei</i> (PL 184, 307-363; ed. P. Verdeyen, SJ, <i>Guillelmi a Sancto Theodorico Opera Omnia: Opera didacta et spiritualia: Pars III</i> , CCCM 88, 2003, pp. 225-289; tr. T. Berkeley, <i>The Golden Epistle: A Letter to the Brethren at Mont Dieu</i> , CFS 12, 1971, pp. 3-105).
<i>Ex. Cant.</i>	<i>Expositio super Cantica canticorum</i> (PL 180, 473-546; tr. Mother C. Hart, <i>Exposition on the Song of Songs</i> , CFS 6, 1970).
<i>Cont. Deo</i>	<i>Tractatus de contemplando Deo</i> (PL 184, 363-379; tr. Sister Penelope, CSMV, <i>The Works of William of St Thierry, Vol 1: On Contemplating God, Prayer, Meditations</i> , CFS 3, 1977, pp. 3-64).

<i>Med. orat.</i>	<i>Meditativae orationes</i> (PL 180, 205-249; tr. Sister Penelope, CSMV, <i>The Works of William of St Thierry, Vol 1: On Contemplating God, Prayer, Meditations</i> , CFS 3, 1977, pp. 77-190).
<i>Nat. corp./nat. an.</i>	<i>De natura corporis et animae</i> (ed. M. Lemoine, <i>Guillelmus de Sancto Theodorico: De natura corporis et animae</i> , Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1988; also ed. P. Verdeyen, CCCM 88, pp. 103-146; trans. B. Clark, OCSO, in McGinn, ed., <i>Three Treatises on Man</i> , CFS 24, 1977, pp. 101-152).
<i>Nat. dig.</i>	<i>De natura et dignitate amoris</i> (PL 184, 379-407; ed. P. Verdeyen, CCCM 88, 2003; tr. T. X. Davis, <i>The Nature and Dignity of Love</i> , CFS 30, 1981).
<i>Spec. fid.</i>	<i>Speculum fidei</i> (PL 180, 365-397; tr. T. X. Davix, <i>The Mirror of Faith</i> , CFS 15, 1979).

#### ISAAC OF STELLA

<i>Ep. an.</i>	<i>Epistola de anima</i> (PL 194, 1875-1889; ed. C. Tarlazzi, 'L'Epistola de anima di Isacco di Stella: studio della tradizione ed edizione del testo'. <i>Medioevo: rivista di storia della filosofia medievale</i> 36 (2011), pp. 167-278; tr. B. McGinn, in McGinn, ed., <i>Three Treatises on Man</i> , CFS 24, 1977; also translated by D. Deme, in Deme, ed., <i>The Selected Works of Isaac of Stella: A Cistercian Voice from the Twelfth Century</i> , Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
<i>Sermo</i>	<i>Sermones in festo Omnium Sanctorum</i> (PL 194, 1689-1875; ed. and trans. [French], A. Hoste, OSB and G. Salet, Isaac de L'Étoile: <i>Sermons: Tome 1-2</i> , SC 130, 1967; trans. [English] H. McCaffery and L. White, <i>Isaac of Stella: Sermons on the Christian Year: Vols. 1-2</i> , CFS 11 and 66, 1979 and 2019).

#### ALCHER OF CLAIRVAUX/PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE

*DSA	<i>De spiritu et anima</i> (PL 40, 779-832; tr. E. Leiva and Sr. B. Ward, SLG, in McGinn, ed., <i>Three Treatises on Man</i> , CFS 24, 1977, pp. 179-288).
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#### HELINAND OF FROIDMONT

<i>Cog. sui.</i>	<i>De cognitione sui</i> (PL 212, 721-735).
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BALDWIN OF FORDE

<i>Sermo</i>	<i>Sermones</i> (PL 204, 403-572; ed. D. N. Bell, <i>Balduini de Forda Opera: Sermones, De Commendatione Fidei</i> , CCCM 99; tr. Bell, <i>Baldwin of Ford: Spiritual Tractates</i> , 2 Vols, CFS 38 and 41, 1986).
<i>Comm. fid.</i>	<i>De commendatione fidei</i> (PL 204, 571-640; ed. D. N. Bell, <i>Balduini de Forda Opera: Sermones, De Commendatione Fidei</i> CCCM 99; tr. J. P. Freeland and D. N. Bell, <i>The Commendation of Faith</i> , CFS 59, 2000).

ARNOLD OF BONNEVAL

<i>Operibus</i>	<i>De operibus sex dierum</i> (PL 189, 1515-1570).
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JOHN OF FORD

<i>Sermo</i>	<i>Sermones I-CXX</i> (ed. E. Mikkers and H. Costello, 2 Vols., CCCM 17 and 18, 1970; tr. W. M. Beckett, <i>Sermons on the Song of Songs</i> , 7 Vols., CFS 29, 39, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 (1977, 1982, 1982, 1983, 1983, 1984, 1984)).
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GILBERT OF HOYLAND

<i>Sermo</i>	<i>Sermones in Cantica</i> (PL 184, 9-251; tr. Lawrence C. Braceland SJ, <i>Sermons on the Song of Songs</i> , 3 Vols., CFS 14, 20, 26 (1978, 1979, 1979).
<i>Tract.</i>	<i>Tractatus ascetici</i> (PL 184, 251-289; tr. Lawrence C. Braceland SJ, <i>Treatises, Epistles and Sermons with a Letter of Roger of Byland The Milk of Babes and an edition and translation of the works of Master Gilbert, Abbot, from MS Bodley 87, The Bodleian Library</i> , CFS 34, 1981).

GEOFFREY OF AUXERRE

<i>Apoc.</i>	<i>Super Apocalypsin</i> (ed. F. Gastaldelli, Rome: Ed. di Storia e letteratura, 1970; tr. J. Gibbons, CSSP, <i>On the Apocalypse</i> , CFS 42, 2000).
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## VICTORINE WORKS

### HUGH OF SAINT-VICTOR

<i>Archa Noe</i>	<i>De archa Noe morali</i> (PL 176, 618-681; ed. Sicard, <i>Hugonis de Sancto Victore Opera: Tomus I</i> , CCCM 176, 2001, pp. 1-117; tr. G. A. Zinn, in Zinn, D. M. Coulter and F. van Liere, eds., <i>Spiritual Formation and Mystical Symbolism: A Selection of Works of Hugh and Richard of Saint-Victor, and of Thomas Gallus</i> , VTT 5, 2022, pp. 133-239).
<i>Arrha</i>	<i>De arrha animae</i> (PL 176, 951-969; ed. H. Feiss and P. Sicard, <i>L'oeuvre de Hugues de Saint-Victor: I</i> (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 209-300; tr. H. Feiss, in Feiss, ed., <i>On Love: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Adam, Achard, Richard, and Godfrey of St Victor</i> , VTT 2, 2011, pp. 184-232).
* <i>Cont.</i>	<i>De contemplatione et eius speciebus</i> (ed. R. Baron, <i>La contemplation et ses espèces</i> , Tournai: Desclée, 1955).
<i>Did.</i>	<i>Didascalicon</i> (PL 176, 741-839; ed. C. H. Buttmer, <i>Didascalicon</i> , Washington: The Catholic University Press, 1939; tr. J. Taylor, <i>The Didascalicon of Hugh of St Victor</i> , New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
<i>Fructibus</i>	<i>De fructibus carnis et spiritus</i> (PL 176, 997-1011).
<i>In hier. cael.</i>	<i>Commentariorum in hierarchiam caelestem</i> (PL 175, 923-1154).
<i>Inst. nov.</i>	<i>De institutione novitiorum</i> (PL 176, 925-951; ed. H. Feiss and P. Sicard, <i>L'oeuvre de Hugues de Saint-Victor: I</i> (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 6-114; tr. F. van Liere and D. Coulter, <i>On the Formation of Novices</i> , in F. van Liere and J. Mousseau, eds., <i>Life at Saint Victor: The Liber Ordinis, the Life of William of Æbelholt, and a Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard, and Odo of Saint Victor, and Other Authors</i> , VTT 9, 2021, pp. 209-253).
<i>Laud. car.</i>	<i>De laude caritatis</i> (PL 176, 969-977; ed. H. Feiss and P. Sicard, <i>L'oeuvre de Hugues de Saint-Victor: I</i> (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 173-207; tr. F. T. Harkins, in <i>On Love: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Adam, Achard, Richard, and Godfrey of St Victor</i> , VTT 2, pp. 159-168).
<i>Libellus arche</i>	<i>Libellus de formatione arche</i> [= <i>De archa Noe mystica</i> ] (PL 176, 681-701; ed. Sicard, <i>Hugonis de Sancto Victore Opera: Tomus I</i> , CCCM 176, 2001, pp. 119-162).

<i>Meditatione</i>	<i>De meditatione</i> (PL 176, 993-997; ed. R. Baron, SC 155; tr. F. van Liere, in C. P. Evans, ed., <i>Writings on the Spiritual Life: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Adam, Achard, Richard, Walter, and Godfrey of St Victor</i> , VTT 4, 2013, pp. 381-393).
* <i>Misc.</i>	<i>Miscellenea</i> (PL 177, 469-900).
<i>Mod. or.</i>	<i>De modo orandi</i> (PL 176, 977-987; tr. H. Feiss, <i>On the Power of Prayer</i> , in C. P. Evans, ed., <i>Writings on the Spiritual Life: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Adam, Achard, Richard, Walter, and Godfrey of St Victor</i> , VTT 4, 2013, pp. 317-348).
<i>Not. Gen.</i>	<i>Notae de Genesi</i> (PL 175, 32C-61B; trans. J. van Zweiten, <i>Notes on Genesis</i> , in F. van Liere and F. T. Harkins, eds., <i>Interpretation of Scripture: Practice: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Andrew, Richard, and Leonius of St Victor, and of Robert of Melun, Peter Comestor and Maurice of Sully</i> , VTT 6, 2016, pp. 51-117).
<i>Quid vere.</i>	<i>Quid vere diligendum sit</i> (ed. R. Baron, SC 155, pp. 94-99; tr. H. Feiss, VTT 2, pp. 179-182).
<i>Quin. sept.</i>	<i>De quinque septenis</i> (PL 175, 405-413; ed. R. Baron, SC 155, pp. 99-119).
<i>Sacr.</i>	<i>De sacramentis Christianae fidei</i> (PL 176, 173-618); ed. R. Berndt SJ, <i>Hugonis de Sancto Victore de Sacramentis de Christianae Fidei</i> , Münster, Aschendorff, 2008; trans. R. Deferrari, <i>On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith (De Sacramentis) of Hugh of Saint Victor</i> , Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1951).
<i>Sent. div.</i>	<i>Sententiae de divinitate</i> (ed. A. M. Piazzoni, ‘Ugo di San Vittore auctor delle ‘Sententiae de divinitate’’, <i>Studi Medievali</i> , 23 (1982), pp. 861-955; tr. C. P. Evans, <i>Sentences on Divinity</i> , in B. T. Coolman and D. M. Coulter, eds., <i>Trinity and Creation: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard and Adam of St Victor</i> , VTT 1, 2001, pp. 103-177).
<i>Sept. don.</i>	<i>De septem donis Spiritus sancti</i> (ed. R. Baron, SC 155, pp. 120-133).
<i>Subst. dil.</i>	<i>De substantia dilectionis</i> (ed. R. Baron, SC 155, pp. 82-93; tr. V. Butterfield, VTT 2, 2011, pp. 143-147).
<i>Tribus diebus</i>	<i>De tribus diebus</i> (PL 176, 811-838; ed. D. Poirel, <i>Hugonis de Sancto Victore Opera II: De Tribus Diebus</i> , CCCM 177, 2002; tr. H. Feiss, in B. T. Coolman and D. M. Coulter, eds., <i>Trinity and Creation: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard and Adam of St Victor</i> , VTT 1, 2001).

<i>Unione</i>	<i>De unione spiritus et corporis</i> (PL 177, 285-294; ed. A. M. Piazzoni, 'Il <i>De unione spiritus et corporis</i> di Ugo di San Vittore', <i>Studi Medievali</i> 21 (1980), pp. 861-888; translated in Appendix).
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#### ACHARD OF SAINT-VICTOR

<i>Disc.</i>	<i>De discretionem animae, spiritus et mentis</i> (ed. N. M. Haring, 'De discretionem animae, spiritus et mentis', in 'Gilbert of Poitiers, Author of the "De discretionem animae, spiritus et mentis" commonly attributed to Achard of St Victor', <i>Medieval Studies</i> 22, 1960, pp. 148-191; tr. H. Feiss, <i>Achard of St Victor: Works</i> , CS 165, 2001, pp. 354-373).
<i>Sermo.</i>	<i>Sermones</i> (ed. J. Châtillon, <i>Sermons inédits</i> , TPMA 17; trans. H. Feiss, <i>Achard of St Victor: Works</i> , CS 165, 1989).
<i>Unitate</i>	<i>De unitate Dei et pluralitate creaturarum</i> , tr. H. Feiss, <i>Achard of St Victor: Works</i> , CS 165, 2001, pp. 375-480).

#### RICHARD OF SAINT-VICTOR

<i>Adnot. Psalm.</i>	<i>Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos</i> (PL 196, 265-402; trans. Evans, VTT 4, pp. 147-229).
<i>XII patr.</i>	<i>De duodecim patriarchis [=Benjamin minor]</i> (PL 196, 1-64; ed. J. Châtillon and M. Duchet-Suchaux, SC 419, 1997; trans. G. A. Zinn, Jr, <i>Richard of St Victor: The Twelve Patriarchs. The Mystical Ark. Book Three of the Trinity</i> , CWS, Mahwah, NJ, 1979, pp. 52-147).
<i>Arca Moysi</i>	<i>De arca Moysi [=Benjamin maior]</i> (PL 196, 64-192; tr. G. A. Zinn, Jr, in <i>Richard of St Victor: The Twelve Patriarchs. The Mystical Ark. Book Three of the Trinity</i> , CWS, Mahwah, NJ, 1979, pp. 149-370; also tr. D. M. Coulter and I. van 't Spijker, in Zinn, D. M. Coulter and F. van Liere, eds., <i>Spiritual Formation and Mystical Symbolism: A Selection of Works of Hugh and Richard of Saint-Victor, and of Thomas Gallus</i> , VTT 5, 2022, pp. 243-453).
<i>Emmanuele</i>	<i>De Emmanuele</i> (PL 196, 601-664; tr. F. van Liere, in F. van Liere and F. T. Harkins, <i>Interpretation of Scripture: Practice: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Andrew, Richard, and Leonius of St Victor, and Robert of Melun, Peter Comestor and Maurice of Sully</i> , VTT 6, 2015, pp. 357-440).



<i>Erud.</i>	<i>De eruditione interioris hominis</i> (PL 196, 1229-1366).
<i>Exterm.</i>	<i>De exterminatione mali et promotione boni</i> (PL 196, 1073-1116).
<i>Except.</i>	<i>Liber exceptionum</i> (PL 177, 191-284; ed. J. Châtillon, TPMA 5; tr. [partial] in F. T. Harkins and F. van Liere, eds., <i>Interpretation of Scripture: Theory: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Andrew, Godfrey and Richard of St Victor, and Robert of Melun</i> , VTT 3, 2012).
<i>Explan.</i>	<i>Declarationes nunnularum difficultatum Scripturae</i> (PL 196, 255-265; tr. H. Feiss and D. Coulter, <i>Explanation of Several Difficulties of Scripture</i> , in <i>Interpretation of Scripture: Practice</i> , VTT 6, 2016, pp. 261-275).
<i>Quat. grad.</i>	<i>De quatuor gradibus violentiae caritatis</i> (PL 196, 1206-1227; tr. A. Kraebel, VTT 2, pp. 261-300).
<i>Quest.</i>	<i>De quaestionibus regulae Sancti Augustini solutis</i> (ed., M. L. Colker, 'Richard of Saint Victor and the Anonymous of Bridlington', <i>Traditio</i> , 18 (1962), pp. 181-227 (text at pp. 201-223); tr. H. Feiss, <i>Answers to Questions on the Rule of Saint Augustine</i> , in F. van Liere and J. Mousseau, eds., <i>Life at Saint Victor: The Liber Ordinis, the Life of William of Æbelholt, and a Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard, and Odo of Saint Victor, and Other Authors</i> , VTT 9, 2021, pp. 277-302).
<i>Centum</i>	<i>Sermones centum</i> (PL 177, 899-1210; 'Sermon 70' translated by H. Feiss, in F. van Liere and F. T. Harkins, <i>Interpretation of Scripture: Practice: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Andrew, Richard, and Leonius of St Victor, and Robert of Melun, Peter Comestor and Maurice of Sully</i> , VTT 6, 2015, pp. 463-468).
<i>Statu.</i>	<i>De statu interioris hominis</i> (PL 196, 1159-1177; ed. Ribailier, <i>AHDLMA</i> 42 (1967), pp. 61-128; tr. Evans, <i>On the State of the Inner Man</i> , in C. P. Evans, ed., <i>Writings on the Spiritual Life: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Adam, Achard, Richard, Walter, and Godfrey of St Victor</i> , VTT 4, 2013, pp. 241-314).
<i>Trinitate</i>	<i>De trinitate</i> (PL 196, 887C-992A; tr. C P. Evans, <i>On the Trinity</i> , in B. T. Coolman and D. M. Coulter, eds., <i>Trinity and Creation: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard and Adam of St Victor</i> , VTT 1, 2011, 209-382).

<i>Fons.</i>	<i>Fons philosophiae</i> (ed. P. Michaud-Quantin, ‘Godefroy de Saint-Victor: Fons Philosophiae’, in <i>Analecta Medievalia Namurcensia</i> , 8 (1956), pp. 7-69; tr. H. Feiss, in F. T. Harkins and F. van Liere, eds., <i>Interpretation of Scripture: Theory: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Andrew, Godfrey and Richard of St Victor, and Robert of Melun</i> , VTT 3, 2012).
<i>Micro.</i>	<i>Microcosmus</i> (ed. P. Delhay, <i>Microcosmos: Texte établi et présenté</i> , 2 vols., Lille: Gembloux Éditions J. Duculot, 1951; partially tr. H. Feiss, VTT 2, pp. 301-341).

#### WALTER OF SAINT-VICTOR

<i>Sermo.</i>	<i>Sermones</i> (ed. ed. J. Châtillon, <i>Galeri a Sancto Victore et quorundam aliorum: Sermones ineditos triginta sex</i> , CCCM 30, 1975).
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#### THOMAS GALLUS

<i>Prologus</i>	<i>Prologus, Comentarii in Cantica Canticorum</i> (ed. Jeanne Barbet, <i>Commentaires du Cantique des cantiques: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables</i> , TPMA 14, Paris: J. Vrin, 1967; tr. S. Chase, <i>Prologue to the Third Commentary on the Song of Songs</i> , in <i>Angelic Spirituality: Medieval Perspectives on the Ways of Angels</i> , ed. S. Chase, CWS, New York: Paulist Press, 2002, pp. 241-250).
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<i>Ex. reg.</i>	Anonymous, <i>Expositio in regulam S. Augustini</i> (PL 176, 881-925; tr. D. A. Smith, CRL, <i>Explanation of the Rule of Saint Augustine</i> , London: Aeterna Press, 2014).
<i>Libellus</i>	Anonymous, <i>Libellus de Diversis Ordinibus et Professionibus qui sunt in Ecclesia</i> (ed. G. Constable and B. S. Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

<i>Lib. ord.</i>	Gilduin [?], <i>Liber ordinis Sancti Victoris Parisiensis</i> (ed. L. Jocqué and L. Milis, CCCM 82, 1984; tr. J. Mousseau, <i>The Book of the Order of Saint Victor in Paris</i> , in F. van Liere and J. Mousseau, eds., <i>Life at Saint Victor: The Liber Ordinis, the Life of William of Æbelholt, and a Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard, and Odo of Saint Victor, and Other Authors</i> , VTT 9, 2021).
<i>RSA</i>	Saint Augustine, <i>Regula Sancti Augustini</i> (ed. and tr., G. Lawless, <i>Augustine of Hippo and his Monastic Rule</i> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
<i>RSB</i>	Saint Benedict, <i>Regula Sancti Benedicti</i> (ed. and tr. J. McCann, <i>The Rule of Saint Benedict</i> , London: Sheen and Ward, 1972).
<i>Statutes</i>	<i>Twelfth Century Statutes from the Cistercian General Chapter</i> , ed. C. Waddell (Brecht: Cîteaux, 2002).

### OTHER AUTHORS

#### WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX

<i>Orig. an..</i>	<i>De origine animae</i> (ed. E. Martnes, <i>Thesaurus novus Anecdotorum</i> , vol. 5 (1717), col. 881-882; reprinted in PL 163, 1043-1044).
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#### PETER LOMBARD

<i>Sent.</i>	<i>Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae</i> (ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, <i>Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae: 2 vols</i> , Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaenturae ad Claras Aquas, 1971 and 1981 [Vol. 1 contains books 1 and 2; Vol. 2 contains books 3 and 4]).
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#### ALAN OF LILLE

<i>*Quin. dig.</i>	<i>Quinque digressiones cogitationis</i> (M.-T. d'Alverny, <i>Alan de Lille: Textes Inédits</i> , EPM 52).
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#### HELOISE & PETER ABELARD

<i>Epist.</i>	<i>Epistolae</i> (ed. D. E. Luscombe and tr. B. Radice, <i>The Letter Collection of Peter Abelard and Heloise</i> , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013).
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#### HILDEGARD OF BINGEN

<i>Causae</i>	<i>Causae et curae</i> (ed. P. Kaiser, <i>Hildegardis Causae et Curae</i> , Leipzig: Aedibus B.G. Teubner, 1903; tr. P. Throop, <i>Causes and Cures: The Complete English Translation of Hildegardis Causae et Curae Libri VI</i> , Medieval MS, 2008).
LDO	<i>Liber divinorum operum</i> (PL 197, 739-1037; ed. A. Derolez and P. Dronke, CCCM 92, 1996).
<i>Sciv.</i>	<i>Scivias</i> (ed. A. Fückrötter and A. Carlevaris, <i>Scivias</i> , CCCM 43, 2003; tr. Mother C. Hart and J. Bishop, <i>Scivias</i> , CWS, 1990).

#### PETER ABELARD

<i>Inst.</i>	<i>Institutio</i> (ed. D. E. Luscombe and tr. B. Radice, in <i>The Letter Collection of Peter Abelard and Heloise</i> , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013).
<i>Ethica</i>	<i>Ethica seu scito te ipsum</i> (PL 178, 633-677; ed. and tr. D. E. Luscombe, <i>Peter Abelard's Ethics</i> , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

#### HUGH OF FOUILLOY

<i>Med. an.</i>	<i>De medicina animae</i> (PL 176, 1183-1202)
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## INTRODUCTION

This thesis makes a simple yet significant claim. Perception, feeling and thinking were interlinked in twelfth-century accounts of psychology. Today, psychosomatic phenomena such as affect, cognition and perception are investigated using both quantitative and qualitative methods by researchers across increasingly specialised academic departments in medicine, psychology, psychophysics, and the neurological and cognitive sciences. No such disciplinary divisions existed in the twelfth- and thirteenth century Latin West. Instead, these questions, today recognised as ‘psychological’, were understood as belonging to the interconnected yet distinct disciplines of natural philosophy, medicine and theology. At the intersection of these three disciplines, we find handbooks on spiritual psychology: treatises ‘On the Soul’ (*De anima*), which are the primary source base for this thesis.<sup>1</sup> *Libri de anima* combined the fields of ethics and physics together, seeking to understand the connection between soul and body, and share a concern with classifying and systematising the powers of the soul.<sup>2</sup>

The twelfth century in particular witnessed an explosion of *libri de anima*, especially by members of reforming religious communities, namely the Cistercian Order of monks and the canons regular of the Abbey of Saint-Victor. Treatises with names such as *De natura corporis et animae* (*On the Nature of the Body and Soul*), *Dialogus de anima* (*Dialogue on the Soul*), *Epistola de anima* (*Letter on the Soul*) and *De spiritu et anima* (*On the Spirit and Soul*) were composed by the Cistercians William of Saint-Thierry, Aelred of Rievaulx, Isaac of Stella and Alcher of Clairvaux. From the pen of Hugh, Achard, Richard and Godfrey of Saint-Victor came *De unione corporis et spiritus* (*On the Union of the Body and Spirit*), *De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis* (*On the Discretion of the Soul, Spirit and Mind*), *De statu interioris hominis* (*On the State of the Inner Man*), and *Microcosmus* (*Microcosm*), respectively.

Much like the sciences of today, these treatises sought to systematically understand the interrelationships between bodily and mental phenomenon. However, as groups predominantly concerned with spirituality and attaining mystical experiences of God, the terminology, categories and models these medieval thinkers embraced were unstable and even contradictory. It has been convincingly shown that the term ‘emotion’ was invented in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a secular category to designate a range of general activities relating to

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<sup>1</sup> On the Cistercians as psychologists, and their treatises on the soul as psychology, see the chapter ‘Psychologists’ in A.-M. Frachebound, *The First Cistercian Spiritual Writers*, tr. R. Seagraves (Xlibris, 2001), pp. 80-93.

<sup>2</sup> Bernard McGinn, *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology*, CFS 24 (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977), pp. 19-20.

psychology, law, observation, evolution, organisms, the brain, nerves, expression, behaviour and viscera.<sup>3</sup> By contrast, Thomas Dixon remarks that the terms which medieval authors used – ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ – were connected to a Christian worldview and words such as ‘soul’, ‘conscience’, ‘fall’, ‘sin’, ‘grace’, ‘Spirit’, ‘Satan’, ‘will’, ‘lower appetite’, ‘self-love’ and so on.<sup>4</sup> Cistercian and Victorine authors, especially, developed a theology around the Latin nouns *affectio* and *affectus* (see Glossary). In the psychological literature produced by both groups, these terms denote both ‘affection’ – an emotional attachment, desire or inclination towards someone or something – as well as the loving or willing power of the soul, often also identified with the will (*voluntas*). These twin functions designate ‘affectivity’: emotional states. In these malleable psychological systems, affectivity is often characterised as the mediating matrix for two modes of perception: (1) sensory perceptions arising from the body (*sensus*) and (2) mental perceptions occurring from thought: variously referred to as *ratio*, *cognitio*, *intellectus* (see Glossary). Any account of medieval experience must, therefore, acknowledge the significant role of affectivity.

### The Cistercian Order

Established in Cîteaux in 1098 by Robert of Molesme (c. 1027 – 1110), the Cistercians were a reforming offshoot of Benedictine monasticism. The Gregorian Reform Movement of the eleventh century established by Hildebrand as Pope Gregory VII from 1073-1085 had seen the reform of the clergy, instating for the first-time commitments to chastity and the *ordo* of the Church. Beginning around 1050 and ending around 1215, the long twelfth century has rightly been called a period of ‘renaissance’. In this period, diverse new forms of monasticism started to emerge – both eremitical and more institutionalised, as a response to widespread religious, intellectual, political, social, economic, agrarian and urban shifts. These were religious orders such as the Camaldolese (c. 1010), Vallombrosians (1036), Gradmontines (c. 1076), Carthusians (1084), Cistercians (1098), Abbey of Fontevrault (1099), Victorines (1111), Premonstratensians (1120), Arrouaisians (1121) and, later, the mendicant orders of the Franciscans (1209), Dominicans (1216) and Carmelites (c.1220); each sought a deeper commitment to embedding the ideals of ‘reformation’, ‘renewal’ and ‘restoration’ in their monastic disciplines by following a renewed commitment to the *simplicitas* (‘simplicity’) and

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<sup>3</sup> T. Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

voluntary poverty of the Apostles, in addition to a new focus on manual labour and carrying as a way of expressing the *opus Dei* or work of God.<sup>5</sup>

As a sub-type of Benedictine monasticism, the pattern of Cistercian life derived from a severe interpretation of the *Rule of Saint Benedict* (c. 516). Saint Benedict's monastery, as C. H. Lawrence has put it, was not a school in an academic sense, but rather a 'combat unit' of troops, trained in 'spiritual warfare' by an abbot, in which 'the objective was the conquest of sensuality and the self-will as to make a man totally receptive to God.'<sup>6</sup> The strict observance the Cistercians adopted sought to imitate the apostolic poverty of Christ and his disciples and were also a reaction against the supposedly lax habits of the main followers of Saint Benedict, the Cluniacs. The example of the founding of the monastery of Cîteaux (1098) is typical of the Order's renewed pledge to asceticism. By establishing Cîteaux in a rural location, Robert of Molesme harked back to the isolation of the Desert Fathers. Manual labour became as crucial to the spirituality of the early Cistercians as the liturgy. To create a sense of *communitas* or 'community' among monks at Cîteaux, brothers were expected to strictly adhere to the Order's customary, the *Carta caritatis* (*Charter of Love*) written in 1119. This document had been drawn up by Abbot Stephen Harding as a way of binding together the fledgling community of Cîteaux together through *caritas*, imagined both as a form of spiritual friendship closely resembling Anselm's notion of *amicitia* and as a series of rules and regulations covering the administration of Cistercian abbeys.<sup>7</sup>

The idea of the Cistercians as spiritual frontiersmen, founding monasteries in remote, inhospitable locations, was a common trope in the histories of Cistercian monasteries and the hagiographies of their founders to legitimise the status and privileges of the Order. It is a trope, however, that has since been debunked as an inaccurate portrayal of the reality of Cistercian foundations; instead, new Cistercian abbeys were largely located on previously developed land and utilised the Cistercian grange system, *conversi* labourers and new agricultural, water and

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<sup>5</sup> For further context see L. J. Daly, S.J., *Benedictine Monasticism: Its Formation and Development through the 12<sup>th</sup> Century* (New York: Sheen and Ward, 1965), pp. 173-187; H. Grundmann, *Religious Movements in the Middle Ages: The Historical Links between Heresy, the Mendicant Orders, and the Women's Religious Movements in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Century, with the Historical Foundations of German Mysticism*, tr. S. Rowan (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), pp. 7-9; W. Simons, 'New Forms of Religious Life in Medieval Western Europe', in *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism*, eds. A. Hollywood and P. Z. Beckman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 80-112 (especially 87-99).

<sup>6</sup> C. H. Lawrence, *Medieval Monasticism: Forms of Religious Life in Western Europe in the Middle Ages* (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 27.

<sup>7</sup> V. Werbal, 'Cistercians in Dialogue: Bringing the World into the Monastery', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Cistercian Order*, pp. 238-239.

building technologies to cultivate monastic territory effectively.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, Cistercians did not always remain secluded in their monasteries; in their practice of *caritas* monks saw themselves as having a duty to go out into the world and spread the Order's mission. Cistercians, therefore, inhabited several different worlds: they became preachers, holders of public office, advisors to rulers and popes, and Cistercian *studia* were established in major cities such as Paris, Toulouse, Montpellier and Oxford for the training of academically gifted students.<sup>9</sup>

As an institution, the Cistercian Order has been regarded as one of the first truly international monastic organisations, developing rapidly through its network of mother-daughter filiations, establishing over 500 abbeys stretching east to west from Spain to the Baltic, and north to south from Scotland to Sicily.<sup>10</sup> While some elements of the early expansion of the Order were due to the expansionist founding of new daughter houses, the success of the Order can only be explained by the incorporation of previous religious houses into the Order; the decision to be assimilated into the Order likely being the initiative of these houses as much as coming from 'above' through Cistercian structures.<sup>11</sup> The Order, though, did possess powerful centralised decision-making machinery in the General Chapter, a juridical structure – becoming increasingly common in the twelfth century – that utilised representatives from each monastic house to regulate the activities of the institution as a whole.

The most celebrated Cistercian was Bernard of Clairvaux (1090/91-1153).<sup>12</sup> Bernard, born into a powerful noble family from Dijon in Burgundy, was one of the second generation

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<sup>8</sup> R. Fossier, 'L'Économie cistercienne dans les plaines du nord-ouest de l'Europe', *L'économie cistercienne: géographie, mutations, du Moyen Âge aux temps modernes*, centre culturel de l'abbaye de Flaran 3 (1981), pp. 53-74; C. H. Berman, *Medieval Agriculture, the Southern French Countryside, and the Early Cistercians: A Study of Forty-Three Monasteries* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1986); R. D. Oram, 'Holy Frontiersman? Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century Monastic Colonisation and Socio-Economic Change in Poland and Scotland', in R. Unger and J. Basista, eds., *Britain and Poland-Lithuania: Contact and Comparison from the Middle Ages to 1795* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 103-122 (see esp. p. 107); J. Burton and J. Kerr, *The Cistercians in the Middle Ages* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2011), pp. 189-201; E. Jamrozak, *Survival and Success on Medieval Borders: Cistercian Houses in Medieval Scotland and Pomerania from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth Century* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), esp. pp. 47-140

<sup>9</sup> For the different worlds the Cistercians inhabited see the essays collected in volume 73 of *Cîteaux – Commentarii Cistercienses* entitled 'Cistercian Worlds', especially E. R. Price-Goodfellow and J. Ford, 'Cistercian Worlds: An Introduction', pp. 5-11. For other literature see M. G. Newman, *The Boundaries of Charity: Cistercian Culture and Ecclesiastical Reform, 1098-1180* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Burton and Kerr, *The Cistercians*, pp. 189-191. For the Cistercians interactions with cities like Paris and Toulouse see M. Sternberg, *Cistercian Architecture and Medieval Society* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 207-260.

<sup>10</sup> M. G. Newman, 'Foundation and Twelfth Century', in M. B. Brunn, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to the Cistercian Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 25.

<sup>11</sup> C. H. Berman, *The Cistercian Evolution: The Invention of a Religious Order in the Twelfth Century Europe* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), pp. 93-160.

<sup>12</sup> For a history of Bernard's life and thought see the studies of Gillian R. Evans: *The Mind of Bernard of Clairvaux* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) and *Bernard of Clairvaux* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Brian Patrick McGuire has provided a succinct, updated account: 'Bernard's Life and Works: A Review', in *A Companion to Bernard of Clairvaux*, ed. B. P. McGuire (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 18-61.



of Cistercian reformers and served as a key Cistercian spokesperson for the Cistercian philosophy of *caritas*. Around 1110, at roughly 20 years old, Bernard along with brothers and friends joined the community at Cîteaux. His personal attraction, writings and charismatic preaching were responsible for attracting the next generation of converts to the Order such as Guerric of Igny (c. 1070-1157), Isaac of Stella (1100-1169) and Aelred of Rievaulx (1110-1167).<sup>13</sup> Isaac of Stella, an English cleric who had studied at the schools, was persuaded to join the Cistercians. His meeting with Bernard, perhaps in 1139 or early 1140 when Bernard preached to the clerics of Paris, clearly left an impression on him.<sup>14</sup> Isaac would later write that the Abbot of Clairvaux had ‘something super-human’ (*aliquid super hominis*) about him, his virtues of innocence, generosity, zeal, authority and charity making him an example of the ‘highest stage of justice in this life’ (*est in hac vita supremus iustitiae gradus*).<sup>15</sup>

Bernard’s own monastery of Clairvaux, founded in 1115, was indeed a critical nexus of the Order. In 1130, there were 39 Cistercian monasteries: the mother house of Cîteaux possessing 12 filiations, while Clairvaux and Morimond, both founded in 1115, held seven each.<sup>16</sup> At the point of Bernard’s death in the mid-twelfth century, Clairvaux had ballooned in size, becoming home to 200 monks and 500 lay brothers. And with approximately 160 houses in its filiation – Cîteaux holding 57 and Morimond 87 – Clairvaux constituted just under half of the total 340 houses then comprising the Order.<sup>17</sup>

It is also with Bernard of Clairvaux that Martha Newman has argued we find the beginnings of the affective spirituality of the Cistercians, a way of life that privileged love and friendship. Bernard bridged the gap between scriptural exegesis and what he called the ‘book of experience’ (*liber experientiae*), encouraging ‘his audiences to use their sensory and somatic knowledge as a starting point in their progression toward the divine’ and as a medium for self-transformation.<sup>18</sup> This receptivity to experience and openness to receive all social classes (not just the nobility) into their ranks – courtiers, *conversi*, students and scholars – has been hailed

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<sup>13</sup> Berman, *The Cistercian Evolution*, p. 2.

<sup>14</sup> B. McGinn, ‘Isaac of Stella in Context’, in *The Selected Works of Isaac of Stella: A Cistercian Voice from the Twelfth Century*, ed. D. Deme (Abingdon: Ashgate, 2007), p. 172.

<sup>15</sup> Isaac of Stella, *Sermo* 52.15-16 (PL 194, 1869C-D; SC 339, 232-234; CFS 66, pp. 182-183). See Michael Casey, OCSO, ‘Reading Saint Bernard: The Man, The Medium, the Message’, in *A Companion to Bernard of Clairvaux*, pp. 81-83, for a discussion of this passage.

<sup>16</sup> C. J. Holdsworth, ‘Bernard of Clairvaux: His First and Greatest Miracle was Himself’, in Brunn, *The Cambridge Companion to the Cistercian Order*, p. 179.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>18</sup> Newman, ‘Foundation and Twelfth Century’, in *The Cambridge Companion to the Cistercian Order*, p. 32; A. Hollywood, ‘Song Experience, and the Book in Benedictine Monasticism’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism*, pp. 74-76.

as one of the key reasons for the expansion of the Cistercian Order in Bernard's time.<sup>19</sup> This was in-keeping with the structures of the Cistercian Order since the refusal of the Cistercians to accept child oblates meant that most new recruits had already reached adulthood and could draw on a reservoir of life experiences, having made friendships, enjoyed familial and sexual relationships, and gained skills through the pursuit of other vocations. Bernard was influential because he popularised an outlook in which moral thought and its practical wisdom for regulating everyday actions was prized over abstract theology. Thus, the writings of the Church Fathers such as Augustine and Gregory the Great offered more utility to the Cistercians than the knowledge to be learnt from the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric, logic) and *quadrivium* (geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music) comprising the seven liberal arts.<sup>20</sup> As centres for copying, reading, exegesis and also living out what was contained in their books, Cistercian monasteries were living bridges to the patristic age. Their engagement with the theological traditions they were in dialogue with has been aptly described by Jean Leclercq as an 'experiential mode of transmission' because of the presence within their daily lives of these ideals.<sup>21</sup>

Since the publication of Louis Lekai's seminal history of the Cistercians, the latter history of the Cistercian Order has long been seen as one of decline, the Order steadily departing from the 'ideals' of stability, asceticism and poverty of its initial founders in the late eleventh and twelfth century.<sup>22</sup> This view has since seriously challenged by waves of scholarship that have argued that, rather than decline, the changes in Cistercian spirituality over this period represent a natural evolution of the expansion of the role of monks: *caritas* extended beyond the cloister 'to include the monks' interest in ordering and controlling their material world and their sense of an ideal Christian society'.<sup>23</sup> Although, whilst the Cistercians could attract new talent from the schools with their asceticism and monastic theology, eventually new religious reform movements in the thirteenth century, such as the Franciscans and Dominicans,

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<sup>19</sup> Werbal, 'Cistercians in Dialogue', pp. 239-242.

<sup>20</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, *On the Song of Songs I* (trans.) K. Walsh (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1971), sermon 1, 11, p.6: 'Once the touch of Spirit can inspire a song like this, and only personal experience can unfold its meaning.'

<sup>21</sup> J. Leclercq, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God*, p. 106.

<sup>22</sup> L. J. Lekai, *The Cistercians: Ideals and Reality* (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1977).

<sup>23</sup> C. Bouchard, 'Cistercian Ideals versus Reality: 1134 Reconsidered', *Cîteaux*, 39 (1988), 217-231; Newman, *The Boundaries of Charity*, p. 9; Berman, *The Cistercian Evolution*; M. B. Bruun and E. Jamroziak, 'Introduction: Withdrawal and Engagement', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Cistercian Order*, pp. 1-2. For the later history of the Cistercians see P. King, 'The Cistercian Order: 1200-1600' and M. Casey, OCSO, 'The Cistercian Order since 1600', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Cistercian Order*, pp. 38-49 and 50-62.

with a greater focus on poverty and with greater integration with the schools and universities, would eventually come to compete with the older forms of monasticism.

### The Abbey and ‘School’ of Saint-Victor

The Abbey of Saint-Victor was first established by William of Champeaux (ca. 1070-1121) in 1111 on the Left Bank of the Seine, just outside Paris (although the building of an abbey church did not occur until at least 1114).<sup>24</sup> Beginning from the early twentieth century, several histories of the Abbey of Saint-Victor have been written, and unsurprisingly the majority of these have been from historians working in the French tradition of scholarship, such as Bonnard Fourier, Jean Châtillon and Dominique Poirel.<sup>25</sup> Initially, William of Champeaux’s connection with Bishop Galon of Paris had secured royal patronage in the form of endowments from Louis VI for his new abbey school: endowments that would be increased following William’s election as Bishop of Châlons-sur-Marne in 1113.<sup>26</sup> Records show that only 18 canons resided at Saint-Victor in 1134.<sup>27</sup> By all accounts, the murder of prior Thomas on 30 August, 1133 by men of Stephen de Garlande (c. 1070-1150) was a turning point, encouraging an outpouring of sympathy and donations of land for the poor Parisian abbey.<sup>28</sup> It was likely during the ensuing ‘golden age’ between 1135 and 1185 that the church at the abbey was extended to 65 metres

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<sup>24</sup> The commonly assumed dating of 1108 (the year of Louis VI’s coronation) has been shown to be without textual foundation by Constant J. Mews. See ‘Between the Schools of Abelard and Saint-Victor in the mid Twelfth Century: The Witness of Robert of Melun’, in D. Poirel, ed., *L’École de Saint-Victor de Paris: Influence et rayonnement du Moyen Âge à L’époque moderne* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), p. 133; ‘The Foundation of St Victor (Easter 1111) and the Chronology of Abelard’s Early Career’, in I. Rosier-Catach, ed., *Arts du langage et théologie aux confins des XI<sup>e</sup> et XII<sup>e</sup> siècles: Textes, maîtres, débats* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), pp. 83-104; ‘Abelard, Heloise and Discussion of Love in the Twelfth-Century Schools’, in B. S. Hellemans, ed. *Rethinking Abelard: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), p. 20; ‘Memories of William of Champeaux: The Necrology and the Early Years of Saint-Victor’, in A. Löffler and Björn Gebert, eds., *Legitur in Necrologio Victorino: Studien zum Nekrolog der Abtei Saint-Victor zu Paris*, CV 7 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2015), pp. 78-86.

<sup>25</sup> F. Bonnard, *Histoire de l’abbaye royale et de l’ordre des chanoines réguliers de St. Victor de Paris*, 2 vols. (Paris: Savaete, 1904); J. Châtillon, ‘La culture de l’école de Saint-Victor au 12<sup>e</sup> siècle’, in M. de Gandillac and E. Jeaneau, eds., *Entretiens sur la renaissance du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris: Mouton, 1968), pp. 147-178; *Id. Le mouvement canonique au moyen âge: réforme de l’église, spiritualité et culture*, BV 3 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992); D. Poirel, ‘L’école de Saint-Victor au Moyen Âge: bilan d’un demi-siècle historiographique’, *Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes*, 156:1 (1998), pp. 187-207; *Id.*, ed., *L’école de Saint-Victor de Paris: Influence et rayonnement du Moyen Âge à l’époque moderne* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010); *Id.*, ‘Qu’est-ce que Saint-Victor?’, in D. Poirel and M. J. Janeczek, ed., *Omnium expetendorum prima est sapientia: Studies on Victorine Thought and Influence*, BV 29 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2021), pp. 487-529. Victorine theology has also attracted interest from the American tradition: see P. E. Wheeler, ‘The Twelfth-Century School of St. Victor’, Ph.D. Diss. (University of Southern California, 1970).

<sup>26</sup> For the history of Saint-Victor’s endowments see R-H. Bautier, ‘Les origines et les premiers développements de l’abbaye Saint-Victor de Paris’, in J. Longère, ed., *L’Abbaye Parisienne de Saint-Victor au Moyen Age: Communications présentées au XIII<sup>e</sup> Colloque d’Humanisme médiéval de Paris (1986-1988) et réunies par Jean Longère* (Brepols: Turnhout, 1991), pp. 23-52.

<sup>27</sup> Bautier, ‘Les origines’, p. 44.

<sup>28</sup> Bautier, ‘Les origines’, p. 43.

in length, making it the second largest building in Paris.<sup>29</sup> At the same time the Victorine federation expanded greatly: the customs of the Abbey of Saint-Victor were adopted by abbeys, priories and churches in modern day France, England, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and Iceland. The will of King Louis VIII in 1225 bestowed £4000 for 40 Victorine abbeys as well as £400 for the Abbey of Saint-Victor itself; and, as Björn Gebert has shown, this number of 40 abbeys likely did not include every Victorine foundation.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, in contrast to the higher degree of uniformity imposed by the Cistercian General Chapter and the internal visitation of abbeys, there were various coexisting forms of life among Victorine foundations: for instance, abbeys could be planned and founded ('from above') by Saint-Victor; abbeys could ask to be reformed ('from below') and have Victorine canons and an abbot sent to them (as in the case of Andrew of Saint-Victor's multiple secondments to Wigmore Abbey); Augustinian canons could come to the Abbey of Saint-Victor to learn and study and then bring back select aspects of Victorine life to their home abbeys; and Victorine customs were also adopted by female convents from the thirteenth century.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> W. W. Clark, 'The Twelfth-Century Church of St Victor in Paris: A New Proposal', in E. A. Matter and L. Smith, eds., *From Knowledge to Beatitude: St Victor, Twelfth-Century Scholars and Beyond. Essays in Honour of Grover A. Zinn, Jr.* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), pp. 78-79.

<sup>30</sup> B. Gebert, 'Sankt Viktor von Paris und die Viktoriner Institutionelle Strukturen eines mittelalterlichen Klosterverbandes', in B. Gebert and A. Löffler, eds., *Legitur in Necrologio Victorino: Studien zum Nekrolog der Abtei Saint-Victor zu Paris* (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2015), p. 123.

<sup>31</sup> Gebert, 'Sankt Viktor von Paris', pp. 124-125.



shown, in contrast to the more self-edifying and individualistic practices of monks (such as the Cistercians), it was a distinctive trait of canonical life ‘to teach by word and example’ (*docere verbo et exemplo*), a phrase that encapsulated a commitment to personal growth *and* the edification of the wider public through preaching and providing an example of piety and neighbourly charity to be imitated.<sup>33</sup> In doing so, the Victorines saw themselves as consciously emulating the life of Saint Augustine himself: for Godfrey of Saint-Victor the Bishop of Hippo was the man who ‘teaches by example how to live and by word how to know’.<sup>34</sup> Giving us a sense of the degree to which a Victorine canon regular was deeply integrated into the fabric of life in twelfth-century Paris, Godfrey adds the following:

Sometimes they devote their time to the office of clerics;  
 sometimes they engage in manual labour;  
 sometimes they return to the drinks of their father [Augustine];  
 they drink something spiritual, whatever pleases each.<sup>35</sup>

In doing so, he perhaps best encapsulates the dual active and contemplative, public and personal, outlook which gave the Victorine federation of canons its distinctive world view.

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<sup>33</sup> C. W. Bynum, *Docere Verbo et Exemplo: An Aspect of Twelfth-Century Spirituality* (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1979); *Id.*, ‘The Spirituality of the Regular Canons’, in *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 22-58; H. B. Feiss, ‘Preaching by Word and Example’, in E. A. Matter and L. Smith, eds., *From Knowledge to Beatitude*, pp. 153-185; *Id.* ‘Pastoral Ministry: Preaching and Confession’, in H. B. Feiss and J. Mousseau, eds., *A Companion to the Abbey of Saint Victor in Paris* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), pp. 147-183. See also R. J. Porwoll, ‘Introduction: Regular Canons, Restoration, and Reform’, in R. J. Porwoll and D. A. Orsbon, eds., *Victorine Restoration: Essays on Hugh of St Victor, Richard of St Victor, and Thomas Gallus* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2021), pp. 14-22 and 29-34.

<sup>34</sup> *Fons.*, line 721 (Michaud-Quantin, p. 60; VTT 3, p. 412): ‘Hinc exemplo vivere, scire verbo docet’.

<sup>35</sup> *Fons.*, lines 749-752 (Michaud-Quantin, p. 61; VTT 3, p. 413): ‘Et nunc ad officium vacant clericale, / Nunc ad exercitium pergunt manuale / Nunc ad patris pocula recurrentes, quale / Cuique placet aliquid bibunt spiritale.’






Figure 2. 'The Abbey of St. Victor. Founded in Paris' (*L'Abbaye St. Victor. Fondée auprès de Paris*) (c. 1650). Side view shows three levels of arched windows. Engraving by Jean Marot. Part of the series: *Recueil des plus beaux édifices et frontispices des églises de Paris*.



Figure 3. 'Another View of the Abbey Church of St Victor in the Neighbourhood of the same Name' (*Ander Prosp: der Alten Kirche zu S. Victor in Der Vorstatt dieses Nahmens*), Le Musée National de l'Éducation (c. 1650).

Practising what they preached, at the Abbey of Saint-Victor there was also a ‘school of learning’ open to the public. The Abbey itself was internationally renowned for its extensive library and its comprehensive instruction that masters offered in biblical exegesis and the liberal arts.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, rather than the top-down institutional apparatus of the Cistercians that promoted expansion, men were drawn to Saint-Victor both because of the opportunities to study at this school and the distinctive, reform-centred way of life in practice at the abbey. One of these students, Hugh of Saint-Victor, arrived at an uncertain date from the Saxon Abbey of Hammersleben and began teaching from 1115. From 1133 until his death in 1141, Hugh discharged the duties of the head of the school (*scholasticus*). This first generation of Victorines also included the poet and musician Adam of Saint-Victor (d. 1146) in addition to the metaphysician Achard of Saint-Victor (c. 1100-1171).<sup>37</sup> Profoundly influenced by Hugh, Achard of Saint-Victor would serve as abbot from 1155-1162. Even during the disastrous abbacy of Ernisius (1162-1172), the abbey would continue its ethical training via a second generation of individuals such as Richard of Saint-Victor (d. 1173) and Andrew of Saint-Victor (d. 1175), both of whom were probably taught by Hugh of Saint-Victor. Richard served as sub-prior (1159-1162), and later as prior (from 1162) until his death. During this time, Richard would engage Andrew, a Hebraist, in debate over the correct meaning of scripture.<sup>38</sup> Finally a third generation of Victorines encompassed men such as Godfrey of Saint-Victor (ca. 1125/30-1194). After studying the liberal arts under Adam of Balsham (between 1140-1150) and the sacred sciences (between 1150-1155), Godfrey of Saint-Victor would enter Saint-Victor sometime between 1155 and 1160 and would integrate his understanding of the liberal arts with Victorine theology in his writings of the 1170s and 80s. Overall, the academic and reforming credentials of the abbey attracted individuals from France, England, Germany, Italy and Scandinavia – men such as Bernard of Clairvaux, Peter Abelard (1079-1142), Peter Lombard

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<sup>36</sup> For the influence of the Victorines, especially Hugh, Richard and Andrew of Saint-Victor, on the study of the Bible see the now classic study by Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), 83-186. For more on the school see Wheeler, ‘The Twelfth-Century School of St. Victor’, especially pp. 29-42.

<sup>37</sup> See Margot E. Fassler, ‘Who was Adam of St. Victor? The Evidence of the Sequence Manuscripts’, *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 37:2 (1984), pp. 233-269; *Id.*, *Gothic Song: Victorine Sequences and Augustinian Reform in Twelfth-Century Paris*, 2nd edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2011).

<sup>38</sup> For Andrew’s method see Smalley, *The Study of the Bible* (n. 36 above); R. Berndt, *André de Saint-Victor (mort en 1175): Exégète et théologien*, BV 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991); F. A. van Liere, ‘Andrew of St Victor (d.1175): Scholar between Cloister and School’, in J. W. Drijvers and A. A. MacDonald, eds., *Centres of Learning: Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East* (Leiden: Brill, 1993), pp. 187-195. Richard’s dispute with Andrew is related by van Liere in ‘Andrew of Saint-Victor and his Franciscan Critics’, in I. van ’t Spijker, ed., *The Multiple Senses of Scripture: The Role of Exegesis in Early-Christian and Medieval Culture* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 299-300.



(1096-1160), Otto of Freising (c.1114–1158), Thomas Beckett (c.1119-1170), Peter Comestor (d.1179), Thorlak Thorhallson (1133-1193) and St Anthony of Padua (1195-1231).

In 1148, Gilduin would choose Odo of Saint-Victor (prior at Saint-Victor from 1133), as the abbot of the neighbouring abbey of Sainte-Geneviève, another centre renowned for academic study which had been recently absorbed into the Victorine federation. Alongside the Abbey of Saint-Victor, the Saint-Genevieve and Notre-Dame Cathedral school would go on to form the major constituents of the University of Paris. In fact, the Victorine presence at the University of Paris would continue well into the fourteenth century. Gerard of Saint-Victor, for instance, would hold the Victorine chair in the theology faculty from 1306 to 1317 and embody the Victorines' involvement in both intellectual and royal concerns: Gerard was both part of the commission that denounced Marguerite Porete's *Mirror of Simple Souls* and helped craft the response to Philippe le Bel's queries regarding the jurisdiction of the French crown over the Knights Templar.<sup>39</sup>

Due to its academic credentials and the coherence of the thought of its members, the Abbey of Saint-Victor is often referred to as a 'school'. But is this label appropriate? The other notable contemporaneous school was the so-called 'school of Chartres', a group of Platonist philosophers who taught and worked within the confines of the cathedral school of Chartres. That Chartres possessed a school devoted to teaching has not been contested. The utility, however, of the term 'school' to describe this intellectual grouping of philosophers has, since the mid-1990s, been subject to critique, largely by Richard W. Southern.<sup>40</sup> While Southern's qualifications have helped fine-tune the precision of scholarship on Chartres, many of his assumptions have been countered or been proven false.<sup>41</sup> Particularly persuasive are the remarks of Willemien Otten who has argued that Southern was mistaken in overly focusing on who was excluded from Chartres and, in the process, downplayed the affinities linking together

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<sup>39</sup> For information on Gerard see Marshall Crossnoe, 'The Philosophical Questions of Gerard of Saint-Victor', in William O. Duba, Russell L. Friedman and Chris Schabel, eds., *Studies in Later Medieval Intellectual History in Honor of William J. Courtenay*, Bibliotheca 14 (Leuven: Peeters, 2017), pp. 89-112.

<sup>40</sup> R. W. Southern, 'Chartrian Humanism: A Romantic Misconception', in *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe. Volume 1: Foundations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 58-101. This was a revision of the thesis Southern presented in R. L. Benson and G. Constable, eds., *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 113-37. See Édouard Jeuneau's chapter, 'The School of Chartres: Myth or Reality?', in *Rethinking the School of Chartres*, trans. C. Desmarais (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 17-27, for a chronological survey of the historiography concerned Chartres.

<sup>41</sup> Jeuneau specifically notes the work of Nikolaus Häring, Roberto Giacone and Peter Dronke, and offers two correctives himself: the enlarged size and importance of the diocese of Chartres and the common practice of ecclesiastical absenteeism during this period. See *Rethinking the School of Chartres*, pp. 25-26. Peter Dronke included two Chartrian philosophers –Thierry of Chartres and William of Conches – amongst the 'innovators' of the twelfth-century thought precisely because of their intellectual contributions. See Dronke, ed., *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 309-27 and 358-85.

members of the school.<sup>42</sup> Similarly, Winthrop Wetherbee has stated that ‘it remains clear that there are important and widely influential common elements in the thought of those masters whose names have been most frequently associated with Chartres.’<sup>43</sup> Therefore, I am persuaded by Wetherbee’s use of ‘school’ to mean a ‘convenient label for a body of ideas’ that united a network of individual with similar interests and method of working.<sup>44</sup> Can we apply this same label to the Victorines?

In short, yes. However, ‘it is important to distinguish the school *at* Saint-Victor from the school *of* Saint-Victor’.<sup>45</sup> Recent research has found very little evidence to support the commonly-held assumption that the Abbey of Saint-Victor operated a school that was accessible to the public.<sup>46</sup> There is also very scant information on where, when, how and to whom the canons of Saint-Victor preached. There was, of course, a system dedicated to the training of new canons at Saint-Victor, however, the training in reading, manners and self-discipline was only available to those residing within the abbey walls. Consequently, we must separate any notion of a public-facing school of the abbey from the way of life and methodology of biblical scholarship practised by the canons living at Saint-Victor.

It is in this latter sense that the Victorine school most resembles that of Chartres. Instead of a focus on Platonic philosophy, the Victorines were a community of individuals with a shared emphasis on the *method* of systematising knowledge, especially scriptural and biblical knowledge. Dividing up knowledge, classifying it, and noticing correspondences between different series was a Victorine speciality.<sup>47</sup> Each individual possessed their own niche, as Dominique Poirel suggests: ‘Adam the Poet, Richard the Theologian of Contemplation and the Trinity, Achard the Metaphysician of Plurality, Andrew the Biblical Scholar, Godfrey the Humanist, Thomas Gallus the Dionysian, John the Historian, and Hugh who was all of these at the same time.’<sup>48</sup> The very fact that all these individuals did not seek to repeat or refine the intellectual projects of their predecessors and colleagues, but possessed their own sub-

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<sup>42</sup> W. Otten, *From Paradise to Paradigm: A Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), note 41, p. 35.

<sup>43</sup> W. Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, Cosmology, and the Twelfth-Century Renaissance’, in Dronke, *A History of Twelfth-Century Philosophy*, p. 21.

<sup>44</sup> W. Wetherbee, *Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), xii.

<sup>45</sup> S. C. Ferruolo, *The Origins of the University: The Schools of Paris and their Critics, 1100-1215* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 28.

<sup>46</sup> Joseph Hopper is currently tackling this question in his thesis. He has argued for an intellectual community at Saint-Victor at a talk entitled ‘The Intellectual Community at Saint-Victor: 1108-1250’, given to the European History, 1150-1550 seminar series at the Institute of Historical Research in London on 7 March 2024.

<sup>47</sup> Poirel, ‘Introduction’, *L’école de Saint-Victor de Paris*, p. 21.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, p. 5. See also Poirel, ‘L’école de Saint-Victor au Moyen Âge’, pp. 187-207, for a prosopography of the school.

disciplines, Poirel argues, is evidence that ‘just as the abbey did not try to maintain a Victorine federation... it did not try to maintain a Victorine school, in the sense of a unitary, coherent and stable current of thought.’<sup>49</sup> Therefore, a loose association and the originality and variation among individuals stemmed from an institutionally disseminated methodology not a monolithic subject area.

Unfortunately, it must be said that the pattern of scholarship on the Abbey of Saint-Victor’s intellectual methodology fits into a similar ‘ideals versus reality’ pattern that characterises Cistercian historiography.<sup>50</sup> The prevailing narrative is that Hugh of Saint-Victor’s humanistic endeavour to provide a grand synthesis of the canonical vocation with all aspects of learning slowly splintered into Victorines focusing on individual sources and methodologies following the golden intellectual years of the Abbey (1135-1150). In contrast to the monastic patristic theologies of the Benedictines and Cistercians, an emphasis on a holistic philosophy flavoured the priorities of novices at Saint-Victor. ‘Learn everything’, Hugh exhorted, ‘later you will see that nothing is superfluous’ (*disce omnia, videbis postea nihil esse superfluum*).<sup>51</sup> No learning was wasted. All knowledge was interconnected in the journey of the novice to transform himself into the image of Christ. In his *De vanitate mundi* (*On the World’s Vanity*), Hugh even describes a school of boys of various ages – no doubt modelled on his experience as *magister* of Saint-Victor, who, despite being engaged in various activities – grammar, writing, drawing, logic, rhetoric, music, astronomy, medicine and natural philosophy – are ‘all... united in their desire to make progress.’<sup>52</sup> This systematic attitude of viewing all of nature as connected to the process of contemplation has correctly been claimed as the greatest contribution of Victorine thought to the Western church in the twelfth century.<sup>53</sup> A common opposition for Anselm – drawn from Augustine – was “I believe so that I may understand” (*Credo ut intelligam*) and “I understand so that I may believe” (*Intelligo ut credam*); to this the Victorines added “I love so that I may understand” (*Amo ut intelligam*) – ‘a principle which, they contended, synthesized the spiritual and emotional elements of human life, and brought them into relation with the other world as well as with this.’<sup>54</sup> Indeed, Hugh of Saint-Victor’s enormously popular educational manual for novices, the *Didascalicon*,

<sup>49</sup> Poirel, ‘Introduction’, *L’école de Saint-Victor de Paris*, p. 25.

<sup>50</sup> C. Németh, *Quasi aurora consurgens: The Victorine Theological Anthropology and its Decline*, BV 27 (Brepols: Turnhout, 2020), pp. 307-500.

<sup>51</sup> *Did.*, 6.3 (PL 176, 800C-801A; Taylor, p. 137).

<sup>52</sup> Hugh of Saint-Victor, *De vanitate mundi*, PL 176, 710A; trans. A Religious of C.S.M.V., in *Hugh of Saint-Victor: Selected Spiritual Writings* (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), p. 168: ‘...una tamen omnibus est proficiendi voluntas...’

<sup>53</sup> P. J. Healy, ‘Mysticism and the School of St. Victor’, *Church History*, 1:4 (1932), p. 213.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 214.

demonstrates the extent to which a more cohesive programme of education was on offer at Saint-Victor than among Cistercian monasteries. ‘Philosophy’, incorporates four strands of knowledge: (1) the theoretical (theology, natural philosophy, and the mathematical *quadrivium*); (2) the practical (ethics, economics, civil); (3) the logical (*trivium*); and (4) the mechanical (agriculture, architecture, medicine, and hunting).<sup>55</sup> For a student of Hugh’s pedagogical system, all activity – even the lowliest activities of daily life – plays a part in the restoration of the divine image in man.

If Hugh of Saint-Victor represents the apex of the Victorine humanistic method in the Victorine ideals versus reality paradigm, Godfrey of Saint-Victor is often considered as the final, last-ditch attempt to provide a systematic anthropology of man’s relationship to God, other human beings and the natural world – what C. Stephen Jaeger has termed ‘Victorine humanism’.<sup>56</sup> In 1176, Godfrey of Saint-Victor notably dedicated his *Fons philosophiae* (*Fountain of Philosophy*) to Stephen of Tournai, abbot of Saint Genevieve. In it, Godfrey provides the following commentary on those who drink from the rivers of philosophy, that is, the students of the liberal arts:

Many drink eagerly from these waters.  
 From them teenagers drink, from them adults drink.  
 Each does so in his own way, whether he is wise or foolish,  
 Although the rash rush in without order.  
 Inexperienced in things, they run without order,  
 They do not have the clear eye of reason.  
 Therefore, they pass by without seeing the truth,  
 Unless finally the evening light shines for them.<sup>57</sup>

The message for Stephen of Tournai was that the liberal arts can nurture the ‘eye of Reason’ if the seven arts are considered in sequence and with purposeful training. Godfrey will continue in his didactic poem to repeat the importance in the training of a Victorine canon of tracing all seven ‘rivers’ of the liberal arts back to their source: the fountain of philosophy. The rivers of *philosophia* was a common image utilised also by two other commentators on the liberal arts in the twelfth century, and notable for their encyclopaedic breadth: Adelard of Bath (1080 –

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<sup>55</sup> B. D. FitzGerald, ‘Medieval Theories of Education: Hugh of St Victor and John of Salisbury’, *Oxford Review of Education*, 36:5 (2010), p. 578.

<sup>56</sup> C. S. Jaeger, ‘Victorine Humanism’, in *A Companion to the Abbey of Saint Victor in Paris*, pp. 79-112.

<sup>57</sup> *Fons*, lines 97-104 (Michaud-Quantin, p. 38; VTT 3, p. 393): ‘His fluentis assident haurientes multi. / Hinc adolescentuli bibunt, hinc adulti, / Quisque suo modulo, sapientes, stulti, / Quamuis preter ordinem runt inconsulti. / Ruunt preter ordinem inexperti rerum, / Rationalis oculum non habentes mereum; / Ideo pretereunt non videntes verum, / Nisi tandem luceat eis lumen serum.’

1152) and Herrad of Landsberg (1130 – 1195).<sup>58</sup> Notably Herrad's encyclopedia, *Hortus deliciarum* (*Garden of Delights*) composed c. 1185, portrays this trope visually: the Boethian goddess Philosophia sits enthroned at the centre of the folio and from the centre of her tunic flow seven tributaries, each representing a separate art (see Figure 4).<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Adelard of Bath in the prologue to *De eodem et diverso* writes that he is offering his treatise to be judged by William, bishop of Syracuse, since William is 'steeped in that seven-formed stream of philosophy' (...*immo talem qui septiformi rivo philosophie imbutus esset*...) and can therefore adequately judge the merits of Adelard's book. See C. Burnett, ed. and trans., *Adelard of Bath, Conversations with his Nephew, On the Same and the Different, Questions on Natural Science, and On Birds* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 3.

<sup>59</sup> Herrad of Hohenbourg, *Hortus deliciarum* fol. 32r. Reproduced in *Hortus deliciarum*, ed. A. Srtaub and G. Keller (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Brothers, 1966), Plate 11, p. 37; *Herrad of Landsberg Abbess of Hohenbourg: Hortus deliciarum* (vol. 1), ed. Rosalie Green, T. Julian Brown, and Kenneth Levy (London: Warburg Institute, 1979), Plate 18, p. 33.



Figure 4. 'Philosophia' as depicted in Herrad of Hohenbourg's *Hortus deliciarum*. See *Hortus deliciarum*, ed. Green, Brown and Levy, p. 33.

However, at the time Godfrey was writing, it is argued that the 'generalist' programme of instruction in the Liberal Arts advocated at Saint-Victor appeared outdated in contrast to the approach of increasing specialisation of scholastic theology, with the effect that the Abbey increasingly closed its doors to new students. On the one hand, there is some evidence that Victorine priors themselves, such as Walter of Saint-Victor (prior from 1173–

c.1180), may have lost faith in the Victorine project to integrate all knowledge into ethical training.<sup>60</sup> Yet on the other hand, the Victorine lifestyle would serve as inspiration for other reforming monastic communities, such as the Carthusians, Carmelites and the Devotio Moderna.<sup>61</sup> Franciscan preaching, education, theology and contemplative practices, as has been shown, took great inspiration from the Victorines, and it has even been suggested that the Franciscans sublimated the Victorine tradition.<sup>62</sup>

The Abbey of Saint-Victor would retain its reputation as a site of scholastic thought throughout the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Individual Victorines, especially, became seen as key authorities in the thirteenth century. Bonaventure's *De reductione atrium ad theologiam* (*On Retracing the Arts to Theology*) divided sacred scriptures into faith, morals and the union of the soul with God, represented by the actions of contemplative study, preaching and mysticism – subjects perfected by Augustine, Gregory the Great and Pseudo-Dionysius, respectively. In his own time, Bonaventure considers Anselm of Canterbury, Bernard of Clairvaux and Richard of Saint-Victor as authorities in these three separate areas of theology. 'For Anselm excels in reasoning; Bernard, in preaching; Richard in contemplation. But Hugh excels in all three', Bonaventure writes, stressing Hugh of Saint-Victor's synoptic and systematic approach to theology.<sup>63</sup> Later, Dante would refer to Richard of Saint-Victor's super-human talents in contemplation in his *Commedia* (c. 1308-1320), attesting to the importance of Richard's writings systematising the stages of contemplation in the fourteenth century.<sup>64</sup> Overall, the importance of the Abbey of Saint-Victor's library and connection to the universities is evidenced by it becoming the target of satire in 1532 by Rabelais' *Pantagruel*; the collection was praised by Martin Lister who documented his tour of the library and its 3000 manuscripts in 1689 before its eventual dissolution during the French Revolution.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Ferruolo, *The Origins of the University*, pp. 40-44.

<sup>61</sup> Porwoll, 'Introduction', in *Victorine Restoration*, p. 13; M. J. Janecki, 'Saint-Victor et le Carmel: le case de Thomas de Jésus (1563-1627)', in Poirel and Janecki, *Omnium expetendorum*, pp. 423-442.

<sup>62</sup> B. T. Coolman, 'Masters, Mystics, & Ministers in the Medieval City', in Poirel and Janecki, *Omnium expetendorum*, pp. 356-373, esp. 360-361 and 367-368; J. Narchi, 'Der Mystische Abstieg von der Kontemplation in die Aktion nach Hugo, Achard und Richard von St. Viktor und dessen franziskanische Rezeption im langen 13. Jahrhundert', in Poirel and Janecki, *Omnium expetendorum*, pp. 375-412.

<sup>63</sup> Bonaventure, *Reduction of the Arts to Theology*, in *The Works of Bonaventure: Cardinal, Seraphic Doctor, and Saint: Volume 3*, trans. J. de Vinck (Patterson, NJ: St Antony Guild Press, 1966), 5, p. 20. For Hugh's influence on Bonaventure more widely see P. Rorem, 'Bonaventure's Ideal and Hugh of St. Victor's Comprehensive Biblical Theology', *Franciscan Studies*, 70 (2012), pp. 385-397.

<sup>64</sup> Dante, *The Divine Comedy*, trans. R. Kirkpatrick (London: Penguin, 2012), *Par.* 10, lines 130-133, p. 367: 'Burning beyond you see the breathing fires/ of Bede, Isidore and Richard, too – / in contemplation he was more than man.'

<sup>65</sup> A. H. Schutz, 'Why Did Rabelais Satirize the Library of Saint-Victor?', *Modern Language Notes*, 70:1 (1955), pp. 39-41; B. Bodemer, 'Rabelais and the Abbey of Saint-Victor Revisited', *Information and Culture*, 47:1 (2012), pp. 4-17.



## **The Significance of the Cistercians and Victorines to Institutional Histories of the Middle Ages**

The first contribution this thesis makes is to the history of institutions in the Middle Ages. More specifically, I argue for the significance of the Cistercians and Victorines as new reforming institutions in the twelfth century. In their pursuit to reform monasticism, the Cistercians and Victorines were part of the same Gregorian reform movement and, consequently, individuals from both orders corresponded with, and promoted, one another. While Cistercian and Victorine life did have its individual character, in their actions, political entanglements, movement of people, texts and sources, the boundaries between the contemplative mysticism of the Cistercians and the proto-scholasticism of the Victorines are more entangled than has been acknowledged.

At the simplest level this entanglement was personal. Members of the Cistercian Order and the Abbey of Saint-Victor corresponded with each other and aided each other in carrying out the daily activities. The original founder of the Victorines, William of Champeaux, struck up an intense friendship with Bernard of Clairvaux from 1115 onwards, which influenced the course of the Cistercian reform movement. William was instrumental in convincing Bernard to found the first daughter house of Clairvaux at Trois Fontaines in 1118; he expedited the transfer requests of recruits from Saint-Victor to Clairvaux around 1120/21; and several sources attest to William's decision shortly before his death in January 1122 to adopt the Cistercian habit at Clairvaux.<sup>66</sup> On his side, Bernard of Clairvaux would proceed to arbitrate for Saint-Victor at heated moments of political tension, such as the murder of prior Thomas and during the frustrated negotiations between the Abbey of Saint-Victor and the Saint-Genevieve (when the Victorines planned to divert the course of the Bièvre river to provide water for a new Victorine mill).<sup>67</sup> And when Cistercians wanted to build their own *studium*, the Collège des Bernardins – what would become a renowned site of learning founded by Stephen of Lexington in 1244 for Cistercians studying at the University of Paris – the active support of the Abbey of Saint-Victor was essential. The Victorines sold land (a four-hectare plot known as the Chardonnet) next to their abbey, effectively making the Victorines and Cistercians

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<sup>66</sup> C. J. Mews, 'Logica in the Service of Philosophy: William of Champeaux and his Influence', in R. Berndt, S. J. ed., *Schrift, Schreiber, Schenker: Studien zur Abtei Sankt Viktor in Paris und den Viktorinern*, CVI 1 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005), pp. 110-111.

<sup>67</sup> John Hall, 'Introduction', in F. van Liere and J. Mousseau, eds., *Life at Saint Victor: The Liber ordinis, the Life of William of Æbelholt, and a Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard, and Odo of Saint-Victor*, VTT 9 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2021), p. 306.



neighbours on the Left Bank in Paris (see Figure 5 and Figure 6).<sup>68</sup> Between the two groups there was clearly a mutual respect for the learning, pedagogy and spiritual mission of the other. At Hugh of Saint-Victor's request, Bernard of Clairvaux would write a treatise on baptism. This work not only shows Bernard's capabilities in scholastic argumentation but the fact that Hugh incorporated much of Bernard's response into his own *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* reveals the high esteem he held for the Abbot of Clairvaux.<sup>69</sup> Richard of Saint-Victor, too, would later dedicate book three of his *De tabernaculo* (*On the Tabernacle*) to Bernard of Clairvaux, revealing that Bernard was regarded as an authority among the Victorine congregation.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Sternberg, *Cistercian Architecture*, pp. 243-244.

<sup>69</sup> H. Feiss, 'Bernardus scholasticus: The Correspondence of Bernard of Clairvaux and Hugh of Saint Victor on Baptism', in *Bernardus Magister: Papers Presented at the Nonacentenary Celebration of the Birth of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, Kalamazoo, Michigan*, ed. J. R. Sommerfeld, CS 135 (Spencer, MA, 1992), p. 355 and 359. For Bernard's treatise see *Tractatus de baptismo aliisque questionibus* (PL 182, 1031-1049).

<sup>70</sup> PL 196, 241. For a complete history of Bernard's involvement with Saint-Victor see H.-B. de Warren, 'Bernard et l'Ordre de Saint-Victor', in T. Merton, ed., *Bernard de Clairvaux* (Paris: Editions Alsatia, 1953), pp. 309-326.

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Figure 5. Map of Paris in the Fourteenth Century. Taken from M. Sternberg, *Cistercian Architecture and Medieval Society*, p. 239. Key: 1. Notre-Dame, 2. Palais de la Cité, 3. Saint-Chapelle, 4. Louvre, 5. Bastille, 6. St. Germain-des-Prés Abbey, 7. St. Martin-des Champs Abbey, 8. Temple, 9. Collège des Bernardins, 10. Carmelite convent, 11. Dominican convent, 12. Franciscan convent, 13. Augustinian convent, 14. Abbey of Saint-Victor, 15. St. Geneviève Abbey, 16. Collège de Navarre.




Figure 6. Detail of sheet 7 from Plan de Turgot depicting the Abbey of Saint-Victor (top left quadrant) in the 1730s alongside the Collège de Bernardins (bottom left), Collège de Navarre (bottom right) and Sainte-Genevieve (bottom right). Michel-Étienne Turgot (co commissioner), Louis Bretez (surveyor) and Claude Lucas (engraver). Engraving, 63 x 90 cm (c. 1734-39). © Norman Luvenhal Map Centre.

These personal entanglements, however, were clearly linked with the wider institutional roles of these religious communities in the twelfth century. While affectivity overwhelming describes the inner thoughts, feelings and responses of an individual, the individual was always enmeshed in a wider community that responded to each other through words, actions and deeds – that is, signs and signals perceptible to one another. The new forms of life developed by each order were distinctive since they did not neglect the ‘exterior’ or ‘outer’ aspect of their coreligionists; instead, we encounter a harmonisation of Augustine and Anselm’s focus on interiority with the wider aims and outward expressions of religious life.

Despite the popular monastic trope of the misery of man, the Cistercians and Victorines followed other communities in the twelfth century – most overtly the School of

Chartres – in being led by an optimistic, humanistic vision of the restoration and regeneration of the human being, both in body and soul. C. Stephen Jaeger’s has described the project of the Victorines as a that of promoting ‘ennobling love’: an optimistic belief in the restoration of the dignity of the human being and the nobility of the soul. It was the indeed through the new forms of ascetic life that the Victorines and the Cistercians developed that promoted new forms of relationships among their communities. For example, Hildebert of Lavardin praised William of Champeaux for his choice to combine intellectual and moral cultivation following his new life at Saint-Victor. In his previous life as a philosopher ‘You merely gathered knowledge from philosophers’, Hildebert writes, ‘you did not bring forth in yourself the beauty of conduct’ (*venustatem morum*).<sup>71</sup> In saying this, Hildebert praises William of Champeaux for adding cultivation of the body and gesture to his cultivation of the soul and mind.

Treatises produced by the order such as the *Liber ordinis* and Hugh’s *De institutione novitiorum* aimed to instil outer as well as inner discipline; they understood that just as inner thoughts could influence conduct, so too could the restoration of man proceed from the outside-in; the promotion of good manners and deeds would serve as the beginning for virtuous thoughts and feelings. Of the Cistercians, Aelred of Rievaulx’s conception of ‘spiritual friendship’ came closest to the training of the Victorine. Spiritual friendship cultivated a sensitivity to outward appearances, deeds and behaviours between the male members of his monastery. Aelred in envisaging his monastery as a community striving together to love God was not far removed from the canonical focus of the Victorines to love thy neighbour.

### **The Significance of Cistercian and Victorine Psychology to Intellectual History**

The second major contribution this thesis makes is to intellectual history. My argument specifically seeks to intervene and place the intellectuals of the Cistercian Order and Abbey of Saint-Victor within histories of philosophy and learning. The achievements and innovations of these individuals have been recognised by historians of religion and theology, and thus, my aim is to show that men such as Bernard of Clairvaux, Aelred of Rievaulx, William of Saint-Thierry, Isaac of Stella, in addition to Hugh, Achard, Richard and Godfrey of Saint-Victor,

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<sup>71</sup> Jaeger, *Envy of Angels*, p. 245.

made equally important contributions to the intellectual life of the twelfth century and merit equal significance in the history of this period.

From the 1930s, the significance of faculty psychology or the ‘powers of the soul’ in medieval intellectual history has long since been recognised following the pioneering studies of Louis Reypens, Odon Lötting and Pierre Michaud-Quantin.<sup>72</sup> Given that Cistercian monks and Augustinian canons remain examples of ‘living’ monastic traditions today – the Order of Saint Augustine (OSA), the Order of Saint Benedict (OSB) and the Order of Cistercians of the Strict Observance (OCSO) – it is perhaps unsurprising that some of the best studies of affective nature of medieval monastic ways of life have been written by Augustinian and Cistercian monks, individuals with first-hand experience of monastic discipline: Augustinians such as Jean Châtillon; Benedictines such as Jean Leclercq (1911-1933), Hugh Bernard Feiss and Jean Troupeau; and a host of modern day Cistercian and Trappist monks and nuns, including Thomas Merton (1915-1968), Louis J. Lekai (1916-1994), Amédée Hallier, Chrysogonus Waddell (1930-2008), Basil Pennington (1931-2005), Charles Dumont, Michael Casey, Elizabeth Connor, Kathleen O’Neill, Thomas X. Davis, M.-André Fracheboud, Elias Dietz, Pierre André-Burton and Anna Laura Forastieri.<sup>73</sup> Yet despite their significance to the course of psychology and affective devotion in the later Middle Ages, to date, there has been no comprehensive assessment of these pre-scholastic (and pre-Aristotelian) Cistercian and Victorine *De anima* writings.

Victorine psychology has suffered most from this dearth of scholarly attention, despite the fact that several individual Victorine psychological treatises were critically edited in the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘80s.<sup>74</sup> Today, there is a thriving interest in Victorine studies by scholars in France, Germany and the U.S.A. who employ a range of approaches such as art history, history,

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<sup>72</sup> L. Reypens, S.J., ‘Ame (son fond, ses puissances et sa structure d’après les mystiques)’, *DS*, 1 (Paris, 1937), col. 433-469; O. Lötting, *Psychologie et morale aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, 6 vols. (Louvain 1942-1960); P. Michaud-Quantin, ‘La classification des puissances de l’ame au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle’, *Revue de moyen âge latin* 5 (1949), pp. 15-34.

<sup>73</sup> The bibliography is too numerous to recite in its entirety. Notable studies include: Hallier, *The Monastic Theology of Aelred of Rievaulx: An Experiential Theology*, tr. C. Heaney (Shannon: Cistercian Publications, 1969); Fracheboud, *The First Cistercian Writers* (see note 1); O’Neill, ‘Isaac of Stella on Self-Knowledge’, *Cistercian Studies*, 19 (1984), pp. 122-138; Burton, *Aelred of Rievaulx (1110-1167): An Existential and Spiritual Biography*, trans. Christopher Coski, CS 276 (Collegeville, MN: Cistercian Publications, 2020); Forastieri, ‘*Per ascensorius gradus imaginationum*: The Mystagogical Teaching of Saint Gertrude (Part 1)’, *CSQ*, 51:4 (2016), pp. 429-448; *Id.* ‘*Per ascensorius gradus imaginationum*: The Mystagogical Teaching of Saint Gertrude (Part 2)’, *CSQ* 52:1 (2017), pp. 89-105.

<sup>74</sup> These are the texts of Hugh, Achard and Godfrey of Saint-Victor: ‘Il “De unione spiritus et corporis” di Ugo di San Vittore’, ed. A. M. Piazzoni, *Studi Medievali* 21 (1980), pp. 861-888; ‘Gilbert of Poitiers, Author of the “De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis” Commonly Attributed to Achard of St Victor’, ed. N. M. Haring, *Mediaeval Studies* 22 (1960), pp. 148-191; *Microcosmus: Texte établi et présenté*, ed. Philippe Delhay, Lille 1951.

musicology, palaeography and theology. In 1990, the Hugo von Sankt Viktor Institut was set up in Frankfurt by Rainer Berndt SJ with the aim to critically edit Hugh of Saint-Victor's works, which have subsequently appeared as part of the Aschendorff Corpus Victorinum (CV) series. The Biblioteca Victorina (BV) series under the direction of Dominique Poirel and Cédric Giraud has contributed key studies on significant Victorines and Victorine theology. Meanwhile, the 10-volume Victorine Texts in Translation (VTT) series – which was completed in 2022 and edited by a number of scholars working in North American Theology and Religious Studies departments (Boyd T. Coolman, Dale M. Coulter, Hugh Bernard Feiss, Franklin T. Harkins, Frans van Liere, Christopher P. Evans and Grover A. Zinn) – has provided English translations of both known and unknown Victorine writings. Of these Victorine scholars, Dale M. Coulter, especially, has shown how affectivity is central to 'Renewal Studies', a branch of Pentecostal studies that reflects on how social and ecclesial renewal is achieved through the work of the Holy Spirit acting upon the affections in the heart.<sup>75</sup> Affectivity is a helpful heuristic for approaching concepts like prepassions, passions and affections, (e)motions, desires and dispositions in the Middle Ages, Coulter suggests, because writers did not precisely distinguish between these terms: affectivity serves as an umbrella term to describe relationships ranging from unconscious stimuli to premeditated desire.<sup>76</sup>

Nevertheless, despite the growth in Victorine scholarship and its accessibility, there has been no comparative study of Victorine psychology as a whole. Scholarship on Victorine psychology is atomised and rarely treated as a research question in itself. The most famous Victorine, Hugh of Saint-Victor, has unsurprisingly attracted the most interest. Heinrich Ostler's 1906 monograph, *Die Psychologie des Hugo von St. Viktor* remains an invaluable study; as is Roger Baron's *Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor* published in 1957.<sup>77</sup> Hugh's understanding of the *affectus* and affectivity has preoccupied most modern Victorine research on psychology.<sup>78</sup> Richard of Saint-Victor fares a little better as monographs on

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<sup>75</sup> See D. M. Coulter, 'Introduction: The Language of Affectivity and the Christian Tradition' and A. Yong 'The Affective Spirit and Historiographical Revitalization in the Christian Theological Tradition', in *The Spirit, the Affections and Christian Tradition*, eds. D. M. Coulter and A. Yong (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 2016), p. 2, 15 and 298-299.

<sup>76</sup> Coulter, 'Introduction: The Language of Affectivity', p. 8.

<sup>77</sup> *Die Psychologie des Hugo von St. Viktor: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Psychologie in Der Frühscholastik* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1906); R. Baron, *Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1957).

<sup>78</sup> I. van 't Spijker, *Fictions of the Inner Life: Religious Literature and Formation of the Self in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), p. 59-232; *Id.*, 'Ad commovendos affectus: Exegesis and the Affects in Hugh of Saint-Victor', *Bibel und Exegese in der Abtei Saint-Victor zu Paris: Form und Funktion eines Grundtextes im europäischen Rahmen*, ed. R. Berndt, CVI 3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2009), p. 215-234; Karin Ganss, 'Affectivity and Knowledge Lead to Devotion to God: A Historical-Theological Study of Hugh of Saint Victor's *De Virtute Orandi*', in *A Companion to the Abbey of Saint Victor in Paris*, ed. H. B. Feiss and J.

Richard's method, and his views on love, the imagination and contemplation, have been comprehensively explored in the last 20 years.<sup>79</sup> The history of the psychology of other Victorines – Achard, Walter and Godfrey of Saint-Victor, for example – has yet to be written. Csaba Németh's 2021 study of Victorine anthropology has so far provided the best attempt at doing this, although it is not solely devoted to psychology or affectivity.<sup>80</sup>

The history of the study of Cistercian psychology has proved more fortunate. The last forty years have seen the psychological doctrines of William of Saint-Thierry<sup>81</sup>, Aelred of Rievaulx<sup>82</sup>, Isaac of Stella<sup>83</sup> and Alcher of Clairvaux<sup>84</sup> unpacked by the excellent scholarship of Charles H. Talbot, Damien Boquet, Alain Boureau, Piroska Nagy, Leo Norpoth, Caterina Tarlazzi, Christian Trottman, Pierre-André Burton, Dominique Bertrand, Aage Rydstrøm-Poulsen, Wolfgang G. Buchmüller and Constant J. Mews, among others. Increasingly these

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Mousseau (Leiden: Brill, 2018), pp. 422-468; M. D. Barbezat, 'Desire to Enjoy Something Thoroughly: The Use of the Latin *affectus* in Hugh of Saint Victor's *De archa Noe*', in *Before Emotion: The Language of Feeling, 400-1800*, eds. Matthew W. Champion, Kirk Essary and Juanita Feros Ruys (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 76-85.

<sup>79</sup> G. Dumiege, *Richard de Saint-Victor et l'idée chrétienne de l'amour* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1952); A. S. Chase, *Angelic Wisdom: The Cherubim and the Grace of Contemplation in Richard of St. Victor* (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); I. van 't Spijker, 'Exegesis and the Emotions: Richard of St. Victor's *De quatuor gradibus violentiae caritatis*', *Sacris Erudiri*, 36 (1996), pp. 147-160; P. Cacciapouti, '*Deus existentia amoris*': *Teologia della carità e teologia della Trinità negli scritti di Riccardo di San Vittore (†1173)*, BV 9 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998); D. M. Coulter, *Per visibilia ad invisibilia: Theological Method in Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173)*, BV 19 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006); H. Nakamura, S.J., *Amor invisibilium: Die Liebe im Denken des Richards von Sankt Viktor (†1173)*, CVI 5 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2011); R. Palmén, *Richard of St Victor's Theory of the Imagination* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014).

<sup>80</sup> C. Németh, 'Contemplation and Cognition of God: The Victorine Theological Anthropology and its Decline' (Ph.D. Diss.: Central European University 2013); *Id.*, *Quasi aurora consurgens*.

<sup>81</sup> D. Boquet, 'Un nouvel ordre anthropologique au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle: réflexions autour de la physique du corps de Guillaume de Saint-Thierry', *Cîteaux* 55 (2004), pp. 5-20; Aage Rydstrøm-Poulsen, 'William of Saint-Thierry on the Soul', in *A Companion to William of Saint-Thierry*, ed. F. Tyler Sargent (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2019), pp. 93-108.

<sup>82</sup> *Ailred of Rievaulx: De Anima*, ed. Charles H. Talbot (London: Warburg Institute, 1952), p. 1-65; *Id. Aelred of Rievaulx: Dialogue on the Soul*, CFS 22 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1981), p. 1-28; Boquet, *L'ordre de l'affect au Moyen Âge: Autour de l'anthropologie affective d'Aelred de Rievaulx* (Caen: Cramh, 2005); *Id.*, 'Affectivity in the Writings of Aelred of Rievaulx', trans. Martha F. Krieg, in *A Companion to Aelred of Rievaulx (1100-1167)*, ed. Marsha L. Dutton (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2017), pp. 167-195; Marjory E. Lange, 'A Reading of Aelred of Rievaulx's *De Anima*: Through Ciceronian Dialogue to Personal Testament', *Cistercian Studies Quarterly* 45:4 (2010), p. 401-420; A. Rydstrøm-Poulsen, 'Recent Research on Aelred of Rievaulx's Augustinianism – and Aelred's Use of Augustine in his *De Anima*', *Analecta Cisterciensia* 60 (2010), pp. 263-273; C. Trottman, 'Aelred de Rievaulx et les discours cisterciens sur l'âme', *Chôra: Revue d'études anciennes et médiévales* 9-10 (2011-2012), p. 429-470; Burton, *Aelred of Rievaulx (1110-1167)*, pp. 506-514; B. H. Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling*, pp. 91-113.

<sup>83</sup> E. Bertola, 'La doctrina psicologica di Isacco di Stella', *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, 45:4 (1953), p. 297-309; G. Raciti, 'Isaac de l'Étoile', in *DS*, 7 (Paris, 1971), col. 2011-2038; C. Tarlazzi, 'L'Epistola de anima di Isacco di Stella: studio della tradizione ed edizione del testo', *Medioevo*, 36 (2011), p. 167-278; W. G. Buchmüller, *Isaak von Étoile: monastische Theologie im Dialog mit dem Neo-Platonismus des 12. Jahrhunderts* (Münster: 2016); D. Deme, 'Introduction to the Theology of Isaac of Stella', in *The Selected Works of Isaac of Stella: A Cistercian Voice from the Twelfth Century*, ed. Deme (Abingdon: 2007), pp. 177-220.

<sup>84</sup> G. Raciti, 'L'autore del *De spiritu et anima*', *Revista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, 53 (1961), p. 385-401; L. Norpoth, *Der pseudo-augustinische Traktat: De spiritu et anima* (Cologne and Bochum: 1971); Mews, 'Affectus in the *De spiritu et anima* and Cistercian Writings of the Twelfth Century', in *Before Emotion*, pp. 86-96.

Cistercian authors are deservedly credited with prefiguring themes that would inspire the scholastic ‘science of the soul’ in the late twelfth- and thirteenth centuries, being recognised as co-contributors to the language and practices that shaped the trajectory of popular emotional and devotional practices in the Late Middle Ages.

It is widely believed that the Cistercian authors who wrote *libri de anima* represented a ‘school’ of psychology. Geoffrey Thomas Webb’s paper to the Aquinas Society in 1961, ‘An Introduction to the Cistercian *De Anima*’, was among the first to draw attention to the *air de famille* between five figures – William of Saint-Thierry, Isaac of Stella, Aelred of Rievaulx, Alcher of Clairvaux and Helinand of Froidmont – and the *De anima* treatises they produced.<sup>85</sup> Due to the short length of Webb’s study, he was only able to draw similarities between William’s *De natura corporis et animae*, Isaac’s *Epistola de anima* and Alcher’s *De spiritu et anima*.

In 1977, and over a decade after Webb’s study, Bernard McGinn would edit *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology* for Cistercian Publications.<sup>86</sup> This remains to this day the most accessible, if now outdated, survey of the *De anima* treatises of William of Saint-Thierry, Isaac of Stella and Alcher of Clairvaux, containing an extensively-researched introduction that sets Cistercian writings on the soul within a tradition stretching back to Antiquity, with accompanying English translations of all three texts.<sup>87</sup> *Libri de anima* are psychological but also anthropological according to McGinn: the texts of William, Isaac and Alcher can be compared because they exhibit a distinctively ‘Cistercian anthropology’.<sup>88</sup> This latter part of this claim, as I will show, has been largely discarded in recent years.

The final major study of Cistercian *De anima* treatises is the most significant yet the least widely known. Siovahn A. Walker’s 2008 unpublished doctoral thesis ‘From Description to Prescription: Twelfth Century Medicine for Psychological and Social Health’ offers a comprehensive survey of the five Cistercian *libri de anima* initially noted by Webb back in 1961.<sup>89</sup> Here, Aelred of Rievaulx and Helinand of Froidmont’s psychology is compared alongside that of William of Saint-Thierry, Isaac of Stella and Alcher of Clairvaux, who dominate most studies of Cistercian psychology. And, in terms of methodology, Walker

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<sup>85</sup> G. Webb, *An Introduction to the Cistercian De anima: A Paper Read to the Aquinas Society in 1961* (London: Aquin Press, 1962).

<sup>86</sup> B. McGinn, *The Golden Chain: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella*, CS 15 (Washington D.C.: Cistercian Publications, 1972); *Id.*, *Three Treatises on Man*.

<sup>87</sup> McGinn, *Three Treatises*, pp. 1-101.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 195.

<sup>89</sup> S. A. Walker, ‘From Description to Prescription: Twelfth-Century Medicine for Psychological and Social Health’ (Ph.D. Diss.: Stanford University, 2008).



combines intellectual and institutional history with a reading of Cistercian *De anima* treatises from the modern perspectives of positive psychology and psychiatry.<sup>90</sup> The contribution of this unique perspective cannot be overstated: Walker conclusively proves that Cistercian psychology was a). concerned with the spiritual health of individuals, and b). that the political and social ideas found in these texts are no mere fluke but ‘there is a causal link between the theoretical content of spiritual psychology and the practical activities of twelfth-century reform-minded de animists.’<sup>91</sup> Describing the soul for Walker thus was always aimed at prescribing cures for the mental, social and political ills of Cistercian life. Unfortunately, remaining unpublished and containing a title that does not make her Cistercian sources conspicuous, Walker’s thesis is virtually unknown in academic scholarship. The result is that McGinn’s *Three Treatises on Man* still remains the most widely acknowledged resource for Cistercian psychology. Since Walker there have been several brief studies that discuss one or more Cistercian *De anima* treatise(s) although none that matches the sophistication of her dissertation.<sup>92</sup>

Third, the twelfth century ‘renaissance’ was a time of diversity, experimentation and great intellectual change.<sup>93</sup> Within current narratives of this time period, monastic orders – especially the Cistercians – have been regarded as a conservative rather than innovative force, interested far more in the theology of the Patristic Fathers than the new forms of logic or the latest translations of Greco-Arabic natural philosophy and medicine. While these two orders were most definitely interested in theology, *libri de anima* and psychological writings reveal a different, untold chapter of this story: both the Cistercians and Victorines were outward

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<sup>90</sup> Walker, ‘From Description to Prescription’, pp. 50-54.

<sup>91</sup> Walker, ‘From Description to Prescription’, p. 51.

<sup>92</sup> These studies have been invaluable but they are mostly either article length or large intellectual surveys of a period or thinker. See Alain Boureau, ‘Un sujet agité: Le statut nouveau des passions de l’âme au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle’, in *Le sujet des émotions au Moyen Âge*, ed. Boquet and Nagy, (Paris: Beauchesne, 2008), p. 187-200; *Id.*, *De vagues individus: La condition humaine dans la pensée scolastique. La raison scholastique III* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2008), especially p. 15-29; Rubén A. P. Rivas, *La antropología cisterciense del siglo XII*, Colección de pensamiento Medieval y Renacentista 102 (Pamplona: 2008) pp. 13-69 and 117-130; Dominique Bertrand, ‘Quatre discours cisterciens du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle sur l’âme’, *Cîteaux*, 63 (2012), pp. 179-190; Boquet and Nagy, ‘Medieval Sciences of the Emotions during the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries: An Intellectual History’, *Osiris* 31 (2016), p. 21-45 (p. 34-38); *Id.*, *Medieval Sensibilities: A History of Emotion in the Middle Ages*, trans. Robert Shaw (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), p. 143-148; Alexander Fidora, ‘The Soul as Harmony: A Disputed Doctrine in Twelfth-Century Cistercian Anthropology’, *Cistercian Studies Quarterly*, 55:3 (2020), p. 333-345; Trottmann, *Bernard de Clairvaux et la philosophie des cisterciens du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2020), p. 263-293, 366-376 and 498-516.

<sup>93</sup> The meaning (and very existence) of the ‘twelfth-century renaissance’ is fiercely contested. For the pro side of the historiographical debate see R. W. Southern’s essay ‘Medieval Humanism’ in his *Medieval Humanism and Other Studies* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970), pp. 29-60 and his *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, Volume I: Foundation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). On the contra side see C. S. Jaeger’s article ‘Pessimism in the Twelfth-Century “Renaissance”’, *Speculum*, 78:4 (2004), pp. 1151-1183, which calls for the term to be scrapped.

looking, not immune to the intellectual changes occurring in the Latin West, and consistently harmonised new philosophical ideas within their theologies.<sup>94</sup>

The *De anima* treatises of the Cistercians and Victorines requires further study from within intellectual history, specifically medieval philosophical attitudes to the soul, senses and emotions. In the Middle Ages the mind-body problem is better thought of as a ‘soul-body’ problem.<sup>95</sup> It was considered unproblematic for the soul to act upon the body. Histories of the mind-body problem all too often begin their narrative in the Early-Modern period with Descartes or the Cartesian tradition he inspired.<sup>96</sup> If premodern theorists are surveyed, often key individuals – Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas – are given prominence as the significant paradigm shifts in thought. Within the history of the mind-body problem Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson’s point out that ‘we can detect three very general trends of thought, or paradigms, which have dominated this field: the Aristotelian paradigm, the Cartesian paradigm, and the scientific materialist (or physicist) paradigm.’<sup>97</sup> This same tripartite paradigm forms the structure of Crane and Patterson’s own *History of the Mind-Body Problem*, a reassessment of the philosophical issue written at the turn of the 21st century. These paradigms are unhelpful for two reasons: first, the focus on collective groupings of thought serves to draw attention to key periods or key thinkers within each tradition. The act of labelling these periods or individuals attributes them significance, a significance, which, when repeated over time, creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that cements a period or thinkers’ importance within the history of philosophy. It is as a result of this unrepresentative labelling that the Middle Ages, and especially a number of theorists between the eleventh to mid thirteenth century, above all the Cistercians and Victorines, have been side-lined in the history of the mind-body debate. The second problem born from an overreliance on grouping individuals in accordance to how neatly they fit within overarching categories of philosophy is that thinkers, or entire schools of thought (such as the Cistercians and Victorines), who demonstrate an

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<sup>94</sup> The Cistercians and Victorines exemplify the three research programmes of the twelfth century renaissance identified by John Marenbon: the use of logic, systematising theology and scrutiny of the natural world. See Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 171.

<sup>95</sup> R. Pasnau, ‘Human Nature’ in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A. S. McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 212; P. King, ‘Why Isn’t the Mind-Body Problem Medieval?’, in *Framing the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medieval Enlightenment*, ed. H. Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 203.

<sup>96</sup> This is the case with D. Cockburn’s *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Souls, Science and Human Beings* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

<sup>97</sup> T. Crane and S. Patterson (eds.), *The History of the Mind-Body Problem* (London: Routledge, 2000), p.2.

eclectic borrowing or mix of two or more of these philosophies are inevitably difficult to place within this narrative.

However, the role of the twelfth-century *De anima* genre as interpreters of Augustine's psychology has led to a second problem related to the Middle Ages specifically: the paradoxical situation in which the *De anima* were simultaneously at the heart of Christian theology yet also liminal to it. Firstly, these texts are of importance since they performed important exegesis of Augustine's psychology. Augustine has been dubbed the 'father of medieval affectivity'<sup>98</sup> and is considered within the history of philosophy to have invented the notion of the will.<sup>99</sup> However, because of the close association of the *De anima* with Augustine these writings on the soul are often considered as simply exegesis of Augustinian thought, that is, texts lacking overall in independent and original contributions. Henrik Lagerlund has said of Isaac of Stella's *Epistola de anima* and Alcher's *De spiritu et anima* that their doctrine was indeed influential yet 'most of the elements of this view could be found in Augustine.'<sup>100</sup> For Lagerlund it is with the translation of Avicenna's *De anima* and the controversies surrounding Aristotle's *De anima* and Averroes's commentaries that the modern idea of the mind-body problem can be found.<sup>101</sup> Simo Knuutilla has done better to signpost the Cistercians and Victorines as inheritors of Augustine's theory of emotions.<sup>102</sup> Moreover, it is the thirteenth century that stands out as the century for the systematisation of a theory of the passions with important treatises on the subject such as John of La Rochelle's *Summa de anima* (1235) and book II-I (22 – 48) of Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* (1265 – 74).<sup>103</sup> Simo Knuutilla similarly has called Aquinas' treatment of the passions 'the most extensive treatment on the subject.'<sup>104</sup>

The importance of La Rochelle and Thomas in taking this process further is indeed undeniable yet the unbalanced focus of scholarship on this systematisation beginning with the scholastics wrongly relegates the contributions of the Cistercian and Victorine *De anima* to that of moral philosophy. As Ian Wei has rightly observed, abstract theology and ethics are generally treated separately, often with the result that thinkers preoccupied with pastoral

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<sup>98</sup> D. Boquet and P. Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, p.22.

<sup>99</sup> See Pasnau, 'Human Nature', p.221.

<sup>100</sup> H. Lagerlund, 'The Systematisation of the Passions', in M. Cameron (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages* (London: Routledge, 2019), p.159.

<sup>101</sup> H. Lagerlund, 'Introduction: The Mind/Body Problem and Late Medieval Conceptions of the Soul', in Lagerlund (ed.), *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p.1.

<sup>102</sup> S. Knuutilla, 'Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul', in *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, eds. H. Lagerlund and M. Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), pp. 54-55.

<sup>103</sup> Lagerlund, 'The Systematisation of the Passions', pp. 157-164.

<sup>104</sup> S. Knuutilla, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.239

theology and ethical concerns are dismissed as second-rate thinkers by intellectual historians.<sup>105</sup> These narratives draw an artificial line between the ‘theology’ of the universities and the ‘spirituality’ of the monastic orders. It is an artificial demarcation since medieval contemporaries would not have distinguished thinking and acting as separate activities.<sup>106</sup> As Bell has asserted, ‘the modern idea that theology is theoretical while spirituality is practical would have been incomprehensible to any medieval monk or philosopher prior to the end of the thirteenth century.’<sup>107</sup> While this distinction is more apt for the scholasticism of the later Middle Ages, earlier figures such as Peter Abelard, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure would have spoken not of ‘scholasticism’ but a ‘spirituality of scholasticism’<sup>108</sup>: these theologies placed an equal emphasis on both gaining knowledge and practical emotive experience to understand God, as did the Cistercians and Victorines. Therefore, expressing modern values of ‘reason’, ‘order’ and ‘logic’ to privilege the importance of the scholastic method of logic is not only teleological and unrepresentative of the reality of medieval contemporaries themselves, but it also fails to recognise the originality and so-called idiosyncratic methods of understanding emotion the Cistercian and Victorine *De anima* texts employed such as allegory, Socratic dialogues or soliloquies.

However, the damage has been done within narratives of medieval philosophy as the Cistercian and Victorines thought on the soul rarely figures in histories of the subject.<sup>109</sup> The most recent study to follow this trend is the 2019 *The Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages* edited by Margaret Cameron. As one book in a six-volume study of the philosophy of mind from Antiquity to the modern day this study begins not in the Early Middle Ages but the High Middle Ages with Peter Abelard. Particularly egregious is the fact that Cameron in her introduction notes the importance of three broad traditions of Platonic ‘anthropology’ or ‘cosmology’ centred around the school of Saint-Victor, the school of Chartres, and the Cistercians, and their importance for 20th century philosophers.<sup>110</sup> Despite this acknowledgement, its main protagonists – Richard of Saint-Victor, William of Conches,

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<sup>105</sup> I. P. Wei, *The Intellectual Culture of Medieval Paris: Theologians and the University c. 1100-1330* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.1.

<sup>106</sup> Bell, ‘Is there such a Thing as Cistercian Spirituality’, p.459.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, p.458.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, p.458.

<sup>109</sup> *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A. S. McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); *Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, eds. S. Knuutilla and P. Kärkkäinen (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008).

<sup>110</sup> M. Cameron ‘Introduction’ in *Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages*, ed. Cameron (London: Routledge, 2019), see p.8 and note 11, p.13.

William of Saint-Thierry and Isaac of Stella – receive merely a cursory mention over a couple of pages.<sup>111</sup>

This is not to say that twelfth-century authors do not have a place within the history of philosophy. They do, albeit a minor role. Knutilla's definitive monograph on emotion briefly treats Bernard, William, Isaac, Aelred, Hugh and Richard and their *De anima*.<sup>112</sup> Similarly, Pasnau's *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy* has attributed mysticism a place within the wider intellectual achievements of the period. Within this collection Christina Van Dyke notably has drawn attention to Bernard and Hugh's 'affective mysticism': the idea that mystical experience could 'include a variety of physical and emotional states, including visions and auditory, olfactory gustatory, and tactile sensations.'<sup>113</sup> Drawing upon Hugh's *De unione spiritus et corporis* Van Dyke states that 'the senses and sensory perception are 'not merely a distraction from contemplation but an important means of achieving union with God.'<sup>114</sup> Nevertheless, the fact remains that a number of otherwise excellent studies have all but erased the contributions of the twelfth-century *De anima* from the history of medieval philosophy.<sup>115</sup> To gain a more nuanced take on where the Cistercian and Victorine *De anima* writings fall within the history of speculation on matter and spirit it is useful to follow the approach of Pasnau. In theories of matter, Pasnau has claimed that the above three traditions Crane and Patterson highlight can be witnessed in the three dominant philosophies throughout history – Platonism, Aristotelianism and Atomism – represented by the thought of Plato, Aristotle and Democritus respectively.<sup>116</sup> While utilising the same broad categories, Pasnau's approach is more sophisticated since he argues that these traditions of thought were not paradigms that supplanted one another, but rather 'perennial philosophies' (*philosophiae perennes*) which rise and fall in influence over time.<sup>117</sup> Through this lens of interpretation the history of the *De anima* genre in the twelfth century is rewritten. These were not ideas completely rendered redundant by the paradigm shift in Aristotelian thought of the thirteenth century but rather a distinct phrase of the Platonic tradition – that is, the tradition of Augustinian Neoplatonism,

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid, pp. 8-9 and see note 11, p.13.

<sup>112</sup> S. Knutilla, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.195-205 and pp. 216-218.

<sup>113</sup> C. Van Dyke, 'Mysticism' in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy. Volume 2*, ed. R. Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 730.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, p. 730.

<sup>115</sup> See, for example, John Marenbon's *Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350). An Introduction*. (London: Routledge, 1991).

<sup>116</sup> R. Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.77.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, pp.77-8.

which would remain influential during scholastic period and would rise in importance during the Platonic revival of the Renaissance – that merits study in its right.

Alongside the poor recognition of Cistercian and Victorine theories of the body and soul, a second reason for the absence of these texts in the history of philosophy is the idiosyncratic nature of the ‘science of the soul’ (*scientia animae*) in terms of its content and literary form. Advocating a Neoplatonic-Augustinian model of sense perception and mystical union, the model of the soul the writings of the Cistercians and Victorines promoted became overshadowed by the thirteenth century commentary tradition on Avicenna’s and Aristotle’s *De anima*, which demonstrated a more ‘stable’ and ‘fixed’ genre in terms of its content and form.

Certain elements of this are undoubtedly true however this picture of events is a simplification. While the methods may have changed, the purpose of the twelfth-century *De anima* was the same as their thirteenth (and fourteenth) century counterparts: to provide a ‘meeting-point’ for discussions on the body and the soul. As early as 1932, Guillaumont’s entry for the Vulgate phrase of Psalms 72:7, ‘cordis affectus’ (‘affect of the heart’) in the *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* has shown that the classical terms for love, *affectio* and *affectus*, were used by both the Cistercians and Victorines with a new ‘precision’ and ‘fervour’ in the development of their monastic spirituality.<sup>118</sup> Boureau in particular has shown how both the Cistercians and Victorines were instrumental in establishing a psychological genre which offered advice on how the soul and body could be harmonised: a genre that by 1220 would become a ‘quasi-discipline’ occupying the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure as part of a programme to discover the ‘unity of man’ – a concern that would be at the centre of scholastic thought until the mid-fourteenth century.<sup>119</sup>

Several different religious groups in the twelfth century were united in their goal for religious reform and renewal. Why then should these two monastic orders and their views on sense perception and affectivity be compared? There are three reasons. First, while the Cistercians and Victorines had different emphasises – the Victorines being particularly interested in the stages of the union of the soul with God, the Cistercians in understanding the different types of love – both utilised the *De anima* genre and psychology for broadly the same purposes, to restore man in virtue and to aid their mystical practices. Bernard McGinn has noted that in their emphasis on reform and restoration in their accounts of the soul ‘the Cistercians were to

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<sup>118</sup> A. Guillaumont, ‘Cor et Cordis Affectus’, Vol. 2, Column 2278. Accessed at <http://www.dictionnairedespiritualite.com/>. Last visited 12/07/2019.

<sup>119</sup> A. Boureau, *De Vagues Individus*, pp. 15-25.

show themselves closely allied to the Victorines, despite differences in particulars'.<sup>120</sup> Other historians alongside McGinn have observed the similarities in the Cistercian and Victorine emphasis on psychology yet until now there has been no systematic comparison of the treatises written by the two orders.<sup>121</sup>

Second, both orders were concerned with understanding the human emotions. As a consequence, out of all the religious groups of the twelfth century, these two used psychological treatises as a medium to harmonise understandings of perception with innovative theories and practices of affectivity. In them, we find rich discussions of emotion words such as *affectio* and *affectus*. The twelfth century in the words of Guillaumont was 'the century of *affectus*' (*le siècle des affectus*).<sup>122</sup> The sum total of the words, emphases and theories available to any community constitutes their 'emotional inheritance'.<sup>123</sup> This inheritance has been called by Barbara Rosenwein the 'generations of feeling', the emotional paradigms that are available at any given time.<sup>124</sup> A number of generations of feeling can be observed within the Cistercian and Victorine psychological treatises yet it is the reworking of Augustine and classical theories of morality into a distinctive theory of affectivity that stands out.

It must be stated at the outset, though, that this twofold division of the soul into affectivity and reason was not novel but represented an ancient pre-Platonic rational/non-rational dichotomy.<sup>125</sup> However, the Cistercians and Victorines were not merely passive inheritors of this psychology. On the contrary, they adapted it for their distinctive forms of Christian mystagogy which integrated theology, philosophy and mysticism into a coherent doctrinal programme.<sup>126</sup> In contrast to the schoolmen who considered metaphysics independently from theology as a branch of natural science or the Platonists (i.e., Pseudo-Dionysius, Meister Eckhart) who considered all theoretical knowledge as secondary to the divine One, the Cistercians and Victorines practised an 'affective metaphysics that prioritised the practical transformation of the self's desires by the beauty of the Good.'<sup>127</sup> David Albertson has intimated that the characteristic which unites both communities was that they

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<sup>120</sup> McGinn, *Three Treatises*, p. 22.

<sup>121</sup> A. Austell, *The Song of Songs in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 5.

<sup>122</sup> A. Guillaumont, 'Cor et Cordis Affectus', *DS*, vol. 2, col. 2278.

<sup>123</sup> B. H. Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling: A History of Emotions, 600-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 9.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid*, p. 9.

<sup>125</sup> D. N. Bell, 'The Tripartite Soul and the Image of God in the Latin Tradition', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 47 (1980), p. 43.

<sup>126</sup> D. Albertson, 'Philosophy and Metaphysics in the School of Saint Victor: From Achard to Godfrey', in H. Feiss and J. Mousseau, eds., *A Companion to the Abbey of Saint Victor in Paris* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), pp. 357-358.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid*, p. 358.

neither praised nor disavowed the boundary between the sensory and intelligible worlds: the path to God necessitated the most effective use of sensory experience to strengthen the intellectual, spiritual, soul within man. The leading intellectuals from both orders – Bernard of Clairvaux, William of Saint-Thierry, Hugh of Saint-Victor, and Richard of Saint-Victor – all demonstrate these characteristics in their writings.

What was the shared emotional tradition available to all these men? Each embraced St Augustine's theology of love and desire. In Augustinian thought, *scientia* (knowledge) and *sapientia* (wisdom) 'form a kind of marriage between action – the accomplishment of the material functions of the body in the material world – and contemplation – partaking of the image of God.'<sup>128</sup> By extending Augustine's philosophy these two religious communities rejected sharp divisions between theology and philosophy. The complementary role of love and knowledge in achieving mystical union with God is what Bernard McGinn has called 'mystical consciousness'.<sup>129</sup> As McGinn persuasively argues, mystical consciousness is helpful because it provides a more precise definition of mysticism as medieval contemporaries imagined it, that is, the mystical process as a *habitus*: 'a form of life, and not merely a matter of raw experience, even of some special kind.'<sup>130</sup>

And yet, past studies often characterise Cistercian spirituality as primarily 'affective' or 'loving' and Victorine spirituality as 'intellective' or 'rational'.<sup>131</sup> By arguing that the Cistercians and Victorines did in fact develop similar forms of mystical consciousness, my argument builds upon the few, often isolated, studies that emphasise the dual role of reason and love for both groups.<sup>132</sup> While some individual members of these schools certainly did establish preferences, siding predominantly with the rational or affective dimension of the soul, my close reading of the psychological texts produced by both communities supports

<sup>128</sup> R. Nájera, 'Scientia in the Twelfth Century', in H. Lagerlund, ed., *Knowledge in Medieval Philosophy* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), p. 38.

<sup>129</sup> B. McGinn, 'Mystical Consciousness: A Modest Proposal', *Spiritus*, 8:1 (2008), p. 54

<sup>130</sup> Ibid, p. 50.

<sup>131</sup> For the distinction between Cistercian and Victorine mysticism and anthropology see R. Smith, 'Cistercian and Victorine Approaches to Contemplation: Understandings of Self in *A Rule of Life for a Recluse* and *The Twelve Patriarchs*', in M. Glasscoe, ed., *The Medieval Mystical Tradition: England, Ireland and Wales. Exeter Symposium VI: Papers Read at Charney Manor, July 1999* (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1999), pp. 55-65; C. Németh, 'Contemplation and Cognition of God: The Victorine Theological Anthropology and its Decline' (Ph.D. Diss., Central European University, 2013), pp. 169-177; *Id.*, *Quasi aurora consurgens*, pp. 266-275 and 490. Ineke van 't Spijker notes this contrast and its relationship with *affectio* and *affectus* in 'Exegesis and the Emotions: Richard of St. Victor's *De quatuor gradibus violentiae caritatis*', p. 147.

<sup>132</sup> R. Javelet, 'Psychologie des auteurs du XIIe siècle', *Revue des Sciences Religieuses*, 33:3 (1959), pp. 209-286; B. McGinn, *The Growth of Mysticism: Gregory the Great Through the Twelfth Century: The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism, Vol. 2*: (New York: Independent Publishers, 1994), p. 154, 390, 399 and 414; I. van 't Spijker, 'After the Manner of a Contemplative, According to the Nature of Contemplation: Richard of Saint-Victor's *De contemplatione*', in Porwoll and Orsbon, *Victorine Restoration*, pp. 176-195 (see especially pp. 193-195).



McGinn's claim that both these aspects of life, that is the affective and the rational, were considered as twin aspects of religious 'experience'. Consequently, by examining the significance of the twelfth-century pre-scholastic focus on reason and love more deeply, this thesis shows how Cistercian and Victorine theorising on affectivity marks a key stage in history of medieval understandings of the soul, perception and emotion. The Cistercians and Victorines emerge as forerunners – and influencers – of the spiritual psychologies of Robert Grosseteste, Bonaventure and others, which placed equal emphasis on knowing and loving God.<sup>133</sup>

## Methodology

To make this claim that the Cistercians and Victorines made significant contributions to the history of institutions and the intellectual history in the twelfth century and beyond, this thesis draws on the methodologies of two, often opposing methodologies: sensory history and the history of emotions. The sensory turn has provided sophisticated frameworks for understanding perception as a feature of the body and embodiment. Likewise, since this thesis aims to show the interconnection between the language of affectivity and the actions that expressed it, my methodology is also aligned closely with the history of emotions, a field that has formulated a nuanced framework that has made developments in understanding how emotions were interpreted, translated and expressed.

## The Place of Sense, Sensibilities and Perception in Sensory History

As whole, histories of the senses in the Middle Ages have tended to fall into two camps, each requiring sweeping generalisations, and polarising discussion. The first – *das sinnefrohe Mittelalter* ('The Sense-Happy Middle Ages') – characterises the Middle Ages as a period of intense sensual activity. The second – *das asketische Mittelalter* ('The Ascetic Middle Ages')

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<sup>133</sup> For Robert Grosseteste's view of the indivisibility of *aspectus* ('rational sight') from *affectus* ('love') see R. W. Southern, 'Richard Dales and the Editing of Robert Grosseteste', in *Aspectus et Affectus: Essays and Editions in Grosseteste and Medieval Intellectual Life in Honor of Richard C. Dales* (New York: AMS, 1993), pp. 10-12. The best studies to date come from Brett W. Smith: 'Aspectus and Affectus in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste' (PhD Diss.: Catholic University of America, 2018); *Id.* "'A Theme Song of His Life': Aspectus and Affectus in the Writings of Robert Grosseteste', *Franciscan Studies*, 76 (2018) (see especially note 28, p. 8, for the possible influence of Isaac of Stella and Alcher of Clairvaux's *affectus-sensus* distinction on Grosseteste). Vincent Gillespie notes Grosseteste's use of wordplay in 'The Senses in Literature: The Textures of Perception', in *A Cultural History of the Senses in the Middle Ages*, ed. R. Newhauser (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 156-158.

– typifies the period as one of extreme sensual starvation and asceticism.<sup>134</sup> Theories of the senses in the Middle Ages are also associated with two distinct emphasises in natural science, medicine, philosophy and theology. On the one hand, Neoplatonic philosophy stressed the unreliability of sense perception and the need to seek truth in the realm of unchangeable ‘Forms’; on the other hand, the rise of Aristotelian theories from the early and mid-twelfth century argued that all truth took its starting point in matter, sense perception and the material world. At the granular level, each of these two philosophical traditions came with an emphasis on whether the perceiving subject was an active or passive participant. Neoplatonic thought tended to lend more towards ‘extramission’, an ‘in-out’ perspective that understood perception as the result of sensory organs sending out invisible rays towards objects, things and people in the world to capture their likenesses or *species* and carry them back to the perceiver. Intromission, the second type, prioritised an ‘outward-in’ dynamic. It was commonly associated with Aristotle’s conception of perception, which viewed the sensory organs as receptacles or receptors for perceptions, capturing the likenesses or *species* that happened to strike them. All in all, these neatly separated distinctions are helpful for generalising attitudes across a long period yet, as Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht has noted, the medieval senses are a ‘centrifugal topic’, of which several discourses ran parallel to each other and were, in reality, characterised more by their variety and overlap.<sup>135</sup> What was at stake with medieval understandings of sensation was to better understand ‘the stage of transition that would mediate between sensual perception and abstract thought’.<sup>136</sup>

My thesis argues that affectivity as an intentional and perceptive act straddles the boundaries between both sensory and emotions history. The Cistercians and Victorines lived in a time when understandings of the senses were in flux; in such a world established binaries such as sensual intensity/asceticism, Neoplatonic/Aristotelian, extramission/intromission, active/passive do not get us very far. As we shall see, each of these aspects find a way into Cistercian and Victorine thinking on sensation and sense perception in some way.

The act of perception itself, I believe, serves as a more fruitful way to understand Cistercian and Victorine thinking on the emotions. Since humans choose to focus their attention on certain physical or mental stimuli, I follow historians of perception José Filipe Silva and Mikko Yrjönsuuri in claiming that ‘perception’ is characterised more by activity than passivity.

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<sup>134</sup> H. U. Gumbrecht, ‘Erudite Fascinations and Cultural Energies: How much can we know about the Medieval Senses’, in *Rethinking the Medieval Senses: Heritage, Fascination, Frames*, eds. S. G. Nicols, A. Cablitz and A. Calhoun (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008), p. 1.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid, p. 4.

Active perception is associated with contemporary philosophy of mind, which has sought to reconcile two factors affecting the perceiving systems of humans: (i) the *habitus* of the individual – their accrued reservoir of behaviours, beliefs and knowledge – before any individual perceptive experience, and (ii) the psychological and physiological information processing systems (sense perception, emotion, thought, etc.) that individuals are naturally endowed with.<sup>137</sup> Thus, active perception rests on the fundamental assumption that the worldview (*Weltanschauung*) and mentality (*mentalité*) of individuals structure how the world is experienced via the senses; and vice-versa, how the physiology of beings (the number of senses, frequency, method, and rationale for perceiving) affects the range of available meanings. While there is no exhaustive definition of active perception, Silva and Yrjönsuuri argue that

Active perception is to be understood in a wide sense as to include any account that takes perception to be the result of the soul's own agency, with or without the reception of sensory stimuli, whether such stimuli are causally relevant or not in the explanation of perception.<sup>138</sup>

The methodological strength of active perception is that it gives priority to the mechanisms of perception, that is, to the body. Sense perception, the pair rightfully argue has often been considered as ‘a side issue to other “major” philosophical problems’; and since the majority of studies focus on Aristotelian and Cartesian models of perception which view sense perception as primarily passive (i.e., the body simply as sense receptor), the active nature of the perceptive process has been largely overlooked for the high Middle Ages.<sup>139</sup>

Yet the active nature of perception has been shown to characterise Augustine's understanding of the senses, and consequently, due to the influence of the Augustinian tradition in the twelfth century, would form the basis of Cistercian and Victorine understandings of perception.<sup>140</sup> Alcher of Clairvaux's *De spiritu et anima* took pains to highlight how both

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<sup>137</sup> J. F. Silva and M. Yrjönsuuri, ‘Introduction: The World as Stereogram’, in *Active Perception in the History of Philosophy: From Plato to Modern Philosophy*, ed. Silva and Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), p. 1.

<sup>138</sup> ‘Introduction: The World as Stereogram’, p. 3.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>140</sup> See J. F. Silva, ‘Augustine on Active Perception’, in Silva and Yrjönsuuri, *Active Perception*, pp. 79-98. In the same volume, Silva has also shown how Augustinian active perception influenced the thought of William of Auvergne, Robert Kilwardby, John Peckham, Matthew of Aquasparta, Peter John Olivi, James of Viterbo, Durandus of St. Pourçain and Vital du Four (though he doesn't note Augustine's influence on the Cistercians and Victorines). See ‘Medieval Theories of Active Perception: An Overview’, pp. 117-146.

The wonderful beauty of the world is available to us exteriorly, and it also has its image in our memory – again an incorporeal image but body-like in appearance. We have recourse to it when we think about the beauty of the world with shut eyes. What a corporeal object in space is to the bodily senses, that the object's likeness in the memory is to the penetrating power of the soul. Likewise, just as the will must have an intention of uniting the object seen and the sight of it, so too the same willed intention is active in uniting the object's likeness, which is in the memory, and the vision of the thinker.<sup>141</sup>

Active perception is therefore in harmony with the goals of the 'sensory turn', a scholarly shift that positioned itself as a reaction to the failure of linguistic methods of scholarship (primarily using the written word) to explain the sensual and embodied aspects of human experience.

The literary scholar Michael Serres is generally regarded as one of the first to challenge this preoccupation with language.<sup>142</sup> In 1985, his polemical *Les cinq sens* advocated for a philosophy of mingled bodies, arguing that the body is mixed with the outside world, and consequently, no sense operates alone: 'each sense is in fact a nodal cluster, a clump, confection, or bouquet of all the other senses, a mingling of the modalities of mingling.'<sup>143</sup> The sensory turn has indeed been transformative in the humanities and social sciences, probing new histories focused on bodies; today, one can pick up several popular histories of human and animal bodies related to the senses.<sup>144</sup> Summarising this ideological revolution David Howes has remarked that 'once the encompassing grip of 'the science of signs' (modelled on linguistics) is broken, we are brought – perhaps with a gasp of surprise or a recoil of disgust – into the realm of the body and the senses.'<sup>145</sup>

### **The Place of Affect, Affectivity and *affectus* in Emotions History**

Emotions arguably are not a new field of study.<sup>146</sup> With its focus on individuals and their subjective orientation, the history of emotions shares a direct genealogy with the history of mentalities (*histoire des mentalités*) as practised by members of the Annales School from the

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<sup>141</sup> DSA, 10 (PL 40, 786; CFS 24, p. 193): 'Mundi quoque istius mirabilis pulchritudo, et nobis foris praesto est, et in memoria nostra habet imaginem suam, incorporalem quidem, sed corpori similem, ad quam recurrimus cum clausis oculis eam cogitamus. Quod enim est ad corporis sensum aliquod corpus in loco, hoc est ad animi aciem similitudo corporis in memoria: et quod est intentio voluntatis ad corpus visum visionemque copulandam, hoc est eadem intentio voluntatis ad copulandam imaginem corporis, quae est in memoria et visione cogitantis.'

<sup>142</sup> M. Serres, *Les cinq sens* (Paris: Grasset, 1985).

<sup>143</sup> S. Connor, 'Michel Serres' *Les Cinq Sens*', in N. Abbas, ed., *Mapping Michel Serres* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), p. 158.

<sup>144</sup> For example: J. Hartnell, *Medieval Bodies: Life, Death and Art in the Middle Ages* (London: Wellcome Collection, 2018); J. Higgins, *Sentient: What Animals Reveal About Our Senses* (London: Picador, 2021).

<sup>145</sup> D. Howes, ed., *Empire of the Senses: The Sensual Cultural Reader* (Oxford: Berg, 2005), p. 1.

<sup>146</sup> The list includes Lucien Febvre (1875-1956), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Karl Lemprecht (1856-1915), Georg Steinhausen (1866-1933), Kurt Breysig (1866-1940), Aby Warburg (1866-1929), Georg Simmel (1858-1918) and Max Weber (1864-1920), see J. Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*, trans., K. Tribe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 44-49.

late 1920s. Nonetheless, it was only from the 1980s that an ‘emotional turn’ began to transform the methods of several disciplines all at once: anthropology, art, criminology, economics, geography, history, literary and media studies, philosophy, psychology and sociology, among others.<sup>147</sup> Several journals and research institutes internationally support emotions scholarship in the UK, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Australia, Canada and the U.S.A.<sup>148</sup>

Cultural histories of emotion such as those written by Peter and Carol Stearns or William M. Reddy have convincingly shown that emotions are in part culturally constructed, that is, emotional states are ‘not simply biological reactions but also involve an interplay between body and mind.’<sup>149</sup> The history of emotions, therefore, not only makes space for the body in its explanations of human actions, but champions the perspective that societal and cultural understandings of the body actively influence the experience of emotion at any given time – a viewpoint shared with sensory historians and active perception.

Tracing, interpreting and understanding the volatility of the meanings of emotion words at different levels of scale (in society, a group, an author, a text) has been a key methodological principle among historians of emotions.<sup>150</sup> It is possible to do so with the Cistercians and Victorines because they represent two distinct yet interrelated ‘emotional communities’. This widely used concept first formulated by Barbara H. Rosenwein describes how shared understandings of emotion, both theoretical and practical, arise as ‘an aspect of every social group in which people have a stake or interest.’<sup>151</sup> For Rosenwein, an emotional community is

largely the same as social communities—families, neighbourhoods, syndicates, academic institutions, monasteries, factories, platoons, princely courts. But the researcher looking at them seeks above all to uncover systems of feeling, to establish what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them (for it is about such things that people express emotions); the emotions that they value, devalue, or ignore; the nature of the affective bonds between

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<sup>147</sup> Otniel E. Dror et al, ‘An Introduction to History of Science and the Emotions,’ *Osiris*, 31 (2016), p. 1.

<sup>148</sup> Queen Mary Centre for the History of Emotions, University of London; Les Émotions au Moyen Âge (EMMA), Universities of Aix-Marseille and Québec à Montréal; Languages of Emotion, Freie Universität Berlin; Centre for the History of Emotions, Max Planck Institute for Human Development; International Network for the Cultural History of Emotions in Premodernity (CHEP), University of Umeå; Emotional Culture and Identity (CEMID), Institute of Culture and Society at the University of Navarra; Australian Research Council funded Centre of Excellence in the History of Emotions (CHE) at the University of Western Australia; The Institute for the Study of Emotions, Florida State University.

<sup>149</sup> P. N. Stearns and C. Z. Stearns, ‘Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards’, *The American Historical Review*, 90:4 (1985), p. 834; W. M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

<sup>150</sup> Rosenwein has suggested that to understand the reception of a text the precise meaning(s) of key ‘emotion words’ (such as *affectus*) should be charted in addition other practices such as reading the silences, metaphors and ironies in the text. See Rosenwein, ‘Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions’, *Passions in Context: The Journal of the History and Philosophy of the Emotions* 1/1 (2010), pp. 1-33.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

people that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore.<sup>152</sup>

The methodological considerations of the emotional community are sevenfold: (1) to collect sources related to the community in study; (2) to scrutinise and problematise individual words for emotive meaning; (3) to understand and utilise the thought of contemporary theorists of emotion; (4) to establish the relative importance of key vocabulary to the historical actors; (5) to read the silences, metaphors and ironies; (6) to understand the social role of emotions, how they are social constructed and reproduce social behaviours; and finally, (7) to trace changes in emotion over time.<sup>153</sup>

While this thesis draws on the history of emotions, the contextual use of the term ‘affectivity’ is also motivated by a rejection of modern, psychological understandings of the term ‘affect’. The affect paradigm, advanced under the names of William James, Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Silvan S. Tomkins, Paul Ekman, Brian Massumi and Antonio Damasio have posited that there exist a number of ‘basic emotions’ or ‘affect programmes’: emotions such as fear, anger, disgust, joy, sadness and surprise, which are genetically hardwired and universally experienced by everyone.<sup>154</sup> The decision of the affect theorists to treat emotion scientifically as a pre-linguistic, physiological and predominantly unconscious activity has gone against a broader trend within the historical and social sciences to view emotion as a culturally conditioned ‘meta-concept’.<sup>155</sup>

In my view, Michael W. Champion has provided one of the most constructive challenges to affect theory. In *Before Emotion* Champion has highlighted the shortcomings of affect theory in its totalising tendency to reduce all experience to preconscious activities means that feelings are reduced to the lowest stage of embodied life; ‘Feelings so understood are a mental representation of bodily affect. They are eliminated if there are no bodily phenomena

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<sup>152</sup> Ibid, p. 11.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid, pp. 12-24

<sup>154</sup> W. James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1890); G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); B. Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham/London, Duke University Press, 2002); E. Shouse, ‘Feeling, Emotion, Affect’, *M/C Journal*, 8/6 (2005); A. R. Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain* (London, William Heinemann, 2003). For an overview of the historiography and a critique see Ruth Leys’ classic article ‘The Turn to Affect: A Critique’, *Critical Inquiry*, 37:3 (2011), pp. 438-9, in addition to her 2017 monograph: *The Ascent of Affect: Genealogy and Critique* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).

<sup>155</sup> Plamper, *The History of Emotions*, p. 12.

associated with it; sadness reduces as one's tears dry up', Champion rightly asserts.<sup>156</sup> Such a view is unidirectional: space affects the person but not vice-versa. It leaves no room for the volitional character of experience so well documented in medieval sources. It is reductive because medieval accounts of affectivity placed deliberate emphasis on the complex interactions between the internal mind and the external world. As Champion suggests: '*affectus* could commonly be translated as 'will' or 'intention', where desiring minds focused on some aspect of the external world... yet in the strands of contemporary affect theory which make minds the representation of bodily states, such a conceptualisation of *affectus* is impossible.'<sup>157</sup>

Possessing training in archives, a critical eye to their sources, a contextual methodology yet a willingness to learn from the fruits of other disciplines makes historians and history ideally suited not only to challenge affect theory but to offer a critical yet constructive alternative. Today there are a range of essays, monographs and edited collections that seek to marry a historical method cautious of biological determinism with the turn to affect's focus on the non-discursive and the material.<sup>158</sup>

The concept of 'affectivity' is thus used to loosely describe the powers of the affective capacity of the soul. Preferring emic accounts – that is, the theories of emotion articulated by medieval writers themselves – recent scholarship of medieval religion has adopted the utility of the concept of 'affectivity' to emphasise the discursive reality of medieval experience.<sup>159</sup> Here the term is employed in a non-scientific context and without the aim of retrospectively diagnosing the emotional predispositions of historical actors.<sup>160</sup> More precisely, I argue here that affectivity offers an insight into the psychological dispositions that both the communities of the Cistercians and Victorines sought to cultivate. Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy's

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<sup>156</sup> M. W. Champion, 'From *affectus* to Affect Theory and Back Again', in J. F. Ruys, M. W. Champion, and K. Essary, eds., *Before Emotion: The Language of Feeling, 400-1800* (New York and London: Routledge, 2019), p. 242.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid, pp. 242-243.

<sup>158</sup> H. A. Crocker, 'Medieval Affects Now', *Exemplaria*, 29:1 (2017), pp. 82-98 (see especially the examples Crocker cites on p. 91); G. D. Burger and H. A. Crocker, eds., *Medieval Affect, Feeling, and Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); C. Monagle, *Scholastic Affect: Gender, Maternity and the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); P. Binski, *Gothic Sculpture* (New Haven: University of Yale Press, 2019).

<sup>159</sup> Etienne Gilson uses the term to describe the activity of the emotional faculty of the soul as opposed to the cognitive. See Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, trans. D. I. Trethowan and F. J. Sheed (New York: St Antony Guild Press, 1965), p. 205. The term is used thirteen times by Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy in their *Medieval Sensibilities* and they have dubbed St Augustine the 'Father of Medieval Affectivity', see p. 21 and 341. It also serves as the key concept of Karin Ganss' article, 'Affectivity and Knowledge Lead to Devotion to God: A Historical-Theological Study of Hugh of Saint Victor's *De virtute orandi*', in *A Companion to the Abbey of Saint Victor in Paris*, pp. 422-68.

<sup>160</sup> For the pitfalls of retrospective diagnosis see J. Edge, 'Diagnosing the Past', *Wellcome Collection* (2018). Available online at <<https://wellcomecollection.org/articles/W5D4eR4AACIArLL8>>. Last accessed 12/11/2019.

assertion that ‘the decisive Cistercian contribution to medieval anthropology was to add affectivity to the pantheon of the soul’s powers’ is no idle claim.<sup>161</sup> Through training and discipline, this psychology sought to bring two rarely cooperative faculties of the soul, the knowledge-producing power, *intellectus*, and the desiring or emotional power, *affectus*, together.

### **Affectivity: Sense, Emotion and Experience**

Despite being rarely defined, the methodological utility of the term ‘experience’ has been much discussed by practitioners of the so-called ‘experiential turn’ in anthropology, art theory, gender studies, literary studies and, more recently, in the fields of social, cultural, intellectual, emotional and sensory history.<sup>162</sup> In my use of the term, I follow emotions and sensory historians such as Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy, Rob Boddice and Mark Smith, Alain Corbin, Richard Newhauser and William Tullett who employ the term ‘experience’ to speak to the interconnectedness of sense perception, emotion and cognition in the *habitus* of daily life.<sup>163</sup> Experience offers a way to bridge the divide between sensory and linguistic scholarship through its focus on the body and language.<sup>164</sup> Indeed, while *experientia*, the closest Latin term to the English experience, could be translated as a ‘trial’, ‘proof’ or ‘experiment’, two other common meanings found in Lewis and Short’s *A Latin Dictionary* and the *Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources* highlight how the term could also refer to those who have witnessed a situation first-hand, or knowledge acquired by effort and endeavour. It is this dual emphasis on the perceptive result of actions and events that associates *experientia* very closely with the terms *affectus* and *habitus*.

This method also shares several affinities with what medieval contemporaries understood as affectivity or what McGinn refers to as ‘consciousness’. Boquet and Nagy’s

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<sup>161</sup> Boquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, p. 143.

<sup>162</sup> For the legacy of E. P. Thompson and class-based approaches to experience see Selina Todd, ‘People Matter’, *History Workshop Journal*, 76 (2013), pp. 259-65; *Id.*, ‘Class, Experience and Britain’s Twentieth Century’, *Social History*, 39:4 (2014), pp. 489-508. Joan Scott has been incredibly influential. See Scott, ‘The Evidence of Experience’, *Critical Enquiry*, 17:4 (1991), pp. 773-797. For a critique of Scott see Dominick La Capra’s chapter ‘Experience and Identity’ in *History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 35-71, especially p. 38.

<sup>163</sup> R. G. Newhauser, ‘Foreword: The Senses in Medieval and Renaissance Intellectual History’, *Senses & Society*, 5:1 (2010), pp. 5-6; *Id.*, ‘Introduction: The Sensual Middle Ages’, in Newhauser, ed., *A Cultural History of the Senses in the Middle Ages* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 1-22; A. Corbin, *Time, Desire and Horror: Towards a History of the Senses*, trans. J. Birrell (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), see especially ‘A History and Anthropology of the Senses’, pp. 181-192; *Id.*, *Village Bells: Sound and Meaning in the Nineteenth-Century French Countryside*, trans. M. Thom (London: Papermac, 1999); For Tullett, see note 170 below.

<sup>164</sup> See E. M. Bruner, ‘Introduction: Experience and its Expressions’, in Victor W. Turner and Edward M. Bruner, eds., *The Anthropology of Experience* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), pp. 4-5.



*Medieval Sensibilities*, for instance, recalls Lucien Febvre's use of the term *sensibilité* ('sensibility') to describe how sensation, thought and emotion are always enmeshed together; sensibility is the *la vie affective et ses manifestations* ('The emotional life of man and all its manifestations').<sup>165</sup> Just like today, emotion for medieval contemporaries referred 'to a phenomenon that is both cognitive and affective', the pair state.<sup>166</sup> In doing so, Boquet and Nagy re-examine previous studies of the terms *affectio* and *affectus*, which associated these terms with transitory and ephemeral passions, affects, impulses, accidents and bodily conditions.<sup>167</sup> While affectivity certainly does involve these attributes, they insightfully argue that

affectivity also includes more stable aspects: atmospheres, moods, and lasting dispositions tied to other cognitive processes (imagination, memory, reasons, etc)... [and] founded on a history of experience...<sup>168</sup>

Following in their stead, Boddice and Smith have recently sought to promote a new 'history of experience'. The pair define experience similarly as the

...lived, meaningful reality of historical actors, whether as subjective or collective reality, and incorporating all the features of past perception in their own terms, be they sensory, emotional, cognitive, supernatural or whatever.<sup>169</sup>

For both Boquet and Nagy and Boddice and Smith, the approach is not to re-constitute or re-enact 'lived experience' but rather to study *how* historical actors perceived their world and the implications this had for their culturally conditioned practices.

Similarly, a series of sensory historians have also contributed to our understanding of experience. William Tullett's suggestion that experience does not mean the 'immediacy of something happening to an individual' but rather is 'the formation of an enduring, accumulated reservoir of habits and perceptual, interpretative, frameworks' is an attractive proposition.<sup>170</sup> Likewise, Richard Newhauser has drawn on the work of French phenomenological philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty to show how in both sensology and

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<sup>165</sup> L. Febvre, 'Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the Past', in *A New Kind of History from the Writings of Febvre*, ed. P. Burke and trans. K. Folca (London: Routledge, 1973), p. 13.

<sup>166</sup> Boquet and Nagy, 'Medieval Sciences of the Emotions', p. 24.

<sup>167</sup> M. Champion, Y. Haskell, J. F. Ruys and R. Garrod, 'But Were They Talking About the Emotions? *Affectus*, *affectio* and the History of the Emotions', *Rivista storica italiana*, 78:2 (2016), pp. 521-543.

<sup>168</sup> Boquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>169</sup> R. Boddice and M. Smith, *Emotion, Sense, Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 17.

<sup>170</sup> W. Tullett, *Smell in Eighteenth-Century England: A Social Sense* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 13.

phenomenology the ‘self’ is integral to the perception of reality – sense perception does not solely involve the perception of something in the world but implies a dynamic interaction between the individual and the norms of the sensory (and emotional) community the perceiving subject is a member of at any given time.<sup>171</sup> Studying experiences, however, requires great caution. As Alain Corbin has suggested, the historian needs to combine both (1) knowledge of the sensory system, its representation and its function with (2) the language used by the community under study. The *habitus* of the group must be mapped out and understood so it is possible to determine ‘the frontier between the perceived and the unperceived, and... the norms which decree what is spoken and left unspoken.’<sup>172</sup> My approach seeks to do this by carefully unpacking the meaning of emotion terms used by Cistercian and Victorine authors – *affectio*, *affectus*, *intellectus*, *sensus*, for example – and reading these terms in the context of relevant monastic and canonical actions and ways of life.

Undoubtably, the most useful understanding of *habitus* has come from the pen of Monique Scheer. Her 2012 article imaginatively drew on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus* to show that emotions can be considered as a ‘practice’. Following Bourdieu, Scheer’s *habitus* recognises that the brain is in dialogue with the body and the world; the brain is limited by the structures of the world yet is subject to change as these structures change. ‘The *habitus* must be static and binding to a certain extent, if it is to be more than a loose cloak that can be thrown off on a whim’, Scheer states, yet ‘at the same time, the set of dispositions is not established once and for all, but is dependent on confirmation in everyday practice.’<sup>173</sup> In contrast to earlier theorists of emotion, Scheer more convincingly harmonises a theory of the senses with a theory of emotion; her view of the ‘practiced’ body offers a unique methodology for ‘putting together doing and saying’.<sup>174</sup>

Experiences of the world and dispositions of acting can be clearly observed in Cistercian and Victorine writings. In the Cistercian view, the promotion and ordering of *caritas* or ‘charity’ was linked to the creation of virtuous habits, what Cistercians called ‘ordered love’. As one Cistercian wrote: ‘Charity makes a loving disposition (*affectus*) and is

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<sup>171</sup> See the section on ‘Phenomenology’ in Richard Newhauser’s essay ‘Sensology and Enargeia’, due to be published in Newhauser, Richard G. ‘Sensology and Enargeia’, in *Literature and the Senses: Oxford Twenty-First Century Approaches to Literature*, ed. Anette Kern-Stohler (Oxford: Blackwell, 2023). I am grateful to Richard Newhauser for sharing a copy of the manuscript with me.

<sup>172</sup> Corbin, *Time, Desire and Horror*, pp. 189-190.

<sup>173</sup> M. Scheer, ‘Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (And is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieuan Approach to Understanding Emotion’, *History and Theory*, 51:2 (2012), p. 204.

<sup>174</sup> B. H. Rosenwein and R. Cristiani, *What is the History of Emotions?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), p. 78.

simple (*simplex*), which means it lacks constituent parts; because it is virtue (*virtus*), the habitual state of a well-disciplined mind (*habitus animi bene constitute*), it is hard to move.’<sup>175</sup> Among the Victorines, Richard of Saint-Victor was clear in differentiating between a mental habit and a fleeting disposition. Richard begins by emphasising how virtue is a form of rational and natural moderation ‘Virtue is a habit of the mind congruent to the measure of nature and to reason’, he remarks.<sup>176</sup> Virtues by being habits are thus characterised by their permanence and stability: ‘A habit is a quality deriving from the inclination of a subject not easily moved, just as a disposition is a quality deriving from the inclination of a subject easily moved.’<sup>177</sup> Elsewhere Richard emphasises the ontological similarities between an ‘intention of the mind’ (*intentio mentis*) and an affective disposition (*affectus*). Despite both originating from the will, they are radically different. He illustrates this by an analogy of baking bread. Richard says that ‘bread... is made from dough, but dough is not made from bread’: as the matter of affectivity, intentions are soft (*mollis*), pliant and malleable like dough, and thus ‘capable of many forms’ (*diversae formae susceptibilis*); affective dispositions, on the other hand, are like loaves of bread – they become firm (*firma*), hard and lasting by being fired in the kiln of personal experience.<sup>178</sup> Like the Cistercian connection between *affectus* and virtue, the process of ‘baking’ acts of will involves a commitment to moderation. ‘In this way’, Richard writes, ‘certainly the promotion of our merits and the renewal of our progress (*profectus*) begins from deliberation (*deliberatio*), is moderated by discretion (*discretio*), and is consummated in love (*dilectio*)’.<sup>179</sup> These examples show that the *habitus* – or *affectus* in Richard’s case – is simultaneously serving as the prism through which thoughts and actions are refracted but, all the while, the shape of the prism is changing slightly, becoming more or less binding, more or less conscious to the individual. In this latter sense, Holly Crocker has perceptively commented that the medieval understanding of *habitus* even shares certain similarities with modern affect theory since it is concerned ‘with an ethical disposition that

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<sup>175</sup> Idung of Prüfening, *Dialogus duorum monachorum*, 2.11, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, ‘Le moine Idung et ses deux ouvrages: “Argumentum super quatuor questionibus” et “Dialogus duorum monachorum”’, *Studi Medievali*, 13/1 (1972), lines 144-147, p. 442; tr. J. F. O’Sullivan, *Cistercians and Cluniacs: The Case for Cîteaux*, CFS 33 (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977), p. 106: ‘Illam quae in affectu est facit caritas illa, quae foras mittit timorem, et est simplex, id est carens integralibus partibus, quia virtus est, id est habitus animi bene constituti, difficile mobilis.’

<sup>176</sup> *Except.* 1.4 (PL 177, 193C; VTT 3, p. 301): ‘Virtus est habitus animi in modum naturae rationi consentaneus.’

<sup>177</sup> *Except.* 1.4 (PL 177, 193C; VTT 3, p. 301): ‘Est autem habitus qualitas veniens per applicationem subiecti difficile mobilis, sicut dispositio est qualitas per applicationem subiecti facile mobilis.’

<sup>178</sup> *Explan.* 3.2.1 (PL 196, 260D; VTT 6, p. 266): ‘Panis, uti jam dictum est, fit de conspersione, non autem conspersio de pane.’

<sup>179</sup> *Explan.* 3.2.1 (PL 196, 260D; VTT 6, p. 266): ‘Sic utique sic meritorum nostrorum promotio profectuum innovatio ex deliberatione inchoatur, per discretionem moderatur, in dilectione consummatur.’

operates beyond intention’ – a hidden framework that undergirds how emotional life is interpreted and experienced by the individual.<sup>180</sup>

In contrast to Bourdieu’s *habitus* which was tied to cultural Marxism and had the drawback of undermining individual agency, Scheer’s conception of emotions as practices linked to a *habitus* captures medieval understandings of the term as connected to change and ethics. ‘For medieval philosophers and theologians... though they would agree with Bourdieu that many of its operations are subterranean and inarticulate, they regard *habitus* as a conscious tool for reforming or perfecting behaviour... medieval individuals and communities routinely set out to use *habitus* to instil in themselves the practice of virtue...’, Katharine Breen comments.<sup>181</sup>

Therefore, it is palpable that each of the above historians have, described a similar entangled set of phenomena that constitute human experience in its totality, whether the word used is affectivity, sensibility, consciousness, experience, *habitus* or practice. Concepts such as affectivity or experience eschew viewing emotions, senses and cognition as discrete categories and collapse the boundaries that have emerged between the approaches of emotions and sensory history. By taking an experiential approach, this thesis promotes a view of affectivity that remains faithful to how medieval contemporaries imagined it – as the consciousness produced by the intersection of bodily *and* mental phenomena. For Hugh of Saint-Victor, the senses, intellect and feelings all comprise different forms of ‘knowing’. This knowledge comes about ‘through act (*per actum*) when... some present object is grasped by sensation (*sensus*), or through understanding (*per intellectus*) when absent things or even non-existent things are grasped in likeness and understanding... or through experience (*per experientiam*), when we sense (*sentiantur*) things within us, such as joy, sadness, fear and love, which subsist within us and are sensed by us.’<sup>182</sup> In the view of William of Saint-Thierry, the monastery contrasts to the schools which advance reason, since it is a ‘unique school of charity’ (*specialis caritatis schola*) which promotes both thought and action: ‘Here its exercises are performed, its disputations held, solutions are arrived at not only by

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<sup>180</sup> Crocker, ‘Medieval Affects Now’, p. 94.

<sup>181</sup> K. Breen, *Imagining an English Reading Public, 1150-1400* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 7-8, in Crocker, ‘Medieval Affects Now’, p. 94.

<sup>182</sup> *Sacr.*, 1.10.2 (PL 176, 328C; Berndt, p. 214; Deferrari, p. 166): ‘...vel per actum quando... presents sensu comprehenduntur, vel per intellectum, quando absentes... et in imaginatione per intellectum capiuntur, vel experientiam, quando ea qua in nobis sunt sentiuntur a nobis, ut est gaudium, tristitia, timor et amor, quae substitunt in nobis et sentiuntur a nobis.’ This passage is also quoted by Feiss in *On Love*, p. 34, note 7 and I have followed Feiss’s translation.

reasoning but by reason and by the very nature and truth of things and by experience.’<sup>183</sup> Hugh and William are clear on the point that both thought and action comprise affectivity. ‘Medieval texts’, Boquet and Nagy write, ‘impose upon us an integrated understanding of affective, sensitive, and rational discursive faculties and experiences.’<sup>184</sup>

My aim in adopting this approach is to reconstruct and interpret, as accurately as possible, the significance of perception and affectivity to twelfth-century monks and canons. To do so requires taking an experiential approach because perception contains an affective dimension – the choice of what to see, hear, smell, taste and touch often is motivated by inner thoughts and affections. Likewise, the affections Cistercian and Victorine monks and canons felt were undeniably linked to the people, things and beings they had perceived. Considering Cistercian and Victorine life through the lens of experience helps to best recognise the structures and habits of behaviour that condition perception, feeling and thinking.

## Thesis Structure

My argument in this thesis is presented across a prologue and seven chapters. In the prologue I chart the key ideas Augustine imparted to the Middle Ages relating to perception and affectivity and the *De anima* tradition in the twelfth century.

Part one ‘Between Theory and Practice: Ordering Reason and Love in Cistercian and Victorine Experience’, intervenes into a historical debate that has considered the Cistercians and Victorines as proponents of radically different Christian worldviews or ‘anthropologies’. Responding to Csaba Németh, Chapters 1 and 2 contain the core arguments of this thesis. Cistercian and Victorine authors, I claim, saw affectivity (*affectus*) and understanding (*intellectus*) as two complementary powers of the soul required for acquiring lasting habits of virtue necessary for the love and contemplation of God. I argue this first by outlining the psychological schemas in *De anima* treatises and spiritual writings produced by these groups, and then showing how this bi-partite psychology was not theoretical but practical. The *affectus*, especially, is necessary for ethical training, although both powers – *affectus* and *intellectus* – are jointly responsible for orientating the senses in perception in a healthy and moderate way. Unhealthy and immoderate perceptions and attachments orientate Cistercian monks and Victorine canons away their goal of living virtuously, contemplating God and saving their souls

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<sup>183</sup> *Nat. dig.*, 4.26 (PL 184, 396D; CCCM 88, p. 198; CFS 30, p. 87): ‘Hic eius studia excoluntur, disputationes agitantur, solutiones non ratiocinationibus tantum, quantum ratione et ipsa rerum veritate et experientia terminantur.’

<sup>184</sup> Boquet and Nagy, ‘Medieval Sciences of the Emotions’, p. 24.

(what I term ‘negative’ affectivity); healthy and moderate perceptions and attachments orientate the soul towards virtue, God and salvation (what I term ‘positive’ affectivity). This chapter ends and concludes the first part of this thesis by suggesting the contours of Cistercian and Victorine anthropology not only map onto the Cistercian and Victorine usage of the terms *affectus*, *intellectus* and *sensus* but also involve a series of other oppositions and wordplays: *effectus*, *defectus*, *profectus* and *habitus* – each of which demand further investigation.

Part 2, ‘Image and Likeness’, develops the argument of part 1 by offering a further analysis of how Cistercian and Victorine psychological writing explore the theological consequences of the soul’s creation in the image and likeness of God. This fundamental doctrine of Christianity appears initially unimportant, yet in chapter 4 I argue that Cistercian and Victorine authors, especially, drew on this passage in Genesis to understand the soul’s powers of *intellectus* and *affectus*. These two capacities are understood as made to the image and likeness of God, and subsequently became corrupted following original sin. Cistercian and Victorine image and likeness theology, I argue, was a key part of the anthropological views of both groups, and is significant because it helped to crystallise the importance of cultivating both thinking and feeling in Cistercian and Victorine practices. Chapter 5 extends this shared conceptions of the soul as made in the image and likeness to explore *how* the soul undergoes spiritual change during experiences of perception, emotion and cognition. With their focus on how the senses and imagination mediate the processes of body and soul, *De anima* treatises reveal the permeability of man’s outer and inner self. In the process both groups, I suggest, utilise understandings of physical sense perception as a form of assimilation as a model for their understandings of spiritual perception. This analogy enables Cistercian and Victorine authors to depict the act of the divine union as the soul changed into the image and likeness of God through its affectivity and intellect.

Part 3 of this thesis is entitled ‘Affectivity, Self-Knowledge and Practice’. Chapter 6 provides a much-needed investigation of the reception of the phrase ‘know yourself’ within Cistercian and Victorine spiritual literature aimed at promoting self-examination. For both Cistercians and Victorines, this involves fostering a dialogue between the soul and the ‘self’, as it did for Augustine, as well as cultivating the affective response of humility in reaction to original sin and God’s grace for mankind. Chapter 7, however, explores the different usages of this theme within *De anima* treatises themselves. I suggest that each community placed their own distinctive spin on communicating this theme. For the Cistercians, self-knowledge is tied up with symbolism derived from the cosmos and the Song of Songs. Victorine self-knowledge is more philosophical in nature, with self love considered to be the corresponding action to the

canonical mission to love thy neighbour. I conclude by arguing that, in some cases, *De anima* treatises and spiritual writings on psychology should not be considered solely as individual texts but rather as a part of a wider corpus of writings that indicated a programme of spiritual reform. In this programme, the knowledge of the soul offered by a *De anima* treatise often constituted the first step of the individual's ethical and spiritual conversion.

## PROLOGUE - AUTHORITY AND INNOVATION: PERCEPTION AND AFFECTIVITY IN THE *DE ANIMA* GENRE AND TWELFTH-CENTURY AUGUSTINIAN PSYCHOLOGY

Before proceeding to explore the psychological doctrines of Cistercian and Victorine treatises on the soul it is useful to unpack the chronological and geographical scope of Cistercian and Victorine thought. The twelfth-century *De anima* tradition was radically different from that of their thirteenth century scholastic counterparts in terms of complexity and genre. These thirteenth century writings on the soul were more influenced more by the Aristotelian as opposed to the Augustinian-Neoplatonism that dominated the intellectual understanding of the soul before 1250. Plato's tripartition of the soul in 439d of *Republic* (c. 380 B.C.) would prove extremely influential.<sup>185</sup> By distinguishing between a reasoning part (*logistikon*), spirited part (*thumoeides*; Latin: *irascibilis*) and appetitive part (*thumêtikon*; Latin: *concupiscibilis*), Plato explained how the thoughts, passions and appetites making up human life interacted and dominated one another.<sup>186</sup> However, it was the *De anima* (c. 350 B.C.) of Aristotle that offered a scientific and systematic account of the *psuchê* (ψυχή), that is, the 'breath of life' or soul within rational and non-rational animals. Aristotle's *De anima* outlined a definition of the soul, provided a discussion on the topics of nutrition, movement and reproduction, and then finally proceeded to explain the functioning of the faculties of sensation, imagination and the intellect.

### Saint-Augustine

The generator of potent waves of thought on psychology that would ripple throughout the Middle Ages was Saint Augustine (354–430). Despite authoring several works that touched on psychological themes, the Bishop of Hippo never penned his own *Liber de anima*. Consequently, Augustine's views on bodily and spiritual perception, the affections and psychology had to be reconstructed through his references to the subject across his oeuvre. For psychology and the inner life, one can turn to the *Soliloquia* (*Soliloquies*), *Genesis ad litteram* (*On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*) and *De trinitate* (*On the Trinity*); for the will, *De libero arbitrio* (*On Free Choice*), *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (*On Grace and free Choice*); whereas extensive treatments on the subject of love and the affections are found in *De civitate Dei* (*The City of God*) and the *Confessiones* (*Confessions*). For Augustine's view of the soul itself there

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<sup>185</sup> See Plato, *The Republic*, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari and trans. T. Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 4, pp. 135-6.

<sup>186</sup> S. Knuuttila, 'Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul', in *Emotions and Choice*, p. 51; C. Shields, 'Plato's Divided Soul', in *Partitioning the Soul*, pp. 15-38.



was *De quantitate animae* (*On the Measure of the Soul*) and *De immortalitate animae* (*On the Immortality of the Soul*).

With the space available, it is not possible to discuss in detail all of Augustine's positions on the soul. However, Leslie Lockett's typology of Platonist-Christian psychology does provide an impression of the prevailing view of the soul that Augustine inherited and advocated. For Christian Platonists like Augustine, Lockett helpfully suggests the following claims regarding the soul were emphasised:

1. The human soul is *unitary*: the soul comprises both rational and non-rational faculties.
2. The human soul is *incorporeal*: it shares its incorporeality with spirits (angels and demons) and God.
3. The incorporeal human soul is *not a material substance*.
4. The human soul is *immortal*.
5. The incorporeal soul can *learn incorporeal truths*: the soul's highest faculty, the *intellectus* – or its spiritual sense(s) – is capable of perceiving things not perceptible by the bodily senses.
6. Incorporeal truths are *immortal*: they exist independently from the material world of things.<sup>187</sup>

While Augustine did not develop this basic foundation, he certainly popularised it across his oeuvre through his preference of the spiritual over the corporeal. Nonetheless, there are four further specific points of doctrine advocated by Augustine, I suggest, that would become acutely significant to Cistercian and Victorine understandings of the soul: the soul's trinitarian structure, the soul's creation in the image and likeness of God, Augustine's 'active' theory of perception, and the neutrality of the *affectus* and *affectiones*.

#### The Structure of the Soul: *anima-animus-mens*

Augustine knew of Plato's tripartite division of the human soul into a spirited, desiring and controlling part yet, as befitting his Neoplatonic leanings, Augustine refers to speak more of an irrational-rational bi-polarity of the soul.<sup>188</sup> In Augustine's division, the *anima* or 'irrational soul' tends to refer to part of the soul responsible for bestowing life throughout the body through the acts of sense perception, memory and appetite; meanwhile, the *animus* or 'rational

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<sup>187</sup> Leslie Lockett, *Anglo-Saxon Psychologies in the Vernacular and Latin Traditions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), pp. 182-183.

<sup>188</sup> G. O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* (London: Duckworth, 1987), p. 13.

soul' rules the *anima* and is responsible for willing and understanding. The most refined power to know God, the *mens* or 'mind', often served as a sub-division of the *animus*. This also creates a threefold hierarchy of *anima*, *animus* and *mens* – these three parts making the soul a reflection of the Holy Trinity.

#### Soul as *imago et similitudo Dei*

The idea that the soul mirrors the nature of God is most explicitly set out in *De trinitate*, a treatise that laid out Augustine's mature thinking on psychology. A characteristic feature of this text is the psychological division of the mind into understanding (*intellectus*), memory (*memoria*) and will (*voluntas*) (*De trinitate* 10.11.17). These three powers of the soul are due to its creation according to Genesis 1:19 as an image and likeness of the Holy Trinity ('Man was created to the image and likeness of God'). As an image of the Holy trinity, the three powers are a single unity. 'Just as it [the soul] always knows and always wills itself, so at the same time it always remembers itself, always understands itself, and always loves itself...', Augustine writes.<sup>189</sup>

#### Types of Perception: Corporeal, Intellectual and Spiritual

The power for sense perception according to Augustine was localised in the anterior part of the face (*Genesis ad litteram*, 401). Notably, Augustine designated three different types of vision (*Genesis ad litteram*, 12.27.55). The first is corporeal vision (*corporalia*) or sense perception which uses the sense organs (i.e., the eyes) to perceive physical objects; the second is spiritual vision (*spiritualia*) whereby concepts and thoughts are seen only in the mind, such as in the imagination or dreams; and the final type is intellectual vision (*intellectualia*) which involves understandings and insights that do not stem from any image whatsoever, achieved through the operation of divine grace on the understanding. This ascending model of vision was particularly significant in the twelfth century, being repeated several times by William of Saint-Thierry and in the *De spiritu et anima*.<sup>190</sup> William's *Mediation* 2 further distinguishes between two forms of intellectual vision: one by which reason works through thought, and another in which the mind is enlightened or illumined by God through pure grace.<sup>191</sup> Isaac of Stella's *Epistola de anima* contains a similar distinction: sense perception and imagination pertain to 'natural science' (*naturalis disciplina*), reason is concerned with theoretical and is a 'mathematical

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<sup>189</sup> *De trinitate*, 10.12.19 (trans. McKenna, p. 59).

<sup>190</sup> William of Saint-Thierry, *Meditatio* 2.9-12 (CFS 91, pp. 13-14); *Prayer* (CFS 3, pp. 72-73); *De spiritu et anima*, 24 (CFS 24, p. 218).

<sup>191</sup> William of Saint-Thierry, *Meditatio* 2.13-14 (CFS 91, pp. 14-15 and p. 113).

science' (*mathematica disciplina*) whereas the soul's highest power of understanding (*intelligentia*) is concerned with divine matters and is called 'theology' (*theologia*).<sup>192</sup> While the previous two forms of sight utilise the natural powers of the soul and effort, theology requires divine grace. 'In some similar proportion reason is able to assist it', Isaac remarks, 'but in no way able to attain it'.<sup>193</sup>

#### Active perception: Willed Sensation and Attention

Despite the dualities Augustine advocates, the body-soul relationship for Augustine is deeply psychosomatic, which makes distinguishing the act of sense perception (of the irrational soul) from the will or understanding (of the rational soul) difficult.<sup>194</sup> *De trinitate* also set forth an 'active' Neoplatonic theory of sensation that attributed importance not only to the objects of perception and perception itself but also to the will or 'attention of the mind' (*intentio animi*). In this philosophy of mind, the invention of the *animi intentio*, which can be thought of as the 'concentration' or 'conscious attention' of the soul, has been seen as a novel element.<sup>195</sup> Augustine writes in *De trinitate* that the *animi intentio*

...is proper to the soul alone, because it is the will... the will possesses such power in uniting these two [perceptible object and sense] that it moves the sense to be formed to the thing which is seen, and keeps it fixed on it when it has been formed.<sup>196</sup>

The *animi intentio*, or will of the soul, thus converts the sense organs from passive recipients of sensory data into entities with agency, entities guided by the will to focus on specific sensory stimuli pre-meditated on by the soul. As Mark Eli Kalderon and Jose Filipé Silva have shown, the inclusion of the *intentio animi* or the perceiving power directed by the will, highlights the power of the will in perception, enabling Augustine to endorse a Trinitarian approach to perception in which all three elements – object, the power of perception and the attention of the mind – must all be equally present for perception to occur.<sup>197</sup> As O'Daly has similarly remarked regarding Augustine's understanding of knowledge: 'every quest for knowledge is a willed orientation of the mind towards the desired object'.<sup>198</sup> Silva has gone furthest in

<sup>192</sup> *Ep. an.* 16 (CFS 24, pp. 169-170).

<sup>193</sup> *Ep. an.* 16 (CFS 24, p. 170).

<sup>194</sup> See, for instance, *Genesis ad litteram* 7.19.25.

<sup>195</sup> M. E. Kalderon, 'Augustine's Trinitarian Perception', *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, 91:1 (2017), p.24.

<sup>196</sup> Augustine, *De trinitate*, 11.2.5 (trans. McKenna, p. 65-66).

<sup>197</sup> M. E. Kalderon, 'I – Trinitarian Perception', *Aristotelian Society*, 91:1 (2017), pp. 23-24; J. F. Silva, 'Augustine on Active Perception', in Silva and Yrjonsuri, *Active Perception in the History of Philosophy*, p. 80.

<sup>198</sup> O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, p. 211.

distinguishing two sets of intentionality in Augustine's theory of active perception. 'Ontological intentionality' he argues refers to the soul's continuous attention to the body (life), whereas 'epistemic intentionality' refers to how the soul's attention is directed outwards towards external things and can be differentiated into lower unconscious intentionality (sense) and higher conscious intentionality (intellection).<sup>199</sup> Silva notes that, 'attention is not only an essential feature of perception, it is *the* precondition of it. This (at)tending is motivated by the need to tend to the wellbeing and preservation of the body, to choose sensory stimuli that are beneficial and avoid those that are harmful.'<sup>200</sup>

### Memory and Imagination

As one of the three powers of the mind, memory was of great significance to Augustine's psychology and daily life.<sup>201</sup> It is the *memoria* where the images from the five senses are stored and recollected in the process of thought. In chapter 18 of *Genesis ad litteram* (401) Augustine cites the opinion of the doctor's that memory is localised in the middle part of the brain. After been perceived by the senses and stored in the cell of memory, the image can be recollected in thought.<sup>202</sup> Augustine's conception of the memory was partially like Aristotle in that he places a great deal of similarity between sense perception and the memory. As Augustine says: 'It is impossible to form any concept at all of a colour or of a bodily figure that has never been seen... then as the limit of perceiving is in bodies, so the limit of thinking is in the memory.'<sup>203</sup>

The imagination (*imagination*) or phantasy (*phantasia*) is closely associated with memory, since the understanding can draw on the memory and combine images together to produce a form of 'compositive imagination'. The consequence is that the imagination can produce images of things never seen before such as a black swan (*De trinitate*, 11.10) or golden mountain. While the imagination is a useful power, the soul that focuses its attention too much on corporeal perception can find it difficult to dissociate itself from them and focus its attention on God.

As the mind, therefore, is within, it goes in some way outside of itself when it directs the affection of its love towards these sensible things which leave their footprints, as it were, in our mind because we have thought about them so often. These footprints are,

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<sup>199</sup> Silva, 'Augustine on Active Perception', pp. 94-95.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid, pp. 96-97.

<sup>201</sup> For the overlooked significance of memory to Augustine's preaching see K. G. Grove, *Augustine on Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

<sup>202</sup> *De trinitate*, 11.9.16 (McKenna, p. 78).

<sup>203</sup> *De trinitate*, 11.8.14 (McKenna, p. 77).

so to speak, impressed on the memory when the corporeal things which are without are so perceived that, even when they are absent, their images are present to those who think of them.<sup>204</sup>

Augustine, therefore, emphasised the moderating the senses, memory and imagination. Twelfth-century *De anima* treatises were acutely concerned with the role of the memory and imagination in cultivating positive affectivity and thoughts directed at God. For instance, Augustine's view of the negative *phantasmata* in *De trinitate* 10.8-10 would be copied almost verbatim in chapter 32 of the *De spiritu et anima*, a text that details the significance of phantasies in dreams, demonic illusions and spiritual ecstasy (chapters 24-28).<sup>205</sup>

#### The Neutrality of the *affectus*, *affectiones* and *passiones*

The fourth aspect of Augustine's psychology would prove the most influential for Cistercian and Victorine authors: his understanding of emotion. *The affectus* and *affectiones* are extensively discussed by Augustine in books 9 and 14 of *De civitate Dei* (*On the City of God*) and books 9 and 10 of his *Confessiones* (*Confessions*). Augustine's view of emotion in *De civitate Dei* is symptomatic of a discernible trend towards the increasingly specific usage of the related terms *affectus* and *passio* in theological discourse. Whilst generally preferring the term *passio* or 'passion' because of its status as a 'common term', Augustine appears to use the terms *affectus*, *affectiones* and *passio* interchangeably, likely because of the neutrality of these terms in contrast to the negatively charged *perturbationes* ('perturbations'). We can see this in the ninth book of *De civitate Dei*, where Augustine discusses the Stoic terms for emotion:

There are two opinions among the philosophers concerning the mental emotions which the Greeks call *pathe* (πάθη), while certain of our of fellow countryman, like Cicero, call them disturbances (*perturbationes*), others as affections (*affectiones*) or affects (*affectus*), and others again, like Apuleius, as passions (*passiones*), which renders the Greek word more explicitly.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> *De trinitate*, 10.8.11 (McKenna, p. 51).

<sup>205</sup> *De spiritu et anima*, 32 (CFS 24, pp. 228-230).

<sup>206</sup> Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 9.4, ed. and trans. D. S. Wiesen, *City of God, Volume III: Books 8-11*, LCL 413 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 157: 'Duae sunt sententiae philosophorum de his animi motibus, quae Graeci πάθη, nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero, perturbationes, quidam affectiones vel affectus, quidam vero, sicut iste, de Graeco expressius passionem vocant. Has ergo perturbationes sive affectiones sive passionem quidam philosophi dicunt etiam in sapientem cadere, sed moderatas rationique subiectas, ut eis leges quodam modo quibus ad necessarium redigantur modum dominatio mentis.'

Augustine evidently believes that *passiones* is the best translation and most in keeping with original Greek term *pathe*. Yet, across Augustine's works, he is careful to use the terms *affectus*, *affectiones* and *passiones* for 'emotions' or 'passions', whereas he strictly uses the term *perturbationes* to refer to negative or disturbed emotions – what I have designated negative affectivity.<sup>207</sup>

For Augustine emotion is not automatically blameworthy and can even be praiseworthy. To clarify this distinction we are informed: 'the will is indeed involved in them all [the affections], or rather, they are all no more than acts of will. For what is desire or joy but an act of will in sympathy with those things that we wish, and what is fear or grief but an act of will in disagreement with the things that we do not wish?'.<sup>208</sup> Clearly then, unlike the Stoics or Desert Fathers who treated emotion as something to be avoided, Augustine presents a model of anthropology in which affectivity is entwined within human experience. In this anthropology, the will's *intentio* is the arbiter of seeking out what is beneficial for the soul and this determines an emotion's utility. Augustine explains that, 'generally, even as a man's will is attracted or repelled in accordance with the diverse character of the objects that are pursued or avoided, so it shifts and turns into emotions (*affectus*) of one sort or the other'.<sup>209</sup>

Due to this connection Augustine is able to say of the emotions that they resemble feet and 'according to the affectivity (*affectus*) which each individual has, according to the love (*amor*) which each has, he draws near to, or moves away from, God'.<sup>210</sup> So too, the four Ciceronian affections, fear, desire, joy and grief, are called the 'motions of souls': joy the soul's extension; sadness its contraction; desire the soul's forward movement; and fear the soul's flight.<sup>211</sup>

Finally, it is important to note that importance of grace that Augustine placed in this process. As an inheritor of the Platonic tradition, grace and wisdom are deeply interlinked in Augustine's thought.<sup>212</sup> Grace never undermines the freedom of the will as it is power given

<sup>207</sup> Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 8.17 (Wiesen, pp. 78-80): 'Perturbatio est enim quae Graece πάθος dicitur; unde illa voluit vocare animo passiva, quia verbum de verbo πάθος passio diceretur motus animi contra rationem.'

<sup>208</sup> Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 14.6, ed. and trans. P. Levine, *City of God, Volume IV: Books 12-15*, LCL 414 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 287).

<sup>209</sup> Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 14.6 (Levine, p. 287).

<sup>210</sup> Augustine, *Ennarationes in Psalmos*, 94.2 (PL 37, 1217): 'Prout quisque affectum habuerit, prout quisque amorem habuerit, ita accedit vel recedit a Deo.' See also O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, p. 48.

<sup>211</sup> See O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, p. 48.

<sup>212</sup> P. Cary, *Inner Grace: Augustine in the Traditions of Plato and Paul* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 8.

by God to actualise the soul's own choices.<sup>213</sup> A positive affectivity and the meditation and contemplation of God cannot be achieved through effort alone but are the gift of God's grace acting on the human intellect, will, memory, imagination and *affectus* through the Holy Spirit. Hugh of Saint-Victor in his *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* is clear that it is only from the assisting grace of Christ that man is able to develop become illuminated to the knowledge of truth (*cognitio veritatis*) and inflamed to love of virtue (*dilectio virtutis*) through the Holy Spirit.<sup>214</sup>

Isaac of Stella, for instance, chose to end his *Epistola de anima* by making it clear that ordered affectivity and the intellectual sight of God through understanding (*intelligentia*) cannot be achieved through human effort alone. Despite having an incredibly positive view of the soul's capacity for perfection through its *sensus* and *affectus* – 'the soul can receive the universe through those five frequently named steps [sense perception, imagination, reason, discernment and understanding] which proceed from its power of rationality to knowledge and from its positive appetite to love' – the final sections of his letter (20-24) distinguish clearly between the soul's natural capacities of *sensus* and the *affectus* and their reliance on God's grace.<sup>215</sup> Isaac writes that

The natural power of knowledge, knowing all things and discerning among them, and the natural power of desire by which, in their order and degree, it loves all things, are in the soul and are what the soul is. It has, however, from nature faculties and instruments as it were of knowing and loving; nevertheless, it cannot possess the knowledge of truth and the right order of love save through grace. The rational mind was made by God, and just as it receives his image first and alone, in like manner it is able to receive knowledge and love.<sup>216</sup>

He then proceeds to use the analogy of sense perception to emphasise the difference between the creation of these faculties and their operation:

The vessels then that creating grace forms so that they can exist, assisting grace fills that they may not be empty. Just as the fleshy eye, though it have the faculty of seeing from nature, and the ear the faculty of hearing, never achieve vision or hearing without the aid of exterior light and sound, so too the rational spirit fit to know the truth and love the good from the gift of creation, never attains the effect of wisdom and love unless it is filled with the ray of interior light and ignited with its heat.<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>213</sup> Ibid, pp. 17-18.

<sup>214</sup> *Sacr.* 2.2.2 (Deferrari, p. 254).

<sup>215</sup> *Ep. an.* 21 (CFS 24, p. 175).

<sup>216</sup> Isaac of Stella, *Ep. an.* 21 (CFS 24, p. 175).

<sup>217</sup> Ibid, 21 (CFS 24, p. 176).

Thus, not only were affectivity and understanding created by God's creative grace, their operation constantly depends on grace also. Since these powers are inferior than God, they, therefore, need divine grace to be brought to understanding of the divine. This is again expressed using the perceptual system Isaac has relayed albeit mixed with a Pseudo-Dionysian understanding of hierarchy and illumination. 'So just as phantasms rise up from below into the imagination', Isaac writes, 'so theophanies descend from above into the understanding... sense knowledge helps from the outside; imagination from below; reason, the gift of creating grace, from within... and discernment and understanding help from above.'<sup>218</sup> Isaac's understanding of grace, while significant in itself, would also be included in *De spiritu et anima*, giving it a wide broad reception in the late twelfth century.<sup>219</sup>

Aelred of Rievaulx made the relationship between God's grace and ordered affectivity most explicit by designating a specific form of affectivity that was stimulated by the Holy Spirit – *affectus spiritualis* or 'spiritual attachment. This is understood primarily as a passive reception of affection through divine grace. 'The soul is stirred by spiritual attachment', Aelred writes, 'when, touched by a hidden and – we might say – unforeseen visitation of the Holy Spirit, it is opened either to the sweetness of divine love or to the pleasantness of fraternal charity.'<sup>220</sup> There are three types of spiritual attachment: an *affectus* that corresponds to the feeling of fear and the 'awakening' of the soul, promoting tears when someone considers their sins and converts their way of life; an *affectus* of piety (*pietas*) that fully extirpates self-will and the passions by consoling those already toiling toward God; and an *affectus* that supports those that already making progress towards justice and is perfected in happiness (*beatitudo*) and love.<sup>221</sup> Aelred is acutely aware that these spiritual affections given by God's grace are fleeting. The more frequent situation is to not feel this sweetness, in which the person must continue to live a life of virtue and self-examination.<sup>222</sup> The end result of the process is the cooperation of human agency with God's grace so that human and divine wills become indistinguishable from one another. 'No spiritual person fails to realise that the love of God should be appraised, not according to these momentary [spiritual] attachments which are not at all dependent on our will', Aelred remarks, 'but rather according to the abiding quality of the will itself.'<sup>223</sup> The height of spiritual affection necessitates, paradoxically, both the

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<sup>218</sup> Ibid, 22 (CFS 24, p. 176).

<sup>219</sup> *De spiritu et anima*, 7 (CFS 24, p. 189).

<sup>220</sup> Aelred of Rievaulx, *Spec. car.* 3.11.31 (CFS 17, p. 241).

<sup>221</sup> Ibid, 2.8.20, 2.11.26, 2.12.29 and 2.13.31 (CFS 17, p. 176, 180 and 182-183). For further discussion on the tears of compunction brought about by spiritual attachment see 2.19.59 (CFS 17, p. 204).

<sup>222</sup> Ibid, 2.15.39 (CFS 17, p. 192).

<sup>223</sup> Ibid, 2.18.53 (CFS 17, p. 200).



complete submission and passivity of the *affectus* or will to the divine will and the total agency and freedom of the will since this choice is freely willed. ‘To join one’s will to the will of God, so that the human will consents to whatever the divine will prescribes, and so that there is no other reason why it wills this thing or another except that it realises God wills it: this surely is the love of God.’<sup>224</sup> The result is the complete union of man and God: ‘the Holy Spirit who is the will and love of God, and who is God, penetrates and pours himself into the human will. Lifting it up from lower to higher things, he transforms it totally into his own mode and quality, so that cleaving to the Spirit by the indissoluble glue of unity, it is made one spirit with him.’<sup>225</sup>

### After Augustine I: The Soul in Late-Antiquity

In terms of the reception of Augustinianism it is difficult to speak of a single ‘Augustine’. Rather, due to the variety of the bishop of Hippo’s thought, is better to speak of several different Augustines, depending on context.<sup>226</sup> By the end of the 420s, Augustine’s writings would become a source of controversy in Gaul, and it seems to have taken another 30 years for Augustinian understandings of the soul and affectivity to boil over into a pamphlet war in the late 460s and early 470s involving Faustus of Riez (c. 405-c. 490), Gennadius of Marseille (d. 496) and Julianus Pomerius (d. 499-505) who all who argued for the corporeality of the soul and even a God capable of feeling human *affectiones*, against an ‘incorporealist’ party made up figures such as Claudianus Mamertus of Vienne (d. 477), Graecus of Marseille and Sidonius Apollinaris (c. 430-485).<sup>227</sup> While the writings of Faustus would not prove very influential for twelfth-century authors, the writings on the soul of Claudianus - *De statu animae* (*On the Nature of the Soul*) written in 496/470 – and Gennadius – the *Liber ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*

<sup>224</sup> Ibid, 2.18.53 (CFS 17, p. 200).

<sup>225</sup> Ibid, 2.18.53 (CFS 17, p. 201).

<sup>226</sup> See T. A. Smith, *De Gratia: Faustus of Riez’s Treatise on Grace and its Place in the History of Theology* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 39.

<sup>227</sup> For the details of this controversy see C. Brittain, ‘No Place for a Platonic Soul in Fifth-Century Gaul? The Case of Mamertus Claudianus’, in *Society and Culture in Late Antique Gaul: Revisiting the Sources*, eds. R. W. Mathisen and D. Shanzer (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001) pp. 239-262; and R. W. Mathisen, *Ecclesiastical Factionalism and Religious Controversy in Fifth-Century Gaul* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1989). Faustus letter that began the controversy c. 450/455 was *Epistola ad Graecum diaconum* [*Epistola* 6], PL 58, 853A-857A, which has been partially translated by R. W. Mathisen, in ‘Appendix 1’, *Ruricius of Limoges and Friends: A Collection of Items from Visigothic Gaul* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), pp. 246-249. The controversy was continued c. 468 in his *Quaeris a me* (*You ask me*) [*Epistola* 3], PL 58, 837D-845A. For a partial translation of this letter and introduction see ‘Appendix 1’, in *Ruricius of Limoges and Friends*, pp. 239-240. Finally, in 474 Faustus would take up his pen again at the request of an episcopal synod at Arles to write *De gratia Dei et libero arbitrio libri duo* (*Two Books on the Grace of God and Free Will*), a treatise using Augustinian doctrine to critique the views concerning predestination of a certain Gallic priest named Lucidus. See Faustus of Riez, *De gratia Dei et libero arbitrio libri duo*, PL 58, 783-836 and the study by T. A. Smith, *De Gratia*, note 226 above.

(*Book on Ecclesiastical Dogma*) composed sometime between 470 and 490 – would be cited as authoritative texts by Cistercian and Victorine thinkers.<sup>228</sup>

Despite not producing his own *De anima*, Boethius (c. 480-525/6) merits a brief mention in this survey for his mediation of Neoplatonic Christianity with the philosophies of Aristotle and Porphyry. His ideas are of significance for two reasons. First, in the *Opuscula sacra* Boethius takes on Aristotelian hylomorphism and combines it with Plato's understanding of the unchanging forms to argue for the integrated unity of the individual human being yet their difference as a 'person' (*persona*) – a doctrine that would be of significant to Richard of Saint-Victor in his understanding of the Trinity.<sup>229</sup> Second, Boethius' reports Aristotle's discussions of the affections of the soul in *De interpretatione* and *De anima*, and in his own definition, locates the affections as part of the mind not the body. In fact, for Boethius, the terms *sensus*, *imaginatio*, *similitudo* and *animae passio* are all interrelated, since all are considered as belonging to the 'understanding' (*intellectus*), although not identical with it.<sup>230</sup> If an *affectus* for Boethius is intellective then free will is only achieved when the will isn't swayed by 'destructive passions' (*perniciosos affectus*) (CV.2.3-10).<sup>231</sup> As Margaret Cameron has shown, Boethius drew upon Aristotle's *De anima* to argue for a unitary model of perception and understanding, 'a perceptual understanding' (*quadam intellectus perceptio*) as Boethius calls it, in which experience (sensual or cognitive), imagination and intellectual clarity not 'discrete categories' but merely describe an aspect of a single process.<sup>232</sup> This integrated view of perception is clear in *De consolatione philosophiae* (V.4.2) where the four cognitive faculties of man are elaborated sense, imagination, reason and intelligence. Each of these faculties have a particular object in the epistemological process (sense = enmattered shapes; imagination = shapes without matter; reason = universal forms; intelligence = simple Forms).<sup>233</sup> This fourfold epistemology, as we shall see, was developed by Hugh of Saint-Victor, Isaac of Stella and Alcher of Clairvaux in their own *De anima* treatises,

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<sup>228</sup> Claudianus Mamertus, *De statu animae*, PL 53, 697-780; Gennadius of Marseille, *Liber de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, ed. C. H. Turner, 'The "Liber Ecclesiasticorum Dogmatibus" Attributed to Gennadius of Marseille', *The Journal of Theological Studies*, 7:25 (1905), pp. 78-99 (text from 89-99).

<sup>229</sup> A. Arlig, 'The Metaphysics of Individuals in the *Opuscula sacra*', in J. Marenbon, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 129-154 (especially pp. 136-137). For Richard of Saint-Victor's use of Boethius see 'The Definition: Boethius and Richard of Saint Victor', in John M. Rist, *What is a Person? Realities, Constructs, Illusions* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2019), pp. 56-61.

<sup>230</sup> J. Magee, *Boethius on Signification and Mind* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989), pp. 99-115; M. Cameron, 'Boethius on Utterances, Understanding and Reality', in *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*, p. 89.

<sup>231</sup> See J. Marenbon, *Boethius* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 123-124.

<sup>232</sup> Cameron, 'Boethius on Utterances', p. 91.

<sup>233</sup> Marenbon, *Boethius*, p. 132-134; Magee, *Boethius on Signification and Mind*, pp. 142-144.

Another late-Antique writer who contributed to the generations of feelings theologians in the twelfth century inherited was the Roman senator Cassiodorus (c.490-585). The first recension of his influential *De anima* can be dated between 537-40. *De anima* was added to Cassiodorus' 12 books of *Variae* (538) or 'official correspondence'. As is the case with many *libri de anima*, Cassiodorus took up the task at the instigation of his friends who demanded an analysis of the soul primarily for its connection to knowledge and virtue. As Cassiodorus himself admits: 'but after I had brought this work of ours [*Variae*] to its desired end in twelve books, my friends compelled me to expound the substance and virtues of the soul, so that we should be seen to speak of that thing [i.e. the soul] by means of which we have spoken of so much else.'<sup>234</sup> Cassiodorus in *De anima* itself explains that his purpose in writing on the nature of the soul is epistemologically grounded. 'It would be very foolish for us to let ourselves remain ignorant of the soul, the source of much of our knowledge... since it is useful for us first of all to understand how we gain knowledge', he exclaims.<sup>235</sup> Hence, the soul is not treated in his *De anima* treatise 'merely for the sake of discussion', Cassiodorus states, but because 'we are most modestly eager to understand the most profound truths.'<sup>236</sup>

The 'truths' Cassiodorus' *De anima* was interested in expounding were not only those of the soul's definition and origin, its moral virtues, its power over the body and the characteristics that constitute a just or unjust soul, but also the 'form and composition of the body itself'.<sup>237</sup> The account is heavily inspired by Augustine, who is the sole authority cited by name. In particular, Cassiodorus expands the six questions of the soul in *De quantitate animae* into twelve. The first nine headings treat the soul's etymology, substance, qualities, lack of form, moral virtues, natural virtues, origin, power of judgement and link with the body; the last three explain possible negative and positive states of the soul, that is, the unfaithful soul in hell, the contemplative soul enlightened by God, and finally the soul at rest in heaven and united once more with the body following the Resurrection. A key reason for the popularity of Cassiodorus' text among medieval writers was because his treatment of the soul was neither lucid, methodical nor philosophically demanding.<sup>238</sup> It is the balance between both body and soul that mark Cassiodorus' main departure from Augustinian doctrine.

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<sup>234</sup> Cassiodorus, *De anima*, trans., J. W. Halporn, *Cassiodorus: Institutions of Divine and Secular Learning and On the Soul* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2004), p. 19.

<sup>235</sup> Cassiodorus, *De anima*, 1, trans., Halporn, *Cassiodorus*, p. 238.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid, 1, p. 238.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid, 1, p. 238.

<sup>238</sup> M. Vessey, 'Introduction', in Halporn, *Cassiodorus*, p. 20.

The final writer covered in this survey of late Antique authorities is Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (late fifth-sixth century). While Pseudo-Dionysius did write a treatise *On the Soul*, it has unfortunately not survived.<sup>239</sup> Surviving Pseudo-Dionysian writings are significant not for their views on the structure of the soul but rather that their Christian-Neoplatonism represents another route – alongside Augustine – by which a Neoplatonic hierarchical ascent to God would come to influence the psychologists of the twelfth century. For example, the *Celestial Hierarchy* and *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, especially, were significant in presenting an ordered, hierarchical and mirrored universe, in which corporeal objects and human activity can be said to represent an unchanging heavenly order. In this universe, the human soul occupies a middle position (*Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, V.1.2, 501C-D) and the cognition of perceptible things is necessary to lift human beings up to the divine (*EH*, 1.1.5, 376D-377A).<sup>240</sup> Indeed, not only was Pseudo-Dionysius responsible for coining the term ‘symbolic theology’<sup>241</sup>, but from the opening paragraph of the *Celestial Hierarchy* a similitude between heaven and earth, God and man, the macrocosm and microcosm, is stressed, which emphasises their interrelationship. Pseudo-Dionysius utilises the scriptural authority of James 1:17 in proclaiming that “Every good endowment and every perfect gift comes from above, coming down from the Father of lights” and then adds from Romans 11:36, “from Him [procession] and to him [return] are all things”.<sup>242</sup> These quotes serve as Pseudo-Dionysius’s template for the assimilation of late-Neoplatonic understandings of ‘procession’ (*exitus*) and ‘return’ (*reditus*) – associated with Proclus (c.410 – 485) – with the language of the Bible and Christian mysticism. Regarding the created world, Pseudo-Dionysius writes in the *Celestial Hierarchy* (1.3, 121C-124A) that God

... modelled it on the hierarchies of heaven, and clothed these immaterial hierarchies in numerous material figures and forms so that, in a way appropriate to our nature, we might be uplifted from these most venerable images to interpretations and assimilations which are simple and inexpressible. For it is quite impossible that we humans should, in any immaterial way, rise up to imitate and to contemplate the heavenly hierarchies without the aid of those material means capable of guiding us as our nature requires.<sup>243</sup>

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<sup>239</sup> Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Divine Names*, 697C, in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, trans. C. Luibheid (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987), p. 73.

<sup>240</sup> Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, p. 234 and 199, respectively.

<sup>241</sup> At several instances throughout the Dionysian corpus, he states he has written a treatise entitled *Symbolical Theology*, a work that was either never completed or has not survived. See *Divine Names*, 597B and 700BC, as well as *Mystical Theology*, 1033AB, in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, pp. 57, 75 and 139.

<sup>242</sup> Pseudo-Dionysius, *Celestial Hierarchy*, 1, 1, 120B, in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, p. 145. For comments on the theme of procession and return here see P. Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to their Influence* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 50-53.

<sup>243</sup> Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Celestial Hierarchy*, in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, p.

This hierarchy is characterised by ascent and descent: divine grace administered via the angels descend to allow the human soul to be illuminated and ascend. ‘The whole purpose of signs for the Neoplatonist’, as David Williams has remarked, ‘is to allow the intellect to pass through them to become one with what they represent.’<sup>244</sup> For Pseudo-Dionysius, the denouement of this process, and the ultimate role of symbols, is to facilitate a mystical union with God.

The Abbey of Saint-Victor were particularly fond of Dionysian thought: Hugh of Saint-Victor edited two commentaries on the *Celestial Hierarchy* between 1125 and 1137.<sup>245</sup> Hugh, in fact, defined a ‘symbol’ using Dionysian terminology in his *Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy* as ‘a comparison, that is, a coaptation of visible forms brought forth do demonstrate some invisible matter.’<sup>246</sup> Dominique Poirel has shown that throughout the works of Hugh of Saint-Victor, we can find a consistent Dionysian theme of the ‘beauty’ in the created world serving as a ‘book’ to be read of the beauty of God.<sup>247</sup> ‘The entire world perceptible to the senses is like a sort of book written by the finger of God...’, he exclaims in *De tribus diebus (On the Three Days)*.<sup>248</sup> And as Hugh writes in his *Soliloquium*: ‘Look at the entire world and consider if there is anything in it that does not serve you.’<sup>249</sup> Here, Hugh can be said to represent a wider programme of ‘physico-theology’ in the twelfth century clustering around centres such as Saint-Victor, Cîteaux and Chartres: the project of ‘building up proofs and gathering illustrations of the existence of God from the world of nature.’<sup>250</sup>

It is largely with Richard of Saint-Victor, drawing on Pseudo-Dionysius that the Victorines developed a view of the human beings as engaged in a process of ‘angelicization’, in which the soul itself becomes progressively transformed and assimilated into the hierarchy of angels.<sup>251</sup> Indeed, Richard makes much use of the Dionysian doctrine of illumination in his *De duodecim patriarchis* when, quoting James 1:17, he describes the soul’s powers of *ratio* and *affectio* as ‘a certain kind of twofold power... given to every rational spirit by that Father

<sup>244</sup> D. Williams, *Deformed Discourse: The Functions of the Monster in the Medieval Thought and Literature* (McGill-Queens University Press, 1996), p. 42.

<sup>245</sup> J. Leclercq, ‘Influence and Noninfluence of Dionysius in the Western Middle Ages’, in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, trans. C. Luibheid (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987), p. 28.

<sup>246</sup> Hugh of Saint-Victor, *Coel. Hier.*, PL 175, 960D: ‘...collatio videlicet, id est coaptatio visibilium formarum ad demonstrationem rei invisibilis propositarum.’

<sup>247</sup> D. Poirel, ‘The Spirituality and Theology of Beauty in Hugh of St. Victor’, in *From Knowledge to Beatitude: St Victor, Twelfth-Century Scholars and Beyond. Essays in Honour of Grover A. Zinn, Jr.*, eds. E. A. Matter and L. Smith (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), pp. 247-280.

<sup>248</sup> Hugh of Saint-Victor, *De tribus diebus*, PL 176, 814B: ‘Universus enim mundus iste sensibilis quasi quidam liber est scriptus digito Dei...’

<sup>249</sup> *Arrha*, 16-17 (VTT 2, p. 209).

<sup>250</sup> C. Glacken, *Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 177.

<sup>251</sup> McGinn, *The Flowering of Mysticism*, pp. 83-84.

of lights from whom comes every good and every perfect gift.’<sup>252</sup> Lastly, Thomas Gallus wrote his own commentary.

By contrast, the Cistercians did not make many direct references to Pseudo-Dionysius, although one of the prized possessions at Clairvaux was a copy of Dionysian works and a sermon by Garnier of Clairvaux took great inspiration from both Dionysius and Eriugena.<sup>253</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, though, did make reference Romans 1:20 – another popular biblical citation – that was used to describe the sensible world as a ‘ladder’ to ascend and approach the invisible.<sup>254</sup> Isaac of Stella was particularly fond of Dionysian imagery and utilised Pseudo-Dionysius’s distinction between ‘divine’ and ‘symbolic’ theology in his sermons.<sup>255</sup> The most apparent application of Dionysian ‘symbolic’ theology can be found in a further sermon, in which the use of metaphor is applied to same psychology we encountered in his *Epistola de anima*. Isaac’s *Sermo III in Omnium Sanctorum (Third Sermon for All Saints)* emphasises the necessity to unify and order the soul’s faculties of desire (*affectus*) and reason (*ratio*) to give birth to the virtues of prudence (*prudentia*), temperance (*temperantia*), fortitude (*fortitudo*) and justice (*iustitia*).<sup>256</sup> To understand the process by which the ordering of the actions of the *exterior homo* establishes harmony and justice in the *interior homo*, Isaac states we should look to an analogy with the firmament..

We are told that the light radiating from all the stars above creates in the highest parts of the heavens (*firmamentum*) a wondrous zone of brightness which is called a Galaxy (*Galaxia*). So too, in the spiritual sky (*in spirituali firmamento*), we may say that it is the bright shining of all the virtues which creates the surpassing splendour of justice. And therefore, justice is said to be a certain equilibrium, a due measure, a determined limit, above or below which rightness cannot be maintained. It is justice that establishes a balance between all other things and renders to each his due.<sup>257</sup>

<sup>252</sup> *De duodecim patriarchis*, 3 (PL 196, 3A-B; Zinn, p. 55): ‘Omni spiritui rationali gemina quaedam vis data est ab illo Pater luminum, a quo est omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum’.

<sup>253</sup> J. Leclercq, ‘Influence and Noninfluence’, *Pseudo-Dionysius*, p. 29; P. Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius*, p. 31.

<sup>254</sup> *Consideratione*, 5.1 (PL 182, 788C-788D; trans J. D. Anderson and E. T. Kennan, *Five Books on Consideration: Advice to a Pope* (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1976), 139-140).

<sup>255</sup> Isaac of Stella, *Sermo* 22.9-10 (PL 194, 1762C-D; trans. H. McCaffery, *Sermons on the Christian Year: Vol. I*, p. 181).

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid*, *Sermo* 3.1-2 (PL 194, 1697C-D; trans. McCaffery, *Sermons on the Christian Year: Vol. I*, 1-2, p. 22).

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid*, *Sermo* 3.3 (PL 194 1697-8D-A; trans. McCaffery, *Sermons on the Christian Year: Vol. I*, 3, p. 22): ‘Sicut visum est quibusdam, ex omnium stellarum radiis sursum micantibus candore notabilem in cono firmamenti circulum creari, quem Galaxiam nominant: sic nimirum in spirituali firmamento ex omnium virtutu fulgore putatur exstare iustitia: quam propterea aequabilitatem quamdam, et modum in rebus dicunt, certum denique finem; quem ultra, citraue nequit consistere rectum. Ipsa enim est, quae omnia aequat, reddens uniuersum quod suum est.’

The firmament resplendent with light can thus be compared to the ‘spiritual sky’ within man that is made bright through the cultivation of the ‘surpassing splendour of justice’. Thus, for Isaac, the imagery of nature’s ordered and balanced systems, and particularly that of the luminosity and regularity of the revolving firmament, serves as the ideal analogy to convey the ideal of psychological balance and stability Cistercian monks should strive for.

## After Augustine II: Bede and the Anglo-Saxons

Following Cassiodorus, one might have expected Bede (d. 735) to have contributed to psychological themes. In his *De elementis philosophiae* (*On the Elements of Philosophy*) we do find the Augustinian triad of the soul’s faculties of perception (*intelligentia*), reason (*ratio*) and memory (*memoria*) yet Bede did not produce his own treatise on the soul or psychology.<sup>258</sup> In the twelfth-century, though, Pseudo-Bede would provide influential. The second book of a cosmographical treatise attributed to Bede and entitled *De mundi celestis terrestrisque constitutione* (*On the Constitution of the Heavenly and Earthly World*) would be dedicated to the soul, exploring several incorrect philosophical views about the soul’s creation and its entry into the body (traducianism).<sup>259</sup>

One of the most important figures of for the reception and adaptation of Augustinian psychology was Alcuin of York (c. 735–804). His opusculum was entitled *De animae ratione liber ad eulaliam virginem* (*Book on the Explanation of the Soul for the Virgin Eulalia*).<sup>260</sup> An alternative translation could also read *On the Rationality of the Soul*, since the treatise is particularly concerned with the soul as a thinking entity and, as such, reflective of the image of God.<sup>261</sup> Composed between 801–4 while he was abbot of Saint Martins at Tours, this work is presented as a letter in 14 chapters to a certain Eulalia – Eulalia, in reality being Gundrada, the sister of Adalhard of Corbie (c. 751–827). While it is tempting to see Gundrada’s influence

<sup>258</sup> Bede, *De elementis philosophiae*, PL 90, 1176.

<sup>259</sup> Pseudo-Bede, *De mundi celestis terrestrisque constitutione*, 2, ed. and tr. C Burnett (London: The Warburg Institute, 1985), pp. 58-67; see also *De mundi caelestis terrestrisque constitutione liber: La creation du monde celeste et terrestre*, ed. and tr. M. Prade-Baquerre, C. Biasi and A. Gévaudan (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2016), pp. 146-171. For a brief discussion of this text in the context of Ratramnus of Corbie see P. Delhay, *Une controverse sur l’âme universale au IXe siècle*, AMN, 1 (1950), notes 64 and 65, pp. 65-66.

<sup>260</sup> Alcuin, *De ratione animae*, PL 101, 639-49; see also the edition and English translation in J. J. M. Curry, *Alcuin, De Ratione Animae: A Text with Introduction, Critical Apparatus, and Translation* (Ph.D Diss.: Cornell University, 1966), pp. 39-96. For Paul E. Szarmach’s notes on preparing the critical edition for CCCM and a summary of the historiography see ‘A Preface, Mainly Textual, to Alcuin’s *De ratione animae*’, in B. Nagy and M. Sebök, eds., *The Many of Many Devices, Who Wandered Full Many Ways: A Festschrift in Honor of János M. Bak* (Budapest: Central European Press, 1999), pp. 397-408.

<sup>261</sup> Lockett also notes that *ratio animae* referred to the nature of the soul from the perspective of natural philosophy – as opposed to a moral account – producing texts Platonist in orientation: *Anglo-Saxon Psychologies*, p. 215.

in the composition of this treatise and the male-female exchange of spiritual advice, it has been plausibly suggested by James Curry that the dedication to Gundrada does in no way suggest that this was a letter of personal communication. Alcuin, rather, was following a regular pattern in letter writing as *De animae ratione* was intended for a much wider diffusion.<sup>262</sup>

Alcuin's *De anima* treatise is significant for understanding later Cistercian and Victorine psychology for three reasons. First, it begins with an appeal to self-knowledge and knowledge of God as a justification for studying the soul, a characteristic element of Cistercian and Victorine psychological treatises.

But I deem it in some measure unworthy to say that I do not know myself. What am I, if not soul and body? ...nothing in this mortal life is more important for man to know God and his own soul. For each loves God in the degree that he knows Him; he who knows Him less loves him less.<sup>263</sup>

Drawing on Augustine's *De trinitate*, Alcuin proceeds to show that knowledge of the soul additionally means knowing that it is made in the image and likeness of the divine Trinity with three powers. This is initially presented philosophically 'as the philosophers maintain' (*ut philosophi volunt*), that is, according to the Platonic tripartition of the soul into reason (*ratio*), concupiscibility (*concupiscibilitas*) and anger (*ira*).<sup>264</sup>

Second, following Augustine, the four virtues (temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice) are seen as necessary for the creation of ordered love. The virtues are created in the soul that uses self-knowledge to order itself and control the *affectus*:

So, then, his life is well-ordered who takes account of himself – what he is and whither he is going – governs his attachments of the mind and fleshly impulses (*affectus animi vel carnales motus*) with rational forethought.<sup>265</sup>

Again, in-line with Augustine, Alcuin considers these three powers of the soul to be good naturally yet are capable of corruption, and if misaligned in their use can create a negative affectivity as opposed to the positive affectivity they were created for. As Alcuin states:

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<sup>262</sup> Curry, *Alcuin, De Ratione Animae*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>263</sup> Alcuin, *De ratione animae*, 1 (PL 101, 639A-B; tr. Curry, p. 73): 'Sed ex parte indignum esse videtur dicere meipsum me nescire. Quid sum ego, nisi anima et caro? ... Nec aliquid magis homini in hac mortalitate viventi necessarium est nosse, quam Deum et animam. Quantum enim quisque Deum agnoscit, in tantum diligit, qui minus agnoscit, minus diligit.'

<sup>264</sup> Alcuin, *De ratione animae*, 3, (PL 101, 639D; tr. Curry, p. 74 [translation modified]. Curry translates these terms as rational, appetitive and passionate.

<sup>265</sup> Alcuin, *De ratione animae*, 4 (PL 101, 640B-C; tr. Curry, p. 75-76 [translation modified]): 'Ita tandem ordinate vivit: si affectus animi, vel carnales motus, provida gubernat ratione.'



Concupiscibility was given for the purpose of seeking after those things which are beneficial and lead to eternal salvation; but if corrupted it gives rise to gluttony, lust, and avarice. Anger was given in order to check vices, lest man be slave to evil masters, that, sins; for according to the Lord's word, "He who sins is the slave of sin"; and when corrupted, irascibility produces melancholy and spiritual weariness (*acedia*).<sup>266</sup>

Yet, Alcuin's main departure from Augustine, and the third aspect of significance, was his stress that the soul (*anima/animus*) also encompasses the mind (*mens*). Augustine, by contrast, had differentiated the two.<sup>267</sup> It is true that Alcuin does indeed equate his Platonic trinity with Augustine's own of understanding (*intelligentia*), will (*voluntas*) and memory (*memoria*).<sup>268</sup> As Godden has observed, where Augustine's *De trinitate* 10.2 had spoke about the memory as a mind, Alcuin extends this analogy to the *anima* entirely: 'And what we call the soul, or mind, or life, or substance we do regarding the thing itself'.<sup>269</sup> Similarly, in chapter 11, Alcuin draws on another schema incompatible with both Plato and Augustine, that of Isidore of Seville's definition of the soul in *Differentiae* 2.27 and *Etymologiae* 11.1.12-13 that the names given to the soul vary according to its functions<sup>270</sup>:

It is called *anima* ('irrational soul'), when it vivifies; *spiritus* ('spirit'), when it contemplates; *sensus* ('sense perception'), when it senses; *animus* ('rational soul'), when it perceives; *mens* ('mind'), when it understands; *ratio* ('reason'), when it discerns; *voluntas* ('will'), when it consents; *memoria* ('memory'), when it remembers. Yet the soul is not divided in its substance, only in its names: for they are all but one soul.<sup>271</sup>

The implications of both these seemingly small changes twofold. Firstly, in making the *anima* rather than the *animus* or *mens* the image of God, Alcuin's *De anima* treatise does not signal out the Augustinian triad of *intelligentia*, *voluntas* and *memoria* but gives equal place

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<sup>266</sup> Alcuin, *De ratione animae*, 4 (PL 101, 640C-D; tr. Curry, p. 76 [translation modified]): 'Concupiscentia data est homini ad concupiscenda quae sunt utilia, et quae sibi ad salutem proficient sempiternam. Si vero corrumpitur, nascitur ex ea gastrimagia, fornication, et phylargiria. Ira data est ad vitia cohibenda, ne impiis, id est, peccatis, homo serviat dominis, quia iuxta Domini vocem: *Qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati* (John 8:34); ex quia corrupta, procedit tristitia, et *acedia*.'

<sup>267</sup> M. R. Godden, 'Anglo-Saxons on the Mind', in R. M. Liuzza, ed., *Old English Literature: Critical Essays* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 285-286.

<sup>268</sup> Alcuin, *De ratione animae*, 6 (PL 101, 641C-642A; tr. Curry, pp. 78-79).

<sup>269</sup> Alcuin, *De ratione animae*, 6 (PL 101, 641; tr. Curry, p. 78 [translation modified]): 'Quod vero anima vel mens, vel vita, vel substantia dicitur, ad seipsam dicitur.' Godden, 'Anglo-Saxons on the Mind', pp. 287-286.

<sup>270</sup> For a discussion of this schema see Lockett, *Anglo-Saxon Psychologies*, pp. 286-279.

<sup>271</sup> Alcuin, *De ratione animae*, 11 (PL 101, 644; tr. Curry, pp. 84-85 [translation modified]): 'anima est, dum vivificat; dum contemplatur, spiritus est; dum sentit, sensus; dum sapit, animus est; dum intelligit, mens est; dum discernit, ratio est; dum consentit, voluntas est; dum recordatur, memoria est. Non tamen haec ita dividuntur in substantia in substantia, sicut in nominibus: quia haec omnia, una est anima.'

to all the soul's powers.<sup>272</sup> Therefore, *De ratione animae* rehabilitates the place of the 'lower' functions of the soul: the senses and affective appetites. In contrast to Augustine's dualistic opposition between flesh and spirit, Alcuin reflects the trend of Anglo-Saxon psychology to regard body and soul as unitary being. 'There is no essential conflict in the soul between the activity of the rational mind and the realms of imagination and sensation... Vicious or irrational behaviour is not simply the victory of the lower elements of the soul over the reason, but reflects the free will of the conscious mind, to choose good or evil.'<sup>273</sup>

Second, by rehabilitating the lower powers of the soul, Alcuin in his other writings was able to hark back to older Greek notions of man's creation not only an *imago Dei* but also a *similitudo Dei*, the likeness of which can be repaired through willed intention and effort: in other words, via the restoration of the soul through of the *voluntas* or will. As John Marenbon has shown, the *dicta Albini*, a discussion on Genesis 1.26 written by Alcuin, simplifies Augustine's view of self-knowledge in *De trinitate* – that is, the working out that man is indeed an *imago Dei*. For Augustine, the trinities of the soul can be discovered through purposeful and effortful self-investigation and introspection. As Marenbon writes: 'When Alcuin borrowed Augustine's image of the Trinity, he omitted much of the complex philosophical discussion surrounding [Augustine's discussion of the trinitarian mind]. It was therefore necessary for him to emphasise the part of human choice and effort in his account of the Man's likeness to God, if he was not to turn his exegesis into a mere glorification of mankind.'<sup>274</sup> In doing so, Alcuin would prefigure a key component of Cistercian and Victorine anthropology: that the *affectus*, associated with the will, is made to the likeness of God.

Alcuin's *De ratione animae* clearly had an impact both at the turn of the ninth century and beyond since it has survived in at least 52 manuscripts (30 prior to the twelfth century, although only two from the ninth century).<sup>275</sup> The work was used by King Alfred the Great (848/49-899) in his translation of Boethius' *De consolazione Philosophiae* and again by Ælfric of Eynsham (c. 955-c. 1025), although more critically, in his homilies, *The Lives of Saints* (996-997).<sup>276</sup> However, the impact of Alcuin on Anglo-Saxon psychology has been called into question by Lockett for two reasons. First, Alcuin's study on the soul dates from

<sup>272</sup> Lockett, *Anglo-Saxon Psychologies*, p. 287.

<sup>273</sup> Godden, 'Anglo-Saxons on the Mind', pp. 286-287.

<sup>274</sup> Marenbon, *From the Circle of Alcuin*, p. 46.

<sup>275</sup> Curry, *Alcuin, De Ratione Animae*, p. 10. For an updated list see Szarmach, 'A Preface', pp. 404-408.

<sup>276</sup> Godden, 'Anglo-Saxons on the Mind', pp. 287-298.

his time at the court of Charlemagne and in Tours rather than in York.<sup>277</sup> Second, Alcuin's Augustinianism wasn't the main mode by which Anglo-Saxon students learnt about the nature of the soul. In the view of Leslie Lockett, it was more common for students to read Gregory the Great or Isidore of Seville than Augustine or Alcuin; *De ratione animae* was more of a supplement for advanced students, those seeking to understand the soul as described in Boethius' *Consolatio*.<sup>278</sup> These points certainly stand. Though, I would add that the text's wide diffusion and the fact that Alcuin's *liber de anima* treatise cites a number of Augustine's works considered authoritative on the soul – *Retractiones*, *De magnitudo animae*, *De duabus animabus* and *De immortalitate animae* – make it a key text in the *libri de anima* tradition, especially since it serves as a Latin source for a more unitary version of the Augustinian view of the soul and body.<sup>279</sup>

### **After Augustine III: The Carolingian Renaissance**

Did kings, queens and emperors need to know about the nature of the soul? This was certainly the case in Carolingian Europe as Charles the Bald (840-877) c. 850 solicited the opinions of the best minds around concerning the nature of the soul, especially whether it was corporeal, circumscribed and spatial (*sitne anima circumscripta sive localis*). His letter was answered by Ratramnus of Corbie (800-c.868), Rabanus Maurus, Gotteschalk of Orbais (c. 804-c. 869) and by Hincmar (806-882), the archbishop of Reims.

Rabanus Maurus, a Frank and Benedictine monk, dedicated his *Tractatus de anima* (*Treatise on the Soul*) of 856 to Emperor Lothair I. It is a text that treats many of the same questions as Cassiodorus and the Roman senator is the only authority cited throughout the text.<sup>280</sup> A problem debated during the second half of the ninth century was that of the soul's incorporeity and it was important because it serves as an indication of how small Augustinian controversies on the soul could lead to broader questions about theology being asked.

For instance, Ratramnus of Corbie (800 - c.868) was requested by a civic official to prove the soul was incorporeal in his *De natura animae* (*On the Nature of the Soul*)<sup>281</sup>, in addition to writing his *Liber de anima ad Odonem Bellovacensum* (*Book on the Soul to Odo of*

<sup>277</sup> Lockett, *Anglo-Saxon Psychologies*, p. 282.

<sup>278</sup> Lockett, *Anglo-Saxon Psychologies*, p. 222.

<sup>279</sup> Alcuin, *De ratione animae*, (PL 101, 645C-D; tr. Curry, *Alcuin, De Ratione Animae*, p. 87).

<sup>280</sup> Rabanus Maurus, *Tractatus de anima, ad Lotharium regem*, PL 110, 1109-20. For the citation of Cassiodorus see 1109C.

<sup>281</sup> A. Wilmart, 'L'opuscule inedit de Ratramne sur la nature de l'ame', *Revue Bénédictine*, 43:1-4 (1931), pp. 207-224.

*Beauvaisi*)<sup>282</sup> after being asked by Odo, Bishop of Beauvais (c.860-80), to refute the claims of Macarius's disciple a young Irish monk, on this matter.<sup>283</sup> The text is lengthy (10 chapters) and draws on Augustine's *De quantitate animae*, Boethius, Cicero.

Similarly, in response to Ratramnus, an anonymous text, *De diversa et multiplici animae ratione* (*On the Diverse and Many Natures of the Soul*)<sup>284</sup>, attributed to Hincmar (806-882), the archbishop of Reims, set out to argue instead for the soul being joined to the body but able to reach further than the body through its influence.<sup>285</sup> These minor Augustinian debates on the soul revealed how fertile the subject of the soul could be for theological controversy; a granular subject such as the matter of the soul could lead to wider questions being asked about whether God has local movement through time and space and the possibility of the beatific vision.<sup>286</sup>

### **After Augustine IV: Anselm and the Early Twelfth-Century**

The final major thinker that contributed to the construction of a 'spiritual psychology' within an Augustinian framework that aimed to 'examine whatever *affectus* or *affectio* controlled an action' was Saint Anselm of Canterbury around 1100.<sup>287</sup> Anselm repeatedly asserted the necessity of cultivating an 'upright' will, that is a will which seeks that which is just, in order to return to God throughout his works. It is one of Anselm's final treatises, *De concordia* (*On Concord*) (1107), where Anselm would provide a definition of affectivity, claiming it to be a 'tool' of the will with its own 'aptitude'. 'An affectivity', Anselm writes, 'is truly a tool of the will in exercising its own aptitudes. That is why the human soul when it passionately wills something is said to be emotionally moved to will it (or to will it affectionately).'<sup>288</sup> In the words of Boquet and Nagy, it is with Anselm that 'never before had affect come so close to taking its place as a distinct force within the soul'.<sup>289</sup>

By this point Anselm could draw his knowledge from a wide variety of authorities on the soul. A testimony from Guibert of Nogent on Anselm's teaching, likely from the 1070s, gives us an impression of the state of learning about the soul at the time before Anselmian

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<sup>282</sup> See D. C. Lambot, OSB, ed., *Ratramne de Corbie: Liber de anima ad Odonem Bellocacensem*, AMN 2 (1952), pp. 25-144.

<sup>283</sup> For this dispute see Delhaye, *Une controverse sur l'âme*, pp. 7-65.

<sup>284</sup> Hincmar (?), *De diversa et multiplici animae ratione*, PL 125, 930-50.

<sup>285</sup> For an overview of this debate see J. L. González, *A History of Christian Thought Volume II: From Augustine to the Eve of the Reformation* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1971), pp. 123-4.

<sup>286</sup> PL 125, 941-42 and 943-8.

<sup>287</sup> C. Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200* (London: SPCK, 1972), p. 76.

<sup>288</sup> Anselm, *De concordia*, 3.11, tr. T. Bermingham, in B. Davies and G. R. Evans, *Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 467.

<sup>289</sup> Boquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, p. 81.

psychology had become widespread. In Guilbert's *reportatio* we learn that whilst still a prior at Bec (1063-1078), Anselm was offering lessons on the powers of the soul to teach students how to manage their inner selves. Gilbert recounts that Anselm

...readily offered to teach me to manage the inner self, how to consult the laws of reason in the government of the body... His teaching was to divide the mind in a threefold or fourfold way, to treat the operations of the whole interior mystery under the headings of appetite (*affectus*), will (*voluntas*), reason (*ratio*), and intellect (*intellectus*). By a resolution based on clear analyses, of what I and many others thought to be one, he showed that appetite and will are not identical, although it is established by evident assertions that in the presence of reason they are practically the same. He discussed with me certain chapters of the Gospels on this principle, and most clearly explained the difference between willing (*velle*) and being subject to appetite (*affici*); it was plain, however, that he did not originate this, but got it from books at hand which did not explicitly deal with these matters. I then began to endeavour to equal his methods in similar commentaries, so far as I could, and to search carefully with all the keenness of my mind everywhere in the Scriptures to see if anything accorded on the moral level with these thoughts.<sup>290</sup>

Such a description of Anselm's teaching is illuminating on three levels. In the first instance, it reveals that Anselm was partly responsible for moving away from a trinitarian division of the soul (such as Augustine's) to one that gave an important place to a fourth power: appetite or *affectus*. Second, Guibert's comments show that Anselm was somewhat disparaging about the *affectus*, linking it closely with the appetite rather than the higher forms of love (as later twelfth-century authors do). Third and finally, Anselm's teachings, overall, indicates that there was a greater focus on discriminating between the powers of the soul, especially between the will (*voluntas*) and affective appetites (*affectus*).

While Anselm certainly contributed to placing *affectus* as one of the key powers of the soul, and had he lived longer, the archbishop of Canterbury had planned to turn his attention to writing a study on the origin of the soul.<sup>291</sup> Following Anselm's death in 1107, these same

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<sup>290</sup> Guibert of Nogent, *De sua vita* 1.17 (Bourgin, p. 66-67; Benton, pp. 89-90): 'Qui cum in prioratu praelibati coenobii adhuc ageret, suae me cognitio ascivit, et omnino puerulum et in summa et aetatis et sensus teneritudine positum, qualiter interiorem meum hominem agerem, qualiter super regimine corpusculi rationis iura consulerem, multa me docere intentione proposuit... Is itaque tripartito aut quadripartite mentem modo distinguere docens, sub affectu, sub voluntate, sub ratione, sub intellectu commercia totius interni mysterii tractare, et quae una a plerisque et a me ipso putabantur certis divisionibus resoluta, non idem duo prima fore monstrabat, quae tamen accedentibus quarto vel tertio eadem mox esse promptis assertionibus constat. Super quo sensu cum quaedam evangelica capitula mihi disseruisset, cum primum quidem quid inter velle et affici distaret, luculentissime aperuisset, quae tamen non ex se, sed ex quibusdam contiguus voluminibus, at minus patenter quidem ista tractantibus eum habuisse constaret, coepi postmodum et ego eius sensa commentis, prout poteram, similibus aemulari, et ubique Scripturarum, si quid istis moraliter arrideret sensibus, multa animi acrimonia perscrutari.'

<sup>291</sup> Davies and Evans, 'Introduction', *Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works*, x.

question of the soul's origin and generation were taken up by his follower, Gilbert Crispin (c. 1045-1117/18) the Cistercian abbot of Westminster, when he penned a brief *De anima* sometime in the early-twelfth century. Crispin was attempting to investigate a question he believed had been neglected by his friend and colleague, Anselm, that of the generation of souls, and the transference of original sin through reproduction.<sup>292</sup> William of Champeaux, the future founder of the Abbey of Saint-Victor, also sought to solve these same questions in his *De origine animae (On the Origin of the Soul)*; as did Anselm of Laon in one of his *Sententiae (Sentences)*.<sup>293</sup> For Gilbert, William and Anselm of Laon, it was not specifically the powers of the soul that needed to be better understood, but the tangible implications of understanding the origin of the soul for clerical practices: How are new souls made? How is it disfigured by original sin? In what ways do sacraments, like baptism, cleanse the soul? What is the fate awaiting unbaptised, yet otherwise innocent, infants?

### Psychology in the Twelfth Century

The twelfth-century reveals a stunning array of genres for approaching the nature of the soul and its powers, ranging from glosses, allegories, ethics, encyclopaedias, questions of medicine and natural science, as well as letters and visionary literature. Glosses and commentaries, such as those written by Thierry of Chartres on William of Conches on the writings of Boethius, discussed the nature of love, the rational powers and cells of the brain, in addition to the four *affectūs animi*: happiness, anger, hope and fear (*gaudium, ira, spes, timor*).<sup>294</sup> The letters of Peter Abelard and Heloise are littered with a rich psychological language of intentionality; a language Peter Abelard would set down in his *Ethica (Ethics)*. Somewhat unexpectedly, William of Conches encyclopaedias of natural philosophy – the *Philosophia mundi (Philosophy of the World)* and *Dragmaticon philosophiae (Drama of Philosophy)* – contain a rich collection of medical and natural philosophical material on the soul, the composition of the body, the soul's powers and the cells of the brain.<sup>295</sup> The *Quaestiones naturales* of Adelard of Bath similarly are witness to a range of philosophical

<sup>292</sup> Gilbert Crispin, *De anima*, ed. A. S. Abulafia and G. R. Evans, *The Works of Gilbert Crispin Abbot of Westminster* (London: British Academy by Oxford University Press, 1986), xxxviii.

<sup>293</sup> *Orig. an.* (PL 163, 1043-1044); Anselm of Laon, 'De animabus hominum', in *Anselmi Laudensis et Radulfi Fratris Eius Sententias Excerptas*, ed. G. Fefèvre (Mediolani Aulercorum: C. Herissey, 1895), pp. 5-9.

<sup>294</sup> Thierry of Chartres in his *Commentum super Boethii librum De Trinitate*, 2.42 (p. 81), speaks of how everything tends to unity through love, that is to God, in addition to elaborating the rational powers are elaborated (see Appendix).

<sup>295</sup> Titles in the *Philosophia mundi* include 'De cerebro' (4.21), 'Quid sit anima' (4.24), 'Quam actiones in animae, quae corporis' (4.26), 'Qualiter anima sit in compositione hominis' (4.27) and 'De virtutibus' (4.28). See *Philosophia mundi*, ed. Marauch, pp. 106-107 and 110-113.

and medical knowledge about the soul and body, the senses, *passiones* and the brain, especially.<sup>296</sup> While a complete survey of texts which examine the nature of the soul and its powers is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the table below gives an impression of the diversity and sheer number texts with psychological themes and content produced between 1100 and 1250.

Date	Title	Author	Group
Before 1068	<i>Liber Pantegni</i>	Constantine the African	M
c.1100-1118	<i>De anima</i> ( <i>On the Soul</i> )	Gilbert Crispin	B
c. 1107-1117	<i>De oedem et diverso</i> ( <i>On the Same and Different</i> )	Adelard of Bath	P
?	<i>De origine animae</i> ( <i>On the Origin of the Soul</i> )	William of Champeaux*	V
1119-25	<i>De natura et dignitate amoris</i> ( <i>On the Nature and Dignity of Love</i> )	William of Saint-Thierry	B/C
1120/25	<i>De tribus diebus</i> ( <i>On the Three Days</i> )	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V
1120-25	<i>De philosophia mundi</i> ( <i>On the Philosophy of the World</i> ) <sup>297</sup>	William of Conches	Ch/P/S
c.1120 [?]	<i>De unione corporis et spritus</i> ( <i>On the Union of Body and Spirit</i> )	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V
1126-27	<i>De archa Noe morali</i> ( <i>On the Moral Interpretation of Noah's Ark</i> )	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V
1127	<i>Sententia de divinitate</i> ( <i>Sentences on Divinity</i> )	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V
Before 1128	<i>De gratia et libero arbitrio</i> ( <i>On Grace and Free Choice</i> )	Bernard of Clairvaux	C
1128-29	<i>De archa Noe mystica/Libellus de formatione archae</i> [ <i>On the Mystical Interpretation of Noah's Ark/Little Book on the Formation of Noah's Ark</i> ]	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V
1128-29	<i>De vanitate mundi</i> ( <i>On the Vanity of the World</i> )	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V

<sup>296</sup> Adelard of Bath, *Quaestiones Naturales*, ed. Burnett, pp. 16-17 (soul), 30-31, 70-71 (powers of the soul), 114-117 (sensation and emotion), 124-125 (cells of the brain), 134-157 (bodily senses).

<sup>297</sup> G. Marauch, ed., *Philosophia mundi: Ausgabe des. I. Buches von Wilhelm von Conches' "Philosophia" mit Anhang, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, Studia 15 (Pretoria, 1974).

c. 1130 [?]	<i>Quid vere diligendum sit?</i> (What Truly Should be Loved?)	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V
c. 1137-40	<i>Soliloquium de arrha animae</i> (Soliloquy on the Betrothal-Gift of the Soul)	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V
c. 1137	<i>Quaestiones Naturales</i> (Natural Questions)	Adelard of Bath	P
1138 [?]	<i>De natura corporis et animae</i> (On the Nature of the Body and Soul)	William of Saint-Thierry	B/C
Before 1138 [?]	<i>De virtute orandi</i> (On the Power of Prayer) [also <i>De modo orandi</i> ]	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V
Before 1141 [?]	<i>De amore sponsi ad sponsam</i> (The Praise of the Bridegroom)	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V
Before 1141 [?]	<i>De laude caritatis</i> (On the Praise of Charity)	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V
Before 1141 [?]	<i>De substantia dilectionis</i> (On the Substance of Love)	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V
Before 1141 [?]	<i>De meditatione</i> (On Meditation)	Hugh of Saint-Victor	V
1142	<i>De speculo caritatis</i> (On the Mirror of Charity)	Aelred of Rievaulx	C
1142-44	<i>Aenigma fidei</i> (The Enigma of Faith)	William of Saint-Thierry	B/C
1144-45	<i>Epistola ad fratres Monte Dei</i> (Letter to the Brothers of Mont-Dieu)	William of Saint-Thierry	B/C
1147	<i>Cosmographia</i> (Cosmography) <sup>298</sup>	Bernard Silvester	Ch
1147-49	<i>Dragmaticon philosophiae</i> (Dialogue/Drama of Philosophy) <sup>299</sup>	William of Conches	Ch/P/S
c. 1150	<i>De anima</i> [translation by James of Venice]	Aristotle	G
After 1151	<i>Epistolae 49, 52</i> (Letters 49 and 52)	Nicholas of Clairvaux	C/B

<sup>298</sup> W. Wetherbee, ed., *Poetic Works*, DOML 38 (MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). See especially *Microcosmus* 13-14, pp. 164-181.

<sup>299</sup> *Dragmaticon philosophiae*, ed. Italo Ronca in *Guillelmi de Conchis Opera omnia. Tomus I*, eds. E. Jeaneau, Ronca, L. Badia and J. Pujol, CCCM 152 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 227-228; trans. I. Ronca and M. Curr, *A Dialogue on Natural Philosophy* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997).



1152-1166 (Approximate date of translation into Latin)	<i>Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus</i> ( <i>On the Soul</i> ) <sup>300</sup>	Avicenna	A
Late 1154-56	<i>Entheticus de dogmate philisophorum</i> ( <i>Introductory Survey on the Teaching of the Philosophers</i> ) [Also called <i>Entheticus maior</i> ] <sup>301</sup>	John of Salisbury	Ch/P/C
1155-61	<i>De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis</i> ( <i>On the Discretion of Soul, Spirit and Mind</i> )	Achard of Saint-Victor	V
Before 1156	<i>De operibus sex dierum</i> ( <i>On the Works of the Six Days</i> )	Arnold of Bonneval	C
1159	<i>Metalogicon</i>	John of Salisbury	Ch/C/P
Before 1162	<i>De duodecim patriarchis</i> ( <i>The Twelve Patriarchs</i> ) [also called <i>Benjamin minor</i> ]	Richard of Saint-Victor	V
c. 1162	<i>Epistola de anima</i> ( <i>Letter on the Soul</i> )	Isaac of Stella	C
c. 1162	<i>De eruditione hominis interioris</i> ( <i>On the Instruction of the Inner Man</i> )	Richard of Saint-Victor	V
c. 1162	<i>De statu hominis interioris</i> ( <i>On the Place of the Inner Man</i> )	Richard of Saint-Victor	V
After 1162	<i>De archa mystica</i> ( <i>The Mystic Ark</i> ) [also <i>Benjamin major</i> ]	Richard of Saint-Victor	V
1163-66	<i>Dialogus de anima</i> ( <i>Dialogue on the Soul</i> )	Aelred of Rievaulx	C
Before 1170	<i>De spiritu et anima</i> ( <i>On the Spirit and the Soul</i> )	Psuedo-Augustine/Alcher of Clairvaux	C?
c. 1170	<i>De quatuor gradibus violentae caritatis</i> ( <i>The Four Degrees of Violent Love</i> )	Richard of Saint-Victor	V
c. 1170	<i>Tractatus de conscientia</i> ( <i>Treatise on Conscience</i> ) <sup>302</sup>	Peter of Celle	B

<sup>300</sup> *Liber de Anima Seu Sextus de Naturalibus*, ed., S. Van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1972); tr. F. Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology. An English translation of Kitāb al-naǧāt, Book II, Chapter VI with Historico-philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements on the Cairo edition* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952).

<sup>301</sup> J. van Laarhoven., ed., *John of Salisbury's Entheticus Maior and Minor: 3 Vols* (Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1987). See especially 2.52-55 and 2.67, pp. 154-158 and 168-171.

<sup>302</sup> PL 202, 1083-98.

c. 1170	<i>Tractatus de anima</i> ( <i>Treatise on the Soul</i> ) <sup>303</sup>	Dominicus Gundissalinus	A
c. 1170-80	<i>Sermones</i> ( <i>Sermons</i> )	Baldwin of Forde	C
c. 1170-1180	<i>Summa "Quoniam homines"</i> ( <i>Summa "Certain Men"</i> ) <sup>304</sup>	Alan of Lille	Ch/P/C
After 1170	<i>De anima</i> ( <i>On the Soul</i> )	Pseudo Hugh of Saint-Victor/Pseudo Bernard of Clairvaux*	V
Before 1171	<i>De regressu animarum ab infernis</i> ( <i>On the Return of Souls from the Depths</i> ) <sup>305</sup>	Hugh Etherian	S
1175-1200	<i>The Peregrinations of the Soul in the Afterlife</i> (BN Latin 3236A) <sup>306</sup>	Anonymous	?
c. 1175-1225	<i>Quid sit anima</i> ( <i>What is the Soul?</i> ) <sup>307</sup>	Anonymous	?
After 1177	<i>Sermo de sphaera intelligibii</i> ( <i>Sermon on the Intelligible Sphere</i> ) <sup>308</sup>	Alan of Lille	Ch/P/C
1180	<i>Anticlaudianus</i> ( <i>Anticlaudian</i> ) <sup>309</sup>	Alan of Lille	Ch/P/C
1185	<i>Microcosmos</i> ( <i>Microcosm</i> )	Godfrey of Saint-Victor	V
Before 1187 [?]	<i>Al-Qānūn fī at-ṭibb</i> ( <i>Canon of Medicine</i> )	Avicenna	M

<sup>303</sup> *De anima*, ed. J. T. Muckle. *Mediaeval Studies*, 2 (1940), pp. 23-103. See also *El Tractatus De Anima atribuido a Dominicus Gundissalinus: Estudio, edición crítica y traducción castellana*, ed. C. M. Jesús Soto Bruna (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2009). Gundissalinus discusses the soul's motions, of which the affections are included, in chapter 1 (Muckle, pp. 35-36; Bruna, 1.10-19, pp. 74-83). For other instances of the affections see chapter 9 (Muckle, pp. 80-82; Bruna, 9.157-163, pp. 234-241).

<sup>304</sup> P. Glorieux, 'La somme "Quoniam Homines" d'Alain de Lille', *ADHLMA*, 20 (1953), pp. 113-364.

<sup>305</sup> PL 202, 167-226. For a brief discussion of this text see N. M. Häring, 'The *Liber de Differentia naturae et personae* by Hugh Etherian and Letters Addressed to him by Peter of Vienna and Hugh of Honau', *Mediaeval Studies*, 24 (1964), p. 13.

<sup>306</sup> Marie-Therese d'Alverny, 'Les Pérégrinations de l'âme dans l'autre monde d'après un anonyme de la fin du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle', *ADHLA*, 13 (1940-42), p. 239-299; ed. and trans. N. Polloni and C. Burnett, 'The Peregrination of the Soul in the Afterlife: A Work from Late 12<sup>th</sup>-century Iberia: Introduction, Edition, and Translation', in *Mark of Toledo: Intellectual Context and Debates between Christians and Muslims in Early Thirteenth Century Iberia*, Serie Arabica Veritas 4, eds. Burnett and P. Mantas-España (Córdoba and London: CNERU – The Warburg Institute, 2022), pp. 155-195.

<sup>307</sup> E. Bertola, 'Di una inedita Trattazione psicologica intitolata: *Quid sit anima*', *Revista di Filosofia Neo-Scholastica*, 58:5/6 (1966), pp. 564-583.

<sup>308</sup> Wetherbee, ed. and trans, in *Literary Works* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2013), pp. 1-19.

<sup>309</sup> Wetherbee, ed. and trans, in *Literary Works*.

After 1192	<i>Speculum universale</i> ( <i>Universal Mirror</i> ) <sup>310</sup>	Radulphus Ardens	U
c. 1195	<i>Les vers de la mort</i> ( <i>Verses on Death</i> )	Helinand of Froidmont	C
1197-1204	<i>Tractatus de anima</i> ( <i>Treatise on the Soul</i> ) <sup>311</sup>	John Blund	U
c.1199-1237	<i>De cognitione sui</i> ( <i>On Self-Knowledge</i> ) [Part of <i>Chronicon</i> ]	Helinand of Froidmont	C
c. 1200-1225	<i>Quinque digressiones cogitationis</i> ( <i>The Five Digressions of Knowledge</i> ) <sup>312</sup>	Alan of Lille*	A
1200-1225	<i>De origine virtutum et vitiorum</i> ( <i>On the Origin of the Virtues and Vices</i> ) <sup>313</sup>	Anonymous	?
c. 1210	<i>Quaternulli</i> ( <i>Four Notebooks</i> ) <sup>314</sup>	David of Dinant	P
c. 1215	<i>De motu cordis</i> ( <i>The Movement of the Heart</i> ) <sup>315</sup>	Alfred of Sareshel	T
c. 1225	<i>De anima et eius potentiis</i> ( <i>The Soul and its Powers</i> ) <sup>316</sup>	Anonymous	U
1230	<i>Summa de bono</i> ( <i>Summa on the Good</i> ) <sup>317</sup>	Philip the Chancellor	U
c. 1230	<i>De potentiis animae et obiectis</i>	Anonymous	U

<sup>310</sup> *Speculum universale*, ed., S. Ernst and C. Heimann, CCCM 241 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011); tr. [partial] C. P. Evans, *The Questions on the Sacraments* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010). For Radulphus' understanding of the affects see S. Ernst, 'Die *passiones animae* im *Speculum universale* des Radulfus Ardens', in *Passiones animae: Die "Leidenschaften der Seele" in der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie. Ein Handbuch*, eds. Christian Schäfer and Martin Thurner (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2013), pp. 135-164.

<sup>311</sup> John Blund, *Tractatus de anima*, ed. D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt (London: British Academy, 1970).

<sup>312</sup> M.-T. d'Alverny, *Alan de Lille. Textes Inédits* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1965), pp. 313-317.

<sup>313</sup> István P. Bejczy, 'De origine virtutum et vitiorum: An Anonymous Treatise on Moral Psychology (c. 1200-1230)', *ADHDA*, 71:1 (2005), pp. 105-145.

<sup>314</sup> *Davidis de Dinanto Quaternulorum Fragmenta*, ed., M. Kurdzialek, *Studia Mediewistyczne* 3 (1963), pp. 108. Dinant's view of the senses and affections are expressed most at pp. 34-42 and 65-71. For a discussion of David of Dinant's physiological view of psychology and the affections see T. Dagron, 'David of Dinant – On the Quaternuli Fragment <Hyle, Mens, Deus>', *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 40:4 (2003), pp. 419-436.

<sup>315</sup> *De motu cordis*, ed. C. Baeumker, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Philosophie des Mittelalters*, 23:1 (Münster, 1923). For the affections see especially 8.6, 15.9 and 16.10 pp. 33, 82-83 and 90.

<sup>316</sup> R.-A. Gauthier, ed., 'Le traité *De anima et potenciis eius* d'un maître ès arts (vers 1225), introduction et texte critique', *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 66:1 (1982), pp. 3-55; critical edition and translation [Romanian] by M. Maga and A. Baumgarten, *Anonim. Despre Suflet și Despre Facultățile Sale* (Bucharest: Polirom, 2023); tr. R. Pasnau, 'Anonymous (Arts Master c.1225): *The Soul and its Powers*', in Pasnau, ed., *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts: Vol. 3: Mind and Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 9-34.

<sup>317</sup> *Summa de bono*, ed., N. Wicki (Bern: Francke, 1985).

	<i>(The Powers of the Soul and its Objects)</i> <sup>318</sup>		
c. 1230	<i>Liber introductorius</i> [MS Escorial f.III.8] <sup>319</sup>	Michael Scot	P/S/U
c. 1230-35	<i>Quaestione disputatae</i> (Disputed Questions) <sup>320</sup>	Hugh of St.-Cher	D
c. 1233-35	<i>Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae</i> (Treatise on The Division of the Powers of the Soul) <sup>321</sup>	John of La Rochelle	F
1235-36	<i>Summa de anima</i> (Summa On the Soul) <sup>322</sup>	John of La Rochelle	F
1235-40	<i>De anima</i> (On the Soul) <sup>323</sup>	William of Auvergne	S
1236-45	<i>Summa Halensis</i> <sup>324</sup>	Alexander of Hales/John of La Rochelle	F
c. 1240 [?]	<i>De compositione exterioris et interioris hominis</i> (On the Composition of the Exterior and Inner Man) <sup>325</sup>	David of Augsburg	F
1242-43	<i>De homine</i> (On Man) <sup>326</sup>	Albertus Magnus	D
c. 1255	<i>De anima</i> [Oxford Digby 204, 121r-122r] <sup>327</sup>	R. de Staningtona	D [?]

<sup>318</sup> D. A. Callus, ed., 'The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 19:1 (1952), pp. 131–170.

<sup>319</sup> For a discussion of this text see Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima*, p. 24.

<sup>320</sup> For a complete treatment of Hugh of St.-Cher's position of the soul and anthropology see Magdalena Bieniak's *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200-1250: Hugh of St-Cher and his Contemporaries* (Leuven, 2010); *Id.* 'The Powers of the Soul in the Anthropology of Hugh of St.-Cher', in *Psychology and the Other Disciplines: A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction (1250-1750)*, eds. P. J. J. M. Bakker, S. W. de Boer and C. Leijenhorst (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 157-170.

<sup>321</sup> P. Michelle-Quantin, ed., *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, TPMA 11 (1964).

<sup>322</sup> J. G. Bougerol, ed., *Summa de Anima: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, TPMA 19 (1995).

<sup>323</sup> tr. R. J. Teske, SJ, *On the Soul* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000).

<sup>324</sup> Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, ed. Quaracchi, (Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48); tr. [partial] L. Schumacher and O. Bychkov, *A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology: The Summa Halensis* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2022).

<sup>325</sup> *De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione secundum triplicem status incipientium, proficientium et perfectorum*, ed. Quaracchi (Collegium S. Bonaventura: 1899); tr. D. Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress by David of Augsburg*, 2 vols. (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1937). For biography on David see B. McGinn, 'Mystical Handbooks of the Late Middle Ages', *Acta Theologica*, 33 (2022), pp. 79-81.

<sup>326</sup> H. Anzulewicz and J.R. Söder, eds, *Opera omnia*, vol. 27.2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2008).

<sup>327</sup> For a description and summary of this work see R. C. Dales, 'R. De Saningtona: An Unknown Writer of the Thirteenth Century', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 4:3 (1966), pp. 199-208; *Id.*, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), p. 60.

1257	<i>Breviloquium</i> <sup>328</sup>	Bonaventure	F
1259	<i>Itinerarium mentis ad Deum</i> ( <i>The Soul's Journey into God</i> ) <sup>329</sup>	Bonaventure	F
?	<i>De humanae cognitionis ratione</i> ( <i>The Reason of Human Knowledge</i> ) <sup>330</sup>	Bonaventure	F
After 1259	<i>Lignum Vitae</i> ( <i>The Tree of Life</i> ) <sup>331</sup>	Bonaventure	F
1260-69	<i>De anima</i> ( <i>On the Soul</i> )	Aristotle [Translation by William of Moerbeke]	G
1265-74	<i>Summa theologiae</i>	Thomas Aquinas	D
1266-67	<i>Quaestiones disputatae de anima</i> ( <i>Disputed Questions on the Soul</i> ) <sup>332</sup>	Thomas Aquinas	D
1268	<i>Commentarium in De anima</i> ( <i>Commentary on Aristotle's De anima</i> ) <sup>333</sup>	Thomas Aquinas	D

Table 1. Treatises with psychological content written between 1100-1260. Key: A = Arabic tradition; B = Benedictine; C = Cistercian; Ch = School of Chartres; D = Dominican; F = Franciscan; G = Greek tradition; M = Medical tradition; P = Philosophical tradition; S = Secular; T = School of Toledo.

Evidently monks and canons weren't the only innovators in psychology during the twelfth century. This period experienced an explosion of writings on the soul, psychology and conscience, with over 80 treatises, tracts and compilations written between 1100-1270. Significantly though 37 of these texts were written by individuals of the Cistercian Order or Abbey of Saint-Victor. That is, these institutions are overrepresented in their desire to classify the soul and explain its powers, responsible for around 45 per cent of all the science of the soul written in this period. Specifically, Cistercian texts account for around 15 per cent

<sup>328</sup> S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, vol. 5, ed. PP. Collegii A S. Bonaventura (Ad Claras Aquas: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1891), pp. 199-292.

<sup>329</sup> tr. E. Cousins, *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey into God. The Tree of Life. The Life of St. Francis* (New York: Paulist Press, 1978).

<sup>330</sup> *De humanae cognitionis ratione*, ed. PP. Collegii A S. Bonaventura (Ad Claras Aquas: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1883), pp. 48-72.

<sup>331</sup> See note 329.

<sup>332</sup> Ed. B. C. Bazán (Rome and Paris, 1996); tr. J. Robb, *Questions on the Soul* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984).

<sup>333</sup> Tr. R. Pasnau, *A Commentary on Aristotle's De anima* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

of the total. Meanwhile, Victorines writings that feature psychological content comprise 24 per cent of the total. Indeed, most of this came from Hugh of Saint-Victor who wrote 15 texts (18 per cent of the total output). Indeed, for Alain Boureau the great wave of psychological speculation on the powers of the soul was initiated by Hugh of Saint-Victor around 1120 when he wrote his own treatise on the soul: *De unione corporis et spiritus*.<sup>334</sup> As the table shows, this wave of psychological speculation began in 1120 with Hugh of Saint-Victor and lasted for around 70 years, concluding with Pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima* written from 1170-1190 and Godfrey of Saint-Victor's *Microcosmus* of 1185. If the Victorines began the trend toward discussing the soul's powers, during this period of 70 years, it was 'the decisive Cistercian contribution to medieval anthropology... to add affectivity to the pantheon of the soul's powers', as Damien Boquet and Pirsoka Nagy write.<sup>335</sup> While Boquet and Nagy are correct to emphasise the Cistercian contributions to affectivity, neither the Cistercians nor the Victorines can be said to have created these psychological models alone.<sup>336</sup> This period of 70 years saw a great deal of interaction and cooperation between both groups.

### **Do the Twelfth-Century *libri de anima* constitute a Genre?**

Why did both these groups *Libri de anima*? Operating with a wide notion of 'psychology' twelfth century authors repurposed the *De anima* treatise to raise the pressing theological questions of their day. Questions such as: How is the soul generated? Is the soul a separate essence from the body? If so, how are the soul and body connected? What are the faculties or 'powers' that are unique to the soul? What happens to the soul after the death of the body? And most importantly for the Cistercians and Victorines, how does the soul achieve mystical union with God? Texts written on the soul were thus in part a reaction to intellectual shifts happening across the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In the early history of the Church the key theological controversies included debates on divine essence and the nature of Christ (Christology), the sacrament of the Eucharist, and the liturgy, whereas psychological questions, particularly the nature and powers of the soul, were vogue between 1100-1340 as a consequence of the reforms of Gregory VII and the Third and Fourth Lateran Councils.<sup>337</sup>

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<sup>334</sup> A. Boureau, *De vagues individus*, p. 29.

<sup>335</sup> Boquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, p. 143.

<sup>336</sup> Their section 'Monastic Anthropology in the Twelfth Century: The Challenges of a Spiritual Psychology', exclusively speaks to the Cistercian contributions. Boquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, pp. 143-148.

<sup>337</sup> A. Boureau, *De Vagues Individus*, p. 25.

The Cistercians, in particular, are considered as breathing new life into the genre of *De anima* writings.<sup>338</sup> Several commentators have noted how the writing of *libri de anima* were crucial to the much broader mission of the sanctification of man and the group's reforming mission. As Anselme Le Bail put it: 'The spiritual teaching of the Cistercians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was not regarded as complete without a treatise *De anima*. Whether composed explicitly as a treatise, or touched on occasion offered throughout their works, their teaching on this subject was the keystone of their doctrine on the sanctification of man.'<sup>339</sup> These treatises on the soul sought to bring together an understanding of soul *and* body. These treatises were tied to the twelfth-century re-appreciation of man as a microcosm since *libri de anima* were a 'complete psychology', explaining both the elemental nature of the body and spiritual substance of the soul. 'However much they might retain the 'inwardness' of Augustinianism', Marie-Dominique Chenu remarks that treatises on the soul 'incorporated these physical principles and this 'materialist' outlook' of the twelfth-century renaissance.<sup>340</sup> They were, thus, receptive to the new works in medicine and natural philosophy (such as the *Pantengi*) as well as the trend in the twelfth-century towards humanism, viewing the human being as divinely created and an important part of the universe.

I would like to suggest that twelfth-century *De anima* treatises can be considered as a loosely defined genre concerned. These texts can be considered as part of a shared genre in a similar way in which Paola Bernardini has recently persuasively argued that commentaries written on Aristotle's *De anima* form 'constitute a unitary tradition'.<sup>341</sup> In the example of Aristotelian commentaries on the soul, Bernardini argues that they share (1) the same historical-institutional context, being produced by the universities; (2) they utilise common sources; and (3) have a common object of discussion: Aristotle's *De anima*.<sup>342</sup> A further

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<sup>338</sup> G. Webb, 'William of Saint-Thierry I: The Five Senses of Love', *New Blackfriars*, 46:539 (1965), p. 465; Boquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, p. 143.

<sup>339</sup> 'Les Cisterciens du xii<sup>e</sup> et du xiii<sup>e</sup> siècles ne comprenaient pas l'enseignement de la spiritualité sans un traité « De Anima ». Rédigé ex professo ou dispersé selon les occasions, ce traité était la clef de voûte de tout leur enseignement sur la sanctification de l'homme'. See A. LeBail, OCR, 'IV. – La doctrine de Saint Bernard' in 'Bernard (Saint)', *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, 1 (1937), cols. 1454-1499 (at 1472). This quote is also cited by Hallier, *The Monastic Theology of Aelred of Rievaulx*, p. 3, and used and agreed with by Aelred Squire in his review of C. H. Talbot's, *Ailred of Rievaulx: De Anima (Life of the Spirit)*, 7: 74/74 (1952), pp. 118-119). The same sentiments have been echoed Louis M. Savary (*Psychological Themes in the Golden Epistle of William of Saint-Thierry to the Carthusians of Monte-Dieu*, *Analecta Carthusiana* 8 (Salzburg: James Hogg, 1973), p. 40) and by Marjory Lange ('A Reading of Aelred of Rievaulx's *De Anima*: Through Ciceronian Dialogue to Personal Testament', *Cistercian Studies Quarterly*, 45:4 (2010), p. 402.

<sup>340</sup> Chenu, *Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century*, p. 34.

<sup>341</sup> P. Bernardini, *Aristotle's De anima at the Faculties of Arts (13<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> Centuries)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), p. 34.

<sup>342</sup> Ibid, p. 34.

criterion of similarity in Bernardini's case is that these commentaries utilise a similar format – the scholastic *quaestio* – as a way of responding Aristotle's treatise. Much like the treatises on the soul that would succeed them, the *libri de anima* written by Cistercian and Victorine monks and canons can be seen as part of a collective *De anima* genre. First, these texts were produced by monks and canons in a monastic/canonical context and largely for a monastic/canonical audiences. Second, they draw upon a common pool of sources, namely the thought of Augustine (as opposed to Aristotle) to understand the soul. Third, they have a common object of discussion in understanding the soul's powers and capacities, although admittedly there is more variety than the later Aristotelian commentaries. In terms of form, the *De anima* treatises of Cassiodorus, the Anglo-Saxons and Carolingians provided a structure to follow. However, this being said, Cistercian and Victorine explorations of psychology are characterised by great flexibility and variation in form. Some treatises were more overtly medical or spiritual in content and form.

### **Treatises *De anima* I: Traditional Texts**

#### *De unione corporis et spiritus* (c. 1120)

Hugh of Saint-Victor on the other hand took up the delicate subject of the union of the soul and body in his brief treatise, *De unione spiritus et anima* (*On the Union of Spirit and Soul*).<sup>343</sup> Hugh's treatise is significant as an early Neoplatonic account of how the corporeal and spiritual realm can be mediated. In his understanding of the soul, Hugh utilises a medical understanding of the corporeal spirits as mediators between the two natures of body and soul. In doing so, Hugh develops an epistemology whereby sensory impressions can become mediated into spiritual realities.

#### *De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis* (1155-61)

While the biography on Achard of Saint-Victor is scanty, he was likely an Englishman at Bridlington Abbey in Yorkshire before moving to the Abbey of Saint-Victor. Achard would become abbot of the Parisian abbey and then living out his final years as the bishop of Avranches before his death c. 1170/71. It was during this time at Saint-Victor that Achard wrote a short treatise discriminating between the operations of, and relationship between, soul, spirit and mind. Nicholas Häring has sought to discredit the authenticity of Achard as the

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<sup>343</sup> Hugh of Saint-Victor, *De unione corporis et spiritus*, PL 177, col. 285-295.



author, preferring to favour Gilbert of Poitiers; despite this, the attribution to Achard remains nearly universally observed in the historiography.<sup>344</sup> As the title suggests, Achard's treatise on the soul explores the trinitarian relationship between its three parts: soul (*anima*), spirit (*spiritus*) and mind (*mens*).

### *Epistola de anima* (c. 1162)

No doubt the most famous letter exchanged on the soul was Isaac of Stella's *Epistola de anima* (*Letter on the Soul*). Less of a letter and more of a philosophical treatise, Isaac provided a condensed, yet systematic, treatment of the soul and its powers. The Abbot of Stella wrote the document in response to his fellow monk, Alcher of Clairvaux (d. 1181), and his request to learn not from scripture 'what the soul may have been like before sin, or what it may be like under sin, or what future sort of soul may exist after sin...' but rather the soul's 'nature and powers - how it may be present in the body, or how it may depart, and other things... which we do not know.'<sup>345</sup> As a historical document, the creation of the *Epistola de anima* is a significant witness to the interest in the soul and psychology in the 1160s among the Cistercian houses. Nine manuscripts of the *Epistola de anima* are extant.<sup>346</sup> And, if we take Isaac at his word, the *Epistola de anima* even suggests that Cistercian monks travelled some distance to gather together at 'community gatherings' in order to discuss theological matters, some of which pertained to the soul.<sup>347</sup> Notwithstanding this, Isaac and Alcher's exchange attests to a substantial degree of communication between Cistercian monks and a collective desire to better understand themselves through advancing an understanding of the spiritual component of their bodies.

### *Dialogus de anima* (1163-66)

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<sup>344</sup> For an outline see M. Ilkhani, *La philosophie de la creation chez Achard de Saint-Victor* (Brussels: Ousia, 1999), pp. 23-26.

<sup>345</sup> *Ep. an.*, 1 (Tarlazzi, lines 5-8 p. 256; CFS 24, p. 155): 'Vis enim a nobis edoceri de anima, sed neque id quod in divinis litteris didicimus, id est quails fuerit ante peccatum, aut sit sub peccato, aut futura post peccatum, sed de eius natura et viribus, quomodo sit in corpore, vel quomodo exeat, et cetera que nec scimus...'

<sup>346</sup> Tarlazzi, 'L'Epistola de anima di Isacco de Stella', pp. 179-207.

<sup>347</sup> *Ibid*, 1 (PL 194 1875B; CFS 24, p. 155). Isaac writes: 'We do confess as true what you heard from us at our community gatherings. And by this you are spurred on to hope for something more' (...utque verum fateamur, id ipsum quod a nobis in collatione audisti, ob quod animaris aliquid amplius sperare...). The filiation system of mother and daughter houses ensured the formation of close ties of friendship between monasteries. Chapters 5 and 6 of one of the founding documents of the Order, the *Charter of Love* (*Carta caritatis*) provides instruction for conducting this relationship. Chapter 7, similarly, sets out the workings of the General Chapter – a representative body comprised of abbots from each monastery – which was to meet annually to discuss matters pertaining to the 'salvation of their own souls'. For the development of this system see E. Jamroziak, 'Centres and Peripheries' in Brunn, *The Cambridge Companion to the Cistercian Order*, pp. 69-73.

The gaps in Augustine's doctrine that each author chose to fill were, nevertheless, subject to variety. At the general level, Aelred of Rievaulx at the beginning of his *Dialogus de anima* (1163-66) establishes his treatise as a conciliation of Augustine's theory of the soul with accepted doctrine.<sup>348</sup> Aelred's biographer, Walter Daniel, a Cistercian monk and admirer of Aelred tells us that this treatise was written late in Aelred's life, at a stage when he was battling with chronic illness. Walter Daniel tells us it was after writing a commentary on Luke 11:33 for Laurence, the Abbot of Westminster, that Aelred

...finished two books of his work about the soul, that is, its nature (*natura*), extent (*quantitas*) and quality (*subtilitas*), and other matters relating to the soul, and he almost finished the third book, but his end in this life came before he brought it to a close.<sup>349</sup>

There is a firm connection between Aelred's age and illness and his motivation for writing his *Dialogue de anima*. In doing so, he was seeking to complete the Cistercian doctrinal synthesis he had worked out throughout his life with a focus on leading the soul to the heights of spiritual life.<sup>350</sup>

This is borne out in the structure of the work. Comprised of three books, book one covers the fundamental nature of the soul; book two details the powers of memory, reason and will and is notable for containing Aelred's longest discussion of the *affectus* as part of the soul's free will (*liberum arbitrium*); and while unfinished, book three is by far the most detailed exploration of any *De anima* treatise on the fate of souls after death. The *Dialogus de anima* as the name suggests is also distinctive in its form: each of the three books involves a dialogue between 'Aelred' and a student 'John'. This Ciceronian dialogue structure likely reflected the reality of Aelred dictating his thoughts on the soul during his final days of life surrounded by the community at Rievaulx. However, the dialogue also serves a subtler purpose. As Marjory Lange suggests, books one and two are pedagogical in focus, employing a teacher-student dynamic, and employing a movement whereby John begins by asking a curious question aimed at 'knowing' (*sentire*) the soul, and ends by being instilled with a correct, monastic

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<sup>348</sup> *Dial. an.* 1 (CFS 22, p. 35). John states to Aelred: 'I should like to know what you think about the soul. For Augustine does not have the same ideas about it as I have been accustomed to hold. He says that it does not move in space and consequently is not contained in a place, that is not circumscribed by local boundaries, and that it has neither length, breadth, nor height.'

<sup>349</sup> Walter Daniel, *Vita Aelredi* 32, ed. and trans. F. M. Powicke, *The Life of Ailred of Rievaulx by Walter Daniel* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1950), p. 42: 'Post que de anima, id est de illius natura et quantitate ac subtilitate atque nonnullis aliis ad animam pertinentibus, duos libros perfecit, et tercium pene usque ad finem deduxit, set ante finem suum in hac vita eius in literam finem non conclusit.'

<sup>350</sup> Hallier, *The Monastic Theology of Aelred of Rievaulx*, p. 3.

‘understanding’ (*intelligere*).<sup>351</sup> The character of John in these two books, therefore, visually represents the soul being changed through correct knowledge. However, book three is radically different. While still an interlocutor, John fades into the background and is content to listen to Aelred’s discussion on the fate of souls until the dialogue progressively fades more and more until it stops with Aelred’s final vision of the communion of saints – the silence of the moment designed to invite his audience to mystically contemplate a reality that is beyond human understanding.<sup>352</sup>

#### *De spiritu et anima* (c. 1170-1190)

The anonymous *De spiritu et anima* is the longest ‘Cistercian’ *De anima* treatise, organised in its largest version into 65 chapters. It is distinctive for two reasons. First, having been written towards the end of the period, *De spiritu et anima* was able to draw on extracts from several earlier Cistercian, Victorine and Benedictine writings. In doing so, it combined diverse interpretations of the soul’s powers drawn from the Church Fathers, philosophers, doctors and – most significantly for this thesis – with intellectuals connected to the Cistercian Order of Benedictine monks and the Augustinian Abbey of Saint-Victor in Paris. With entire chapters paraphrased from the works of Cistercians such as Bernard of Clairvaux, William of Saint-Thierry and Isaac of Stella, or Victorine canons like Hugh of Saint-Victor, it is unsurprising to find manuscript copies of *De spiritu et anima* attributed to all of these authors.<sup>353</sup>

The second reason this handbook on the soul was significant, was because it harmonised an Augustinian understanding of the soul with ‘new’ Cistercian and Victorine developments. The Cistercian and Victorine Augustinianism running throughout *De spiritu et anima* ensured that attributions of authorship were quickly made to Bishop of Hippo himself. Despite Dominicans like Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas later questioning its authenticity in the thirteenth century, the compilation gained unmatched authority as Saint Augustine’s ‘lost’ treatise on the soul, the prestige of the Bishop of Hippo’s name made it one of the, if not *the*, most widely circulated and authoritative *De anima* treatise. *De spiritu et anima* would serve as an authoritative source in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Cistercian, Franciscan and Dominican monastic psychology, as well as scholastic and literary thought.<sup>354</sup>

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<sup>351</sup> Lange, ‘A Reading of Aelred of Rievaulx’s *De anima*’, pp. 412-415.

<sup>352</sup> Ibid, pp. 415-419.

<sup>353</sup> See B. McGinn, ‘The Spirit and the Soul’, in *Three Treatises on Man*, pp. 70-72. The notes to *De spiritu et anima* in McGinn’s edition (pp. 181-288) show that whole chapters are dependent upon key Cistercian and Victorine texts.

<sup>354</sup> For analysis of the reception of the text in Franciscan and Dominican circles see Mews, ‘Debating the Authority’, pp. 337-342 and Mews, ‘The Diffusion of the *De spiritu et anima*’, pp. 317-320. For its impact on

Recent research has since shown that this ‘Pseudo-Augustine’ was highly likely the Cistercian monk Alcher of Clairvaux, the recipient of Isaac of Stella’s *Epistola de anima*, and a figure renowned for his knowledge of medicine and natural science.<sup>355</sup> Alcher had also asked the Benedictine monk Peter of Celle (d. 1183) to produce the treatise *De conscientia* (*On Conscience*), and he may have even asked others for their opinions on the soul before putting his compilation together.<sup>356</sup> Although there is no evidence that Alcher was aware of Aelred’s *Dialogus de anima*. Chapters 1-33 explore the interaction of the soul and spirit; Chapters 34-50 treat the image of God within the soul and the more monastic theme of misery of postlapsarian human condition; chapters 51-65 explore actions, words and thoughts. Constant J. Mews has identified up to five common types of length that this text circulated.<sup>357</sup>

### **Treatises *De anima* II: Natural Science and Medicine**

A second grouping of *De anima* treatises in the twelfth century sought to integrate the latest medical learning with their theological understandings of the soul. This is clear in three texts: William of Saint-Thierry’s *De natura corporis et animae* (*On the Nature of the Body and Soul*), Richard of Saint-Victor’s *De statu interioris hominis* (*On the State of the Interior Man*) and the aforementioned *De spiritu et anima*.

Nemesius of Emesa’s *De natura hominis* (*On the Nature of Man*), written at the turn of the fifth century yet translated by Alfano of Salerno (1015-1085) around 1080 was a significant medical authority in the twelfth century. Nemesius sought to use medicine and philosophy to gain an integrated understanding of both body and soul.<sup>358</sup> This text, offering a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism, Galenic medicine and Christianity, is notable for its anthropological rendering of man in the cosmos. *De natura hominis* is deeply psychological:

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the Franciscan *Summa Halensis* see L. Schumacher, ‘The *De anima* Tradition in Early Franciscan Thought: A Case Study in Avicenna’s Reception’, in Schumacher, ed., *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), p. 164. A survey of Dominican criticisms against the treatise can be found in G. Théry, O.P., ‘L’authenticité du *De spiritu et anima* dans Saint Thomas et Albert le Grand’, *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 10:3 (1921), pp. 373-377. And for the impact of *De spiritu et anima* on scholastic discussions of corporeity and Dante see A. J. Minnis, *Hellish Imaginations from Augustine to Dante* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 117-133.

<sup>355</sup> Mews has noted that the medical language employed in the text means that Alcher, known for his understanding of *physica*, ‘should not be dismissed as its possible author’. See Mews, ‘Debating the Authority’, *Przegląd Tomistyczny*, 24 (2018), p. 342. See also Mews’ remarks in ‘*Affectus* in the *De spiritu et anima* and Cistercian Writings of the Twelfth Century’, in *Before Emotion: The Language of Feeling, 400-1800*, ed. K. Essary, M. Champion and J. F. Ruys (New York/London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 87 and 90, as well as in ‘Redefining the Soul in Cistercian Perspective: Reason, Affect, and Harmony in Isaac of Stella and Alcher of Clairvaux’, *Cîteaux - Commentarii Cistercienses*, 73 (2022), pp. 29-46.

<sup>356</sup> Mews, ‘The Diffusion of the *De spiritu et anima*’, p. 298.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid, p. 303.

<sup>358</sup> G. J. Grudzen, *Medical Theory about the Body and the Soul in the Middle Ages* (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007), p. 95.

it draws upon the medical writings of Galen and the philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle and Porphyry to discuss, among other things, man's place in the cosmos (chapter 1), the soul and its union with the body (2-4), imagination, the five senses, reason, thought and memory (5-13), the non-rational or 'affective' part of the soul capable of obeying reason (15-21), the non-rational or 'nutritive' part of the soul not capable of obeying reason (33-43), and a series of discussions on choice and fate (35-43).<sup>359</sup> A reader of Nemesius' can learn the soul's powers are three (*imaginatio, intelligentia, memoria*).<sup>360</sup>

That *De natura hominis* brought new Greek medical concepts to the Latin West is further attested by William of Conches' use of Nemesius' terms *homimeria* and *organica*, originally employed by Anaxagoras but common also to Aristotelian and Galenic medicine, to differentiate between 'simple' and 'composite' body parts.<sup>361</sup> An indication that Nemesius was regarded as an authority in *materia medica* throughout the twelfth century is revealed by the fact that in 1159 John of Salisbury advised anyone seeking to learn about the soul to read the *Premnon physicon*.<sup>362</sup>

Another major source of medical knowledge was the *Isagoge* of Johannitius, which had been translated into Latin by the latter part of the eleventh century. Fifty years later the *Isagoge* was circulating as part of a collection of medical texts known as the *Articella*, which also included the *Aphorisms* and *Prognostics* of Hippocrates with Galen's commentary, the *De urinis* of Theophilus and *De pulsibus* of Philaretus.<sup>363</sup> Another major source was the translation of the *Kitāb Kāmil aṣ-ṣinā'a aṭ-ṭibbīya* ('*Complete Art of Medicine*') of 'Alī ibn al-'Abbās al-Magūsī (d. 994), a Latin translation being made before 1086 by Constantine the African under going under the title of *Pantegni*. The *Pantengi* was an influential source for innovative natural philosophers such as Adelard of Bath (c. 1080-1152), Hermann of Carinthia (c. 1110? – c.1160) and William of Conches. These men drew their definitions of the elements, theories of bodily spirits and additional *quaestiones* of medicine from this compilation – William of Conches

<sup>359</sup> Nemesius of Emesa, *De natura hominis*, ed. G. Verbeke and J. R. Moncho, *Némésius d'Émèse: De Natura Hominis. Traduction de Bungundio de Pise* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975); trans. R. W. Sharples and P. J. van der Eijk, *On the Nature of Man* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008).

<sup>360</sup> *De natura hominis*, 4, ed. Verbeke/Moncho, p. 70; tr. Sharples/Eijk, p. 100).

<sup>361</sup> T. Silverstein, 'Guillaume de Conches and the Elements: *Homimeria* and *Organica*', *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964), p. 363-367; *Idem.*, 'Guillaume de Conches and Nemesius of Emesa: On the Sources of the "New Science" of the Twelfth Century', in *Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume: On the Occasion of his Seventy-Fifth Birthday. English Section: Volume II*, ed. Harry A. Wolfson, Jerusalem 1965, p. 719-734 (p. 723-734).

<sup>362</sup> John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, 4.20, ed. J. B. Hall and K.S.B. Keats-Rohan, *Iohannis Saresberiensis: Metalogicon* (CCCM 98), Turnhout 1991, lines 37-45, p. 158.

<sup>363</sup> F. L. Newton, 'Constantine the African and Monte Cassino: New Elements and the Text of the *Isagoge*', in *Constantine the African and 'Alī Ibn al-'Abbās al-Magūsī: The Pantegni and Related Texts*, eds. D. Jacquart and C. Burnett (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 17.

most of all.<sup>364</sup> Where Constantine's medicine overlapped with theology, such as in his physiological account of 'spirit' (*spiritus*), proved a particularly influential jumping-off point for commentaries by monks seeking to bring this new Greco-Arabic medicine under the orthodoxy of Catholic doctrine.<sup>365</sup> As Charles Burnett has shown, the *Pantegni* especially influenced the speculation on the soul of canons regular and Cistercian monks, since parallels with the *Pantegni*'s doctrines of corporeal spirits mediating the operations of body and soul occur in the *De anima* treatises of Hugh of Saint-Victor, William of Saint-Thierry, Isaac of Stella and Alcher of Clairvaux.<sup>366</sup>

By 1140, the *De differentia spiritus et animae* (*On the Difference of Spirit and the Soul*) of Qusta ibn Luqa was translated by John of Seville and offered a further medical explanation for the 'spirits' (*spiritus*) mediating body and soul.<sup>367</sup> By 1160, Avicenna's *Canon Medicinae* (*Canon of Medicine*) was circulating in a Latin translation. Thus, by the middle of the century there were several medical sources from which to draw explanations of the soul from. Hildegard of Bingen *Causae et curae* (*Causes and Cures*) demonstrate an immersion in this medical knowledge.<sup>368</sup>

#### *De natura corporis et animae* (c. 1140)

William of Saint-Thierry (1085-1148), abbot of the Benedictine community of the same name, was a confidant of Bernard of Clairvaux and is recognised for his achievements as an administrator, biographer, mystic, polemicist, reformer and spiritual teacher. It was in these latter capacities that, after converting to the Cistercians in 1135 and retiring to the Abbey of Signy, William circulated *De natura corporis et animae* sometime around 1140. Divided into two books, the first, 'On the Nature of the Body', explicates 'the physics of the human body' (*physica corporis*) by drawing on Hippocratic, Galenic and Salernitan medical tractates.

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<sup>364</sup> C. Burnett, 'Scientific Speculations', in *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, ed. P. Dronke, Cambridge, 1988, p. 151-176 (p. 172); I. Ronca, 'The Influence of the *Pantegni* on William of Conches' *Dragmaticon*' in *Constantine the African and 'Alī ibn al-'Abbās al-Magūsī: The Pantegni and Related Texts*, pp. 266-285; D. Jacquart, 'Minima in Twelfth-Century Medical Texts from Salerno', in *Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories*, eds. C. Lüthy, J. E. Murdoch and W. R. Newman (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 39-56 (p. 34).

<sup>365</sup> D. Jacquart, 'Medicine and Theology', in *Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities*, ed. Spencer E. Young (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 36), (Leide: Brill, 2011), pp. 213-226 (p. 218-219)

<sup>366</sup> C. Burnett, 'The Chapter on the Spirits in the *Pantegni* of Constantine the African', in Burnett and Jacquart, *Constantine the African*, p. 99-120 (p. 107).

<sup>367</sup> For this text see J. C. Wilcox, 'The Transmission and Influence of Qusta ibn Luqa's "On the Difference Between Spirit and the Soul"' (Ph.D. Diss: City University of New York, 1985).

<sup>368</sup> *Hildegardis Causae et Curae*, ed. Paul Kaiser (Leipzig, 1903); trans. Margaret Berger, *Hildegard of Bingen: On Natural Philosophy and Medicine: Selections from Causae et curae* (Rochester, NY, 1999).

These include the *Premnon physicon*, *Ysagoge ad artem Galeni*, *Liber graduum* and *Pantegni*, which were written by key authorities of medicine of his day: Nemeseius of Emesa (fl. 390), Johannitius, and Constantine the African (d. before 1098). Utilising these authorities, the opening book covers the elements, the humours and good bodily complexion (*eucrasia*), the powers of the soul administering life to the body, the spirits, as well as the five corporal senses.<sup>369</sup> By contrast, the second book, ‘On the Nature of the Soul’, employed theological sources such as Augustine’s *De quantitate animae*, Claudianus Mamertus’, *De statu animae*, Gregory of Nyssa’s *De humano opificio* and Cassiodorus’ *De anima* in order to outline the faculties of the mind (notably reason and the affective appetites), the soul’s spiritual senses, and concludes by explaining the fate awaiting virtuous and sinful souls.<sup>370</sup> While William does discuss the affections, he does not do so systematically. Throughout the entire treatise the terms *affectio* and *affectus* are used in total only seven times.<sup>371</sup>

The composition of this hybrid treatise was complex. William’s *Epistola de fratres Monte-Dei* reveals it occurred in two stages: *De natura animae* was written first, perhaps when William was still a Benedictine at Saint-Thierry, and then, significantly later, *De natura corporis* was added ‘in order to treat... man in his entirety’.<sup>372</sup> Indeed, the preface openly publicises that the work combines information from a diverse cross-section of seemingly conflicting authorities: philosophers, physicians and ecclesiastical writers: ‘I have gathered together here the books of the philosophers and the physicians, and also... ecclesiastical writers’, William states.<sup>373</sup> Past research has accounted for this variation by showing that the genesis of *De natura corporis et animae* was partly polemical. Building on the initial study by Michel Lemoine, Teresa O. Pierre and Svenja Gröne have produced persuasive arguments that claim William’s use of Arabic medical terminology and ideas – which parallel those of William of Conches – should be seen as part of William’s reply to the Chartrian philosopher concerning

<sup>369</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 1-50 (PL 180, col. 695A-708C; Lemoine, pp. 72-127; CCCM 88, pp. 103-120; CFS 24, 1.1-10, pp. 105-123).

<sup>370</sup> *Nat. an.*, 51-120 (PL 180, col. 707D-726C; Lemoine, pp. 128-213; CCCM 88, pp. 121-146; CFS 24, 2.1-15, pp. 125-152). For William’s sources see J.-M. Déchanet, *Guillaume de Saint-Thierry: Aux sources d’une pensée*, (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1978), pp. 69-76.

<sup>371</sup> See Lemoine’s ‘Index Verborum’, in *Guillaume de Saint-Thierry*, p. 222.

<sup>372</sup> *Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei*, ‘Prologue’, 13, ed. P. Verdeyen, *Guillelmi a Sancto Theodorico Opera Omnia: Pars III*, lines 78-82, p. 227; trans. T. Berkeley, *The Golden Epistle* (CFS 12), Kalamazoo, MI 1980, p. 7. For an alternate view that connects *De natura corporis et animae* to William’s conception of ‘unity of spirit’ in the *Epistola ad fratres Monte Dei* see Rydstrøm-Poulsen, ‘William of Saint-Thierry on the Soul’, p. 93 and 104-108.

<sup>373</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 2 (PL 180, col. 695; Lemoine, p. 69; CCCM 88, p. 103; CFS 24, 1.1, p. 103): ‘Scias autem quae legis non mea esse, sed ex parte philosophorum vel physicorum, ex parte vero ecclesiasticorum doctorum, nec tantum eorum sensa, sed ipsa eorum sicut ab eis edita sunt dicta vel scripta, quae excerpta ex eorum libris hic in unum congesti.’

his heretical use of natural philosophy, which came to the Cistercian monk's attention around 1140.<sup>374</sup> William the Cistercian would denounce William of Conches as a 'philosopher and man of natural science' (*homo physicus et philosophus*) in his 1141 *Epistola de erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis* (*Letter of the Errors of William of Conches*) for arguing that natural science could understand the most profound theological mysteries. William of Conches was charged with providing an overly-philosophical explanation of the Holy Trinity.<sup>375</sup> However, in contrast to William of Saint-Thierry's careful and successful condemnation of Peter Abelard, which culminated at Sens in May 1141, his immediate rebuttal of Conches' doctrines in *De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis* (*The Errors of William of Conches*) was hurried, unsystematic and even faulty.<sup>376</sup> The case consequently never went to a formal trial, helped perhaps because the Chartrian enjoyed the political protection of Geoffrey Plantagenet and, in early 1140, likely pre-emptively circulated a corrected, second edition of his offending text, *De philosophia mundi*.<sup>377</sup> William of Conches's later *Dragmaticon* still demonstrated an extensive borrowing of medical quotations, albeit without much direct reference to the *Pantegni*.<sup>378</sup> Medicine, therefore, could have a role in theology but it had to serve within particular boundaries.

What role, then, did William of Saint-Thierry's treatise on the soul play in this conflict? The limited manuscript transmission of *De natura corporis et animae* (only two extant manuscripts)<sup>379</sup>, in addition to the text's limited polemical tone, supports the interpretation that this work should be situated alongside two of William's other treatises of the early to mid 1140s – the *Speculum fidei* and *Aenigma fidei* (*Enigma of Faith*) – which were not strictly polemical but were concerned with clarifying orthodox Christian doctrine.<sup>380</sup> *De natura corporis et animae* clearly shows William's wider 'interest in medicine and in the 'psychology' of the spiritual life' as Rozanne Elder has remarked.<sup>381</sup> William was aware of the new scientific and medical treatises circulating around Salerno and this likely prompted

<sup>374</sup> Pierre, "That We May Glorify Him", p. 210-213; Svenja Gröne, 'Le premier écrit scientifique cistercien: Le *De natura corporis* de Guillaume de Saint-Thierry (†1148)', *Rives nord-méditerranéennes* 31 (2008), pp. 125-129.

<sup>375</sup> William of Saint-Thierry, *Epistola de erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis*, PL 180, 339BA: 'Datus enim in reprobum sensum homo physicus et philosophus, physice de Deo philosophatur...' (He has been ascribed 'philosopher and man of natural science' in the base sense, for he philosophised about God from the view of natural science).

<sup>376</sup> Paul E. Dutton, *The Mystery of the Missing Heresy Trial of William of Conches* (Toronto: PIMS, 2006), p. 11.

<sup>377</sup> Ibid, pp. 27-28.

<sup>378</sup> I. Ronca, 'The Influence of the *Pantegni* on William of Conches *Dragmaticon*' in *Constantine the African and 'Alī Ibn Al- 'Abbās Al-Magusī*, pp. 271-272.

<sup>379</sup> Charleville-Mezieres, Bibliothèque municipale MS 172, f. 113<sup>r</sup>-132<sup>v</sup>; Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale MS 1262, f. 54<sup>r</sup>-73<sup>v</sup>. See also Lemoine, *Guillaume de Saint-Thierry*, p. 33-49.

<sup>380</sup> Pierre, "That We May Glorify Him", p. 212.

<sup>381</sup> E. Rozanne Elder, 'Early Cistercian Writers', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Cistercian Order*, p. 201.



the inclusion of a medically-orientated book to an existing treatise entitled ‘De anima’, perhaps to show that there was no contradictions between the ‘science of observation’ found in medicine or natural philosophy on the one hand, and the science of theology on the other.<sup>382</sup> And while at first glance the medical bent of the text appears idiosyncratic for a Cistercian, this text packaged medicine into the monastic genre of a *De anima* treatise and the theme of self-knowledge: the Cistercian advises using the macrocosmic-microcosmic harmonies present in the universe, soul and body to approach God via the self rather than pursuing worldly knowledge out of vain ‘curiosity’ (*curiositas*).<sup>383</sup> Thus, following the failure of the formal conviction process against William of Conches, it is most suitable to view *De natura corporis et animae* as representing William’s informal parting shot to discredit the philosopher and at the same time publicise an orthodox, Cistercian account of how natural philosophy *should* be used to explain the interconnected natures of body and soul.

#### *De statu interioris hominis* (c. 1162)

Richard of Saint-Victor, who wrote around twenty years after William, displays a familiarity with *De natura corporis et animae* and had undoubtedly witnessed the growing popularity of Greco-Arabic medical doctrines in the intervening period. It was during his transition from sub-prior (1159-1162) to prior (1162-1173), when *De statu interioris hominis* was composed.<sup>384</sup> Concerned with identifying the disorders of the ‘passions’ (*passiones*) responsible for vice and sin, medicine serves as a tool to diagnose the causes of both bodily and spiritual ‘sickness’ (*infirmitas*) in man. While both he and William contrasted body and soul, Richard’s body-soul analogies stem more from his immersion in the distinctive Victorine mode of reading, popularised by handbooks on the *Ars legendi* like Hugh of Saint-Victor’s *Didascalicon*. In the Richardian system, the outer literal meaning of scripture serves as a mirror to approach inner allegorical and moral interpretations. This is on full display in *De statu interioris hominis* when Richard instructs his reader to ‘consider then the nature and cause of the infirmity of the exterior man, and you will see what you should think about spiritual infirmity.’<sup>385</sup>

<sup>382</sup> Gröne, ‘Le premier écrit scientifique cistercien’, p. 125.

<sup>383</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 1 (PL 180, col. 695; Lemoine, p. 65-67; CCCM 88, p. 103; CFS 24, p. 103). The literature on curiosity is too extensive to fully relate here but for its reception in Cistercian circles see Richard G. Newhauser, ‘The Sin of Curiosity and the Cistercians’, in *Erudition at God’s Service*, ed. John R. Sommerfeldt (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publication, 1987), pp. 71-95.

<sup>384</sup> Dale M. Coulter, ‘Introduction’, *Writings on the Spiritual Life*, p. 244.

<sup>385</sup> *Statu*, 1.34 (PL 196, col. 1141B; Ribaillier, p. 101; VTT 4, p. 282): ‘Considera igitur que vel unde sit exterioris hominis infirmitas, et animadvertes quid de spiritali infirmitate estimare debeas.’

But who did Richard write this treatise for? We are told the immediate context is ‘to satisfy the request of a friend.’<sup>386</sup> The newly appointed prior apologises in the prologue for his lateness in providing his commentary on the meaning of Isaiah 1:5-6: ‘Your head suffers, your heart grieves, your foot with the whole body is in pain. From the sole of your foot to the top of your head there is no soundness’ (*Caput languet, cor meret, pes cum toto corpore dolet, quia a planta pedis usque ad verticem non est in eo sanitas*).<sup>387</sup> So, Richard’s key term, *sanitas* – ‘soundness’ or ‘health’ – is primarily derived from biblical exegesis as opposed to the medical tradition. Richard interprets Isaiah’s use of the term *sanitas* as a reference to the total corruption and sickness of man’s outer and inner nature through sin. The full treatise of *De statu interioris hominis* comprises fifty-two chapters and takes Isaiah as the structuring principle. The first part (chapters 1-37) is by far the longest in length, and examines the sickness affecting the head, heart and feet, treating the defects of human nature, ignorance, concupiscence and the structure of the soul.<sup>388</sup> The second part (chapters 38-44) uses the wounds, welts and sores of Isaiah 1:6 to tease out the theological distinction between vice and sin.<sup>389</sup> Lastly, the third part (chapters 45-52) concludes by allegorically interpreting the ‘bandages’ and ‘oil’ Isaiah speaks of as the three remedies provided by God for man’s sickness: (1) the proscriptions, prohibitions and admonitions of the ten commandments; (2) the threats of reprimand, reprobation and damnation; and (3) the promises of forgiveness, grace and glory.<sup>390</sup>

While this structure appears peculiar for a work of psychology, it is necessary to note that Richard of Saint-Victor’s principal motivation, unlike that of William of Saint-Thierry, was not to systematically define concepts such as soul, affectivity or free will. Rather, *De statu interioris hominis*, as its title implies, was intended more as a personal – and hence, more general – reflection on the ‘inner man’.<sup>391</sup> Following the view of Jean Ribailier, this treatise is different from other Victorine and Cistercian works of psychology since Richard does not assess the *affectus* in its entirety but assigns priority instead to the ‘lower’ aspects of affectivity – the passions – which cause affectivity to become ‘diseased’.<sup>392</sup> Nonetheless, this does not mean that affectivity is absent; on the contrary, Richard’s commentary refers to the

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.*, ‘Prologue’ (PL 196, col. 1118A; Ribailier, p. 62; VTT 4, p. 252).

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.1 (PL 196, col. 1171B; Ribailier, p. 61; VTT 4, p. 251).

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.1-37 (PL 196, col. 1117B-1146B; Ribailier, p. 64-108; VTT 4, p. 252-288).

<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.38-44 (PL 196, col. 1145C-1152C; Ribailier, p. 108-117; VTT 4, p. 288-295).

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.45-52 (PL 196, col. 1151D-1160B; Ribailier, p. 117-128; VTT 4, p. 296-305).

<sup>391</sup> J. Ribailier, ‘A. Étude littéraire du Texte’, in ‘Richard de Saint-Victor De Statu Interioris Hominis’, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 34 (1967), p. 7-128 (at p. 13 and 20).

<sup>392</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

affects of the soul four times more than his Cistercian counterpart: the Victorine using variations of *affectus* or *affectio* thirty-three times.<sup>393</sup>

Further insight into the context surrounding *De statu interioris hominis* is supplied by Dale M. Coulter, who has noted that in the 1150s Richard was engaged in debate with his fellow Victorine brother, the Hebraist Andrew, over the correct interpretation of Isaiah, and thus this text should be understood as interconnected with Richard's other writings on Isaiah.<sup>394</sup> Significantly, then, Richard, like William, wrote about psychology partly to debate orthodox doctrine; in this case Andrew and Richard's disagreement highlighted the 'living and dynamic' character of the Abbey of Saint-Victor and the receptiveness of its members to different intellectual trends.<sup>395</sup> *De statu interioris hominis* consequently shares several wider affinities with Richard's trilogy of allegorical works on the formation of the people of Israel: *De duodecim patriarchis*, *De exterminatione mali et promotione boni* (*On the Extermination of Evil and Promotion of Good*) and *De arca mystica* (*On the Mystic Ark*). *De statu interioris hominis* can, therefore, be understood as part of a corpus of Richardian texts that symbolically chart the conversion of the canon regular and their passage from the active life to contemplative life.<sup>396</sup>

## Letters

Given that letters were one of the most common forms of communication it is natural that correspondence between monks and canons during the twelfth century would contain psychological themes. Quite often, though, this psychological material is not presented in a systematic form and can be easily missed. Overall, Isaac's *Epistola de anima* and William's *Epistola ad fratres Monte-Dei* (in addition to the *Epistolae* exchanged between Nicholas of Clairvaux and Peter of Celle) were a part of an epistolary genre, which itself was further subdivided and subject to series of established traditions and rules known as the 'art of letter-writing' (*Ars dictaminis*). Both, due to their purpose of clarifying doctrine on the soul, can be best classified as 'letters of doctrinal consultation'.<sup>397</sup> It was normal for Cistercian treatises to be composed in the form of expanded letters: parchment was costly and time consuming to

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<sup>393</sup> *Statu.*, 1.6, 1.8 (x2), 1.9 (x6), 1.10 (x2), 1.14, 1.16, 1.17, 1.26 (x2), 1.29 (x2), 1.34 (x3), 1.35 (x2), 1.37 (x5), 2.39 (x4), 3.47.

<sup>394</sup> Coulter, 'Introduction', *Writings on the Spiritual Life*, p. 245.

<sup>395</sup> Porwoll, 'Introduction', in *Victorine Restoration*, p. 36.

<sup>396</sup> Coulter, 'Introduction', *Writings on the Spiritual Life*, p. 245.

<sup>397</sup> Leclercq, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God*, p.179-80. Leclercq identifies six other types of letters: vocation letters, letters of exhortation, letters of business, letters of recommendation, letters to dying monks, and letters of friendship.

make and as a consequence the letter was a public (as opposed to a private) gift that would be read communally in the Cistercian monastery, passed around and copied by monks.<sup>398</sup> Isaac expected that not only would Alcher be the recipient of his treatise, but potentially a series of Cistercian houses would use the letter for their spiritual betterment. Isaac's *Epistola de anima*, therefore, emerges as an example of a wider trend among the *De anima*. This was a text written for, and to aid the salvation of, the spiritual elite comprising the cenobitic Cistercian community.

#### Odo of Saint-Victor, *Epistola* 6 (c. late 1120s-30s)

A clear example of this is found in the *Epistola* 6 of Odo of Saint-Victor, correspondence potentially dating between 1127-1132 between Odo and the courtier, Stephen of Garlande.<sup>399</sup> Odo begins the letter by stating that it is with 'how great a desire and emotion (*desiderio et affectu*) I have desired your well being'<sup>400</sup> While the early sections of the letter reference the political connections between the recipient and the French king, it is through warning his correspondent about the vanity of elite life posed from the accumulation of gold and silver that Odo shows his knowledge of the human mind.<sup>401</sup> For this *contemptus mundi* to succeed, Odo beseeches Stephen that he listens to the voice of his 'interior reason', his conscience and soul's power of 'discretion' (*discretio*) that can help him navigate between correct and incorrect uses of the temporal things – a voice that becomes all the more important given Stephen's exalted status as a member of the royal court:

For it is incredible when your reason (*ratio*), which thrives only in the oversight and management of worldly things – it is incredible – when it lies as good as dead for knowing and doing good. But perhaps your reason understands the things which are good by discernment (*discretio*), and nevertheless does not do them because pride resists. For pride controls your reason and resists it with a tyrannical law. Reason says: if you were doing this or that, you would be acceptable to God. Pride says: if you were doing this or that, you would be worthless in the sight of people. O wicked and detestable slavery, when reason, which ought to rule as the mistress, evidently obeys pride as a handmaid. I beg that reason may return to its proper freedom, pride may go out expelled from your heart, and that its place be taken by true humility, which is dear to God.<sup>402</sup>

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<sup>398</sup> Ibid, p.178.

<sup>399</sup> The recipient is unknown but Stephen of Garlande has been suggested from the content of the letter. See J. Hall, 'Introduction', in VTT 9, pp. 309-310.

<sup>400</sup> Odo of Saint-Victor, *Epistola* 6 (VTT 9, p. 334).

<sup>401</sup> Odo of Saint-Victor, *Epistola* 6 (VTT 9, p. 335-336).

<sup>402</sup> Odo of Saint-Victor, *Epistola* 6 (VTT 9, p. 338).

Odo presents neither a systematic account of the human soul nor a view of the psyche that is out of the ordinary. At the crux of Odo's Victorine psychology is 'knowing and doing good', possessing a healthy rationality to discern the good, and then a healthy affective appetite and will to choose and perform good actions – actions which lead to virtuous dispositions and habits. Here, however, it is this ordinariness which is significant. By casually referencing a Victorine theme – that of the inversion of the rule and command of reason by pride – and informing Stephen that he should seek to cultivate self-knowledge through listening to his inner man, his reason and discretion, to guard against this daily psychomachia, the *Epistola VI* reveals how commonplace these psychological doctrines were. If Odo felt he could draw upon contemporary understandings of the soul without any prior explanation or definition of its individual powers, this reveals that he knew his reader would understand and be receptive to his teachings.

#### Nicholas of Clairvaux and Peter of Celle's *Epistolae*

The letters exchanged between Nicholas and the Benedictine Peter of Celle regarding this text serve as an important reminder that the soul was a contentious area of debate.<sup>403</sup> Peter of Celle in his final letter to Nicholas of Clairvaux writes in a tone laced with sarcasm due to Nicholas' dogged persistence in the belief of Boethian unicity. Not only was Nicholas asleep when reading his last reply,<sup>404</sup> Peter scoffs, but Nicholas' alleged accusation of Peter's misreading of Claudianus Mamertus *De statu animae* in fact reflects more Nicholas' own spiritual confusion, having first started his life as a Benedictine and becoming a Cistercian only in later life.<sup>405</sup> Peter concludes that instead of love, 'torrents of vanity' (*torrentes vanitatis*) and 'speeches of excessive garrulousness' (*sermones superflue garrulitatis*) pour from Nicholas' mouth, and he should abandon his intransigence. As a consequence, Peter ends his letter with a final injunction for Nicholas to 'please write no more' (*itaque noli scribere*) to him on this matter.<sup>406</sup> Therefore, not only could debates on the soul be contentious if understood incorrectly but they also reflected the difference in particular doctrinal beliefs among monastic orders.

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<sup>403</sup> For this correspondence see Letters 49 and 51-53 in L. Wahlgren-Smith, ed. and trans., *The Letter Collections of Nicholas of Clairvaux* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 209-257. For an overview of the dispute see 'Appendix IV', pp. 289-91, in the same volume. Peter of Celle's letters have been edited separately in J. Haseldine, ed and trans., *The Letters of Peter of Celle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Letters 49-51, pp. 201-235.

<sup>404</sup> See Letter 51, Haseldine, *The Letters of Peter of Celle*, pp. 232-3: 'O sweetest one, were you sleeping when you were reading our letter? (O dulcissime, dormiebas quando epistolam nostram legebas?)'.

<sup>405</sup> Ibid, pp. 232-3.

<sup>406</sup> Ibid, p.234-5.

## Sermons

Closely related to the genre of letter writing are sermons. Sermon collections which feature psychological content were written by Bernard of Clairvaux, William of Saint-Thierry, Isaac of Stella, Aelred of Rievaulx, Baldwin of Forde, Richard of Saint-Victor, Walter of Saint-Victor and Godfrey of Saint-Victor.

### ***Libri spirituales: Soliloquies, love, grace, faith, hexamera and mysticism***

Supplementing this list were a number of other Cistercian and Victorine works that developed and integrated the psychological themes of the *De anima* within a more overtly mystical framework. Several soliloquies were written during this period such as the *Soliloquium de arrha animae* (*Soliloquy on the Betrothal-Gift of the Soul*) of Hugh of Saint-Victor. Written around 1138-40 for the brothers of Hammersleben monastery, his *Soliloquium* was his most widely read spiritual work, extant in over 500 Latin manuscripts and several languages. This treatise is a small mystical treatise which presents an inner dialogue between Soul ('Anima') and her Reason ('Ratio'). The thrust of the argument is a *contemptus mundi*: the soul must cultivate her spiritual senses as opposed to her physical senses. Closely related were William of Saint-Thierry's *Meditativae Orationes* (*Meditative Orations*) and *Prayer*.

Alongside these texts were several tractates on love where psychological content could be found: Hugh of Saint-Victor's *Quid vere diligendum sit?* (*What Truly Should be Loved?*) (c. 1130) *De laude caritatis* (*On the Praise of Charity*) and *De substantia dilectionis* (*On the Substance of Love*) (both written before 1141); William of Saint-Thierry's *De natura et dignitate amoris* (*On the Nature and Dignity of Love*) explore the affections and their role in prayer and loving God; whereas Aelred of Rievaulx's *De speculo caritatis* (*Mirror of Charity*) written around 1142, was an immensely popular treatise on love with an entire section devoted to the *affectus* (book 3.11-30). Richard of Saint-Victor's *De quatuor gradibus violentiae caritatis* (*On the Four Grades of Violent Love*), written c. 1170.

Other treatises such as Bernard of Clairvaux's *De gratia et libero arbitrio* touched upon the powers of the soul in its treatment of free will (*liberum arbitrium*). As did William of Saint-Thierry's *Aenigma fidei* and *Speculum fidei*, and Godfrey of Saint-Victor's *Microcosmus* which structured its anthropological account of man through the genre of a hexameron. Additionally, Hugh of Saint-Victor's three treatises on Noah's Ark, Richard of Saint-Victor's *De duodecim patriarchis* and *De archa mystica*, or Bernard of Clairvaux's *Commentary on the Song of Songs* brought the discussion of the soul and its capacities explicitly the domain of Cistercian and Victorine mystical experience.

## Anonymous and Pseudonymous Texts

Finally, there were several pseudonymous treatises on psychological subjects such as the soul, mind, the conscience and subjects such as self-knowledge circulating widely during the twelfth century. These texts – found in the table below – were not original in their content. They took a lot of their structure and content from significant works written by Hugh of Saint-Victor and Bernard of Clairvaux, who were commonly ascribed as the authors of several of these treatises. These texts were significant for their wide diffusion, which brought aspects of Cistercian and Victorine psychology beyond the cloister. For instance, the *De anima* ascribed to Hugh of Saint-Victor was c. 1210 has been persuasively argued to serve as the model for the English text *Sawles Warde*, which was likely created at Wigmore Abbey in or under the influence of this Augustinian house.<sup>407</sup> With the *De anima* of Pseudo Hugh of Saint-Victor we see how a treatise on psychology developed for the use of male monastics could be re-told to a female audience: the four barely personified virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice become the Four Daughters of God, invocations to ‘brothers’ (*fratres*) are removed and descriptions of female saints increased.<sup>408</sup>

Name of Text	Attribution
<i>Libellus de conscientia</i> <sup>409</sup> ( <i>Book on conscience</i> ) [also called <i>Petis a me</i> ] ( <i>You Ask from Me</i> )	Anonymous
<i>De anima</i>	Attributed to both Hugh of Saint-Victor and Bernard of Clairvaux
<i>Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis</i> ( <i>Holy Meditations on Knowledge of the Human Condition</i> ) <sup>410</sup>	Pseudo Bernard of Clairvaux
<i>De interiori domo, seu de conscientia aedificanda</i> <sup>411</sup> ( <i>On the Interior Home or on the Conscience to be Built</i> )	Pseudo Bernard of Clairvaux
<i>De spiritu et anima</i>	Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux, Isaac of Stella and Hugh of Saint-Victor

<sup>407</sup> A. Eggebroten, ‘Sawles Warde: A Retelling of *De Anima* for a Female Audience’, *Mediaevalia* 10 (1984), pp. 27-28.

<sup>408</sup> Ibid, pp. 28-44.

<sup>409</sup> PL 184, 552-560; reprinted in PL 213, 903-912.

<sup>410</sup> PL 177, 165-166; PL 184, 485-507.

<sup>411</sup> Chapters 1-49 are in PL 184, 507-552. The final chapter is found in PL 177, 165-70.

<i>Liber de stabilitate animae</i> <sup>412</sup> ( <i>Book on the Stability of the Soul</i> )	Benedictine affiliation
<i>De septem septenis</i> <sup>413</sup> ( <i>The Seven Sevens</i> )	Chartrian affiliation

Table 1. Pseudonymous Treatises on Spiritual Psychology

## Conclusion

Overall, the tradition of writings on the soul that the men of the Cistercians and Victorines contributed to are marked by their fluidity in content and genre. Alongside traditional *libri de anima*, we encounter allegories, chronicles, compilations, dialogues, doctrinal controversies, *hexaemera*, *epistolae*, medical tracts, mystical and contemplative guidebooks, philosophical disputations, poems, sermons, soliloquies and theological treatises. A *De anima* text could incorporate two or more different forms as, for example, as *De natura corporis et animae* did in providing an eclectic synthesis of theology, philosophy, medicine, ethics and mysticism all within a single, unified treatise. They were also highly specialised: William of Saint-Thierry, Aelred of Rievaulx, Isaac of Stella, Alcher of Clairvaux, Baldwin of Forde, and Arnold of Bonneval all wrote about psychology yet utilised psychology for different purposes. The same can be said of Hugh, Achard, Richard and Godfrey of Saint-Victor. Hugh was concerned with the union of the body and spirit; Achard with discriminating between soul, spirit and mind; Richard with disordered affectivity; and Godfrey wrote an anthropology that becomes a psychology. Discussions on the body, soul and mind were distinctive and tailor-made for the needs of the intended person or community.

For a medieval theologian the soul served as a Porphyrian Tree: it could be employed deductively as the starting point to descend down to the *species* of individual theological or physical controversies on the lower branches; or vice-versa, the *genus* – the nature of the soul itself – could be inductively approached through specific, tangible, problems. Aelred's *Dialogus de anima*, for example, showed how the tripartition of the soul could be used as a tool to understand the nature of the Holy Trinity:

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<sup>412</sup> PL 213, 911-929.

<sup>413</sup> PL 199, 945-64.



AELRED. It should not now be difficult to understand what we believe, namely that the Trinity in whom we profess our faith is one God and that singularity is adored in the persons, unity in the essence and equality in majesty.

JOHN. What we have proved so far about the soul opens up an easy way of understanding this reality.<sup>414</sup>

These texts, therefore, can be thought of as instructive and pedagogical. For both the Cistercians and Victorines, a better understanding of the interaction between the body and the soul with the body's *outward* moral actions and habits would allow Cistercian monks or novices at Saint Victor to better orientate themselves *internally* in spirit. When compared with the more 'advanced' mystical speculations of the two communities *libri de anima* and psychological literature can be seen as primers or textbooks in mystical theory. Bernard McGinn has argued that there a 'pattern' within Cistercian (and Victorine) thought was to write a *De anima* treatise in order to develop a theory of mysticism. Viewed in this light, these texts were of high importance: nothing less than the salvation of the soul was at stake. While redemption was a concern to all within the geopolitical boundaries of Christendom, the structure of daily life within the Cistercian monasteries and the school at Saint-Victor was distinctly orientated to this purpose. The *De anima* genre, therefore, reflects the crucial importance of overcoming original sin for these two interrelated communities. In providing a foundational answer to the call to "know thyself" – an answer that would open the floodgates to a cascade of sustained speculation of the *interior homo* – the writings on the soul provided an important conduit for the practical realisation of this aim by offering guidance on how to develop virtuous actions and habits.

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<sup>414</sup> Aelred, *De anima* (CFS 22, p. 79).

**PART 1 - THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF REASON AND  
AFFECTION IN CISTERCIAN AND VICTORINE  
EXPERIENCE**

## How Similar were Cistercian and Victorine Anthropologies?

‘Every theology... is based on the assumption that the world must have a *meaning*’, Max Weber claimed.<sup>415</sup> Theology, the ‘intellectual *rationalisation*’ of sacred beliefs exists to provide a logical system of thought that explains the existence and purpose of human beings.<sup>416</sup> This ‘meaning’ for the Cistercians and Victorines, as we shall see, was situated squarely within the distinctive theologies of divine love that were uniquely developed at this time; by viewing the soul as an image and likeness of God, these theologies had to account for anthropology: the purpose of the human condition. In the Cistercian case, Jean Leclercq has noted the development of an anthropology in the twelfth century in which God’s love for creation was married with an anthropological realisation of ‘the application to each of us, of this love.’<sup>417</sup>

Cistercian and Victorine monastic theology is often described as encompassing the subject of anthropology. The desire to use medicine and classical philosophy to try to understand the body in addition to the spirit shows a deep interest in trying to understand the unity of man. Indeed, the titles of several *De anima* treatises attest to this purpose.<sup>418</sup> The fact that William of Saint-Thierry, Hugh of Saint-Victor and Alcher of Clairvaux utilised medicine to understand the body shows their concern to reconcile the dualism of Platonic-Augustinianism they inherited by showing how the union between bodily matter and incorporeal soul came about and the purpose of its union.<sup>419</sup> To examine their texts is to try to understand what twelfth-century thinkers thought about the nature of being and the purpose of the body. The first question to be addressed, then, is how similar were the anthropologies of the Cistercians and the Victorines? And, more pressingly, what does anthropology mean?

The term *anthropologia*, the Latin precursor to our modern English word, was a neologism in the twelfth century, not being popularised until the sixteenth century. The word is widely held to be invented by Abelard as the title for a planned treatise exploring the incarnation of the ‘Man-God’, Jesus Christ. As a consequence, from the term’s original inception with Abelard, there was an intimate connection between the human – the *anthropos* (ἄνθρωπος) – and the divine, suggesting an interest in questions concerning human nature among schoolmen of twelfth-century France.<sup>420</sup> The monasteries were also contributors to

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<sup>415</sup> Max Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’, in *The Vocation Lectures: “Science as a Vocation”, “Politics as a Vocation”*, ed. D. Owen and T. B Strong and tr. R. Livingstone (Indianapolis/Cambridge, 2004), p. 28.

<sup>416</sup> Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’, p. 28 [emphasis in original].

<sup>417</sup> Leclercq, *The Love of Learning*, p. 221.

<sup>418</sup> This includes William of Saint-Thierry’s *On the Nature of the Body and the Soul*, Hugh of Saint-Victor’s *On the Union of the Spirit and Soul* and Godfrey of Saint-Victor’s *Microcosmos*.

<sup>419</sup> McGinn, *Three Cistercian Treatises on Man*, p.86-7.

<sup>420</sup> Peter Abelard, *Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos*, 3.8.2, ed. E. M. Buytaert in *Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica I*. CCCM 11 (Brepols: Turnhout, 1969), lines 176-183, p. 215.

this questioning. Hence, several historians have referred to monastic explanations of the body and the soul, and their place in the spatial and temporal order as ‘anthropology’.<sup>421</sup> The concept of ‘eschatological anthropology’, coined by the theologian and philosopher Janet Martin Soskice, helpfully elucidates some of its contours. The predominant aspect of the New Testament is its anthropological nature concerned with the exit and return (*exitus-reditus*) of man to God: exile through sin initiated through the Fall and restoration through grace and Christ’s love for mankind. As Soskice puts it, ‘anthropology in the Bible is never wholly disconnected from eschatology, nor creation from redemption, because ‘what we will be’ is not separable from what we were made to be and what we are now.’<sup>422</sup>

With the meaning of the term established, how similar, then, were the anthropologies of the Cistercians and Victorines? Perhaps the greatest advocate of this concept in Cistercian studies has been Bernard McGinn, who has written that ‘what these twelfth-century monks were really concerned about when they penned *De anima* treatises is what today we would call theological anthropology – the meaning of the human situation in the light of revelation.’<sup>423</sup> Bernard McGinn argued that the writings of William of Saint-Thierry, Isaac of Stella and the *De spiritu et anima* can be considered as a part of the same, Cistercian anthropology, inspired by the ideas of Bernard of Clairvaux. While Bernard McGinn’s study *Three Treatises on Man* remains required reading, the uncritical manner in which other scholars draw on McGinn’s notion of anthropology is problematic. I agree with the assessment of Teresa O. Pierre that his classification of Cistercian *libri de anima* is no longer fit for purpose since it artificially elides Cistercian treatises as part of the same ‘Cistercian anthropology’, all inspired by a Bernardine vision of human nature.<sup>424</sup> As we have just seen, such a view downplays developments and originality in the form, content and sources of these treatises occurring over the century. Walker’s thesis is similarly ‘built on the rejection of the theory and an affirmation

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<sup>421</sup> For example, Etienne Gilson frequently speaks of ‘Christian anthropology’. Pierre Courcelle speaks of William of Saint-Thierry’s ‘intéresse particulièrement à l’anthropologie’ (see *Connais-Toi*, vol. 3, p. 720), whereas Simo Knuuttila writes that William’s *De natura corporis et animae* ‘represents Cistercian theological anthropology’; Pierre-André Burton describes Aelred of Rievaulx’s *De anima* as ‘The Path of Anthropology’ (see Burton, ‘Appendix II’, in *Aelred of Rievaulx (1110-1167)*, p. 558). Hugh Feiss places Achard of Saint-Victor’s Sermon 9 under the rubric of ‘theological anthropology’ (Feiss, *Achard of Saint-Victor: Works*, p. 61). Alain Boureau extends anthropological thinking out of the monastery to the schools and universities when he speaks of ‘anthropologie scolastique’. (See Boureau, *De Vagues Individus*, p. 15). Finally, Boquet and Nagy refer to all theoretical speculation on the emotions (Cistercian, Victorine, Franciscan, Dominican, among others) as practically orientated ‘into the framework of a Christian anthropology or medieval “human science” program.’ (Boquet and Nagy, ‘Medieval Sciences of the Emotions’, p. 23).

<sup>422</sup> J. M. Soskice, *The Kindness of God: Metaphor, Gender, and Religious Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.181.

<sup>423</sup> B. McGinn, ‘Introduction’, *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology*, p. 76.

<sup>424</sup> Teresa O. Pierre, ‘“That We May Glorify Him In Our Bodies”: William of St. Thierry’s Views on the Human Body’ (Ph.D. Diss., University of Toronto 1997), p. 194.

of the idea... that there ever was a Cistercian school of psychology.’<sup>425</sup> In Walker’s view, McGinn’s study provides no criteria to distinguish a Cistercian anthropological school from that of other twelfth-century religious communities.<sup>426</sup>

Pierre and Walker’s criticisms of Cistercian anthropology are certainly valid. While I argue that the term anthropology when used to compare Cistercian and Victorine ways of life presents some difficulties, I go further than Pierre and Walker and advocate throughout this thesis that taking a looser definition of *De anima* to include psychological or spiritual writings adjacent to ‘traditional’ treatises on the soul broadens the source base for better understanding the place of the soul among Cistercian and Victorine communities.

Among scholarship of the Victorines, the Victorine approach to anthropology has only been subject to a systematic study in 2020 by Csaba Németh. Two important insights arise from Németh’s monograph: (1) that it is necessary to differentiate between twelfth-century views on cognition (or philosophical epistemology) and theological anthropology and the fact that ‘contemporaries used both languages, in various combinations’; and (2) that a feature of anthropological speculation was that philosophical and theological theories about the cognition of God didn’t need to be harmonised.<sup>427</sup> Together, Leclercq, Soskice, McGinn and Németh make an important claim that cannot be overstated: through the lens of anthropology the Cistercian or Victorine way of life considered the grace of prelapsarian man, his current postlapsarian fallen condition, and the future hope for bodily and spiritual purification as a single continuum.

However, the term anthropology throws up two problems which cannot be ignored. First, is its overly broad usage. While McGinn’s study remains of incontrovertible significance, as I noted in the Introduction, I agree with the assessment of Teresa O. Pierre that his classification of Cistercian *De anima* texts artificially elides treatises as diverse as William’s *De natura corporis et animae*, Aelred’s *Dialogus de anima*, Isaac’s *Epistola de anima* and Alcher’s *Liber de spiritu et anima* as part of the same ‘Cistercian anthropology’.<sup>428</sup> Christian Trottman’s recent study of Bernard of Clairvaux is rightly sceptical that the Cistercians represented a distinct ‘school’ of thought. While Aelred of Rievaulx, Garnier of Rochefort and Geoffrey of Auxerre could be said to be representative of key ‘Cistercian’ ideas, there were also Cistercians that adopted more philosophical outlooks

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<sup>425</sup> Walker, ‘From Description to Prescription’, p. 44.

<sup>426</sup> Walker, ‘From Description to Prescription’, p. 47.

<sup>427</sup> Németh, *Theological Anthropology*, p. 38.

<sup>428</sup> Teresa O. Pierre, “‘That We May Glorify Him In Our Bodies’”, p. 194.

(Isaac of Stella, Alcher of Clairvaux and Helinand of Froidmont), as well as ‘satellite’ Cistercians (William of Saint-Thierry, Alan of Lille and Joachim of Fiore) – individuals who converted to the Cistercian habit late in life.<sup>429</sup> To view all these individuals as alike, also downplays developments and originality in the form, content and sources of these treatises occurring over the century. As a corrective, Pierre helpfully proposes that ‘twelfth century texts on the soul’ is a more useful heuristic for historical analysis than ‘anthropology’ since Augustinian, Benedictine, Chartrian and Cistercian speculation on the soul shares a concern with cultivating self-knowledge or Christian Socratism.<sup>430</sup> I mostly agree with Pierre’s stance because as, I have shown in Chapter 2, I believe that the Cistercians and Victorines were united in their pursuit to write *libri de anima*; and, as we see in Chapter 4, self-knowledge was crucial to these writings.

A similar objection must be levelled at Németh’s otherwise masterful study which differentiates between Cisterican and Victorine anthropology. Victorine anthropology, Németh argues, was largely Hugonian in character. In his attempt to establish a special, distinctive role for Victorine anthropology, Németh overly ring-fences Victorine ideas from cross-pollination with Cistercian thought, and other intellectual groups of the twelfth century. For Németh, the Victorine way of life is characterised by six defining features:

- **Image and likeness:** Man’s creation *in imago et similitudo Dei* corresponds psychologically to the cognitive and affective capacities of the human soul.
- **Cognition and love are separated.** Since cognition and love are conceived as image and likeness, their operations are distinct from one another and never mix.
- **The prelapsarian state and the Fall:** Victorines argue – unlike their contemporaries, Cistercians included – that the ignorance and concupiscence disfiguring the image and likeness of the intellect and affect to God can be gradually removed in life by acquiring knowledge. The total restoration of the image and likeness is, thus, considered an achievable goal in this lifetime.
- **Overcoming the consequences of the Fall in contemplation:** Victorine writings outline two main ways of overcoming the consequences of the Fall: (1) within institutional settings and (2) individually. Communal canonical life enables moral and

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<sup>429</sup> Trottmann, *Bernard de Clairvaux*, chapter 5, 6 and 7, pp. 229-589).

<sup>430</sup> Ibid., pp. 195-6.

doctrinal development, meanwhile monastic exercises and the acceptance of the sacraments foster the love of truth and love of virtue.

- **Predisposition to contemplation.** Victorine anthropology specifies that the intellectual faculty of the soul, if specifically trained, can achieve the vision of God. This contrasts from the other contemporary views in which seeing God is only possible after death.
- **Visual Imagery of Contemplation:** Victorine authors utilise strong visual imagery to depict the cognition of God (symbols, allegory and figures).<sup>431</sup>

A key aspect of Németh's thesis is that this distinctive anthropology – spearheaded by Hugh and given different emphases by Achard, Richard, Walter and Godfrey – was eventually discarded later on. Additionally, in his PhD thesis, Németh also engages in an illuminating contrast of Cistercian and Victorine anthropology – a comparison that is curiously absent from the published monograph (perhaps due to space or a revision in thinking). To my knowledge, Németh's contrast is the most detailed of its type, the main areas of difference between the two reforming groups relate to their views concerning the relationship between love and cognition, their spiritual programme, their use of representation and literary preferences.

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<sup>431</sup> Németh, *Quasi aurora consurgens*, pp. 165-166.

Characteristic		Victorine Anthropology	Cistercian Anthropology
Love and cognition	(i.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Soul is divided into a rational and affective part.</li> <li>Reason is identified with the image of God; love is identified with the likeness of God.</li> <li>Each operates in its separate capacity although both are equally necessary to the programme of human restoration.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Soul is divided into a rational and affective part.</li> <li>Reason is not identified with the image of God; love is not identified with the likeness of God.</li> <li>The capacities of reasoning and loving are blurred but they are not equal in the programme of human restoration: love predominates.</li> </ul>
	(ii.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The cognitive part of the soul is temporarily damaged by original sin.</li> <li>It can be purified and receive the vision of God in this life.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The cognitive part of the soul is permanently damaged by original sin.</li> <li>It cannot adequately perform the cognition of God in this life.</li> </ul>
	(iii.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Love does not have a cognitive function.</li> <li>Union with God is an intellectual activity as opposed to an affective activity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Love also has a cognitive function.</li> <li>Union with God is an affective as opposed to an intellectual activity.</li> <li>Terms such as <i>affectus</i> and <i>affici</i> frequently describe this process.</li> </ul>
	(iv.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A clear distinction between knowledge and love permits an identification of the part of the soul responsible for contemplation.</li> <li>An epistemological understanding of contemplation is also possible.</li> <li>The power through which contemplation comes about (<i>oculus contemplationis/intelligentia</i>) has a stable, agreed upon meaning.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Seeing knowledge as a form of love produces uncertainty as to what 'knowledge' means since the relationship between love and knowledge is unclear.</li> <li>An epistemological understanding of contemplation is impossible.</li> <li>Terms conveying the blurring of love and knowledge (e.g., <i>intellectus amoris</i>) have no agreed upon meaning.</li> </ul>
	(v.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Holy Spirit is not conceived as divine love.</li> <li>Human beings are linked to God intellectually through Wisdom.</li> <li>Christ is associated with Wisdom.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Holy Spirit is conceived as divine love.</li> <li>Human beings are linked to God affectively through love.</li> <li>Christ, the Bridegroom, is an object to be loved and desired.</li> </ul>
Spiritual programme		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contemplation occurs through the gradual restoration of the intellectual part of the soul via the cognition of less and less material realities.</li> <li>The affective part is minimally involved.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Emphasis is placed on controlling the affective part of the soul by increasingly ensuring the proper direction of love is reached until human and divine love coincide.</li> </ul>
Uses of representation		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Images are tools for contemplation and often describe the stages of the contemplative process.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Images serve to trigger a specific emotional response in the reader.</li> </ul>
Literary preferences		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of use of the Song of Songs</li> <li>Emotions in the Song of Songs are not considered as relating to the cognitive act of uniting the soul to God.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extensive commentaries and exegesis of the Song of Songs</li> <li>Emotions in the Song of Songs are considered significant for their mystical meaning in uniting the soul to God.</li> </ul>

Table 3. Csaba Németh's Contrast between Victorine and Cistercian Anthropology.



As the above table shows, Németh has made a clear contribution to distinguishing between the features of the Victorine and Cistercian anthropological outlook. His efforts have certainly not been in vain in revealing the distinctive Victorine approach to the postlapsarian, fallen condition of mankind, in addition to his account of Victorine contemplation. Similarly, Németh is correct to locate a Cistercian literary preference for utilising the Song of Songs to develop their distinctive style of affective mysticism. Nevertheless, Németh's typology is at odds with several findings of this study.

At the general level, Németh's methodology can be called into question since his comparison is based on the generalisation of the ideas of only two 'Cistercians': Bernard of Clairvaux and William of Saint-Thierry. While Németh is conscious that this is a generalisation, in its present form, I would argue that it does not capture the full variety of Cistercian thought to be considered representative. A full assessment of the Cistercians would need to account for figures such as Aelred of Rievaulx, Isaac of Stella, Helinand of Froidmont among others.

Additionally, this in-depth study of Cistercian and Victorine psychology has shown that key aspects of Németh's portrayal of Cistercian and Victorine love and cognition misses the mark. As I have shown in chapter two, which surveyed Cistercian and Victorine psychology and their respective psychological notions of image and likeness, Németh's argument that the Victorines possessed a distinctive image and likeness theology with cognition and affect as two different and distinct acts downplays the similarities in approach between the Cistercian and Victorine psychological texts studied here. While the Cistercians certainly emphasise the soul as an image of love, both groups undoubtedly consider reason and love as made to the image and likeness of God and that these powers are capable of being restored and cleansed of their sinful inclinations. It is true that both groups consider the powers of affect and cognition to be distinct yet, as I have argued, it is a key view among both communities who, following Augustine's psychology, consider that the perceptive, contemplative and affective dimensions of life are interrelated and blurred. Neither does Németh's statement that the Cistercians do not possess an epistemology of knowledge ring true without qualification. We saw that figures such as Isaac of Stella and Alcher of Clairvaux integrate a fivefold epistemology into their definition of a key power of the soul – the *sensus* or knowledge-producing power. Similarly, while the Victorines arguably do demonstrate greater stability and precision in their definitions of Latin terms relating to intellectual activities – e.g., *cognitio*, *meditatio* and *contemplatio* – and employed specific, technical vocabulary, we have seen that definitions of the powers of the soul, particularly the

affective power, but also the intellective power, are more fluid than fixed, with different authors not only using different terminology but also demonstrating a flexible approach to the psychological schemas they adopt. Overall, these criticisms also impact upon the spiritual programmes of the two orders. I showed in the last chapter that the blurred boundaries between the affective and rational capacities of the soul highlighted a concern among both orders with teaching their recruits to control both their emotional impulses and thoughts. Finally, while Németh's remarks concerning the difference Cistercian and Victorine use of representation and literary preferences do quite accurately reflect the methodologies of each group, they arguably have less connection with the anthropological world view of the members of each religious community. Simply put, this thesis argues that the Cistercian and Victorine anthropologies share more in common than they differ.

### **Argument of Part 1**

Examining affectivity among Cistercian and Victorine religious communities presents a serious challenge: throughout the twelfth century there emerged no coherent or stable model of psychology that could be characterised as 'Cistercian' or 'Victorine'. The soul's powers could be sub-divided utilising one – or combining several – schemas taken from classical, theological or medical models. Adding a further level of complexity is that terms and concepts to describe the soul's powers are neither fixed nor used consistently. We commonly find the Latin nouns *intellectus* ('intellect'), *ratio* ('reason'), *cognitio* ('thought'), *sensus* ('knowledge') or *aspectus* ('rational sight') describing the operations of the soul's cognitive power, and *affectus* ('affectivity' / 'affect' / 'attachment' / 'desire'), *affectio* ('affection' / 'emotion'), *appetitus* ('appetite') or simply 'love' for the affective power. Medieval authors also use several different terms for a single concept, both for stylistic variety and to place different emphases. Across different writings of William of Saint-Thierry, for example, we encounter him arguing for the indiscriminate definitions of terms relating to love and affectivity (*amor/caritas/dilectio*) in one place, yet arguing that each term represents a distinct stage of the soul's affectivity and progress to God in another.<sup>432</sup> Therefore, even in works by the same individual (where a greater stability of vocabulary and concepts might be presumed), the definitions of these terms and understandings of affectivity are constantly being adapted to the format of the text and the needs of the audience.

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<sup>432</sup> In his *Expositio super Cantica canticorum* William comments on the flexible usage of *amor*, *caritas* and *dilectio* to represent human affectivity (*affectus*) See *Ex. Cant.*, Prologue 6 (PL 180, 475B-C; CFS 6, p. 8). Conversely, for love's different stages see *Ep. frat.* 2.10.235 (CCCM 88, lines 310-315, p. 276; CFS 12, p. 88).

Notwithstanding these subtleties, I suggest in this first chapter that a bi-partite distinction between the soul's affectivity and intellect, the *affectus* and *intellectus*, proved to be one of the most versatile models upon which both Cistercian monks and Victorine canons constructed theologies centred upon the 'ordering of love' (*ordinatio caritatis*) towards God. It is certainly true that the interconnected relationship between the reasoning and desiring capacities of the soul were articulated through several sets of terms. Yet no matter the combination of words, these two dimensions of human experience – associated with the mind (*mens*) and heart (*cor*), respectively – would become increasingly popular in monastic circles from the twelfth century onwards.<sup>433</sup>

As I will show in the next two chapters, both groups were key contributors to an anthropology in which thinking and feeling possessed a *complementary* significance in effecting the salvation of man's soul. By complementary, I mean that the training of a person's feeling and thinking, affectivity and cognition, perceiving and contemplating, were not mutually exclusive activities. They were, instead, understood as interconnected and coactive components of the psyche, both equally necessary to Cistercian and Victorine modes of life that saw the reformation of body and soul as two interrelated priorities necessary to the spiritual quest of redemption and salvation. In complementing each other, the *affectus* and *intellectus* are described as being more than the sum of their parts; they enhance one another, enabling new states of consciousness.

In the three chapters which follow, I show that in Cistercian and Victorine texts on the soul we find that, while the remits of emotion and thought are often separate, there is nonetheless a great degree of interaction between the two: each complementing the other's activity. I begin by exploring Cistercian contributions to psychology in chapter 1 before contrasting these with their Victorine counterparts in chapter 2. Chapter 3 concludes by setting out the dimensions of affectivity and Cistercian and Victorine anthropology.

This section is called 'between theory and practice' because the ideas Cistercians monks and Victorine canons had about psychology influenced their daily practices and behaviour. These practices can be viewed as akin to how Boddice and Smith speak of experience as 'embodied' and 'embrained' reality.<sup>434</sup> Language is necessary to this project to decipher the meaning of these psychological terms. But so are the sources that reveal the

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<sup>433</sup> McGinn has suggested that the twelfth-century trend to consider union with God as the union of knowledge and love may indicate the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius. See McGinn, 'Love, Knowledge and Mystical Union in Western Christianity: Twelfth to Sixteenth Centuries', *Church History*, 56:1 (1987), p. 8.

<sup>434</sup> Boddice and Smith, *Emotion, Sense, Experience*, p. 17.

practices or patterns of behaviour – or *habitus* – these words were connected to. Affectivity in *De anima* treatises, I conclude, should be read as a practice: a series of behaviours aimed at utilising contemporary psychological theories to inculcate positive intentions, actions and, eventually, virtuous habits in individual monks and canons. My aim here is to unpack Cistercian and Victorine understandings of the terms *sensus*, *affectus* and *intellectus* to map the contours of affectivity. In what follows, I argue that that these terms underpinned Cistercian and Victorine understandings of anthropology, and, as we shall see later, are especially connected with monastic understandings of the soul as made in the image and likeness of God and the related advice to “Know Yourself” or cultivate self-knowledge.

## CHAPTER 1 – THE COMPLEMENTARY SIGNIFICANCE OF LOVE AND REASON IN CISTERCIAN PSYCHOLOGY

### Introduction

As Jean Leclercq intimated in his *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God*, a key principle animating monastic theology from Gregory the Great onwards was that learning and knowledge were developed through love in the experiential context of communal monastic life.<sup>435</sup> Similarly, Victorine pedagogy drawn from Hugh of Saint-Victor gravitated around discipline (*disciplina*) and doctrine (*doctrina*). ‘Doctrine restores morals (hence, it is ultimately affective) and teaching educates the ignorant intellect (to perceive truth)’ resulting in virtue.<sup>436</sup> From the twelfth century, this foundational insight was increasingly emphasised and applied to psychological writings. While still using and working within Augustine’s trinitarian analogy of the soul as reason (*ratio*), will (*voluntas*) and memory (*memoria*), in the twelfth century a key development was the inclusion of the *affectus* as a power of the will, or even the will itself. As a consequence, we find a bipartite theory of the soul, comprised of a thinking and feeling component increasingly becoming more prominent. Not only did it grow in popularity, but the powers of the *affectus* and *intellectus* were imagined as having a complementary relationship in structuring the experience of everyday life for Cistercian monks and Victorine canons. What was this relationship, and how were these two powers integral to daily and spiritual experience?

### Bernard of Clairvaux

Bernard of Clairvaux was a significant innovator and authority in psychology. As an inheritor of Augustine’s thought, Bernard does on occasion utilise triads to describe the soul’s psychological structure. This includes the Platonic division of the soul into *rationabilitas*, *concupiscibilitas* and *irascibilitas* as well as the Augustinian triad of *ratio*, *voluntas* and *memoria*.<sup>437</sup> Nonetheless, Bernard was instrumental in popularising discussions of the soul as revolving around two twinned capacities: the *affectus* (the soul’s power to feel the presence of God) with the *intellectus* (the soul’s capacity to understand God’s wisdom).<sup>438</sup> The affections of love, joy, fear and sadness are found in the *affectus*, a power identical with (or

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<sup>435</sup> J. Leclercq, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God*, pp. 29-33 and 212-217.

<sup>436</sup> Porwoll, ‘Introduction’, in *Victorine Restoration*, p. 31.

<sup>437</sup> *Parabola* 5.1 (PL 183, 770B-C); *Sermo in festivitatem omnium sanctorum*, 4.5 (PL 183, 474A-B); *Gratia* 14.49 (PL 182, 1028B; CFS 19, p. 109).

<sup>438</sup> *SCC* 67.2:3 (PL 183, 1103C; CFS 40, p. 6).

sometimes, related to) the will (*voluntas*). This is not to say that the Abbot of Clairvaux's thought is consistent. In *De diligendo Deo* (*On Loving God*) Bernard speaks of how man's *sensūs* ('feelings') and *cogitationes* ('thoughts') or *animus/ratio* ('rational mind' / 'reason') are the two aspects of the mind that are corrupted by sin and become inclined to evil.<sup>439</sup> Elsewhere he uses the terms *perturbatio*, *passio* and *compassio* to refer to the emotions.<sup>440</sup> However, as Ulrich Köpf has observed, the terms *affectus* and *affectio* are Bernard's preferred terms for the emotions; *affectus* occurs some 450 times across Bernard's corpus, *affectio* around 200.<sup>441</sup>

Complicating matters are the multiple usages of these terms. Sometimes Bernard employs the term *affici* passively to represent a subject affected by an emotion; whereas *afficere* is used to show the active effect of bodily-meditated mental processes such as the generation of affections by the individual; still other times, *affectio* and *affectus* are utilised to emphasise the virtues and vices of the will, connecting the emotions with pedagogy and training the soul in virtue.<sup>442</sup> In a sermon entitled 'De intellectu et affectu' (On Intellect and Affectivity), Bernard argues that these two powers of the soul – affectivity and intellect – must be purified in order for the soul to be virtuous.<sup>443</sup>

Unfortunately, the spatial constraints of a doctoral dissertation prevent a complete assessment of Bernard of Clairvaux's understanding of psychology across his corpus. However, since Saint Bernard's influence made him a renowned authority on spiritual concerns during the Middle Ages, it is worth considering the key aspects of his psychology. To do so, the best text is Bernard's treatise on willing, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (*On Grace and Free Choice*) since Bernard wrote no treatise specifically entitled 'De anima'. Not only does *De gratia et libero arbitrio* provide a helpful entry point for understanding how the soul's affections and reasoning form different yet interconnected aspects of the will (*voluntas*), but in form it closely resembles the structure of the proto-scholastic *De anima* treatises, employing a series of definitions for the different powers of the soul, comprehensively discussing these powers, and doing so in a clear and concise way. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* thus is the ideal textbook for a new Cistercian recruit to learn about the nature of the soul, and specifically the role of the will and its relationship with God.

<sup>439</sup> *Dil. Deo*, 2.6 (PL 182, 977D; *SBO* 3, lines 7-11, p. 124; CFS 13, p. 98). The citation is a reference to Genesis 8:21.

<sup>440</sup> U. Köpf, 'Die Leidenschaften der Seele im Werk Bernhards von Clairvaux', in *Passiones animae*, pp. 94-96.

<sup>441</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>442</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

<sup>443</sup> *In Ascensione domini*, 3.2 (PL 183, 305B): 'Duo ergo sunt in nobis purganda sunt, intellectus et affectus: intellectus, ut noverit; affectus, ut vellit.'

For Bernard, the twin aspects of human nature – part-divine, part-animal – are signified by what he calls the soul’s ‘self-determining habit’ (*habitus animi liber sui*) to consent voluntarily (*consensus voluntarius*) to actions and the body’s natural appetite (*appetitus naturalis*).<sup>444</sup> It is the senses and appetite which constitute the human being’s ability to be influenced both exteriorly and interiorly. It is the role of the will to give its assent (or dissent) to these forces:

Whereas sense perception (*sensus*) is a vital movement of the body alert and outward, and natural appetite (*appetitus*), is a force in a living being, intent on getting the senses moving, consent (*consensus*), on the other hand, is a spontaneous inclination of the will (*nutus est voluntatis spontaneus*), or... a self-determining habit of the soul.<sup>445</sup>

Therefore, Bernard gives priority to the will over the ‘lower’ bodily parts of human body-soul composite, the senses and the appetite. Nonetheless, the *sensus*, *appetitus* and *consensus* become interconnected with reason, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* explains, because the will is defined as a ‘rational movement’ (*motus rationalis*). In sum, Bernard conceives of a partnership between the will and reason which governs the lower appetites of sense perception and appetite. ‘In whatever direction it [will] turns’, he says, ‘it has reason as its mate, one might say as its follower... it is never moved without reason.’<sup>446</sup> As the Abbot of Clairvaux will remark later in *De gratia*: ‘choice is an act of judgement’ (*Arbitrium quippe iudicium est*).<sup>447</sup>

In *De gratia et libero arbitrio* the human power of judgement is also embedded in a further triad of mental capacities. Those of judgement, pleasure and counsel. This triplet refers to the attention and response of the mind toward outward stimuli. ‘...it belongs to judgement to distinguish what is lawful and what not... it belongs to counsel to examine what is expedient and what not, and to pleasure to experience what is pleasant and what not’, Bernard says.<sup>448</sup> Bernard thus integrates Augustine’s *uti-frui* distinction, that is, between the ‘useful’ and ‘enjoyable’ into his psychology of mind: Judgement (identifiable with reason), counsel (identifiable with will) and pleasure (identifiable with sensuality) are all required in

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<sup>444</sup> *Gratia*, 2.2 (*SBO* 3, lines 6-13, p. 167; CFS 19, p. 55).

<sup>445</sup> *Gratia*, 2.3 (*SBO* 3, lines 25-30, p. 167; CFS 19, p. 57): ‘Sensus vero, vitalis in corpore motus vigilans et extrinsecus. Appetitus autem naturalis, vis in animante, movendis avide sensibus attributa. Verum consensus, nutus est voluntatis spontaneus, vel... habitus animi, liber sui.’

<sup>446</sup> *Gratia*, 2.3 (*SBO* 3, lines 2-6, p. 168; CFS 19, p. 58): ‘Habet sane, quocumque se volverit, rationem semper comitem et quodammodo pedissequam... quod numquam absque ratione moveatur.’

<sup>447</sup> *Gratia* 4.11 (*SBO* 3, lines 25-26, p. 173; CFS 19, p. 67).

<sup>448</sup> *Gratia* 4.11 (*SBO* 3, lines 26-28, p. 173 ; CFS 19, p. 67): ‘Sicut vero iudicii est discernere quid liceat vel non liceat, sic profecto consilii probare quid expediat vel non expedat, sic complaciti quoque experiri quid liberat vel non liberat.’

the act of discerning what is to be enjoyed and determining to what extent sensory stimuli should be enjoyed according to the tenets of Christian doctrine.

Throughout his writings, Bernard of Clairvaux confirms the superiority of the will and reason over the senses and appetites. While sense, appetite, will and reason are discrete powers, they are imbricated together in perception; and significantly, the extent to which the former three are unified with reason provides perceptual acts with moral value. As Bernard puts it in *De diligendo Deo*, the greater subtlety of the mind in contrast to the senses means that the mind

...anticipates the senses in all things and they dare not contact an object unless the mind approves its utility beforehand... The mind looks ahead for the senses and these must not pursue their desires unless the mind gives its consent.<sup>449</sup>

Following Augustine, the human will occupies a middle position for Bernard and it is 'able to go in either direction', to pursue divine Spirit or the fleshly appetite.<sup>450</sup> Yet, as a result of original sin, the affections, morally neutral in themselves, tend more towards the flesh than pursuing reason's goal – the virtue of justice and loving God. Hence, due to the Fall, the affections enable the soul's negative affectivity more so than its positive affectivity. As Bernard writes, the will 'is so weakened in its desires by the flesh that only with the Spirit constantly helping its infirmity through grace is it capable of righteousness... without that help, borne by the pull of its own weight, the will would tumble headlong down the precipice, from vice to vice. This pull would come not only from the law of sin originally implanted in its members, but from the habit of worldliness long implanted in its affections.'<sup>451</sup>

The above quotation highlights how Bernard recognises varying levels of 'deficiency' or 'weakness' (*defectus*) negatively affecting the powers of perception. As powers of the soul and body, the appetite, sense, will, memory and reason – are naturally good: they have what Bernard calls 'freedom from necessity' (*libertas necessitatis*), a freedom of operation that is not affected by original sin or the 'defects' (*defectūs*) which affect the moral standing of the

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<sup>449</sup> *Dil. Deo*, 7.20 (PL 182, 986C; SBO 3, lines 9-13, p. 136; CFS 13, p. 113): '...animus... ut illum ad omnia praeveniat; nihilque audeat contigere sensus, quod animus praecurrens ante utile non probaverit... ut videlicet ille huic provideat nec in suum votum, nisi ad illius iudicium consequatur.'

<sup>450</sup> *Gratia*, 12.41 (SBO 3, p. 195; CFS 19, pp. 98-99).

<sup>451</sup> *Gratia*, 12.41 (SBO 3, pp. 195-196; CFS 19, p. 99): 'humana voluntas... ita in appetitu infirmatur per carnem, ut nisi sedulo Spiritus adiuvet infirmitatem eius per gratiam, non solum non valeat iustitiae... sed etiam de vitio semper in vitium suo ipsius pondere devoluta ruat in praeceptis, praegravata nimirum non solum lege peccati originaliter membris insita, verum et consuetudine terrenae inhabitationis usualiter affectionibus inolita.'



soul through its habits of vice.<sup>452</sup> By contrast, human ‘freedom of pleasure’ (*libertas frui*) has been completely inverted by sin, so that it is rarely engaged with freely, so much so that Bernard surmises that it is only contemplatives who can enjoy true freedom of pleasure and ‘only in a very small part, and on the rarest occasions’.<sup>453</sup> Connected with the body, sensual pleasures are often motivated by the ‘prick of necessity’ (*urgens necessitatis*).<sup>454</sup> To be human, then, is to constantly navigate the *affectūs* of the body governing the necessities of life – imperceptible changes in hunger, thirst, temperature – that are not always willed freely. This is what Bernard refers to as ‘passive compulsion’ (*passiva compulsio*) which occurs ‘without the voluntary consent of the sufferer’ (*fieri absque consensu voluntario patientis*).<sup>455</sup> Displaying the fickleness of pleasure in the human condition, Bernard writes:

Bread is fine, but only to someone who is hungry; drink is delightful, but only to the thirsty. To the sated, food and drink are a burden, not a joy. Once hunger has been eased, bread will mean little to you; once thirst is slaked, even the most limpid stream will no more attract you than a swamp. Only those who are hot seek the shade only the cold or those in darkness hail the sun.<sup>456</sup>

Complicating this lack of freedom in pleasure is that ‘freedom of counsel’ (*libertas consilii*) – the ability to freely decide what is useful – has similarly been corrupted by original sin. True freedom of counsel belongs only to ‘a few spiritual people... who have crucified their flesh with its passions and desires’, Bernard writes.<sup>457</sup>

Clearly, the Cistercian way of life in its pursuit of virtue and the ordering of love served as Bernard’s preferred way for this faculty to be cleansed and moderated effectively. Little acknowledged is that the Abbot of Clairvaux conveys the choice open to every Cistercian monk between negative and positive affectivity through a sophisticated wordplay: monks who are morally defective suffer from some sort of mental ‘defect’, ‘failure’, ‘weakness’ or ‘fall’ (*defectus*), whereas those who are mentally restored experience ‘progress’ (*profectus*). In doing so, he thus associates the *intellectus*, and especially the

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<sup>452</sup> *Gratia*, 3.6-4.9 (*SBO* 3, pp. 170-173; CFS 19, p. 63-65).

<sup>453</sup> *Gratia*, 5.15 (*SBO* 3, lines 13-15, p. 177; CFS 19, p. 71): ‘Itaque in hac vita soli contemplativi possunt utcumque frui libertate complaciti, et hoc ex parte, et parte satis modica, viceque rarissima.’

<sup>454</sup> *Gratia*, 4.14 (*SBO* 3, p. 176; CFS 19, p. 70).

<sup>455</sup> *Gratia*, 12.40 (*SBO* 3, p. 194; CFS 19, p. 97).

<sup>456</sup> *Gratia*, 5.14 (*SBO* 3, p. 176; CFS 19, p. 67): ‘Bonus est panis, sed esurienti; potus delectat, sed sitientem; denique saturato cibus potusque iam nequaquam sunt grata, sed gravia. Tolle famem, et panem non curabis; tolle sitim, et limpidissimum fontem, ac si paludem, respicies. Similiter umbram non quaerit nisi aestuans, solem non curat nisi algens sive caligans’ [translation modified].

<sup>457</sup> *Gratia*, 4.12 (*SBO* 3, lines 24-26, p. 174; CFS 19, p. 68): ‘Nam libertas consilii ex parte, et hoc in paucis spiritualibus, qui carnem suam crucifixerunt cum vitiis et concupiscentiis.’

*affectus*, with the moral journey of each human being either ‘to fail’ (*deficere*) or ‘to progress’ (*proficere*) in loving God.

For to will the good indicates an achievement (*profectus*); and to will the bad, a defect (*defectus*); whereas simply to will denotes the subject itself which does either the achieving or the failing (*proficit vel deficit*). To this subject, however, creating grace gives existence. Saving grace gives it the achievement (*proficit*). But when it fails (*deficit*), it is to blame for its own failure.<sup>458</sup>

As Bernard makes clear, divine grace cooperates with human will to pursue positive affectivity. The orientation of the will towards God is what establishes virtue and goodness in the soul. ‘Because of our willing faculty, we are able to will; but because of grace, we are able to will the good’, Bernard writes.<sup>459</sup> This is what Bernard calls ‘active compulsion’ (*activa compulsio*) – and is equivalent to Augustine’s understanding of ‘active perception’.<sup>460</sup> The will chooses the objects to perceive and therefore imbues an ontologically neutral faculty (e.g., perception, willing, thinking) with moral connotations. Consequently, for Bernard, as with later Cistercians, good and bad perception and affectivity operate synecdochally; incorrect willing implies a privation or lack of grace, and correct willing implies the presence of God’s grace, wisdom and power. To be a ‘perfect’ (*perfectus*) thus involves willing in accordance with wisdom every time. ‘For, if to will what is evil is a defect (*defectus*) of the willing faculty’, Bernard says, ‘then undoubtedly to will what is good marks a growth (*profectus*) in this same faculty.’<sup>461</sup>

Since affectivity is contained within the orbit of the will, this *defectus/profectus* binary extends to the affections, too. Virtue production thus becomes interconnected with the Cistercian ordering of love, that is, the positive habits that produce ‘ordered affections’ (*ordinatae affectiones*).

Simply to fear is one thing, and to fear God, another; to love, one thing, and to love God, another, – since to fear and to love on their own signify affections, but, coupled

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<sup>458</sup> *Gratia*, 6.16 (*SBO* 3, pp. 177-178; CFS 19, p. 72): ‘Velle etenim bonum, profectus est; velle malum, defectus. Velle vero simpliciter, ipsum est quod proficit, vel deficit. Porro ipsum ut esset, creans gratia fecit; ut proficiat, salvans gratia facit; ut deficiat, ipsum se deicit.’

<sup>459</sup> *Gratia*, 6.16 (*SBO* 3, lines 4-5, p. 178; CFS 19, p. 72): ‘Ex ipso nobis est velle, ex ipsa bonum velle.’

<sup>460</sup> *Gratia*, 12.40 (*SBO* 3, p. 194; CFS 19, pp. 97-98).

<sup>461</sup> *Gratia*, 6.18 (*SBO* 3, lines 2-4, p. 180; CFS 19, p. 75): ‘Si enim velle malum defectus quidam est voluntatis, utique bonum velle profectus eiusdem erit, sufficere autem ad omnem quod volumus bonum ipsius perfectio.’

with the additional word “God”, signify virtues, – so also will is one thing, and to will the good, another.<sup>462</sup>

The Cistercian life, therefore, is about learning to direct a natural power (i.e., the senses, affections and reason) to the right end. As Bernard writes elsewhere: ‘Anger is a natural emotion of man, but those who abuse a good thing of nature will be grievously punished and perish miserably.’<sup>463</sup> All Cistercians must be wary of illicit and non-useful outbursts of emotion because the same affection when immoderate can create disorder in the soul: ‘love generally blots out love, so fear usually drives out fear’.<sup>464</sup>

Since, for Bernard, ‘virtues are nothing else than ordered affections’ (*...nil aliud sint virtutes nisi ordinatae affectiones*), perception and affectivity become deeply intertwined with the ethical *habitus* of the monk.<sup>465</sup> Here, Monique Scheer’s Bourdieuan conception of emotions as an active disposition capable of training is clearly applicable to Bernard’s understanding of *habitus*. In my view, however, Scheer’s thought can be taken one step further. The Cistercians (and, as we shall see, the Victorines to a lesser extent) additionally saw the practices associated with affectivity and virtue development as a form of ‘spiritual capital’ – a currency that designated and communicated an individual’s (or group’s) status to themselves and others in society.<sup>466</sup> Spiritual capital and practice theory compliments Sara Ahmed’s understanding of how emotions are imbricated with systems of power. As the meeting point between sensation and cognition, emotions attract and repel, they ‘stick’ onto things or ‘slide’ away off other things: ‘Emotions shape the very surface of bodies, which take shape through repetition of actions over time, as well as through orientations towards and away from others’.<sup>467</sup> In doing so, they bring multiple individual agents together into collectivities. Similar to spiritual capital, the emotional power of people, objects and places is ever-changing; power increases and decrease over time, depending on which feelings get impressed and stick.

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<sup>462</sup> *Gratia*, 6.16 (*SBO* 3, lines, 5-8, p. 178; CFS 19, p. 72): ‘Quemadmodum namque aliud est timere simpliciter, aliud timere Deum, et aliud amare, aliud amare Deum, – timere quippe et amare, simpliciter quidem prolata, affectiones, cum additamento autem virtutes significant, – ita quoque aliud est velle, aliud velle bonum.’

<sup>463</sup> *Sermones in quadragesima de psalmo ‘Qui habitat’*, 13.5 (PL 183, 237D; CFS 25, p. 227): ‘Nimirum affectio naturalis ira hominum est; sed abutentibus bono naturae gravis perditio est, et miseranda perniciēs.’

<sup>464</sup> *Ibid*, 13.5 (PL 183, 237D-238A; CFS 25, p. 227): ‘Sic nimirum solet amorem amor expungere, solet timor timore depelli.’

<sup>465</sup> *Gratia*, 6.17 (*SBO* 3, p. 178; CFS 19, pp. 72-73).

<sup>466</sup> This term was coined by Tomas Zahora. See ‘Affect, Affections, and Spiritual Capital in the Thirteenth Century’, in *Before Emotion*, pp. 108-110.

<sup>467</sup> S. Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), p. 4.

The clearest example of the significance of spiritual capital entangled with *habitus* and power at a large scale are the Franciscans. In the thirteenth century, the Order of Friars Minor leveraged their institution's moral rejection of luxury and commitment to the ideals of true poverty as practised by Apostles as a way to secure their position as pedagogues at schools and universities, their moral virtue making them uniquely qualified both to preach and teach.<sup>468</sup> While the Cistercians did not seek to gain the same degree of status and integration in public structures, the reforming nature of the Order with its stringent commitment to simplicity – combined with a careful propaganda campaign – certainly did give its members an air of elevated status in terms of their piety. The distinctive way of life offered by Cistercian customs, in particular the Order's claim to teach new recruits the tools of emotional regulation through harsh manual labour and the affective devotion to Christ through nuptial mysticism, attracted several people to enter the Order, notably William of Saint-Thierry and Aelred of Rievaulx, who had had successful careers as a Benedictine monk and courtier, respectively. It is no coincidence, then, that a line taken from Song of Songs 2.4 – “Set charity in order in me” (*Ordinate in me caritatem*) – would serve as Bernard's mystical justification for the Cistercian mission of ordering the affections. Ordering charity connects the practice of Cistercians to manage emotion and cultivate virtue with the mystical marriage of the soul (the Bride) to Christ (the Bridegroom) – the end goal and allure of Cistercian contemplation.<sup>469</sup>

Bernard's psychology represents the beginning of a theme that would be developed not only by the Cistercians but also the Victorines: the indivisibility of affectivity and rationality as the two interlinked dimensions by which the soul experiences the world. The idea that reason and affect inform one another is central throughout the Bernardine corpus.<sup>470</sup> Yet the flexibility of the bi-partite schema of love and reason, *affectus* and *intellectus*, is that, as suggested earlier, they can be mapped onto existing schemas of the soul. Alluding to Augustine's triad of thought, will and memory, Bernard will state at the close of *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, that it is only when (1) ‘rightness of intention’ (*intentio*) of the rational mind, (2) the ‘purity of affection’ in the *affectus* and (3) the ‘remembrance of good works’ in the memory are harmonised together that these powers restore the soul to its divine likeness.<sup>471</sup>

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<sup>468</sup> N. Senoçak, *The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order, 1209-1310* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2012), pp. 76-143 (see especially 127 and 143).

<sup>469</sup> *Gratia*, 6.17 (*SBO* 3, line 18, p. 178; *CFS* 19, p. 73).

<sup>470</sup> Köpf, ‘Leidenschaften’, pp. 116-119.

<sup>471</sup> *Gratia* 14.49 (*SBO* 3, p. 202; *CFS* 19, p. 109).

Namely, good intentions, pure affections and a memory responsive to virtue are formed through the ascetic discipline mandated by Cistercian life:

These merits are our fastings, watchings, continence, works of mercy, and other virtuous practices, by means of which as is evident, our nature is renewed every day. Our intention, bent down under the weight of earthly cares, rises again slowly from depths to heights; the affection, languishing in fleshly desires, gradually gains strength for spiritual love; and our memory, sullied by the shame of former deeds, becomes clean once more with continual good works, reaches each day a new measure of joy.<sup>472</sup>

As Bernard says, to become completely ‘perfect’ (*perfectus*) is an almost superhuman feat, requiring nothing less than ‘to measure up to every good thing that we will’.<sup>473</sup> Significantly, for Bernard, this can only be achieved through grace which perfects the soul’s two primary abilities: knowing and willing. ‘We need the twofold gift of grace’, he writes, ‘namely, true wisdom, which means the turning of the will to good, and full power, which means its confirmation in the good.’<sup>474</sup> Thus, while Cistercian practices such as fasting, manual labour, meditation and contemplation could bring order to the affections and make the soul receptive to God’s grace, true perfection in which the affections are made stable in their love was only believed to be capable after death.

### Aelred of Rievaulx

The influence of Bernard’s psychology is clear from the writings of his protégée, Aelred of Rievaulx. Aelred’s *Dialogus de anima*, *De speculo caritatis* and *Sermones* identify the Augustinian triad of reason, memory and will in the soul.<sup>475</sup> Alongside this, though, we encounter the same Augustinian-Bernardine inspired schema in positing that the two things which move the spirit as *voluntas/affectus* (‘will’ / ‘attachment’) and *ratio*.<sup>476</sup> Recalling how his mentor defined the will, Aelred states that an *affectus* is a kind of spontaneous, pleasant

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<sup>472</sup> *Gratia*, 14.49 (SBO 3, CFS 19, p. 109): ‘Ipsa sunt ieiunia nostra, vigiliae, continentia et opera misericordiae ceteraque virtutum exercitia, per quae utique constat interiorem nostrum hominem renovari de die in diem, dum et intentio terrenis incurvata curis, de imis paulatim ad superna resurgit, et affectio circa carnis desideria languens, sensim in amorem spiritus convalescit, et memoria veterum operum turpitudine sordens, novis bonisque actibus candida in dies hilaescit.’

<sup>473</sup> *Gratia*, 6.18 (SBO 3, pp. 180; CFS 19, p. 75): ‘...sufficere autem ad omne quod volumus bonum, ipsius perfectio.’

<sup>474</sup> *Gratia*, 6.19 (SBO 3, lines 5-8, p. 180; CFS 19, p. 75): ‘Ut ergo velle nostrum, quod ex libero arbitrio habemus, perfectum habeamus, duplici gratiae munere indigemus, et vero videlicet sapere, quod est voluntatis ad bonum conversio, et pleno etiam posse, quod est eiusdem in bono confirmatio.’

<sup>475</sup> *Sermo* 75.12-13 (CCCM 2B, p. 272; CFS 80, p. 343).

<sup>476</sup> *Spec. car.* 3.10.30 (PL 195, 587C; CCCM 1, lines 546-548, p. 119; CFS 17, p. 240); *Dial. an.* 2.27 (CCCM 1, lines 396-397, p. 716; CFS 22, p. 87).

inclination of the spirit towards someone' (*Est igitur affectus spontanea quaedam ac dulcis ipsius animi ad aliquem inclinatio*).<sup>477</sup> Similarly, in *Sermo* 51 an *affectio* is defined as 'a spontaneous inclination of the mind to someone, accompanied by pleasure' (*Affectio est... spontanea quaedam mentis inclinatio ad aliquem cum delectatione*).<sup>478</sup> Upon first glance the 'spontaneity' of affect, then, appears to be its defining character. Unlike Bernard, affectivity is less associated with ingrained habits but is reactive, seemingly uncontrolled, and hence more in-keeping with modern notions of affect.

A closer look at Aelred's understanding of affectivity reveals a much more sophisticated view of the will. Affectivity operates on a sliding scale ranging from the most sensual and emotional inclinations of the will (and hence more reactive to bodily conditions and less consciously controlled by thought) to those that are more 'rational' in character (and thus more controlled and rooted in conscious thoughts and habit). For instance, love according to Aelred loses its emotionality when we love according to reason alone. Love of enemies is an example of this, Aelred suggests, 'as we love our enemies not from spontaneous mental inclination, but in accordance with the command imposed by precept.'<sup>479</sup> It is here that Aelred goes furthest in placing the *affectus* as a power independent of reason and, even independent of the will to some extent, 'as sometimes this inclination comes about in the mind against a person's will, with the reason wholly opposed to it' yet when it causes both reason and will to consent 'attraction passes over into love'.<sup>480</sup> By recognising that the *affectus* could compete with the will and reason, Aelred is widely understood to have been advocating for his own tripartite model of the soul, comprising affectivity, will and reason.<sup>481</sup>

Stressing the independence of the *affectus* was the Abbot of Rievaulx's greatest innovation to the field of affectivity. This achievement can, however, be broken down into two distinctive contributions. First, his portrayal of the *affectus* is intimately linked with the senses, emphasising the connection of affectivity with the body. In the second book of *Dialogus de anima*, the 'attachments' (*affectūs*) of the soul are argued to reflect the inclination of the will. The will, Aelred says, can be understood in two ways: by nature (*natura*) and by its attachment (*affectus*).<sup>482</sup> By nature, the will's ability to make decisions is always good yet 'the use of it,

<sup>477</sup> *Spec. car.* 3.11.31 (PL 195, 587D; CCCM 1, lines 361-362, p. 119; CFS 17, p. 241).

<sup>478</sup> *Sermo* 51.5 (CCCM 2B, lines 50-51, p. 41; CFS 80, p. 52).

<sup>479</sup> *Spir. am.* 3.2 (DOML 71, pp. 90-91).

<sup>480</sup> *Sermo* 51.5 (CCCM 2B, lines 51-54, p. 41; CFS 80, p. 52): 'Haec mentis inclinatio aliquando fit in mente contra hominis voluntatem, ratione ei per omnia resistant; provocat tamen et voluntatem et rationem ut consentiant, et sit affectio transit in amorem.'

<sup>481</sup> Boquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, p. 145.

<sup>482</sup> *Dial. an.*, 2.25 (CCCM 1, lines 338-341, p. 715; CFS 22, p. 85).

which proceeds from the *affectus* (*ex affectu*) to which it is inclined (*afficitur*), can be good or bad.’<sup>483</sup> It is the faculty of sensation, particularly sight, that receives the fullest treatment in connection to the will. ‘Sight is a good gift of nature and it can never be anything else but good’, Aelred writes, ‘but to look upon a woman to lust after her can never be anything else but bad.’<sup>484</sup> Thus, even ‘a look’ (*aspectus*) becomes morally charged due to its interaction with man’s emotional/willing faculty.<sup>485</sup> Examples of ‘impure looks’ (*impudicus aspectus*) the *De anima* relate include those directed at Susanna (Dan 13:8), those of Holofernes (Judith 10:17), Ahab (1 Kings 21:16), and those directed at Joseph by his brothers (Gen. 37: 19-20).<sup>486</sup> By contrast, those who regard the poor with a kindly eye, gaze intently on the cross or feel compassion for Sacred Scripture use their will in a meritorious fashion.<sup>487</sup> These examples serve to demonstrate the sympathetic relationship between the senses, the affective capacity of man and the three faculties of the soul: reason, memory and will. As Aelred himself observes: ‘You see, then, that in order for a man to act well or ill two faculties must work at the same time, reason and will.’<sup>488</sup> ‘Free choice’ (*liberum arbitrium*) is produced from the psychological partnership of reason and will, echoing Aelred’s earlier *De speculo caritatis*.<sup>489</sup>

An important consequence of Aelred’s spiritual psychology, then, is that the delight felt by the senses and the affections are always linked to the will. An *affectus*, he says:

...comes about sometimes through sight, sometimes through hearing, sometimes even through one’s duty. For when we see someone whose face is cheerful, whose behaviour is charming, whose conversation is agreeable, and who inspires respect in all things, our mind is at once drawn to that person by a delightful attraction. We experience the same kind of feeling when the praises of someone’s virtues and sanctity are sung to us. And we find the same thing happening when we try to be the first in showing dutiful attention to one another.<sup>490</sup>

<sup>483</sup> Ibid, 2.25 (CCCM 1, lines 344-345, p. 715; CFS 22, p. 85): ‘At usus eius, qui procedit ex affectu quo afficitur, et malus esse potest et bonus.’ My translation differs from Talbot’s to emphasise Aelred’s use of *affectus*.

<sup>484</sup> Ibid, 2.25 (CCCM 1, lines 352-4, p. 715; CFS 22, p. 85): ‘Certe bonum naturae visus est, et numquam potest esse non bonum. Videre autem mulierum ad concupiscendum eam malum est, et nunquam potest esse non malum.’

<sup>485</sup> Ibid, 2.26 (CCCM 1, lines 359-60, p. 715; CFS 22, p. 68).

<sup>486</sup> Ibid, 2.26 (CCCM 1, lines 460-376, pp. 715-16; CFS 22, p. 86).

<sup>487</sup> Ibid, 2.27 (CCCM 1, lines 377-381, p. 716; CFS 22, p. 86).

<sup>488</sup> Ibid, 2.27 (CCCM 1, lines 397-398, p. 716; CFS 22, p. 86): ‘Vides ergo ut homo bene faciat vel male, duo simul operari, rationem et voluntatem.’

<sup>489</sup> Ibid, 2.28 (CCCM 1, lines 414-416, p. 716; CFS 22, p. 87).

<sup>490</sup> *Sermo* 51.5 (CCCM 2B, lines 54-61; CFS 80, p. 52): ‘Euenit autem haec mentis inclinatio, quam affectionem dicimus, aliquando ex visu, aliquando ex auditu, nonnumquam autem ex officio. Cum enim videmus hominem vultu hilarem, moribus suauem, sermon iocundum, in omnibus verecundum, statim ad eum animus cum dulci quodam inclinatur affectu. Sentimus id ipsum cum alicuius nobis virtus sanctitasque laudatur. Agitur hoc idem in nobis cum nos mutuis praeuenimus officiis.’

Sights and sounds can delight the mind and cause an inner inclination to these outer stimuli all ‘at once’ (*statim*), creating a synaesthetic attachment to objects of perception.

Nonetheless, these same sensory stimuli can operate in isolation, too. As Aelred states in *De amicitia spirituali*, there is a form of love ‘from affection alone, when someone because of merely corporeal attributes, for example, beauty, strength, or eloquence, bends the affection of certain people to himself.’<sup>491</sup> Therefore, for Aelred, the different *affectūs* sit on a sliding scale with regard to their origin: some are nearly entirely simulated by bodily senses, whereas others are motivated more by reason.

This leads to Aelred’s second, and more significant, contribution. Across his writings he presents a consistent and systematic classification of the *affectus*. This can be seen in the quote above where Aelred identifies three *affectūs*: ‘dutiful’ (*officialis*), ‘physical’ (*carnalis*) and ‘rational’ (*rationalis*). These are supplemented in *De speculo caritatis* and *De amicitia spirituali* by three further forms of attraction or attachment – ‘natural’ (*naturalis*), ‘irrational’ (*irrationalis*) and ‘spiritual’ (*spiritualis*) – to give a total of six main types of *affectus* (see Table 4).<sup>492</sup>

No.	<i>Affectus</i>	Description
1	Spiritual ( <i>spiritualis</i> )	The soul stirred up by the Holy Spirit
2	Rational ( <i>rationalis</i> )	Reflection on another person’s virtue
3	Irrational ( <i>irrationalis</i> )	When inclined to someone’s defects
4	Dutiful ( <i>officialis</i> )	Affection through service or deference
5	Natural ( <i>naturalis</i> )	The bond between relatives
6	Physical ( <i>carnalis</i> )	Attraction to beauty

Table 4. Aelred’s Taxonomy of the *affectus*.

<sup>491</sup> *Spir. am.* 3.2 (DOML 71, pp. 90-91): ‘Ex solo affectu, quando aliquis ob ea quae sola corporis sunt, verbi gratia pulchritudinem, fortitudinem, facundiam, sibi quorundam inclinat affectum.’

<sup>492</sup> The full six feature in *De speculo caritatis*, 3.11.31-3.15.38 (PL 195, 587D-590D; CCCM 1, pp. 119-123; CFS 17, p. 241-247). In *De spirituali amicitia* spiritual affection is omitted. See *Spir. am.* 3.2 (DOML 71, pp. 90-91).



Moreover, these six *affectus* as a group can be hierarchically differentiated with spiritual affection serving as the most praiseworthy *affectus* and physical affection as the least exalted. The perceptive faculties are also involved in this hierarchy, too: the intellect (*intellectus*), the power of seeing God, ought to rule the soul's reason and sense perception.<sup>493</sup> However, much like Bernard, in both the *De speculo caritatis* and *Dialogus de anima*, the *affectus* is never an autonomous actor in perception. Rather, it is the *affectus*' powers of attachment in tandem with *ratio* that constitutes the soul's 'free choice' or *liberum arbitrium*.<sup>494</sup> The power of willing and each *affectus* of the soul is neutral in itself. The will only gains moral value 'according to attachment' (*secundum affectum*) and 'how it is inclined' (*secundum quod afficitur*).<sup>495</sup> Drawing on Bernard of Clairvaux's *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, Aelred states that while the will's nature is only ever good, 'the use of it, which depends on the attachment to which it is inclined, can be good or bad... the man who pursues good uses this will well, whereas the man who is bent on evil uses his will badly.'<sup>496</sup> Consequently, sinning for Aelred is a form of negative affectivity: an attraction – or motion – away from God. 'A sin may be defined in other words as a spontaneous movement of the will away from the Creator and towards the creature', the *Dialogus de anima* relates, consciously inverting Aelred's own earlier definition of an *affectus*.<sup>497</sup> Consequently, more so than Bernard, affectivity forms the lynchpin of Aelred's anthropological view of mankind.

### William of Saint-Thierry

William of Saint-Thierry's investigation of the soul in *De natura corporis et animae* is markedly different in genre and scope to Bernard and Aelred's due to its medical and natural philosophical character. He begins not with the soul and its bipartition or tripartition but with the body's composition from the four elements. In *De natura corporis* the operations of the four humours inside the body, called 'the offspring of the elements' (*fili elementorum*), mirror the actions of the four terrestrial elements.<sup>498</sup> This macrocosmic-microcosmic parallel

<sup>493</sup> *Sermo* 34.18 (CCCM 2A, lines 152-161, p. 283; CFS 77, p. 56); *Sermo* 75.8 (CCCM 2B, lines 63-66, p. 271; CFS 80, p. 341).

<sup>494</sup> *Spec. car.*, 1.9.29 (CCCM 1, lines 420-435, p. 24; CFS 17, p. 103); *Dial. an.* 2.32 (CCCM 1, lines 474-475, p. 718; CFS 22, p. 90).

<sup>495</sup> *Dial. an.*, 2.24 (CCCM 1, p. 715; CFS 22, p. 85).

<sup>496</sup> *Gratia*, 4.10 (SBO 3, p. 173; CFS 19, p. 66; *Dial. an.* 2.24 (CCCM 1, lines 344-345, p. 715; CFS 22, p. 85): 'At usus eius, qui procedit ex affectu quo afficitur, et malus esse potest et bonus... Itaque bono hoc, id est voluntate, bene utitur qui bonum vult, quo nihilominus male utitur qui malum vult [translation modified].'

<sup>497</sup> *Dial. an.*, 2.47 (CCCM 1, p. 724; CFS 22, p. 99): 'Potest etiam dici peccatum aliis verbis hoc ipsum, id est, spontanea inclinatio voluntatis a Creatore ad creaturam.'

<sup>498</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 11 (PL 180, col. 698C; Lemoine, p. 81; CCCM 88, p. 107; CFS 24, 1.3, p. 108).

allows the Cistercian to establish several correspondences centred on the number four. As Table 5 shows, the four elements, qualities, humours and ages of man form corresponding quaternities with each other.<sup>499</sup> William even goes as far to harmonise the five senses (touch, taste, smell, hearing and sight) within the fourfold schema of the elements. (To do so he makes use of a creative solution: smell and hearing use the same medium – that of air – to operate). Similarly, the four humours are apportioned four corresponding locations where they are purged from the body.<sup>500</sup> The formation of the humours from digested material is accomplished through four corresponding virtues or ‘powers’ of the stomach, as stated in the *Pantegni*: the appetitive (*appetitiva*), retentive (*contentiva*), digestive (*digestiva*) and expulsive (*expulsiva*).<sup>501</sup> Likewise, the body’s functions as a whole, are carried out by four organs and their powers. This grouping encompasses the genitalia (reproductive power), the liver (natural power), the heart (spiritual power) and the brain (sensitive power).<sup>502</sup> Overall, these fourfold bodily analogies blend into the quaternities of the mind: the four affections – joy (*gaudium*), hope (*spes*), sadness (*tristitia*) and fear (*timor*) – which, when ordered, bring forth the four classical virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice.<sup>503</sup>

Element	Earth	Water	Air	Fire
Quality	Dry + Cold	Cold + Wet	Wet + Hot	Hot + Dry
Humour	Black Bile	Phlegm	Blood	Red Bile
Sense	Touch	Taste	Smell / Hearing	Sight
Age of Man	Old Age	Debility	Adolescence	Young Manhood
Place of Humoral Purgation	Spleen (via eyes)	Kidneys (via nose + mouth)	Bladder (via urine)	Ears
Natural Power	Appetitive ( <i>appetitive</i> )	Retentive ( <i>contentiva</i> )	Digestive ( <i>digestiva</i> )	Expulsive ( <i>expulsiva</i> )
Bodily Organ	Genitalia	Liver	Heart	Brain
Bodily Power	Reproduction	Retention	Vivification	Sensation
Affection	Hope ( <i>spes</i> )	Joy ( <i>gaudium</i> )	Fear ( <i>timor</i> )	Sadness ( <i>tristitia</i> )
Virtue	Prudence ( <i>prudentia</i> )	Temperance ( <i>temperantia</i> )	Fortitude ( <i>fortitudo</i> )	Justice ( <i>iustitia</i> )

<sup>499</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 46-47 (PL 180, col. 707A-707C; Lemoine, pp. 121-123; CCCM 88, p. 119; CFS 24, 1.10, p. 122).

<sup>500</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 17 (PL 180, col. 700A; Lemoine, p. 89; CCCM 88, p. 109; CFS 24, 1.3, p. 111).

<sup>501</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 7 (PL 180, col. 697C; Lemoine, p. 77; CCCM 88, p. 105; CFS 24, 1.2, p. 107).

<sup>502</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 7 (PL 180, col. 697C-697D; Lemoine, p. 77; CCCM 88, p. 105; CFS 24, 1.2, p. 107).

<sup>503</sup> *Nat. an.*, 88 (PL 180, col. 718A-718B; Lemoine, p. 175; CCCM 88, p. 134; CFS 24, 2.8, p. 139).

Table 5. Harmonies of Four in William of Saint-Thierry's *De natura corporis et animae*.

The abbot of Saint-Thierry's *De anima* treatise noticeably doesn't use the terms *affectus* and *affectio* much, nor does it explicitly name the *affectus* as a power of the soul, despite the noun *affectus* being a central term across his wider spiritual oeuvre and used frequently in a psychological context.<sup>504</sup> Instead, here William prefers a tripartite division of the soul's powers into *concupiscibilitas* ('concupiscibility' / 'desiring power'), *irascibilitas* ('irascibility' / 'fleeing power'), and *rationabilitas* ('rationality').<sup>505</sup> Having three powers enables the soul to be connected with other triads in the body as well as displaying the soul's similarity to the Holy Trinity (see Table 6). Nonetheless, despite not employing a bipartite distinction between reason and love, affectivity, I would argue, is still central to *De natura animae*'s psychological system.

Organs	Liver	Heart	Brain
Linked Organs / Organ Subdivisions	Gall Bladder	Lungs	Anterior Lobe (sensation + imagination)
	Spleen	Tissues of the Chest	Middle Lobe (reason + discernment)
	Kidneys	Muscles of the Chest	Posterior Lobe (memory + movement)
Spirit	Natural ( <i>naturalis</i> )	Spiritual ( <i>spiritualis</i> )	Animal ( <i>animalis</i> )
Platonic Faculties	Irascibility ( <i>irascibilitas</i> )	Concupiscibility ( <i>concupiscibilitas</i> )	Rationality ( <i>rationabilitas</i> )
Virtue	Faith ( <i>fides</i> )	Hope ( <i>spes</i> )	Charity ( <i>caritas</i> )
Augustine (I)	Thinking	Loving	Willing
Augustine (II)	Deliberation ( <i>consilium</i> )	Memory ( <i>memoria</i> )	Will ( <i>volutas</i> )
Quality of Bodies	Measure	Number	Weight
Chain of Being	Bodies	Soul	God
Holy Trinity	Father	Son	Holy Spirit

Table 6. Harmonies of three in William of Saint-Thierry's *De natura corporis et animae*

<sup>504</sup> The majority of William's references to *affectus* come in the second, less-medical, book of his treatise. See the 'Index Verborum' in Lemoine, *Guillelmus de Sancto Theodorico*, p. 222.

<sup>505</sup> *Nat. an.*, 89 (PL 180, col. 718B; Lemoine, p. 177; CCCM 88, p. 134; CFS 24, 2.8, p. 139).

Affectivity, for example, features in William's discussion of the affections of anger and charity. While it would seem that anger and charity are diametrically opposed, William instead argues, much like Bernard and Aelred, that the affections of the soul can be characterised by two states: one positive that utilises reason and is appropriate for rational beings, and one negative displaying a lack of reason and the similarity of human beings to animals. As William remarks:

...it is a certain fervour of spirit that gathers this diversity into one; there is fervour in anger and fervour in charity. But I do not speak of beastly anger, but rather of human or rational anger. For there is beastly anger, and there is a rational anger. Rational anger is divided into two kinds, zeal and discipline. Hence this habit of mind is nothing other than love of God and neighbour and hatred of vice... Beastly anger is divided into three kinds: fury... madness... [and] "coitus"... Therefore, just as the life of the body is controlled and preserved by the powers in the liver, the heart, the brain, and the effects of these powers, as has been said, so virtues control and preserve the life of the spirit.<sup>506</sup>

In the process, William subscribes to Augustine's view that an affection (*affectio*) is neutral in itself and that emotions only take on moral significance when directed by an intention or habit of mind.<sup>507</sup> Consequently, anger is not a bad emotion per se. Rather, when anger is guided by reason it is rational, rendered beneficial through the virtues of zeal and discipline. But when reason is absent, anger slides away from moderation and becomes bestial or harmful. As such, the soul's affectivity in preserving spiritual life through Christian virtues (namely, the love of God and hatred of vice) is analogous to the role of the bodily virtues (*virtutes*) or powers which preserves the life of the body.

More so than any other Cistercian *libri de anima*, William's *De natura corporis et animae* thus attempts to present a unified view of the body and soul. The body affects the soul and, vice-versa, soul affects body. This is made clear through William's emphasis on how deficiencies and superfluities in the powers sustaining the health of the body equally can

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<sup>506</sup> Ibid, 90-91 (PL 180, col. 718C-719A; Lemoine, p. 177-179; CCCM 88, p. 135; CFS 24, 2.8, p. 140): 'Sed hanc diversitatem fervor quidam spiritus colligit in unitatem, quia fervor in ira, fervor in charitate est. Non autem hanc iram dico bestialem, sed humanam, rationalem. Est enim ira rationalis, et est ira bestialis. Rationalis in duo dividitur, in zelum et disciplinam. Est autem hinc habitus mentis non aliud quam amor Dei et proximi, odiumque vitiorum... Sicut ergo in hepate, in corde, in cerebro, suae virtutes, ut dictum est, et virtutum effectus corporalem vitam administrant et tuentur, sic ista spiritualem.'

<sup>507</sup> The terms *affectus* and *affectio* have several meanings and uses across William's corpus but in general relate to the perfection of human action and devotion, and the experience of God's grace and presence. See W. Zwingmann, 'Ex affectus mentis: Über die Vollkommenheit menschlichen Handelns und menschlicher Hingabe nach Wilhelm von St. Thierry', *Cîteaux* 18 (1967), p. 5-37; *Id.*, 'Affectus illuminanti amoris: Über das Offenbarwerden der Gnade und die Erfahrung von Gottes beseligender Gegenwart', *Cîteaux* 18 (1967), p. 193-226.

affect the theological virtues sustaining the health of the soul. If the powers of the liver, heart and brain

are impeded in their various operations, either from weakness due to defects (*ex remissione defectuum*) or strain due to excess (*ex superfluitatis intentione*), and the body suffers or becomes infirm, so also can the virtues be affected. An affected rationality (*rationalitas*) often produces of itself presumption, heresies, and the like; concupiscibility (*concupiscibilitas*), concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes and the pride of life; and irascibility (*irascibilitas*), beastly anger, cruelty and hatred.<sup>508</sup>

In this passage, William's line of argument is thus very close to that of Bernard by emphasising the role of a specific 'defect' (*defectus*) in harming the soul's affectivity and cultivation of virtue. William instead uses the Galenic medical view of a harmonious body to show how imbalances of the body's powers can directly cause the psychological powers to change from a state of humoral balance (*eucrasia*), altering emotions like anger from a positive, 'rational' condition to a negative condition (*dyscrasia*), on par with animals and beasts rather than human beings. In doing so, *De natura corporis et animae* stresses the connection between a healthy body, rationality and affectivity.<sup>509</sup>

Moreover, the significance of the dual capacities of loving and knowing appear in a more subtle way near the end of William's treatise. Here, the Abbot of Saint-Thierry follows Augustine's *De quantitate animae* in specifying seven grades of the soul's ascent to God: the initial four comprising life, sensation and appetite, memory and rejection of the world. The fifth and sixth steps represent a combination of the purification and strengthening of the soul's affective and cognitive capacities in preparation for the final, permanent state of the soul: peace in the vision of God and enjoyment of supreme goodness.<sup>510</sup> This same sevenfold Augustinian model would later be found in the *De spiritu et anima*.<sup>511</sup>

We must turn to William's other theological works, especially his writings on love, for a fuller treatment of affectivity. In the prologue to *De diligendo Deo*, William argues that

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<sup>508</sup> Ibid., 92 (PL 180, col. 719A; Lemoine, p. 179; CCCM 88, p. 135; CFS 24, 2.8, p. 140) 'Sed et sicut illa vel ex defectuum suorum remissione, vel ex superfluitatis intentione, operationum suarum diversa patiuntur impedimenta, quae sunt passiones corporis, sive infirmitates, sic et ista. Rationalitas enim corrupta saepe de se generat praesumptiones, haereses, et his similia. Concupiscibilitas concupiscentiam carnis, concupiscentiam oculorum, superbiam vitae; irascibilitas iram bestialem, truculentiam, odium. Nunc de sensibus videamus.'

<sup>509</sup> For more on William's use of the term *eucrasia* see my dedicated study 'Healthy Body, Healthy Mind: *Eucrasia* and *sanitas* in the Medical Approaches to Affectivity of William of Saint-Thierry and Richard of Saint-Victor', *Cîteaux – Commentarii Cistercienses*, 73 (2022), pp. 47-99.

<sup>510</sup> *Nat. an.*, 14 (CFS 24, pp. 147-150).

<sup>511</sup> *DSA*, 61 (PL 40, 825-826; CFS 24, pp. 277-279).

‘love is a power of the soul, leading her by a kind of natural gravity to her place or destination’ (*Est quippe amor vis animae naturali quodam pondere ferens eam in locum vel finem suum*).<sup>512</sup> The soul was created in the middle state yet its natural inclination is upwards to God and the celestial and spiritual realm; the body, meanwhile, is inclined earthward, bringing the human being downward to the level of animals. ‘Now although, according to the order due by nature, their spirit ought to be led upwards by its own natural gravity (*pondus*), by its own love to the God who created it, the person who is humiliated by the allurements of the flesh does not understand; comparable to stupid animals, he has become like them.’<sup>513</sup>

*Pondus* is a term Augustine had used in *Confessiones* 13.9.10.

Natural gravity or *pondus* is very significant because it captures William’s view of the ascent or descent of the soul. William’s *De natura animae* speaks of how the *pondus caritatis* or ‘weight of divine love’ unites the soul to God, re-forming the soul’s image and likeness to God’s own – ‘the Form that gives form’.<sup>514</sup> As William points out, it is natural that the soul should move upwards (via positive affectivity) to God, whereas the body, after death, will decay and decompose.<sup>515</sup> Yet in humans that cultivate negative affectivity, that is, they abuse the power of love, then the heart – the seat of the affective powers – sinks down into the body:

Yes, the heart naturally has been placed by the Author of nature in the narrow and central part of the body where it may govern and regulate the fortress of the higher senses and the lower body, the common folks, as it were, the whole territory of thought and action round about. Melting at the fire of fleshly concupiscence into some degenerate softness, [the heart] flows into the viscera and into the core of these organs. This is to say, it relishes only the things which are visceral. And from this visceral part, [the heart] sinks even into lower parts; it confuses everything, causes everything to degenerate, adulterates everything and perverts the natural *affectus* of love into some animal appetite of the flesh.<sup>516</sup>

<sup>512</sup> *Dil. deo.* (CCCM 88, p. 177; Davis, p. 47).

<sup>513</sup> *Dil. deo.* (PL 184, 381B-C; CCCM 88, 2, p. 178; Davis, ‘prologue’, 2 p. 49-50): ‘Quippe cum debito naturae ordine, spiritus eorum naturali pondere suo, amore suo sursum ferri deberet ad Deum qui creavit eum; carnis humiliatus illecebris, non intellexit, et comparatus jumentis insipientibus similis factus est illis.’

<sup>514</sup> *Nat. an.* (CFS 24, 2.11 p. 145).

<sup>515</sup> *Dil. deo.* (PL 184, 380C; Verdeyen, 1, p. 177; Davis, ‘prologue’, 1, p. 48)

<sup>516</sup> *Ibid* (PL 184, 381C-D; CCCM 88, 2, p. 178-179; Davis, p. 50): ‘In angusta quippe corporis parte cor locatum (ubi quasi medium, superiorum sensuum arcem, et corporis inferioris, sicut populi humilioris quasi quamdam regeret et dispensaret rempublicam, totamque circumquaque cogitatum et actionum regionem) ad concupiscentiae carnalis ignem degenerare quadam mollitie liquescens, totum defluxit in ventrem, et in medium ventris; videlicet non sapiens nisi ea quae ventris sunt, et de ventre in ventris inferiora, omnia confundens, omnia degenerans, omnia adulterans, amoris naturalem affectum pervertens in brutum quemdam carnis appetitum.’

Across William's oeuvre we find more concrete assertion of the indivisibility of the soul's loving and rational capacities. In his *Meditatio* 2, William complains of being 'absent from God in mind and heart' (*ego cogitatione vel affectu sum absens*).<sup>517</sup> Whereas in *De natura et dignitate amoris* (*On the Nature and Dignity of Love*), the interconnection between these two powers is expressed through the metaphor of human eyesight. As the two eyes of the soul, *amor* and *ratio* are considered as different aspects by which the soul experiences God through *caritas*:

The sight for seeing God, the natural light of the soul therefore, created by the Author of nature, is charity (*caritas*). There are, however, two eyes in this sight, always throbbing by a sort of natural intensity to look toward the light that is God: love (*amor*) and reason (*ratio*). When one attempts to look without the other, it does not get far. When together they help one another, they can do much...<sup>518</sup>

Later in his treatise, William would go on to extend this organic analogy to the human sensorium in totality. For him, the five bodily senses (*sensūs corporales*) are mirrored by the equivalent 'senses of love' (*sensūs amoris/affectus*). the passage is worth quoting in full to show how William's holistic view of body and soul in the *De natura corporis et animae* extended far into his more explicitly spiritual writings. He writes that:

The soul likewise possesses her own senses; she possesses her own sight or eye by which she sees God. For as the body has its five senses by which it is joined to the soul by the instrumentality of life, so, too, the soul has her five senses by which she is joined to God by the instrumentality of charity...

This demonstrates how we become old through the senses of the body and are conformed to this world, but through the senses of the mind we are renewed to the recognition of God, in newness of life, according to God's will and pleasure. There are five animal or physical senses by which the soul sensitises the body. If I may begin from the bottom one, they are: touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight. Similarly, there are five spiritual senses by which charity enlivens the soul; they are: physical love—that is, love of parents—social love, natural love, spiritual love, and the love of God. By the instrumentality of life, the body is joined to the soul through these five

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<sup>517</sup> *Med. orat.* 2 (PL 180, 208D; CFS 3, 2.2, p. 96).

<sup>518</sup> *Nat. dig.*, 21 (PL 184, 393A; CCCM 88, p. 21; CFS 30, p. 77): 'Visus ergo ad videndum Deum naturale lumen animae, ab auctore naturae creatus, caritas est. Sunt autem duo oculi in hoc visu, ad lumen quod Deus est videndum naturali quada, intentione semper palpitantes, amor et ratio. Cum alter conatur sine altero, non tantum proficit; cum invicem se adjuvant, multum possunt...'

senses of body. Through the instrumentality of charity, the soul is joined to God by these five spiritual senses.<sup>519</sup>

Consequently, while William's *De anima* treatise doesn't include a systematic classification of the affections of the soul, it is clear from *De natura et dignitate amoris* that the Abbot of Saint-Thierry shared Aelred's concern for creating a hierarchical model of the different affectivities available to human perception. Perception is an appropriate term here since William concatenates his typology of affectivity with the popular view of the senses as ordered according to purity: touch is the most base, animalistic sensation whereas sight functions as the noblest, most spiritual sense. Table 7 below shows these correspondences as well as the sacramental significance William attaches to them.<sup>520</sup>

	Type of <i>sensus</i>				
	Touch	Taste	Smell	Hearing	Sight
<b>Type of <i>amor/affectus</i></b>	Love of parents ( <i>amor parentum</i> )	Social love ( <i>amor socialis</i> )	Natural love ( <i>amor naturalis</i> )	Spiritual love ( <i>amor spiritualis</i> )	Divine love ( <i>amor divinus</i> )
<b>Sense Organ</b>	[Skin]	Mouth	Nose	Ears	Eyes
<b>Sacrament</b>	Everyone	Christ	Prophets	Patriarchs	Angels
<b><i>Animalis/spiritualis</i></b>	Most animal	Animal and spiritual	More spiritual than animal	Spiritual	Most spiritual

Table 7. William of Saint-Thierry's Five Senses of Love in *De natura et dignitate amoris*.<sup>521</sup>

<sup>519</sup> *Nat. dig.*, 15 (PL 184, 390B-291A; CFS 30, p. 72-73): 'Habet enim anima etiam sensus suos, habet visum suum vel oculum, qui videt Deum. Sicut enim corpus habet suos quinque sensus, quibus animae conjungitur, vita mediante: sic et anima suos quinque sensus habet, quibus Deo conjungitur, mediante charitate. Hic ostenditur quia per sensus corporis veterascimus, et huic saeculo conformamur: per sensum vero mentis renovamur in agnitionem Dei, in novitatem vitae, secundum voluntatem et beneplacitum Dei. Quinque enim sunt corporis sensus animales vel corporales, quibus anima corpus suum sensificat (ut ab inferiori incipiam): tactus, gustus, odoratus, auditus, visus. Similiter quinque sunt sensus spirituales, quibus charitas vivificat animam: id est, amor carnalis parentum, amor socialis, amor naturalis, amor spiritualis, amor Dei. Per quinque sensus corporis, mediante vita, corpus animae conjungitur: per quinque sensus spirituales, mediante charitate, anima Deo consociatur.'

<sup>520</sup> For a discussion of these five loves see Webb, 'William of Saint-Thierry I: The Five Senses of Love', pp. 464-468; Webb, *An Introduction to the Cistercian De Anima*, pp. 23-24.

<sup>521</sup> *Nat. dig.* 16-20 (PL 184, 391-393; CFS 30, pp. 73-75).



Bernard of Clairvaux similarly had spoken of five types of love the soul gives to the bodily senses.<sup>522</sup> William's fivefold classification is significant, however, in that these sacramental links were no mere symbolic filler but aid the Abbot of Saint-Thierry in suggesting that while some perceptions and affectivities are more exalted than others, all are necessary for human beings in different ways. For example, while touch is the most basic sense, resembling man's animality, its corresponding affectivity, *amor parentum* or the natural love of parents for their children, is used by William as a sign of a type of love that everyone experiences in life. This type of perception and love is not isolated from the others. To learn to perceive the world correctly and live a full life, touch has to work in tandem with taste, smell, hearing and sight. Similarly, when love of parents goes hand in hand with social, natural, spiritual and divine love, all Christians become part of a community with Christ, the prophets, patriarchs, the angels and God. Thus, while William's *De natura corporis et animae* is fundamentally concerned with unpacking the bodily and spiritual layers of the individual as a microcosm, his wider writings show how this unified vision of man pertains also to the sacramental macrocosm of Christendom the novice joins and inhabits through the use of their bodily and spiritual powers.

Overall, in William's texts, the application of synaesthetic or multi-sensory metaphors to human sensory or vital organs is an effective technique. While not as refined as William's vision metaphor, the Pseudo-Bernardine *Tractatus de interiori domo* utilised a more popular organ, the heart, to convey a similar idea. 'The conscience is the knowledge of the heart' (*conscientia cordis est scientia*), the text proclaims, attributing the power of 'knowing' to the heart, an organ understood predominantly as the site of 'feeling'.<sup>523</sup> While some Cistercian writers engaged with these metaphors more than others, it is clear that what these schemas offered were a framework to categorise, often hierarchically, the different operations sense, love and reason. Yet, the fluidity of these metaphors was often employed to suggest paths by which the *sensus*, *affectus* and *intellectus* inter-cooperate and become co-partners in uniting the soul to God.

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<sup>522</sup> In Bernard's *Sermones de diversis* 10.1-3 (PL 183, 567B-569B) touch is pious love (*amor pius*), taste is social love (*amor socialis*), smell is general love (*amor generalis*), hearing is divine love (*dilectio*) and sight is holy love (*amor sanctus*). See Newhauser, 'Introduction', in *A Cultural History of the Senses*, p. 5.

<sup>523</sup> *Int. dom.* 11.18 (PL 184, 517A).

## Helinand of Froidmont

Helinand of Froidmont's *De cognitione sui* is similar to William of Saint-Thierry's *De natura corporis et animae* in that Helinand isn't concerned with understanding the *affectus* or the affective part of the soul in great detail. Instead, the troubadour-turned-Cistercian monk works with two models of the soul. The first is Plato's encompassing rationality, concupiscibility and irascibility. Unusual for a Cistercian, though, *De cognitione sui* stresses the primacy of the rational power. This preference is given a Cistercian image and likeness veneer to it through Helinand's explanation. Similar to Holy Trinity in which the Son and Holy Spirit proceed from the Father, Helinand says that 'in the trinity of the powers of the soul irascibility and concupiscibility always ought to proceed from reason, so that the soul shuns nothing, desires nothing, unless reason has dictated that it should be shunned or desired.'<sup>524</sup>

The second model Helinand espouses involves a sixfold division of the soul between what he calls 'natural' (*naturalis*) and 'arbitrary' (*arbitraria*) parts of the inner man.<sup>525</sup> Natural parts are shared in common by all men (*generalis est omnium*), are naturally good in expressing man's image and similarity to God, and involve changes 'according to condition' (*secundum conditionem*): that is, the rationality, immortality, invisibility and boundlessness of the soul.<sup>526</sup> Of these four parts, Helinand adds that the rational has its own 'triple function' (*triplex officium*): 'to discern (*discernere*) between contraries, to reject (*reprobare*) the worse, [and] to choose (*eligere*) the better.'<sup>527</sup> By contrast, arbitrary things belong to particular individuals (*propria singulorum*) and involve change 'according to will' (*secundum voluntatem*).<sup>528</sup> It is this through this voluntary dimension that an individual's soul can be 'beautified' (*pulchritudo*), improving itself morally in two ways – both essentially a restatement of Augustine's *uti-frui* theology. The first is 'to will that which we know God wants'; the second, is 'to resist the desire for that which we ought not to want.'<sup>529</sup> If

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<sup>524</sup> *Cog. sui.* 7 (PL 212, 729A-B): 'sic in trinitate potentiarum animae irascibilitas et concupiscibilitas semper a ratione debent procedere, ut nihil fugiat illa, nihil appetat illa, nisi quod ratio fugendum et appendum dictaverit.'

<sup>525</sup> *Cog. sui.* 4 (PL 212, 725C): 'Interioris autem species duplex est, naturalis et arbitraria.'

<sup>526</sup> *Cog. sui.* 4 (PL 212, 725C-D): 'Naturalis generalis est omnium... naturalis attenditur secundum conditionem... in naturali quatuor attenda sunt; quod anima rationalis est, quod immortalis, quod invisibilis, quod illocalis.'

<sup>527</sup> *Cog. sui.* 4 (PL 212, 725D-276A): 'Rationalis autem triplex officium est: discernere, repobare, eligere. Discernere inter contraria, reprobare peiora, eligere meliora.'

<sup>528</sup> *Cog. sui.* 4 (PL 212, 725C-D).

<sup>529</sup> *Cog. sui.* 5 (PL 212, 727A): 'Videlicet in volendo quod Deum velle scimus; et in nolendo quod ipsum nolle non dubitamus.'

anywhere Helinand has a theory of affectivity it is here: these two powers of will enable the soul to pursue positive affective attachments and reject negative attachments.

Indeed, the beauty of the soul is its moral virtue (*sanctitas*); sanctity is a holy affection (*affectio sancta*), and in moral virtue is a constant and firm resolution: and these are twins, namely holy hatred and holy love: hatred for evil, and desire for the good. And nothing is evil except sin, and the occasion to sin; and nothing is good, except God, and the imitation of God. And the first of the two [affections] always will flee, but the second will always embrace: for purity of heart consists in these two affections.<sup>530</sup>

Clearly, then, for Helinand it is principally the role of the will – through the exercise of positive affectivity, holy love and holy hatred – to establish moral virtue in the soul through correctly choosing what to be attracted to and reject in perception, willing and action.

Incorporating all these contrasting schemas, Helinand's psychology is confusing and not systematic yet the effect across each schema is the same: 'all parts [of the soul] are said to be mutually necessary, based upon an imitation of the divine mind and made to serve the distinct but related functions of 1). Knowing right from wrong, 2) rejecting wrong and 3) choosing right.'<sup>531</sup> Therefore, while not concerned with systematising the *affectus* or psychology for that matter, *De cognitione sui* does highlight the interconnected relationship between perception and the emotions in Cistercian life.

### Isaac of Stella and Alcher of Clairvaux

Changing the terminology slightly, Isaac of Stella's *Epistola de anima* and *Sermones* consistently maintain a distinction between *affectus* and *sensus* ('knowledge').<sup>532</sup> Of all the Cistercian writers, Isaac demonstrates the greatest dexterity in harmonising several different schemas of the soul: bipartite, tripartite, quadripartite, and beyond. Much like William and Helinand, Isaac argues that the *affectus* can be sub-divided into a concupiscible (or desiring) component and an irascible (or rejecting) component, allowing for a tripartite soul when these two powers are combined with reason. *Concupiscentia* and *irascibilitas*, he argues, can be sub-divided further to include the four Stoic affections: desiring and accepting things is

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<sup>530</sup> *Cog. sui.* 5 (PL 212, 727): 'Denique punchritudo animae sanctitas est; sanctitas aautem est affectio sancta, et in sancto proposito constans ac firma; haec autem gemina, videlicet odium et amor sanctus: odium mali, et desiderium boni. Et malum quidem nihil est nisi peccatum, et peccati occasio: bonum vero nihil est, nisi Deus, et Dei imitatio. Primaque duo semper fugienda sunt, secunda vero amplectenda: in his enim duabus affectionibus consistit cordis munditia.'

<sup>531</sup> Walker, 'From Description to Prescription', p. 234.

<sup>532</sup> *Ep. an.*, 5 (PL 194, 1878D; Tarlazzi, lines 125-126, p. 261; CFS 24, p. 160).

expressed through the affections of joy (*gaudium*) and hope (*spes*), whereas anger and rejecting things is invoked by feelings of pain (*dolor*) and fear (*metus*).<sup>533</sup> Human affectivity, thus, is characterised by the daily alteration of the affections.

Isaac concretely links these inner *affectiones* to outer bodily actions. ‘A change of heart (*mutata affectio cordis*) leads, inevitably, to a change of behaviour (*exercitium corporis*)’, he says.<sup>534</sup> Across his *Epistola de anima* and sermon collection, the abbot of Stella consistently equates virtue with the moderation and balancing of emotion. ‘Since virtue is the habit of a well-trained soul’ (*Et quoniam virtus est habitus animi bene instituti*), he states, ‘the powers of desire of the soul must be trained, organised, and ordered to the proper goal and operation by reason so that they may give birth to the virtues’.<sup>535</sup>

So much for the power of affectivity. Isaac also introduces two overlapping schemas for the soul’s power of *sensus* or *rationabilitas* (‘rationality’). *Rationabilitas*, he writes, can be temporally differentiated into its capacities into discernment (*ingenium*), reason (*ratio*) and memory (*memoria*), equivalent to thinking located in the future, present and past (themselves localised to three distinct parts of head – the anterior, middle and posterior, respectively, where they were said to be located according to twelfth-century medical treatises).<sup>536</sup> However, extending the fourfold contemplative schema of Boethius (and possibly influenced by Hugh of Saint-Victor), Isaac also argues the soul’s power of *sensus* has five increasing grades of purity, forming an epistemological and anagogical chain of knowledge and ascent towards God: *sensus corporeus* (‘sense perception’), *imaginatio* (‘imagination’), *ratio* (‘reason’), *intellectus* (‘discernment’) and *intelligentia* (‘understanding’).<sup>537</sup> Isaac’s fivefold schema shares similarities with several other philosophically-orientated writings written by members of the School of Chartres and the Abbey of Saint-Victor in the twelfth century that specified increasingly purified different

<sup>533</sup> *Ep. an.*, 4-5 (PL 194, 1877B-1879A; Tarlazzi, lines 64-137, pp. 258-261; CFS 24, pp. 157-161; Deme, pp. 144-146); *Sermo* 10.18 (PL 194, 1726C-D; SC 130, lines 185-189, pp. 234-235; CFS 11, p. 89; CFS 11, p. 51); *Sermo* 17.13 (PL 194, 1747B; SC 130, lines 111-113, p. 318; CFS 11, p. 143; Deme, pp. 64-65); *Sermo* 25.5 (PL 194, 1772D-1773A; SC 207, lines 36-44, p. 118; CFS 11, p. 206; Deme, p. 78); *Sermo* 51.13 (PL 194, 1864A; SC 339, lines 97-105 pp. 206-208; CFS 66, p. 138).

<sup>534</sup> Isaac, *Sermo* 17.16 (PL 194, 1747D; SC 130, line 136, p. 322; CFS 11, p. 144; Deme, p. 65).

<sup>535</sup> *Ep. an.*, 5 (PL 194, 1878D; Tarlazzi, lines 133-136, p. 261; McGinn, p.160); *Sermo* 3.1-2 (PL 194, 1697C-D; SC 130, lines 1-19, pp. 114-116; CFS 11, p. 21; Deme, p. 14).

<sup>536</sup> *Ep. an.*, 7 (PL 194, 1878B-1879D; Tarlazzi, lines 155-175, pp. 262-263; CFS 24, p. 161; Deme, pp. 146-147); *Sermo* 17.10 (PL 194, 1746D; SC 130, lines 86-91, pp. 316-317); CFS 11, p. 142; Deme, p. 64). See also *Sermo* 23.10-12 (PL 194, 1767A-C; SC 207, lines 94-126, pp. 88-93; CFS 11, pp. 192-193).

<sup>537</sup> *Ep. an.*, 8-10 (ed. PL 194, 1879D-1881B; Tarlazzi, pp. 262-265; CFS 24, p. 162); *Sermo* 4.6-8 (PL 194, 1701D-1702A; SC 130, lines 48-65, p. 134; CFS 11, p. 31; Deme, p. 20.). See McGinn, *The Golden Chain*, p. 174, for the link with Boethius. For Isaac’s possible dependence on Hugh of Saint-Victor see Tarlazzi, ‘L’Epistola’, p. 263, note 45.

grades of cognition ending with *intelligentia* or *sapientia* (see Appendix). Perhaps one of the reasons why Isaac favoured the term *sensus* – simultaneously meaning ‘sense’ and ‘knowledge’ – was that it could convey both the rational soul’s connection with the bodily senses and its role in bringing the soul to the highest forms of intellectual knowledge through these senses.

Indeed, in both Isaac’s epistemology and his symbolism, the lower and higher functions of perception and thought are imbricated with the emotions. Following a similar formulation to Eriugena’s *Periphyseon*, Isaac across both his *Epistola de anima* and *Sermones* likens the five powers of *sensus* to Homer’s ‘golden chain’, since these perceptive powers function analogously to the ladder of increasingly rarefied ‘elements’ of the universe (earth, water, air, ether, and the empyrean heaven), which unite heaven and earth.<sup>538</sup> Similar to William of Saint-Thierry, Isaac doesn’t shy away from interconnecting body and soul, microcosm and macrocosm. The Homeric symbol, he argues, can be expanded to include the five senses of the body, too. Touch represents earth, taste water; smell odorous, dense air; hearing thin, pure air; and sight fire).<sup>539</sup>

Somewhat predictably, this *affectus-sensus* schema is repeated in *De spiritu et anima*, which was heavily dependent on Isaac’s *Epistola de anima*.<sup>540</sup> Nonetheless, the great length of *De spiritu et anima* means that the treatise does not systematically employ Isaac’s *affectus-sensus* distinction but in fact employs a host of other terms to show the complementary actions of thinking and feeling. At one place, the treatise defines an *affectus* as ‘a spontaneous and sweet turning of the soul toward God’, recalling Bernard and Aelred’s definitions.<sup>541</sup> Further, Alcher of Clairvaux includes much of the medical material in William’s *De natura corporis et animae*. Alcher subscribes to an interconnected view of the soul’s powers of reasoning and loving. This is clear in *De spiritu et anima*’s definition of *ratio* (‘reason’). Reason, Alcher says, is the *aspectus mentis*, the sight by which the mind utilises all the branches of philosophy – logic, ethics and physics – to distinguish between

<sup>538</sup> *Ep. an.*, 10 and 16-19 (PL 194, 1880A-1881A and 1885A-C; Tarlazzi, lines 200-231 and 392-454, pp. 264-265 and pp. 271-273; CFS 24, p. 163 and p. 170-172; Deme, p. 148 and pp. 152-154); *Sermo* 4.6-9 (SC ; CFS 11, p. 31-32; Deme, p. 20-21). In his discussion of Paradise, Eriugena had symbolically associated to earth, water, air and reason to bodies, sense perception/imagination, reason and the mind, respectively. See *Periphyseon* (*Division of Nature*), trans. J. O’Meara (Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 1987) 4, 822B-C, p. 477.

<sup>539</sup> *Ep. an.*, 10 (PL 194, 1881A; Tarlazzi, lines 221-23, p. 265; CFS 24, p.163; Deme, p. 148).

<sup>540</sup> *DSA*, 4 (PL 40, 781-782; CFS 24, pp. 184-185, 208).

<sup>541</sup> *DSA*, 50 (PL 40, 816; CFS 24, p. 259): ‘Affectus est spontanea quaedam ac dulcis ipsius animi ad Deum inclinatio.’

good and bad, choose virtue and love God.<sup>542</sup> Terms such as *aspectus mentis* ('gaze of the mind'), *mens* ('mind'), *rationalitas* ('rationality'), *discernere* ('ability to discern'), *intellectus* ('knowledge'), *sapientia* ('wisdom'), *cogitatio* ('thought') are used to describe the rational, thinking power; *concupiscibilitas-irascibilitas* ('desire'/'irascibility'), *sentire* ('ability to feel'), *animus* ('intellectual soul'), *amor* ('love'), *caritas* ('charity'), *desiderium* ('desire') highlight the capacities of the affective, willing power.<sup>543</sup>

### Baldwin of Forde

Finally, it is also worth noting that the *affectus-sensus* opposition of Isaac and Alcher was utilised to great effect by Baldwin of Forde in his *Sermones*. In *Sermo* 3, these two terms describe the disordered 'inclinations' and 'judgements' of the animal man – a pair which, when ordered through obedience to Christ give way to an 'affect of devotion' (*affectus devotionis*) that captivates man's thought (*intellectus*), transforming these two powers of the soul into *devotio* ('devotion') and *discretio* ('discretion'); the transformed faculties are indistinguishable from the monastic virtues of the same name.<sup>544</sup> Commenting upon the blurring of affective and intellective boundaries in Baldwin's writings and Cistercian thought more generally, David N. Bell has remarked that the soul's power of 'understanding' or *intellectus* implies not truth in the strict sense, but rather 'an experiential awareness of the truth'.<sup>545</sup> Hence, just as the affective part of the soul has rational orientations, the *intellectus* does not strictly mean knowledge. As Bell helpfully observes, for the Cistercians 'the highest *intellectus* is an experiential *intellectus*, and at this stage of our progress *intellectus*, love and wisdom are all the same thing.'<sup>546</sup>

Much like William of Saint-Thierry, Baldwin communicates this inseparability of love and knowledge through the analogy of sight. Here, he advocates a hybrid, part-intromissive, part-extramissive, theory of vision to explain the necessity of devotion and discretion working together to attain the total perception of God. Drawing on contemporary understandings of optics, Baldwin recommends that

<sup>542</sup> DSA, 11 and 37 (PL 40 786 and 808; CFS 24, p. 194 and 242-243).

<sup>543</sup> DSA, 10, 11, 13, 17, 34, 35, 36, 39, 47 (PL 40, 785-786, 789, 792, 803, 806, 809, 814; CFS 24, pp. 192, 194, 200, 208, 232, 238-239, 245, 255)

<sup>544</sup> Baldwin of Ford, *Sermo* 3 (CCCM 99, 51 and 60-63, pp. 60, 62-63; CFS 41, pp. 110 and 113-114).

<sup>545</sup> D. N. Bell, 'Certitudo fidei: Faith, Reason, and Authority in the Writings of Baldwin of Forde', in *Bernardus Magister*, p. 256.

<sup>546</sup> Ibid, p. 259.

If we want to examine the visible form of an object, the light inside our eyes is insufficient, and we must have the assistance of the light outside as well. The same is true of the reverse situation: if a visible object is to be seen, the light [outside] must be helped by the light [inside]. A closed eye sees nothing at midday, and an open eye sees nothing in the darkness of the night. There is a certain similarity here to discernment without devotion and devotion without discernment... For this we need two eyes... The eye of discernment without the eye of devotion, or the eye of devotion without the light of discernment, sees nothing: it is just like an eye which is closed in the light or open in darkness.<sup>547</sup>

Such a view of perception involves the intromission of light rays from the sun which illuminate the *species* of objects in combination with the extramission of visual rays from the eyes to perceive them – these two forms of light being similar to the two eyes required for spiritual vision.

In a different sermon Baldwin elaborates upon this process further, arguing it involves three types of light in a process of reflection, thus giving visual perception a trinitarian character and relationship with the Holy Trinity. (1) Initially, the sun, the source of ‘illuminating light’ (*lux illuminans*), illuminates *both* the object to be seen and the human eye. (2) Next, the object receiving the light shines in proportion to the illuminating light received, reflecting the colours, forms, shapes and *species* of the object – a light that is called by Baldwin the ‘illuminated light so that things can be seen’ (*lux illuminata ut videatur*). (3) Third, the illuminated light falling on the eyes is extramitted in combination with the eye’s own visual ray to become the ‘illuminated light by which we see’ (*lux illuminata ut videat*) – a strengthened visual ray that makes contact with the chosen object of perception. Finally, (4) this ray is reflected back into the eye of the perceiver to allow the object to be seen (see Figure 7).<sup>548</sup> While all theories of vision presuppose a form of mediated contact between the object and perceiver, Baldwin’s sermon emphasises this through the intermingling of the three forms of light which he can apply in a psychological context to the faculties of knowing and loving. This is aptly summed up with a third pairing: *scientia* (‘knowledge’) and *caritas* (‘love’), which represent the perfectly ordered mode of perception. ‘Discernment’, he says, ‘should be joined to devotion and devotion to discernment, so that there may abound in us charity with knowledge and knowledge with charity...’<sup>549</sup>

<sup>547</sup> Baldwin of Ford, *Sermo* 3 (CFS 41, pp. 114-115).

<sup>548</sup> Baldwin of Ford, *Sermo* 21 (CCCM 99, 8-12, pp. 324-325).

<sup>549</sup> Baldwin of Ford, *Sermo* 3 (CFS 41, p. 115).




Figure. 7. Stages of Perception According to Baldwin of Forde's *Sermo 21*

### Conclusion: Love, the Song of Songs and Marian Devotion

To conclude this section, it must be stated that the complementarity between reason and love was common across all types of Cistercian writings. It is no less prominent in Cistercian mystical understandings of love as found in their commentaries on the Song of Songs or Marian devotion. Gilbert of Hoyland, John of Forde and William of Saint-Thierry continued the project of Bernard of Clairvaux to commentate upon all the books of The Song of Songs, and these commentaries unsurprisingly serve as a key source for Cistercian understandings of perception and affectivity, especially of the spiritual kind.

Across his commentary, Gilbert of Hoyland, for instance, repeatedly stresses the complementarity between the powers of affection (*affectus*) and understanding (*intellectus/ratio*).<sup>550</sup> In true Cistercian fashion, love (*amor*) for John of Forde, serves as the binding force behind every relationship on earth, parents and children, friendships, and man to God.<sup>551</sup> Being a Cistercian monk, then, involves knowing how to correctly respond to this love, ordering it towards God. Even the irrational animals, John believes, express their desires through their affections: 'In the innate desires of their instinctive affections (*naturalis*

<sup>550</sup> Gilbert of Hoyland, *Sermo 24* (CFS 20, pp. 297-303); *Sermo 28.2*; *Sermo 45.1* (CFS 26, p. 531); Treatise 3.7 (PL 184, 265B; CFS 34, p. 29); Treatise 3.7. and 4.5 (PL 184, 265B and 269A; CFS 34, p. 29 and 38).

<sup>551</sup> John of Forde, *Sermo 14.5* (CCCM 17, lines 185-195, p. 129; CFS 29, p. 258).



*appetitus affectibus*), all speak to us of their instinctive affections, all things speak to us of the ineffable mystery of eternal love (*caritas*), if we only take the trouble to notice.<sup>552</sup> In *Sermo* 77, the discriminating power of spiritual smell is highlighted to show how the virtuous monk and bride of Christ use their senses (*sensus*) correctly to develop the virtue of discretion (*discretio*), needed to love God.<sup>553</sup> The soul must use ‘her keen perceptions (*sensibus*) to scent out the just and unjust, the honest and the dishonest, the useful and the useless [Mt 5:45]’, John remarks, because otherwise the powers of the perception and affectivity fail to have a purpose for human beings.<sup>554</sup> The human soul, instead, undergoes an ‘animalisation’, losing its rationality, since

what divides irrational beasts and the living man who has the faculty of irrational reason (*irrationalem*) in his instinct (*affectus*), except what is the natural faculty of the beast, is, in the case of man, defective (*vitium*) because of his fallen nature (*depravatae naturae*); that is his unwillingness to understand for the purpose of acting rightly and the resultant defiling of the dignity of the divine image with the image and superscription of brute beasts.<sup>555</sup>

Gaining a real experience of God therefore involves teaching the senses and affections to discriminate properly with the aid of reason. As John suggests: the bride’s nose is like ‘a tower of Lebanon’, because the tower of discriminating wisdom she has raised for herself comes from the ‘knowledge of holiness’ (*experientia sanctitatis*). In other words, she has been taught holiness not so much from the example of others, or from reading books, but from her own resolute practice of virtue.<sup>556</sup>

Across John of Forde’s *Sermones*, therefore, we encounter several examples of how affect stimulates intellect, and vice-versa, in the affective contemplation of God.<sup>557</sup> Similar to William of Saint-Thierry and Baldwin of Forde, John finds that that metaphors of sight are helpful to show the progress of cultivating the most profound affectivities with the divine. Cistercians should imitate the Virgin Mary, whose eyes were blessed because, ordering her

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<sup>552</sup> John of Forde, *Sermo* 14.5 (CCCM 17, lines 222-226, p. 130; CFS 29, p. 260).

<sup>553</sup> John of Forde, *Sermo* 77.2 (CCCM 18, lines 42-47; CFS 45, p. 186).

<sup>554</sup> John of Forde, *Sermo* 77.5 (CCCM 18, lines 116-139, pp. 537-538; CFS 45, pp. 189-190).

<sup>555</sup> John of Forde, *Sermo* 77.5 (CCCM 18, lines 116-139, pp. 537-538; CFS 45, pp. 189-190).

<sup>556</sup> John of Forde, *Sermo* 77.5 (CCCM 18, lines 116-139, pp. 537-538; CFS 45, pp. 189-190).

<sup>557</sup> John of Forde, *Sermo* 7.5 (CCCM 17, lines 210-214, p. 77; CFS 29, p. 157); 17.11 (CCCM 17, lines 305-307 and 313-322, p. 156; CFS 39, pp. 43-44); *Sermo* 17.11 (CCCM 17, lines 77-81, pp. 158-159; CFS 39, p. 49); *Sermo* 22.1 (CCCM 17, lines 11-17, p. 186; CFS 39, p. 102); *Sermo* 38.6 (CCCM 17, lines 153-164, p. 287; CFS 43, p. 111); *Sermo* 75.3 (CCCM 18, lines 42-47, p. 521; CFS 45, p. 157); *Sermo* 82.7 (CCCM 18, lines 144-149, p. 567; CFS 45, p. 249); *Sermo* 88.8 (CCCM 18, lines 174-187, p. 603; CFS 46, pp. 69-70); *Sermo* 88.9 (CCCM 18, lines 196-201, p. 603; CFS 46, p. 70).

love to God and ‘disdaining all things of the flesh, she fixed her gaze (*aspectus*) and focused her attention on the one who absorbed all her affection (*affectus*).’<sup>558</sup> God, ‘the font of charity’ (*fons caritatis*), John says, ‘creates new eyes for those who would see Jesus, by illuminating their mind (*intellectus*) and enkindling their heart (*affectus*).’<sup>559</sup> Significantly, John’s sermons are reflective of the experiential ethos of Cistercian life; a monastic life that combines learning with devotion, giving equal weight to intellectual as well as affective experience. Indeed, John explicitly states that the reciprocity of thought and affectivity is essential to the contemplation of Christ. He writes that

...there is no obtaining the joy of your contemplation (*ad gaudium contemplationis*) except through a powerful desire for love (*validum desiderium amoris*). They are looking for you in the wrong way, those who labour to see you by means of their minds (*per intellectum*), but take no pains to savour you in their hearts (*per affectum*). But on the other hand, they also look too carelessly, those who long to be drawn to you (*affici te*), but continuously shrink back from the bedchamber of her who conceived you, driven away because the sheer hard work of studying truth is too much for them.<sup>560</sup>

In this case, the studies of truth that John recommends are not purely academic in nature. Rather, with John, as with other Cistercians of the twelfth century, we encounter a psychology which demands of its monks the ability to cultivate and order every aspect of their self – sense, affect and intellect – to achieve the outcome of their monastic vocation: the contemplation of God and the salvation of their soul.

The *Homiliae de beata virginis* (*Homilies on the Virgin Mary*) of Amadeus, bishop of Lausanne from 1145 to 1159, gives a sense of how physiology and psychology could be used as a framework to structure Cistercian Marian devotion. Chrysogonus Waddell notes Amadeus’s tendency to write in the ‘biblical language of symbols, often favouring patterns of three’.<sup>561</sup> This is on full display in his second homily where the outer physiognomy of the Virgin Mary is used to symbolically understand the inner, psychological processes, which contributed to Mary’s sanctity. For Amadeus

Her head signifies her mind. For just as the head controls the body’s members, so the mind rules and controls the feelings of the soul. In the neck, which towers over the other

<sup>558</sup> John of Forde, *Sermo* 75.3 (CCCM 18, lines 42-47, p. 521; CFS 45, p. 157)

<sup>559</sup> John of Forde, *Sermo* 48.5 (CCCM 17, lines 109-117, p. 341; CFS 44, p. 21).

<sup>560</sup> John of Forde, *Sermo* 94.7 (CCCM 18, lines 170-179, p. 639; CFS 46, p. 143 [translation modified])

<sup>561</sup> Waddell, ‘Introduction’, in *Magnificat: Homilies in Praise of the Blessed Virgin Mary*, tr. Marie-Bernard Saïd and Grace Perigo, CFS 18 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1979), xxix-xxx.

members and supplies to the limbs the vital power, is expressed her loftiness, by which, presiding over the members of the Church, she unites the head to its body, for she unites Christ with the Church and the life, which in the first place she receives, she pours forth on her other members... The hairs on her head are the thoughts of her heart, her ears the inner hearing. In her breast lies hidden her secret and her thought stirs... By the breast, therefore, the secrets of that glorious breast are signified, by the arms the virtues of her works, by the hands the works themselves, by the fingers diverse kinds of work. Her body is the undivided unity of her works, her thighs her desires, her feet her affections by which, entering upon the paths of justice, she has left behind clear footprints for those coming after.<sup>562</sup>

Here, we find a hierarchical model of perception: mind linked with the head signifies the most exalted faculty, and following a common association, affections are associated with the feet. Despite these hierarchies, what is striking is the unity of the person of Mary. Joining the head and feet in a triad is Mary's neck. Amadeus clearly has had some knowledge of medicine or natural philosophy as this neck, he claims, symbolises Mary's 'vital power' which not only gives motion to the members of the body, but symbolises the connection of Church and Christ. Despite having their separate spheres (top/bottom) and function (thought/feeling), the capacities of mind and affection are entangled as Mary's hairs on her head are said to represent 'the thoughts of her heart'. Just like the Church creates unity from a plurality of followers in their belief, Mary's harmony of body and soul stands for her own undivided faith – for which Amadeus uses the triad of body, thigh, and feet to stress Mary's ordered works, desires and affections.

Most significant for his audience is that, as an example of virtue and justice, Mary's example can be imitated. Mary's affections have 'left clear footprints for those coming after', indicating that the path Mary walked should be emulated by fellow Cistercians seeking to live a life of virtue. Amadeus' homily thus shares a resemblance with the Victorine method of imitating the virtues of other members of the congregation; the main difference for Amadeus and the Cistercians is that the example of Mary is directed more at the individual's perfection as opposed to a coherent idea of communal progress.

Overall, among Cistercian writers we encounter a stunning variety of psychological schemes and views of the soul. This comparison of *De anima* treatises and writings on psychology is significant at the macro level because it shows how that there was great innovation in shaping the Augustinian model of perception and affectivity to the needs of Cistercian communities at any one time. On the Cistercian side, Aelred of Rievaulx is

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<sup>562</sup> Amadeus of Lausanne, *Homily 2*, tr. Marie-Bernard Saïd and Grace Perigo, *Magnificat: Homilies in Praise of the Blessed Virgin Mary*, CFS 18 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1979, pp. 73-74.

particularly significant for his systematic approach to classifying the *affectūs*, as is William of Saint-Thierry for his harmonisation of medicine with monastic theology, or Isaac of Stella for his more philosophically inflected account of the soul.

These examples support Bernard of McGinn's view that Cistercian *De anima* writing was aimed at supporting Cistercian mystical practices and spirituality. Consequently, in their aim to educate and teach, treatises such as Bernard of Clairvaux's *De libero arbitrio*, William of Saint-Thierry's *De natura corporis et animae*, Aelred's *De anima* and *De speculo caritatis*, Isaac of Stella's *Epistola de anima* and Alcher of Clairvaux's *De spiritu et anima* were not overly complex nor philosophically demanding (Isaac's is perhaps the most difficult philosophically yet is compact). In the works of William of Saint-Thierry, for instance, it is clear to see a reciprocity between the ideas found in his treatises on the soul with his more mystical approach to love in a work such as *De natura et dignitate amoris*. In their discussion of the powers of the soul, Cistercian *libri de anima* touched upon matters that were recognisably more spiritual such as faith, friendship, love, the cultivation of the classical and theological virtues, and how the soul is united to God. It appears clear, therefore, that these treatises were used to support the wider spiritual goals of the Order.

The low transmission of some of these texts, such as William of Saint-Thierry's *De natura corporis et animae*, Aelred of Rievaulx's *De anima* or Isaac of Stella's *Epistola de anima* supports this view. While the Cistercians are overrepresented in how many treatises on the soul they composed, evidently these texts were not necessarily a key part of the education of Cistercians. Instead, they were produced on an *ad hoc* basis to address a particular need in the community. Written on his own deathbed, Aelred's treatise, for example, was written to explore the life of soul after death and comfort the community that had developed strong ties of affection towards him. Radically different was William's treatise which may have been written during his conflict with William of Conches to show the correct application of natural science and medicine to a monastic understanding of the soul.

## CHAPTER 2 – THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF REASON AND LOVE IN VICTORINE PSYCHOLOGY

### Introduction

For a canonical order that has often been characterised as predominantly focused on contemplation and cognition, love and affectivity formed the subject of many Victorine writings. In *De substantia dilectionis* (*On the Substance of Love*), Hugh of Saint-Victor describes the human heart in rich Augustinian language as a fountain of love (*amor*), its two streams consisting of worldly love or desire (*cupiditas*) and divine love (*caritas*).<sup>563</sup> Likewise, the opening line of *Quid vere diligendum sit?* (*What Should Truly be Loved?*) proclaims that ‘The life of the heart is love, and for that reason it is utterly impossible for the heart that desires to live to be without love.’<sup>564</sup> In his flexible usage of terms like *dilectio*, *amor*, *caritas* and *affectus*, Hugh matches Bernard of Clairvaux or William of Saint-Thierry in his wordplay and distinction between the Latin terms for love.<sup>565</sup> Richard of Saint-Victor was equally proficient at systematising the stages of contemplation as he was at dissecting the four grades of love. And Adam of Saint-Victor’s *Sequences* integrated loving with the Victorine goal of self-restoration through the medium of symphonies.

Notably, the Victorines took the scriptural invocation to love God in Deuteronomy 6 *ex toto corde* (‘with all your heart’) in a psychological sense to mean the rational love of God. This is clear from the *Expositio in Regulam S. Augustini* (*Exposition of the Rule of Saint Augustine*), a text mistakenly attributed to Hugh of Saint Victor, though likely originating from a Victorine or Victorine inspired context.<sup>566</sup> In this rule of living, the canonical requirement to love God *ex toto corde* is understood, by definition, to involve the faculty of reason also: ‘This means’, pseudo Hugh writes, ‘that we must refer all our thoughts to God’.<sup>567</sup> There is a dynamic cooperation between affectivity and reason: ‘We must love Him with our whole mind (*ex tota mente*); and this we do when we direct our reason, with which we judge and understand, to the service of God. Then we are bidden to love God with our

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<sup>563</sup> *Subst. dil.*, 1 (SC 155, p. 82; VTT 2, p. 143). As Pascaline Mercury notes, the Victorines inherited this Augustinian distinction between two loves just like the Cistercians and figures such as Abelard and Heloise. See P. Mercury, ‘L’amour selon Hugues de Saint-Victor: la nature comme voie vers le salut’, in *Omnium expetendorum*, p. 127 and 133.

<sup>564</sup> *Quid vere*. 1 (SC 155, p. 94; VTT 2, p. 179): ‘Vita cordis amor est, et ideo omnino impossibile est ut sine amore sit cor quod vivere cupit.’

<sup>565</sup> *Arrha* 27, 45 and 56 (Feiss and Châtillon, p. 248, 260 and 268; VTT 2, p. 213, 218 and 221).

<sup>566</sup> For this misattribution and further discussion on the *Expositio* see T. F. Martin, OSA, *Our Restless Heart: The Augustinian Tradition* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2003), pp. 82-93.

<sup>567</sup> *Ex. reg.*, 7 (PL 176, 907A): ‘...ut omnes cogitationes nostrae referamus ad Deum’

whole soul (*ex tota anima*); that is we must make all the affections of our soul tend to Him.<sup>568</sup>

Moreover, it is easy to see how the *Expositio* became associated with Victorine doctrine and attributed to Hugh of Saint-Victor especially. Hugh had given the exhortation to ‘Love with your whole heart and your whole soul and your whole mind’ in his *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* a trinitarian dimension; the Victorine magister interpreted this as meaning that a canon should love using all three powers of their soul: intellect (*intellectus*), affection (*affectio*) and memory (*memoria*).<sup>569</sup> ‘Let the whole be filled with knowledge; let the whole be affected by love; let the whole be held by memory’, he advises.<sup>570</sup> All three must be co-equal in loving God, since if either is lacking, the soul cannot truly be said to love fully. The life of the canon should, thus, involve a reciprocal relationship between all three powers, each growing with one another. Hugh writes that ‘as much as you are illumined, so much should be affected, so that the whole is sweet, whatever comes from Him into knowledge and memory. If the whole is rightly proven, why should not the whole be loved?’<sup>571</sup>

The main contrasting factor between canonical and monastic ideas of love, as has been noted by Caroline Walker Bynum, is the more communal nature of the canonical vocation. The *Expositio* sits within the Augustinian tradition of ‘teaching by word and example’ (*docere verbo et exemplo*) and therefore also emphasises the love to be shown to others, both in the Victorine community and further afield.<sup>572</sup> Life at the Abbey of Saint-Victor was thus characterised by several ‘webs of interlocution’. This concept, borrowed from the work of the philosopher Charles Taylor, who himself was influenced by Wittgenstein, usefully suggests that ‘one is a self only among other selves’.<sup>573</sup> Humans are porous, open to the influence of other agents (humans, animals, spirits); selfhood hence can only be discovered through comparison to those around us and the act of finding common agreement (or disagreement). As Taylor observes, learning norms of behaviour – including

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<sup>568</sup> *Ex. reg.*, 7 (PL 176, 907A): ‘*ex tota mente*, ut omnem rationem qua intelligimus et discernimus habeamus in ipsum; *ex tota anima*, ut omnes affectiones animae dirigamus ad Deum.’ See also Achard, *Sermo* 15.5.15 (CS 165, p. 318).

<sup>569</sup> *Sacr.*, 2.13.9 (Berndt, p. 494; Deferrari, p. 386).

<sup>570</sup> *Sacr.*, 2.13.9 (Berndt, p. 494; Deferrari, p. 386): ‘Totum cognitione impleatur, totum dilectione afficiatur.’ totum memoria teneatur.’

<sup>571</sup> *Sacr.*, 2.13.9 (Berndt, p. 494; Deferrari, p. 386): ‘Quantum illuminaris tantum afficiaris, ut totum dulce sit quicquid de illo in cognitionem et memoriam venit. Si recte totum probatur cur non totum diligatur?’

<sup>572</sup> Bynum, *Docere verbo et exemplo*, p. 44.

<sup>573</sup> Charles Taylor, *Sources on the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 35.

emotional norms – requires a dialogue with others: ‘I can only learn what anger, love, anxiety, the aspiration to wholeness, etc., are through my and others’ experience of these being objects for *us*, in some common space’.<sup>574</sup> Barbara Newman’s *The Permeable Self* (2021) has shown how Taylor’s understanding of selfhood can successfully be applied to the Middle Ages. The relationship between teacher and student – exemplified by the Victorines yet also seen by monastic groups, like the Cistercians – demonstrate what she calls ‘coinherence’, the interpersonal exchanges that occur at the boundaries of identity.<sup>575</sup> The individualism that characterises much of modern Western cultures often encourages individuals to try to declare their independence from the webs of interlocution that have formed them ‘like the training wheels of nursery school to be left behind and to play no part in the finished person’.<sup>576</sup> While Victorine preachers articulated the *telos* of their canonical vocation in terms of fraternal charity and neighbourliness instead of self-fashioning through webs of interlocution or coinherence, it is clear that not only were these webs present (as they are in all social interactions) but the rule of life and customary of Saint-Victor sought to make these processes central to canonical life.

In a chapter entitled ‘On the Measure of Loving Neighbour’, Hugh of Saint-Victor’s *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* set out in detail how the love of others meant first to cultivate an ordered love of oneself.<sup>577</sup> Perhaps the best example, though, of how these webs of interlocution or coinherence were thought to function is evident from Achard of Saint-Victor’s sermons. Achard claims in *Sermo* 13 that someone who loves themselves and God *ex toto corde* is someone who loves ‘fervently’ (*ferventer*), ‘wisely’ (*sapienter*), ‘perseveringly’ (*indeficienter*) and ‘abundantly’ (*sufficienter*), using their heart, mind, life and the strength of soul fully.<sup>578</sup> ‘Therefore, since you are commanded to love your neighbour as yourself’, Achard concludes, ‘so you must love your neighbour as yourself for the sake of these four, or in them.’<sup>579</sup> The triad interconnecting self, God and neighbour, therefore, necessitates that every act of self-love can be re-directed to other coreligionists or members of the secular public:

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<sup>574</sup> Taylor, *Sources on the Self*, p. 35.

<sup>575</sup> B. Newman, *The Permeable Self: Five Medieval Relationships* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), pp. 7-8. Chapter 1 ‘Teacher and Student: Shaping Boys’, discusses Hugh of Saint-Victor’s *De institutione novitiorum* and the Victorine customary as examples of coinherence, see pp. 22-31.

<sup>576</sup> Taylor, *Sources on the Self*, p. 36.

<sup>577</sup> *Sacr.* 2.13.10 (Berndt, p. 494-498; Deferrari, pp. 386-390).

<sup>578</sup> Achard of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 13.21 (Châtillon, p. 154; CS 165, p. 232).

<sup>579</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.22 (Châtillon, p. 155; CS 165, p. 232).

You ought to love your neighbours so that they may love, or because they love God fervently; for the purpose of loving or in loving God widely; to possess the love of God indefatigably, or because that love is possessed indefatigably; and also to possess it sufficiently, or because you possess it sufficiently.<sup>580</sup>

As spiritual leaders, Victorine canons were supposed to serve as an example for others to imitate, even to the extent that their specialist psychological training in knowledge and love can be passed on. 'In themselves they shine by the splendour of their knowledge and they are ardent with the fire of love. They illumine others by the word of preaching and inflame them by the example of their good lives', Achard writes of the ideal canon.<sup>581</sup>

### Hugh of Saint-Victor

This focus on neighbourly love evidently gives the Victorine understanding of affectivity its distinctive tone. Nonetheless, like the Cistercians, Victorine psychology was still centred around the twinned actions of loving and thinking. Hugh of Saint-Victor, for instance, knows of the tripartite Platonic division of the soul into reason (*ratio*), desire (*concupiscentia*) and anger (*ira*) and utilises it in his early writings; he also is well aware of Augustine's own triad of reason, will and memory.<sup>582</sup> Furthermore, in the *Didascalicon*, Aristotle's threefold division of the soul into vegetative, sensible and rational capacities is used by the Victorine master.<sup>583</sup> However, in addition to these tripartite models, it is the 'knowledge of the truth' and the 'love of virtue' that are consistently framed as the two fundamental activities of the rational soul, performed by two powers: *cognitio* and *affectus*.<sup>584</sup>

In contrast to other Victorines, like Richard, Hugh's language for these capacities and affectivity is neither stable nor systematic.<sup>585</sup> Across the Hugonian oeuvre, an affective-intellective distinction of the soul's powers is made through several pairs of terms: (1) *cognitio* and *affectio* (or *affectus*), (2) *cognitio* and *amor*; (3) *intellectus* and *amor* or (4) *cognitio veritatis* ('knowledge of truth') and *dilectio virtutis* ('love of virtue') or 'love of the good'.<sup>586</sup> While he does not use explicit terminology, Hugh frequently employs a distinction

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<sup>580</sup> Ibid, *Sermo* 13.22 (Châtillon, p. 155; CS 165, p. 232).

<sup>581</sup> Ibid, *Sermo* 2.1 (CS 165, p. 149).

<sup>582</sup> *Tribus diebus* 72 (CCCM 177, p. 18; VTT 1, p. 68); *Misc.*, 5.67 (PL 177, 794CD).

<sup>583</sup> *Did.*, 1.3 (Taylor, pp. 48-50).

<sup>584</sup> See Feiss, 'Hugh of St Victor – *Soliloquy*', in VTT 2, note 29, p. 193.

<sup>585</sup> Ineke van 't Spijker, 'Ad commovendos affectus', p. 223. *De arrha animae* uses the terms *dilectio*, *amor*, *caritas* and *affectus* both interchangeably and as different concepts. See *Arrha*, 45 and 56 (VTT 2, p. 218 and 221).

<sup>586</sup> *Allegoriae in Vetus Testamentum* 3.9 (PL 175, 661D); *Tribus diebus*, 2.20.5 (PL 176, 829C; CCCM 177, lines 825-828, p. 48; VTT 1, p. 83); *Archa Noe*, 1.3 (PL 177, 621D; CCCM 176, p. 9; VTT 5, p. 137); *Misc.* (PL 177,



between the terms *affectus*, *amor* and *dilectio*, with *amor* designating physical love and *dilectio* referring to spiritual love. The *affectus* is capable of mediating between the two. ‘Analogous to Augustinian *pondus*, which leads the soul to its desired object, the *affectus*, at the foundation is the first form of love. In as much as it arises from the root of the soul, it is nearly *appetitus* or instinctive desire’, as Pascaline Mercury observes.<sup>587</sup> Yet, paradoxically, despite this association with the appetite, affectivity and the *affectus* are central to Hugh’s vision of the restoration of man.

Affectivity was significant to Hugh of Saint-Victor’s psychology for two reasons. First, we can see Hugh’s own adaptation of Augustinian aesthetics, and second, the Victorine master places an emphasis on virtue in the restoration of man. In *De archa Noe morali* Hugh defines an *affectus* as the ‘feeling’, ‘longing’ or ‘desire’ to enjoy something fully (*affectus est desiderium perfruendi*).<sup>588</sup> This definition is in line with Augustine because affectivity is attributed a moral dimension: spiritual affects are directed towards the good ‘use’ (*uti*) and correct ‘enjoyment’ (*frui*) of an object, thought or individual; evil affects are characterised by the wrong intention to use and seek enjoyment in things of the world.<sup>589</sup> Echoing the Cistercian understanding of the ordering of love, the *De contemplatione et eius speciebus* commonly attributed to Hugh of Saint-Victor, remarks that ‘Charity is ordered love, having given back to him, what he ought.’<sup>590</sup> In Hugh’s anthropology the ‘*affectus* is the lynchpin in humanity’s disorder’, Michael D. Barbezat says, since ‘when humanity sinned, it abandoned the desire for the just, and was left with only the desire for benefit.’<sup>591</sup> A key effect of the Fall is that darkened the soul’s three ‘eyes’ for gaining self-knowledge and knowing God: the ‘eye of contemplation’ (*oculus contemplationis*), the ‘eye of reason’ (*oculus rationis*) and the ‘eye of the flesh’ (*oculus carnis*).<sup>592</sup> If a misplaced *affectus* or sense of love darkened these powers of sight, love becomes the route back to God, underpinning the creation of the universe and man’s restoration.<sup>593</sup>

It is through this *uti-frui* distinction that Hugh’s teachings regarding a misaligned *affectus* shares a resemblance to those of Aelred of Rievaulx and the Cistercians. In a small work attributed to Hugh, *De fructibus carnalis et spiritus* (*On the Fruits of the Flesh and*

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485A, 485D-486C and 490C; *Sent. div.* ‘Prologue’ (Piazzoni, lines 405-410, pp. 924-925; VTT 1, p. 125). For these distinctions see note 29 in Hugh Feiss’ Introduction to the *Soliloquy*, in *On Love*, VTT 2, p. 193.

<sup>587</sup> Mercury, ‘L’amour selon Hugues de Saint-Victor’, p. 128.

<sup>588</sup> *Archa Noe*, 3.10-11 (PL 176, 658A and 660C; VTT 5, pp. 185 and 188).

<sup>589</sup> *Archa Noe*, 3.11 (PL 176, 661C-662A; VTT 5, pp. 188-189).

<sup>590</sup> *Cont.*, 4 (Baron, p. 51): ‘Caritas est amor ordinatus, ad eum quem debet, relatus’.

<sup>591</sup> M. D. Barbezat, ‘Desire to Enjoy Something Thoroughly’, pp. 77-78.

<sup>592</sup> Baron, *Science et sagesse*, p. 30.

<sup>593</sup> Mercury, ‘L’amour selon Hugues de Saint-Victor’, p. 142.

*Spirit*), an *affectus* is defined as ‘soldier’ (*comes*) of the cardinal virtue of faith (*fides*) and is ‘conceived from holy joy by means of the faith of an outpouring of tender love for a neighbour.’<sup>594</sup> Pseudo-Hugh’s definition of *affectus* here thus imbibes affectivity with a social dimension. Affectivity can be orientated towards people or spirits (e.g., God) as well as things and is a definition fitting for the spiritual friendship regular canons sought to cultivate among each other in their Victorine congregation and, to a lesser extent, with the wider public in their duties of pastoral care and preaching.

Second, in keeping with their Cistercian counterparts, the *affectus* is part of the canon’s training in virtue. In *De archa Noe morali*, the mind’s ‘caution’ (*circumspectio*) against vice is achieved by the training of the four *passiones*: *timor* (‘fear’), *necessitas* (‘necessity’), *affectus* (‘longing’) and *cura* (‘anxiety’).<sup>595</sup> These passions pull or push the mind towards consenting to superfluous acts; acts that can be instrumental in training. As Hugh writes:

We strive restlessly to escape what we fear (*timemus*) may take place. We strive restlessly to distance ourselves from what makes us grieve (*dolemus*) when it happens. We strive restlessly to obtain what we long to acquire. And so after the feeling that arises from a passion (*post affectionem passionis*), comes the anxiety of restlessness (*cura sollicitudinis*). And after the anxiety of restlessness comes effort in the opportunity for training in doing something. And with the opportunity for training in doing something, the precaution of being careful (*cautela circumspectionis*) increases... the result is that for evil pursuits we easily acquire the precaution of being careful which we have neglected in to establish in our good pursuits.<sup>596</sup>

The circumspection gained from these passions in turn stimulates the discipline and patience necessary to generate virtue.<sup>597</sup> In this training an *affectus* becomes transformed into *dilectio*, a higher form of love. Following the accumulation of virtue, the canon can fully enjoy the culmination of their spiritual growth: the contemplation of God. However, when describing this act, it is as equally as affective as it is intellective: ‘God is the food’, Hugh writes,

<sup>594</sup> *Fructibus*, PL 176, 1004B: ‘Affectus est concepto per fidem sancto gaudio pii amoris in proximum effusio.’

<sup>595</sup> *Archa Noe*, 3.11 (PL 176, 659A-661B; VTT 5, pp. 186-89).

<sup>596</sup> *Archa Noe*, 3.11 (PL 176, 659A-B; VTT 5, p. 187): ‘Quod enim timemus incidere sollicite studemus evitare, et quod dolemus adesse sollicite studemus a nobis remove, et quod desideramus adipisci, sollicite studemus obtinere; et sic post affectionem passionis requiritur cura sollicitudinis et post curam sollicitudinis sequitur conatus in exercitio operationis, et per exercitium operationis crescit cautela circumspectionis... in bonis studiis comparare negleximus per mala studia facile acquiramus.’

<sup>597</sup> *Archa Noe*, 3.12-15 (PL 176, 661B-662A; VTT 5, pp. 189-191).

‘Contemplation is the refreshment about which the Psalmist says: *With your face, you shall fill me with joy; in your right hand [are] delights until the end* (Psalm 15:11).<sup>598</sup>

More so than other authors, when we compare the presentation of affectivity across multiple works it is apparent that the emotionality of human beings has both positive and negative emphases for Hugh of Saint-Victor. In *De unione corporis et spiritus*, for instance, we encounter perhaps Hugh’s most negative account of the affections. Here, the *affectus* is not explicitly designated as a power of the soul yet Hugh’s own *liber de anima* does reveal the mechanisms underpinning his understanding of the connection between perception and affectivity. This treatise sets out the two realities – body and spirit – which comprise the human being, each ontologically distinct from the other and incapable of interaction without a medium.<sup>599</sup> As the highest corporeal substance, the imagination is the ‘fiery force’ (*vis ignea*) capable of serving as the medium between both the lower bodily senses (*sensus*) and the superior powers of reason (*ratio*) and intelligence/wisdom (*intelligentia sive sapientia*) enacted by the spirit.<sup>600</sup> Hugh uses the analogy of Jacob’s Ladder to explain how these increasingly purified powers of perception enable the individual to know God. He writes:

Subsequently in the incorporeal spirit, immediately after the body, there is the affect of the imagination (*affectio imaginaria*), by which the soul is affected (*afficitur*) through its conjunction with the body, and above it is reason, which acts on the imagination. Then, above the imagination, pure reason exists, and in it there is the highest reality of the soul in the ascending progression starting from the bodies.<sup>601</sup>

Consequently, in *De unione corporis et spiritus*, imagination’s position as the medium between bodily and spiritual reality gives it importance. Mirroring corporeal perception, affectivity serves as a form of spiritual perception: the medium being the soul’s perception of the images in the imagination rather than the bodily object itself.

However, since the goal of the spirit is to advance and assume the nature of God, in this hierarchical account of the human being, the affections are considered in a negative light due to their origin from, and association with, the bodily senses. If the meeting of spirit and body retains its natural hierarchy with spirit in control, the spirit may undergo a ‘change’ but not a corruption (*mutatio habet et non habet corruptio*) and therefore is not forced beyond the

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<sup>598</sup> *Archa Noe*, 3.16 (PL 176, 662B; VTT 4, p. 191).

<sup>599</sup> *Unione*, 1 (PL 177, 285A; Piazzoni, p. 883).

<sup>600</sup> *Ibid*, 11 and 13 (PL 177, 287B-D; Piazzoni, pp. 885-887).

<sup>601</sup> *Ibid*, 19 (PL 177, 288D-289A; Piazzoni, p. 888): ‘Postea in spiritu incorporeo proxima post corpus est affectio imaginaria, qua anima ex corporis conjunctione afficitur, supra quam est ratio in imaginationem agens. Deinde ratio pura supra imaginationem, in qua ratione supremum est animae a corpore sursum.’

boundaries of its nature.<sup>602</sup> Nonetheless, it is more common, Hugh suggests, for the spirit's capacity for reasoning to be debased by the love issuing from the corporeal *affectiones* – a process whereby the imagination darkens the light of reason and disfigures its nature by covering it 'like a skin' (*quasi pellis*).<sup>603</sup> The imagination is implicated with the images of corporeal bodies, and Hugh repeatedly refers to the imagination as a 'shadow' (*umbra*) that 'darkens' (*obumbrate*) reason, if immoderate.<sup>604</sup> This damaging and darkening of the mind can become permanent if the bodily delights of the affections continue to overwhelm the spirit: '...the soul, insofar as it is affected by bodily enjoyments (*afficitur delectatione corporis*), derives from it, so to speak, a certain materialization, and thus is deformed by the fantasies of bodily imaginations', *De unione corporis et spiritus* states.<sup>605</sup> Indeed, for those who become so enslaved to corporeal pleasure can find the spiritual essence of their soul has become entirely bodily and therefore retains these affections even after the separation of soul and body upon death. The soul 'cannot be liberated from these [affections], not even when it is released from the body', Hugh writes, 'because they are deeply impressed upon it'.<sup>606</sup>

Consequently, *De unione corporis et spiritus* is mainly concerned with setting out the hierarchical ordering of bodily and spiritual realities. When the relationship between body and spirit is ordered according to nature, man is able to cultivate a positive affective relationship between bodily things, his spirit and God. It is a consequence of original sin, though, that this order is subverted and difficult to re-establish and maintain. Elsewhere Hugh would present this relationship through an agrarian analogy, in which human nature represents the estate (*villa*) of God, the spirit is the steward (*villicus*), and the soul's powers of intellect (*intellectus*), affectivity (*affectus*), sense (*sensus*) and human appetite (*appetitus humani*) function are farmers (*coloni*).<sup>607</sup> Working together, the soul's capacities are able to cultivate the farm, producing spiritual virtues. Yet, as Hugh remarks, following original sin these powers became corrupted from their original goal. The powers 'that ought to serve... are depraved by blame' and become 'separated from the good' (*dissidet bono*).<sup>608</sup>

By contrast, using this same psychological foundation established in *De unione corporis et spiritus*, we encounter a much more optimistic account of the bodily senses

<sup>602</sup> Ibid, 17 (PL 177, 288C; Piazzoni, pp. 887-888).

<sup>603</sup> Ibid, 16 (PL 177, 288B; Piazzoni, p. 887).

<sup>604</sup> Ibid, 14 and 15 (PL 177, 288B; Piazzoni, p. 887).

<sup>605</sup> Ibid, 18 (PL 177, 288C-D; Piazzoni, p. 888): '...anima, in quantum delectatione corporis afficitur quasi quamdam corpulentiam trahens, in eadem phantasiis imaginationum corporalium deformatur'

<sup>606</sup> Ibid, 18 (PL 177, 288D; Piazzoni, p. 888): '...eisdemque alte impressis etiam soluta corpore non exuitur.'

<sup>607</sup> *Allegoriae in Novum Testamentum*, 4.23 (PL 175, 821B).

<sup>608</sup> Ibid, 4.23 (PL 175, 821D).

stimulating affections in Hugh's *Homilae in Ecclesiasten* (*Homilies on Ecclesiastes*). Here, Hugh maintains that it is through 'knowledge and feeling (*cognitio et affectus*) that the rational soul is totally guided: the wisdom from knowledge enables the soul to discover the truth (*veritas*); the love of the *affectus* enables it to love virtue (*virtus*).<sup>609</sup> Translating *affectus* as 'feeling' is appropriate in this passage since, using the epistemology set out in his *De anima* treatise, Hugh shows clearly how corporeal, sensory feelings stimulate the immediate delight of the soul through its affections.

And so that even the outer things would serve the rational soul, there are two instruments of the senses in the human body, so that through them the notions of visible things would gain entrance into the soul and either bring about in her wisdom or virtue if it were not there, or increase it if it were only small. Thus the essence of things enters through the sight and the meaning of sounds through hearing, and both bring forth knowledge (*scientia*). Again, the form of things entering through sight, and the melody of words through hearing inflame the mind to delight. As often as the sight is affected (*afficitur*) from the outside through the appearance of things, or hearing is caressed by the sweetness of sounds, the mind inwardly is awake with marvellous affections (*miris affectionibus*), answering to that by which it feels itself touched from the outside. And it happens sometimes that through the sweetness which it draws from the corporeal sense it returns to the recollection of invisible goods, and somehow through similitude, admonished by an inexpressible desire, begins to long for that by which it is aware that it has perceived as it were a shadow and an image in the corporeal affect (*in affectu corporali quasi umbram et imaginem*).<sup>610</sup>

In her reading of this passage, Ineke van 't Spijkjer is correct to assert that the Victorine magister doesn't always regard affect as an autonomous, willed reaction – feelings can be provoked by sensory stimuli just as much as they can be 'man's reaction, or rather the will's reaction' to these same perceptions.<sup>611</sup> The difference in this example is that instead of the affections obscuring the intellect, the feelings they elicit are considered good in themselves. As Hugh notes, these affections are essential for training the soul in virtue. Drawing on

<sup>609</sup> Hugh of Saint-Victor, *In Salomonis Ecclesiasten Homiliae XIX*, 19 (PL 175, 141B-D): 'Tota ergo animae rationalis his duobus regitur, id est cognitio et affectu, ut per sapientiam quidem veritatem inveniatur, per amorem autem amplectatur virtutem.'

<sup>610</sup> Ibid, 19 (PL 175, 141B-D): 'Ut igitur ob beatitudinem rationali animae enim exteriora servirent, posita sunt in corpore humano haec duo instrumenta sensuum, ut per ea ad animam notions visibilium ingederentur atque in ipsa sapientiam sive virtutem, vel si omnino non esset, efficerent, vel si minus esset augerent. Ergo essentia rerum per visum ad animam ingreditur, et vocum significatio per auditum scientiam pariunt. Forma vero rerum per visum intrans, et melodia vocum per auditum ad iocunditatem animi accendunt. Quoties enim foris sive rerum specie visus afficitur, sive auditus vocum dulcedine demulcetur, evigilat animus intus affectibus, illi quo exterius tactum se sentit, respondens. Et fit nonnumquam, ut per eam quam sensu corporeo trahit dulcedinem, redeat ad invisibilium bonorum recordationem et quodammod ex similitudine, admonitus inenarrabili desiderio illud incipiat concupiscere: cuius quasi umbram et imaginem in affectu corporali se sentit percepisse.'

<sup>611</sup> Van 't Spijkjer, 'Ad commovendos affectus', p. 226.

positive or affirmative theology, due to their likeness, sense perceptions from without can inflame the soul to desire and meditate upon invisible spiritual truths. This is a subversion of the language in *De unione corporis et spiritus*: the soul is drawn to spiritual images as if they are a ‘shadow’ and ‘image’ of delights from bodily affectivity.

Overall, despite their contrasting outlooks on the senses, one negative, one positive both *De unione corporis et spiritus* and Hugh’s homilies show how these senses, whether curbed or encouraged, are essential to the canon’s training virtue. Further, there is no doubt in Hugh’s writings that we are encountering a complementary relationship between feeling and thinking, ‘an affective-hermeneutical circle... a constant interaction between *affectus* and understanding’.<sup>612</sup>

We can gain further insight to Hugh’s understanding of affectivity from both smaller works, such as in *De modo orandi* (*On the Power of Prayer*) and *De meditatione* (*On Meditation*), in addition to his monumental *summa*, *De sacramentis Christianae fidei*. In *De modo orandi*, the ‘dispositions’ (*affectūs*) of the mind in prayer can attach the soul to God in several ways. For Hugh, the physical sounds produced by the mouth in speaking the words of prayer are not enough to communicate with God effectively; instead, a relevant *affectus* is required, of which *De modo orandi* identifies nine. The nine *affectūs* are organised according to three subdivisions: (1) those indicating praise (love, awe and joy); (2) those expressing wretchedness (humility, sadness and fear); and those (3) directed towards examples of bad conduct: the accusation of adversaries (indignation, zeal and assurance).<sup>613</sup>

While these affectivities in prayer are considered as different modes of communication, they are, nonetheless, consistently understood as interconnected with the faculty of knowledge. Victorine prayer is founded on meditation. A sub-category of meditation, that is moral meditation, focuses the mind to consider thoughts and affects.<sup>614</sup> Meditation is affective when it considers the correct object of love: that is, the aforementioned Augustinian teaching determining what is useful and the degree it should be enjoyed. Yet, significantly, mediation on thoughts always involves an affective dimension: ‘Regarding thoughts we have to reflect on whether they are pure and well-ordered. They are pure when they neither originate from evil affections, nor generate evil affections’, Hugh

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<sup>612</sup> Ibid, p. 234.

<sup>613</sup> *Mod. or.*, 14.2 (PL 176, 985B-C; VTT 4, p. 341). Feiss relates these in VTT 4, p. 329. The best discussion of these nine *affectus* has been by Karin Ganss: ‘Affectivity and Knowledge’, pp. 455-456.

<sup>614</sup> *Meditatione*, 3.1. (PL 176, 994C; SC 155, pp. 48-49; VTT 4, p. 388): ‘Meditatio in moribus secundum affectus, et cogitationes, et opera.’

exclaims.<sup>615</sup> In the Victorine magister's taxonomy of prayer meditation first produces 'knowledge' (*scientia*); second, knowledge leads to 'compunction' (*compunctio*); and finally, compunction enkindles the 'devotion' (*devotio*) necessary to love God with the necessary *affectus*.<sup>616</sup> 'Devotion is a loving and humble feeling toward God, which is engendered from compunction' (*Devotio est pius et humilis affectus in Deum, qui ex compunctione generatur*), *De modo orandi* claims.<sup>617</sup>

The entangled boundaries of affect and intellect become especially prominent in the role of the memory. Each of the nine affects are drawn upon when recollecting certain parts of scripture:

...the feeling of love (*affectus dilectionis*) arises from remembrance of goodness, the feeling of wonder (*affectus admirationis*) arises from remembrance of power and strength, and the feeling of joy (*affectus congratulationis*) arises from remembrance of some favourable outcome or happy deed. The three following feelings pertain to that kind of Scriptures which recalls unhappiness and misery, because the feeling of humility (*affectus humilitatis*) arises from remembrance of one's own weakness, the feeling of sorrow (*affectus doloris*) arises from remembrance of present and past evils, and the feeling of fear (*affectus timoris*) from foreseeing future evils. The last three feelings connect more to that form of Scriptures in which there is inveighing and accusation against adversaries, namely, indignation [*affectus indignationis*] against their vileness, zeal [*affectus zeli*] against their injustice, greater assurance [*affectus praesumptionis*] regarding the mercy of God because of their wickedness.<sup>618</sup>

As this passage and others throughout the text show, the 'recollection' (*commemorationis*) of past thoughts regarding scripture amplifies devotion.<sup>619</sup> Therefore, thought and love are complementary since past experiences drawn from sense perception are utilised by the canon in Hugh's system of prayer, since it is the purposeful consideration of the memories of past

<sup>615</sup> Ibid, 3.1 (PL 176, 995A; SC 155, pp. 50-51; VTT 4, p. 389): 'In cogitationibus considerandum ut sint munda et ordinatae. Munda sunt quando neque de malis affectionibus generantur, neque malas generant affectiones.'

<sup>616</sup> *Mod. or.*, 5.1 (PL 176, 978D-979A; VTT 4, p. 333).

<sup>617</sup> Ibid, 5.1 (PL 176, 979A; VTT 4, p. 333).

<sup>618</sup> Ibid, 14.3 (PL 176, 985C-986A; VTT 4, p. 341): '...surgit affectus dilectionis, ex commemoratione potentiae et fortitudinis surgit affectus admirationis, ex commemoratione autem alicuius prosperi eventus et facti felicitis surgit affectus congratulationis. Tres sequentes ad illud genus peritent, in quo fit commemoratio infelicitatis et miseriae. Quia videlicet affectus humilitatis surgit ex commemoratione propriae infirmitatis, affectus doloris, surgit ex commemoratione malorum praesentium, vel ex recordatione praeteritorum. Affectus timoris ex praevisione futurorum. Tres ultimi affectus illi magis Scripturarum generi congruent, in quo fit invectio et accusatio in adversarios videlicet contra nequitiam illorum, indignatio contra iniuriam, zelus propter malitiam, maior de Dei misericordia praesumptio.'

<sup>619</sup> Ibid, 12.2 (PL 176, 983C; VTT 4, p. 338).

perceptions throughout our life that move the heart to speak to God through a humble *affectus* – a view that would prove influential for other Victorines.<sup>620</sup>

Nor is this a one-way relationship. It is, as suggested previously, an intellectual-affective feedback loop, with each of the soul's powers stimulating the other. When singing the psalms or other scriptures, Hugh recommends his canons to

...expend every effort to rouse his heart to that feeling (*affectus*) to which he sees what he is saying most relates, because if he has the feeling of the words (*affectus verborum*) which he speaks, through that very feeling (*ipsius affectus*) he will know better the power of the words and grasp their understanding (*intelligentia*), and through the understanding of the words (*per intelligentiam verborum*) he will enkindle his feeling (*affectus*) to greater devotion (*devotio*).<sup>621</sup>

All the powers of the Augustine's trinitarian soul – intellect, will and memory – are 'activated' and respond to each other as if part of a circuit. In this Victorine bipartite psychology consisting of affect and intellect, the *affectus* promotes the *intelligentia* to greater knowledge, which, in turn, strengthens the initial *affectus*.

Hugh was not alone in seeking to understand the affections in prayer. Peter Abelard taught that words were not necessary to speak with God; prayer is an act associated not with the senses but with the intellect.<sup>622</sup> Serlo of Wilton (d. 1181), originally a Cluniac monk and then a Cistercian at Aumône in Normandy, also concerned himself with better understanding the intersection of the affection, thought and will in prayer. Compare Hugh's *De modo orandi* to the Cistercian monk Serlo of Wilton's (d. 1181) exposition of the Lord's Prayer.

See how the Lord teaches us to pray, that our petitions may become known to God in a triple way: that our intention (*intentio*) may be directed to the Father, our understanding (*intellectus*) enlightened by the Son and our affection (*affectus*) enkindled by the holy Spirit. Thus also our spirit (*animus*), no longer animal but spiritual, understanding and loving (*intelligens et diligens*), may project its yearning (*desiderium*) to the height in an aroma most sweet to the Lord.<sup>623</sup>

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<sup>620</sup> Ganss, 'Affectivity and Knowledge', pp. 462-463. For Richard's use of Hugh's *De modo orandi* see *Quest.* 9 (Colker, line 5, p. 211; VTT 10, 9, p. 286): 'Oracio siquidem si fit sonitu vocis et non affectu cordis, inanis est' (If prayer occurs in the sound of the voice but not in the affect of the heart, it is in vain).

<sup>621</sup> *Mod. or.* 12.3 (PL 176, 984A; VTT 4, p. 339): '...diligenter consideret cui affectui serviant, et ad illum affectum toto nisu cor suum excitet, ad quem id quod loquitur magis pertinere videt, quia si verborum quae loquitur affectum habuerit, per affectum ipsum melius verborum virtutem cognoscet, et intelligentiam capiet, et per verborum intelligentiam in maiorem devotionem affectum ascendet'

<sup>622</sup> S. R. Kramer, "'We Speak to God with our Thoughts': Abelard and the Implications of Private Communication with God", *Church History*, 69:1 (2000), p. 27.

<sup>623</sup> Serlo of Wilton, *The Lord's Prayer*, 4, tr. L. Braceland, SJ, in *Serlo of Savigny and Serlo of Wilton: Seven Unpublished Works*, CFS 48 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1988), lines 301-305, pp. 102-103: 'Ecce sic dominus orare nos docet, ut tripliciter innotescant petitiones nostre apud deum, scilicet, ut ad patrem



Much like his Victorine counterpart, Serlo clearly considered the intellective and affective faculties as mutually reinforcing in the act of prayer. Likewise, William of Saint-Thierry's *Epistola ad fratres Monte-Dei* includes a section on prayer, outlining four kinds: petition, supplication, prayer, and supplication. 'Prayer is the state of mind (*affectus*) of a man who clings to God, a certain familiar and devout conversation, a state in which the enlightened mind enjoys (*ad fruendum*) God as long as it is permitted', William notes.<sup>624</sup> While no Cistercian sought to systematise the affectivities of prayer to the same degree as Hugh of Saint-Victor, William perhaps best captured the intermingling of affectivity and understanding involved in prayer through his catchphrase *Amor ipse intellectus est*. The very act of deciding to pray to God is a form of understanding, since prayer is an act of faith and belief in God: 'he reaches out to him in state of mind (*affectus*), and love itself is understanding for him'.<sup>625</sup>

Hugh of Saint-Victor's most profound enquiry into perception and affectivity can be found in his influential synthesis of Christian doctrine, *De sacramentis Christianae fidei*. Here, Hugh goes as far to define *fides* or 'faith' as affectivity and cognition: 'Faith consists in two things: knowledge and affectivity, that is the constancy and firmness of believing.'<sup>626</sup> In speaking of *constantia* or 'constancy', the Victorine was employing the language of Saint Augustine. The purpose of life on earth for Augustine was to strive as much as possible to convert temporal and changeable affections (*affectiones*) into *constantiae* – spiritual, immovable affections, united eternally to God's will.<sup>627</sup> To do so necessitates growing in faith and requires the development of the affective and cognitive capacities of the soul. 'Faith grows according to cognition, when it is instructed unto knowledge', Hugh remarks, and 'it increases according to affection, when it is excited unto devotion (*ad devotionem*) and is

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dirigatur intention, et intellectus illuminetur a filio, et affectus inflammetur a spiritu sancto, sicque iam spiritalis non animalis animus, et intelligens et diligens, desiderium iaculetur in altissima, in odorem suavissimum domino.'

<sup>624</sup> *Ep. frat.*, 179 (PL 184, 337A; CCCM 88, lines 1297-1299; CFS 12, p. 71): 'Oratio vero est hominis Deo adhaerentis affectio, et familiaris quaedam et pia allocutio, et statio illuminatae mentis ad fruendum, quamdiu licet.'

<sup>625</sup> *Ep. frat.*, 173 (PL 184, 336A; CCCM 88, lines 1249-1250, p. 264; CFS 12, p. 68): '...tantum ei in affectu est et ei amor ipse intellectus est.'

<sup>626</sup> *Sacr.*, 1.10.3 (PL 176, 331B; Berndt, p. 227; Deferrari, p. 169): 'Duo sunt in quibus fides constat: cognitio et affectus, is est constantia vel firmitas credendi.'

<sup>627</sup> J. D. Teubner, 'The Failure of *affectus*: *Affectiones* and *constantiae* in Augustine of Hippo', *Before Emotion*, pp. 9-25 (esp. p. 15). The importance of *constantiae* to Hugh's understanding of *mutabilitas* and *stabilitas* are explored in chapters 3 and 6.

strengthened unto constancy (*ad constantiam*).<sup>628</sup> Hugh even uses these two powers to create a typology of types of believers, ranging from the truly faithful who use both faculties and possess pure affection and certain cognition, to those who refuse to cultivate either (see Table 8).<sup>629</sup>

*De sacramentis Christianae fidei* is important because the section detailing the virtues and vices (book II, part 13) discusses the *affectiones* and their relationship with virtue. Like the other Cistercian *De anima* treatises we have explored, Hugh identifies four key affections: fear, pain, love and hope (*dolor, timor, amor, spes*).<sup>630</sup> Of these, two key ‘movements of the heart’ (*motus cordis*) are singled out, that of fear and love (*caritas*). Hugh defines fear as ‘the affect of the mind by which it is moved to give way to a superior’ (*timor est affectus mentis quo movetur ut superiori cedat*), associating fear with the soul’s ability to avoid harm and evil.<sup>631</sup> Fear is sub-divided into two good types and two evil types: the evil types are ‘servile’ fear (*servilis*) and ‘mundane’ (*mundanis*) fear, which represent the abstaining from evil to avoid punishment and abstaining from good to avoid punishment, respectively; the two good types are ‘initial fear’ and ‘filial fear’, the rejection of evil thoughts to avoid punishment and the clinging towards good through fear of loss.<sup>632</sup> By contrast, love is the attractive power of the soul. Placing his examination of love in a canonical context, Hugh specifies two types of *caritas*: love of God and love of neighbour.<sup>633</sup>

	Affection	Cognition
<b>Truly Faithful</b>	Purity of heart senses and chooses what to believe	Reason confirms the choice, and intelligence apprehends certainty
<b>Faithful</b>	Belief by piety alone	No cognition
<b>Rational</b>	No affection	Use of reason to approve what to believe
<b>Secular</b>	Sometimes struck by feelings of divine grace and encouraged to reflect on himself yet this only leads to greater confusion	Receive sacraments but do not consider Christian teachings

<sup>628</sup> *Sacr.*, 1.10.4 (PL 176, 332B-C; Berndt, p. 228; Deferrari, p. 170): ‘Secundum cognitionem, fides crescit quando eruditur ad scientiam. Secundum affectum crescit, quando ad devotionem excitatur et robratur ad constantiam.’

<sup>629</sup> *Sacr.*, 1.10.4 (PL 176, 332D-333D; Berndt, pp. 229-230; Deferrari, pp. 170-171).

<sup>630</sup> *Cont.*, 4 (Baron, p. 58).

<sup>631</sup> *Sacr.*, 2.13.4 (PL 176, 527C; Deferrari, p. 377).

<sup>632</sup> *Sacr.*, 2.13.5 (PL 176, 528A-B; Deferrari, pp. 377-378). *Cont.* 4 (Baron, p. 58) also relates servile fear.

<sup>633</sup> *Sacr.*, 2.13.6 (PL 176, 528D-531B; Deferrari, pp. 378).

Table 8. Typology of the faithful in *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* 1.10.4.

These two affections are significant for two reasons. First, they comprise the axis by which Hugh elaborates the positive and negative affectivities of the soul. ‘When these two are good, they effect (*efficiunt*) all good’, Hugh notes, ‘For through fear evils are avoided; through love goods are practised’.<sup>634</sup> Nonetheless, when either fear or love become inclined to evil ‘they are the cause of all evils’.<sup>635</sup> Using a metaphor commonly applied to the senses, Hugh views the affections of fear and love as the two ‘gates’ (*portae*) through which life and death enter to soul.<sup>636</sup>

Second, Hugh’s understanding of affectivity in *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* represents a change in Hugh’s understanding of virtue over time. In his prior *Didascalicon*, the following definition of virtue had been provided: ‘Virtue is a habit of mind congruent to the measure of nature and to reason’ (*Virtus est habitus animi in modum naturae rationi consentaneus*).<sup>637</sup> However, by the time of writing *De sacramentis Christianae fidei*, Hugh had altered his definition to make affectivity the key arbiter of virtuous conduct. ‘Virtue is nothing other than an affect of the mind ordered according to reason’ (*Virtus namque nihil aliud est quam affectus mentis secundum rationem ordinatus*), he says.<sup>638</sup> Thus, positive affectivity is associated with a *habitus* that promotes the spiritual health (*sanitas*), virtue, justice and integrity of the soul. Negative affectivity, by contrast, involves spiritual sickness, vice, injustice and corruption. Indeed, *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* provides a second definition of virtue as

a kind of sanity and integrity of the rational soul whose corruption is called vice. Truly a work of justice is in the movement of the rational mind which advances according to God, arising from a conception of the heart and proceeding to the completion of the corporeal act.<sup>639</sup>

<sup>634</sup> *Sacr.*, 2.13.3 (PL 176, 527B; Deferrari, pp. 377): ‘Haec duo cum bona sunt omne bonum efficiunt. Per timorem enim mala caventur; per amorem bona exercentur.’

<sup>635</sup> *Sacr.*, 2.13.3 (PL 176, 527B; Deferrari, pp. 377): ‘Cum autem mala sunt, omnium malorum initium et causa existunt.’

<sup>636</sup> *Sacr.*, 2.13.3 (PL 176, 527C; Deferrari, pp. 377).

<sup>637</sup> *Did.*, 1.5 (PL 176, 809C; Buttner, p. 12; Taylor, pp. 51-52); This definition is also used by Richard of Saint-Victor in *Exceptione* 1.4 (PL 177, 193C; VTT 3, p. 301).

<sup>638</sup> *Sacr.*, 1.6.17 (PL 176, 273B-C; Berndt, lines 15-16, p. 148; Deferrari, p. 105). Richard of Saint-Victor would also use this definition in *XII patr.*, 7 (PL 196, 6B; SC 419, p. 108; Zinn, pp. 59-60). Several definitions of virtue are also listed in *De contemplatione et eius speciebus* although curiously not Hugh’s updated one (see *Cont.*, 4, Baron, p. 59).

<sup>639</sup> *Sacr.*, 2.13.2 (PL 176, 526C-D; Deferrari, p. 376): ‘Virtus enim quasi quaedam sanitas est et integritas animae rationalis, cujus corruptio vitium vocatur. Opus vero iustitiae est in motu mentis rationalis, qui secundum Deum incedit, a cordis conceptione surgens, et foras usque ad actionis corporalis completionem procedens.’

From these two definitions, the Victorine *magister* makes it clear that positive affectivity is the full alignment of the inner affections of the heart with the exterior actions of justice.

Thus, while Hugh does not hold a systematic view of affectivity it is nonetheless possible to see that affectivity throughout his writings is conceived as actions that promote justice and love in the soul, training the person in habits of discipline. For instance, one can draw a parallel between the *Didascalicon*, *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* and *Allegoriae in Novum Testamentum*. In these allegories, Hugh defines a vice as a corrupt *affectus*. ‘A vice is a corruption of natural longing beyond order, and beyond measure’ (*Vitium autem est corruptio naturalis affectus praeter ordinem, et extra mensuram*).<sup>640</sup> In this passage, Hugh would go furthest in giving priority to the *affectus* in orientating the soul to God. Associating vice entirely with feeling, the seven vices, he says, are caused by seven ‘corrupt affections’ (*corruptiones affectionis*).<sup>641</sup> True spiritual health requires both just affections and correct understanding, yet it is the affections that are primarily responsible for developing the virtue necessary for the loving God. Hugh states that

The integrity of the natural spirit consists in truth and goodness: in truth, when it understands; in goodness, when it loves. Thus knowledge is corrupted through ignorance, as the rational soul is thrust into a certain shame; and love is corrupted through concupiscence, which is the deformity of the soul; but sincerity of love, is the health of the soul. For this reason, it is a greater vice to not love the good, than to not know the truth: for it follows that the will, is justly regarded to blame... On this account all merit consists by affect; you are not able to discern justice nor blame except in the affect of the rational will.<sup>642</sup>

Hence, in this passage, the *affectus* comes close to being identified with *voluntas* or ‘will’.

### **Achard of Saint-Victor**

Following Hugh, in Achard of Saint-Victor’s *De discretionem animae, spiritus et mentis*, it is the *affectus* and *intellectus* that reflects man’s creation in God’s likeness and image. Also called *voluntas* and *ratio*, the capacities to will and reason form the ‘basic structure’ of the soul – a duality no doubt reflecting Hugh’s influence.<sup>643</sup> Affectivity for Achard is considered as a wilful and intentional attraction towards the good. As he puts it, ‘love is a pleasant bond

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<sup>640</sup> *Allegoriae in Vetus Testamentum*, 2.3 (PL 175, 774B).

<sup>641</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.3 (PL 175, 775A).

<sup>642</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.3 (PL 175, 774C-D).

<sup>643</sup> See Németh, *Quasi aurora consurgens*, p. 250.

that draws no one who is not willing'.<sup>644</sup> Achard's *De anima* treatise discerns three divisions of the soul: *anima*, *spiritus* and *mens*. In this tripartite model, *anima* or 'soul' is the lowest part of the hierarchy and is identifiable with the power of *sensus* ('sensation') and *sensualitas* ('sensory inclination'). While *sensus* is the power of sensation, *sensualitas* reflects how the power is used, specifically how it delights in sensory objects. 'When you perceive something by sight, or hearing, or any other sense, and desire it and take delight in it, such a perception pertains to sense', Achard notes, 'while the desire and the delight (*appetitus et delectatio*) pertain to sensory inclination'.<sup>645</sup> Even emotions to some degree are connected with sensory inclination: 'Even when you are not affected by delight but by a contrary passion (*passio*) from what you sense, and you do not desire it but loathe and flee it, these also occur in the same sensory inclination.'<sup>646</sup> The senses are in contact with the *spiritus*, the middling part of the hierarchy, which is identifiable with the imagination. Since each part of the soul is an image and likeness of the other, the spirit works on similar principles to the soul, except the way by which it is affected isn't by matter but the images of matter:

As the perception of the spirit is formed according to the perception of the soul, so too its affection imitates the affection of the soul. Just as the latter is affected by the properties of bodily things, in a similar way the former is affected by the images of those properties. The spirit has, then, the power of perceiving non-bodily images of bodily things according to a likeness of the senses and of being affected by them according to the likeness of the sensory appetite. Thus, to the spirit pertains whatever we do or undergo during dreams...<sup>647</sup>

The highest part of the soul is the *mens* or 'mind'. The mind contains primarily the powers of *affectus* and *intellectus* yet it is also the place of memory, these three parts making it an image of the trinity.

When all these substances are ordered in their natural hierarchy – mind controlling spirit, spirit controlling soul – the human organism is unified. However, as Achard observes,

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<sup>644</sup> Achard of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 15.2 (CFS, p. 300).

<sup>645</sup> *Discretione.*, 36 (Haring, p. 182; CS 165, p. 365): 'Cum quid enim visu vel auditu sive quolibet alio sensu percipis et id appetis vel in eo delectaris, ipsa quidem perception ad sensum perinet; appetitus vero et delectatio ad sensualitatem.'

<sup>646</sup> Ibid, 37 (Haring, p. 182; CS 165, p. 365): 'Quando etiam ex eo, quod sentis, non delectatione sed contraria afficeris passione nec id appetis abhorres et fugis, haec quoque in eadem fiunt sensualitate.'

<sup>647</sup> Ibid, 48-49 (Haring, pp. 184-185; CS 165, p. 368): 'Quemadmodum autem perceptio spiritus secundum animae formatur perceptionem, sic et ipsius affectio illius imitatur affectionem. Prout illa namque ex rerum corporalium afficitur proprietatibus, in modum consimilem et iste ex illarum proprietatum afficitur imaginibus. Est igitur spiritus potentia corporalium imagines non corporales iuxta sensus similitudinem percipiendi et ex eis ad similitudinem sensualitatis afficiendi. Ad spiritum itaque pertinent quaecumque in somnis...'

this unity is difficult to achieve because the *spiritus* has a natural affection for the lower, sensuousness of *anima*, rather than supporting the activities of *mens*.

Although soul is connected to flesh and to spirit without any intermediary, and spirit is similarly connected to soul and to mind, by a kind of kinship soul seems to have a greater affinity to spirit than to flesh, and spirit a greater affinity to soul than to mind... Although consubstantial with soul and mind, spirit, in what concerns its perceptions and affections, is more closely conformed to soul than mind.<sup>648</sup>

The consequence of this affinity between *spiritus* and *anima*, as Mohammad Ilkhani has suggested, is that Achard's treatise also contains a less obvious bipartite vision of the soul. Whereas the *mens* is concerned with thought and the wisdom of God, the soul and spirit are concerned more with experiential knowledge.<sup>649</sup> *De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis*, thus, offers two schemas of the soul: one threefold model (*anima/spiritus/mens*) related to the purity and hierarchy of the soul's powers, and another focused on the outcome and intention of these powers (world/God; experience/wisdom).

Division	Hierarchy	Power	Description
<i>Mens</i> (‘mind’)	Top / Innermost	<i>Intellectus</i> (‘understanding’)	The power of knowing
		<i>Affectus / Voluntas</i> (‘affectivity’ / ‘will’)	The power of loving / willing
		<i>Memoria mentis</i> (‘memory of the mind’)	Memory of things perceived neither by soul nor spirit (i.e., divine revelation)
<i>Spiritus</i> (‘spirit’)	Middle	<i>Imaginaria memoria</i> (‘imaginary memory’)	Memory of images of corporeal things stored in the spirit
		<i>Imaginatio</i> (‘imagination’)	The power of perceiving the images of things
<i>Anima</i> (‘soul’)	Bottom / Exterior	<i>Sensualitas</i> (‘sensory inclination’)	The power of desiring and taking delight in corporeal things
		<i>Sensus</i> (‘sense’)	The power of perceiving corporeal things in themselves

<sup>648</sup> Ibid, 62 (Haring, p. 188; CS 165, p. 371): ‘Quamvis autem absque medio anima coniuncta sit carni et spiritui, spiritus quoque et animae et menti, cognatione tamen quadam anima ad spiritum quam ad carnem, et spiritus ad animam quam ad mentem maiorem habere videtur affinitatem... etsi consubstantialis animae et menti, in perceptionibus tamen et affectionibus suis magis accedit ad conformitatem animae quam mentis.’

<sup>649</sup> Ilkhani, *La philosophie de la creation chez Achard de Saint-Victor*, p. 46.

Table 9. Achard of Saint-Victor's Psychology of Mind in *De discretion animae, spiritus et mentis*

### Richard of Saint-Victor

Of the Victorines, Richard of Saint-Victor is generally considered as an expert in mystical contemplation not love. Yet, love plays a key role in his psychological system. Richard applies an intellectual-affective division to the soul his *De quatuor gradibus violentiae caritatis* (*The Four Degrees of Violent Love*) using the terms *ratio/intellectus* and *caritas/dilectio/amor/affectio*. In this text, Richard gives priority to love as the four steps in uniting itself with God, yet loving and thinking are considered as equally necessary to the process of mystical union, with love spurring on thoughts directed at God and then ensuring their stability. Richard's *De quatuor gradibus violentiae caritatis* thus reveals how an ordered affectivity creates ordered perception and intellection. Each degree of love affects the soul, strengthening its perceptive, loving and understanding capacities: firstly divine charity 'wounds' (*vulnere*) by affection, secondly it 'binds' (*ligare*) thoughts to affection, thirdly it 'excludes' (*excludere*) all other thoughts and affections not centred on God, lastly desire becomes insatiable (see Table 10).

	Degree of Love			
	1	2	3	4
<b>Effect of Love</b> <sup>650</sup>	Wounding	Binding	Excluding	Insatiability
<b>Characteristic</b> <sup>651</sup>	Unconquerable	Inseparable	Singular	Insatiable
<b>Strength of Love</b> <sup>652</sup>	Love of God with the heart	Love of God with entire heart	Love of God with entire soul	Love of God with all strength
<b>Type of Union</b> <sup>653</sup>	Betrothal	Marriage	Sexual Union	Childbirth
<b>Desires of the Soul</b> <sup>654</sup>	Thirsts for God	Thirsts toward God	Thirsts into God	Thirsts in accordance with God

<sup>650</sup> *Quat. grad.*, 2.6-16 (PL 196, 1209B-1213C; VTT 2, pp. 276-282).

<sup>651</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.17 (PL 196, 1213D; VTT 2, p. 282).

<sup>652</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.24 (PL 196, 1216B; VTT 2, p. 285-286).

<sup>653</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.26 (PL 196, 1216C-D; VTT 2, p. 286).

<sup>654</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.28 (PL 196, 1217A; VTT 2, p. 287).

<b>Movement of the Mind</b> <sup>655</sup>	God enters the mind; the mind retreats into itself	Mind ascends above itself and is lifted up to God	Mind passes into God completely	Mind goes out on account of God and descends beneath itself
<b>Direction of Procession</b> <sup>656</sup>	Procession into itself	Transcending itself	Procession into God	Procession towards others [neighbour]
<b>Method of Thought</b> <sup>657</sup>	Meditation	Contemplation	Jubilation	Compassion
<b>Change of the Mind</b> <sup>658</sup>	Lifting up of the mind		Transfiguration of the mind	
<b>Conformation of the Soul</b> <sup>659</sup>	Ascends toward itself	Transcends itself	Conformed to brightness of God	Conformed to humility of Christ

Table 10. Degrees of Love in *Quatuor gradibus violentiae caritatis*.

The interwoven nature of perception, affection and understanding becomes clear in Richard's description of these stages, For the Victorine, the initial wounding of the heart comes about by a 'fiery sting of desire' (*igneus...amoris aculeus*) that causes a person to become 'ablaze with desire' (*desiderio ardet*), and 'seethe with feeling' (*fervet affectu*).<sup>660</sup> Regarding this first grade of charity, Richard writes that: 'The Lord indeed enkindles emotion (*affectus*), but he does not yet illumine the intellect (*intellectus*). He inflames desire (*desiderium*), but he does not yet illumine the intellect.'<sup>661</sup> Consequently, the soul in this early state of loving is able 'to perceive' (*sentire*) God yet is unable 'to see' (*videre*) God intellectually.<sup>662</sup> The third grade is similar to a languor, Richard says, since the mind (*mens*) 'cannot itself move anywhere through thought or action unless its desire (*desiderium*) draws it there or its emotion (*affectus*) impels it.'<sup>663</sup>

<sup>655</sup> Ibid, 4.29 (PL 196, 1217C-D; VTT 2, p. 287).

<sup>656</sup> Ibid, 4.29 (PL 196, 1217D; VTT 2, p. 287).

<sup>657</sup> Ibid, 4.29 (PL 196, 1217D; VTT 2, p. 287).

<sup>658</sup> Ibid, 4.44 (PL 196, 1224C; VTT 2, p. 296).

<sup>659</sup> Ibid, 4.44 (PL 196, 1224C; VTT 2, p. 296).

<sup>660</sup> Ibid, 2.6 (PL 196, 1209D; VTT 2, pp. 276-277).

<sup>661</sup> Ibid, 4.32 (PL 196, 1218D; VTT 2, p. 289): 'Accendit namque affectum, sed nondum illuminat intellectum. Desiderium inflammat, sed intellectum non illuminat.'

<sup>662</sup> Ibid., 4.32 (PL 196, 1218D; VTT 2, p. 289 [translation modified]).

<sup>663</sup> Ibid., 2.11 (PL 196, 1211C-D; VTT 2, p. 270): 'Mens... nusquam se per cogitationem neque per actionem movet, nisi quo eam vel desiderium trahit vel affectus impellit.'



In line with the mainstay of Victorine anthropological thought, Richard views the inner hierarchy of the soul as being inverted by original sin. In one of his tractates, Richard espouses a view in which the ‘effective parts of the soul’ (*virtuales partes animae*) equal six in number: the corporeal sense (*sensus*), appetite (*appetitus*), memory (*memoria*), affection (*affectio*), reason (*ratio*) and intellect (*intelligentia*).<sup>664</sup> It is in *De statu interioris hominis*, though, a text where Richard is not concerned with affectivity proper but how affectivity becomes diseased, that we encounter Richard’s investigation into the disordered powers of the body and soul. *De statu interioris hominis* presents not a sixfold but a fourfold schema of the mind: Richard places affectivity or the *affectus* as a key movement of the body – a movement that naturally rules over both bodily motion (*motus corporis*) and sensual motion (*motus sensualitatis*). Under the conditions in the earthly paradise, affectivity was perfect, moderated by the movements of a free will led by reason: free choice (*liberum arbitrium*).<sup>665</sup> Richard says:

Even if some motion in man rises up against or contrary to the human will, then just as it only consents to the will by reason of its free choice, so it only comes forth into action by its permission. The sensual motion (*motus sensualitatis*) very often rules over the bodily motion (*motus corporis*), and the affect of the soul (*affectus animi*) frequently rules over both the senses and the appetites (*appetitus*). Yet none of these motions achieves the outcome (*effectus*) of their impulse unless at the approval and voluntary consent of free choice.<sup>666</sup>

Thus, while the soul’s capacities may become disordered, every ‘outcome’ (*effectus*) of the soul can be attributed to the will.

And since Richard’s text is consciously influenced by medicine, as a consequence, in *De statu interioris hominis* we find many of the same medical quaternities as those related by William of Saint-Thierry, such as those relating to the elements, humours, digestive powers, and the affections (see Table 11). As such, the soul’s faculties are better recognised as carnal desire (*desiderium carnale*), carnal appetite (*appetitus carnalis*), carnal affect (*affectus carnalis*) and a corrupted intellect (*ratio* or *intellectus*).<sup>667</sup> Like Hugh, it is only through

<sup>664</sup> Adnot. *Psalm.*, 113.4 (PL 196, 338C; VTT 4, p. 187).

<sup>665</sup> *Statu*, 1.2-6 (PL 196, col. 1118B-1120C; Ribailier, p. 65-69; VTT 4, p. 253-256).

<sup>666</sup> Ibid, 1.6 (PL 196, 1120A-B; Ribailier, pp. 68-69; VTT 4, p. 255).

siquidem etsi aliquis motus in homine contra vel preter hominis voluntatem surgit, sicut nunquam ei nisi ex arbitrii libertate consentit, sic numquam ex ipsius permissione in actum prorumpit. Imperat sane persepe motui corporis motus sensualitatis, imperat frequenter et animi affectus non solum sensibus verum et appetitibus; nichil tamen horum omnium ad conatus sui exit effectum nisi ad liberi arbitrii nutum voluntariumque consensum.’

<sup>667</sup> Ibid, 1.6 (PL 196, 1120A-B; Ribailier, p. 68-69; VTT 4, p. 255).

acquiring virtue and restoring the original order between the faculties can the soul use its four capacities – necessity (*necessitas*), power (*potestas*), will (*voluntas*) and freedom (*libertas*) – to heal itself, restore its integrity, and eventually liberate the person from sin.

Element	Earth	Water	Air	Fire
Quality	Dryness	Wetness	Coldness	Heat
Humour	Black Bile	Phlegm	Blood	Red Bile
State of Motion	Bodily ( <i>motus corporis</i> )	Sensuality ( <i>motus sensualitatis</i> )	Affect of the Soul ( <i>affectus animi</i> )	Free Choice ( <i>liberum arbitrium</i> )
Affection	Hate ( <i>odium</i> )	Sorrow ( <i>dolor</i> )	Joy ( <i>gaudium</i> )	Love ( <i>amor</i> )
Corrupted Psychological Power	Carnal Desire ( <i>desiderium carnale</i> )	Carnal Appetite ( <i>appetitus carnalis</i> )	Carnal Affect ( <i>affectus carnalis</i> )	Intellect ( <i>ratio/intellectus/intelligentia</i> )
Power to Cleanse the Soul	Necessity ( <i>necessitas</i> )	Power ( <i>potestas</i> )	Will ( <i>voluntas</i> )	Freedom ( <i>libertas</i> )

Table 11. Harmonies of four in Richard of Saint-Victor's *De statu interioris hominis*

*De statu interioris hominis* claims that four emotions – hate, sorrow, joy and love – issue from the *affectus*. Since Richard is concerned with the failure of affectivity, in this text an *affectus* or *affectio* is largely characterised by its changeable characteristics. In a chapter entitled ‘On the Restlessness of Human Affect’ (*De inquietudine humani affectus*) Richard appears at a loss to explain the variability of the affections: ‘Who I ask, can correctly explain in how many ways the human affect continually varies itself?’ (*Quis, queso, digne exponere possit quot modis se affectus humanus variare consuevit?*)<sup>668</sup> For Richard, the affections proceed ‘in a circuit’ (*in circuitu*), producing different yet reliable affective responses depending on the stimuli:

Love, fear, hope, sorrow, and any other affect (*affectus*) are thus led through diverse things and are varied in many ways. But through every motion of its affects (*affectionum*) and through every way of its motions the mind always returns to its

<sup>668</sup> Ibid, 1.9 (PL 196, 1121D; Ribailier, p. 71; VTT 4, p. 257).

circle, as long as it is moved again in the same way around the same or similar object.<sup>669</sup>

Consequently, the unstable, rotational motion of affectivity – oscillating between contradictory emotions – is likened to the light and subtle particles of air, which are easily moved. Richard again illustrates this with reference to the human body. Likening affectivity to air (*aer*) or ‘spirit’ (*spiritus*), Richard remarks that ‘In a moment, in the blink of an eye it becomes heated and grows cold again with the same ease as the breath comes out warm and sometimes blows out cold at nearly the same moment when it is gently exhaled or forcefully blown out of the mouth.’<sup>670</sup> He then adds that ‘In this way the spiritual breath and passible affect is easily moved and changed into contrary passions through a slight alteration.’<sup>671</sup> Making this connection clearer, the Victorine appeals to the lived experience of his reader by asking them to consider the actions of men they have seen around the cloister who appear as if intending goodwill – and are carried by ‘a gentle breeze of a favourable breath’ – yet when ‘a gust of slander blows from the same mouth, then it immediately turns his affect (*affectus*) in another direction and changes it into hatred and fury (*odium et furor*)...’<sup>672</sup> The Victorine way of life is therefore presented as a quest for stability. ‘As long as the mind, enticed and dragged away by carnal desire, follows its affect (*affectus*) at one time and the appetite (*appetitus*) at another time, it is never allowed to be tranquil and at rest.’<sup>673</sup>

Arguably, Richard’s most systematic exploration of psychology occurs, however, in his *De duodecim patriarchis*, an exegetical treatise that centres around the characters of Jacob and his wives, with all 16 members of Jacob’s family personifying psychological powers. In this allegory, the two key powers of the soul – reason and affection – are personified as Jacob’s wives, Rachel and Leah, respectively. At times Richard seems to mark out reason and love as two independent faculties, without much form of cooperation. He writes that

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<sup>669</sup> Ibid, 1.9 (PL 196, 1122B; Ribaillier, pp. 71-72; VTT 4, 257-258): ‘Sic amor, sic timor, sic spes vel ceterorum quilibet affectus per diversa ducitur multipliciterque variatur. Sed per omnes affectionum suarum motus motionumque semper in circuios suos reuertitur, dum circa eandem rem iterum eodem modo afficitur.’

<sup>670</sup> Ibid, 1.9 (PL 196, 1122C; Ribaillier, p. 72; VTT 4, p. 258).

<sup>671</sup> Ibid, 1.9 (PL 196, 1122C; Ribaillier, p. 72; VTT 4, p. 258): ‘Est autem hoc elementum quod spiritum, vel aerem nominamus pre caeteris omnibus elementis mutabilis, variisque subiacens passionibus: *In momento*, in *ictu oculi* incalescit, et iterum eadem facilitate refrigescit, intantum ut ab uno ore et pene sub eodem tempore vel tenuiter exhalatus vel fortiter impulsus, nunc calidus exeat, nunc frigidus prorumpat. Sic spiritus ille spiritualis affectusque passibilis facile afficitur, levique permutatione in contrarias passiones mutatur.’

<sup>672</sup> Ibid, 1.9 (PL 196, 1122C-1122D; Ribaillier, p. 72; VTT 4, p. 258): ‘...homo ad tenuem spirantis favoris auram totus statim inclinatur ad gratiam, et si ex eodem ore et sub eodem tempore ventus detractionis eruperit, statim affectum in alteram partem flectit, et in odium et in furorem vertit.’

<sup>673</sup> Ibid, 1.8 (PL 196, 1121C-D; Ribaillier, p. 71; VTT 4, p. 257): ‘Dum enim animus, carnali desiderio illectus et abstractus, nunc affectum suum nunc appetitum sequitur, nunquam quietus, nusquam tranquillus esse permittitur.’

Reason (*Ratio*) is one thing. Affection (*Affectio*) is another thing. Reason by which we distinguish things; affection, by which we love. Reason, resulting in truth; affection, resulting in virtue.<sup>674</sup>

Rachel and Leah, therefore, communicate the two types of ‘knowing’ that the soul requires and could be acquired at the Abbey of Saint-Victor. These are knowledge (*scientia*) and experience (*experientia*), or the contemplative life and the active life.<sup>675</sup> Other Victorines and Cistercians – such as Isaac of Stella and Aelred of Rievaulx – would also personify the soul using Jacob’s family members.<sup>676</sup>

Richard’s allegory, however, is the longest and most systematic examination of how the active and contemplative lives mutually stimulate one another. Ritva Palmén has noted the emotionality of Reason who ‘wants, suffers, and experiences pains when attempting to attain wisdom.’<sup>677</sup> On the other hand, Affection’s longings can be rationally directed to the pursuit of virtue. The central metaphor of family and familial cooperation is certainly drawn on by Richard to emphasise the blurring of boundaries between all the powers of the soul. Leah needs the sense perceptions of her handmaid Zilpah, Sensuality (*Sensualitas*), for ‘without sensation, affection would have sense of nothing; meanwhile, Rachel requires Bilhah, the personification of Imagination (*Imaginatio*), because ‘without imagination, reason would know nothing’.<sup>678</sup> Thus, similar to Affectivity and Reason, Sensuality and Imagination are presented by Richard as interconnected, creating a web of interactions between the four key psychological powers of the soul.

Notably, Richard’s *De duodecim patriarchis* departed from the Augustinian tradition by adding three further affections to his organising categories: hatred, love and shame. There

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<sup>674</sup> *XII patr.*, 3 (PL 196, 3B; SC 419, p. 96; Zinn, p. 55). ‘Una est ratio, altera est affectio: ratio, qua discernamus, affectio, qua diligamus; ratio, ad veritatem, affectio, ad virtutem.’

<sup>675</sup> ‘Who is this Benjamin? Many know, some by knowledge, others by experience’ (*Quis sit Benjamin iste, multi noverunt, alii per scientiam, alii per experientiam*). See *XII patr.*, 1 (PL 196, 1A; SC 419, p. 90; Zinn, p. 54)

<sup>676</sup> Walter of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 19.6 (CCCM 30, p. 165). Achard of Saint-Victor, too, taught that it was necessary to constantly vary between the active and contemplative lives exemplified by Leah and Rachel, Martha and Mary: see *Sermo* 12.6 (Châtillon, pp. 127-128; CS 165, pp. 196-197). David of Augsburg seems to have known of the Victorine use of Leah and Rachel as personifications for the harmonisation of the exterior and interior life as they would prove influential to the Franciscan audience reading the *De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione*. In the letter before the prologue to book II on ‘The Inward Man’ Leah’s six sons represent discipline, repression of evil tendencies, the implanting of virtue, patience under adversity, the control of reason over thoughts, affections and motives (ordered love) and love of other souls (ordered love of neighbour). Rachel’s two sons – Joseph and Benjamin – symbolise the search for truth (study of scripture and meditation) and devotion to prayer. See Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress*, vol. 1, pp. 53-56.

<sup>677</sup> R. Palmén, *Richard of St. Victor’s Theory of the Imagination* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), pp. 101-102.

<sup>678</sup> *XII patr.*, 5 (PL 196, 4C; SC 419, lines 6-7, p. 102; Zinn, p. 57).

are ‘seven principal affections’, Richard writes, ‘that rise by turns from the one affective disposition (*affectio animi*) of the soul: hope and fear, joy and grief, hatred, love and shame... [which] can be ordered at one time and disordered at another’.<sup>679</sup> Yet, it is evident from this quotation that his account of ordered affectivity was still in harmony with the wider Augustinian and Benedictine traditions. ‘One ought to keep cautious watch over all the virtues’, Richard advises, ‘so that they not only are ordered but also moderated.’<sup>680</sup>

*De duodecim patriarchis* accurately shows how this training in virtue takes time because each child – or cognitive/emotional state – must be born in succession, with each new sibling, when ordered according to virtue, creating the conditions for the next child in the series to be born. Over the course of the 87-chapter allegory, Richard recounts the births of Ruben (Fear), Symeon (Pain), Levi (Hope), Judah (Love), Dan (Consideration of Future Evils), Nephtali (Speculation of Future Rewards), Gad (Abstinence), Asher (Patience), Issachar (Happiness), Zabulon (Hatred), Dina (Shame), Joseph (Discretion) and Benjamin (Contemplation). Richard’s language, which repeats verbs emphasising creation and making – ‘to be born’ (*nasci*), ‘to be made’ (*fieri*), ‘to beget’ (*pariendi*), ‘to bring forward’ (*proferre*) and ‘to give birth to’ (*gignere*) – highlights the creative and *active* process by which a canon’s *habitus* is constantly changing throughout this process.

Indeed, for ordered love to truly exist the entire ‘family’ of the soul must work together in their separate spheres. The seven affections of Affectivity (Leah) ‘dispose wills’ to order (*dispositio voluntatum*); Sensuality’s (Zilpah’s) children are responsible for the ‘discipline of works’ (*disciplina operum*), that is, actions and deeds; the children of Imagination (Bilhah) ensure the ‘moderation of thoughts’ (*moderatio cogitationum*); and finally Reason’s (Rachel’s) children enable the ‘judgement of assertions’ (*sententia assertionum*).<sup>681</sup> When all these powers are ordered correctly, the ensuing network is a model of horizontal cooperation between family members. As Richard puts it, the soul cannot err too much when

any thought is judged in a tribe, as it were, when every error is corrected by its parallel, when will is corrected by will, when work is chastened by work, and assertion by assertion.<sup>682</sup>

<sup>679</sup> *XII patr.*, 7 (PL 196, 6B-C; SC 419, lines 10-14, p. 108; Zinn, p. 60). See also Palmén, *Richard of St Victor’s Theory of the Imagination*, pp. 66-67 and 69 for the significance of this definition of virtue and its relationship with ethical training in Richard’s oeuvre.

<sup>680</sup> *XII patr.*, 66 (PL 196, 47D-48A; SC 419, lines 7-8, p. 280; Zinn, p. 123).

<sup>681</sup> *XII patr.*, 20 (PL 196, 14B; SC 419, lines 27-28, p. 143; Zinn, p. 72).

<sup>682</sup> *XII patr.*, 20 (PL 196, 14B; SC 419, lines 30-34, p. 144; Zinn, p. 72): ‘Quaelibet ergo cogitatio quasi in sua tribu iudicatur, quando omne erratum per suum simile corrigitur, quando voluntas voluntate emendatur, quando opus opera catigatur, assertion assertionem corrigitur.’

Nevertheless, if this is moderation and one part of the soul is imbalanced, neutral or beneficial affections can easily become disordered and produce vices:

...excessive fear often falls into despair; excessive grief, into bitterness; immoderate hope, into presumption; overabundant love, into flattery; unnecessary joy, into dissolution; intemperate anger, into fury. And so in this way the virtues are turned into vices if they are not moderated by discretion.<sup>683</sup>

Consequently, Richard's treatise not only provides an active role to the human will (*voluntas*) in perception, feeling and cognition, but also artfully shows how each of the capacities of the soul come together to check and balance one another.

### 2.1.1. Walter of Saint-Victor

After Richard, Walter of Saint-Victor (d. after 1180) would similarly speak of two capacities of the soul: the intellective 'capacity for truth' (*capax veritatis*) or 'capacity for divine knowledge' (*capax divinitatis*) is analogous to man's *ratio*, *intellectus* and *mens*; the 'capacity for love' (*capacitas amoris/dilectionis*) is designated by the terminology of *affectus*, *voluntas*, *intellectus* or *cor*.<sup>684</sup> For Walter, these processes are deeply intertwined with virtue, too. Following Isaac of Stella, Walter repeats the phrase, taken from Ambrose, that 'Your *affectus* gives a name to your every act' (*Ex affectu tuo impone nomen operi tuo*), equating inner feelings squarely with ethics.<sup>685</sup>

It is, however, Walter's fusion of Christology and virtue that adds nuance to his psychology, since it through faith in Christ and God's grace that man can restore his soul's faculties. 'From Him alone is all illumination of truth and every movement (*affectio*) of a good will', Walter remarks.<sup>686</sup> His *Sermo* 18 especially exhorts canons at Saint-Victor to follow Christ's example in preaching and baptising. 'Whence two duties are enjoined on him [Christ]: the office of preaching and the office of baptising, to counter the two troubles of the human race, namely ignorance (*ignorantia*) and unruly desire (*concupiscentia*).'<sup>687</sup> For

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<sup>683</sup> *XII patr.* 66 (PL 196, 47D; SC 419, lines 8-13, pp. 280-282; Zinn, p. 123): 'Timor enim nimius saepe cadit in desperationem, dolor nimius in amaritudinem, spes immoderata in praesumptionem, amor superfluous in adulationem, Laetitia supervacua in dissolutionem, ira intemperate in furorem. In hunc itaque modum virtutes in vitia vertuntur, si per discretionem minime moderentur.'

<sup>684</sup> Walter of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 8.6, *Sermo* 11.1, 11.9 and *Sermo* 17.2 (CCCM 30, pp. 67, 93, 100-101, 144). For Walter's psychology, see also C. Németh, *Quasi aurora consurgens*, pp. 256-257.

<sup>685</sup> Walter of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 11.1 (VTT 8, p. 442).

<sup>686</sup> Walter of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 11.1 (VTT 8, p. 442).

<sup>687</sup> *Ibid*, *Sermo* 18 (VTT 8, p. 224).

Walter, the son of God provides both the medicine and doctrines – medicine heals the soul’s affective capacity, doctrine illuminate the intellectual capacity.<sup>688</sup> The main thrust of Walter’s christologically orientated psychology can be found in a nutshell in *Sermo* 16 when he writes that Christ

...is both the virtue of God and the wisdom of God; he is virtue since he heals, wisdom since he illuminates. Redemption was made for us by the sacrament of the passion, so great as to redeem us from sin, from the devil and from torment; sanctification was made for us in the sacrament of baptism, so great to bestow on us virtue and efficacy of redemption itself; and justice was made for us assemblage of virtue and divine love; and wisdom was made for us, so great it illuminated us by recognition and intelligence of heavenly secrets. Through three, namely redemption, sanctification, and justice he heals us; through the fourth, namely wisdom, he illuminates us. Through two, namely redemption and sanctification, he cleanses us; through justice and wisdom he replenishes us: through justice he restores the *affectus*, through wisdom he restores the intellect. He himself and no other is who makes the *whole man healthy* [John 7:23].<sup>689</sup>

The Victorine prior, thus, places Jesus Christ at the centre of a Victorine practice of self-restoration. Like Hugh, the soul’s *affectus* is connected with the virtue of justice yet Walter is clear that this process occurs primarily not through individual effort, but by human effort cooperating with divine grace: the redemptive grace bestowed upon man by Christ’s crucifixion, in addition to the cleansing of the soul of original sin through baptism, can heal the soul when coupled with Christian teachings in doctrine and wisdom.

### Godfrey of Saint-Victor

Finally, it is with Godfrey of Saint-Victor’s *Microcosmus* that we find the last major twelfth-century innovation in Victorine psychological thought. Godfrey’s ‘innovation’ was less invention and more synthesis: returning to the classic genre of the commentary on Genesis (or hexaemeron) provided a framework for Godfrey to combine his Victorine teachings with a humanistic understanding of the dignity of humankind and the symbolic and physico-theological understanding of the macrocosmic and microcosmic relationships permeating the

<sup>688</sup> Ibid, *Sermo* 16.1 (CCCM 30, p. 136).

<sup>689</sup> Ibid, *Sermo* 16.1 (CCCM 30, pp. 136-137): ‘Est enim virtus Dei et Dei sapientia; quia virtus est sanat, quia sapientia illuminat... Redemptio factus est nobis sacramento passionis, quando redemit nos a peccato, a diabolo et a tormento; sanctificatio nobis factus est in sacramento baptismatis, quando nobis virtutem et efficaciam ipsius redemptionis contulit; iustitia vero nobis factus est in collatione virtutis et divinae dilectionis; sapientia vero nobis factus est, quando nos illuminavit veritatis agnitione et coelestium secretorum intelligentia. Per tria, scilicet redemptionem, sanctificationem, iustitiam nos sanat; per quartam, scilicet sapientiam, nos illuminat. Per duo, scilicet redemptionem et sanctificationem, nos mundat; per iustitiam et sapientiam nos replet; per iustitiam replet affectum, per sapientiam intellectum.

universe. In this sense, Godfrey's *Microcosmus* shared the same symbolic and cosmological structure as Hildegard of Bingen's *Scivias* or *Liber divinorum operum*. Envisioning man as an analogue to the cosmos comprised from the four elements, the human soul for Godfrey: contains four corresponding powers: sensuality (*sensualitas*), imagination (*imaginatio*), reason (*ratio*) and understanding (*intelligentia*).<sup>690</sup> Much like Hugh's *De unione corporis et spiritus*, the affective reactions of the soul are considered as the sub-powers of the imagination. Godfrey considers the imagination to have four capacities: inventiveness (*ingenium*) and memory (*memoria*), as well as the two (Platonic) affective dispositions: *concupiscibilitas* and *irascibilitas* (see Table 12).<sup>691</sup> While Godfrey does follow the bipartite *affectus-intellectus* model characteristic of Hugh, Achard, Richard and Walter, he is more interested in triads since this tripartite symbolism better fits the hexaemeral narrative of the six days of Creation which structure *Microcosmus*. Consequently, Godfrey argues that grace subsists in three powers of the soul: the intellect being illuminated in truth, virtue from affection, and the 'capacity' or 'faculty' (*facultas*) for action (Table 13).<sup>692</sup>

Of all the Victorines, Godfrey arguably went furthest in distinguishing between the different states of affectivity. Godfrey adds a further eighth emotion to Richard's seven: sorrow (*dolor*), joy (*gaudium*), fear (*timor*), hope (*spes*), love (*amor*), hate (*odium*), shame (*verecundia/pudor*) and confidence (*confidentia*).<sup>693</sup> Connecting these eight affections with his hexaemeral and cosmological symbolism, Godfrey states that each affection can at any time possess one of three orientations – either negative, neutral or positive – establishing twenty-four possible modes of feeling in the soul.<sup>694</sup> Thus, the affections in *Microcosmus* are intimately tied up with ethics and the life of the canon regular to pursue know, will and perform good deeds. *Demeritoriae affectiones* or 'blameworthy affections' correspond to negative affectivity; *meritoriae affectiones* or 'praiseworthy affections' represent the positive affectivity of the soul. Godfrey's innovation, here, was to identify a third type of affection, neutral affections – affections similar to so-called 'pre-passions' (*propatheia/propassiones*), which don't have any moral value – and giving these *neutrae affectiones* a prominent place in his psychological system.

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<sup>690</sup> *Micro.*, 19 (Delhay, p. 46).

<sup>691</sup> *Micro.*, 25 (Delhay, p. 50-51).

<sup>692</sup> *Micro.*, 82 (Delhay, p. 94).

<sup>693</sup> In Psalm 134.7 Richard of Saint-Victor does note that confidence along with love and fear are the three feelings corresponding with affection (PL 196, 367D; VTT 4, p. 206).

<sup>694</sup> *Micro.*, 105 (Delhay, pp. 116-117).



Element	Elemental Quality	Powers of the Soul	Power of Imagination
Earth	Large, dull, immobile	Sensuality ( <i>sensualitas</i> )	Inventiveness ( <i>ingenium</i> )
Water	Large, dull, mobile	Imagination ( <i>imaginatio</i> )	Concupiscibility ( <i>concupiscibilitas</i> )
Air	Fine, dull, mobile	Reason ( <i>ratio</i> )	Memory ( <i>memoria</i> )
Fire	Fine, sharp, mobile	Understanding ( <i>intelligentia</i> )	Irascibility / Anger ( <i>irascibilitas</i> )

Table 12. Micro- and Macrocosmic Parallels in Godfrey of Saint-Victor's Psychology

	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3
<b>Type of Grace</b>	Grace of illumination to truth ( <i>gratia illuminationis ad veritatem</i> )	Grace of affection to virtue ( <i>gratia affectionis ad virtutem</i> )	Grace of capacity for work ( <i>gratia facultatis ad operationem</i> )
<b>Eschatology</b>	Beginning of time	Construction of the microcosm	Dwelling place of God
<b>Origin</b>	Begins from faith ( <i>a fide incipit</i> )	Begins from a good will ( <i>a bona voluntate incipit</i> )	Begins from power ( <i>a potentia incipit</i> )
<b>Medium</b>	knowledge to arrive at truth ( <i>per scientiam proficit et ad veritatem pervenit</i> )	Arrives at virtue by the rise of good affections ( <i>per bonas affectiones crescit et ad virtutem pervenit</i> )	Progress by good exercises and capacity to do good ( <i>per exercitia bona et ad facultatem bene operandi pervenit</i> )
<b>Type of Good</b>	To know the good ( <i>scire bonum</i> )	To will the good ( <i>velle bonum</i> )	To be able to do good ( <i>posse bonum</i> )

Table 13. Days of Grace According to *Microcosmus* 82.

Godfrey was unoriginal in arguing that these affective orientations depend upon the presence or absence of habits of behaviour. ‘Praiseworthy affections create a habit of grace (*habitus gratiae*), blameworthy affections a deficiency of grace (*defectus gratiae*), neutral affections exist by the law of nature (*ius naturae*)’, Godfrey remarks.<sup>695</sup> In themselves, the eight *affectiones* are morally neutral, Godfrey observes, because they ‘are the natural motions of the heart towards something, willed or unwilled, having arisen from inside the memory from various images of exterior things retained...’<sup>696</sup> Four of the affections are felt in respect to images related to different temporal states: pain and happiness are linked to present and past images; fear and hope are elicited by images of the future. These eight natural affections can be said to be neutral because they do not produce enough of an effect to move the heart, either negatively away from God or positively towards him: they operate ‘by filling and bending the breadth of the heart’, Godfrey states, ‘yet [the heart] is not disturbed (*turbantia*), and if disturbed, it is nevertheless not confused (*perturbantia*), [and] neither is the state of the heart overthrown.’<sup>697</sup>

By contrast, praiseworthy and blameworthy affections stem from a perfected or corrupted *habitus*. Neutral affections gain positive moral value, transforming into meritorious affections, because they involve effort. Blameworthy affections show a lack of grace. ‘What is natural is less; what is a freely given gift is greater’, Godfrey writes: ‘By natural love man was formed “in the image of God”; by freely given love he is reformed “in the likeness of God”’.<sup>698</sup>

Consequently, a corruption of nature is a *defectus* or ‘falling’ away from the grace offered to humanity.<sup>699</sup> This perversion of the goods of nature occurs when the individual has ‘grown accustomed by a long-lasting habit of vice’ (*ex consuetudine longiore vitium*) to seeking inordinate pleasures.<sup>700</sup> ‘Blameworthy affections are the vicious motions of the heart towards something inordinate or immoderate, willed or not willed.’<sup>701</sup> Praiseworthy

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<sup>695</sup> *Micro.*, 105 (Delhay, p. 116): ‘Meritorias creat habitus gratie, demeritorias defectus gratie, neutras ius nature.’

<sup>696</sup> *Micro.*, 105 (Delhay, p. 117): ‘Neutre affectiones sunt naturales motus cordis ad volendum aliquid vel nolendum ex variis ymaginibus exteriorum rerum memoriter retentis intus orti...’

<sup>697</sup> *Micro.*, 105 (Delhay, p. 117): ‘...sinuosam illam cordis amplitudinem multiplicibus quidem motibus velud aquis implentes sed non turbantes.’

<sup>698</sup> *Micro.*, 226 (Delhay, p. 248; VTT 2, p. 335): ‘Minus autem est quod naturale est, maius quod gratuitum donum. Et naturali amore formatur homo *ad ymaginem dei*, gratuito reformatur *ad similitudo dei*.’

<sup>699</sup> *Micro.*, 216 (Delhay, p. 236; VTT 2, p. 325): ‘Est autem corruption nature defectus a natura condita que, dum sibi confidit de se et a proposita sibi gratia avertit se...’

<sup>700</sup> *Micro.*, 216 (Delhay, p. 236; VTT 2, p. 325).

<sup>701</sup> *Micro.*, 106 (Delhay, p. 117): ‘Demeritorie affectiones sunt viciosi motus cordis ad aliquid inordinate vel immoderate volendum vel nonvolendum.’

affections, by contrast, stem from an ordered *habitus*, when willed affective states cooperate with divine grace. It is the ordering of the affections and love that create virtue in the soul.<sup>702</sup>

## Conclusion

Among the Victorines, Hugh of Saint-Victor can be considered as integral to the popularisation and systematisation of a theory of affectivity. This understanding would later be adapted in creative ways by individuals such as Richard of Saint-Victor who would expand the number of emotions to seven in his *De duodecim patriarchis*, as well as Godfrey of Saint-Victor who sought to better clarify the ambiguity between neutral, blameworthy and praiseworthy affections. Much like the Cistercians, then, in Victorine discussions on the soul we encounter a similar conception of the need to develop healthy, ordered attachments to things, human beings and spirits. Virtually all the Victorine authors surveyed here drew on Augustine's distinction between the useful and the enjoyable, and it was conceived of the purpose of the human being to develop virtue and slowly restore the use of their powers of perception and affectivity over time.

Unlike the Cistercians, however, it is undeniable that the canons at Saint-Victor possessed a far more outward facing conception of the importance of emotional training to both their own community at the Abbey of Saint-Victor and the public audience they preached to. Richard of Saint-Victor's *De duodecim patriarchis*, for instance, envisages what we might call a 'social' model of affectivity by considering the entire body of canons at Saint-Victor as a single ordered (or disordered) soul. Meanwhile, Godfrey of Saint-Victor's *Microcosmos* provides an picture of the individual being – the microcosm – as part of a symbolic unity with the wider community of Christians and the structure of the cosmos itself – the macrocosm.

Two particular areas of specialisation are noticeable in the Victorine tradition of *De anima* treatises. (1) First, whilst all authors follow suit with each other and agree that the *affectus* and *intellectus* have a complementarity relationship, some authors – such as Hugh, Alcher and Richard of Saint-Victor – were more willing than the Cistercians to view the power of *affectio* or *affectus* negatively as a power and mode of movement closely associated with appetite and the sensory delight of the soul. Richard of Saint-Victor's *De statu interioris hominis*, for instance, considers a disordered *affectus* as the root cause of all human evil, making the soul sick and weak. (2) Second, a number of the early Victorines – such as Hugh

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<sup>702</sup> *Micro.*, 163 (Delhay, p. 183).

and Achard – demonstrate a particular niche in seeking to understand how exactly the spiritual substances of body, soul and mind coexist with one another and arranged. Hugh's text does this with a sensitivity to the latest medical thought, although both seek to understand the hierarchical operation of the substance of the soul. It is notable these treatises are produced before the first half of the twelfth century and therefore could suggest an early once this new religious group had gained a basic understanding of the physical and spiritual composition of the soul through the *De anima* treatises of Hugh and Alchard, it was not necessary to write any more. Authors such as Richard and Godfrey of Saint-Victor were able to turn their attention to other subjects such as the restoration of the soul through virtue and grace, in addition to the union of the soul to God through contemplation.

Overall, despite the variation in thought, form and genre, what unites these psychological writings – both Cistercian and Victorine – is that they offer up a series of theoretical and (sometimes practical) instructions of how to best cultivate the soul. *Libri de anima*, therefore, sit between theory and practice because while the genre is theoretical in nature, these texts evidently were meant to be studied and interiorised in the daily life of Cistercian monks and Victorine canons. All of these texts teach novices the fundamentals of how to discern between the substances of body and soul, the reasons why senses, affections and thoughts should be moderated and ordered, and may even suggest strategies and techniques for doing so. These treatises, therefore, laid the foundations for a more advanced practices relevant to Cistercian and Victorine mystics: the development of virtue and the full ordering of love towards God.

## CHAPTER 3 - THE DIMENSIONS OF AFFECTIVITY

### Horizontal and Vertical Affectivity

Thus far, we have explored the complementarity between the soul's powers of affectivity and intellect. In doing so, I have described the affectivity that Cistercian and Victorine authors wrote about as having a moral orientation: either negative (that is, disinclined from God) or positive (aligned to God). By way of an extended conclusion to the issue of the anthropological relationship of the powers of the soul o Cistercian and Victorine thought, I propose that it is helpful to distinguish two further 'dimensions' of affectivity for a total of three. First, we have the aforementioned positive and negative mode; second, the horizontal; and thirdly, the vertical. Of these three dimensions, negative and positive affectivity constitute one type. The two other distinct yet interrelated forms of affectivity can be thought of as two axes along which the soul moves temporally, experiencing and creating dispositions and habits (see the figure below). Situated on the  $x$  axis, 'horizontal affectivity' expresses the growing union (as opposed to the training) of the two key faculties of man: affect and reason. Horizontal affectivity, consequently, is associated more with the 'active life' (*vita activa*) in Cistercian and Victorine communities since it involves the purification of the soul's thoughts and desires in order to bring about good acts and deeds. This lateral psychic recalibration of the soul's powers and actions often serves as the preparatory step for vertical affectivity. Positioned on the  $y$  axis, vertical affectivity maps the increasingly upward metaphysical trajectory of soul as it attaches itself to God via contemplation, generally through the advanced training of rationality and affectivity (but only fully achieved through divine grace). The 'inner' aspect of vertical affectivity means it aligns more with the 'contemplative life' (*vita contemplativa*) and the quest to achieve a mystical vision of God. And while the 'sight' of God was overwhelmingly described as the remit of the rational faculty, in the affective theologies of the Cistercians and Victorines, the *affectus* and *affectiones* were constantly present in these meditations, and in some contemplative schemas, an *affectus* super-infused by God's grace even represented the apex of the soul's ascent to God.<sup>703</sup> As we have seen, the intent behind a person's affectivity – whether horizontal or vertical – can be positive or negative based on its

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<sup>703</sup> For example, the thirteenth-century Victorine, Thomas Gallus (d. 1246), described the highest stage of the soul's loving union as 'only the highest affection which can unite the soul to God' (*sola principalis affectio Deo unibilis*), a state of ultimate affectivity which surpasses the *intellectus*. See Thomas Gallus, *Prologus* (ed. Barbet, p. 67; tr. Chase, p. 249). For Richard's balanced approach to the intellectual and affective dimensions of experience see van 't Spijker, 'After the Manner of a Contemplative', pp. 193-195.

moral and ethical alignment. Thus, positive and negative affectivity comprise the third moral dimension to affectivity, spanning the *z* axis: affectivity is positive if thoughts and emotions aid in aligning the soul with God; affectivity is negative if desires are directed away from God and towards the self.




Figure 8. The Dimensions of Affectivity

I introduce these three dimensions of affectivity on account of their utility as a framework to breakdown three aspects that commonly constitute what medieval authors refer to as ‘affectivity’. Certainly, these etic terms would be unfamiliar to a Cistercian monk or Victorine canon for whom all three dimensions formed one *habitus* of the soul for experiencing the world and living a life in which love was ordered towards God and neighbour. Yet understanding affectivity as linked to the moral space of the self is useful to account for how the monastic and canonical life emphasised reformation and restoration of virtue. To draw again on the webs of interlocution and coinherence identified by Charles Taylor and Barbara Newman, what thinking about these different aspects of affectivity does

is to recognise, as Cistercians and Victorines did, that the soul ‘exists’ in a moral space – an ever-changing space connected to acts of will. ‘This is why we naturally tend to talk of our fundamental orientation in terms of who we are’, Taylor says, and to even speak of an orientation ‘is to presuppose a space-analogue within which one find’s one way’.<sup>704</sup> As we have seen, one consistent feature of the *affectus* and *affectiones* is that they incline the individual either ‘towards’ or ‘away from’ something or someone. Affectivity thus involves real or imagined ‘contact’ with the ‘Good’ (or conversely, distance away from the ‘Good’). In the Cistercian and Victorine case, being in contact with the Good equates to being in contact with God – this contact is the yardstick by which the meaningfulness of life can be measured according to Taylor; what connects someone ‘with some greater reality or story’.<sup>705</sup> Despite its artificiality, for historians this framework can give structure to seemingly overlapping and contradictory psychological systems. The rest of this thesis will show how thinking in terms of positive, negative, horizontal and vertical affectivity can illuminate some of the methods in which Cistercian and Victorine authors describe the interconnectedness between the soul’s senses, mental powers, the intent of the will and the soul’s degree of attachment to God.

Unfortunately, no contemporary Cistercian or Victorine visualisation of the soul’s affectivity exists. Nonetheless, we can get a sense of how contemporaries understood affectivity through stemma diagrams found in manuscripts that reproduce, or take inspiration from, the *Ysagoge in Theologiam*. These are the aforementioned Trinity College Cambridge, MS B.14.33, in addition to British Library, Harley MS 3038 and British Library, Royal MS 10 A. XII. Of the British Library manuscripts, the former contains the *Ysagoge* text from folios 3r to 7v in addition to a glossed copy of Leviticus (folios 7-58), and was written in 1176 at the Cistercian abbey of Saint Mary, Buildwas (located in Shropshire).<sup>706</sup> The second British Library manuscript contains a brief treatise on the soul as the image of God (folios 117v-123r), belonging to Rochester Priory, a Benedictine house, in the thirteenth century. Several other works in this collection of sermons and tracts display an affinity with the style of biblical commentary associated with Saint-Victor (see folios 8-72). Some degree of Victorine influence seems plausible, since the treatise on the soul also includes Hugh of Saint-Victor’s division of the scientific and theological arts (see Figure 9 and Figure 10).

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<sup>704</sup> Taylor, *Sources on the Self*, p. 29.

<sup>705</sup> Ibid, pp. 42-43.

<sup>706</sup> The inscription on folio 7v reads: *Liber Sancte Marie de Bildewas. Scriptus anno ab incarnatione domini Millesimo centesimo septuagesimo sexto*.

These three manuscripts are significant when compared and contrasted together because they each contain copies of the same stemma diagrams (see Table 14). This treatise is significant because two small stemma diagrams reveal how the senses, affections and powers are linked with both with soul's pursuit of the 'good' and how they corrupted and turned 'evil'. Figure 11 and Figure 12 (detail: Figure 13), stemma diagrams of 'Bonum', identify the pursuit of the good with five powers of the soul's 'spiritual *nature*': *ingenium*, *ratio*, *memoria*, *irascibilitas*, *concupiscibilitas*. Meanwhile the corresponding powers of the *sensus* and *affectio* are understood as part of man's 'bodily nature'. Through 'hard work' (*per industriam*), the spiritual nature of the soul can pursue two key activities that Victorine authors associate with the *intellectus* and *affectus*, respectively: *cognitio veritatis* or 'knowledge of truth' and *amor virtutis* or 'love of virtue'. All these powers pursue and achieve the 'good' when used well.

Stemma Diagrams in Manuscripts of <i>Ysagoge in theologiam</i>		
Trinity MS B.14.33	Harley MS 3038	Royal MS 10. A. XII
Prudentia (f. 6r)		
Mechanica (f. 10v)		
Scientia (f. 10 v)	Sciencia (f. 3v)	Scientia (f. 118r)
Virtus (f. 13r)	Virtus (f. 4v)	Virtus (f. 118v)
Temperantia (f. 13r)		Temperantia (f. 119r)
Fortitudo (f. 13r)		Fortitudo (f. 119r)
Fides (f. 16r)	Fides & spes (f. 5r)	Fides (f. 119v)
Caritas (f. 18r)	Karitas (f. 5v)	Karitas (f. 120r)
Libertas (f. 22v)		
		Gratia (f. 120v)
Bonum (f. 23v)	Bonum (f. 6r)	Bonum (f. 122v)
Malum (f. 27v)	Malum (f. 6v)	Malum (f. 122v)
		Vitium (f. 123r)
Temptacio (f. 28v)		
Peccatum (f. 33v)		Peccatum (f. 123r)
Remedia (f. 83v)		
Mundus (f. 92v)		
Mutacio (f. 95v)		
Nomina Divinitatis (f. 103v)		
Divina Comprehensio (f. 111r)		

Table 14. Stemma Diagrams in *Ysagoge in theologiam* Manuscripts





Figure 9. Opening pages of the 'Treatise on the Soul', British Library, Royal MS 10 A XII, ff. 117r-118r.



Figure 10. Hugonian division of 'Sapientia' and 'Scientia', British Library, Royal MS 10 A XII, f. 118r.






Figure 11. Stemma diagram of 'Bonum'. Trinity College Cambridge, B. 14. 33, f. 23v.






Figure 12. Stemma diagram of 'Bonum' and 'Malum'. British Library, Royal MS 10 A XII, f. 121v.






Figure 13. Detail of 'Bonum'. British Library, Royal MS 10 A XII, f. 121v.




Figure 14. Detail of Malum. British Library, Royal MS 10 A XII, f. 121v.







Figure 15. Stemma diagram of 'Malum'. Trinity College Cambridge, B.14.33, f. 27r.





211

Yet, as we can observe in the diagrams of ‘Malum’ (Figure 13, Figure 14, Figure 15 and Figure 16), the soul can easily become imbalanced due to its poorly regulated affectivity. In Royal MS 10 A XII (Figure 13 and Figure 14), a *corruptio affectuum* or ‘corruption of affectivity’ is considered as an important route through which evil enters the soul, alongside ‘forgetfulness’ (*oblivio*), ‘vice’ (*viciū*) and ‘cupidity’ (*cupiditas*). Significantly, the ‘ignorance’ (*ignorantia*) of the soul is nested under the corruption of affectivity, suggesting how both knowing and feeling are simultaneously corrupted. By contrast, the more developed stemma diagram in Trinity College Cambridge B.14.33 (Figure 15) has some significant differences. First, the illustrator has included *defectus* as one of the causes of corruption of the body, further cementing this term as a key word in Victorine theology. Second, instead of a corruption of affectivity (*corruptio affectuum*), this diagram reads *corruptio effectuum* (‘corruption of effects’). This is perhaps more accurate since this diagram also depicts the *effectūs* that stem from a corrupted affectivity: the seven vices and venial and mortal sins. Finally, this ‘corrupt effectivity’ is not connected to other form of corruption in the soul, ‘natural corruption’ (*corruptio naturalium*), and is considered as its own sub-species of evil in the soul, giving it importance as the cause of moral corruption in the soul.

While this British Library manuscript shows how affectivity is connected with virtue and vice, a further illustration, UEL MS. 8, folio 130v, visually represents affective training and places it an eschatological dimension (see Figure 17). In this illustration, the soul’s orientation to God is depicted using the popular image of a two-pronged ladder: one fork extending from earth to heaven, another leading the soul to damnation in hell. Significant is the fact that the soul’s ascent up the first five rungs of the ladder involves the ordered use of the five senses: *visus* first (‘sight’), followed by *auditus* (‘hearing’), *gustus* (‘taste’), *odoratus* (‘smell’) and, finally, *tactus* (‘touch’). If used correctly, the soul keeps following the ‘right’ path upward to God – a path noticeably thinner in width than the equivalent downward trajectory of the leftward leaning path to hell. The final four rungs of the ladder represent the four virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice, respectively. The soul develops these virtues, whilst simultaneously having the ‘seven gifts of the holy spirit’ (*Septenie dona spiritus sancti*) bestowed upon it from above by God. In doing so, God appears to be the puppet master, as if pulling up the soul by cords.

Conversely, if the soul does not use the senses, a gift deriving from ‘Nature’ (*Natura*) correctly, the image shows that the imaginative power of the soul initiates a vicious cycle of negative affectivity. ‘Phantasms of the flesh harm the seat of the mind’ (*Dum sedem mentis*



*vexant phantasmata carnis*), enchaining the soul into the ‘seven sins’ (*Septenie denigratae*) of the devil. Subverting the virtues of *prudentia*, *temperantia*, *fortitudo* and *iustitia* gained from ascending the right path, the descent downwards to the left steadily inculcates the vices of *imprudentia* (‘imprudence’), *intemperantia* (‘intemperance’) and *levitas* (‘fickleness’ or ‘inconstancy’) in the sinful soul. A soul choosing to depart entirely from God’s grace has become completely enslaved to *iniusticia* or ‘injustice’; this negative affectivity strikingly portrayed by a demon who holds the person’s soul down with the pitchfork of ‘bad habit’ (*prava consuetudo*). The name of the pitchfork emphasises the long length of time it has taken the soul to depart from habits of justice.

When considered in its totality, the manuscript image is a stark reminder of the two affectivities open to humankind. The ladder structure of the image also visualises Charles Taylor’s understanding of orientation in moral space as a form of contact, both literally and symbolically. Symbolically, the bi-furcating ladders show the route by which the soul gains contact or loses contact with the ‘Good’. Literally, it is through gripping the sides and footholds of the ladder through touch that the soul climbs; *tactus*, traditionally regarded as the basest of the senses, marks the choice open to the soul to move right or left; and different agencies (God, the devil, angels and demons) make contact with the soul to accelerate its ascent or descent.



Figure 17. 'The Ascent and Descent of Faithful and Unfaithful Souls'. *Parabolae Salominis* (1175-1200), Universitätsbibliothek, Erlangen (Allemagne), UEL MS. 8, fol. 130v.

### **Habitus and Affective Wordplay: *Affectus*, *effectus*, *defectus* and *profectus***

This chapter has concentrated on highlighting a shared Cistercian and Victorine fascination with ordering the *affectus* and *intellectus* as part of the *habitus* of monastic and canonical life. Nevertheless, throughout the course of this chapter it has emerged that, within this *habitus*, perception and affectivity was interconnected with other Latin terms to create wordplays and oppositions: namely *effectus* ('effect'), *defectus* ('failure'/'lack'/'defect') and *profectus* ('progress'). This wordplay has been overlooked and its significance is rarely noted, except in some rare cases, and never systematically.<sup>707</sup> These wordplays merit a much deeper treatment than can be given here, but before progressing to explore *how* the *affectus-intellectus* psychological distinction was specifically employed by Cistercians and Victorines, to end this chapter, it is worth briefly how these oppositions were used. These are significant, I suggest, because they add linguistic texture to the image of shared elements of Cistercian and Victorine anthropology we have uncovered thus far.

#### Affectivity-Effectivity (*affectus-effectus*)

I have argued that *affectus* and *intellectus* demonstrate a *complementary* relationship in establishing a *habitus* aligned with virtue. The next most common wordplay is *affectus-effectus*. This wordplay has two primary uses. Less commonly, it is used to contrast the human and divine response to love. While human love is *affected* by sense perceptions and God, God can only love *effectively*. We have seen examples of this type throughout this chapter. William of Saint-Thierry, for instance, writes of God that 'We love you, or you love yourself in us, we affectively and you effectively...'<sup>708</sup> Juanita Feros Ruys has shown through the example of Abelard's that the terms *affectus* and *effectus* mean different things when applied to human and divine agencies: 'as there is no slippage between intention and act', in the case of God, 'so there is no distinction between *affectus* and *effectus*.'<sup>709</sup>

The main use of the *affectus-effectus* distinction is to highlight an *inner-outer* relationship between desire and actions: if affectivity denotes interior feelings, effectivity

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<sup>707</sup> William of Saint-Thierry's use of *affectus-effectus* wordplay has been briefly noted by Pierre and Zwingmann. See Pierre, 'That We May Glorify Him', pp. 70-72; Zwingmann, 'Ex Affectu Mentis', note 31, p. 13. Isaac of Stella's use of *defectus-profectus* wordplay in *Sermo* 28 and 29 has been explored comprehensively by Domenico Pezzini: Isaac of Stella on How to Compose the Duality of Human Nature into Unity', *CSQ*, 48:2 (2013), p. 184 and 187-208.

<sup>708</sup> *Cont. Deo.*, 11 (CFS 3, p. 58).

<sup>709</sup> J. F. Ruys, 'Before the Affective Turn', p. 66.

denotes the agency through which they are expressed in the world through outward actions. Sometimes this wordplay is used for fun or to add emphasis through rhyme, with authors following a standard trope.<sup>710</sup> Yet, behind the wordplay is a serious message regarding the cooperation of human and divine agency. As William of Saint-Thierry says: ‘Consequently, love at first involves effort and *affectus*; charity involves the *effect*.’<sup>711</sup> And elsewhere: ‘Sometimes, it is true, the *effect* of her affection of her work staggers or deviates as long as charity in this unable to see except in part or through a mirror and in an enigma. But yet, her *affectus* remains whole and steady in virtue.’<sup>712</sup> God, in in the Pseudo-Bernardine *Tractatus de interiori domo* is said to be conceived in the hearts of believers yet it is only when faith is externalised into deeds and actions that it is fully realised. ‘He is brought forth by intellect (*intellectus*), he is seized by consent (*consensus*), he is born by affect (*affectus*), he is nourished by deed (*effectus*).’<sup>713</sup> In this psychological literature, then, the *effectus* represents the tangible outcome of the initial desire or *affectus*. Through action, deeds and outcomes, the inner mind is connected to the outer world.

#### Affectivity-Defectivity-Progress (*affectus-defectus-profectus*)

*Affectus-defectus*, the second example of wordplay, offers a window into Christian eschatology and shows the role of an *affectus* in transcending the fallen condition of man, as we have briefly encountered already. As I have argued with Bernard of Clairvaux and Richard of Saint-Victor, *defectus* connotes a ‘lack’, ‘failing’ or ‘defect’ in something. This ‘defectivity’ of the soul is referred to in two overlapping yet distinct senses. First, the term *defectus* has been employed in disability studies, particularly in studies that explore Thomas Aquinas’ theory of relationship between ‘bodily infirmity’ (*infirmetas corporis*) and bodily ‘defects’ (*defectūs*).<sup>714</sup> Richard Cross argues that Aquinas considers defects in human organisms as the result of original sin, even using *defectus* as a technical term to refer to the privations in the soul and body as a result of the Fall. These unavoidable defects resulting

<sup>710</sup> *Nat. dig.*, 6 (PL 184, 383D-384A; Verdeyen, CCCM 88, p. 181-182; Davis, p. 58): ‘Amor ergo prius habuit conatum aliquem affectum; caritas habet effectum’.

<sup>711</sup> *Nat. Dig.*, 13 (PL 184, 388D; Verdeyen, CCCM 88, p. 188; Davis, p. 69).

<sup>712</sup> *Nat. Dig.*, 13 (PL 184, 388D-389A; Verdeyen, CCCM88, p. 188; Davis, p. 69-70): ‘Aliquando quidem titubatur, vel deviat affectionis vel operis effectus, quamdiu in hac vita non potest videre caritas nisi ex parte et per speculum in aenigmate: sed integer tamen semper et solidus in sua virtute suus permanet affectus.’

<sup>713</sup> *Int. dom.*, 39 (PL 184: 548A-B): ‘Intellectu gignitur, consensu concipitur, affectu nascitur, effectu nutritur’

<sup>714</sup> See R. Cross, ‘Aquinas on Physical Impairment: Human Nature and Original Sin’, *The Harvard Theological Review*, 110:3 (2017), pp. 317-338 (esp. pp. 317-320); M. J. Romero, ‘Aquinas on the *corporis infirmitas*: Broken Flesh and the Grammar of Grace’, in B. Brock and J. Swinton, eds., *Disability in the Christian Tradition: A Reader* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), pp. 101-151.

from an eschatological event that unleashed imbalance in the cosmos is how Hugh of Saint-Victor views some defects. ‘Evil is nothing else than a lack of good’ (*malum enim nihil aliud est nisi defectus boni*).<sup>715</sup> There are no moral attributes attached to these defects; rather, in individuals they can be considered beneficial, since they help contemplatives understand the true beauty and harmony of the universe when compared with individual examples of defectivity.<sup>716</sup>

Additionally, a *defectus* can be used similarly to an *effectus* as referring to the soul’s changeability through its dispositions and habits. In this sense it is often used to contrast the soul’s mutability from God’s completeness and stability. God, for Alcher of Clairvaux, exists ‘without a defect of substance’ (*sine defectu substantiae*) yet the intellectual soul or *animus* ‘can both be deficient and excel (*deficit et proficit*), know and ignore, remember and forget’.<sup>717</sup> As Alcher and others make clear, made in the image and likeness of God, the soul’s powers can never totally be effaced yet the soul is still capable of fearing its ‘moral’ defectiveness through its will assenting immoderately to the desires of the body:

Our soul is joined to our body by certain desires (*affectiones*) and a certain friendship (*amicitia*) which keeps us from hating our own flesh... the soul is greatly affected (*afficitur*) by the body’s sufferings. Unable to die, still the soul fears annihilation. Although its nature keeps it from being defective (*defectus*), yet the soul fears defectiveness (*deficere*).<sup>718</sup>

The ‘affections’ (*affectiones*) in addition to its ‘defects’ (*defectūs*) are both involved in distancing the soul morally from God. As the *De spiritu et anima* states: ‘The soul has love (*amor*) within itself by which it can always either be with God, or, if it has been moved by affections, or even its defects, to go away from him, it can return to him.’<sup>719</sup> *Defectus* thus has an *antithetical* relationship with the *affectus*: while positive affectivity represents the capacity of the soul to perfect itself through the ordering of love, a *defectus* represents the failure or

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<sup>715</sup> *Sent. div.* 2 (Piazzoni, line 360, p. 945; VTT 1, p. 151).

<sup>716</sup> *Sent. div.*, 2 (Piazzoni, pp. 945 and 948; VTT 1, p. 151 and 154). Victorines placed great importance on sacraments as a tool for understanding God. For an equivalent example – that of the soul and body as a tool to understand God – see Richard of Saint-Victor’s *De trinitate* 3.9 (PL 196, 921A-B; VTT 1, p. 254).

<sup>717</sup> *DSA*, 2 (PL 40:781; CFS 24, p. 183): ‘Non talis est animus: sed deficit et proficit, novit et ignorat, meminit et obliviscitur.’

<sup>718</sup> *DSA*, 14 (PL 40, 789; CFS 24, p. 201): ‘Quibusdam affectibus et quadam amicitia anima corpori conjungitur, secundum quam amicitiam nemo carnem suam odio habet. Doloribus ejus vehementer afficitur. Formidat interitum, quae mori non potest. Timet defectum quae per naturam non potest deficere.’

<sup>719</sup> *DSA*, 36 (PL 40, 807; CFS 24, p. 240): ‘Habet anima in se amorem, quo semper potest stare cum Deo, aut redire, si mota cum suis affectibus, imo defectibus, ab eo fuerit.’

weakness of affectivity – it is a willed refusal to repair man’s fallen condition, and therefore can be considered as synonymous with what I have termed ‘negative’ affectivity.<sup>720</sup>

Consequently, when the term *defectus* is used in this second sense to describe a deficiency in the *habitus* of monks or canons, it is frequently employed in wordplay with *profectus* or ‘progress’, as Alcher does above, and Bernard of Clairvaux does extensively in his *De gratia et libero arbitrio*. As the antonym of *defectus*, to make ‘progress’ or be ‘proficient’ means a monk or canon that has ordered their affectivity correctly and is advancing towards God. *Profectus* is therefore sometimes synonymous with ‘positive’ affectivity and the ordering of love. Godfrey of Saint-Victor certainly has this conception in mind in his *Microcosmus*. ‘If you look not at nature that is falling (*deficiens*), but at nature that is advancing (*proficiens*)’, he claims,

you will see how ordered love of a friend and ordered love of an enemy are born from a single root. Neither nature nor grace know inordinate love of friend or enemy, but for its part, the fallenness of nature (*defectus naturae*), that is, vice (*vitium*), connects the two insofar as it can. For when nature has fallen (*deficisset*) in itself, because it found no help in itself, it was compelled to seek outside and in some fashion made friends for itself. Those who it could not make friends it found were enemies – when it could not be in harmony with them regarding what is good, and it did not want to be out of harmony with them because of what was evil. Thus, therefore ordered love of both the enemy and the friend are born from the place where love of neighbour is born. For, since every human being is neighbour to you, none is to be considered your enemy, even if someone considers you his enemy.<sup>721</sup>

The ‘advancing’ canon is a social animal. Reflecting the canonical ethos to love thy neighbour, not only does the proficient canon order their love towards their friends but also their enemies. The very fact that human nature is defective, Godfrey suggests, means that we require the help of others to become virtuous. In the *Microcosmus*, then, we see how this *defectus/profectus* wordplay, used by Cistercians and Victorines alike, could be utilised as a justification of the canonical way of life.

## Conclusion

Elena Carrera has suggested that the unifying theme across the major religious orders of the Middle Ages – the Augustinians, Benedictines, Cistercians, Dominicans and Franciscans – was that affectivity designated ‘a state of mind which was best understood not as a passive

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<sup>720</sup> Isaac of Stella consistently plays on the idea of God’s inability to progress not suffer any deficiency. See *Sermo* 21.2 (SC 207, p. 48-51; CFS 11, p. 171); *Sermo* 25.8 (SC 207, p. 120; CFS 11, p. 207).

<sup>721</sup> *Micro.*, 3.217 (Delhayre, p. 236; VTT 2, p. 326)

surrendering to God's action on the soul, but as an active engagement with it'.<sup>722</sup> This chapter has aimed to show that this activity was crucial to Cistercian and Victorine anthropology which recognised affectivity as the key power by which the soul could be restored into the divine image and likeness. To do so both groups found that their theories of active sensation could provide a helpful analogue to explain spiritual sensation: the process by which the soul spiritually changes to more closely resemble the divine. The final section of this chapter aimed to show how Cistercian and Victorine anthropology can be characterised by three different models of affectivity (negative and positive, horizontal and vertical). All three of these types of affectivity are concerned with the joint Cistercian and Victorine goal of promoting virtue. Consequently, there is also an anthropological relationship between the language of affectivity these groups use: the soul's twin powers of *affectus* and *intellectus* being commonly founded coupled with terms such as *effectus*, *defectus* and *profectus* which are used to chart the soul's progress from negative to positive affectivity.




Figure 18. The anthropological relationship between *affectus*, *intellectus*, *effectus*, *defectus* and *profectus*

It is in passages describing the emotional training of a canon or monk where all these terms coalesce. For example, in a single paragraph William of Saint-Thierry expresses the close

<sup>722</sup> E. Carrera, 'Augustinian, Aristotelian, and Humanist Shaping of Medieval and Early Modern Emotion: *Affectus*, *affectio*, and 'affection' as Travelling Concepts', in *Before Emotion*, p. 172.

relationship between the terms *affectus*, *defectus*, *profectus*, *virtus* and *vitium*, which act as the coordinates for diagnosing a person's training in virtue.

For love is nothing other than the will ardently fixed on something good. The will, in itself, is a simple *affectus* rooted in a rational soul that may be capable of good as well as evil. [This *affectus*] is filled with good when it is helped by grace; with evil when left to itself; it is lacking (*deficit*) in itself. In order that the human soul may be lacking in nothing from the point of the Creator she is given free will in every respect. When the will is in unison with grace helping it, it develops (*profectus*) and receives the name of virtue (*virtus*) and is made love (*efficitur amor*). When left to itself, it chooses to enjoy itself selfishly, it endures its own lack (*defectus*) in itself. And it is assigned as many names of vices as there are vices: cupidity, avarice, lust, and so on.<sup>723</sup>

The main idea William expresses is that without the grace of God, the will always fails (*deficere*) and therefore is unable to progress (*proficere*). When it does progress, the effect (*effectus*) is love, which creates the virtue necessary for the soul to effectively love God. In a similar passage, Isaac of Stella connects all of these terms to the *habitus* of a Cistercian monk. 'Virtue (*virtus*)', he writes, has been defined as the disposition of a well-ordered soul (*habitus animi bene institute*)'.<sup>724</sup> Therefore, he adds

We must therefore so unify, order, and govern the desires of the soul (*affectus animi*), in a manner befitting their true function and purpose, so they may become virtues. It is these desires which qualify every action; they are capable of degenerating into vices (*in vitia deficiunt*) or developing into virtues (*in virtutes proficiunt*). If we rule them prudently and moderately, valiantly and justly, they grow steadily into the virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice. They are said to be the roots of all the virtues, the hinges upon which all the others turn.<sup>725</sup>

In sum, what investigations of Cistercian and Victorine *libri de anima* and writings on psychology show us is how the mechanisms of affectivity (the shaping of the soul through emotion, practices and dispositions), in addition to its language (key terms such as *effectus*,

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<sup>723</sup> *Nat. dig.*, 4 (PL 184, 383A-B; CCCM 88, p. 180-181; Davis, II, p. 56): 'Nihil enim aliud est amor quam vehemens in bono voluntas. Per se enim voluntas simplex est affectus, sic animae rationali inditus, ut sit capax tam boni quam mali: bono replendus, cum adjuvatur a gratia; malo, cum sibi dimissus deficit in semetipso. Ne enim a Creatore aliquid animae deesset humanae, libera in utramvis partem data est ei voluntas: quae, cum adjuvanti concordat gratiae, virtutis accipit profectum et nomen, et amor efficitur: cum sibi dimissa se ipsa secundum se ipsam frui vult, sui in se ipsa patitur defectum; et quot habet vitia, tot vitiorum sortitur nomina, cupiditatis, avaritiae, luxuriae et alia hujusmodi.'

<sup>724</sup> *Sermo* 3.1 (PL 194, 1697C-D; SC 130, p. 114; CFS 11, p. 21).

<sup>725</sup> *Sermo* 2.1-2 (PL 194, 1697C-D; SC, 130, p. 114; CFS 11, p. 21): 'Componendi ergo, et instituendi, ac etiam ordinandi apposita ratione ad id quod debent, et quomodo debent, sunt animi affectus, ut in virtutes proficere possint. Ipsi enim sunt, qui operi foris nomen imponunt: quique aut in vitia deficiunt, aut in virtutes proficiunt. Cum ergo prudenter, modeste, fortiter, et juste instituuntur, exsurgunt in virtutes, prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem, et iustitiam: quae quasi cardines sive radices omnium dicuntur virtutum.'



*defectus, profectus, virtus* and *habitus*), were to a high degree shared by these two groups. Both organisations shared a view of the affections and thoughts as a form of spiritual change within the soul – a view that gained some traction in the mid-twelfth century as evidenced by the manuscript transmission of the *Ysagoge in theologiam*. By developing and systematising Augustine’s understanding of spiritual motion and change, the Cistercians and Victorines were thus able to pinpoint with some precision where change in the body-soul organism occurred in the body, senses or spirit. The development of this theory of motion in *libri de anima*, I have argued, can be seen to dovetail with the joint Cistercian and Victorine understanding of “like knows like” perception, whereby the bodily senses and spiritual senses of the soul mirror each other in their perceptual mechanisms.

A greater awareness of these semantic wordplays is needed, I argue, because it not only reveals Cistercian monks and Victorine canons are talented writers and composers, but also shows *what* the function of these words are at any point. Much like definitions of *sensus*, *affectus* and *intellectus*, context is key to uncovering the nuances in meaning. Certainly, terms such as *defectus*, *effectus* or *profectus* may not always be used in a technical or specialist sense, but the use of these sophisticated wordplays by writers such as Bernard of Clairvaux, Isaac of Stella, William of Saint-Thierry, Hugh, Richard and Godfrey of Saint-Victor was clearly no accident. At the broader level, then, this chapter has started to uncover the *why* of these oppositions. One answer to this question, I believe, is that terms such as *affectus*, *intellectus*, *defectus*, *effectus*, *profectus* and their interactions with each other help map out the dimensions of an affective anthropology subscribed to by both groups. The shared Cistercian and Victorine emphasis on the ordering of love can be seen as part of a way of life in which to restore the soul of its defects and deficiencies, produce and cultivate virtuous practices, actions and behaviours – a positive *habitus* – in order to make progress in uniting the soul to God.

## **PART 2 – IMAGE AND LIKENESS**

## CHAPTER 4 – CISTERCIAN AND VICTORINE IMAGE AND LIKENESS THEOLOGY

*Et ait faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostrum...  
et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam ad imaginem Deum creavit illum  
masculum et feminam creavit eos.*

And He said: Let us make man to our image and likeness...  
And God made man according to his image: to the image of God he created  
him: male and female he created them.

Genesis 1.26-27

In the last three chapters, we have seen how the union of reason and love was essential to Cistercian and Victorine understandings of the soul's structure and powers. This bipartite view of the soul was not only limited to Cistercian and Victorine psychological accounts; as I have previously touched upon, it also was key to Cistercian and Victorine anthropological understandings of the purpose of humanity. It was a fundamental Christian doctrine to know that the soul was made 'in the image and likeness of God' (*in imago et similitudo Dei*) as stated in Genesis 1:26. I will argue that Cistercian, and especially Victorine, anthropology was distinctive in viewing the powers of thinking and feeling, the *intellectus* and *affectus*, as reflecting the creation of human beings in the image and likeness of the divine. This was significant since by understanding the intellective and affective faculties as imprinted with a divine image and similitude, both groups sought to equally privilege both powers – and stress their mutual collaboration – in the 'divinisation' of man through restoring virtue and knowledge to the soul. This piece of doctrine was key to the Cistercian and Victorine emphasis on the complementarity of both powers of the soul in knowing and loving God. By implication, the restoration of man to his original prelapsarian dignity as a 'divine' creature, thus necessitated the training, progression and perfection of his psychological capacities.

### Victorine Image and Likeness Theology

As we have seen, the Victorines certainly subscribed to the Augustinian view that the structure of the soul was a trinity.<sup>726</sup> Yet among the Victorines there was also a clear association between the soul and the image and likeness of God, so much so that Csaba

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<sup>726</sup> Peter Lombard recalls several of Augustine's triads in *Sent.* 1.2(10)-3(11), pp. 70-75.

Németh has referred to this as a ‘hallmark’ of Victorine theology.<sup>727</sup> Hugh’s admonition to ‘learn everything’ (*Disce omnia*) in the *Didascalicon*, as Stephen Jaeger has shown, justified the study of the soul for the Victorines, since the soul was understood to possess a similarity to the entire universe, making one able to comprehend all things through it via similitude, and making each man a microcosm.<sup>728</sup> The *Didascalicon* also contains one of Hugh’s earliest statements of love and reason reflecting the image and likeness of God. ‘The integrity of human nature... is attained in two things – in knowledge and in virtue, and in these lies our sole likeness to the supernal and divine substances’, he states.<sup>729</sup> A much more developed image and likeness comparison can be found in his *De sacramentis Christianae fidei*. Originally, the soul, he writes

...was the image and likeness of God: image according to reason, likeness according to love; image according to understanding of truth, likeness according to love of virtue; or image according to knowledge, likeness according to substance. Image, because all things in it are according to wisdom; likeness, because it is itself one and simple according to essence; image because rational, likeness because spiritual; image pertains to figure, likeness to nature.<sup>730</sup>

In the prelapsarian state, man’s soul was entirely good, both in nature and its operation. Yet, in the current fallen state of life, man’s nature is both good and evil: good because it still contains the nature of the divine, evil because it has been corrupted and is deficient. Consequently, the pursuit of life for Hugh and the Victorines was geared towards both the ‘integrity of nature’ (*integritas naturae*) granted to these powers and relieving any ‘weaknesses’ (*defectūs*) they suffer from.<sup>731</sup> This restoration occurs both through contemplation and virtue. As Hugh says: ‘there are two things which restore the divine likeness in man, namely the contemplation of truth and the practice of virtue.’<sup>732</sup> Therefore,

<sup>727</sup> Németh, *Quasi aurora consurgens*, p. 164.

<sup>728</sup> C. S. Jaeger, ‘Victorine Humanism’, *A Companion to the Abbey of Saint Victor in Paris*, ed. Hugh Bernard Feiss and Juliet Mousseau (Leiden: Brill, 2018), p. 106.

<sup>729</sup> *Did.*, 1.6 (PL 176, 745C; Taylor, p. 52): ‘Integritas vero vitae humanae duobus perficitur: scientia et virtute, quae nobis cum supernis et divinis substantiis similitudo sola est.’

<sup>730</sup> *Sacr.*, 1.6.2 (PL 176, 264CD; Berndt, pp. 137-138; Deferrari, p. 94): ‘Factus est homo ad imaginem et similitudinem dei, quia in anima potior pars erat hominis vel potius ipse homo erat fuit imago et similitudo dei: Imago secundum rationem; similitudo secundum dilectionem; imago secundum cognitionem veritatis; similitudo secundum amorem virtutis; imago secundum rationem; similitudo secundum substantiam. Imago quia omnia in ipsa secundum sapientiam; similitudo quia una et simplex ipsa secundum essentiam; imago quia rationalis, similitudo quia spiritualis; imago pertinet ad figuram, similitudo ad naturam pertinent.’

<sup>731</sup> *Did.*, 1.5 (PL 176, 745B; Taylor, pp. 50-51).

<sup>732</sup> *Did.* 1.9 (PL 176, 747A; Buttner, p. 15-16; Taylor, pp. 54-55): ‘Duo vero sunt quae divinam in homine similitudinem reparant, id est, speculatio veritatis et virtutis exercitium.’

the *Didascalicon* makes the quest for wisdom a lifelong journey to bring the thinking and feeling powers of the soul back into order with one another.

### **Spatial Image and Likeness: Regio dissimilitudinis and regio similitudinis**

Hugh's integration of psychology with a theology of image and likeness is a distinction found across several other of his writings besides the *Didascalicon*.<sup>733</sup> Hugh's status as an authority ensured that his viewpoints were wholeheartedly embraced by several other members of the Victorine school who specifically state that the *intellectus* and *affectus* symbolise the soul's image and likeness of God. The first to do so was Achard of Saint-Victor, whose Victorine image and likeness theology is clear in *De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis*.<sup>734</sup> When describing the mind, Achard defines it in terms of its reflection of the image and likeness of God.

The mind (*mens*) is that which has a natural capacity, both in understanding and in affectivity (*intellectu et affectu naturaliter capax*), for truth, which is superior in dignity and deeper in subtlety to other things; in understanding through knowledge, in affectivity through love; it possesses the image of God in its power of knowing, the likeness in its power of loving.<sup>735</sup>

However, following the Fall, the mind's understanding has been weakened and its affectivity to seek God and cultivate virtue completely disordered:

The image of God in humanity was twofold: from nature and from grace. The natural image consisted in the potency or possibility of knowing, loving and enjoying God. This image was corrupted and deformed after sin and by sin, but not utterly effaced; hence *surely a human being passes as an image* [Ps 39:7]... The image from grace consists in actual knowledge, love and enjoyment. This has been completely effaced by transgression... He was completely deprived of virtues, weakened in natural gifts.<sup>736</sup>

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<sup>733</sup> *Adnotationes Elucidatoriae in Pentateuchon*, 1 (PL 175, 37C); *Archa Noe*, 3.7 (PL 176, 651D-652A; VTT 5, pp. 177-178); *Arrha*, 37-39 (Feiss and Sicard, p. 252-255; VTT 2, pp. 216-217).

<sup>734</sup> Feiss discusses Achard's anthropology of image and likeness in *Achard of Saint Victor. Works*, CFS 165, pp. 31-36.

<sup>735</sup> *Discretione*, 33 (Haring, p. 181; CS 165, p. 364): 'Mens enim est quae veritatis rebus utique aliis et dignitate superioris et subtilitate interioris et intellectu et affectu naturaliter capax est: intellectu per cognitionem; affectu per dilectionem; imaginem Dei habens in potentia cognoscendi; similitudinem habens in potential diligendi.'

<sup>736</sup> Achard of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 1.3 (CS 165, pp. 98-99).

In *Sermo* 9, Achard would elaborate further on this theme, arguing that it is on account of this fallen, postlapsarian condition why humans need to use and enjoy the sensible world correctly:

Besides that general image found in all things, the rational creature is endowed interiorly with another image, in that it can understand him from whom it comes, love him whom it understands, embrace him whom it loves, for both implementation (*executio*) and enjoyment (*fruitio*): implementation so that it may be just; enjoyment, so that it may be blessed.<sup>737</sup>

Thus, as the above quotations reveal, Achard firmly associates the *intellectus* and *affectus* as created to the image and likeness of God and argues for their functioning within the parameters of Augustine's understanding of 'use' and 'enjoyment' (*uti-frui*). In a medieval world that operated with 'a discourse of opposites', in which two opposites could simultaneously exist, the meaning of 'likeness' and 'resemblance' was often informed by its contrasting state: 'unlikeness' or 'dissimilitude'.<sup>738</sup> As Etienne Gilson has noted, Augustine's notion of likeness was bound up in the Neoplatonic understanding of matter. At one end is the soul's assimilation with matter, at the other is the spiritual realm that invites the soul to increasingly resemble the divine.<sup>739</sup> Those souls that do not cultivate their affective and cognitive powers remain trapped in the *regio dissimilitudinis* ('region of unlikeness'), according to Augustine. All human beings have the potential to restore their impaired faculties, Achard believes, although this depends on using them to enjoy the world in a just manner – a way of life in which the soul's thoughts and affection increasingly resemble those of God.

Achard notably employs Augustine's understanding of the *regio dissimilitudinis* in his sermon, but he also opposed it with its contrary: the *regio similitudinis* or 'region of likeness'. There are three *regiones similitudinis* identified in *Sermo* 9: the regions of nature, justice and blessedness. The region of natural likeness is in all, whereas the region of justice can only be achieved through the cultivation of reason and affect: 'The region of justice consists in usefulness brought about by an act implementing the power of understanding,

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<sup>737</sup> Achard of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 9.4 (Châtillon, p. 106; CS 165, p. 68): 'Preter enim illam generalem imaginem, que est in omnibus, rationalis creatura habet in se quamdam imaginem, in eo quod potest intellegere eum a quo est, et intellectum amare, et amatum potest apprehendere, vel ad executionem, vel ad fruitionem: ad executionem ut sit iusta, ad fruitionem ut sit beata.'

<sup>738</sup> C. B. Bouchard, "Every Valley Shall Be Exalted": *The Discourse of Opposites in Twelfth-Century Thought* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003).

<sup>739</sup> E. Gilson, 'Regio Dissimilitudinis de Platon à Saint Bernard de Clairvaux', *Mediaeval Studies*, 9 (1947), p. 126 (for Augustine see pp. 121-128)

loving and embracing’, Achard writes.<sup>740</sup> In this region, individuals are just because they form themselves into God through the ‘actual’ (*in actu*) use of a power and similitude that exists in them by nature only ‘potentially’ (*in potentia*).<sup>741</sup> In Victorine fashion, there is also a communal dimension to this spatial view of positive affectivity. As Achard points out: ‘the likeness of justice is in each of the just; the region is in the totality’.<sup>742</sup> The ‘region’ thus refers to the total number of human beings who successfully use the gifts of nature in the correct way; in doing so, a likeness is established not only with God but also with all other like-minded individuals who strive to live virtuously – a community extending beyond the cloister walls of Saint-Victor and embracing all virtuous Christians.

### **The Restoration of Image and Likeness as Medicine in Victorine Thought**

The soul’s creation in the image and likeness of God is a persistent theme across Richard of Saint-Victor’s *Liber exceptionum* (*Book of Notes*).<sup>743</sup> Richard, however, draws on Victorine image-likeness theology as found in Hugh of Saint-Victor’s *Didascalicon* in order to emphasise how the Fall and sin has corrupted the divine likeness in man originally made by ‘the work of creation’ (*opus conditionis*), and that knowledge of Sacred Scripture serves as path for ‘the work of restoration’ (*opus restaurationis*), the restoration of man through virtue.<sup>744</sup> He explains that the world was originally created for men not to suffer any ‘deficiencies’ (*defectūs*) or want from the ‘necessities’ (*necessitates*) of life: ‘the world had been created arranged, adorned, and endowed with what was necessary (*necessarius*), suitable (*commodus*), and pleasing (*gratus*) to the human body...’<sup>745</sup> Borrowing from Hugh’s *Didascalicon*, Richard claims that the theoretical, practical and mechanical arts serve as the branches of knowledge that form the three remedies – wisdom (*sapientia*), virtue (*virtus*) and necessity (*necessitas*) – against three evils – ‘ignorance’ (*ignorantia*), ‘concupiscence’ (*concupiscentia*) and ‘weakness’ (*infirmetas*) – that have collectively marred the three goods

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<sup>740</sup> Achard of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 9.5 (Châtillon, p. 106; CS 165, p. 68): ‘Regio iustitie consistit in usu, actu potentie intelligendi et diligendi et apprehendendi ad executionem.’ Jean Châtillon briefly discusses these two states of resemblance in *Théologie spiritualité et métaphysique dans l’oeuvre oratoire d’Achard de Saint-Victor* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1969), pp. 169-170.

<sup>741</sup> Achard of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 9.5 (Châtillon, p. 106; CS 165, p. 69).

<sup>742</sup> Achard of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 9.5 (Châtillon, p. 106; CS 165, p. 69): ‘Similitudo iustitie in singulis iustis, regio vero in universalis.’

<sup>743</sup> *Except.*, 1.1 and 2.12.5 (PL 177, 191-192; Châtillon, p. 104 and p. 464; VTT 3, p. 299 and VTT 6, p. 458).

<sup>744</sup> *Except.*, 2.6 (PL 177, 206D; Châtillon, p. 117; VTT 3, p. 314).

<sup>745</sup> *Except.*, 2.7 (PL 177, 200A-B; Châtillon, p. 118; VTT 3, p. 315): ‘Mundo igitur creato, dispositor, ornato, et eo quod esset humano corpori necessarium, commodum, gratum parato...’

bestowed on the first man: his image (rationality/truth/understanding) and likeness (affectivity/love/virtue) with the divine, as well as his immortality.<sup>746</sup>

For Richard, medicine, as one of the seven mechanical arts, thus plays a key role in restoring man's 'integrity of nature' (*integritas naturae*). To medicine, as well as the six other mechanical arts – fabric making, armament, navigation, agriculture, hunting and theatrics – 'pertain all things that are found pleasing (*gratus*), suitable (*commodus*), and necessary (*necessarius*) for human needs', he writes.<sup>747</sup> Medicine, thus, joins with rationality and affectivity in restoring the original health of the body by healing the three aforementioned evils afflicting human life (ignorance, concupiscence and weakness). Indeed, the *Liber exceptionum* goes as far to say that healing the body and soul is the goal of spiritual life in a nutshell. Citing Hugh's *Didascalicon*, Richard writes that 'the aim and intent of all human actions or efforts that reason guides must be directed either to restoring the integrity of our nature (*integritas naturae*) or to tempering the neediness (*necessitas*) of the deficiencies (*defectūs*) to which this present life is subject'.<sup>748</sup>

### **Image and Likeness through Allegory: Beatitude, Microcosmism, Celestial Hierarchy and Gender**

Passages emphasising the powers of reasoning and loving as made in the *imago et similitudo Dei* re-occur across Victorine works. The *Sententiae* (*Sentences*) of Peter Lombard, for instance, drew on the authority of Augustine's *De quantitate animae*, to combine an Augustinian trinitarian discussion of image and likeness with the Victorine preference for reason and love. In his *Sententiae*, the Lombard would also stress justice as a key feature of the affective, loving part of the soul:

Therefore man has been made to the image and likeness of God according to mind, which surpasses the irrational animals; to the image according to memory, intelligence and love; to the likeness according to innocence and justice which are naturally in the rational mind. Either the image is inspected in cognition of truth, the likeness in the love of virtue; or the image in all the others, the likeness in the essence, because it is immortal and indivisible. Whence Augustine in the book *De quantitate*

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<sup>746</sup> *Did.*, 'Appendix' (Buttimer, p. 134; Taylor, p. 152-154); *Except.*, 1.2-1.5 (PL 177, 203C-206D; Châtillon, pp. 104-106; VTT 3, pp. 300-301).

<sup>747</sup> *Except.*, 1.14 (PL 177, col. 220A-B; Châtillon, p. 109; VTT 3, p. 306): 'Ad hanc enim pertinent universa que humanis necessitatibus inveniuntur grata, commode, necessaria...'

<sup>748</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.5 (PL 177, col. 196A; Châtillon, p. 106; VTT 3, pp. 301-302): 'Omnium enim humanarum actionum seu studiorum que ratio moderatur, finis et intentio ad hoc spectare debet, ut vel nature nostre reparetur integritas, vel defectuum quibus presens subiaceret vita temperetur necessitas.' See *Did.* 1.5 (Buttimer, p. 130; Taylor, p. 152).



*animae* says: “The soul was made similar to God, because God made it is immortal and indissoluble.” The image therefore pertains to the form, the likeness to nature.<sup>749</sup>

Similar statements occur in Richard’s *Sermones centum*.<sup>750</sup> Godfrey’s *Sermones* and *Microcosmus* emphasise man’s psychological image and likeness.<sup>751</sup> Four of Walter of Saint-Victor’s sermons also pursue this theme.<sup>752</sup> Walter’s *Sermo* 11.9 is particularly notable since, like Achard, image and likeness are attributed a spatial dimension. The creation of the world in six days serves as an analogue for the psychic restoration of man through six ‘dwelling places’ (*mansiones*), also equivalent to the Beatitudes. In particular, the sixth and final dwelling place corresponds to the beatitude of ‘purity of heart’ and is only achieved by cleansing six qualities pertaining to the intellectual and affective powers of the soul (see Table 15).<sup>753</sup>

Other influences were possible, though, other than Hugh of Saint-Victor or Augustine. Showing the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius and light metaphysics, Richard of Saint-Victor invokes James 1:17 in *De duodecim patriarchis* to state that reason and affection are the two gifts given by God to man through man’s creation *in imago et similitudo Dei*. They constitute ‘A certain twofold power that has been given to every rational spirit by that Father of lights from whom comes every good gift and every perfect gift’, he says.<sup>754</sup> Elsewhere, Richard suggests a threefold image and likeness between God, the soul and the Church. In this allegory, the restoration of the image and likeness within the human soul – equivalent to the sacrarium and choir, respectively – is part of the process of building a church within each human soul, and the expansion of the Catholic faith more widely (see Table 16).

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<sup>749</sup> *Sent.*, 2.16.3(94).5, lines 12-21, p. 408: ‘Factus est ergo homo ad imaginem Dei et similitudinem secundum mentem, qua irrationabilibus antecellit; sed ad imaginem secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et dilectionem; ad similitudinem secundum innocentiam et iustitiam quae in mente rationali naturaliter sunt. Vel imago consideratur in cognitione veritatis, similitudo in amore virtutis vel imago in imago in aliis omnibus, similitudo in essentiali, quia immortalis et indivisibilis. Unde Augustinus in libro *De quantitate animae: Anima facta est similis Deo, quia immortalem et indissolubilem fecit eam Deus*. Imago ergo pertinet ad formam, similitudo ad naturam.’

<sup>750</sup> *Centum* 70 (PL 177, 1119C-1121C; VTT 6, pp. 463-4).

<sup>751</sup> Godfrey of Saint-Victor, ‘Sermon for the Birth of the Lord’ (VTT 8, p. 180).

<sup>752</sup> Walter of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 3.3 (CCCM 30, lines 79-120, pp. 28-29), *Sermo* 8.6 (CCCM 30, lines 142-162, p. 67) and *Sermo* 11.9 (CCCM 30, lines 276-298, pp. 100-101), *Sermo* 20.2 (CCCM 30, lines 39-49, p. 172).

<sup>753</sup> Walter of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 11.9 (CCCM 30, pp. 100-101)

<sup>754</sup> *XII patr.*, 3 (PL 196, 3A-B; SC 419, p. 96; Zinn, p. 55): ‘Omni spiritui rationali gemina quaedam vis data est ab illo Patre liminum, a quo est *omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum*.’

<b>Intellective Power</b>	<b>Affective Power</b>
Capacity for divine knowledge ( <i>capax divinae cognitionis</i> )	Capacity for divine love ( <i>capax divinae dilectionis</i> )
Reason ( <i>ratio</i> )	Will ( <i>voluntas</i> )
Intellect ( <i>intellectus</i> )	Feeling ( <i>affectus</i> )
Image ( <i>imago</i> )	Likeness ( <i>similitudo</i> )
Mind ( <i>mens</i> )	Heart ( <i>cor</i> )
Wisdom ( <i>sapientia</i> )	Justice ( <i>iustitia</i> )

Table 15. Walter of Saint-Victor's sixth step to restore the image and likeness of man to God.

<b>Church</b>	<b>Soul</b>
Stone	Virtues
Cement	Charity
Foundation	Christ
Walls	Contemplation
Roof	Good action
Length	Faith
Height	Hope
Width	Charity
Sacrarium	Image of God
Choir	Likeness of God
Nave	Sensuality
Atrium	Flesh
Altar	Contrition of heart
Glass windows	Spiritual senses
Turret	Name
Words	Preaching

Interior plaster	Purity of heart
Exterior plaster	Purity of flesh
Twelve Candles	Doctrines of the Twelve Apostles

Table 16. Richard of Saint-Victor's Church of the Soul in *Sermones centum* 2.<sup>755</sup>

Contemporary stereotypes, particularly those applying to gender, were also commonly used by the Victorines to justify the hierarchical relationship of reason, affection and the senses. The creation of Adam prior to Eve (the latter created *from* Adam's body, his rib) as well as patriarchal gender roles between men and women, husbands and wives, found in the Old Testament, gave textual foundation for Victorine exegesis to personify and allegorise the soul through the prism of gender. The result was that the male part of the soul – reason or intellect – is often considered naturally instituted to rule over the feminine aspects of the soul – will, affection or sensuality.

This more unequal, gendered, image of the relationship between thought and feeling was taken from Augustine and, predictably, is found in Hugh of Saint-Victor's writings too (see Appendix).<sup>756</sup> Achard of Saint-Victor's sermons used men and women as a reflection of this image and likeness. 'How is male to be understood if not as reason (*sensus interior*), and female if not as the will (*voluntas*)?'<sup>757</sup> In another sermon, Achard adds that he associates reason (*ratio*) with Adam, the flesh with the serpent, and Eve as the will is the 'mean between reason and flesh'.<sup>758</sup> This imagery also re-occurs in Godfrey's *Microcosmus* to highlight the ordered love needed between the flesh and the spirit.<sup>759</sup> As R. H. Bloch pointed out, the repeated invocations of the subjugation of women to men became a 'household code', an

<sup>755</sup> *Centum* 2 (PL 177, 903D-905B).

<sup>756</sup> Hugh of Saint-Victor, *De verbo Dei* (PL 177, 290B-C). For the history of this exegesis and Augustine's significance see A. K. Hieatt, 'Eve as Reason in a Tradition of Allegorical Interpretation of the Fall', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 43 (1980), pp. 221-226; E. Jager, *The Tempter's Voice: Language and the Fall in Medieval Literature* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 23-49. This was not entirely a negative coding: Eugene Teselle has suggested that linking Eve with the affections could be positive too since 'affection' was a trait men could internalise too (See 'Serpent, Eve, and Adam: Augustine and the Exegetical Tradition', in *Augustine: Presbyter Factus Sum*, eds. J. T. Lienhard, E. C. Muller and R. J. Teske, S.J., (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), p. 353. Bernard of Clairvaux's view on gender and original sin is surveyed in S. M. Krahmer, 'Adam, Eve, and Original Sin in the Works of Bernard of Clairvaux', *Cistercian Studies Quarterly* 37:1 (2002), pp. 3-12.

<sup>757</sup> Achard of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 5.4 (VTT 2, p. 255).

<sup>758</sup> Achard of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 13.9 (Châtillon, p. 143; Feiss, p. 218): 'Voluntas media inter rationem et carnem, inferior ratione et superior carne'.

<sup>759</sup> *Micro.*, 157 and 160 (Delhay, pp. 174-176, 178-180).

internalised view which was not simply an ‘abstract fear of sensuality, but a mistrust of the senses – a fear of the woman as body, the body as woman. In other words, it is the fear of the woman in every man's body’.<sup>760</sup>

Richard’s personifications of Rachel and Leah as Reason and Affection in *De duodecim patriarchis* certainly plays on this tradition of gender imagery, too. I have explored this in depth elsewhere.<sup>761</sup> Richard uses the creation of Eve from Adam to highlight the priority of knowledge (symbolised by Adam) over the affections. It also finds expression in Richard’s *Mysticae adnotationes in psalmos* (*Mystical Notes on the Psalms*). In this instance, Richard tells his students to

Interpret Adam as reason (*ratio*), and Eve as affection (*affectio*). These two, are understanding (*intellectus*) and desire (*affectus*). These two are called spirit (*spiritus*) and soul (*anima*). Indeed the two are not distinguished by essence but by function (*efficientia*). The soul vivifies, the spirit discerns; love (*dilectio*) pertains to the soul, thought (*cognitio*) to the spirit... Adam was created first, and Eve was created later from Adam. We ought first to prudently choose what should be loved through reason, based on that judgement of choice we should love ardently what must be loved. Therefore, let knowledge of truth come first, and let love of justice follow.<sup>762</sup>

Just as in his *De statu interioris hominis* and *De duodecim patriarchis*, the ordering of reason and love is essential for positive affectivity to occur. Richard, like Achard, thus elevates the decision to cultivate reason and affectivity as part of the eschatological struggle of all souls; each time negative affectivity is chosen over positive affectivity, the soul encounters another Fall, and is sent out again in exile in the region of unlikeness. As Richard puts it:

Knowledge profits (*proficit*) from love, just as love grows stronger (*convalescit*) from knowledge. But if love does not support reason in the search for truth, then very quickly the eye of discretion becomes dark. And love’s support of reason then turns into the opposite when, because of her reason, she is hurled into the darkness of error. Every time Eve throws Adam out of paradise into exile, affection entangles reason,

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<sup>760</sup> R. H. Bloch, *Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic Love* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), p. 31). For the universality of misogynistic attitudes in the Middle Ages see R. M. Karras, *Sexuality in Medieval Europe: Doing Unto Others* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 85-86.

<sup>761</sup> See J. Ford, ‘Jacob’s Family as a Symbol of Horizontal Affectivity’, *Archa Verbi*, 18 (2021), pp. 39-91 (at pp. 64-75).

<sup>762</sup> *Adnot. Psalm.*, 121 (PL 196, 363B-C; VTT 4, p. 196): ‘Per Adam intellige rationem, per Evam accipe affectionem. Duo sunt, intellectus et affectus. Duo nominantur anima, et spiritus. Duo quidem non per essentiam, sed per efficientiam. Anima vivit, spiritus discernit; ad animam perinet dilectio, ad spiritum cognitio... Prius Adam formatus est, postea Adam Eva facta est. Prius enim debemus per rationem quid amandum sit prudenter eligere, deinde secundum electionis iudicium quod amandum est ardentius diligere. Praecedat ergo cognitio veri, subsequatur dilectio iusti’ [translation modified]. Richard repeats this distinction between Adam and Eve again in the same commentary: see PL 196, 365A.

deflated from the search of truth, in vain thoughts. O how often does Eve through Adam out of his own house!<sup>763</sup>

### Cistercian Image and Likeness Theology

How does this compare with the Cistercian understanding of the soul as created to the image and likeness of God? The Cistercians certainly were sensitive to Augustine's understanding of the soul as the image and likeness of God in *De trinitate*. 'Man's nobler gifts – dignity, knowledge, and virtue – are found in the highest part of his being, his soul', Bernard of Clairvaux writes in *De diligendo Deo*.<sup>764</sup> By this, he means free will, self-knowledge and affectivity.<sup>765</sup> Likewise, Bernard's triplet in *De gratia et libero arbitrio* – free choice, free counsel and free pleasure – are said to contain the image and likeness of God. This is connected to his *defectus-profectus* opposition: free choice alone is made to God's image and is 'the reason why... [it] suffers no lessening or falling away (*defecus seu diminutio*)'; by contrast, free counsel and free pleasure are only made to God's likeness and thus 'liable not only to partial diminution but even a total loss'.<sup>766</sup> As Bernard sees it, each day the likeness of the soul to God is changing: 'By a fault we lost them; by grace we recovered them; and daily, each in varying degrees, either advance in them or fall away (*aut in ipsis proficimus, aut ab ipsis deficiamus*).'<sup>767</sup>

Much the same way, William of Saint-Thierry in his *Meditatio* 12 compares the soul to the Holy Trinity in a manner similar to Augustine's *De trinitate*:

For just as we say and believe of the Trinity that there are three Persons, so also the enlightened and affective will – that is, understanding and love and the disposition of enjoyment – are three personal affections, in a sort of way; but the substance of beatitude is one, for nothing is loved except by being understood, nor understood except by being loved, and when a man is found worthy to enjoy a thing he does not do so unless he both loves and understands it. To have and to enjoy, then, is to understand and love.<sup>768</sup>

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<sup>763</sup> *Adnot. Psalm.*, 121 (PL 196, 363C-D; VTT 4, pp. 196-197): 'Nam ex amore cognitio proficit, sicut ex cognitione amor convalescit. Si vero rationem amor in veritatis inquisitione non sublevat discretionis oculus citius caligat, et tunc ei eius adiutorium in contrarium veritur, cum per erroris caliginem dejicitur. Toties vero Adam Eva de paradiso in exilium mitit, quoties a veritatis inquisitione deiectam affectio rationem vanis cogitationibus involvit. O quoties per Evam Adam dejicitur a domo sua!''.

<sup>764</sup> *Dil. Deo.*, 2.2 (PL 182, 976A; CFS 13, p. 95): 'Quaerat enim homo eminentiora bona sua in ea parte sui, qua praeeminet sibi, hoc est in anima quae sunt dignitas, scientia, virtus.'

<sup>765</sup> *Dil. Deo.*, 2.2. (PL 182, 976A; CFS 13, p. 95).

<sup>766</sup> *Gratia*, 9.28 (PL 182, 1016B; CFS 19, p. 84).

<sup>767</sup> *Gratia*, 9.28 (PL 182, 1016C; CFS 19, p. 84): 'Denique et amisimus illas per culpam, et per gratiam recuperavimus; et quotidie quidem alii plus, alii minus, aut in ipsis proficimus, aut ab ipsis deficiamus.'

<sup>768</sup> *Med. orat.*, 12 (PL 180, 246D; Ceglar, 12.23, p. 76; Penelope, 12.14, p. 175): 'Nam illuminata voluntas et affecta, id est intellectus et amor, et fruendi habitus, sicut de Trinitate Deo dicitur et creditur, quodammodo tres sunt affectionum personae; sed una beatitudinis substantia, quia quod amatur, nonnisi intelligendo amatur, nec

Helinand of Froidmont would compare the three powers of the soul (*irascibilitas*, *concupiscibilitas* and *ratio*) to the Holy Trinity.<sup>769</sup> Alcher of Clairvaux in *De spiritu et anima*, too, draws on Augustine's *De trinitate* (6.11) to argue that essence, form and gift (or enjoyment) reflect the trinity. Eternity is the father, form in the image and enjoyment in the gift.<sup>770</sup> Form, Alcher identifies with the intellectual life, calling it the 'first and highest discernment' (*primus et summus intellectus*), whereas enjoyment – 'delight, joy, happiness, gaiety and sweetness' (*delectatio, gaudium, laetitia, felicitas, suavitas*) denotes the affective life.<sup>771</sup> However, more so than the Victorines, the Cistercians established love as the key attribute of God.

### God and the Soul as Love

Around 1153, Bernard of Clairvaux stated to Pope Eugenius III that 'God is not affected; he is affectivity' (*Non est Deus affectus; affectio est*).<sup>772</sup> In doing so, he used his style of positive (cataphatic) theology to affirm that, in their emotionality, human beings share in the likeness of the God's loving nature. Indeed, in his *De diligendo Deo*, Bernard had referred to love as 'one of the four natural affections' saying that 'it would be right for that which is natural to be first of all at the author of nature's service.'<sup>773</sup> Alluding to 1 John 4:8, Bernard of Clairvaux writes emphatically that 'God is love' (*Deus caritas est*).<sup>774</sup>

William of Saint-Thierry's *De natura animae* makes the same distinction as Bernard.<sup>775</sup> Yet, loving is consistently regarded as the related to knowing for the Abbot of Saint-Thierry. Gregory the Great's maxim that 'love itself is a form of knowledge' (*amor ipse notitia est*) is oft-repeated throughout William's corpus of spiritual writings to stress the overlapping functions of loving and knowing – a doctrine that is later preserved via the *amor-sensus* formula in the *De spiritu et anima*. For William, the activity of contemplation

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nisi amando intelligitur, nec nisi amando et intelligendo fruitur eo, qui meretur frui. Hoc enim ibi est habere vel frui, quod intelligere vel amare.'

<sup>769</sup> *Cog. sui.*, PL 212, 729AB. See also Trottmann's discussion in *Bernard de Clairvaux et la philosophie des Cisterciens au XIIIe siècle*, p. 483.

<sup>770</sup> *DSA*, 6 (PL 40, 783; CFS 24, p. 188).

<sup>771</sup> *DSA* 6 (PL 40, 783; CFS 24, p. 188).

<sup>772</sup> *Consideratione*, 5.7.17 (PL 182, 798B; SBO 3, line 23, p. 480; CFS 37, p. 160. The alternate reading of *affectio* as affectivity rather than 'affection' has been suggested by Constant J. Mews. See '*Affectus* in the *De spiritu et anima*', p. 88.

<sup>773</sup> *Dil. Deo.*, 7.23 (PL 182, 987D; CFS 13, p. 115): 'Amor est affectio naturalis una de quatuor... Quod ergo naturale est, iustum quidem foret primo omnium auctori deservire naturae.'

<sup>774</sup> *Dil. Deo.*, 12.35 (PL 182, 996B; CFS 13, p. 127). This view is also found in *De spiritu et anima*: *DSA*, 16 (PL 40; CFS 24, p. 204).

<sup>775</sup> *Nat. an.* 11 (CFS 24, p. 143).

facilitates the soul's affectivity, and vice-versa. Drawing on his metaphysics of 're-formation' by which the affections mould the soul, he states in *De natura animae* that the soul's contemplation of God increasingly re-configures the soul's emotional attachments in harmony with the divine: 'By contemplation of that form it becomes ever more beautiful; for to study that Form is to be formed (*formari*). Whatever is drawn (*afficitur*) toward God is not his own, but by whom it is drawn (*afficitur*)'.<sup>776</sup> The repetition of the verb *afficere* here emphasises that even in a distinctly intellectual activity, that of contemplation, the 'drawing up' of the soul to God through the development of the mind's understanding is both an intellective *and* affective act.

William's view of the soul's rationality and affectivity as an imprint of the divine image and likeness is conveyed clearest in his commentary on the Song of Songs. Together, these two powers comprise the human 'love' (*amor*) that should become increasingly changed to embody divine love. Reminiscent of the Augustinian *uti-frui* distinction favoured especially by the Victorines, William claims that human beings were created in the divine image and likeness so that 'that we might contemplate (*contemplandum*) you and have fruition (*fruendum*) of you. No one who contemplates you reaches fruition of you save insofar as he becomes like to you.'<sup>777</sup> Again, similar to the Victorines, this can occur practically through prayer. God, 'teaching man to pray as he ought and drawing man to God and rendering him pleasing and able to be heard, illumines his intellect (*intellectus*) and shapes his disposition (*affectus*)', the Cisterican Abbot of Saint-Thierry claims.<sup>778</sup>

Geoffrey of Auxerre, sensitive to many of these same ideas, summarises Cistercian theology of image and likeness in a single sentence: 'Nothing less than God will fill a soul created in God's image'.<sup>779</sup> He writes:

A soul unaware of itself goes after the flocks of its companions not only associating with irrational beasts through wanton craving, but is later, when it has put aside reason, reckoned one of them. Neglecting its own reflections, it goes in love of its own will. People of this sort are lovers of themselves (2 Tm 3:2) simply because they do not know themselves. The more the elect love God, the more aware they are. The

<sup>776</sup> *Nat. an.*, 105-106 (PL 180, 722B-722C; Lemoine, p. 195-196; CCCM 88, p. 140; CFS 24, 2.13, p. 146): 'Anima... cui intendendo semper efficitur formosior. Ipsum enim intendere, formari est. Quidquid enim ad Deum afficitur, non est suum, sed ejus a quo afficitur.'

<sup>777</sup> *Ex. Cant.*, Preface 1 (PL 180, 473C; CFS 6, p. 3): 'Domine, Deus noster, qui ad imaginem et similitudinem tuam creasti nos, scilicet ad te contemplandum, teque fruendum; quem nemo usque ad fruendum contemplatur, nisi in quantum similis tibi efficitur.'

<sup>778</sup> *Aen. fid.*, (PL 180, 440C; CFS 9, 90, p. 117).

<sup>779</sup> *Apoc.*, 19 (CFS 42, p. 200).

more they set their minds only on what is lovable, the more truly they discover and understand in themselves things to hate.<sup>780</sup>

Self-knowledge for Geoffrey, then, begins with avoiding the ‘animalisation’ or changing of the soul to metaphorically resemble the desires associated with animal behaviour; an act that has no moral value for irrational beasts, but increasingly morally degrades the rational faculties of the soul by its longstanding habits for craving the objects of the sensory world as opposed to those connected with the divine. Knowing the self, therefore, involves the recognition that the imprint of God remains in the human psychological capacities, with the result that the soul can undergo a kind of moral ‘divinisation’ if reason can draw the soul to the correct objects of love (via the positive appetite) whilst teaching the soul what to hate and avoid (via the negative appetite).

These positive and negative appetites, the *concupiscibilitas* and *irascibilitas*, as we have seen, were the two powers Isaac of Stella considered as belonging to the *affectus*. Much like Geoffrey, Isaac’s *Sermones* reveal the key places of the *affectus* and *intellectus* in man’s restoration. The Cistercian ‘who goes out to his proper work symbolises turning towards God in investigation and imitation, to knowing and loving God, and, not least, to delighting in such knowledge and love’, he writes.<sup>781</sup> Fostering an ordered rationality and affectivity is essential to man’s restoration precisely because these powers were made according to God’s image and likeness and, through following the teachings of Christ, offer humans a way to share in God’s nature.<sup>782</sup> Isaac makes this clear through a series of juxtapositions of knowledge and love, each bringing the other into relief: ‘Eternal life is knowing the true God [Jerome 17:3]; the true way to it is to love with one’s whole heart [Jerome 15:1]. Love, then, is the way, truth, and the life [Jerome 14:6]; truth is the image, love the likeness; love is the price, truth is the prize, by love we make our journey, in truth we stand fast.’<sup>783</sup>

The *De spiritu et anima* is awash with similar statements. In chapter 7, Alcher writes that ‘since the rational mind has been made by God, along with his image it has received the

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<sup>780</sup> *Apoc.*, 18 (Gastaldelli, lines 295-305, p. 216; CFS 42, pp. 184-185).

<sup>781</sup> Isaac of Stella, *Sermo* 16.15 (PL 194, 1744A; SC 130, p. 304; CFS 11, p. 134): ‘conversio vero ad Deum per investigationem et imitationem, die, qua exit homo ad opus suum, id est ad cognoscendum ac diligendum Deum, et delectandum in ipsius cognitionem et dilectione.’ For Isaac’s understanding of image and likeness see D. Deme, ‘A Reason to Understand: The Epistemology of Isaac of Stella’, *The American Benedictine Review*, 56:3 (2005), pp. 306-308; Deme, ‘Introduction to the Theology of Isaac of Stella’, in *The Selected Works of Isaac of Stella*, pp. 188-192.

<sup>782</sup> Isaac of Stella, *Sermo* 16.15-16 (PL 194, 1744A-B; SC 130, pp. 304-307; CFS 11, p. 134).

<sup>783</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.16 (PL 194, 1744B; SC 130, p. 306; CFS 11, pp. 134-135): ‘...aeterna est vita, sed ut toto corde diligat, vera est via. Carita ergo via, veritas vita; caritas similitudo, veritas imago; caritas meritum, veritas praemium; caritate itur, veritate statur.’



power to know and to love'; this same image and likeness giving the soul its 'natural power to know' (*sensus naturalis*) and 'natural power of desire' (*affectus naturalis*).<sup>784</sup> In chapter 10, he adds that the *spiritus* is the image and likeness of God: 'The image is in the knowing and the likeness in the loving. We speak of an image because knowing is a rational function, and we speak of a likeness because loving is spiritual'.<sup>785</sup> This distinction is reinforced at later points in the text with reason enabling rational understanding and the freedom of the will, love (*caritas*) permitting good conduct, just works and the virtues; the likeness to God being restored through the exercise of truth and virtue.<sup>786</sup>

Baldwin of Ford similarly speaks of God's restoration of the image and likeness as an illumination of the heart, that is, purifying the soul ability to see and to love.<sup>787</sup> Although God gave man both rational judgement and good will, Baldwin claims only the divine likeness has been altered not the image: the remedy for restoring this likeness is to promote 'the devotion of faith and that charity' which destroys cupidity, that is, the affective, willing capacity of the soul.<sup>788</sup>

### Cosmological and Angelic Symbolism

The writings of Isaac of Stella, Alcher of Clairvaux and Arnold of Bonneval are special, however, in their use of analogies to the macrocosm and microcosm to make the connection between image and intellect, likeness and affectivity, explicit. We have seen earlier how Isaac and Alcher compare the five stages epistemological stages to the cosmos. Eliding these various symbolic modes of virtually conceptualising the powers of an indivisible soul – bipartite, tripartite, quadripartite and quinquepartite – Isaac suggests in his *Epistola de anima* that the four affections of 'willing' in tandem with the five powers of 'knowing' yield a total of nine subdivisions. In doing so, this ninefold separation of the soul's five cognitive powers and four affections can be compared to the nine orders of the angelic hierarchy, which signify the individual's nine steps in their 'journey into itself' (*in semetipsa*) – a 'pilgrimage' (*peregrinans*) ending in mystical union with God.<sup>789</sup> In his *Epistola de anima* and *Sermones* the four affections of the *affectus* and five epistemological states of the *sensus* symbolise the nine orders of angels or the anagogical path of the soul to increasing unity with God: the

<sup>784</sup> DSA, 7 (PL 40, 784; CFS 24, p. 189)

<sup>785</sup> DSA, 10 (PL 40, 786; CFS 24, p. 193).

<sup>786</sup> DSA, 39 and 54 (PL 40, 809 and 819; CFS 24, pp. 244-245 and 265-266)

<sup>787</sup> Baldwin of Ford, *Sermo* 21 (CFS 41, p. 133).

<sup>788</sup> Baldwin of Ford, *De commendatione fidei*, 'Preface', 1-3, tr. J. P. Freeland and D. N. Bell, *The Commendation of Faith*, CFS 59 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 2000), pp. 37-39.

<sup>789</sup> Isaac of Stella, *Sermo* 4.6 (PL 194, 1702A; SC 130, line 52, pp. 134-135; CFS 11, p. 31; Deme, p. 20).

cherubim and seraphim signifying the soul's *intelligentia* and *spes* ('hope'), the pinnacle of the soul's image and likeness to God.

Similar to Isaac and Alcher, Arnold of Bonneval's *De paradiso animae* envisions man as a microcosm of the heavenly macrocosm, Arnold establishes cosmological analogies to express the psychological similarity of the soul to God. For example, the human brain stands atop the human person 'as if the roof of heaven' (*quasi camera coeli*).<sup>790</sup> The hierarchies of the man's psychology thus become analogous to the ordered yet harmonious structure and functioning of the cosmos. An ordered human being thus reflects an ordered cosmos. In psychological terms, this means that the mind, as if the highest region of heaven, controls each *affectus* underneath it. Arnold in *De paradiso animae* writes that

We can consider man as if another world, every part in miniature, from the mixture of heaven and earth, having community below himself with the visible creation, and above himself with the invisible creation, collected together in one mind, a seed encompassing the universe. The mind in him is as if a certain mark of divinity, furnishing and arranging the *affectūs* placed under it. He has wisdom and intellect, advice and knowledge, constancy and piety, and chaste fear from heavenly nature... Anything spiritual in us, it is; there is the example man uses to spur on the sense, construct habits, prepare virtue, order charity.<sup>791</sup>

Specifically, in this analogy, the fourth day of creation represents the 'illumination of the mind' (*illuminatio mentis*), the fifth day is the 'discretion between the carnal appetite and the spirit of reason' (*inter appetitus carnis et spiritus rationis discretio*), whereas the sixth – and final – day represents the growth of spiritual virtue: 'the expression of the divine image and similitude, in intellect and action, as if by the sex of man and woman, and the Church filled with the offspring of spiritual marriage.'<sup>792</sup> The sixth day of creation, Arnold recounts, represents the restoration of man's purity of heart and the pacification of the spirit through the knowledge and contemplation of God, an act by which man's *imago* is reformed through imitating the sign of charity, his *similitudo* imitating God's stability and peace.<sup>793</sup>

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<sup>790</sup> Arnold of Bonneval, *De operibus sex dierum*, PL 189, 1529A.

<sup>791</sup> Ibid, PL 189, 1528B-C: 'Intueri possumus in homine velut quemdam alterum mundum, totum in exiguo, e coelo terraque commistum, habentem sub se visibilem creaturam, supra se invisibilem, in unius mentis angustia, universitatis semina complectentem. Mens in eo quasi quoddam divinitatis insigne, subditos aptat et dispensat affectus. Habet de coelesti natura sapientiam et intellectum, consilium et scientiam, constantiam et pietatem, et castum timore... Quidquid spirituale in nobis est, inde est: ibi exemplar est ad cuius formam homo sensum acuit, mores componit, aptat sanctimoniam, ordinat charitatem.'

<sup>792</sup> Ibid, PL 189, 1520B-C: '...sexta, in intellectu et actione, quasi quodam sexu maris et feminae, imaginis et similitudinis divinae expressio, ex qua copula spiritalis fetu repletur Ecclesia.'

<sup>793</sup> Ibid, PL 189, 1519C.

## Image and Likeness in Aelred of Rievaulx's Anthropology

Perhaps the clearest example of Cistercian image and likeness theology is found in the writings of Aelred of Rievaulx. At the beginning of *Dialogus de anima*, Aelred makes use of an analogy to suggest that just as God's essence is everywhere, 'so the human soul, made in the image of its creator, acts in its own body in somewhat the same fashion as does God in all his creatures'.<sup>794</sup> While not the same essentially as the divine due to its changeable thoughts and affections, the fact that the soul is not localised but equally present throughout the entire body imitates God's omnipresence, and hence, the divine likeness.<sup>795</sup> As a consequence, the soul serves as a mirror humans can gaze into to see their own divinity.<sup>796</sup> In line with Augustine, the soul's rational faculties of reason (*ratio*), will (*voluntas*) and memory (*memoria*) enable all human beings to share in their rationality both between each other and with God.<sup>797</sup> This rationality, Aelred suggests, has been given uniquely to the human soul so the individual can choose to pursue happiness in loving God:

Only a rational creature is capable of this happiness. Made in the image of its creator, this creature is fitted to cling to him whose image it is, because this is the rational creature's sole good; as holy David says: *for to cling to God is good*. Obviously this clinging is not of the flesh but of the spirit, since the author of all natures inserted in this creature three things that allow it to share his eternity, participate in his wisdom and taste his sweetness. By these three I mean memory, understanding, and love or will. Memory is capable of sharing his Eternity, understanding his Wisdom, and love his Sweetness. By these three man was fashioned in the image of the Trinity; his memory held fast to God without forgetfulness, his understanding recognised him without error, and his love embraced him without the self-centred desire for anything else. And so man was happy.<sup>798</sup>

As the *Speculum caritatis* elaborates, human beings received the powers to love, reason and sense from God and can only be happy by loving him back in return.<sup>799</sup> Yet, Adam and Eve fell from this place of spiritual stability through an inordinate, curious *affectus mentis* or

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<sup>794</sup> *Dia. an.*, 1.4 (CCCM 1, lines 48-50, p. 686; CFS 22, p. 37): 'Anima proinde humana ad sui creatoris imaginem facta quodam modo in suo agit corpore, quod Deus in creaturae universitate.'

<sup>795</sup> *Dia. an.*, 1.4 (CCCM 1, lines 52-54, p. 686; CFS 22, p. 37).

<sup>796</sup> Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermo* 34.10 (CFS 77, p. 54).

<sup>797</sup> *Dia. an.*, 1.34 (CCCM 1, lines 423-429, p. 695; CFS 22, p. 52).

<sup>798</sup> *Spec. car.*, 1.3.9 (CCCM 1, lines 117-129, p. 16; CFS 17, pp. 91-92): 'Huius beatitudinis sola rationalis creatura capax est. Ipsa quippe ad imaginem sui Creatoris condita, idonea est illi adhaerere, cuius est imago, quod solum rationalis creaturae, ut ait sanctus David: *Mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonus est*. Adhaesio plane ista non carnis, sed mentis est, in qua tria quaedam naturarum auctor inseruit, quibus divinae aeternitatis compos efficeretur, particeps sapientiae, dulcedinis degustator. Tria haec memoriam dico, scientiam, amorem sive voluntatem. Aeternitatis quippe capax est memoria, sapientiae scientia, dulcedinis amor. In his tribus ad imaginem Trinitatis conditus homo, Deum quidem memoria retiebat sine oblivion, scientia agnoscebat sine errore, amore amplectabatur sive alterius rei cupiditate. Hinc beatus.'

<sup>799</sup> *Spec. car.*, 1.1.3 (CCCM 1, lines 38-47, p. 14; CFS 17, p. 89).

‘affect of the mind’.<sup>800</sup> The Fall, therefore, is interpreted as the case *par excellence* for negative affectivity – an event that resulted in the loss not only of self-knowledge but knowledge of God by consequence. As Aelred says: ‘Unwilling to keep my soul’s substance for you, I took it for myself, and wishing to possess myself without you, I lost both you and myself.’<sup>801</sup>

Nonetheless, if the *affectus* was the cause of disfiguring the likeness of the soul to God, it is also key to the soul’s restoration. Affection is so significant to Aelred’s anthropological vision that he, somewhat unorthodoxly, suggests in his *Dialogus de anima* that latent parental affection could offer an explanation for the infusion of new souls into infants. This subtle and powerful force issues ‘not from the flesh of the parents but emanates invisibly and corporeally from their affection [and] resides in the seed’ (*non de concumbentium carne, sed affectu procedens invisibiliter et incorporaliter insit semini*).<sup>802</sup> The very existence of the soul in man, according to Aelred, proves God’s existence and the need to return to oneself, cultivate self-knowledge, and direct the soul’s love towards the divine.<sup>803</sup> Consequently, the quest for wisdom, the *Speculum caritatis* states, begins by reflecting on the existence of the soul and its purpose for thinking and loving God. ‘Connect these three: to be, to be wise, to will’, Aelred exclaims, ‘Return to your heart, then, you dissembler.’<sup>804</sup> Concluding his anthropological vision of man and staying true to the teachings of Saint Benedict, the return to God is achieved through re-correcting human love and fostering the virtue of humility: ‘It is obvious, if I am not mistaken, that just as with human pride, by departing from the supreme good not by foot stride but by the mind’s attachment (*affectus mentis*), and becoming decrepit in itself disfigured God’s image in itself, so human humility, approaching God by his spirit’s attachment is restored to the image of his Creator.’<sup>805</sup> The faculty of love, therefore, is given primacy, as it is through perfecting charity

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<sup>800</sup> *Spec. car.*, 1.7.23 (CCCM 1, line 334, p. 21; CFS 17, p. 99).

<sup>801</sup> *Spec. car.*, 1.7.23 (CCCM 1, lines 335-337, p. 21; CFS 17, p. 99): ‘Nolens enim substantiam animae meae servare ad te, accepi eam ad me, et volens meipsum possidere sine te, et te perdi et me.’

<sup>802</sup> *Dial an.*, 1.57 (CCCM 1, lines 719-720, p. 702; CFS 22, p. 65). For further details see J. S. Russell, ‘Conceiving the Soul: Aelred of Rievaulx and the Sanctifying Labor of the Mind’, in Bequette, ed., *A Companion to Medieval Christian Humanism*, pp. 202-204.

<sup>803</sup> *Spec. car.*, 1.6.20 (CCCM 1, p. 20; CFS 17, p. 98).

<sup>804</sup> *Spec. car.*, 1.6.21 (CCCM 1, lines 301-302, pp. 20-21; CFS 17, p. 98): ‘Iunge igitur haec tria, esse, sapere, velle. Redi ergo praevaricator ad cor.’

<sup>805</sup> *Spec. car.*, 1.8.24 (CCCM 1, lines 343-347, p. 22; CFS 17, p. 100): ‘Patet, ni fallor, quia sicut non pedum passu, sed mentis affectu a summo bono recedens, et in semetipsa veterascens humana superbia, Dei in se corrumpit imaginem, ita mentis affectu ad Deum accedens humana humilitas, renovator in imaginem eius, qui creavit eum.’

that the reformation of the soul's other two parts – its memory and knowledge – can take place, completing the reformation of the divine image and likeness.<sup>806</sup>

## Conclusion

This survey of Cistercian and Victorine psychology has shown that despite the diversity in accounts of the structure of the soul, both groups consistently maintain that the *affectus* and *affectiones* are essential for developing a just and virtuous *habitus*. Training in the soul or psychology was deeply significant for both groups because it was the essential foundation for a novice to begin to understand how they can learn to bring the different powers of their mind into balance. Two powers, especially, those of affectivity and understanding – the *affectus* and *intellectus* – were crucial not only to the bipartite psychological system the Cistercians and Victorines developed throughout the twelfth century, but also to the anthropological view of each community which emphasised the soul's creation in the image and likeness of God. While the Cistercians certainly did place more emphasis on the soul's affectivity, love and will as the key trait of God, in both groups we find an anthropology which places equal importance on the training of both powers. And it was only through this training that the soul could be restored from the some of the effects of sin, becoming increasingly shaped to the image and likeness of God.

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<sup>806</sup> *Spec. car.*, 1.8.24 (CCCM 1, lines 351-356, p. 22; CFS 17, p. 100)

## CHAPTER 5 – *MOTUS ANIMAE*: AFFECTIVITY AND MOVEMENT IN BODILY AND SPIRITUAL PERCEPTION

In this chapter, I aim to build upon these points of commonality to show how Cistercian and Victorine anthropology was similar in two further unexplored aspects. First, I argue that we can find equivalent understandings of affect and reason as integral to changing the moral standing and ‘space’ of the soul. At a foundational level, Cistercian and Victorine authors align in viewing thoughts and affections as the qualities which cause spiritual change, progressively altering the soul’s *habitus*. Second, I seek to illuminate how both groups then used this understanding of spiritual change to consider perception as a form of mediation. This enabled a shared Neoplatonic epistemology of knowledge in which wisdom or understanding (*intelligentia*) is considered as the final stage in the abstraction of sense perception and the contemplative ascent to God. As I show through the case studies of Hugh of Saint-Victor’s *De unione corporis et spiritus* and William of Saint-Thierry’s *De natura corporis et animae*, the connection between the processes of sense perception, affectivity and thinking could be used to establish two comparable epistemologies in which the perceiver is assimilated into the objects of sense perception, thought and affection. I end by showing how these two ideas can be mapped on to the wider shared Cistercian and Victorine anthropological and eschatological understandings of spiritual reform as a transformation from being born into original sin and defective habits to cultivating ordered affections and achieving progress through virtue.

### ***Motus animae*: Affection and Knowledge as Qualities of the Soul**

The first underappreciated point of connection between the mainstream anthropological understandings of the Cistercians and Victorines is that affection and cognition both change the soul. This similarity in their approaches to human nature is significant because it has the consequence of making learning to positively control thoughts and affections to develop virtue a ‘practice’ or ‘learned disposition’ (*habitus*) that is attained over time.

### **Hugh of Saint-Victor and Rational Motion**

This view that the soul’s faculties could be trained and developed was representative of a wider institutional Cistercian and Victorine ‘emotional inheritance’ from Augustine. In *De vera religione* (*On True Religion*), Augustine had stated that ‘the soul could be changed (*mutari*)

not spatially (*localiter*) but in time (*temporaliter*) by its affections (*suis affectionibus*).<sup>807</sup> Although he wasn't the only author to do so in the twelfth century, Hugh of Saint-Victor provided the fullest account for the role of affections in changing the soul temporally.<sup>808</sup> In his *De unione corporis et spiritus*, Hugh exclaims that the soul itself can adapt itself to the nature of the body through their union in one person is evidence of the soul's special nature that is capable of mutability whilst remaining entirely indivisible in essence.<sup>809</sup> All 'mutability' (*mutabilitas*), Hugh argues, can be categorised in three ways: a change occurring according to 'place' (*locus*), 'form' (*forma*) or 'time' (*tempus*).<sup>810</sup> Souls 'are essentially one', yet, unlike God, 'they are not one without any variation', he says in *De tribus diebus* (*On the Three Days*).<sup>811</sup> This is because while spirits are not capable of changing in place, they are capable of changing in form. 'Something changes formally when it stays in the same place in regard to its essence', Hugh remarks, 'but either receives through increase something which it did not previously have or loses through decrease something that it previously had, or, by alteration, begins to have in a different way something that it previously had.'<sup>812</sup> Since anything that is mutable and subject to change – either in body and spirit – involves a change in location or form from a present to a future state, temporal change necessarily results.<sup>813</sup>

Alongside this theory of change was an equivalent taxonomy of motion (*motus*) that Hugh alongside *mutabilitas* to offer a full explanation of bodily and spiritual alteration in the human body and soul. Hugh distinguishes four types of *motus*, ranging from the most inferior to the most superior: local (*localis*), natural (*naturalis*), biological (*animalis*) and rational

<sup>807</sup> Augustine, *De vera religione*, 1.10.18 (PL 34, 130). This doctrine is repeated in *De immortalitate animae* 5.7, *De Immortalitate Animae of Augustine: Text, Translation and Commentary*, ed. and tr. C. W. Wolfskeel (Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner, 1977), p. 74. See also O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 34-38, for Augustine's conception of the soul's mutability.

<sup>808</sup> See, for instance, Thierry of Chartres view of motion: *Commentum super Boethii librum De trinitate*, 2.11-15, ed. N. M. Häring, in *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School* (Toronto: PIMS, 1971), pp. 71-73; *Lectiones in Boethii librum*, 2.55 (Häring, *Commentaries on Boethius*, p. 173); *De sex dierum operibus*, 30-31 (Häring, *Commentaries on Boethius*, p. 568); Significantly, the *Glosa Victorina*, a commentary on the Trinity faithful to Thierry's views, is preserved in a manuscript belonging to the Abbey of Saint-Victor. See *Glosa Victorina* (Häring, *Commentaries on Boethius*, pp. 541). For Häring's comments see pp. 38-45.

<sup>809</sup> *Unione*, 16 (PL 177, 288C; Piazzoni, p. 887).

<sup>810</sup> *Tribus diebus*, 2.19.5 (PL 176, 827D; CCCM 177, line 735, p. 43; VTT1, p. 80): 'Tribus modis fit omnia mutabilitas: loco, forma, et tempore.' See also *Sacr.* 1.3.15 (PL 176, 222B; Berndt, pp. 80-81; Deferrari, p. 46). Richard of Saint-Victor copies this doctrine *Trinitate* 2.9 (PL 196, 906A-C; VTT 1, p. 233).

<sup>811</sup> *Tribus diebus*, 2.19.4 (PL 176, 827C; CCCM 177, lines 725-726, p. 42; VTT 1, p. 80): '...sicut animae quae unum sunt essentialiter, sed unum sunt non invariabiliter.'

<sup>812</sup> *Tribus diebus*, 2.19.6 (PL 176, 827D-828A; CCCM 177, lines 741-746, p. 43; VTT 1, p. 81): 'Formaliter mutatur res quaelibet, quando quidem secundum suam essentiam in eodem persistens loco, vel secundum augmentum aliquid accipit quod prius non habuit, vel secundum detrimentum aliquid quod prius habuit amittit, vel secundum alterationem aliquid quod prius habuit aliter habere incipit quam prius habuit.'

<sup>813</sup> *Tribus diebus*, 2.19.7 (PL 176, 828A; CCCM 177, lines 747-752, p. 44; VTT 1, p. 81).

(*rationalis*).<sup>814</sup> ‘Local motion is back and forth, right and left, up and down, and around. Natural motion consists in increase and decrease; biological motion in the senses and appetites; rational motion in actions and decisions (*in factis et consiliis*).’<sup>815</sup> These four types of motion would be taken up after Hugh in the writings of Richard of Saint-Victor.<sup>816</sup>

Augustine had specified three types of motion or *motus* (*stabilis, illocalis, localis*; ‘stable’, ‘boundless’ and ‘local’) in his *Genesis ad litteram*, arguing like Hugh later would, that the soul’s motion was ‘boundless’ or ‘not being confined to specific place’, moving only in time and serving as the pivot of bodily motion.<sup>817</sup> For Augustine the parallelism between body and soul means that, similar to how the body moves through its feet, the *affectiones* are the feet of the soul. As Gerard O’Daly writes, ‘just as bodies are contained in space, in a place, so the soul’s affection is its ‘place’: that is, it is the situation, the condition, in which it momentarily finds itself.’<sup>818</sup> Both the Cistercians and Victorines drank from this same Augustinian pool of anthropology – we encounter numerous examples of the affections described as the ‘feet of the mind’, the soul’s motive power, that enables the soul to reach out spiritually to the objects of its attention, and change accordingly.<sup>819</sup>

Hugh’s understanding of rational motion (*motus rationalis*) is particularly significant for historians of affectivity because it is this highest form of motion that makes mankind dissimilar from animals and enables Hugh to pinpoint affection and cognition as the two ‘rational qualities’ constantly shaping the ‘form’ of the soul over time. Bodily change occurs through the rearrangement of bodily parts and the change in elemental qualities, ‘change in

<sup>814</sup> *Tribus diebus* 1.1.3 (PL 176, 812C; CCCM 177, lines 20-21, p. 5; VTT 1, p. 61). For the contrast between the four types see 2.16.4 (PL 176, 824C-D; CCCM 177, lines 585-591; VTT 1, p. 77).

<sup>815</sup> *Tribus diebus* 1.1.3 (PL 176, 812C-D; CCCM 177, lines 21-24, p. 5; VTT 1, p. 61): ‘Localis est ante et retro, dextrorsum et sinistrorsum, sursum et deorsum, et circum; naturalis est in incremento et detrimento; animalis est in sensibus et appetitibus; rationalis est in factis et consiliis.’ See also 1.8.1-5 (PL 176, 818C-819A; CCCM 177, lines 300-325, pp. 20-21; VTT 1, pp. 69-70).

<sup>816</sup> *Excerpt.*, 2.2 (PL 177, 204D; VTT 3, p. 311).

<sup>817</sup> Augustine, *Genesis ad litteram* 4.12 and 8.20-2 (PL 34, 304 and 388-389); *Id.*, *De quantitate animae*, 23 (PL 32, 1058-1060).

<sup>818</sup> O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 47-48.

<sup>819</sup> For instance, Bernard of Clairvaux in his *Sermo de conversione ad clericos* when speaking of the ‘paradise of contemplation’ states: ‘You must not suppose this paradise of inner pleasure is some material place: you enter this garden not on foot, but by deeply-felt affections.’ See *Conv.*, 13.25 (PL 182, 847C-D; CFS 25, p. 59). Likewise in his *Lenten Sermons*, Bernard writes that ‘your foot is your affection, the foot of the soul borne up by angels lest it stop that foot against a stone.’ (13.1, *Sermons on Conversion*, CFS 25, pp. 223-224). See also SCC 8.6 (CFS 4, p. 49) and SCC 85.3 (CFS 40, p. 198). Isaac of Stella, *Sermo* 4.2 and 10.1 (PL 196, 1701B and 1723B; SC 130, p. 130 and 220; CFS 11, p. 29 and 83; Deme, p. 19 and 47); John of Forde, *Sermo* 65.2 (CCCM 17, lines 15-31, p. 453; CFS 45, pp. 36-37); *Statu* 1.8 and 1.10 (Ribaillier, p. 71 and p. 75; VTT4, p. 256 and 259 and note 50, p. 307); Walter of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 3.5 (CCCM 30, p. 31); Anonymous Victorine Sermon 8.4 (CCCM 30, p. 285); Godfrey of Saint-Victor, *Sermon on the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin*, 6 (VTT 4, p. 493 and note 23, p. 501). This image does, however, predate the twelfth century. Philo of Alexandria speaks of the four feet of pleasure as relating to the four passions. *Allegorical Interpretation* (3.47.139, pp. 394-95). It is used by Augustine in *Ennarationes in Psalmos* 9.15 (PL 36, 124).



spirits occurs through knowledge and affect' (*alteratio spirituum per cognitionem et affectum*), the Victorine writes.<sup>820</sup> Affective changes occur through the mutability of emotions felt by the soul: sadness turning into joy, for instance; cognitive change, on the other hand, is caused by increases and decreases of knowledge.<sup>821</sup> The significance of this model of spiritual change to Hugh is attested by its inclusion in *De sacramentis Christianae fidei*, Hugh's most mature work. A spirit, he says,

...can neither increase at all by augmentation of parts, since it is not a body, nor decrease by diminution, since it is a simple nature; and yet spirit is changed by affection (*affectus*) and cognition (*cognitio*)... It passes from this to that, it varies, and experiences the vicissitudes of joy, pain, repentance, and wish; its knowledge increases and forgetfulness befalls it; it varies its thoughts and it knows in succession, and that change in it of knowledge (*scientia*) and affection (*affectus*) is, as it were, a change of form. Temporal change follows this, and it is subject to time on account of these things, which are varied in it.<sup>822</sup>

### The Diffusion of a Victorine Model of Spiritual Change

That this fourfold model of motion was popular even outside Victorine circles is evident from its inclusion as stemmata diagrams in two theological natural philosophical manuscripts of the early twelfth-century (see Figure 19 and Figure 20).<sup>823</sup> One of these manuscripts even includes a further diagram of the Hugonian division of *mutacio* ('change'). This is Trinity College, Cambridge MS B.14.33, a codex which preserves the only full copy of the *Ysagoge in theologiam* (*Introduction to Theology*).<sup>824</sup> This work was written by an unknown Odo, an Englishman in the circle of Gilbert Foliot. Odo was significant because his *Ysagoge* eclectically elides the thought of writers such as Peter Abelard, Hugh of Saint-Victor and William of

<sup>820</sup> *Tribus diebus*, 2.20.5 (PL 176, 829D; CCCM 177, line 826, p. 48; VTT1, p. 83)

<sup>821</sup> *Tribus diebus*, 2.20.5 (PL 176, 829D; CCCM 177, lines 826-828, p. 48; VTT1, p. 83)

<sup>822</sup> *Sacr.* 1.3.16 (PL 222AB; Berndt, p. 81; Deferrari, p. 47): 'Et videmus quod spiritus omnino nec augmento partium crescere potest quoniam corpus non est, nec decrescere diminutione, quoniam simplex natura est; et tamen affectu et cognitione mutatur spiritus. Et transit de hoc in illud; et variatur et vicissitudinem suscipit gaudii, doloris, et poenitudinis et voluntatis, et crescit scientia et obliuio in eum cadit; et variat cogitationes et succedenter intelligit; et est quasi formae mutatio ista in eo mutatio scientiae et affectus. Et sequitur istam temporalis mutatio; et subiacet tempori propter ista quae variantur in eo.' p. 83).

<sup>823</sup> Trinity College, Cambridge, MS O.7.7 includes a short cosmological tract, *Plato ad ostendendum* (ff. 26r-27v) written in the late 1120s. Brian Stock has shown this treatise was inspired by Bernard Silvestris' *Cosmographia* while simultaneously paraphrasing Hugh's *De tribus diebus*. See B. Stock, 'Hugh of St Victor, Bernard Silvester and MS Trinity College, Cambridge, O.7.7', *Medieval Studies* 34 (1972), pp. 155-159, and p. 154 for Stock's transcription of Figure 2. Folio 92v of the *Ysagoge in theologiam* in Trinity College, Cambridge, MS B. 14.33, also visually depicts the four types of *motus*. This stemma is transcribed in A. Landgraf's edition of the text: see *Ysagoge*, 3, in *Écrits théologiques de l'école d'Abélard: Textes inédits* (Louvain: Bureaux, 1934), p. 241.

<sup>824</sup> See note 823 above for the edition of the *Ysagoge in theologiam*.

Conches, testifying to the dissemination of early French theology and natural philosophy in England around 1137.<sup>825</sup> As Figure 21 shows, on the left branch Hugh's three forms of change – form, place and time – are included under the rubric of *mutacio corporalis* ('corporeal change'); and on the right branch under *mutacio spiritualis* ('spiritual change') we find Hugh's view of rational motion faithfully represented: the soul is changed 'by affectivity' (*affectu*) and 'by cognition' (*cognicio[n]e*). Paraphrasing Hugh's *De tribus diebus* the *Ysagoge* relates that:

Spiritual change is by affectivity and cognition. Spirits are changed by affectivity when they are sad, when they are cheerful, when they desire, when they reject. And there are two accustomed ways of effecting a change of affect, either because a judgement changes regarding the past, or because a disorder is displayed regarding the future... Change of cognition is threefold: through increase... through decrease... [and] through change, which is fourfold: in essence, form, place and time.<sup>826</sup>

In this Victorine view of change, increases and decreases in affectivity (via emotions like joy and pain) and cognition (learning and forgetting) are thus interpreted as unique aspects of human nature.

Hugh of Saint-Victor had made the contrast between human and divine affectivity most overt in his *Sententiae de divinitate* (*Sentences on Divinity*) (c. 1120s), a *reportatio* of his lectures on the nature of God as recorded by Lawrence of Durham (d. 1154). The Victorine master writes that 'the soul is changed by different accidents like anger, joy, sadness, fear, and other such things, all of which do not affect the divine essence'.<sup>827</sup> Odo, the author of the Victorine-inspired *Ysagoge*, also follows the Hugonian line via *De tribus diebus* and argues for the immutability of the divine will and thought.<sup>828</sup> The similarities between Odo and Hugh are so strong that Odo even reports the unique thought experiment that is found in Hugh's *Sententiae*. For humans to perceive without motion would make give them perception akin to

<sup>825</sup> D. E. Luscombe, 'Authorship of the "Ysagoge in Theologiam"', *ADHDLA* 35 (1968), pp. 7-16; M. Evans, 'The Ysagoge in Theologiam and the Commentaries Attributed to Bernard Silvestris', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 54 (1991), pp. 1-42. For how the treatise utilises Victorine thought see C. J. Mews, 'An English Response to Victorine Thought: Odo's *Ysagoge in theologiam*', in *Omnium expetendorum*, pp. 329-341.

<sup>826</sup> *Ysagoge in theologiam*, 3 (Landgraf, p. 247): 'Spiritualis mutacio affectus et cognitionis. Mutantur affectu spiritus, qui modo sunt tristes, modo hilares, modo apertunt, modo reiciunt. Duo autem sunt que operantis affectum mutare solent, vel quia consilium mutat de preterito, vel quia inordinatum proponit de future... Cognicionis triplex est mutacio: per incrementum... per detrimentum... per vicissitudinem, que est quadripartite: in essencia, forma, loco et tempore.'

<sup>827</sup> *Sent. div.*, 3 (Piazzoni, lines 134-135, p. 952; VTT 1, p. 159): 'Varitatur enim anima per diversa accidentia, ut iram, gaudium, tristitiam, metum et alia huiusmodi, que omnia divinam essentiam non contingunt.' See also *Sent. div.* 1 (Piazzoni, lines 89-81, p. 132; VTT 1, p. 132).

<sup>828</sup> *Ysagoge*, 3 (Landgraf, pp. 247-248)

<sup>829</sup> *Tribus diebus*, 2.20 (PL 176, 830C-830D; CCCM 177, lines 872-887, p. 50; VTT 1, p. 84); *Ysagoge*, 3 (Landgraf, p. 248).









ualemus. S; d; ggnicio neq; cretat q plena est. Quoniam si q  
 ubiq; suba est pletit exte alieu pultione ableni. Hec detinetu  
 futept q aliunde non est. q unum totum q est. vialle  
 udine non futept q amul q semel oia caput. Genuil q omne  
 subam. omne fuma. omia loca. oia tempa. Genuil q uultionem  
 nec habitam ut mutet nec ut mutam recipit. Si humanum  
 corpus totum oculis ellet. nullo stareo lueret retentaret. q qcuq; se  
 ret uiceret uisus pletit eet. Huc au qm ex parte ho uider maca  
 bilis uidet. Cu. q. vel tntit aut uidi dntur aut uisione tntit  
 Sic g. qd ex parte e. est mutabile ita q ex parte non est imuta  
 bile. Hec loco g. mutari pot deus qui uia; est. nec tpe qui  
 etnus est. nec auget qui imenit; nec minui quide uis q  
 S; neq; cognitione mutat sapientissim; nec affectu optant.




Figure 21. Stemma diagram of *Mutacio* ('Mutatio' / 'Change'). Trinity College, Cambridge, MS B.14.33, folio 95v. © The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge.

### Victorine Change After Hugh: Achard, Richard and Godfrey of Saint-Victor

The contrast between human and divine affectivity and rationality was of particular importance to the Victorines.<sup>830</sup> As half-human, half divine, the question of whether Jesus Christ could experience affections and bodily change proved an especially sensitive point of doctrine for Victorine theologians. Achard, Richard and Godfrey would each spill ink to answer this question, the response unequivocally being that Christ, as a man was subject to human affectivity yet, born without original sin, he was not subject to the usual deficiencies or *defectūs* inhibiting his natural mental faculties. His thoughts and affections, therefore, were completely ordered in pursuit of God, goodness and virtue.<sup>831</sup> For instance, Hugh's thought resurfaces in the *Sententiae* of Peter Lombard.<sup>832</sup> When we speak of the soul 'artificially' (*artificiosum*), the Lombard says, we find 'one sluggish part, another alert, another in memory, another in cupidity, another in fear, another in joy, another sad' (...*aliud inertem, aliud acutem, aliud memorem, aliud cupiditas, aliud timor, aliud laetitia, aliud tristitia*...), providing the soul to be not of a simple essence like God.<sup>833</sup> In contrast to divine or angelic stability, Richard of Saint-Victor notably would thrust human mutability to the forefront of his anthropological view of humanity in his exegesis of Psalm 74:9: *Because in the hand of God there is a chalice full of mixed wine*. The Victorine mystic interprets the mixed quality of the wine as referring to man's mixed condition on earth, constantly in motion, and torn between good affections and bad passions. 'The Lord's chalice is still in motion, and thus he cannot make it pure wine... because justice is not yet fixed in humans, either part of the chalice remains uncertain for either evil or good humans'.<sup>834</sup> Human life, therefore, is characterised by the changes from states of positive and negative affectivity – states that will only become fixed following death and the Last Judgement. As a consequence, Richard exclaims: 'The chalice is constantly in motion, because immobile justice is still not fixed in anyone... a good person can become better, and an evil person can become worse... after all things are accomplished, and after humans will at last be

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<sup>830</sup> See *Sacr.* 2.18.19 (PL 176, 616B-D; Berndt, p. 600; Deferrari, p. 474). See also Richard of Saint-Victor, *Trinitate*, 2.3, 2.24 and 3.9 (PL 196, 903A-C, 914C-915A and 921A-C; VTT 1, pp. 229-230, 244-245 and 254-255).

<sup>831</sup> Achard of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 1.6 (CS 165, p. 104); Godfrey of Saint-Victor, 'Sermon on the Birth of the Lord', 16-17 (VTT 8, pp. 181-182); *Emmanuele*, 2.16 (PL 196, 650C-651B; VTT 6, pp. 419-420).

<sup>832</sup> *Sent.*, 1.27.7 (170), lines 20-25, p. 271: 'Mutari autem tempus est variari secundum qualitates interiores vel exteriores quae sunt in ipsa re quae mutatur, ut quando suscipit vicissitudinem gaudii, doloris, scientiae, oblivionis, vel variationem formae sive alicuius qualitatis exterioris. Haec enim mutation, quae fit secundum tempus, variatio est qualitatū quae fit in corporali vel spirituali creatura, et idea vocatur tempus.'

<sup>833</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.8.4(24).2, lines 14-16, p. 99.

<sup>834</sup> *Adnot. Psalm.*, 74 (PL 196, 326A; VTT 4, p. 171): 'Calix enim Domini adhuc in motu, et ideo purum facere non potest... Sed quia iustitia in hominibus necdura fixa est, et pars neutral in neutron confirmata est'

fixed as the angels are now – the just in good, the unjust in evil – the chalice will stop moving and the dregs will descend to the bottom of the chalice.’<sup>835</sup>

Significantly, we find this view of the affections as a form of human change is incorporated into Victorine treatises on the soul and psychology. Achard of Saint-Victor’s *De unitate Dei et pluralitate creaturarum* (*On the Unity of God and the Plurality of Creatures*), a proto-scholastic treatise which systematically examines the relationship between man and God, repeatedly places emphasis on the immutability of God as a rational substance.<sup>836</sup> As an image of God, human reason shares some of God’s stability: by its nature ‘the substance or quality of reason itself... remains invisible and unchangeable.’<sup>837</sup> The nature and function of reason, made in the image of God, cannot ever be removed and, as such, reason serves the person like a constantly shining light, even if they are shrouded in moral darkness. ‘When they are enlightened by it [reason], so that they recognise and love it, they are changed and move, not in space but by a kind of alteration – because those who were only darkness become *light in the Lord* [Ep. 5:8]’, Achard writes.<sup>838</sup>

This contrast between divine and human mutability is continued in *De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis*, and with a more deliberate focus on the *affectus*. God’s power, in contrast to human power, ‘is not affected (*afficitur*) in different ways by its different actions, because nothing ever affects it (*affectio*), Achard says.’<sup>839</sup> In human beings, however, it is the case that

not only is an inferior power [i.e., the human soul] affected (*afficitur*) in various ways according to various effects (*effectus*), but it also is, or can be, subject to multiple forms of alteration because of various passions (*passiones*)... its essence... receives into itself various affections (*affectiones*) by which it – though simple in and by itself – is moved, changed, and differentiated in multiple ways.<sup>840</sup>

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<sup>835</sup> Ibid (PL 196, VTT 4, pp. 171-172): ‘Calix assidue movetur: nam in nemine adhuc iustitia immobilis figitur...qui bonus est potest fieri melior, et qui malus est potest fieri peior... Nam postquam omnia consummabuntur, et sicut modo angeli, tandem homines, hi in bono, illi in malo confirmabuntur, calix moveri desinet, et faex ad calcis ima descendet...’

<sup>836</sup> *Unitate*, 1.43, 1.49, 2.17, 2.2 (CS 165, p. 411, 426-428, 433-434, 468).

<sup>837</sup> *Unitate*, 2.18 (CS 165, p. 474).

<sup>838</sup> *Unitate*, 2.18 (CS 165, p. 475).

<sup>839</sup> *Discretione*, 13 (Haring, p. 176; CS 165, p. 359): ‘Non enim ex diversis actionibus suis ipsa diversis afficitur modis quia nec in ipsam ulla prorsus cadit affectio.’

<sup>840</sup> *Discretione*, 14-15 (Haring, pp. 176-177; CS 165, p. 360): ‘Potentia autem inferior varie afficitur nec modum secundum effectus varios sed et ex passionibus variis multiplex subicitur vel subici potest alteration... essentia... diversas in se suscipit affectiones quibus ipsa secundum in se simplex multipliciter movetur, variatur atque distinguitur.’

Affections and passions are thus imagined like Hugh as the mode by which the soul's essence is extended and changed formally though not essentially.<sup>841</sup> Hugh had stated in *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* that the various affections attribute 'diverse names' to a single will.<sup>842</sup> Achard would, however, go further in stating that it is the affections themselves which necessitate the soul being virtually divided into discrete powers such as will, reason, sense, imagination, understanding and memory. 'Their names', Achard exclaims, 'were invented because of the affections, which are diverse, rather than because of the essence, which is the same in all.'<sup>843</sup> Victorine thinkers overall saw affectivity and cognition as holding special places as the source of change in the soul; Achard, however, went furthest to argue that all the soul's capacities originate from the many different qualities experienced by the soul through a single action: willing.<sup>844</sup>

### The Cistercians and Spiritual Change

While the Cistercians did not emphasise the soul's changeability with the same enthusiasm or rigour of the Victorines, the concept still remained crucial to their understanding of affectivity. In their spiritual writings, change is often remarked upon as the key differentiator between human and divine nature. William of Saint-Thierry in *De natura animae* held that the human soul does not possess 'mass' (*moles*), 'quantity' (*quantitas*) or 'place' (*locus*) yet 'because it is subject to changing affections (*mutabilitas affectionum*), it has quality (*qualitas*)... for the soul acts not through place but according to its various desires, pleasant or painful.'<sup>845</sup> Here, William makes a rare and important distinction of the temporal nature of affectivity and the affections. 'Affectus is one thing, affectio another', he exclaims: 'The *affectus* is that which possesses the mind by a kind of generalised force and perpetual virtue, firm and stable and maintained through grace. Affections, however, are things which vary according to the various occurrences of things and times.'<sup>846</sup> As we have seen, William's understanding of affectivity is imbued with the Augustinian idea of natural gravity or *pondus*. In *De natura animae*,

<sup>841</sup> *Discretione*, 16 (Haring, p. 177; CS 165 p. 360).

<sup>842</sup> *Sacr.*, 1.6.17 (PL 176, 273C; Deferrari, p. 105).

<sup>843</sup> *Discretione*, 18 (Haring, p. 177; Feiss, p. 360): 'Earum quippe vocabula magis affectiones quae diversae sunt, quam essentiam, quae eadem in omnibus.'

<sup>844</sup> *Discretione*, 19 (Haring, p. 177; CS 165, pp. 360-361).

<sup>845</sup> *Nat. an.*, 95-96 (Lemoine, p. 183; CCCM 88, pp. 136-137; CFS 24, 10, p. 141-142): 'Humana autem anima quia non habet molem, non habet quantitatem, quia affectuum mutabilitati subiacet, non effugit qualitatem... Agitur enim anima non per loca, sed pro affectuum diversitate delectabiliter et poenaliter.'

<sup>846</sup> *Nat. dig.*, 3.14 (PL 184, 389A-B; Verdeyen, CCCM 88, p. 188-189; CFS 30, p. 70): 'Aliud quippe est affectus, aliud affectio. Affectus est qui generali quadam potentia et perpetua quadam virtute firma et stabili mentem possidet, quam per gratiam obtinuit. Affectiones vero sunt quas varias variis rerum et temporum affert eventus.'



William associates self-knowledge with the soul's self-perception of its need to move upward to God through its power of desire. The soul, William argues, 'understands about itself that even if it does not move locally it does move through desire (*per affectum*), and that there is some more stable support above it that moves neither in place nor in time...'<sup>847</sup>

The affections, unique to human beings, thus characterise the mental instability of man from the pure stability of God's mind and essence. Bringing the ideas of Lactantius into the twelfth-century, human love is considered by William as 'passive' in contrast to the 'active' and 'effective' love of God.<sup>848</sup> Using the *affectus-effectus* distinction, William says that 'God loved us first, not with an affective love but an effective love (*non affectu, sed effectu caritatis*)... for, the Eternal loves no one temporarily, and he who is unchangeable is not subject to the affections.'<sup>849</sup> The idea that God is the source of activity is clear from William's remarks in his *Meditatio* 8: 'The human soul turns to you as many faces as she has affections (*affectiones*). Yet you, O Truth, receive them all and, though you adapt yourself to all of them, you yourself are unchanged.'<sup>850</sup>

God's immutability is also particularly apparent in *De aenigma fidei* (*On the Enigma of Faith*) where, comparing God's breath of grace to his own changeable body, William elaborates a taxonomy of change:

...I see in it nothing which is changeable either spatially or temporally as bodies are; neither subject to change only temporally and quasi-spatially such as the thoughts of our spirits; nor only temporally, with no spatial image at all, like certain reasonings of our mind.<sup>851</sup>

Thinking, therefore, is understood by William to be a quasi-spatial activity embedded in time, halfway between the pure mutability of bodies and the scarcely mutably quality of the mind.

Overall, the spiritual motion of the soul is apparent in Cistercian *De anima* writings. 'Everyone can see that bodies are subject to change, and everyone is conscious that the soul is also changeable', Aelred of Rievaulx writes in his *Dialogus de anima*.<sup>852</sup> When providing a

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<sup>847</sup> *Nat. an.*, 2.98 (Lemoine, p. 187; CFS 24, 11, p. 143): 'Intelligensque de se quia etsi non movetur per locum movetur tamen per affectum, aliudque esse supra se stabilius stabilimentum, quod nec loco movetur nec tempore.'

<sup>848</sup> Lactantius, *De ira Dei* 5 (PL 7, 91).

<sup>849</sup> *Aen. fid.*, 90 (CFS 9, p. 116).

<sup>850</sup> *Med. orat.*, 8.1 (PL 180, 229C; CFS 3, p. 139): 'Quot enim anima humana habet affectiones, tot ad te habet facies. Tu autem, o Veritas, omnes excipis, et omnibus te mutuans, in te ipsa non mutaris.'

<sup>851</sup> *Aen. fid.*, (PL 180, 401A-B; CCCM 89A, 10, pp. 134-135; CFS 9.9, p. 42): '...in ea nil mutabile video; nec locis et temporibus sicut corpora; nec solis temporibus, et quasi locis, sicut spirituum nostrorum cogitationes, nec solis temporibus, et nulla vel imagine locorum, sicut quaedam mentium nostrarum ratiocinationes.'

<sup>852</sup> *Dial. an.*, 2.50 (CCCM 1, lines 734-736, p. 725; CFS 22, p. 100): 'Verum omnia corporalia mutabilitati obnoxia, nemo qui non videat: animam autem esse mutabilem, nemo qui non sentiat.'

definition of the soul, Aelred will single out its changeability, arguing that the soul ‘is, according to the state of our present life, a kind of rational life, changeable in time but not in place, immortal in its own way, and capable of being either happy or miserable’, possessing a nature by which it is ‘shown to be different from that of God which is changed neither by place nor time.’<sup>853</sup> We have seen in Chapter 2 that sin for Aelred is considered as a spontaneous *motus* of the soul away from God; a motion initiated by the *affectus*.<sup>854</sup> It is the *affectus* that unequivocally distinguishes humanity from God. In contrast to the stability of God who ‘is always the same and in the same state... the soul... is drawn here and there by diverse attachments and wishes (*affectus et voluntates*)’, Aelred observes.<sup>855</sup>

Similarly, we have already seen that Isaac of Stella and Alcher of Clairvaux regarded an *affectus* as a form of change in the heart linked to a *habitus*. In contrast to the training of the *affectus* in virtue through the ‘habit of a well-trained soul’ (*habitus animi bene instituti*), the divine mind requires no such emotional training or habits. God encompasses ‘justice and virtue that do not depend on will and habit of soul (*sine affectu vel habitu animi*)’, the Abbot of Stella writes.<sup>856</sup> Isaac follows Augustine in stating that souls have no physical dimensions, yet they do have a degree of spiritual or moral dimensionality to them.<sup>857</sup>

Using this metaphysical system, Domenico Pezzini has helpfully suggested that Isaac’s theological anthropology sees human beings as a blend of heaven and earth. As such, in his *Sermones* he would utilise the image of the changing phases of the moon to show how human beings experience constant decreases and increases in their thoughts and affections, going from mutability to stability, over and over again. Such an image allows Isaac to interlink three different lexemes – ‘lack-progress’ (*defectus-profectus*), ‘mutability-stability’ (*mutabilitas-stabilitas*) and ‘foolishness-wisdom’ (*insipientia-sapientia*) – as Pezzini has convincingly shown.<sup>858</sup> These linguistic pairings can be read alongside Isaac’s psychological couplet of *affectus-intellectus* as key markers of the spiritual growth that takes place in a person’s soul across their lifetime as they inculcate virtues, learn to control their emotions and develop stable patterns of behaviour, and gain important knowledge about divine truths.

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<sup>853</sup> *Dial. an.*, 1.10 (CCCM 1, lines 115-117, p. 688; CFS 22, pp. 39-40): ‘...secundum praesentis vitae statum vita quaedam est rationalis, tempore non loco mutabilis, sui modo immortalis, quae beata potest esse vel misera.’

<sup>854</sup> See note 497.

<sup>855</sup> *Dial. an.*, 1.10 (CCCM 1, lines 124-127, p. 688; CFS 22, p. 40): ‘...idem et eodem modo semper est. Quod quidem de anima dici non debet, quae per diversos affectus et volutantes distrahitur.’

<sup>856</sup> Isaac of Stella, *Sermo* 22.8 (PL 194, 1761B; SC 207, lines 61-62, p. 68; CFS 11, p. 181).

<sup>857</sup> *Sermo* 8.3 (PL 194, 1716C; SC 130, p. 192; CFS 11, p. 66; Deme, p. 36).

<sup>858</sup> Pezzini, ‘How to Compose Unity’, p. 195.

The nature of the soul as a ‘passible’ (*passibilis*) and ‘changeable’ (*mutabilis*) substance were singled out by the *De spiritu et anima* in its definition of the soul, in addition to other characteristics: simplicity, indestructibility, invisibility, incorporeality, and a lack of shape or colour.<sup>859</sup> However, the text is clear that this is not a spatial but a temporal motion achieved through the will.<sup>860</sup> The will, instead, has a temporal or moral mutability: ‘a certain changeableness (*mutabilitas*) by which it can become better or worse’ through virtue or vice.<sup>861</sup> ‘The soul is a spirit which is intellectual, rational, always living, always in motion, and capable of willing both the good and the bad’, Alcher remarks.<sup>862</sup> And like the other Cistercian authors we have explored, it is the will that enables the soul to develop over the course of training in Cistercian discipline. ‘The powers and virtues of the soul grow as a result of long practice and the passage of time’, *De spiritu et anima* exclaims.<sup>863</sup>

### Mediated Perception: The Blurring of Sensation, Affection and Thought

God made three wonders of beneficial influence in creation: herbs, precious stones, and the stars. Some herbs have the power to cool down and warm up, causing a complete change in the condition of the body... Precious stones too, in their own way, bring about a complete change of the body... And all the stars, the planets in particular, have special effects through the air on bodies subsisting below them. And when the body is changed, its affinity with the soul inside causes the soul to change as well, receiving joy or sadness or other such affections from outside. But these affections don’t rule the human soul to such an extent that our actions follow them rather than our discretion or free will.<sup>864</sup>

Hugh of Saint-Victor, *Notes on Genesis*

<sup>859</sup> DSA, 24 (PL 40, 796; CFS 24, p. 217).

<sup>860</sup> DSA, 15 and 18 (PL 40, 792 and 794; CFS 24, p. 206, 211).

<sup>861</sup> DSA, 18 (PL 40, 793; CFS 24, p. 210): ‘quamdā mutabilitatem, qua potest melior vel deterior fieri.’ See also chapter 40 and 45 (PL 40, 809-810, 813; CFS 24, pp. 245-246, 253).

<sup>862</sup> DSA, 13 (PL 40, 788; CFS 24, p. 199): ‘Anima est spiritus intellectualis, rationalis, semper vivens, semper in motu, bonae malaeque voluntatis capax.’

<sup>863</sup> DSA, 30 (PL 40, 800; CFS 24, p. 225): ‘Potentiae animae atque virtutes longa exercitatione et successu temporum crescunt.’

<sup>864</sup> *Not. Gen.*, 1:14 (PL 175, 36C-D; VTT6, p. 66): ‘Tria enim mirae virtutis et efficaciae fecit Deus in creaturis, herbas, lapides, stellas. Herbae enim frigefaciunt, et calefaciunt, et totum statum corporis permutant... Lapidēs similiter statum corporum diverso modo permutant. Stellae quidem omnes, et principaliter planetae in corporibus subjectis suos habent effectus permutandi mediante aere. Immutatis vero corporibus per affinitatem quam habent cum animabus sibi adjunctis, et ipsae quoque animae mutantur, gaudium vel tristitiam, et consimiles affectiones sortientes ab extrinsecis. Istaē tamen affectiones non in tantum dominantur animis hominum, ut actiones nostrae magis sequantur eas, quam discretionem mentis, et liberum arbitrium.’

This quote from Hugh of Saint-Victor adequately sums up how the medieval human being was understood to be affected externally and internally by various forces other than soul and body. As I noted previously, Charles Taylor and Barbara Newman have both referred to this permeability as exemplifying a ‘porous self’. The study of the influence of herbs (medicine/herbalism), precious stones (mineralogy) and stars (astronomy/astrology) mentioned by Hugh, indicate three common – although quite eclectic – ways certain bodily states could be influenced, induced or completely altered by external causes.<sup>865</sup> In contrast to modern ideas of affectivity in which emotions are closed off from the outside world, Taylor’s statement that in societies which subscribe to the porous self ‘the inside is no longer just inside; it is also outside’, holds true for the Middle Ages.<sup>866</sup> In such a world-view ‘emotions... exist in a space which takes us beyond ourselves, which is porous to some outside power, a person-like power.’<sup>867</sup> Medieval discussions on affectivity are also concerned with discussions around agency and intentionality.

A consequence of the medieval porous self is that bodily, exterior sense perceptions necessarily must be mediated to influence interior, spiritual thoughts and affections. Any theory of change in the *De anima* treatises of the Cistercians and Victorines thus needed to adequately explain how changes in bodies can cause changes in a separate essence, that of souls. *Libri de anima* did this in two main ways: first, they posit a power of the soul (normally sensuality or imagination) or a ‘spirit’ (*spiritus*) which mediates bodily and spiritual reality; second, and more significantly, the mechanism behind the process of physical sense perception is viewed as analogous to the processes undergirding spiritual perception.

### Perception as Mediation

Hugh of Saint-Victor’s *De unione corporis et spiritus* is primarily concerned with the question of how the body and spirit can be united together. For Hugh, psychological processes occurring inside human beings can be read as ‘sacraments’ (*sacramenta*) of scripture and spiritual truths.<sup>868</sup> For example, the rising of bodies (*corpora*) and the descent of spirits (*spiritus*) coming together in the activity of perception and thought is said to be

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<sup>865</sup> Other medieval external motions acting upon the body and mind could include the operations of benevolent and malevolent spirits (angelology/demonology).

<sup>866</sup> C. Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA, 2007), p. 36.

<sup>867</sup> Taylor, *A Secular Age*, p. 36.

<sup>868</sup> *Unione*, 2 (PL 177, 285B; Piazzoni, p. 883).

comparable to Moses ascending the mountain and God descending to meet him.<sup>869</sup> If there was not this movement – simultaneously upward and downward – man and God ‘would not come together as one’ (*non convenissent in unum*).<sup>870</sup> By the same logic, *De unione corporis et spiritus* appeals to the biblical image of Jacob’s Ladder to portray the different gradations of body and spirit in the human microcosm as analogous to the cosmological hierarchies between heaven and earth. As Hugh states:

Consider the ladder of Jacob, resting on earth, and its highest point was touching heaven. The earth is the body, the sky is God. Souls ascend by contemplation from the bottom to the top, from the body to the spirit, by the medium of sense and sensuality (*mediante sensu et sensualitate*), and from the spirit to God, by the medium of contemplation and revelation (*mediante contemplatione et revelatione*).<sup>871</sup>

These sacraments, he argues, reveal that body and spirit cannot be entirely separate substances but share a point of interconnection since ‘if there is no medium between spirit and body, neither spirit with body, nor body with spirit can come together.’<sup>872</sup> There are several gradations of both body and spirit within man all differing in quality from lowest to highest, establishing a hierarchy that allows the highest quality of body to unite with the lowest quality of spirit.<sup>873</sup> For Hugh, the faculty of imagination, as the highest corporeal body, serves as this medium.

Achard of Saint-Victor’s *De differentia animae, spiritus et mentis*, as the title suggests, sought to achieve greater clarity between the three key psychological substances: soul, spirit and mind. Of the three, the soul (*anima*), Achard contends, is the lowest substance, utilising bodily instruments to perceive corporeal bodies ‘by sense (*sensus*) and to desire them by sensory appetite (*sensualitas*)’<sup>874</sup>; the spirit (*spiritus*) is the medium of soul and mind, and like Hugh, is designated as the power of imagination (*imaginatio*)<sup>875</sup>; and the mind (*mens*) – the purest substance – ‘has a natural capacity, in understanding and affectivity (*intellectus et affectus*), for truth... in understanding through knowledge, in affectivity through love’ and thus ‘possesses the image of God in its power of knowing, and the likeness

<sup>869</sup> Ibid, 2 (PL 177, 285B; Piazzoni, p. 883).

<sup>870</sup> Ibid, 2 (PL 177, 285B; Piazzoni, p. 883).

<sup>871</sup> Ibid, 4 (PL 177, 285C; Piazzoni, p. 884): ‘Vide scalam Jacob, in terra stabat, et summitas eius coelos tangebatur. Terra corpus, coelum Deus. Ascendunt animi contemplatione ab infimis ad summa. A corpore ad spiritum, mediante sensu et sensualitate. A spiritu ad Deum, mediante contemplatione et revelatione.’

<sup>872</sup> Ibid, 1 (PL 177, 285A; Piazzoni, p. 883): ‘Si nihil inter spiritum et corpus medium esset, neque spiritus cum corpore, neque corpus cum spiritu convenire potuisset.’

<sup>873</sup> Ibid, 1-2 (PL 177, 285A-B; Piazzoni, p. 833).

<sup>874</sup> *Discretione*, 34, (Haring, p.181; CS 165, p. 364): ‘...sensu percipiendas et sensualitate concupiscendas...’

<sup>875</sup> *Discretione*, 41(Haring, p. 183; CS 165, p. 366).

in its power of knowing.’<sup>876</sup> Like the Trinity, these three powers come together in a union to actualise the interrupted mental processes of sensation, imagination, rationality and affectivity. Achard puts it thus: ‘As that Spirit is a kind of connection between the Father and Son, so this spirit is not unreasonably thought to be a kind of bond between mind and soul, in the middle not by its position in space but by its position in nature so that without it they are not thought capable of being joined and existing in the same thing.’<sup>877</sup>

Among the Cistercians, William of Saint-Thierry’s *De natura corporis et animae* argued for a sophisticated, medically-influenced system of three increasingly refined ‘spirits’ (*spiritus*) – the natural (*naturalis*), spiritual (*spiritualis*) and animal (*animalis*) – necessary for the physiological functions of man, and produced by the successive ‘digestion’ (*digestio*) of the four humours in the liver, heart and brain.<sup>878</sup> Contrastingly, Aelred of Rievaulx identified the ‘power of sense’ (*vis sensualis*)<sup>879</sup>, generated by the rarefaction of the elements air and fire, as the mediating bond between body and soul. Sensation (*sensus*), Aelred argues, ‘is so subtle and so akin to spirit’<sup>880</sup> that the soul ‘could in no way be mingled with the body... only through the medium of sense’<sup>881</sup>; it is the sole ‘medium... which has both an affinity with the soul because of its subtlety and an affinity with the body because of its bodily quality.’<sup>882</sup>

Out of the Cistercians, Isaac of Stella came closest to the Victorine symbolic mentality in arguing that the inner, microcosmic psychological processes of a person’s soul are paralleled in the macrocosmic structure of the universe: ‘Just as in the visible world there are mounting steps: earth, water, air, ether or the firmament, and the highest heaven itself which is called the ‘empyrean’, so too there are five stages of wisdom for the soul as it makes its pilgrimage in the world of its body: sense perception (*sensus*), imagination (*imaginatio*), reason (*ratio*), discernment (*intellectus*) and understanding (*intelligentia*)’, he writes in *Epistola de anima*.<sup>883</sup> Like Hugh, Isaac read Pseudo-Dionysius, an influence that shows as

<sup>876</sup> *Discretione*, 33 (Haring, p. 181; CS 165, p. 364): ‘Mens... intellectu et affectu naturaliter capax est; intellectu per cognitionem; affectu per dilectionem; *imaginem* Dei habens in potentia cognoscendi; *similitudinem* habens in potentia diligendi.’

<sup>877</sup> *Discretione*, 54 (Haring, p. 186; CS 165, pp. 369-370): ‘Ut enim ille Patris et Filii conexio quaedam est, ita et iste, inter mentem et animam non loci sed gradu naturae medius, vinculum quoddam eorum non immerito censetur adeo, ut sine eo illae non putentur iungi posse et in eodem esse.’

<sup>878</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 6-34 (CCCM 88, pp. 105-115; CFS 24, 2-7, pp. 106-117).

<sup>879</sup> *Dial. an.*, 3.1 (CCCM 1, line 33, p. 732; CFS 22, p. 112. Earlier Aelred calls sensation the *vis sentiendi* (‘the power to sense’), see *Dial. an.*, 1.50 (CCCM 1, line 62, p. 700; CFS 22, p. 60).

<sup>880</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.50 (CCCM 1, line 612, p. 700; CFS 22, p. 60): ‘...quae ita subtilis est et vicina spiritui...’

<sup>881</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.62 (CCCM 1, lines 800-802, p. 705; CFS 22, p. 68): ‘anima... eam nullo modo posse misceri carni... nisi sensu mediante.’

<sup>882</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.57, (CCCM 1, lines 710-712, p. 702; CFS 22, p. 64): ‘...mediante... quae hinc ei vicina est propter suam subtilitatem, hinc carni propter corpoream qualitatem.’

<sup>883</sup> *Ep. an.* (PL 194, 1880A-B; Tarlazzi, p. 263; CFS 24, 8, p. 162): ‘Sicut ergo sursum versus quinquepertita quadam distinctione mundus iste visibilis gradatur, terra, aqua, aere, aethere, sive firmamento, ipso quoque

each of the soul's epistemological powers are symbolically compared to the rungs of Jacob's Ladder, each step the image and likeness of the next. As Isaac says:

The true and not pure incorporeal being [discernment] is some kind of image and likeness of the pure and true incorporeal being [understanding]; and that which we have called the 'scarcely incorporeal' [reason] being is an image of the former [discernment]. That which we said is 'scarcely bodily' [imagination] is an image of the 'scarcely incorporeal' [reason]. The highest body, fire that is, is joined to the 'scarcely bodily' by a kind of likeness, and air to fire, water to air, earth to water. Therefore (in a manner of speaking) by this golden chain of the poet (Homer, *The Iliad*, 8) the lowest realities hang down from the highest, or by the upright ladder of the prophet (Gen. 28:12) there is an ascent from the lowest to highest.<sup>884</sup>

This same viewpoint was borrowed by Alcher of Clairvaux in his *Liber de spiritu et anima*, who extends it also to the angelic hierarchy.<sup>885</sup> As an eclectic summa of previous writings on the soul, Alcher's text includes William's medical understanding of the three bodily spirits<sup>886</sup>, a similar blend of microcosmic imagery used by Hugh in *De unione corporis et spiritus* and the fiery medium of Aelred, showing how in the 1170s one could learn about the interconnection of body and soul through several different sources: the bible, theology and philosophy, or medicine and natural science.<sup>887</sup>

### **“Only like knows like”: Perception and Affectivity as Assimilation**

Neoplatonic understandings of perception operated on the basis of assimilation. The Platonic maxim “only like knows like” communicated the idea that understanding and truth necessitated the transformation of the similar to the similar. The progressive assimilation of the rational soul to God's love is an idea that it has been argued the Cistercians re-discovered in the twelfth century.<sup>888</sup> ‘The reason of nature demands the likeness of the likeness’ (*De ratione naturae similis similem quaerit*) was a Pythagorean maxim quoted by Bernard of

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coelo supremo, quod empyreum vocatur; sic et animae in mundo sui corporis peregrinanti quinque sunt ad sapientiam progressus: sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia’ [Translation modified].

<sup>884</sup> Ibid, (PL 194, 1885C; Tarlazzi, p. 271; CFS 24, 18, p. 171): ‘Est igitur pure et vere incorporei quaedam imago et similitudo, vere et non pure incorporeum; et ipsius, id quod diximus, pene incorporeum, et ipsius, id quod diximus, pene corpus. Ipsi quoque supremum corpus, id est ignis, quadam similitudine iungitur, et igni aer, aeri aqua, aquae terra. Hac igitur quasi aurea catena poetae, vel ima dependent a summis, vel erecta scala prophetarum ascenditur ad summa de imis.’

<sup>885</sup> DSA, 4 (PL 40, 782; CFS 24, p. 185).

<sup>886</sup> These are the natural, (*naturalis*), vital (*vitalis*) and animal (*animalis*) powers.

<sup>887</sup> DSA, 33 (PL 40, 802; CFS 24, p. 230).

<sup>888</sup> Pacifique Delfgaauw, ‘La Lumière de la charité chez saint Bernard’, *Coll.* 18 (1956), pp. 44-47; E. Stiegman, ‘A Tradition of Aesthetics in Saint Bernard’, in *Bernardus Magister*, p. 141.

Clairvaux to express this fundamental idea of assimilation.<sup>889</sup> David N. Bell has shown how the same idea undergirds William of Saint-Thierry's anthropology.<sup>890</sup> So too has Amédée Hallier for Aelred. For the Abbot of Rievaulx, Hallier writes that

Knowledge supposes likeness; to know is to be, is to become the thing known while still remaining oneself. The union of the *affectus* and the intellect... finds its explanation only in the doctrine of the image: the act of the intellect is accompanied by a movement of the soul that tends toward an ever truer resemblance to God and spiritual things, an inclination to possess them.<sup>891</sup>

Geoffrey Webb observed early on that the notion of assimilation and movement towards an object is particularly associated with the soul's affectivity, and is even implied by the etymology of *affectus*:

Man who must follow his attractions, is utterly bound to change, for he must become in some way the thing that he loves. *Affectus*, after all, means *facere ad*; it means *pathein*, an underdoing, a 'being influenced'.<sup>892</sup>

That this Neoplatonic "only like knows like" model perception is associated with affectivity is unsurprising because it could allow for both positive and negative change depending on the strength of the stimulus. *De spiritu et anima*, for instance, notes how the coinherence of body and soul is a constant assimilative battle. 'When one of the two natures conquers, the other is conquered and both take on the nature of whichever is the victor, that is, either the soul makes the flesh spiritual by adorning it with virtues, or the flesh makes the soul carnal by conquering it.'<sup>893</sup> Positive and negative affectivity is thus imagined as an act of perception: 'Neither can one nature be transformed into the other unless the soul is infected by vices or unless the flesh is abandoned by the virtues.'<sup>894</sup> This same understanding can be found in the writings of Gertrude of Helfta, and significantly in the thought of Victorines such as Hugh and Richard.<sup>895</sup> By modelling the 'sense of the soul' (*sensus animae*) on the sense of the body (*sensus corporis*), both the Cistercians and Victorines stressed the fundamental association

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<sup>889</sup> SCC, 82.7 (SBO 2, p. 297; CFS, p. 178).

<sup>890</sup> D. N. Bell, *The Image and Likeness: The Augustinian Spirituality of William of Saint-Thierry* (Cistercian Publications, 1984), pp. 125-165.

<sup>891</sup> Hallier, *The Monastic Theology of Aelred of Rievaulx*, p. 118.

<sup>892</sup> Webb, *An Introduction to the Cistercian De Anima*, p. 21.

<sup>893</sup> DSA, 18 (PL 40, 793; CFS 24, p. 209-210).

<sup>894</sup> DSA, 19 (PL 40, 794; CFS 24, p. 210).

<sup>895</sup> *In hier. cael.* (PL 175, 1038D); Dumiege, *Richard de Saint-Victor et l'idée chrétienne de l'amour*, p. 125.



between perception and affection in their anthropology. This cross-pollination of the view of the soul as united to God through assimilation is most clearly expressed in the *libri de anima* of Hugh of Saint-Victor, Alcher of Clairvaux and William of Saint-Thierry.

a). Hugh of Saint-Victor's *De unione corporis et spiritus*

'Now it was a Pythagorean teaching that similars are comprehended by similars'.<sup>896</sup> In his *Didascalicon*, Hugh of Saint-Victor had drawn on this Pythagorean understanding of the "only like knows like" principle to suggest how the human body-soul composite is capable of knowing all things since it is similar to all things in the universe being composed of matter and spirit.<sup>897</sup> Hugh's notion of perception as a form of assimilation is tinged with Platonism, specifically Plato's understanding of *entelechy* in the *Timaeus* as involving both the 'same' and the 'different'. The soul, Hugh argues, 'gathers its movement into twin spheres [the bodily and spiritual] because, whether it goes out to things through its senses or ascends to invisible things through its understanding, it circles about, drawing to itself the likenesses of things; and thus it is that one and the same mind, the capacity for all things... it represents within itself their imagined likeness.'<sup>898</sup>

In an illuminating passage of *De unione corporis et spiritus*, the Victorine master notes how the passage of forms from bodily sensation to imagination, and then to the spiritual faculties of reason and discretion, involves the successive touching, impressing, and moulding of bodily and spiritual substances. Hugh draws on the same vocabulary as corporeal sensation to explain the change in form of spirits. He writes:

And thus, imagination is similar to sensation, and in the height of the corporeal spirit, in the deepest part of the rational [spirit], a bodily thing shapes (*informans*) and the rational touches (*contingens*). For instance, sense, either through sight, or hearing, or smell, or taste, or touch, is formed by touching (*contingens*) an external body, and the same form (*forma*) is conceived from the contact (*ex contactu*) of a body and lead back inside through the movement of single senses having been sent out and called back inside, being placed and collected in the phantasmal cell, and imprinting (*imprimens*) [the form] to that purer part of corporeal spirit, it makes the imagination. Indeed, this imagination in certain brute animals does not transcend the phantasmal cell; but in rational animals it progresses all the way up to the rational [cell], where it

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<sup>896</sup> *Did.*, 1.1 (Taylor, pp. 46-47).

<sup>897</sup> *Did.*, 1.1. (Taylor p. 47).

<sup>898</sup> *Did.* 1.1 (Taylor, p. 46).

touches (*contingit*) the same incorporeal substance of the soul and excites discretion.<sup>899</sup>

The passage is particularly significant since it was inserted verbatim by Alcher of Clairvaux into his influential *Liber de spiritu et anima*, with chapter 33 relying almost entirely on Hugh's text.

There is a certain fiery power which, after being tempered by air, rises from the heart to the brain – our brain being the heaven of the microcosm which is our body. In the brain the fiery power is cleansed and purified, and then it goes outside the body through the eyes, ears, nostrils, and other sensory apparatus. The power is formed into a shape when it contacts things exterior to the body (*ex contactu exteriorum formata*), and makes the body's five senses, that is sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch. The sense of touch passes from the anterior to the posterior part of the brain and from there it descends through the cervix and spinal medulla and is diffused throughout the whole body.

The fiery power is formed (*formata*) into a shape on the outside through the sensory apparatus (through which it goes out and in which it is shaped) and itself takes on the name of "sense". Now this power is subsequently interiorised and brought back to the phantasmal chamber, where it becomes the imagination. The imagination moves from the anterior to the medial part of the head, thereby touching (*contingit*) the very substance of the rational soul and occasioning the capacity for discerning. The imagination has now been purified and made keen to such an extent that it is joined (*coniungatur*) to the spirit with no other substance intervening, while all along it truly retains the nature and properties of a body. In dumb animals the imagination does not go beyond the phantasmal chamber; in rational animals the imagination is made purer until it is brought into contact (*contingendam*) with the rational and incorporeal substance of the soul. Seen thus, the imagination is a likeness of the body. It is formed externally when through the corporeal senses the fiery power contacts corporeal things (*ex contactu corporum*). After being formed, the imagination is led back through those same senses to the purer part of the corporeal part of the corporeal spirit and is imprinted (*impressa*) upon it. At its highest point the imagination is a corporeal spirit, and at its lowest something rational which informs bodily nature and is contact with rational nature (*corporalem informans, et rationalem contingens*).<sup>900</sup>

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<sup>899</sup> *Unione*, 13 (PL 177, 287D-288A; Piazzoni, pp. 386-387): 'Est itaque imaginatio similitudo sensus, in summo corporalis spiritus, et in imo rationalis corporalem informans et rationalem contingens. Sensus namque sive per visum, sive per audium, sive per olfactum, sive per gustum, sive per tactum, extrinsecus corpus contingens formatur, ipsamque formam ex corporis contactu conceptam intrinsecus reducens per meatus singulis sensibus emittendis et revocandis introrsum dispositis ad cellam phantasticam colligit, eamque illi parti puriori corporei spiritus imprimens imaginationem facit. Quae quidem imaginatio in brutis animalibus phantasticam cellam non transcendit; in rationalibus autem usque ad rationalem progreditur, ubi ipsam incorpoream animae substantiam contingit, et excitat discretionem.'

<sup>900</sup> *DSA*, 33 (PL 40, 802-803; CFS 24, pp. 230-232): 'Quaedam vis ignea aere temperata a corde ad cerebrum ascendit, tanquam in coelum corporis nostri: ibique purificata et colata per oculos, aures, nares, caeteraque instrumenta sensuum, foras progreditur, et ex contactu exteriorum formata quinque sensus corporis facit; visum videlicet, auditum, gustum, odoratum et tactum. Qui tangendi sensus ab anteriori parte cerebri ad posteriorem transiens, et inde per cervicem et medullam spinae descendens per totum corpus diffunditur. Porro ipsa vis ignea, quae exterius formata sensus dicitur, eadem formata per ipsa sensuum instrumenta, per quae egreditur et

Throughout both works the use of verbs indicating ‘forming’ and ‘impressing’ (*formare, informare, imprimere*) as well as those connoting ‘touching’ and ‘joining’ (*tangere, contingere, coniungere*) indicate the repeated points of contact between these psychological powers. Sense perception, imagination, reason and discretion can work together only because of the similarities between them. ‘Although the body may be raised up all the way to the spirit, and the spirit may be abased all the way to the body’, Hugh stresses that ‘neither is spirit transmuted into body, nor body transmuted into spirit.’<sup>901</sup> Crucially, it is the differences between body and spirit that ensure unity is created in the human being through hierarchy. Thus, while mediated, each substance maintains their allocated place in the hierarchy – a sentiment that Hugh repeats throughout *De unione* by citing the scriptural passage, ‘that which is born from flesh is flesh, and that which is born from spirit is spirit’ (John 3:6).<sup>902</sup>

There are thus rigid hierarchical boundaries between the substances of body and spirit in *De unione corporis et spiritus* yet Hugh allows for several mediums – points of permeability within the human organism that permit the interaction of different substances. If these points of permeability and coinherence can exist within the human organism, why not between man and God? In one of Hugh’s final texts, *De arrha animae*, Hugh suggests that since man is an *imago et similitudo Dei*, sharing to a degree in God’s essence, the rational soul is capable of progressive transformations to grow in likeness to God. Just as the process of bodily perception in *De unione corporis et spiritus* requires the touching, shaping and imprinting of form onto the powers of the soul, human love for God increasingly stamps God’s form on the soul: ‘the force of love is such that it is necessary for you to be like the object of your love’, Hugh comments.<sup>903</sup> Just as higher forces in Hugh’s *De anima* affect lower forces, the same relationship underscores the soul or bride’s relationship with Christ her bridegroom, God’s grace stretching out to elicit human affection through grace:

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in quibus formatur, natura operante introrsum ad cellam phantasticam usque retrahitur et reducitur, atque imaginatio efficitur. Postea eadem imaginatio ab anteriori parte capitis ad medium transiens, ipsam animae rationalis substantiam contingit, et excitat discretionem: in tantum jam purificata et subtilis effecta, ut ipsi spiritui immediate coniungatur, veraciter tamen naturam corporis retinens et proprietatem. Quae quidem imaginatio in brutis animalibus phantasticam cellam non transcendit: in rationalibus autem purior fit, et usque ad rationalem et incorpoream animae substantiam contingendam defertur et progreditur. Est itaque imaginatio similitudo corporis, per sensus quidem corporeos, ex corporum contactu concepta extrinsecus, atque per eosdem sensus introrsus ad partem puriorem corporei spiritus reducta, eique impressa, in summo scilicet corporalis spiritus, et in imo rationalis, corporalem informans, et rationalem contingens.’

<sup>901</sup> *Unione*, 12 (PL 177, 287C; Piazzoni, p. 886): ‘...nec spiritus tamen in corpus, nec corpus in spiritus transmutatur.’

<sup>902</sup> *Unione*, 1 (PL 177, 285A and 287C; Piazzoni, p. 883 and 886).

<sup>903</sup> *Arrha.*, 13 (VTT 2, p. 208).

It truly is your Beloved who visits you, but he comes invisibly in a hidden way, and incomprehensibly. He comes to touch you, not be seen by you; he comes to move you, not to be grasped by you; he comes not to pour himself completely into you, but to offer you a taste; not to fulfil your desire, but to elicit your affection (*affectus*). He is extending to you the first fruits of his love; he does not offer full and perfect union. This is the core of his betrothal-gift to you: he, who in the future will give himself to you to see and to possess unendingly.<sup>904</sup>

Since this process involves God's grace Hugh notes his lack of knowledge about how it actually comes about: 'The association of love will somehow transform you into the likeness of the one to whom you are conjoined by affection.'<sup>905</sup> The use of the word 'somehow' suggests Hugh's inability to totally understand this process within his epistemological system since this is a mystical process – a process that doesn't follow the laws of nature.

b). William of Saint-Thierry's *De natura corporis et animae*

In the background all of William's thought is an Augustinian understanding of man as made 'to the image and likeness' (*ad imaginem et similitudinem*) of God. While the soul always serves as an *imago* of the divine, every act of self-love corrupts its likeness to God. By contrast, every good act of the will restores the image corrupted by the Fall and allows the soul to become increasingly like God.<sup>906</sup> William's Platonic-Augustinian model of "only like knows like" perception is certainly the most developed of all Cistercian and Victorine thinkers – the instances whereby physical sensation is used as an analogue for spiritual sensation are too numerous to relate fully here, and would require their own separate study.

We encounter his "only like knows like" doctrine in *De natura corporis et animae*.<sup>907</sup> For William, the act of sense perception itself must involve a change in the perceiver, changing the sensory organ to become like the perceptible object. 'Every sense experience changes the one experiencing it in some way into that which is sensed or there is no sensation', William writes in *De natura corporis*.<sup>908</sup> Likewise, where the soul's affectivity is

<sup>904</sup> *Arrha.*, 70 (VTT 2, p. 228).

<sup>905</sup> *Arrha.*, 13 (VTT 2, p. 208).

<sup>906</sup> See the essays of D. N. Bell, 'The Mystical Theology and Theological Mysticism of William of Saint-Thierry', and E. R. Elder, 'William of Saint-Thierry and the Renewal of the Whole 'Man'', in *A Companion to William of Saint-Thierry*, p. 72-85 and 117-120; also relevant is Dominic V. Monti, 'The Way Within: Grace in the Mystical Thought of William of Saint Thierry', *Cîteaux – Commentarii Cistercienses*, 26 (1975), pp. 31-47 (pp. 33-35).

<sup>907</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 41-46 (PL 180, col. 705D-707A; Lemoine, p. 113-121; Verdeyen, p. 117-119; CFS 24, 1.8-9, pp. 120-122).

<sup>908</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 41 (PL 180, col. 705D-706A; Lemoine, p. 113; Verdeyen, p. 117; CFS 24, 1.8, p. 120): 'Omnis enim sensus sentientem transmutat quodammodo in id quod sentitur, alioquin non est sensus.'

concerned, an equivalent pronouncement fully in keeping with William's understanding of the transformative effect of the emotions on the soul could read: "every affection changes the soul experiencing it in some way into that which is felt or there is affection". Indeed, Wolfgang Zwingmann has noted how the *affectus* for William can mean both a spiritual form of sensation and a perception that is directed towards things relating to God.<sup>909</sup> Regarding the strong affinity between William's medical and spiritual doctrines, David N. Bell has rightly suggested that 'it is a simple logical extension... for William to say that just as the senses are transformed into sense objects, so too the soul, when it senses God, must in some way be transformed into God.'<sup>910</sup>

This is certainly the case in *De natura animae*. The emphasis on analogies of higher substances affecting lower substances in the cosmos makes it easy for William to suggest that the emotional contemplation of God affects the soul itself, increasingly moulding the soul into the form of the divine. The soul discerning God, William writes:

...is no longer delighted in its own beauty alone but also in the Form that gives it form. By contemplation of that form it becomes ever more beautiful; for to study that Form is to be formed. What is drawn (*afficitur*) toward God is not its own, but his by whom it is drawn (*afficitur*).<sup>911</sup>

The repetition of the verb *afficere* emphasises how, by grace, the soul is 'drawn up' to God, having been emotionally affected by a superior being. The soul's ascent (or *anabathmon* as William calls it) necessarily involves the progressive transformation of the soul into the likeness of God – an act that parallels William's view of the transformation of bodies during perception. The soul that is drawn to God with 'faithful affection' (*affectio fidelis*) becomes 'almost impassible' (*impassibilis*), William argues, since '...its very passions are not passions for it but virtues'.<sup>912</sup>

While not directly named in his *De anima* treatise, this idea is analogous to William's broader mystical understanding of 'unity of spirit' (*unitas spiritus*): the ultimate likeness of the soul to God in which self-will has been eliminated and the affective faculty of the soul, its

<sup>909</sup> Zwingmann, 'Affectus illuminati amoris', p. 195.

<sup>910</sup> Bell, *The Image and Likeness*, p. 126.

<sup>911</sup> *Nat. an.*, 105-106 (PL 180, col. 722B-722C; Lemoine, p. 195-196; CCCM 88, p. 140; CFS 24, 2.13, p. 146): 'Anima... non jam tantum delectatur in sua formositate quam in forma formatrice, cui intendendo semper efficitur formosior. Ipsum enim intendere, formari est. Quidquid enim ad Deum afficitur, non est suum, sed ejus a quo afficitur.'

<sup>912</sup> *Nat. an.*, 106 and 116 (PL 180, 722C and 725A; Lemoine, p. 197 and 207-209; CCCM 88, p. 140-141 and p. 144; CFS 24, 2.15, p. 150: '...passiones ipsae non passionibus ei sint, sed virtutes.'

will (*voluntas*), is only capable of loving and choosing in accordance with God's will.<sup>913</sup> It is this transformed, apathetic soul that, at the point of the body's death, becomes one with God. Alongside the 'negative' emotions of fear and sorrow, the theological virtues of faith and hope become transformed entirely into charity (*caritas*); the soul's love for God 'will exult in victory, with fear and sorrow destroyed, faith and hope transformed', *De natura animae* states.<sup>914</sup> At the greatest extent of the soul's transformation into the divine, William writes that 'it lives as one spirit with him... one in love, one in beatitude, one in immortality and incorruption, one even in some way in divinity itself.'<sup>915</sup> The soul through its ordered rationality and affectivity thus becomes almost indistinguishable from God in the same way that the quasi-corporeal images produced from perception closely resemble the sensible objects they originate from.

This doctrine of affectivity in William's *De anima* treatise translates to his wider spiritual writings, especially the *Speculum fidei* (*Mirror of Faith*). For a Cistercian monk, if the affections of the soul conform to faith 'it is good for the flesh [the affections] and the for the bones [the virtues] because the flesh becomes more solid from the strength of the bones and the bones are nourished by the flesh.'<sup>916</sup> Through their intermingling with the virtues, it is implied that the affections are impressed with the likeness of spiritual strength, and are themselves transformed to resemble the strength of the virtues. All the while, these affections ordered in accordance with reason provide spiritual nourishment to the soul in the form of perceptions, which assist the soul's contemplation of God. However, if the opposite process takes place – faith conforms to the affections – then 'the spiritual powers', William remarks, 'are relaxed into physical affections (*affectiones carnales*), [and] the whole becomes flesh...'<sup>917</sup> Thus, just as in William's theory of *eucrasia*, in the *Speculum fidei* it is whatever part of the spiritual 'mixture' of the human being that comes to predominate – either the corporeal affections or the spiritual virtues – that determines the overall temperament of the

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<sup>913</sup> Bell, 'The Mystical Theology', p. 86-90; Rydstrøm-Poulsen, 'William of Saint-Thierry on the Soul', p. 103-104. This theme is comprehensively examined in *Unity of Spirit: Studies on William of Saint-Thierry in Honor of E. Rozanne Elder*, eds. F. Tyler Sergeant, A. Rydstrøm-Poulsen, M. L. Dutton (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 2015).

<sup>914</sup> *Nat. an.*, 116 (PL 180, 725B; Lemoine, p. 209; CCCM 88, p. 144; CFS 24, 2.15, p. 151): 'in victore... exulstabit destructo timore et dolore, speque fideque transmissa.'

<sup>915</sup> *Nat. an.*, 106-107 (PL 180, 722D; Lemoine, pp. 197-199; CCCM 88, p. 141; CFS 24, 2.13, p. 146-147): 'Unus spiritus cum eo existens... Unum amore, unum beatitudine, unum immortalitate et incorruptione, unum etiam quodam modo ipsam diivinitate.'

<sup>916</sup> *Spec. fid.*, 17 (PL 180, col. 380C; Déchanet, p. 110; Davis, p. 43): 'Cum ergo carnes ossibus adhaerent, bene et cum ossibus, et cum carnibus agitur, quia et carnes ex ossium robore solidantur, et ossa a carnibus nutriuntur.'

<sup>917</sup> *Ibid.*, 17 (PL 180, col. 380C; Déchanet, p. 110; Davis, p. 44): '...si vero spirituales illae virtutes resolvuntur in affectiones carnales, totum caro fit.'

person. Over time these temperaments progressively transform the nature of the less numerous substance, fixing the spiritual complexion of the soul in either a state of positive or negative affectivity. While *eucrasis* is mentioned only once, the fact it is used to stress the ordered virtues of love, faith and hope and coupled with William's Augustinian understanding of image and likeness strongly indicates that the medically grounded view of affectivity in *De natura corporis et animae* was no fluke but supported William's wider programme of Cistercian spirituality, mysticism and contemplation.

## **PART 3 - AFFECTIVITY, SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE**



## CHAPTER 6 – “KNOW YOURSELF”: SELF-KNOWLEDGE AS AN AFFECTIVE PRACTICE

If you know not yourself,  
O fairest among women,  
Go forth and depart, following after  
the steps of the flocks.

– Song of Songs, 1:7

If you go forth from yourself, it is because you know not yourself. Know yourself, then, to be my image... If you are with me in your soul, there I will repose with you... strive to have him ever in your memory, to know by loving him; and in the thought of his goodness you shall perceive the sense of his eternity...

– William of Saint-Thierry, *Expositio super Cantica Canticorum*.<sup>918</sup>

### Introduction

In itself, to propose a tripartite (Platonic-Augustinian) or bipartite (affective-intellective) division of the soul was only half of the picture. The other half concerns how Cistercian and Victorine developments in thinking about affectivity intersect with other broader twelfth-century tropes and developments in monastic spheres, such as ideas of reform and reformation, moderation, interiority, balance, identity, humanity and ‘the self’.<sup>919</sup> Therefore, in this chapter I develop the arguments made in the previous five chapters of this thesis to show how the explorations of the Cistercians and Victorines into understanding the powers of feeling (*affectus*) and thinking (*intellectus*) dovetailed with monastic and canonical understandings of the self and practices for acquiring self-knowledge. Several historians from the 1970s onwards

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<sup>918</sup> *Ex. Cant.*, 5.64 (PL 184, 494A; CFS 6, p. 50).

<sup>919</sup> W. Ullmann, *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1967); G. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform: Its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the Age of the Fathers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959); Ladner, ‘Terms and Ideas of Renewal’, in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. R. L. Benson, G. Constable and C. D. Lanham (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 1991); G. Constable, ‘Moderation and Restrain in Ascetic Practices in the Middle Ages’, in *From Athens to Chartres: Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought: Studies in Honour of Edouard Jeuneau*: 35, ed. H. J. Westra (Leiden, 1992), pp. 319-326; J. Kaye, *A History of Balance, 1275-1375: The Emergence of a New Model of Equilibrium and Its Impact on Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

have noted the role of treatises on the soul in particular for encouraging a collective sense of awareness and individuality in this period.<sup>920</sup> For William of Saint-Thierry, the soul and the use of its powers was the source of self-knowledge. All of these individual developments, I argue, can be seen as another element of a broader monastic ‘anthropological’ view of human beings, that is, a Cistercian and Victorine perspective on man whereby learning about the soul’s powers of loving and thinking – and how to develop them – is understood as an essential form of self-knowledge required to save the soul from sin and damnation.

This is the case because in Cistercian and Victorine *libri de anima* and psychological tracts, the soul is believed to function as a mirror through which one can gain an understanding of man and God. To show how this took place, this chapter will first place Cistercian and Victorine *De anima* treatises within the wider intellectual trend of acquiring self-knowledge in the twelfth century. I then draw on the work of Pierre Hadot and Brian Stock to suggest that Cistercian and Victorine spiritual writings – most notably their soliloquies and prayers – consciously emulated a tradition of spiritual exercises that saw self-knowledge as part of an interrelated series of practices designed to re-configure the perception of a person and change their mode of action, behaviour and habits.

### **“Know Yourself”: Self Knowledge and Christian Socratism**

The Greek aphorism *Gnōthi Seauton* (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) or “know yourself”, was widely believed to have been inscribed on the Apollo at Delphi. But what is meant by self-knowledge? For Greeks approaching the Delphic Pythia the inscription has generally been interpreted as a warning to carefully consider the question they wanted answered. For Socrates, the inscription was understood as an encouragement to cultivate the soul.<sup>921</sup> However, in the second century convent of San Gregorio in Rome, a mosaic of a skeleton pointing to the Delphic motto may have served more as a *memento mori* to passers-by (see Figure 22). Additionally, Cistercian and Victorine authors also looked to the authority of the Song of Songs for a mystical junction to ‘go forth’ and cultivate self-knowledge. Evidently, then, the meaning of the admonition to “know yourself” changed throughout time.

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<sup>920</sup> Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200*; J. F. Benton, ‘Consciousness of Self and Perceptions of Individuality’, in *Renaissance and Renewal*, p. 284; M.-D. Chenu, *Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West*, ed. L. K. Little and tr. J. Taylor (Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 1997), p. 34; A. Boureau, ‘Un Sujet Agité’, pp. 187–200; Boureau, *De Vagues Individus*, especially pp. 15-29; Boquet and Nagy, ‘Medieval Sciences of the Emotions’, pp. 34-38; Boquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, pp. 143-148.

<sup>921</sup> Plato, *The First Alcibiades*, 124a, 127e-d and 129e-130a, tr. D. S. Hutchinson, in *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. J. M. Cooper (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), p. 580, 585 and 587-588.




Figure 22. *Gnothi seauton* mosaic (second century), Convent of San Gregorio, Via Appia, Rome, Italy. Now displayed in the Baths of Diocletian, National Museum of Rome, Italy.

In Etienne Gilson's view it was largely Bernard of Clairvaux and the Cistercians' reception of the dictum that enabled 'Christian Socratism' to flourish in the twelfth century.<sup>922</sup> Christian Socratism, or the reading of human nature from the perspective of theology, denoted an experiential learning process wherein all Christians were prompted to understand the interconnection between human nature, God, the universe, and history (past, present and future). In other words, Christian Socratism was anthropological. It was only by knowing the nature God gave to humanity, the place of man in the universe, original sin and humanity's Fall from grace (*exitus*), that an individual could return (*reditus*) to God.<sup>923</sup> Therefore, for Bernard of Clairvaux, self-knowledge did not signify merely intellectual knowledge, but was experiential. To know the self meant cultivating an awareness of one's own inadequacies, and the recognition of the necessity to accept God's love, and love God in return, in order to better oneself.<sup>924</sup> In short, it was to experience a moment of conversion that turns the soul to God –

<sup>922</sup> E. Gilson, 'Self-Knowledge and Christian Socratism', in *The Spirit of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, tr. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), p. 227. See also Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London: Sheen and Ward, 1955), pp. 56-59.

<sup>923</sup> Gilson, *The Spirit of Christian Philosophy*, p. 214.

<sup>924</sup> SCC, 36.6 (PL 183, 970C; CFS 7, p. 179): 'When a man first discovers that he is in difficulty, he will cry out to the Lord who will hear him and say: "I will deliver you and you shall glorify me." In this way your self-knowledge will be visible to you according as his image is being renewed within you.'

one that persists throughout life and helps the person live a life in accordance with God, ideally in a monastic setting.

Despite being particularly connected with the Cistercians, appeals to self-knowledge held importance both before, during and following the twelfth century. “Know yourself” was cited as a philosophical maxim in the works of Augustine, Bede, Macrobius, Boethius and Anselm.<sup>925</sup> Rendered into Latin as *nosce te ipsum*, *scito te ipsum*, *cognitio sui* or *notitia sui*, the theme’s reception from Antiquity to the modern day has been well studied.<sup>926</sup> Pierre Courcelle’s three volume study *Connais-toi toi-même* has produced the fullest account of self-knowledge up to the twelfth century.<sup>927</sup> However, it was in the twelfth century that the adage experienced a renaissance. Colin Morris has noted that ‘self-knowledge was one of the dominant themes of the age.’<sup>928</sup> The trope intersected with new theological and philosophical trends that gave increasing importance to discriminating between interior and exterior sensations – and privileging the interior – for experiencing God.<sup>929</sup> Following from Anselm’s advocacy of interiorisation and meditation, in the twelfth century self-knowledge held appeal to all the major religious communities. Invocations of the Delphic aphorism were made by the Benedictines Wibald of Stavelot (1098-1158) and Hugh of Poitiers (d. 1167), in addition to the Premonstratensian abbot of Bonne-Espérance, Philip of Harvengt (d. 1183). “Know yourself” features in the commentaries of Chartrian philosophers like William of Conches, Bernard Silvester and John of Salisbury. Moreover, it was used by the Augustinian canon Martin of Leon, as well as three Cistercian abbots: Garnier of Rochefort (1186-1193), Thomas of Perseigne (c. 1190), and Geoffrey of Auxerre (c. 1115-1120).<sup>930</sup>

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<sup>925</sup> Augustine, *De trinitate*, 10.5.7 (McKenna, p. 49); Macrobius, *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio*, 1.9.1-2, tr. W. H. Stahl (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 124; Boethius, *Philosophiae Consolatio* 2.5.29, ed. L. Bieler (Turnhout: Brepols, 1957), lines 75-58; Bede, *In proverbialia Salomonis*, PL 91, 1066B; Anselm, ‘Prayer to St John the Baptist’, tr. B. Ward, SLG, *The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm* (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 130.

<sup>926</sup> The following are select titles in a voluminous historiography: E. G. Wilkins’s *The Delphic Maxims in Literature* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1929) charts the maxim from Greece to the present day (see pp. 74-84 for the medieval tradition); Louis de Bezelair, ‘Connaissance de soi’, *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, 2 (1953), cols. 1511-1532; U. Renz, ed., *Self-Knowledge: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

<sup>927</sup> P. Courcelle, *Connais-toi toi-même: de Socrate à Saint Bernard*, 3 vols, Série Antiquité 58-60 (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1975).

<sup>928</sup> Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual*, p. 65.

<sup>929</sup> For Augustine’s importance see G. Verbeke, ‘Connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu chez S. Augustin’, *Augustiniana* 4 (1954), p. 499 and 506; L. Ashe, ‘Know Yourself: Interiority, Love, and God’, in *The Oxford English Literary History: Volume 1: 1000-1350: Conquest and Transformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 127-180.

<sup>930</sup> For several of these references see R. Javelet, *Image et ressemblance au douzième siècle, de saint Anselme à Alain de Lille*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1967), p. 369; Wibald, *Epistola* 147, PL 189, 1256C; William of Conches, *Glosae super Boethium*, 1, ed. Nauta, lines 61-70, pp. 64-64; Bernard Silvestris, *Commentum super sex libros Aeneidos*, 51.20-2, ed. J. W. Jones and E. F. Jones, *The Commentary on the First Six Books of the “Aeneid” of Virgil* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1988); John of Salisbury, *Epistola* 297, PL 199, 345C;

Due to its broad usage, interpretations of what “know yourself” meant were diverse and contextually dependent. Hence, the Benedictine historian and theologian Guibert of Nogent (1053-1124) began his autobiographical *De vita sua sive monodiarum suarum* (*Memoirs*) similar to Augustine’s *Confessiones* with a confession to God and appeal for self-knowledge.<sup>931</sup> In the context of the schools, Peter Abelard felt inclined to use the phrase as the subtitle of his treatise on ethics: *Ethica, seu scito te ipsum* (*Ethics, or Know Thyself*). This handbook on ethics, completed between 1135-9, set out the relationship between morally right and wrong ‘intentions of the mind’ (*intentiones animi*) and good and bad actions, claiming that it is the internal ‘consent’ (*consensus*) of the will rather the object of the will that establishes whether actions are virtuous.<sup>932</sup> And in a work of medically-inspired spirituality, such as the *De medicina animae* (*On the Medicine of the Soul*) of Hugh of Fouilloy (d. 1174?), the maxim is found as a meditative tool to remember the sinfulness of life prior to religious conversion and to strive for temperance in the religious calling.<sup>933</sup>

### Self-Knowledge as a Practice

In Etienne Gilson’s account, self-knowledge largely features as an *intellectual* activity: the awareness of one’s own reasoning and thinking. However, this misses a crucial – if not the main – aspect of understandings of the Delphic injunction: to cultivate the self through *action*. For instance, Bruce Hennig has argued that self-knowledge in the twelfth century was orientated around two binaries: ‘double attention’ and ‘double judgement’.<sup>934</sup> The first is a historico-teleological orientation since self-knowledge is constantly defined by an ideal-actual binary; the reality of a person’s situation measured in comparison to the ‘archetypal’ or

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Hugh of Poitiers, *Chronicon abbatae Vizeliacensis* (ed. R. B. C. Huygens, CCCM 42, 1987), 2, line 1; Martin of Leon, *Sermo* 9, PL 209, 61B; Garnier of Rochefort, *Sermo* 7 and *Sermo* 24, PL 205, 622B-D and 734D; Geoffrey of Auxerre, ‘Sermo XI’, in *Super Apocalypsin*, ed. F. Gastaldelli (Rome: Ed. di Storia e letteratura, 1970), line 220, p. 150. The Delphic Apollo is also utilised by two anonymous treatises: *De septem septenis*, PL 199, 956A-B, connected to Chartres; *De vitis mystica seu tractatus de passione domini*, 29.103, PL 184, 695D-696A, linked to the Cistercians.

<sup>931</sup> Guibert of Nogent, *De vita sua*, 1.1, ed. G. Bourgin, *Guibert de Nogent: Histoire de sa vie (1053-1124)* (Paris, 1907), p. 4; tr. J. F. Benton, *Self and Society in Medieval France: The Memoires of Abbot Guibert of Nogent (1064?-c. 1125)* (New York and Evanston, 1970), p. 37.

<sup>932</sup> For the text see D. E. Luscombe, ed. and tr., *Peter Abelard’s Ethics: An Edition with Introduction* (Oxford, 1971). For Abelard’s use of the Delphic Apollo see also Luscombe, *Peter Abelard* (London, 1979), p. 37. Eileen Sweeney has shown how Abelard’s other texts utilise the Socratic theme: ‘Abelard’s Christian Socratism’, in *A Companion to Medieval Christian Humanism*, ed. Bequette, pp. 101-121.

<sup>933</sup> *Med. an.* (PL 174, 1189C-D).

<sup>934</sup> Hennig himself draws these concepts from Christopher Moore’s understanding of Socratic self-knowledge in *Socrates and Self-Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 5.

‘perfect’ example.<sup>935</sup> This process is an act of ‘self-constitution’ since it involves ‘deciding what sort of person to become.’<sup>936</sup> The second binary is that of theory-practice. As Hennig writes: ‘self-knowledge coincides both with the discerning (theoretically) of one’s level of goodness and with the (practical) application of the skill of discipline or improvement.’<sup>937</sup> Put differently, self-knowledge describes the initial stage of an interconnected and complementary series of practices through which Cistercian and Victorine contemplatives believed they could restore themselves to the image and likeness of the divine.<sup>938</sup> ‘Whoever achieves these two, namely to know oneself and his God, that person is perfect’, Hugh of Saint-Victor writes in *Sententiae de divinitate*.<sup>939</sup> Reflecting the processes of double judgement and double attention, the Victorine magister taught that ‘to know oneself is to know what sort of person one is so that one may correct oneself and what sort of person one ought to be so that one may desire this.’<sup>940</sup>

Admittedly, this is not a new argument. Walker has also persuasively shown how Cistercian *libri de anima* served as a form of mimesis or *speculum* – a mirror with which to measure and ground the person in the practices – ethical, political, social and religious – of the world. As she puts it:

Close inspection of high medieval *De anima* treatises... shows that their authors composed them not in spite of the lushness of the metaphorical implications of the relationship between soul and body, but because of it... In writing texts of philosophical psychology, they were elucidating the terms through which their society and religion understood not only mental health, but also spiritual advancement, social cohesion and good governance. The mimetic principle allowed them to do this. It allowed them to say something about the mind and derive from it a multiplicity of meanings about society, politics, and eschatology. Thus, they urged their readers to self-examination not because they wished to encourage a sterile exercise in theoretical abstraction, but because they wished to inspire action, and to urge active imitation and conformity with the nature or will of God.<sup>941</sup>

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<sup>935</sup> B. Hennig, ‘Self-Knowledge by Participation: Hugh of St. Victor on Self-Knowledge’, in G. Klima and A. Hall, eds., *Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in Medieval Philosophy* (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018), p. 238.

<sup>936</sup> Moore, *Socrates and Self-Knowledge*, p. 5.

<sup>937</sup> Hennig, ‘Self-Knowledge by Participation’, p. 238.

<sup>938</sup> Javelet, ‘Psychologie des auteurs spirituels’, pp. 226-233; Javelet, *Image et ressemblance*, pp. 368-371.

<sup>939</sup> *Sent. div.*, ‘Prologue’ (Piazzoni, p. 914; VTT 1, p. 113): ‘Et quicumque hec duo consequitur, scilicet ut sese cognoscat et Deum suum, ille perfectus est.’

<sup>940</sup> *Sent. div.*, ‘Prologue’ (Piazzoni, p. 914; VTT 1, p. 113): ‘Cognoscere autem se ipsum est scire quails sit, ut corrigat, et quails esse debeat, ut hoc appetat.’

<sup>941</sup> Walker, ‘From Description to Prescription’, p. 93.

This sentiment has been further supported by Christina van Dyke, who has suggested that mystical accounts of self-knowledge differ from those found in scholasticism principally because they are concerned with the practical steps of acquiring self-knowledge.<sup>942</sup> In what follows I will build upon the claims of Hennig, Walker and van Dyke by showing that the interwoven theoretical and practical angle of Cistercian and Victorine self-knowledge owes its existence in large part to Augustine's integration of Christian spiritual exercises with psychology, and how twelfth-century *libri de anima* were designed as part of a programme for cultivating self-knowledge and self-restoration.

### Spiritual Exercises

Let us examine Augustine's understanding of spiritual exercises first. Brian Stock has drawn attention to Augustine's use of the first-person format (especially in the *Soliloquia* and his autobiographical *Confessiones*) for popularising the 'spiritual exercises' of early ascetic Christians (Philo, Origen and Clement of Alexandria) which incorporated a lived philosophy with an emphasis on self-reform as the method for attaining *sapientia*.<sup>943</sup> Stock's view is influenced by the work of the French philosopher Pierre Hadot, who had claimed that to "know yourself" formed the basis of all ancient spiritual exercises since every spiritual exercise involves a dialogue.<sup>944</sup> In the Hadotian view, the dialogue represents the 'exercise of authentic presence of the self to itself, and others.'<sup>945</sup> This exercise of self-presence normally occurs through two techniques: (1) self-control, involving (what the Stoics called) wilful 'attention' (*prosoche*) and vigilance to one's actions and conscience, as well as practical exercises designed to curb appetitive, emotional and mental impulses (e.g., anger, curiosity, greed); and (2) meditation, the exercise of reason through the memorisation and assimilation of dogmas for living, and the subsequent reflection upon them.<sup>946</sup> In contrast to other belief systems (philosophical and/or religious), Hadot thought that Christianity was especially

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<sup>942</sup> C. van Dyke, 'Self-Knowledge', in *Hidden Wisdom: Medieval Contemplatives on Self-Knowledge, Reason, Love, Persons, and Immortality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 33; *Id.* "Many Know Much, But Do Not Know Themselves": Self-Knowledge, Humility, and Perfection in the Medieval Affective Contemplative Tradition', in *Consciousness and Knowledge in the Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 89-109.

<sup>943</sup> B. Stock, *Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996 [2<sup>nd</sup> edition: 1998]), p. 14; Stock, *After Augustine: The Meditative Reader and the Text* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), pp. 10-11; Stock, *Augustine's Inner Dialogue: The Philosophical Soliloquy in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 18-26.

<sup>944</sup> Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, ed. and tr. A. I. Davidson and M. Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 90.

<sup>945</sup> A. Davidson, 'Introduction', in *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, p. 20.

<sup>946</sup> Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, pp. 59-60 and 130-131. See also Stock, *Inner Dialogue*, p. 23-24.

unique in its ability to claim that living out its teachings offered the one true *philosophia* or ‘way of life’ – an experiential wisdom centred around the imitation of Christ that from the fifth century onwards the monastic life lay special claim to.<sup>947</sup>

We can observe clear aspects of this Augustinian/Hadotian model of self-knowledge in the twelfth century. It is clearest in texts that consciously imitate the structure of deeply introspective inner conversations that came before such as Augustine’s *Soliloquia* (*Soliloquies*) written c. 386/387, Isidore of Seville’s *Synonyma* (*Synonyms/Lamentations of a Sinful Soul*), or Anselm of Canterbury’s *Prayers and Meditations* (1070-1080).<sup>948</sup> Both Peter Abelard and the Cistercian abbot Adam of Perseigne wrote texts with the title ‘Soliloquium’. In Peter Abelard’s inner dialogue, the splitting of the two parts of his mind is made clear through the two conversing persons, ‘Petrus’ and ‘Abelardus’. His *Soliloquium* begins: ‘Abelard spoke to Peter. Peter spoke to Abelard; the same self spoke to the same self’.<sup>949</sup> The synthesis produced by dialogue between two contrary positions is crucial to Abelard’s purpose in the text and his wider goal of reconciling philosophy with theology.<sup>950</sup> Contrastingly, Adam’s *Soliloquium* features a different yet equally significant use of the dialogue form. Here, the soliloquy is between a Cistercian ‘Monk’ (*Monachus*) tired of the harsh Cistercian rule of life and his Reason (‘Ratio’), who strives, ultimately successfully, to persuade him to preserve his vow of stability. When *Monachus* complains that he has become subject to more temptations since joining the Cistercian Order, *Ratio* responds that knowledge of temptation is not enough; instead, *Monachus* must frequently use *Ratio*’s advice to develop the self-knowledge necessary to overcome them:

So do not be surprised you are tempted but resist vigorously so as not to be overcome by temptation. That if you hardly know by yourself how to resist such and such a temptation, show me which temptations overwhelm you most, so that my teaching teaches you how great your power is to overcome them.<sup>951</sup>

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<sup>947</sup> Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, p. 131; Stock, *Inner Dialogue*, p. 31.

<sup>948</sup> Augustine’s *Soliloquies in Old English and in Latin*, trans. L. Lockett (MA: Harvard University Press, 2022); Isidore of Seville’s *Synonyms (Lamentations of a Sinful Soul) and Differences: an English translation of Synonyma (Liber lamentationum animae peccatricis) and De differentiis verborum (Liber differentiarum I) and De differentiis rerum (Liber differentiarum)*, trans. P. Throop (Charlotte, Vermont: MedievalMS, 2012); *The Prayers and Meditations of Saint-Anselm with the Proslogion*, trans. B. Radice (London: Penguin, 1973).

<sup>949</sup> Peter Abelard, *Soliloquium*, ed. C. Burnett, ‘Peter Abelard “Soliloquium”: A Critical Edition’, *Studi Medievali*, 25 (1984), p. 885.

<sup>950</sup> Burnett notes the similarities between Abelard’s *Soliloquium* and his *Collationes* which features a dialogue between a Christian, Jew and Philosopher, all of whom may be regarded as aspects of Abelard’s own *persona*. Burnett, ‘Soliloquium’, p. 883.

<sup>951</sup> Adam of Perseigne, *Soliloquium*, ed. J. Bouvet, ‘Soliloquium: Texte et traduction’, *Collectanea Cisterciensia*, 50 (1988), lines 44-47, p. 122: ‘Non igitur mireris quia temptaris, sed contende ne a temptatione supereris. Quod si minus per te scis quibuscumque temptationibus resistere possis, ostende mihi a quibus maxime fatigaris, ut quantum eis resistere queas meis documentis instruaris.’



The message is clear: theoretical knowledge alone is insufficient to the monastic life. A monk must take principles, in this case those regarding temptation, and identify how they apply to their own strengths and weaknesses – a process that can only be discovered through constant critical introspection using reason.

Perhaps the greatest convergence of the soliloquium genre with the language of affectivity comes from the pen of the woman writer of the *Epistola duorum amantium* (*Letters of Two Lovers*), a series of love letters between a man and a woman discovered in 1471 at the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux. Constant J. Mews has vigorously argued that these letters represent the correspondence of Peter Abelard and Heloise, written at the time of their love affair in 1116/17.<sup>952</sup> Much like the exchanges of Abelard and Heloise, these love letters are deeply psychological and engage with twelfth-century theological understandings of intention. The fact that the male and female writer have very different outlooks on love supports their attribution to Abelard and Heloise for Mews.<sup>953</sup> Far more than the male writer, the female correspondent makes us of terms *affectus* and *affectio* in her letters, employing *affectus* 10 times and *affectio* twice.<sup>954</sup> What is exceptional is that the woman writer uses the *affectus-defectus* wordplay we have previously seen to frame the inner dialogue between her ‘Feeling’ (*Affectus*) and ‘Weakness’ (*Defectus*): ‘Although I wanted to write back to you, the magnitude of the task, being beyond my powers, drove me back. Indeed I wanted to but could not, I began then grew weak (*defeci*), I persisted but collapsed, my shoulders buckling under the weight. The burning feeling of my spirit (*fervens affectus animi*) longed to do so but the weakness of my dried-up talent (*aridi defectus ingenii*) refused.’<sup>955</sup> Letter 23 proceeds to show the resulting *akrasia* of the woman’s mind. She writes to her lover that

I endured the numerous disputes and litigious arguments of both [*Affectus* and *Defectus*], and after weighing up rationally to which of the two I would rather yield, I was unable to decide. For the Feeling of my Spirit said: “*What are you doing, ungrateful woman? For how long do you keep me in suspense with long and surely undeserved silence?... Does not the generous kindness and kind generosity of your*

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<sup>952</sup> Mews, ‘Philosophical Themes in the *Epistola duorum amantium*: The First Letters of Heloise and Abelard’, in *Listening to Heloise: The Voice of a Twelfth-Century Woman*, ed. Bonnie J. Wheeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p. 37.

<sup>953</sup> *Ibid.* p. 48.

<sup>954</sup> See Letters 7, 16, 21, 23, 49, 76, 79, 85, 86 in *The Lost Love Letters of Heloise and Peter Abelard: Perceptions of Dialogue in Twelfth-Century France*, ed. and trans. C. J. Mews and N. Chiavaroli (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 216-217, 222-223, 226-231, 252-255, 282-285, 288-291.

<sup>955</sup> Letter 23 (Mews, pp. 227-228): ‘Cum vellem tibi rescribere, reiecit me impar viribus meis rei magnitudo. Voluit enim et non potui, incepti et defeci, sustuli et elisis gravitate humeris corruui. Voluit animi fervens affectus, renuitque aridi defectus ingenii.’

*beloved stir you?” ...I thought that I ought to heed these arguments, and certainly I wanted to heed them, but the Dryness of my Talent resisted, rebuking the attempts of my temerity with the harsh whip of reproach, saying: “Where are you rushing, you foolish and feeble woman... Surely you are no match for a matter so distinguished?... Suspended between this alternating encouragement and discouragement, I have now deferred the due act of thanks, yielding to the advice of a mental capacity ashamed of its own ineptitude.”<sup>956</sup>*

This soliloquy between Feeling and Dryness of Talent (or, alternatively, Weakness of Talent) offers us a rare instance of a person’s decision making – and in this specific case, the difficulty of the creative and emotional process behind writing a love letter is captured in minute detail. Here, Feeling is presented positively, the *affectus* drawing the woman writer to write. However, in this dialogue the *defectus* of Dryness of Talent has more force, overpowering the initial affectivity the woman experienced.

Elements of this soliloquium genre would be utilised in Cistercian and Victorine *libri de anima*. In its purest form, we find it in Hugh of Saint-Victor’s *Soliloquium de arrha animae*, an inner dialogue between ‘Hugh’ and his ‘Soul’ (*Anima*), as well as *De vanitate rerum mundanarum* (*On the Vanity of the World*), which features a dialogue between ‘Reason’ (*Ratio*) and ‘Soul’ (*Anima*). From the *De contemplatione et eius speciebus*, we know that the Victorines designated the soliloquy as an exercise relating to the middling stage of spiritual progression. It is a type of

discourse which someone holds with himself and about himself, giving birth to contempt of himself. It is called *soliloquium* because a man addresses himself alone; that is, when the interior man is not disturbed by the exterior, but probes the secrets of the heart, considers and looks into his mind and conscience for the sake of contempt of himself.<sup>957</sup>

The text goes on to designate three interconnected stages to a soliloquy: ‘a soliloquy arises from grace, is excited by meditation, and formed by prayer. It arises by compunction, is

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<sup>956</sup> *Epistola* 23 (Mews, pp. 227-30): ‘Horum duorum altercationes plenasque litibus persuasiones sustinui, et perpensa utriusque ratione cui potius cederem examinare nequivi. Ait enim animi affectus: “Quid agis ingrata? Quamdiu suspendis me longa et certa indigna taciturnitate? Nonne te exitat dilecti tui liberalis benignitas, et benigna liberalitas?... Persuasionibus his parendum credidi, et certe parere volui, sed restitit ingenii arditas temeritatis mee inceptum acri correptionis flagello castigans: “Quo”, inquit, “stulta et infirma ruis?... Non enim suffices materie tali et tam magnifice... Hac hortaminis et dehortaminis alternatione suspensam, hucusque debilitam gratarum actionem distuli, parens consili, imbecillitatem suam erubescens ingenii.”’

<sup>957</sup> *Cont.* 2 (Baron, p. 42; trans. Feiss, in VTT 2, p. 192): ‘Soliloquium sequitur, quod est alicuius ad se et de se solum eloquium, ipsius hominis generans contemptum. Soliloquium dicitur quia vir se solum alloquitur: id est, quando homo interior ab exterior non turbatur, sed cordis secreta rimatur, mentem et conscientiam ob sui contemptum considerat et speculatur.’

excited by devotion, formed by a good will.’<sup>958</sup> This understanding is significant because the anonymous author of the text then proceeds to cite the *Nosce te ipsum* motto of the Delphic Apollo and interconnect the Victorine soliloquy with self-knowledge, achieved through Hugh of Saint-Victor’s pedagogical system based on reading outlined in the *Didascalicon*.

By the Tripod of Apollo a threefold wisdom (*triplex sapientia*) is understood: the historical, mystical and moral. Through the historical, the exterior stoops down to the interior; through the mystical the inner man, that is the mind and conscience, is inquired into and thoroughly examined through the secrets of heart; through the moral, he realises what he may be, what he is and what he should strive towards.<sup>959</sup>

For the Victorines, then, a *soliloquium* was not just a form of self-dialogue – a closing of the senses long enough to focus the attention of the mind on the self – but it was deeply interwoven with the goal of fostering the virtue of humility and attaining wisdom. Gaining self-knowledge of an individual’s sinful condition was designed to elicit feelings of compunction and the bodily reaction of tears which would supplement the Victorine education in the literal, mystical and moral senses of scripture.

Anselm of Canterbury’s prayers and meditations were particularly notable for combining the inward turn to self-knowledge with an affective response – elicited through the negative emotions of pain, despair, guilt, grief, regret, sadness, sorrow, self-hatred and fear – to the misery of man’s sinful condition and a guilty conscience.<sup>960</sup> Following closely in Anselm’s model are *Oratio* (*Prayer*) and *Meditativae orationes* (*Meditative orations*) of William of Saint-Thierry, the *Oratio pastoralis* (*Pastoral Prayer*) of Aelred of Rievaulx, and the anonymous *Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis* (*Pious Meditations on the Knowledge of the Human Condition*), falsely attributed to Bernard of Clairvaux.

William’s *Meditatio* 7, for instance, distinguishes between two types of humility (*humilitas*): the first is ‘contempt of one’s own excellence’ whereas the second is ‘knowledge of oneself’.<sup>961</sup> This form of self-knowledge, much like Anselm and Saint-Bernard, involves the prick of conscience stimulated from the ‘inward gaze’ of the soul reflecting on and feeling the bitterness of one’s own sins and then choosing to choose the spiritual and eternal

<sup>958</sup> *Cont.* 2 (Baron, p. 42): ‘Soliloquium vero tribus fit modis: ex gratia oritur, ex meditatione excitatur, ex oratione formatur. Oritur in compunctionem, excitatur in devotionem, formatur in bonam voluntatem.’

<sup>959</sup> *Cont.* 2 (Baron, p. 43): ‘Tripos Apollonis triplex sapientie intellectus, historialis, mysticus et moralis. Per historiam homo exterior interior condescendit: per mysticum, homo interior secreta cordis, id est mentem et conscientiam, scrutator et discutit: per morale, unde sit, quid et quid agnoscit.’

<sup>960</sup> See especially ‘Prayer to St John the Baptist’ (lines 101-145), ‘Meditation 1’ and ‘Meditation 2’, in *The Prayers and Meditations of Saint-Anselm*, pp. 130-131 and pp. 221-229.

<sup>961</sup> *Med.* 7.3 (CFS 3, p. 135).

reality of God and the soul over the corporeal and transitory things of the world.<sup>962</sup> In *Meditatio* 9 William critiques his own sensory curiosity (*curiositas*) as he has been ‘the plaything of the winds, a prey to phantom notions, impulses, and longings as many as the faces of mankind, the minutes of the hours, and the ins and outs of circumstances and events.’<sup>963</sup> As we have seen, William understands the soul is made the image and likeness of God and therefore the use of its sensory powers degrades its likeness to the divine.<sup>964</sup> As outward curiosity is a perversion of the inward and movement of the soul spiritually into itself and upward to God through prayer, meditation and contemplation, it is communicated through a falling away from God. As William laments: ‘When, with mental vision thus obscured... my ardent longing wearies and grows shattered... from your heights I fall back to my depths. I fall from you into myself, and from myself I fall below myself.’<sup>965</sup>

In *Meditatio* 10, William censures his inability to contemplate God spiritually due to lack of training of his faculties to progress beyond the corporeal images needed by ‘animal man’ (*homo animalis*) and ‘the elementary stage of sensory imagination’.<sup>966</sup> In doing so, his meditations provide a document of his own suffering to control his thoughts – a four stage process that culminates with affectivity. Going into ‘the dark house of conscience’, William initially attempts to order and examine his impudent, uncontrolled, diverse and confused cloud of thoughts yet they scatter before him; next, angry with himself he draws on more stable thoughts connected with God; having done so he can preen away any idle or useless thoughts, allotting ‘to each of them its proper place and time’ as well as allowing conscience to judge any incriminating thoughts; and finally, William is able to find the origin of his thoughts ‘in order to effect the discipline of... affections’.<sup>967</sup> What follows is the operation of love working alongside God’s grace to create order in the mind. ‘Love, the prince of my affections’, William says, ‘reduces the whole crowd of them [thoughts] to bondage under himself... He issues laws, he orders their behaviour, and sets limits that they may not overpass.’<sup>968</sup> Therefore, in the view of self-knowledge presented in the *Meditativae orationes*, knowledge of oneself, knowledge of God and affectivity are all interlinked. In fact, the *affectus* and will are given the most important role in ordering thoughts and actions since it is the affections that direct the attention of the mind to God. In *Meditatio* 11, a dialogue

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<sup>962</sup> *Med* 7.3 (CFS 3, p. 135).

<sup>963</sup> *Med* 9.1 (CFS 3, p. 145).

<sup>964</sup> *Med* 9.6 (CFS 3, p. 147).

<sup>965</sup> *Med* 9.1 (CFS 3, p. 145).

<sup>966</sup> *Med* 10.4 (CFS 3, p. 152).

<sup>967</sup> *Med* 9.2-4 (CFS 3, p. 146-147).

<sup>968</sup> *Med* 9.4 (CFS 3, p. 147).

between key connecting parts of the body – Intents, Joints, Marrow, Soul and Spirit – it is the personification of the marrow of the bones that emphasises this the importance of only desiring God. ‘Let out affections be set on the centre of truth, and the outward action will correspond thereto, as the circumstance to the centre. Every affection is indeed owed to God’, Marrow says.<sup>969</sup> For those that inevitably fail to direct every *affectus* to God, conscience again plays a role in developing a sense of self-knowledge of one’s failing through the ‘seeking of pardon for both our disposition (*affectus*) and our action’.<sup>970</sup> This repentance explained by Marrow is recommended to Soul by the Spirit, who firmly agrees with Marrow’s advice. ‘I agree’, Spirit states, for ‘this is indeed the marrow and centre of the truth not to hug one’s disease, but to let the poison of one’s inward wickedness drain away.. nothing remains, therefore, but humble confession and striving after every virtue, so that however unfruitful and useless we may appear outwardly [i.e., in actions], we may not be found wholly barren and empty inside.’<sup>971</sup>

Lastly, drawing on both authentic Cistercian and Victorine material, the anonymous *De spiritu et anima* conceptualises self-knowledge, too, as a form of dialogue. In fact, a reader of *De spiritu et anima* could not fail to miss the themes of Christian Socratism in this text: nine out of its sixty-five chapters repeat the admonition of self-examination, making it the most sustained treatment of the theme by volume out of all Cistercian and Victorine psychological treatises, so much so that the text could be equally called a ‘Liber de cognitione sui’ as well as a *Liber de anima*.<sup>972</sup> Self-knowledge is when a monk ‘speaks only to himself and to God’ – a conversation that occurs only – much like William of Saint-Thierry – after self-control has been implemented: that is, the monk has ‘closed his carnal senses and... placed himself outside the flesh and of the world.’<sup>973</sup> After this self-control is achieved, self-knowledge can be developed only through several practices beginning with meditation. ‘Knowledge (*scientia*) is when a man attains through careful meditation knowledge of himself’, he writes.<sup>974</sup> Upon meditating, the Cistercian is lead to compunction, devotion and prayer – a process that culminates with affectivity.<sup>975</sup> As *De spiritu et anima*

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<sup>969</sup> *Med.* 11.13 (CFS 3, p. 164).

<sup>970</sup> *Med.* 11.14 (CFS 3, p. 166).

<sup>971</sup> *Med.* 11.15 and 17 (CFS 3, p. 166).

<sup>972</sup> *DSA*, 1, 14, 31, 32, 50, 51, 53, 54 (PL 40, 781, 791, 800-801, 816-819; CFS 24, pp. 182, 205, 226-229, 259-266).

<sup>973</sup> *DSA*, 14 (PL 40, 791; CFS 24, p. 204): ‘...quam velut clausis carnalibus sensibus extra carnem mundum... soli et Deo loqui.’

<sup>974</sup> *DSA*, 50 (PL 40, 816; CFS 24, p. 259): ‘Scientia est quando homo ad cognitionem sui assidua meditatione illuminatur.’

<sup>975</sup> *DSA*, 50 (PL 40, 816; CFS 24, p. 259).

relates: ‘Prayer is a devotion of the mind (*devotio mentis*), that is, conversion to God through a pious and humble desire (*affectus*)... nothing so moves God to love and mercy as the pure desire of the mind.’<sup>976</sup> Therefore, the dialogue between man, the self and God that was initiated through self-knowledge is completed through the reciprocal affectivity of man for God, and God for man.

### **Self-Knowledge and the Structure of the Soul**

The second major contribution of Augustine to the theme of self-knowledge in the twelfth century that Stock elucidates is its psychological dimension. In *De trinitate* (10.5-10), self-knowledge is explained via the trinitarian relationships present among the three powers of the soul: memory (*memoria*), understanding (*intelligentia*) and will (*voluntas*).<sup>977</sup> Thus, in the Bishop of Hippo’s psychology, the active use of the memory, understanding and will all involve a degree of reflexivity or ‘dialogue’ with the self: the inner self or rational soul is conscious that it remembers, knows and desires in relation to sense perceptions from the outer self or body.<sup>978</sup> In short, as Stock argues, self-knowledge for Augustine represents the paradoxical relationship between known things (via sense perception) on the one hand, and unknown things (in the soul) that are confirmed through faith in God; an ever-present exchange in Christian life that can be framed around the goal of transforming *scientia* into *sapientia*, knowledge into wisdom.<sup>979</sup> And since the soul is made to the image and likeness of God and the Holy Trinity, the necessary first step to self-knowledge is to shut off perceptions from the senses and move inward to reflect on the soul and the interior man.

This Augustinian need soul reference to the triune nature of the soul as the source of self-knowledge is made explicit in the Pseudo-Bernardine *Meditationes*. The beginning of the text makes it clear that self-knowledge and knowledge of God are one and the same: ‘For I make progress in knowledge of myself, in so far as I approach knowledge of God’.<sup>980</sup> Pseudo-Bernard goes on to say that ‘I find three things in my mind according to the inner

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<sup>976</sup> DSA, 50 (PL 40, 816; CFS 24, p. 259): ‘Oratio est mentis devotio, id est, conversio in Deum per pium et humilem affectum... Nil enim ita Deum inclinatur ad pietatem et misericordiam quemodmodum purus mentis affectus.’

<sup>977</sup> For an excellent explanation of Augustine’s view of self-knowledge and ‘image and likeness’ see Németh, *Quasi aurora consurgens*, pp. 31-34.

<sup>978</sup> Augustine, *De trinitate*, 10.5-10 (tr. McKenna, pp. 49-55).

<sup>979</sup> Stock, *Augustine the Reader*, p. 14; Stock, *Inner Dialogue*, p. 27-31. See also O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 207-211.

<sup>980</sup> Pseudo-Bernard, *Meditationes*, 1.1 (PL 184, 485A): ‘Quanto namque in cognitione mei proficio, tanto ad cognitionem Dei accedo.’

man, through which I may recollect, discern and desire God. And they are three: memory, understanding and will or love.’

Therefore, in the Augustinian tradition the Cistercians and Victorines inherited, self-knowledge, affectivity and perception are interlinked. Since self-knowledge is a form of wisdom, it is also deeply interconnected with the Cistercian and Victorine quest to cultivate virtue. As Geoffrey Webb noted, Cistercian *De anima* treatises ‘make much of the motto “Know thyself”, since self-knowledge is the basis of all virtue, as St Benedict explained in the seventh chapter of his Rule.’<sup>981</sup> It is this restorative, virtue-producing effect of wisdom why Bernard of Clairvaux chose to elaborate on the contrasting ladders of humility and pride in *De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae* (*On the Grades of Humility and Pride*), arguing that self-knowledge stimulates the primary virtue of humility necessary to ascend to God.<sup>982</sup> ‘Humility is a virtue by which man has a low opinion of himself because he knows himself well’, Bernard writes.<sup>983</sup> By contrast, the first step on the downward ladder of pride is *curiositas* – mental curiosity or negative affectivity – that hinders self-knowledge and humble thoughts and feelings.<sup>984</sup>

These twin ladders feature, too, in *Sermo* 36 of Bernard of Clairvaux’s commentary on the Song of Songs. Self-knowledge is demanded by right order and utility, he argues:

Right order, since what we are is our first concern; and usefulness because this knowledge gives humility rather than self-importance... If you lack self-knowledge you will possess neither the fear of God nor humility. And whether you may presume to be saved without the fear of God, is for you to judge.<sup>985</sup>

Humility thus blurs the traditional boundaries of thought and emotion since in Bernard’s anthropology *humilitas* is an affective state of knowledge in which the self is changed to feel disgust and revulsion through its understanding of how original sin, sensual desire and human weakness affect human actions.<sup>986</sup> Indeed, underscoring the practical nature of this transformation, in his next sermon, Bernard will go on to explain that a second emotional state brought on by humility – the fear of God – allows the soul to effect humility through acts such as crying, distributing alms, fasting, prayer and penance.<sup>987</sup>

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<sup>981</sup> Webb, *Introduction to the Cistercian De Anima*, p. 4.

<sup>982</sup> *Grad.*, 2.3-5.18 (*SBO* 3, pp. 18-30; CFS 13, pp. 31-46).

<sup>983</sup> *Grad.*, 1.2 (*SBO* 3, lines 21-22, p. 17; CFS 13, p. 30): ‘Humilitas est virtus, qua homo verissima sui cognition sibi ipse vilescit.’

<sup>984</sup> *Grad.*, 10.28 (*SBO* 3, p. 38; CFS 13, p. 57).

<sup>985</sup> *SCC* 36.5 and 7 (CFS 7, p. 177 and p. 179).

<sup>986</sup> *SCC* 36.5 (PL 183, 969C-970A; CFS 7, p. 178).

<sup>987</sup> *SCC* 37.2 (PL 183, 971D; CFS 7, p. 182).

Bernard himself is conscious of the ambiguity of fearing God and humility as mental-emotional states tied to his psychological distinction between rationality and affectivity. Fear of God and humility, he states, are two kinds of knowledge of the soul: one is the beginning of wisdom, the other stimulates love.<sup>988</sup> Ignorance of the self and pride represent their privation.<sup>989</sup> These two poles – true knowledge and vain curiosity – is the intellectual distinction upon which Bernard’s world-view rests.<sup>990</sup> As Luke Anderson has pointed out, authentic self-knowledge for Bernard is necessary for knowledge of God because it ‘kills self-importance’; it is a practical form of knowledge because by avoiding *curiositas* it enables ‘the intellect to *do* the truth’ by focusing its attention on God.<sup>991</sup> Not only in the thought of Bernard but virtually in all Cistercians is the idea that humility and self-knowledge are conjoined.<sup>992</sup> It is through knowledge and love, fear and humility that the Cistercian monk is transformed into the image of God, exemplified by the affective and contemplative act of seeing God face-to-face during the beatific vision.<sup>993</sup>

Privation of Self-Knowledge		Self-Knowledge	
Curiosity [Ignorance of Self]	Beginning of Sin	Fear of God	Beginning of Wisdom
Pride	Fulfilment of Sin	Humility	Fulfilment of Love

Table 17. Self-Knowledge in Bernard of Clairvaux's *Sermo* 37.

The cultivation of wisdom was also considered the primary goal of the Victorine programme of life. ‘Of all things to be sought, the first is wisdom’ (*Omnium expetendorum prima est sapientia*).<sup>994</sup> These are opening words of Hugh of Saint-Victor’s *Didascalicon*, an

<sup>988</sup> SCC 37.6 (PL 183, 973B; CFS 7, p. 184).

<sup>989</sup> SCC 37.5-6 (PL 183, 972D-974A; CFS 7, pp. 184-185)

<sup>990</sup> G. R. Evans, *Bernard of Clairvaux* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 49.

<sup>991</sup> L. Anderson, OCSO, ‘The Rhetorical Epistemology in Saint Bernard’s *Super Cantica*’, in *Bernardus Magister*, pp. 105-106.

<sup>992</sup> E. Connor, ‘Saint Bernard’s Three Steps of Truth and Saint Aelred of Rievaulx’s Three Loves’, in *Bernardus Magister*, p. 23. Amadeus of Lausanne, *Homily 4*, in *Magnificat: Homilies in Praise of the Blessed Virgin Mary*, tr. Marie-Bernard Saïd and Grace Perigo, with introduction by Chrysogonus Waddell, OCSO, CFS 18 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1979), pp. 89-90.

<sup>993</sup> SCC 36.6 (PL 183, 973B-974A; CFS 7, p. 179).

<sup>994</sup> *Did.*, 1.1 (PL 176, 741C; Taylor, p. 46).



instructional guide on how learning the art of reading is necessary for wisdom. While reading is core to the Victorine education programme, *sapientia* is achieved through instruction in Christ and therefore is not something to be gained but someone: God.<sup>995</sup> Reading at Saint-Victor was experiential and restorative; through reading the reader is immersed in examples of Christian piety with the goal of imitating, re-enacting and living out what they read.<sup>996</sup> Indeed, *sapientia* in the *Didascalicon* is defined as a blend of affective and contemplative self-knowledge. Through knowing itself the soul develops ‘love’ (*amor*) and ‘friendship’ (*amicitia*) with God and, having been illuminated by God’s grace, man ‘may recognise himself’ (*ut agnoscat seipsum*).<sup>997</sup> The ‘love of wisdom’, Hugh says,

is an illumination of the apprehending mind by that pure Wisdom and, in a certain way, a drawing and a call back to itself of man’s mind, so that the pursuit of Wisdom appears like a friendship with that Divinity and pure Mind.<sup>998</sup>

As we have seen, Christ for Hugh and several of the Victorines is considered as a *remedium* or ‘medicine’ for man’s fallen condition, and the darkness that now clouds his ‘eye of reason’ (*oculus rationis*) and ‘eye of contemplation’ (*oculus contemplationis*).

Much like Bernard and the Cistercians, the virtue of humility is key to the canonical process of developing self-knowledge and wisdom. Walter of Saint-Victor, for instance, taught that devotion is born from the affections (*affectiones*) created by man ‘diligently considering himself’ (*diligenter se considerans*), especially his weaknesses (*infirmities*).<sup>999</sup> It should be said, however, that Hugh of Saint-Victor’s definition of humility is distinctly his own. *Humilitas* for him means to embrace all aspects of the Victorine pedagogical programme. Study (*studium*) requires three things, he says: natural endowment (*natura*),

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<sup>995</sup> I. Illyich, *In the Vineyard of the Text: A Commentary on Hugh’s Didascalicon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 10.

<sup>996</sup> H. T. Harkins, ‘Lectio exhortatio debet esse’: Reading as a Way of Life at the Twelfth-Century Abbey of St. Victor’, in *From Knowledge to Beatitude*, pp. 104-105; Orsbon, ‘Restoration Through Experiential Exegesis: A Study of Richard of Saint-Victor’s *Benjamin minor*’, in *Victorine Restoration*, p. 210 and 218. For reading at Saint-Victor more generally see Harkins, *Reading and the Work of Restoration: History and Scripture in the Theology of Hugh of St Victor* (Toronto: PIMS, 2009).

<sup>997</sup> *Did.*, 1.1. (PL 176, 741C; Taylor, p. 46).

<sup>998</sup> *Did.*, 1.2 (PL 176, 743A-B; Buttner, lines 4-9, p. 7; Taylor, p. 48): ‘Est autem hic amor sapientiae, intelligentis animi ab illa pura sapientia illuminatio, et quodammodo ad seipsum retractio atque advocatio, ut videatur sapientiae studium divinitatis et purae mentis illius amicitia.’ Hugh’s definition comes from Boethius. See Taylor, note 21, p. 182.

<sup>999</sup> Walter, *Sermo* 9.4 (CCCM 30, p. 77): ‘Ex consideratione enimstrarum infirmitatum oritur in nobis humilitas. Homo enim diligenter se considerans, quid in se invenit, nisi materiam humilitatis? Ex consideratione enim divinae pietatis erga nos, qua iam maiora dimisit, et abstulit, et insuper gratiam contulit, per quam nostris infirmitatibus restimus, et tandem ex toto liberabit, nascitur in affectibus nostri devotio. Humilitas mundat et purgat, devotio mundatos replet.’

practice (*exercitium*) and discipline (*disciplina*).<sup>1000</sup> ‘The beginning of discipline is humility’, the Victorine magister remarks, since to learn requires that the individual’s mental disposition and habits not be too rigid or inflexible: humility ensures ‘first, that he hold no knowledge and no writing in contempt; second, that he blush to learn from no man; and third, that when he has attained learning himself, he not look down upon everyone else.’<sup>1001</sup>

Yet, since the enlightening act of reading restores a person’s eye of reason, self-knowledge is also a transformational process whereby the canon changes how they see themselves and their surroundings. Sacred scriptures are called ‘divine’, Hugh writes, ‘because they lead man to a perfect knowledge of divinity, namely so that he may know how to know himself and his Creator.’<sup>1002</sup> Consequently, the page becomes both a medicine for the eye and a mirror for which to see oneself: Hugh ‘wants the reader to face the page so that by the light of wisdom he shall discover his self in the mirror of the parchment’, Ivan Illyich remarks.<sup>1003</sup>

As a Victorine, it is his stress of both interior thoughts and outer actions that the canonical life stands out. Wisdom in the *Didascalicon* is a practice that cultivates *disciplina*, not only brings about ‘truth of speculation and thought’ (*speculationum cogitationumque veritas*) in the *vita contemplativa* but also ‘holy and pure chastity of action’ (*sancta puraque actuum castimonia*) in the *vita activa*.<sup>1004</sup> In *De institutione novitiorum*, a text concerned with providing Victorine novices with the right instruction for living as a canon regular, Hugh is clear that the process of self-knowledge is tied to constant inner and outer self-examination: the canon ‘should diligently consider and, inasmuch as one is able on one’s own, discern what is licit and what is not licit, what is fitting and what is not fitting in every act, at every place, at all times, and with respect to every person.’<sup>1005</sup>

This idea is present too in Richard of Saint-Victor’s corpus yet grounded more in the realities of the practices of work, meditation and prayer that were necessary as a canon at the Abbey of Saint-Victor. As Richard notes: ‘Through the effort of work, through the effort of meditation and through the effort of prayer we are advanced little by little, and finally we are

<sup>1000</sup> *Did.*, 3.6 (PL 176, 770C; Taylor, p. 90).

<sup>1001</sup> *Did.*, 3.13 (PL 176, 773C; Taylor, pp. 94-95): ‘Principium autem disciplinae humilitatis... Primum ut nullum scientiam, nullam scripturam vilem teneat; secundum, ut a nemine discere erubescat; tertium, ut cum scientiam adeptus fuerit, caeteros non contemnat.’

<sup>1002</sup> *Sent. div.*, ‘Prologue’, (Piazzoni, p. 914; VTT 1, p. 118).

<sup>1003</sup> Illyich, *In the Vineyard of the Text*, see pp. 20-23 (quote at p. 23).

<sup>1004</sup> *Did.*, 1.2 (PL 176, 743B; Buttner, lines 12-14, p. 7; Taylor, p. 48).

<sup>1005</sup> *Inst. nov.*, 1 (PL 176, 927A; VTT 9, p. 219): ‘Debet siquidem diligenter considerare, et quantum valet per semetipsum discernere quid liceat et quid non liceat, quid deceat, et quid non deceat, in omni actu, et in omni loco, in omni tempore, erga omnem personam.’

brought to perfection of knowledge'.<sup>1006</sup> *De duodecim patriarchis* utilises the image of climbing a mountain as a metaphor for the laborious task of achieving self-knowledge through the ordering of the affections. Much like ascending a mountain is physically and mentally challenging, self-knowledge is not an easy task and, perhaps alluding to his own abbey in Paris, Richard is well aware that many fail to recognise the daily commitment necessary for the task: 'O how many persons we see today, studious in reading, slothful in work, tepid in prayer, who nevertheless take for granted that they are able to take possession of this mountain!'<sup>1007</sup>

In sum, for both Hugh and Richard, self-knowledge is the map present within all human beings. 'To know oneself is the path of truth' (*Cognoscere... se ipsum via est veritatis*), Hugh says, since it provides a route to knowing God.<sup>1008</sup> Using the mirror of self-knowledge found in the soul thus permits an individual to (re)orientate themselves during their return journey to God: this involves not only scrutinising past and current thoughts and affections but also the teachings of scripture in the Old and New Testaments as templates to repeatedly shape the (future) self into conformity with the divine model.<sup>1009</sup>

Before moving to see how self-knowledge was linked to practices, it is significant to note that the language used by Cistercians and Victorines to describe this process was to an extent shared. Achard of Saint-Victor communicated the dual experiential and knowing aspects of wisdom using a popular play on words. Wisdom, he says, 'is savory knowledge' (*sapientia... est sapida scientia*) since it consists both in tasting the sweetness and 'seeing' (intellectually) the splendour of God.<sup>1010</sup> Baldwin of Ford used the same wordplay to speak of the disordered state of the animal man's *sensūs* ('judgements') and *affectūs* ('inclinations'). 'His judgement is animal he since does not savour (*non sapit*) the things which pertain to the spirit of God and his inclinations are animal since for him the things which pertain to the spirit of God have no savour (*non sapiunt*).'<sup>1011</sup>

<sup>1006</sup> *XII patr.*, 79 (PL 196, 56B; SC 419, lines 5-7, p. 318; Zinn, p. 136): 'Per studium operis, per studium meditationis, per studium orationis paulatim promouemur, et quandoque perducimur ad perfectionem cognitionis.'

<sup>1007</sup> *XII patr.*, 79 (PL 196, 56C; SC 419, lines 16-18, p. 318; Zinn, p. 137): 'O quam multos hodie uidemus studiosos in lectione, desidiosos in opere, tepidos in oratione, praesumentes tamen montis huius cacumina posse apprehendere!'

<sup>1008</sup> *Sent. div.*, 'Prologue' (Piazzoni, lines 23-24, p. 914; VTT 1, p. 113).

<sup>1009</sup> *Sent. div.*, 'Prologue' (Piazzoni, lines 23-32, p. 914; VTT 1, p. 113); *XII patr.* 70 and 83 (PL 196, 50C-51B and 59B-D; SC 419, p. 294 and 332; Zinn, p. 128 and 141-142).

<sup>1010</sup> Achard of Saint-Victor, *Sermo* 13.17 (Châtillon, p. 151; CS 165, p. 230)

<sup>1011</sup> Baldwin of Ford, *Sermo* 3 (CCCM 99, p. 60; CFS 41, p. 117): 'Animalis autem homo vel sensu vel affectu cognoscitur. Animalis est sensu, qui non sapit *ea que sunt spiritus Dei*. Animalis est affectu, cui non sapient *ea que sunt spiritus Dei*.'

This was a play on words that persisted into the last quarter of the twelfth century. Alcher of Clairvaux writes similarly that ‘Wisdom is a love of the good or a tasting of the good’ in the *De spiritu et anima*.<sup>1012</sup> Alcher, however, explicitly relates this to the epistemological process of proceeding through sense perception, imagination, reason, discernment and understanding in order to arrive at wisdom: God.<sup>1013</sup> In linking the sense of taste with the highest forms of mental abstraction, *De spiritu et anima* here is emphasising just how far sensation and wisdom are entangled together in a single continuum. Specifically, since *sapor* (‘taste’) is etymologically connected with *sapientia*, the text is, as Vincent Gillespie suggests ‘implicating the highest forms of knowledge and understanding with the flavours of the sensorium.’<sup>1014</sup> In this process, Gillespie adds, the imagination serves as the key link between the experience of sensations and universal knowledge.<sup>1015</sup> In typical Augustinian fashion, apprehension through the senses, the imagination, the emotions and the intellect thus each play a part in the journey of a monk towards wisdom.<sup>1016</sup> Perception, as understood in *De spiritu et anima*, is therefore both sensual and affective, active and contemplative: ‘Man’s wisdom consists in devotion, which is exercised in the worship of God’, Alcher writes.<sup>1017</sup>

## Conclusion

In this brief chapter I have argued that the twelfth century and Cistercian and Victorine texts represent an important stage in the history of self-knowledge. Cistercian and Victorine authors were indeed ‘Christian Socratists’; their psychology represents a significant moment in the Christian reception, transmission and development of the Delphic injunction *Gnōthi Seauton* (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) or ‘know yourself’. To know yourself was not simply an intellectual activity as Eitenne Gilson initially supposed but a holistic practice or way of life that combined thinking, feeling and acting. Pierre Hadot’s conception of self-knowledge as a practice, in addition to Brian Stock’s reading of Augustine’s spiritual exercises predicated on establishing a dialogue between the soul (*anima*), the inner man (*interior homo*) and God, I have suggested, best explains the conception of self-knowledge found in twelfth-century psychological literature written by Cistercian monks and Victorine canons. Due to its

<sup>1012</sup> DSA, 11 (PL 40, 786; CFS 24, p. 195): ‘Sapientia namque est amor boni et sapor boni.’

<sup>1013</sup> DSA, 11 (PL 40, 786; CFS 24, p. 195).

<sup>1014</sup> V. Gillespie, ‘The Senses in Literature: The Textures of Perception’, in *A Cultural History of the Senses in the Middle Ages*, ed. R. G. Newhauser (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 155.

<sup>1015</sup> Ibid, p. 155.

<sup>1016</sup> See footnote **Error! Bookmark not defined.** above.

<sup>1017</sup> DSA, 11 (PL 40; CFS 24, p. 194): ‘Sapientia hominis est pietas, id est, cultus Dei.’

formation in the image and likeness of God, the soul was understood as the place where knowledge of God could be found, ensuring that self-knowledge was more often than not conflated with interiority and a journey within oneself.

The Cistercian and Victorine reception of the Delphic Apollo's adage was therefore unmistakably Augustinian in character. The monks of the Cistercian Order and the canons at Saint-Victor, nevertheless, made two, significant joint contributions to this theme.

The first contribution, as I have argued above, self-knowledge was embedded into anthropology, that is, the monastic and canonical way of life that intimately associated self-knowledge with the promotion of virtue. The virtue of humility was especially significant to both the Cistercians and Victorines: for Bernard of Clairvaux *humilitas* represented the initial stage of self-knowledge; for Hugh of Saint-Victor or Walter of Saint-Victor, humility is the first stage of discipline and a precondition for gaining wisdom.

The second, interrelated – yet more distinct – contribution made by these two communities was to give prominence to affectivity and the affections in understanding the self. The Cistercian and Victorine quest for *scientia* 'knowledge' necessitated developing habits of virtues and ordered affections that resulted in moderating and beneficially using sense perceptions from the world. For the Cistercians particularly (although not exclusively) useless or harmful perceptions were examples of 'curiosity' (*curiositas*), a form of intellectual pride, that led to imbalanced *affectus* and disordered and unmoderated affections. The Cistercian contrast between self-knowledge and *curiositas* was particularly drawn from their fusion of Christian Socratism with the exposition of the Song of Songs, as I will explore further in the next chapter.

These two developments in theme of self-knowledge would prove influential throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, being received and developed by other intellectuals and religious groups. One such individual was Bonaventure (ca. 1217-1274) whose treatises *De regimine animae* (*On Governing the Soul*), written between 1264-1274 for Blanche of Castille and his *Soliloquium de quatuor mentalibus exercitiis* (*Soliloquy on the Four Spiritual Exercises*) draws on and transforms earlier monastic ideals of self-knowledge, meditation and contemplation. This is evident in the *Soliloquium*, especially, a dialogue between 'Soul' and the 'Inner Man' which was written between 1255-1260 and spans the period just before and after Bonaventure was elevated to the positions of Minister General of the Franciscans and Regent Master of Theology at the University of Paris in 1257. The simple layout and structure of the *Soliloquium* suggests an audience beyond Franciscans, that of lay persons and tertiaries; and with over 250 Latin manuscripts surviving, it was an

incredibly popular text, utilised especially in the spiritual exercises of the Devotio Moderna in the Low Countries of the late fourteenth century.<sup>1018</sup>

Bonaventure's *Soliloquium*, much like the ancient tradition of spiritual exercises, is concerned with 'a range of therapeutic and ascetic practices, such as self-examination, meditation, and the cultivation of mental vigilance, whose purpose was to change individual subjects' perceptions of reality... in such a way that they began to live according to the *logos*, the universal and immutable laws of reason, rather than continue to be enslaved and made unhappy by the fickle dictates of the passions.'<sup>1019</sup> As has been noted, Bonaventure draws on Augustine, Anselm, Bernard of Clairvaux, Pseudo-Bernard of Clairvaux and the Victorine masters, notably Hugh and Richard of Saint-Victor. Alongside Anselm, Bonaventure's most significant authorities are Bernard of Clairvaux and the Pseudo-Bernardine *Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis*.

For instance, the opening book begins by stressing the need to cultivate self-knowledge by referencing Bernard of Clairvaux's advice to Pope Eugenius III in *De consideratione*: "Begin by considering yourself, lest you have seek other things in vain for having neglected yourself."<sup>1020</sup> From the Pseudo-Bernard *Meditationes* Bonaventure then adds: 'Many people know a great deal but ignore their own selves, they scrutinise others but overlook their own soul.'<sup>1021</sup> After citing further injunction to know yourself from John Chrysostom and Ambrose, the text cites a long and significant passage from the Pseudo-Bernardine *Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis*:

Therefore, O soul make a daily check of your way of life. May a careful account of how far you have advanced and how you may have fallen (*quantum proficias, vel quantum deficias*); what sort of condition you are in your behaviours (*mores*), and in your affections (*affectiones*): of how like you are to God or how unlike Him, how close to God or how far removed from Him. Remember this always: it is much better and more praiseworthy to know yourself than to ignore yourself while knowing the course of the stars, the powers of herbs, the structure of man, the nature of animals – in short, all other things of heaven and earth. Turn to your inner self, it not permanently, at least from time to time. Master your affections, guide your actions, straighten your ways (*Rede tuos affectus, dirige actus, corrige gressus*).<sup>1022</sup>

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<sup>1018</sup> Mark Chinca, *Meditating Death in Medieval and Early Modern Devotional Writing: From Bonaventure to Luther* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 16.

<sup>1019</sup> Ibid, pp. 16-17.

<sup>1020</sup> Bonaventure, *Soliloquium*, in *The Works of Bonaventure: Vol. 3*, 1.1, p. 41.

<sup>1021</sup> Bonaventure, *Soliloquium*, 1.2, p. 41; Pseudo-Bernard, *Meditationes*, 1.1 (PL 184, 485A).

<sup>1022</sup> Bonaventure, *Soliloquium*, 1.1, p. 42; Pseudo-Bernard, *Meditationes*, 5.14 (PL 184, 494D-495A).

The Cistercian and Victorine emphasis with scrutinising both affection and action is evidently clear from this passage. The training of the individual's *affectus* in gaining self-knowledge is also judged by their level of progress or deficiency (*profectus/defectus*), which, as we have seen, were terms uniquely associated with the Cistercian and Victorine anthropological outlook.

Yet it is significant that Bonaventure's *Soliloquium* was not simply a re-statement of Cistercian and Victorine ideas of self-knowledge. 'In order to make traditional techniques of spiritual exercise available to users in the various branches of the Franciscan movement and beyond, it was necessary to adapt them: to make them more explicit and more directive as to compensate for their users' lack of acculturation in the customs and practices of the special environment of the monastery', remarks.<sup>1023</sup> Bonaventure's use of Cistercian self-knowledge that he found in the Pseudo-Bernardine *Meditationes* is at the service of his own instructions for ordering the soul in which first the ray of contemplation is turned inward and purified, second the soul turns to the exterior world and sees it for what it is, and in the third and fourth stages grows in love for God. Bonaventure's *Soliloquium*, therefore, serves as an important witness to the mediation and transformation of Cistercian and Victorine understandings of self-knowledge in the thirteenth century and beyond.

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<sup>1023</sup> Chica, *Meditating Death*, p. 17.

## CHAPTER 7 - COMBINING THEORY AND PRACTICE: SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN CISTERCIAN AND VICTORINE PSYCHOLOGY

### Introduction

As I argued in the previous chapter, the Augustinian understanding of self-knowledge as linked to the soul's structure, its perception and affectivity, in addition to spiritual exercises makes it unsurprising that self-knowledge occupies a key place in Cistercian and Victorine psychological writings, especially *libri de anima* and psychological treatises. The problem of the soul in the twelfth century was, therefore, also the problem of self-knowledge.<sup>1024</sup> Yet, the significance of *cognitio sui* within the *De anima* treatises of the Cistercians and Victorines has not been adequately explored. In the history of philosophy self-knowledge is a relatively new field. Currently, the majority of medieval studies of self-knowledge have gravitated to elucidating the philosophical tradition ushered in by Thomas Aquinas or the tradition of affective mysticism in the thirteenth century.<sup>1025</sup>

To date there have been two studies of self-knowledge in Cistercian circles, a scattered assortment of articles on the Victorines, yet no systematic analysis of the theme in *De anima* or psychological texts.<sup>1026</sup> Regarding the Cistercians, the first study, a short article from 1959 by Ermenegildo Bertola helpfully illustrates how these texts were distinctive in their fusion of the ethical imperative of Christian Socratism with other twelfth-century oppositions, namely those of the macrocosm and microcosm (from theology and cosmology) and the dignity and misery of man (from monasticism).<sup>1027</sup> The second, a 1976 monograph by Anna M. Tuozzi, explored the theme in writings of Bernard of Clairvaux, Aelred of Rievaulx and the pseudo-

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<sup>1024</sup> Jean-Marie Déchanet, OSB, *Guillaume de Saint-Thierry: L'homme et son oeuvre* (Éditions Charles Beyaert, 1942), p. 155.

<sup>1025</sup> T. S. Cory, *Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); D. Perler, 'Self-Knowledge in Scholasticism', *Self-Knowledge: A History*, pp. 114-130; C. van Dyke, 'Self-Knowledge, Abnegation, and Fulfillment in Medieval Mysticism', in *Self-Knowledge: A History*, pp. 131-145.

<sup>1026</sup> For Aelred see A. Tuozzi, 'La Connaissance de soi chez Aelred of Rievaulx', *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique*, 46 (1970), pp. 145-160. For Bernard of Clairvaux and Richard of Saint-Victor's use of self-knowledge see A. M. Haas, 'Christliche Aspekte des 'Gnothi Seauton' Selbsterkenntnis und Mystik', *Zeitschrift für deutsches Alterum und deutsche Literatur*, 110 (1981), pp. 71-87. Richard, in particular, is recognised among scholarship as a key proponent of Victorine self-knowledge: Wilkins, *The Delphic Maxims*, pp. 76-77; M.-A. Aris, *Contemplatio: Philosophische Studien zum Traktat Benjamin Maior des Richard von St. Victor: Mit einer verbesserten Edition des Textes*, Fuldaer Studien 6 (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Josef Knecht, 1996), pp. 89-96; H. Nakamura, "'Cognitio sui" bei Richard von Sankt-Viktor', in *"Scientia" und "Disciplina": Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im Wandel vom 12. zum 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. R. Berndt S.J., M. Lutz-Bachmann and R. M. W. Stammberger, *Erudiri Sapientia* 3 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), pp. 127-156; H. Nakamura, *"amor invisibilium": Die Liebe im Denken Richards von Sankt Victor († 1173)* (Corpus Victorinum), *Instrumenta* 5 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2011), pp. 190-191.

<sup>1027</sup> E. Bertola, 'Il socratismo cristiano nel XII secolo', *Revista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 51:3 (1959), pp. 260-263.



Bernardine *Meditationes*.<sup>1028</sup> Tuozi convincingly shows that one of the distinguishing features of Cistercian understandings of self-knowledge is that, following Origen's use of the Delphic maxim in his commentary on the Song of Songs, the trope made its way into Cistercian commentaries on Song of Songs to aid them in developing their understandings of love.<sup>1029</sup> While Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy have not explored the theme of self-knowledge in great depth, they have best captured how Cistercian *and* Victorine thinkers used the injunction to unite their understanding of psychology with their wider anthropological view of ordering love to return to God. This 'ordering of charity began with an interior ordering of the faculties, envisioned as a balancing of reason and affectivity, knowledge and sensitivity', the pair write.<sup>1030</sup>

When the arguments of Boquet and Nagy are combined with those of McGinn, Bertola and Tuozi, it is clear to see that self-knowledge in Cistercian and Victorine psychological writings served several purposes. For the Cistercians, especially, we find it in combination with mystical approaches to love exemplified by the Song of Songs and the development of humility. Nonetheless, like Franciscans such as Bonaventure after them, both the Victorines and Cistercians saw self-knowledge as the foundation for developing further ascetic and mystical practices – in other words, as a framework for cultivating affectivity with God.<sup>1031</sup> As such, to “know yourself” is linked intricately with the avoidance of negative affectivity, that is, mental curiosity (*curiositas*), and advanced spiritual exercises, such as prayer, meditation and contemplation. All of this supports Bertola's assessment that the soul's connection both with self-knowledge – and, by extension, with God and the world – justified the study of the soul from a scientific point of view.<sup>1032</sup> It also reinforces my earlier argument that the soul and the *De anima* genre functioned as an entry point into theological, philosophical and medical debates, big and small.

In what follows, I provide a re-examination of the Socratic and Biblical injunction to “know yourself”, commonly within *De anima* treatises specifically. I argue this injunction was interpreted as relating to a series of practical steps, beginning with the physiological and psychological makeup of the body and soul, to cultivate wisdom. Next, I argue that knowledge of the self in Cistercian and Victorine treatises was not an end in itself but is better understood as connected to the practical spiritual exercises dedicated to fostering discipline and ordering

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<sup>1028</sup> See note 1035 above.

<sup>1029</sup> Tuozi, *La conoscenza di sé*, pp. 90-92.

<sup>1030</sup> Boquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, p. 88.

<sup>1031</sup> Bezelaire, 'Connaissance de soi', cols. 1519-1520.

<sup>1032</sup> Bertola, 'Il socratismo cristiano', p. 258.

the thoughts and love of monks and canons. With this purpose in mind, I end by suggesting that an understanding of the soul in some Cistercian and Victorine psychological treatises – such as Bernard of Clairvaux’s *De consideratione*, Richard of Saint-Victor’s *De duodecim patriarchis*, and the *De spiritu et anima* – were meant to be read alongside other key texts as part of a programme of reform.

### **Cistercian Psychology and Self-Knowledge**

In regard to Cistercian *De anima* treatises, Geoffrey Webb suggested that their interest in philology, anatomy, psychology and the theories of knowledge exceeded the Benedictine Rule’s limited advice on cultivating self-knowledge.<sup>1033</sup> Bernard McGinn has observed that William of Saint-Thierry understanding of “know yourself” re-directs Bernard of Clairvaux’s use of the term in the context of grace and free will towards a systematic focus on the body, the soul, and the powers of each.<sup>1034</sup> This psychological genre, thus, was the ideal place for the development of Cistercian and Victorine understandings of self-knowledge because studying the soul also necessitated studying the body. As McGinn again writes: ‘No matter how puerile the analogies drawn between the operations of the body and those of the soul as a way of meditating the body-soul dichotomy, we must recognise that what was at stake was an attempt by Cistercian authors to show that “know yourself” meant knowing the material as well as the spiritual aspects of human nature.’<sup>1035</sup> As we will now see, for the Cistercians knowing the self was intimately tied up with the practice of ordering love to God.

It is at the beginning of William of Saint-Thierry’s *De natura corporis et animae* where all of these themes – the Delphic admonition to “know yourself”, body and soul, macrocosm and microcosm, the dignity and misery of man, Cistercian mystical love, *curiositas* and spiritual exercises – are clearest to observe. This prologue serves as William’s justification why he chose to write a treatise on the body and soul. In it, William states:

Among the Greeks the answer of the Delphic Apollo is well known: “Man, know yourself.” So also Solomon, or rather Christ, says in the Canticle, “If you do not know yourself, go forth!” [Song of Songs 1:7]. For he who does not dwell in his own domain through the contemplation of wisdom, necessarily enters into that of others through the vanity of curiosity (*curiositas*)... It is an unfortunate and stupid mistake to expend the forces of one’s mind on other things when nature, indeed the God of

<sup>1033</sup> Webb, ‘An Introduction to the Cistercian *De anima*’, p. 5.

<sup>1034</sup> McGinn, *The Golden Chain*, p. 236.

<sup>1035</sup> McGinn, *Three Treatises*, p. 87. See also the comments of A. M. Tuozi regarding Aelred’s use of medicine and physiology in his *Dialogus de anima. La conoscenza di sé nella scuola cisterciense* (Naples: Nella Sede Dell’Istituto, 1976), p. 123.

nature, has enjoined such an important work within oneself. And so we shall make a thorough investigation of our microcosm, our little world, man, both within and without, that is in soul and body, so that through our understanding of what we can see and perceive in ourselves we may rise to the Author of all things, visible and invisible.<sup>1036</sup>

This passage is significant for two reasons. First, by comparing the body and soul to the macrocosm and microcosm, William highlights the primacy of both these substances in acquiring knowledge of man himself but also of God. In other words, both the outer bodily nature of man in addition to his inner spiritual nature are equally necessary educational tools for the monk. *De natura corporis et animae*, then, begins by making an anthropological claim concerning the value of man himself to the beginning of the monastic quest for enlightenment.

The second reason why William's *De natura corporis et animae* is significant is its treatment of mental curiosity or *curiositas*. Common monastic tropes – such as the citation to the Song of Songs and the danger of the vanity of curiosity – helps give added force to the inward turn a monk should make when examining their soul and applying the ethical imperatives of *De anima* texts. The warning against *curiositas* was a particularly significant trope employed by the Cistercians in connection with correct perception and affectivity. Curiosity as we have previously seen is considered by William as symptomatic of a *defectus* or *dyscrasia* in the soul, a spiritual imbalance, specifically in the soul's desiring capacity (*concupiscibilitas*).<sup>1037</sup>

The Cistercian that is regarded as exploiting the theme of self-knowledge to the greatest extent, however, was the Cistercian monk Helinand of Froidmont (1162?-c.1229).<sup>1038</sup> *De cognitione sui* or *On Self Knowledge* served as the title for the opening book of his universal history, the *Chronicon*, a text which discusses the similarities of the soul to God.<sup>1039</sup> Much like William of Saint-Thierry, Helinand begins his *De anima* treatise by appealing to the apothegm *Gnothi seauton*, yet as Walker has shown, he 'Cistercianises' the phrase by arguing it was not of Greek or even Roman origin but biblical wisdom stolen from the Song of Songs:

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<sup>1036</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 'Prologue', 1-2 (Lemoine, pp. 64-67; Verdeyen, p. 103; CFS 24, p. 103): 'Fertur celebre apud Graecis deliphici Apollonis responsum: *homo, scito teipsum*. Hoc et Salomon, immo Christus in Canticis: *Si non*, inquit, *cognoveris te, egedere*... miserrime errat et disipit qui extra se in alienis intellectum suum dispergit, cui natura, immo auctor naturae Deus, tantum intra se indixit operationis negotium. Ut igitur microcosmon nostrum, id est minorem mundum, hominem scilicet, ex aliqua parte intus perscrutemur et foris, id est anima et corpore, ut per visibilia vel sensibilia nostra intellecta ad visibilium et invisibilium omnium surgamus auctorem.'

<sup>1037</sup> See note 508

<sup>1038</sup> Walker, 'From Description to Prescription', p. 241.

<sup>1039</sup> *Cog. sui*. (PL 212, 721-30).

Apollo was not the author or inventor of this sentence, but rather the pilferer of it. For, he stole it from another place. After all, to know oneself is the same thing as to examine oneself; or certainly this comes from that place in the Song of Songs: “If you do know yourself, oh beauty among women, go, and depart, etc.”<sup>1040</sup>

In what follows, Helinand establishes a contrast between ‘stupid knowledge’ (*stulta scientia*) or knowledge of the world and the study of the soul, which he deems a ‘necessary science’.<sup>1041</sup> *De cognitione sui* asks its reader: ‘What does it profit a man to know how to measure the world, but not to know himself, and without this knowledge of self, nothing useful comes to mortals and nothing beneficial to men?’<sup>1042</sup> Much like William of Saint-Thierry before him, introspection is, therefore, understood as key to the spiritual health of a person. Helinand portrays the monk as a spiritual doctor, who must be capable of diagnosing their own bodily infirmities before correcting their ethical and spiritual affectivities. As he writes: ‘Those who visit the spiritually infirm should first call upon themselves, and examining with a discerning finger the state of their own inner self – the pulsing veins and affections – lest, by chance, it occur that in making such a visit, those who have not yet been visited, that is, not yet corrected, and yet daring to correct others, should hear this proverb whispered by the infirm: ‘Physician, heal thyself’ (Luke 4:34).’<sup>1043</sup>

Using the prologue to forcefully justify the utility of writing a *De anima* treatise was emulated by another Cistercian text, the *De spiritu et anima*. In the prologue, Alcher of Clairvaux tells his reader why examining the self or the soul serves as a precondition for further spiritual exercises:

Because I have been told that I should know myself, I cannot bear being a stranger to myself. It is very neglectful not to know that by which we consider heavenly things in depth, and investigate natural things by subtle teachings, and even yearn after knowledge of our Maker... I shall therefore turn to myself and to my God, in whose debt I am above all for my person, and I will consider what the intellectual soul is and what its native dwelling place might be.<sup>1044</sup>

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<sup>1040</sup> *Cog. sui.* (PL 212, 723B): ‘Huius autem sententiae non est credendum Apollinem fuisse auctorem, vel inventorem, sed potius furem. Furatus est enim eam de praesenti loco. Idem est enim, noscere seipsum, quod speciem suam visitare. Aut certe de illo loco Cantici canticorum: *Nisi cognoveris te, o pulchra inter mulieres, egedere, et abi*, etc.’

<sup>1041</sup> Walker, ‘From Description to Prescription’, p. 79.

<sup>1042</sup> *Cog. sui.* (PL 212, 723B-723C): ‘Quid enim prodest homini scire metiri mundum, et nescire seipsum? et absque hac scientia nihil mortalibus est utile, nihil hominibus salutare.’

<sup>1043</sup> *Cog. sui.* (PL 212, 723A):

<sup>1044</sup> *DSA*, ‘Prologue’ (PL 40, 779-780; CFS 24, p. 181): ‘Quoniam dictum est mihi ut me ipsum cognoscam, sustinere non possum ut me habeam incognitum. Magna namque est negligentia nescire quid illud sit quo coelestia tam profunde cogitamus, quo naturalis tam subtili indagatione investigamus, et de ipso quoque

Alcher most likely modelled his prologue from William of Saint-Thierry's example. The very fact that Alcher adds the fact that he has been 'told' to know himself shows that the Delphic aphorism had become something of a cliché by the 1170s, and that it was a known fact by this point that self-knowledge was recognised by both Greco-Roman and Christian philosophy and, therefore, should be emulated.<sup>1045</sup>

As noted in the previous chapter, *De spiritu et anima* is different from other Cistercian psychological treatises in that it makes self-knowledge a repeated theme. Alcher not only connects self-knowledge with self-assessment of thoughts and emotions, but also with the tropes of *profectus-defectus* and image and likeness:

Whoever submits his heart to this kind of scrutiny [i.e. of thoughts, words and deeds] is listening to what the wise man said: "Know yourself." Know whence you came and whither you are going; how you live, how much you are progressing or losing ground (*proficis vel deficis*); how far you are from God or how near, not by space, but by likeness or unlikeness of character (*similitudine vel dissimilitudine morum*).<sup>1046</sup>

As a consequence, Alcher is clearly concerned with fostering a sense for double attention and double judgement in his reader.

While self-knowledge is present in the treatise, the theme is noticeably more concentrated towards the end of the Type 1 version of *De spiritu et anima* (chapters 31-32), the recension most likely authored by Alcher of Clairvaux. Chapter 31 is even entitled *Homo mortalis. Sensus impediunt ne se noscat* ('Man's Mortality: How the Senses Keep Man from Knowing Himself'). Utilising Augustine's *De quantitate animae* and *De ordine*, this section emphasises how the definition of man by the 'ancient sages' as a rational and moral animal serves as a mirror and warning for our actions. Following *De ordine*, the first aspect of this definition, man's rationality, the part made in God's image, 'tells man how he is to return to himself', Alcher writes, whereas the second part, his mortal animality, warns 'what is to be avoided'.<sup>1047</sup> What exactly is to be avoided? Alcher is unambiguous that this is the allure of *curiositas* from the senses. Towards the end of the Type 1 variant, Alcher explains that this is

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Creatore nostro tam sublime scire desideramus... idcirco reddam me mihi, imo Deo meo, cui maxime me debeo, et videbo quid sit animus, et quae patria eius.'

<sup>1045</sup> Walker, 'From Description to Prescription', p.

<sup>1046</sup> DSA, 51 (PL 40, 817; CFS 24, p. 261): 'Quisquis scilicet cor suum in huiusmodi studio exercet, audiat quid quidam sapiens dicat: Scito te ipsum. Scito unde venisti, aut quo vadis; quomodo vivis, quantum proficis vel deficis, quam longe es a Deo, vel quam prope, non intervallis locorum, sed similitudine vel dissimilitudine morum.'

<sup>1047</sup> DSA, 31 (PL 40, 800; CFS 24, p. 226-227): '...et quo sibi esset redeundum, et unde fugiendum.'

achieved through the harmonisation of the mind's reason and love. The Cistercian exclaims that the mind's affectivity must be focused inwards, using self-knowledge to stabilise the otherwise restless 'intention of the will' (*intentio voluntatis*) to 'remain in itself and think about itself, with the final end of knowing and loving itself', glancing at itself through the use of the spirit and reason, and utilising the practices of meditation and contemplation to ascend to God.<sup>1048</sup>

However, due to its status as a compilation, *De spiritu et anima* cannot be regarded entirely as a 'Cistercian' treatise on self-knowledge since it draws much of its content for this theme from other Cistercian and Victorine psychological tracts, notably those of pseudo-Bernard and Hugh of Saint-Victor. One of the more noteworthy episodes where self-knowledge is related is chapter 52, which is reliant upon the use of Hugh of Saint-Victor *De archa Noe* and Richard of Saint-Victor's *De archa mystica* to express the vertical journey to God that self-knowledge enables. 'Let us return to ourselves, so that we can ascend to ourselves'<sup>1049</sup>, Alcher writes, a process that takes place in a way analogous to Richard of Saint-Victor's three stages of contemplation: the enlarging (*dilatio*), raising (*sublevatio*) and disengagement (*alienatio*) of the mind.<sup>1050</sup> This ascent begins with first with *contemptus mundi*, that is, 'considering the world and despising it' as a form of 'vanity' (*vanitas*).<sup>1051</sup> This approach was common to the teachings of Hugh of Saint-Victor as a technique to block off *curiositas*, by moving away the attention of the mind from the exterior sensual world to the interior world of the soul.<sup>1052</sup> Second, entering the heart, the contemplative is told to develop self-knowledge 'by knowing and despising ourselves'.<sup>1053</sup> Third, by exploring the depths of the heart, the final part of the ascent comes by growing the 'knowledge and love of God.'<sup>1054</sup>

Isaac of Stella's *Sermones* and *Epistola de anima* provide the most conclusive Cistercian assessment of the relationship between self-knowledge, *curiositas* and psychology. Similar to William of Saint-Thierry, Isaac's *Sermo* 2 communicated the importance for monks not to become distracted with concerns outside the cloister or even outside their own bodies, but rather to focus their attention on themselves. 'If you desire to know yourself and to possess

<sup>1048</sup> DSA, 32 (PL 40, 801-802; CFS 24, p. 229-230).

<sup>1049</sup> DSA, 52 (PL 40, 817; CFS 24, p. 262): 'Redeamus ergo ad nos, ut possimus ascendere ad nos.'

<sup>1050</sup> *Arca Moysi*. 5.2-5 (PL 196, 169D-175A; Zinn, pp. 310-317; VTT 5, pp. 392-399).

<sup>1051</sup> DSA, 52 (PL 40, 817; CFS 24, p. 262): 'Primus ascensus fit consideratione mundi, et contemptu.'

<sup>1052</sup> This is the theme of Hugh of Saint-Victor's *De vanitate mundi* (PL 176, 701-741).

<sup>1053</sup> DSA, 52 (PL 40, 817; CFS 24, p. 262): 'Secundus ascensus fit cognitione et contemptu nostri.'

<sup>1054</sup> DSA, 52 (PL 40, 817; CFS 24, p. 262): 'Tertius ascensus fit cognitione et amore Dei.'

yourself, go into yourself, and do not search for yourself outside’, he remarks.<sup>1055</sup> Self-knowledge, Isaac suggests, begins with learning to perceive – and subsequently, to estimate – the relationship of the soul and body to the world correctly:

Distinguish between what is around you, what belongs to you, and your self! The world surrounds you, your body belongs to you, and you yourself are within, made to the image and likeness of God. Return then, “transgressor to the heart, within, where you are truly yourself” [Isaiah 46:8]. Outwardly you are an animal, fashioned as the world is fashioned, and that is why man is called a miniature world. But inwardly you are made in the image of God and so are capable of being deified.<sup>1056</sup>

Put differently, self-knowledge can only occur if the soul’s *affectus* and *sensus* – its feelings and thoughts – are ordered and can attribute appropriate worth to external and internal perceptions. Self-knowledge is the beginning of a conversion that will result in the ‘divinisation’ of the monk; and it is no accident that the extended treatment of self-knowledge in *Sermo 2* is associated with the beatitude ‘blessed are those who mourn’ since fear and regret were strongly linked in Benedictine and Cistercian thought with the first steps of religious conversion.<sup>1057</sup>

The problem, as Isaac goes on to explain in his *Epistola de anima* is that, following the Fall, self-knowledge necessitates a difficult process of self-recognition and transformation. Using metaphorical language remarkably similar to that of Hugh of Saint-Victor, Isaac relates that the five ‘eyes’ for seeing God, the *sensus*, have been impaired by original sin.<sup>1058</sup> The severity of impairment for each capacity or eye significantly corresponds to its utility in contemplation, in addition to its purity and proximity to the divine in the scale of nature. Consequently, the ‘eye of sense knowledge and imagination’ (*oculus sensus et imaginationis*) is clouded, the ‘eye of reason scarcely sees’ (*oculus rationis vix*) and the ‘eye of discernment and understanding’ (*oculus intellectus et intelligentiae*) – that is, the highest forms of cognition – see virtually nothing.<sup>1059</sup> Meanwhile, at the lower, corporeal end of human nature, the ‘eyes of concupiscence’ (*oculi concupiscentiae*) have been opened further to curiosity (*curiositas*) and the ‘eye of the flesh’ (*oculus carnis*) to pleasure (*voluptas*), following the blinding of the

<sup>1055</sup> Isaac of Stella, *Sermo 2.13* (PL 194, 1695C; SC 130, lines 99-100, p. 106; CFS 11, p. 14; Deme, p. 10): ‘vis te ipsum cognoscere, te possidere, intra se te ipsum, nec te quaesieris extra.’

<sup>1056</sup> Ibid., 2.13 (PL 194, 1695C; SC 130, lines 101-106, p. 106; CFS 11, pp. 14-15; Deme, p. 10): ‘Circa te mundus, tui corpus, tu ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus intus. Redi igitur, praevarior ad cor. Foris pecus es, ad imaginem mundi: unde et minor mundus dicitur homo; intus homo ad imaginem Dei under potes deificari.’

<sup>1057</sup> K. O’Neill, ‘Isaac of Stella on Self-Knowledge’, *Cistercian Studies*, 19 (1984), pp. 127-130.

<sup>1058</sup> See *Sacr.*, 1.10.2 (PL 176, 329C-33-A; Berndt, p. 225; Deferrari, p. 167).

<sup>1059</sup> *Ep. an.*, 20 (PL 194, 1886C; Tarlazzi, lines 462-464, p. 274; CFS 24, p. 173).

faculty of *sensus*.<sup>1060</sup> ‘Who knows himself?’ in this postlapsarian condition, Isaac remarks, since ‘the soul which through itself ought to know God above itself, has lost the capacity to know itself in itself, and the angel on a par with it.’<sup>1061</sup>

### Victorine Psychology and Self-Knowledge

What of the Victorine usage of self-knowledge? Despite the term appearing less frequently it possessed a similar range of meanings. Much like Isaac of Stella above, the soul was regarded as a sacrament of eschatology and salvation history: a mirror into which every person could gain knowledge of the fallen nature of man, their current sinfulness but also the redemption possible in the future. Absalon of Springersbach, a canon affiliated with the Victorine school, appealed to the Delphic Apollo to underscore how the unique constitution of man in the universe as a mortal, rational, animal can be read as a mirror of salvation history. ‘Look, ‘animal’ was given to you [to understand] the age of sin, ‘mortal’ for the necessity of punishment, ‘rational’ for heavenly dignity’, he explained.<sup>1062</sup>

For Hugh of Saint-Victor, the soul’s rational nature was proof itself of God’s existence.<sup>1063</sup> In the *Didascalicon*, Hugh of Saint-Victor interprets the meaning of “Know Yourself” much like William and Isaac as the monastic search for divine wisdom within one’s soul, as opposed to from external sources. Wisdom, ought to be sought, Hugh writes, because:

Wisdom illuminates man so that he may recognise himself; for man was like all the other animals when he did not understand that he had been created of a higher order than they. But his immortal mind, illuminated by Wisdom, beholds its own principle and recognises how unfitting it is for it to seek anything outside itself when what is in itself can be enough for it. It is written on the tripod of Apollo: γνῶθι σεαυτόν, that is, “Know Thyself”, for surely, if man had not forgotten his origin, he would recognise that everything subject to change is nothing.<sup>1064</sup>

With its emphasis on wisdom as equivalent to the unchangeable nature of God, this understanding of self-knowledge corresponds with Hugh’s metaphysics of change that we

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<sup>1060</sup> *Ep. an.*, 20 (PL 194, 1886C; Tarlazzi, lines 460-462, p. 274; CFS 24, p. 173).

<sup>1061</sup> *Ep. an.*, 20 (PL 194, 1886C-D; Tarlazzi, lines 464-468, p. 274; CFS 24, p. 173): ‘Quis enim seipsum uidit?... itaque anima, que per se debuit deum noscere supra se, perdidit seipsam noscere in se et angelum iuxta se.’

<sup>1062</sup> Absalom of Springersbach, *Sermo* 45 (PL 211, 265A): ‘Et ecce animal dat tibi peccati vetustatem, mortale poenae necessitatem, rationale coelestem dignitatem.’

<sup>1063</sup> *Tribus diebus*, 17.3-18.5 (PL 176, 825A-826D; VTT 2, pp. 77-79; CCCM 177, p. 36-41).

<sup>1064</sup> *Did.*, 1.1 (PL 176, 741C-D; Taylor, p. 46).



explored earlier. This passage also neatly fits with Hennig's twofold model of double attention and double judgement. That is, self-knowledge for Hugh necessitates an exchange between all the powers of the soul: memory, will and reason. Self-knowledge involves the remembrance of sin, knowing what to focus one's perceptions upon (i.e., God), and how to best will this practically through action.

That self-knowledge equates to correct perception can be seen in *De sacramentis Christianae fidei*. Here, knowledge of God, self and virtue is considered as necessary for the health of the soul.<sup>1065</sup> Hugh's summa even includes a chapter entitled 'On Self-Knowledge' in which Hugh elaborates that man was created by God with knowledge of his origin, what is above him, under him and what he should do and avoid.<sup>1066</sup> Hugh hence clearly brings self-knowledge and perception into the realm of affectivity: self-knowledge is knowing what to orientate the affections towards.<sup>1067</sup> Furthermore, as Hennig has shown, this perceptual-affective understanding of self-knowledge is directly related to the understanding of active perception and affectivity Hugh had outlined in his *De unione corporis et spiritus*. It is specifically the ability of the senses to assimilate the outside world and bring it within for abstraction that the Victorine magister uses as a model for his view of self-knowledge. As Hennig points out, in *De unione corporis et spiritus* 'the mind is purely active... in order to process any perceptual information, it has to actively and freely emulate it.'<sup>1068</sup> We have seen that in Hugh's extramissive view of sensation, sense perception is a form of change; the sense organ assimilating or changing itself in some way to the quality of the perceived object. This has problematic consequences for self-knowledge because, as Hugh sets out in *De sacramentis*, to know the self involves fleeing the corporeal world and pursuing God. Since the senses to some degree become what is sensed, perceiving too many bodily objects and people thus is seen by Hugh as corporealizing the mind, debasing the incorporeal nature of the soul. As Hennig explains:

All such knowledge involves assimilation. Now according to Hugh, bodily things are ontologically inferior to us... The point of self-knowledge is, then, to direct the energy of the soul towards what it is, and thus expend less energy on towards what it is not. The intended result is the fortification of the soul. Also, because the soul is incorporeal, for it know itself is to know something incorporeal. And since all knowledge involves

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<sup>1065</sup> *Sacr.*, 1.6.8 (Defferari, p. 100).

<sup>1066</sup> *Sacr.*, 1.6.15 (Deferrari, p. 104). Ganss discusses this chapter in 'Affectivity and Knowledge', and Hugh's notion of self-knowledge more generally, p. 430 and 444-445.

<sup>1067</sup> *Sacr.* 1.6.16 (Deferrari, p. 105); See also *Arrha*, 23 (VTT 2, p. 207).

<sup>1068</sup> Hennig, 'Self-Knowledge by Participation', p. 72.

assimilation, the knowledge of immaterial things will turn the soul into something more immaterial.<sup>1069</sup>

When Hugh's *De unione corporis et spiritus* is compared with his wider spiritual oeuvre, specifically his *De sacramentis Christianae fidei*, it becomes clear just how significant his earlier presentation of the soul's powers of perception and affectivity is for his wider anthropological understanding of man's rehabilitation through acquiring and developing self-knowledge. The canon, Hugh believes, should re-orientate his perceptions to the incorporeal realm in order to increasingly shape his soul to the form of God through affection and cognition.

While Godfrey of Saint-Victor did not explicitly use the phrase *Scito te ipsum*, we can discern aspects of self-knowledge in his writings. For example, in his autobiographical *Fons philosophiae* the return to self-knowledge offered by the Victorine way of life serves as his stated reason behind his decision to become a canon regular.<sup>1070</sup> Most importantly though is that Godfrey's *Microcosmus* followed the Cistercians William of Saint-Thierry, Isaac of Stella and Alcher of Clairvaux in using the theme of macrocosm and microcosm to highlight the parallels between the cosmological structure of the universe and the inner, psychological structure of the mind. For Godfrey, the human soul's capacities of power (*facultas*), wisdom (*intellectus*) and goodness (*affectio*) show the soul's similarity with the divine trinity.<sup>1071</sup> And, as we have seen previously, for Godfrey, the powers of the soul are a microcosm: sensuality is akin to the earth, imagination to water, reason to air and understanding to fire.<sup>1072</sup> Godfrey's microcosmic parallels are not meant as a mere curiosity but serve as an exercise in self-knowledge for the reader. The theme of microcosmism is intricately linked with self-knowledge: analogies are drawn between the cosmos and man by Godfrey with the effect of producing a favourable impression of the human being and to cultivate knowledge of man.<sup>1073</sup>

Here, the *Microcosmus* is aligned very closely with female writers such as Hildegard of Bingen and Herrard of Hohenberg who developed the microcosm theme in tandem with understandings of the senses and self-knowledge. Book one of Hildegard's *Scivias* (c. 1151-

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<sup>1069</sup> Hennig, 'Self-Knowledge by Participation', pp. 78-79.

<sup>1070</sup> *Fons*, lines 761-768 (Michaud-Quantin, p. 61; Synan, p. 67; VTT 3, pp. 413-414).

<sup>1071</sup> *Micro.*, 109 (Delhay, p. 121).

<sup>1072</sup> *Micro.* 19 and 25 (Delhay, pp. 46-47 and 50-51).

<sup>1073</sup> Delhay, 'Le sens littéral et le sens allégorique du "Microcosmus" de Geoffroy de Saint-Victor', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 16 (1949), p. 155; Feiss, 'Godfrey of St Victor – *Microcosm*', in VTT 2, p. 314.

1152) intimately connects self-knowledge with the proper understanding of God and the universe.<sup>1074</sup> Studying the correspondences between man and cosmos, Hildegard advises, teaches man important truths about how to conduct himself and love God. For example, the two key attributes that unify the spirit, enabling it to rise to God, that is, its affective or desiring capacity and its rationality, all find analogues in the heavens and earth:

The spirit raises itself in two ways: sighing, groaning and desiring God; and choosing among options in various matters as if by some rule, for the soul has discernment in reason. Hence Man contains in himself the likeness of heaven and earth. In what way? He has a circle, which contains his clarity, breadth, and reason, as the sky has its lights, air and birds; and he has a receptacle containing humidity, germination and birth, as the earth contains fertility, fruition and animals. What is this? O human, you are wholly in every creature, and you forget your Creator; you are subject to Him as was ordained, and you go against His commands.<sup>1075</sup>

Similarly, using the theme of microcosmism, Hildegard's book of medicine, *Causae et curiae* (*The Causes and Cures*), particularly emphasises the likeness of the body's five senses to the five planets and elements:

There are also the five planets. They receive their light from fire and ether, and they are the strength and support of the firmament. Wherever they are and wherever they move, they also serve the course of the sun, restrict its velocity, and cause its fire to lessen... Thus, on account of these planets, the sun does not produce such fiery ardour as it would if it were not restrained by them. And as a human's five senses hold the body together, so too these five planets hold the sun together and are its ornament... For as body and soul are together and are strengthened by one another, so it for the firmament and the planets; they foster and strengthen one another. As the soul vivifies and solidifies the body, so too the sun, the moon and the other planets foster and strengthen the firmament with their fire. For the firmament is like the head of a human being. Sun, moon and stars are like the eyes. The air is like hearing. The winds are like smell. Dew is like taste, and the sides of the earth and like the arms and like touch.<sup>1076</sup>

All of these macrocosmic-microcosmic parallels are strengthened in Hildegard's later work, the *Liber divinorum operum* (c. 1163-1173). In this text, Hildegard sets out a series of image and likeness parallels between the soul, the Holy Trinity senses and the four stages of ascent to God based around four senses: taste, smell, hearing and sight (see Table 18). The Lucca manuscript famously depicts these circular microcosmic and macrocosmic parallels between

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<sup>1074</sup> *Scivias*, 1.2, pars 25 and 30 (Führkötter, pp. 31 and 33; Hart, pp. 85-86 and 87).

<sup>1075</sup> *Scivias*, 2.1, pars 3 (Führkötter, p. 113; Hart, p. 151).

<sup>1076</sup> *Causae*, 1, fol. 7a-8b (Kaiser, pp. 9-10; Throop, p. 30).

the cosmos, man and God (see Figure 23).<sup>1077</sup> Later in the text, Hildegard will show how the five senses are crucial to purgatory, which each sense associated with a particular zone of the earth (see Figure 24).

<b>Holy Trinity</b>	<b>Sense Organs</b>	<b>Stages of Ascent</b>	<b>Trinitarian Division of the Soul (1)</b>	<b>Trinitarian Division of the Soul (2)</b>	<b>Fourfold Division of the Soul</b>
Father	Eyes	Seeing	Understanding ( <i>comprehensio</i> )	Spiritualisation ( <i>expiratio</i> )	Understanding ( <i>intellectus</i> )
Son	Ears	Hearing	Insight ( <i>intelligentia</i> )	Knowledge ( <i>scientia</i> )	Knowledge ( <i>scientia</i> )
Holy Spirit	Nose	Smelling	Execution ( <i>motio</i> )	Sensation ( <i>sensus</i> )	Sensation ( <i>sensus</i> )
	Mouth	Tasting			Will ( <i>voluntas</i> )

Table 18. Image and likeness parallels in book 4 of Hildegard of Bingen's *Liber divinorum operum* 4.17-19.

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<sup>1077</sup> For analysis of all the symbolism and correspondences in this image see S. Salvadori, *Hildegard von Bingen: In the Heart of God*, pp. 92-101.





Figure 23. 'Microcosmic Man'. Hildegard of Bingen, *Liber divinorum operum*. Lucca, Biblioteca Statale, MS. 1942, f. 9r.





Figure 24. The Five Senses and their Correspondences Zones of Purgation. Hildegard of Bingen, *Liber divinorum operum*. The white zone on the left represents the temperate East, the Earthly Paradise and sight; the dark zone on the right represents the damp West, associated with hearing and the punishment of venial sins; the top zone is the hot South; the lower zone represents the cold North and symbolises taste.

Hildegard's outstretched microcosmic man illustration appears to be part of a broader iconographic trend that developed from the 1150s onwards. For instance, the association of the five senses with the elements, planets was found in folio 10v of Herrad of Hohenburg's encyclopedia, *Hortus Deliciarum*, produced between 1167 and 1185.<sup>1078</sup> As Figure 25 shows, Herrad made use of Honorius of Autun's *Elucidarium* to note how the human head resembled the celestial sphere with its seven openings (two eyes ears, nostrils and mouth) corresponding to the seven planets, and human breathing and coughing resembling wind and thunder. However, perhaps the exemplar for Hildegard and Herrad's imagery was a manuscript such as the *Glossarium Salomonis*, produced at the Regensburg Benedictine monastery of Prüfening c. 1158 (see Figure 26).<sup>1079</sup> While the manuscript was created under Abbot Erbo of Prüfening (1121-1162), the pen drawing of the microcosmic man on folio 7v was added three years later in 1165, just before Hildegard and Herrad were composing their own writings. This model for showing macrocosmic and microcosmic correspondences would also been used late into the fourteenth century (see Figure 27).

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<sup>1078</sup> Reproduced as Plate 6 in Straub p. 19; Plate 9 *Hortus Deliciarum*, ed. R. Green, T. J Brown, and K. Levy (London: Warburg Institute, 1979), fol. 16v. This image is also featured and discussed in *Painting the Hortus deliciarum*, fig. 60, pp. 96-99.

<sup>1079</sup> An excellent discussion of this illustration can be found in John E. Murdoch, *Album of Science: Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (New York: John Scribner's Sons, 1984), p. 358.




Figure 25. 'Microcosm'. Man, the animals, the four elements, five senses and seven planets. Folio 16v of Herrad of Hohenburg's *Hortus Deliciarum*.






Figure 26. 'Microcosmic Man', *Glossarium Salomonis*, BSB Clm 13003, fol. 7v (c. 1158). The bands relating to the senses read: 'Vision derives from fire, hearing from the superior air, smell from the inferior air, touch from earth, and taste from water' (Ex igne visum, ex aere superiori auditum, ex inferiori olfactum, ex terra tactum, ex aqua gustum).'



Figure 27. 'Microcosmic Man', Natural History Manuscript. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 2357, fol. 65r. (d. 1350-399). Provenance: Austria?. Ink on parchment. 28.5 x 21 cm. Digitisation available: [https://digital.onb.ac.at/RepViewer/viewer.faces?doc=DTL\\_5115115&order=1&view=SINGLE](https://digital.onb.ac.at/RepViewer/viewer.faces?doc=DTL_5115115&order=1&view=SINGLE)

To return to Godfrey of Saint-Victor, microcosmism has both an individual, personal meaning and a second societal or collective meaning as Philippe Delhaye, Vincezo Cilento and Hugh Feiss have all explored. First, any soul or individual participating in God's grace is philosophically said to be a microcosm (*microcosmus particularis*); and second, there is a theological grouping of faithful soul's around Christ (*microcosmus generalis*), each serving

as a microcosm of the human race and the mystical Church.<sup>1080</sup> The cosmos is, therefore, utilised by Godfrey to stimulate two forms of ‘circumspection’ (*circumspectio*) in harmony with Victorine canonical life: (1) Circumspection of one’s own actions, and (2) circumspection of the actions of others. With body and soul aligned to God, it is Godfrey’s vision is that ‘all of humanity will become a *microcosm*.’<sup>1081</sup>

The formation of both microcosms requires the ordering of love. Just as there are four elements, powers of the soul and powers of the imagination, Godfrey distinctly links man’s creation to ordering four loves: what is beneath him (i.e., animals and sensual things), what he himself is (i.e., the self), what is next to him (i.e., neighbour) and what is above him (i.e., angelic spirits and God).<sup>1082</sup> The ‘grace of reward’ stemming from an ordered love of God, Godfrey claims, in ‘the consummated state of the human spirit made according to the image and likeness of God.’<sup>1083</sup>

This process begins with self-knowledge. Godfrey tells his reader to “Recollect yourself” (*Collige dispersiones tuas*), referring to the person’s thoughts and impulses.<sup>1084</sup> The self-knowledge achieved through a confession of one’s deficiencies (*defectūs*) is the first step in the process. It is related by Godfrey as part of a vision he experiences from Mistress Charity (*Magistra Caritas*), who offers Godfrey the necessary ‘capacity’ (*facultas*) to know himself. ‘It was not without tears and sobbing sighs’, Godfrey relates, that he said to Mistress Charity: “My Lady, you know very well my knowing, willing, and capacity; before you is all my desiring. Have mercy on me, because my soul trusts in you.’ It is this humility, which causes Mistress Charity to remark:

“I indeed know you better than you know yourself , but I wanted you to show the devotion of your heart by the confession of your mouth... Come forward now and touch my head so that your capacity may be increased and your willing may be effective...

Consequently, humility and Mistress Charity’s vision is transformative for Godfrey, causing an ‘increase’ (*profectus*) in his capacity, and making his willing more effective (*effectus*). Concluding the story, Godfrey says:

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<sup>1080</sup> P. Delhaye, ‘Le sens littéral et le sens allégorique du "Microcosmus" de Geoffroy de Saint-Victor’, *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 16 (1949), p. 156; V. Cilento, *Il metodo e la dottrina del "Microcosmus" di Goffredo di San Vittore* (Naples: Libreria Scientifica Editrice, 1959), p. 96.

<sup>1081</sup> H. B. Feiss, ‘Introduction’, VTT 2, p. 314.

<sup>1082</sup> *Micro.*, 203 (VTT 2, p. 315).

<sup>1083</sup> *Micro.*, 203 (VTT 2, p. 315).

<sup>1084</sup> *Micro.*, 204 (Delhaye, p. 224; VTT 2, p. 203). Hugh Bernard Feiss has traced the likely origin of this phrase to Psalm 146.2 not the Delphic Apollo, however (see note 3, VTT 2, p. 337).

And having said this, the vision disappeared. I, however, *found myself* [Psalms 83:4] in the church *next to the altar* of my Lord whom I was serving continually. Then, *returning to myself* [Acts 12:11], I reflected back on what I had seen and heard, and I understood what else Mistress Charity wished me to do. She wanted me to preserve in the ordered love of my Lord... so that I would direct all my strivings and all flights toward him.<sup>1085</sup>

Thus, *Microcosmus* clearly links together understandings of the soul, self-knowledge and ordered love together.

How will Godfrey order his love? In his vision, Mistress Charity relates the six wings of love through which man ascends to God as if an angel: ordered love of the flesh, spirit, friend, enemy, God and Christ (see

Table 19). Importantly, the first two steps involve the ordering of what is below and what is in the self: the ordering of the five senses and the thoughts and affections, that is, control of the soul's powers of *sensualitas* and *imaginatio*. Godfrey earlier had pointed out that there were three types of loving the flesh just like there are three modes of affectivity: 'For we love our flesh in three ways: naturally, ordinately and inordinately; natural love subsists between the limits and nature; inordinate love inclines the soul below its natural limit, precipitating vice; only ordered love is above the limits of nature, lifting the soul to God... therefore ordered love progresses towards merit, inordinate love hinders, natural love neither progresses nor hinders.'<sup>1086</sup> To fail to control the senses is a *defectus*, whereas the mortification of the flesh through canonical practices such as 'frequent fasts, vigils, prayers, bodily disciplines, and many other afflictions of the body' keep the senses in the order.<sup>1087</sup> Relating to the *interior homo*, ordered love of the self is greater than ordered love of flesh, Godfrey says, because it renews the mind completely: 'It cleanses unclear thoughts and feelings, cuts off those that are superfluous, orders those that are unstable, gives birth to good thoughts and feelings, and nurtures, guards, perfects, and preserves them.'<sup>1088</sup> Godfrey,

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<sup>1085</sup> *Micro.*, 224 (Delhay, p. 244-245; VTT 2, p. 333): 'Tum ego non sine lacrimis et singultuosis suspiriis dixi: Domina, mea tu nostri melius et scire et velle et posse meum, ante te omne desiderium meum. Miserere mei quoniam in te confidit anima mea. At illa: Ego quidem melius te novi te, sed devocionem cordis oris confessione manifestari volui... Accede nunc et tange capud meum ut augeatur posse tuum et sic effectum habeat velle tuum... Et hoc dicto, disparuit visio. Ego autem *inventus sum* in ecclesia iuxta altare domini mei cui iugiter inserviebam. Tunc *reversus ad me*, retractavi apud me quod videram et audieram, et intellexi quid me de cetero magistra caritas agree voluisset, scilicet ut in ordinato amore domini mei... ut omnis conatus et volatus meos in ipsum dirigerem.'

<sup>1086</sup> *Micro.*, 155 (Delhay, pp. 172-173).

<sup>1087</sup> *Micro.*, 209 (VTT 2, p. 321).

<sup>1088</sup> *Micro.*, 210 (VTT 2, p. 321).



however, repeats throughout the treatise that for men to become angels requires both wings to grow, forming a pair. ‘Flying requires not just one wing, but at least one pair of wings.’<sup>1089</sup> The virtue of ‘circumspection’ (*circumspectio*) makes it such as the bodily grow alongside the spiritual, and vice-versa. ‘As feathers are born to the spirit – from continuous consideration of the things the spirit owes its flesh – to move itself for ordered love of the flesh, so are born to her – from consideration of those things the flesh owes her spirit, with reciprocal love – feathers, by which to move herself for ordered love of the spirit.’<sup>1090</sup> Thus, progress with ordering of the senses becomes tied to progress in ordering thoughts and affections. Showing this union between body and soul, Godfrey asks: ‘If by loving your flesh inordinately, you were to seek only the pleasures of the flesh, how would you serve the spirit? If by loving the spirit inordinately and completely neglecting the flesh, you pursued only the pleasures of the spirit, how would you satisfy the needs of the flesh.’<sup>1091</sup>

Wing	Subject	Ordered Love	Actions	Direction of Love	Pair of wings
1	Flesh	Ordered senses	Fasts, vigils, prayers, bodily disciplines	Below man	Ordered love of self
2	Spirit	Ordered thoughts and affections	Cutting away superfluous thoughts, guarding and preserving good thoughts and feelings	Man	
3	Friend	Ordered love of neighbour	Following the commandments of God and example of Christ	Next to man	Ordered love of neighbour
4	Enemy	Ordered love of enemies	Following the commandments of God and example of Christ		
5	God	Ordered love of God	Knowing and loving God and his love for humankind	Above man	Ordered love of God
6	God-man	Ordered love of Christ	Knowing and loving Christ and his sacrifice for humanity		

Table 19. The Six Wings of Love. Godfrey of Saint-Victor's *Microcosmus*, chapters 205-226.<sup>1092</sup>

The addition of love of neighbour and enemy as the third and fourth wings of love gives Godfrey's view of self-knowledge and the ordering of love a distinctly canonical dimension. The final pair of wings, love of God and Christ join with the others to perfectly order the

<sup>1089</sup> *Micro.*, 215 (VTT 2, p. 324).

<sup>1090</sup> *Micro.*, 215 (VTT, p. 324).

<sup>1091</sup> *Micro.*, 211 (VTT 2, p. 322)

<sup>1092</sup> *Micro.*, 205-226 (VTT 2, pp. 316-355).

canon's love. These six wings together lock the soul into a state of ordered love, with each moderating the other. As Godfrey notes: 'It is not possible that one of these [six] be – much less be useful – without the other, and so the number cannot be decreased, so it cannot be increased.'<sup>1093</sup> The soul becomes like God: 'It allows nothing superfluous; it suffers no diminishment.'<sup>1094</sup>

Moreover, just as we saw with Hugh of Saint-Victor and William of Saint-Thierry, the soul is changed into God's likeness through its affection. This ordered love makes the soul truly a microcosm:

Raised up by its wings, the spirit of a human being is advanced to such a great dignity that the whole new formed in the "image and likeness of God" and, as it were, a kind of world – that is, a microcosm – is made worthy to have God dwell with him.<sup>1095</sup>

'The love (*amor*) is the bond of sweetest affection (*dilectio*) by which the human soul is conveyed above itself by grace and bound to God, adhering to God immediately, ineffably and inseparably.' Godfrey's *Microcosmus* ends with the image of Christ, the Bridegroom, entering into mystical union with his Bride, the soul. 'Out of intense love', Godfrey remarks,

he gradually "emptied himself, accepting her form" (Phil. 2:7) so that he could fill her through mutual love, imprinting on her a form, his image and likeness. Thus, after a fashion, God – out of love – falls (*deficit*) into humankind, so that humankind in some fashion might – out of love – advance (*proficit*) into God.<sup>1096</sup>

*Microcosmus*, thus, carefully plays with the *defectus-profectus* binary. Christ 'falls' in order for the soul to 'advance' yet unlike human love, Christ's is never deficient or lacking. In total, the *Microcosmus* shows how man, learning to focus on his own dignity as a reflection of the cosmos and an image and likeness of God, can restore himself to that likeness. Such a transformation begins with self-knowledge and ends with the 'angelisation' of man, developing the six wings of love through virtuous conduct relating to practices and actions concerning ordered love of the self, neighbour and God.

### **Cistercian and Victorine Self-Knowledge as a Programme of Reform**

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<sup>1093</sup> *Micro.*, 212 (VTT 2, p. 322).

<sup>1094</sup> *Micro.*, 212 (VTT 2, p. 322).

<sup>1095</sup> *Micro.*, 225 (VTT 2, p. 334).

<sup>1096</sup> *Micro.*, 225 (VTT 2, p. 335).

As I have argued, self-knowledge implies a practical process of self-reformation. In this final section, I wish to end by showing how self-knowledge and Cistercian and Victorine thinking on the soul can be said to be part of a broader programme aimed at the complete restoration of the individual. I will do this by exploring three case studies. The first explores the connection between self-knowledge and ‘consideration’ in two treatises and a sermon by Bernard of Clairvaux. The second reveals how self-knowledge can be seen to be a key theme, necessary in the training of Victorine novices, across two interrelated works of Richard of Saint-Victor. The final case study briefly explores how recensions of *De spiritu et anima* circulated together with other, more advanced spiritual writings, suggesting that *libri de anima* likely were imagined as foundational textbooks in a wider and integrated programme of spiritual reform.

### **Bernard of Clairvaux and ‘Consideration’**

That self-knowledge was important for spiritual exercises is clear from the writings of Bernard of Clairvaux. In his *De consideratione* (*On Consideration*), a book of advice written for Pope Eugenius III, self-knowledge is the lynchpin of salvation for all human beings, even someone like Eugenius – a pope occupying the highest level of spiritual and political office. In this text *cognitio sui* (‘self-knowledge’) is synonymous with *consideratio sui* (‘self-consideration’). And similar to the Cistercian *De anima* treatises, self-consideration is regarded as an activity prior to knowledge of the divine. As the Clarevallian abbot states, *consideratio* (‘consideration’) is the first step to achieving knowledge of God since *consideratio* is a process distinct from contemplation, since it should ‘begin and end with your self’.<sup>1097</sup> Again, like other Cistercian *De anima* treatises whereby self-knowledge invites comparison between the world, body and soul (man) and God, Bernard’s self-consideration involves an awareness of the relationship between an individual and other agents in the universe. Similar to Godfrey’s *Microcosmus*, the monk (or pontiff in the case of Eugenius) is instructed to consider four things in ordered sequence: himself (*te*), what is below himself (*sub te*), what is around himself (*circa te*) and, finally, what is above himself (*supra te*).<sup>1098</sup> This fourfold model of consideration would prove influential, being found in the writings of Alan of Lille.<sup>1099</sup>

<sup>1097</sup> *Consideratione*, 2.5-6 (*SBO* 3, p. 414; *CFS* 37, pp. 52-53): ‘A te proinde incipiat tua consideration; non solum autem, et in te finiatur.’ Contemplation, by contrast, begins and ends in God.

<sup>1098</sup> *Consideratione* 2.6 (*SBO* 3, p. 414; *CFS* 37, 53).

<sup>1099</sup> Alan of Lille, *Omnis mundi creatura*, 7, ed. W. Wetherbee, in *Literary Works* (DOML 22), pp. 546-547.

This fourfold model of consideration is significant since each mental act of consideration provokes a specific resultant action – one leads to the other.<sup>1100</sup> For Eugenius, consideration must involve him acting upon these four strands of self-knowledge. He should consider his (1) nature as a mortal, rational animal; next, (2) he should foster the community of Christians under his care; (3) serve as an example to the men around him; and (4) turn to the angelic hierarchy above to understand he shares their virtues and is capable of being deified. This final ascent through the angelic hierarchy makes it explicit just how necessary self-knowledge is. ‘If you do not know yourself’, Bernard writes, ‘you are like a building without a foundation; you raise not a structure but ruins.’<sup>1101</sup> This architectural metaphor highlights the importance of self-knowledge as a beginning step in the Cistercian programme of re-forming or re-constructing a person’s affections, thoughts and eventually, their habits of life, into stable and lasting positive dispositions.

While Pope Eugenius is an exceptional example, the principles of *consideratio* evidently were applicable to every human being. It is possible to glimpse how this programme of self-knowledge would have worked in a monastic context. The architectural trope of *De consideratione* is repeated in the *Tractatus de interiori domo* (*Treatise on the Inner House*), a treatise pseudonymously attributed to Bernard of Clairvaux. Here, the anonymous author describes the conscience as an inner house, which is cleansed and built up by erecting seven columns signifying (1) good will, (2) memory and kindness of God, (3) purity of heart, (4) freedom of the soul, (5) rectitude of spirit, (6) devotion of the mind and, finally, the (7) illumination of reason.<sup>1102</sup> Significantly, the cleansing of the will is effected through the correct use of the thoughts and affections: ‘thoughts, in the investigation of truth; affections in the exercise of virtue.’<sup>1103</sup> Following this, the advice to ‘Learn to form an estimation of your spirit’ (*Discas aestimare spiritum tuum*) is given to contemplatives to begin the secondary process of ‘building’ the conscience.<sup>1104</sup> As the anonymous author makes clear, this is because ‘no knowledge is better than that by which man knows himself’ – a phrase also repeated by the author of *De spiritu et anima* albeit with the added qualification that it is because of self-knowledge one can examine their thoughts, words and deeds.<sup>1105</sup>

<sup>1100</sup> *Consideratione*, 5.1 (SBO 3, p. 467; CFS 37, p. 139).

<sup>1101</sup> *Consideratione*, 2.6 (SBO 3, p. 414; CFS 37, p. 53): ‘...sit e necieris, eris similis aedificanti sine fundamento, ruinam, non structuram faciens.’

<sup>1102</sup> *Int. dom.*, 1-8 (PL 184, 509A-515D).

<sup>1103</sup> *Int. dom.*, 1.1 (PL 184, 509A): ‘Cogitationes et affectiones necessariae sunt in conscientiae mundatione: cogitationes, in investigatione virtutis; affectiones in exercitatione veritatis.’

<sup>1104</sup> *Int. dom.*, 36.76 (PL 84, 545B).

<sup>1105</sup> *Int. dom.*, 36.75 (PL 184, 544C): ‘nulla scientia melior es tilla, qua cognoscit homo se ipsum’; *DSA* 51 (PL 40, 816-817; CFS 24, p. 260).



Only self-knowledge can initiate further exercises that lead a person to divine knowledge via examining their present, past and future selves; their sins, deeds and deservedness of grace; and using their spirit to judge other spirits and advance to knowledge of heavenly, earthly and infernal things.<sup>1106</sup> The step-by-step process of the seven columns highlights the key role of self-knowledge in the building of the soul to God. Each new process changes the space of the soul, making it more receptive to God's grace.

Bernard of Clairvaux's *Sermo ad clericos de conversione* (*Sermon to the Clerics on Conversion*) perhaps serves as the greatest witness to how self-knowledge for the Cistercians served as the crucial first step in the conversion of the soul from a state of negative to positive affectivity. The exact date of Bernard's sermon is unknown. He had stopped in Paris, apparently at the request of the Bishop of Paris, Stephen of Senlis, to deliver a lecture to the students, likely between Lent in 1139 and early 1140. Geoffrey of Auxerre's *Vita prima* recounts that the event was well attended by clerics and that Bernard's preaching was so effective that three students renounced the world and became Cistercian converts.<sup>1107</sup>

Throughout its 32 chapters, the *Sermo de clericos de conversione* sets out a programme for spiritual reform that begins with self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is a form of 'affective knowledge' for Saint Bernard principally because it stems from experience. At the beginning, the 'ears of the heart' (*aurēs cordis*) hear the cries of the individual's guilty conscience as well as the voice of God beseeching the individual to repair their sinful condition by following the teachings of Christ.<sup>1108</sup> Since the soul is a single essence yet has multiple powers – namely reason, memory and will – the soul's self-knowledge and self-perception of its own suffering is analogous to the threefold instruction by the Holy Trinity comprising Father, Son and Holy Spirit. As Bernard says:

Nor is there any difference between this inward voice and this light, as the one same Son of God is both the Word of the Father and the brightness of the his glory. Yet the substance of soul, spiritual and simple in its nature, seems also devoid of any distinction in its senses, yet is whole – if we may speak of wholeness – both seeing and hearing. What other effect does that beam or that word have than to bring the soul to self knowledge? It opens the book of the conscience, passes in review the wretched sequence of life, unfolds the sad events of its history, enlightens the reason and, the memory having leafed is set, as it were, before its own eyes. What is more, these two [memory and reason] are not so much faculties of the soul as the soul itself, so that it is both observer and observed: it appears resolved against itself [Ps 50:21] and is

<sup>1106</sup> *Int. dom.*, 36.76 (PL 185, 545B-C).

<sup>1107</sup> M.-B. Saïd, 'Introduction' in *Bernard of Clairvaux: Sermons on Conversion*, CFS 25 (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1981), p. 13.

<sup>1108</sup> *Conv.*, 1.2 (CFS 25, p. 33).

dragged by these heavy-handed officers before its own assizes to be judged by its own thoughts.<sup>1109</sup>

By conjuring this juridical imagery, Bernard conflates the beginning of self-knowledge with the rise in self-awareness and self-examination of the soul's own merits and demerits through its memories of past perceptions. Pride, envy, avarice, ambition, fornication, theft, cruelty, fraud, evil pleasures and sensual satisfaction are all example of vices which, through spiritual assimilation, 'stamp' on the memory certain 'bitter marks', 'filthy traces' and 'dirty thoughts'.<sup>1110</sup> Because each person's perceptions are unique, this rational probing of the memory is also unique to each individual. 'Do not hope to hear from me what is within your memory that your reason detects, judges and sentences', Bernard rebukes; instead, he cautions every person to 'Apply your hearing within, roll back the eyes of your heart, and you will learn by your own experience what is going on.'<sup>1111</sup> When this self-examination by the court of the soul – will, memory and reason – is complete, feelings of shame, contempt and humility for the soul's past misdeeds and present sinfulness will be enough, Bernard believed, to begin the process of conversion. 'How could the stomach of my memory not ache, when it is crammed with so much muck?', Bernard asks his audience.

What follows in this minor treatise on conversion is a series of steps to repair the fallen condition of the soul. This begins by observing the body since a self-aware and, by extension, a self-knowing person, appreciates and wishes to cultivate their body and soul. This intimate relationship between body and soul is why it is possible to detect sickness in a soul through observing outer actions. 'It is not so much in the disposition as in the results (*non in affectu sed in effectu*) that this hatred of body and soul is discovered', Bernard writes, marking clear use of *affectus-effectus* wordplay.<sup>1112</sup> A proper examination of everyday habits and behaviours, therefore, are essential for detecting signs of spiritual imbalance. Bernard of Clairvaux illustrates this using the example of a madman who keeps scratching at his hand until it bleeds: his outer actions drawing attention to the inner temptation, curiosity and torment of his mind.<sup>1113</sup>

The programme of reform *Sermo ad clericos de conversione* puts forward is loosely structured on the eight beatitudes reflecting Christ's teachings: poverty, contrition, humility,

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<sup>1109</sup> *Conv.*, 1.3 (CFS 25, p. 34).

<sup>1110</sup> *Conv.*, 3.5 (CFS 25, p. 35).

<sup>1111</sup> *Conv.*, 3.4 (CFS 25, p. 35).

<sup>1112</sup> *Conv.*, 4.5 (CFS 25, p. 37).

<sup>1113</sup> *Conv.*, 4.5 (CFS 25, p. 37).

righteousness, mercy, purity of heart, peace and suffering persecution. Overcoming sensual *curiositas*, the first rung on Bernard's ladder of pride, is considered the preparatory step in the restoration of the soul. 'You'll find', Bernard says, 'that a curious man is an empty man' since the five senses, whilst pursuing pleasure, bring no satisfaction to the mind.<sup>1114</sup> To overcome curiosity involves humility and contrition: 'tears will wash the darkness from his eyes, his sight will become keen so he will be able to turn his gaze towards the brightness of glistening light.'<sup>1115</sup> Second, the convert kindles desire for God, briefly glimpsing the heights of contemplative bliss through 'deeply-felt affections'.<sup>1116</sup> The empty soul transforms into a righteous soul as it is filled through instruction in the three theological (hope, faith and love) and four classical virtues (prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice); the spiritual senses of sight, hearing, smell and taste meanwhile are given a foretaste of the fulfilment they can expect in heaven.<sup>1117</sup> The third and fourth steps involve fully purifying the memory of impure thoughts and seeking forgiveness from God and others.<sup>1118</sup> Cultivating purity of heart comprises the fifth step. 'Just as our bodily sight is blurred by some inner fluid or some outer speck of dust, so spiritual insight is impeded either by the lust of our flesh or by worldly curiosity and ambition', Bernard writes.<sup>1119</sup> The sixth step is to make peace by following Christ's example and spreading Christian teachings to others. The penultimate stage is poverty of spirit, the renunciation of worldly goods – a process Bernard explicitly associates with monastic as opposed to urban living. 'Can chastity remain unscathed amid delights, or humility among riches, or piety in business, or truth amid much talking, or charity in this present age?'.<sup>1120</sup> The importance placed on the monastic life is undoubtedly given a prominent position due to Bernard's Cistercian background and his purpose in trying to convert new converts for his growing reform movement. Those who retain some connection to the world cannot truly be said to have cultivated self-knowledge nor purity of heart; nor too can they fulfil their Christian obligation to convert, teach and perfect others. 'Woe to you who have taken away the key not only of knowledge but also of authority', Bernard exclaims, 'for you did not enter yourselves, and you have hindered variously those whom you ought to have led in.'<sup>1121</sup> The eighth and final step in the conversion of a monk is to experience

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<sup>1114</sup> *Conv.*, 6.10 and 8.14 (CFS 25, p. 44 and 48).

<sup>1115</sup> *Conv.*, 11.23 (CFS 25, p. 58).

<sup>1116</sup> *Conv.*, 13.25 (CFS 25, p. 59).

<sup>1117</sup> *Conv.*, 13.25 (CFS 25, p. 60).

<sup>1118</sup> *Conv.*, 15.28 (CFS 25, p. 64).

<sup>1119</sup> *Conv.*, 17.30 (CFS 25, p. 67).

<sup>1120</sup> *Conv.*, 21.37 (CFS 25, p. 75).

<sup>1121</sup> *Conv.*, 19.32 (CFS 25, p. 69).

suffering in the name of Christ. Overall, then, Bernard of Clairvaux's sermon provides a clear itinerary structured on the beatitudes for perfecting the soul. This programme starts and ends with self-knowledge as the goal, with learning how use the senses, emotions, thoughts and memory correctly being considered as vital at the beginning, middling and final stages of the process.

### ***De duodecim patriarchis*: A Victorine Programme of Reform?**

Another clear case where we can witness a programme of reform centred around recalibrating the soul's sense, affect and intellect occurs in Richard of Saint-Victor's *De duodecim patriarchis*. Richard's most explicit appeal to self-knowledge comes at the climax of this biblical allegory whereby the members of Jacob's family personify different capacities of the soul. This text has been well-studied for the character of Joseph, 'Discretion' or 'Self-Knowledge', although less so for its role in revealing how treatises on the soul were integral to the wider Victorine programme of self-knowledge and self-reformation.<sup>1122</sup> Toward the end of the text, after Richard has elaborated the majority of the powers of the soul, he introduces Benjamin, the personification of Contemplation, who is the only one to see Christ transfigured on Mount Tabor.

Much like Bernard, this contemplation is associated with the arduous process of self-knowledge. Here the Victorine thrice exhorts his readers to 'climb this mountain, learn to know yourself' (*Ascende in montem, disce cognoscere teipsum*), associating the mountaintop as the conclusion of a journey to bring order to a person's affections and thoughts. The two final virtues are *Discretio* ('Discretion') and *Contemplatio* ('Contemplation'). Discretion, as we have seen is personified by the biblical patriarch Joseph, who represents the perfect ordering of the emotional and rational faculties of soul and the beginning of contemplation.<sup>1123</sup> Upon first glance it seems odd in *De duodecim patriarchis* that self-knowledge or the virtue of discretion is only discussed near the climax of the treatise, after the senses, emotions and thoughts have been ordered, rather than near the beginning of the process of the soul's cognitive and emotional ordering (as with other *De anima* texts). However, it is clear that Richard

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<sup>1122</sup> Haas, 'Christliche Aspekte', pp. 84-87; Wilkins, *The Delphic Maxims*, pp. 76-77; M.-A. Aris, *Contemplatio: Philosophische Studien zum Traktat Benjamin Maior des Richard von St. Victor: Mit einer verbesserten Edition des Textes*, Fuldaer Studien 6 (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Josef Knecht, 1996), pp. 89-96. For a comprehensive assessment of the Richardian approach to self-knowledge see H. Nakamura, "'Cognitio sui" bei Rikhard von Sankt-Viktor', in *"Scientia" und "Disciplina": Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im Wandel vom 12. zum 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. R. Berndt S.J., M. Lutz-Bachmann and R. M. W. Stammberger, *Erudiri Sapientia* 3 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), pp. 127-156.

<sup>1123</sup> *XII patr.*, 72 (PL 196, 56A; SC 419, p. 296-299; Zinn, p. 129-130).

envisages this process of the ordering love as one journey in itself. Self-knowledge pertains to a second, connected journey of the soul to learn how to contemplate God. As Richard exclaims:

Let him ascend above himself through himself; to knowledge of God, through himself. Let a person first learn in the image of God, let him learn in His similitude what he ought to think about God. The ascent of the mountain [to God], as has been said, pertains to knowledge of self. The things that happen upon the mountain lead on to the knowledge of God.<sup>1124</sup>

Contemplation is the final son of Jacob, Benjamin. Richard would devote an entire treatise to discussing contemplation – *De archa mystica* – which serves as the sequel to *De duodecim patriarchis*, picking up where this first treatise on the soul left off.

That Richard's investigation of the powers of the soul and self-knowledge was understood as preparatory is evident when the *De duodecim patriarchis* is compared with two other texts, the *De exterminatione mali et promotione boni* and *De arca mystica* (*The Mystic Ark*). Beginning with the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt (*De exterminatione*) and ending with creation of the Ark of the Covenant by Moses (*De arca mystica*), these three works form a loose trilogy of allegorical works. Following the journey of the Israelites, these treatises chart the conversion of a canon regular and their passage from the active life to the contemplative life. The character of Jacob, in particular, can be identified with what Németh has called a 'dislocated allegory', since, across his oeuvre, Richard uses the same allegory to explore similar themes yet differentiates different parts of the allegory throughout a single work – or even across multiple treatises. Not only does the repetition create a cluster of interrelationships between the diverse writings of Richard's oeuvre but, as Németh notes, the technique may have even been considered as a learning exercise: 'reading all the parts together gives a fuller meaning... recognising and joining separate parts may well pertain to the active role that he assigns to his reader'.<sup>1125</sup> This is clear in the third book of *De exterminatione mali et promotione boni* as we only encounter a summary of *De duodecim patriarchis* but Richard extends the symbolism of his earlier text by associating each of Jacob's descendants with a stone symbolising a particular virtue. These stones are later used to construct twelve memorials following the entrance of the Israelites into the Promised Land. As van 't Spijker has observed, these stones have a mnemotechnical role in helping a

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<sup>1124</sup> *XII patr.*, 83 (PL, 59B-C; SC 419, pp. 330-332; Zinn, p. 141).

<sup>1125</sup> Németh, 'Contemplation and Cognition of God', p. 97.

Victorine canon maintain a balanced psyche.<sup>1126</sup> In van 't Spijker's assessment of *De exterminazione*, the use of transferable symbols such as Jacob's family was designed to help the Victorine congregation learn through experience, that is, partly as a pedagogical tool to encourage canons to meditate on the literal, allegorical and moral meaning of the text, and partly as a blueprint or architecture to structure their spiritual journey.<sup>1127</sup>

The final text in Richard's trilogy, *De arca mystica*, outlines the differences between the thinking, meditation and contemplation, and can be considered as the sequel to *De duodecim patriarchis* for more advanced students.<sup>1128</sup> *De arca mystica* is mostly concerned with vertical affectivity, the contemplative ascent to God. The opening of the text, consequently, contains a serious health warning to its reader: Richard recounts the story of Jacob's patience in working for Laban for 14 years to remind his audience not to consult this guide to contemplation if they are not ready, that is, they have not achieved the requisite levels of purity of heart and ordered their affections and cognitive faculties together (i.e., horizontal affectivity).<sup>1129</sup> 'For indeed many, even if they know how to be unoccupied in their body, yet are not at all strong enough to be unoccupied in their heart', he writes.<sup>1130</sup>

Consequently, Richard's understanding of the powers of the soul through biblical allegories in *De exterminazione mali et promotione boni*, *De duodecim patriarchis* and his elaboration of the modes of contemplation in *De arca mystica* are envisaged as a journey or integrated spiritual programme, the first two are applicable for beginners, the final text for advanced mystics. Indeed, a popular alternate title for *De duodecim patriarchis* was *De praeperatione animi ad contemplationem* ('On the Preparation of the Soul for Contemplation') or *Benjamin minor* ('The Lesser Benjamin'); whereas *De arca mystica* often went under the title *Benjamin major*. Furthermore, both works commonly were copied together in the same manuscripts. It is in this sequel that Richard not only seeks to discuss more fully how reason is illuminated by wisdom but he builds upon Hugh's educational program into his discussion of the ark. As Dale Coulter writes: 'The figure of the ark becomes both a mnemonic device to expand the mental capacity to hold the knowledge one acquires from reading the books of Creation and Scripture and an immersive meditation

<sup>1126</sup> Van 't Spijker, 'Learning by Experience: Twelfth-Century Monastic Ideas', in *Centres of Learning: Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East*, eds. J. W. Drijvers and A. A. MacDonald (Leiden: Brill, 1995), pp. 204-205; *Id.*, *Fictions of the Inner Life*, p. 167.

<sup>1127</sup> Van 't Spijker, 'Learning by Experience', p. 199 and 206.

<sup>1128</sup> For the definitions of these terms see *Arca mystica*, 1.3-4 (PL 196, 171C-174A; Zinn, pp. 155-158; VTT 5, pp. 259-261).

<sup>1129</sup> *Arca mystica*, 1.2 (PL 196, 65D-66C; VTT 5, pp. 257-258).

<sup>1130</sup> *Arca mystica*, 1.2 (PL 196, 66A; VTT 5, p. 258).

device that focuses the mind on the topic at hand.’<sup>1131</sup> While the focus of *De arca mystica* is clearly contemplation and the cultivation of vertical affectivity, the principal teachings of horizontal affectivity *De duodecim patriarchis* are not invalidated. In fact, affectivity is crucial to contemplation: the ‘entire enterprise must be driven by ordered affectivity or the affections as unified by the love set ablaze for the Wisdom of God.’<sup>1132</sup>

### ***De spiritu et anima*: A Cistercian Programme of Reform?**

Reading a *De anima* text on its own certainly helped a monk to understand human nature: how the constituent parts making up the body and soul came together, were interrelated and, more significantly, how they should be used correctly. Yet is there any evidence of *De anima* treatises being seen as part of a canon? That *De anima* treatises specifically could be integrated into a programme of self-reformation is clearest from observing the textual transmission of the Cistercian *De spiritu et anima*. For instance, there is evidence of the *De spiritu et anima* being compiled with other pseudonymous spiritual texts to form a coherent programme of training beginning in self-knowledge and ending with contemplating God.

This compilation was a treatise ascribed to Hugh of Saint-Victor and known simply as *De anima*. The compilation brought together four texts. First, the reader is introduced to self-knowledge with the pseudo-Bernardine *Meditationes*, which has three basic sub-divisions: (1) a definition of self-knowledge, (2) interior obstacles to self-knowledge (instability of the heart, negligence and impatience) and (3) exterior obstacles (the flesh, the world and the devil).<sup>1133</sup> Next, they can learn about the soul’s powers in depth by consulting the *De spiritu et anima*. Third, is the aforementioned *Tractatus de interiori domo* which, as we saw, contains seven practices which involve self-examination. And finally, in most cases, the compilation concludes with another pseudo-Augustinian work, the *Manuale*, focused on the praise of God, as well as prayer – the latter, a practice that constantly re-starts the cycle of self-knowledge again through establishing a dialogue between God and the self.<sup>1134</sup>

<sup>1131</sup> Coulter, ‘Introduction’, in VTT 5, p. 246. See also van ’t Spijker, ‘Richard of Saint-Victor’s *De contemplatione*’, in Porwoll and Orsbon, *Victorine Restoration*, p. 181.

<sup>1132</sup> Coulter, ‘Introduction’, p. 246. See especially van ’t Spijker’s discussion of the unity of affect and reason in this text: ‘Richard of Saint Victor’s *De contemplatione*’, pp. 193-195.

<sup>1133</sup> C. Giraud, *Spiritualité et histoire des textes entre Moyen Âge et époque moderne: Genèse et fortune d'un corpus pseudépigraphie de méditations* (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2016), p. 163.

<sup>1134</sup> Giraud, *Spiritualité et histoire*, p. 219. In the version preserved in the Patrologia Latina (PL 177, 171A-190D) the fourth text is not the *Manuale* but rather a text with the title *De erectione animae seu mentis in Deum* (‘On the Erection of the Soul or Mind to God’). Chapters 13-15 of which (PL 177, 185A-188D) is dependent on a Pseudo-Anselmian text *De custodia interioris hominis* (‘On the Safekeeping of the Inner Man’).

While the exact purpose and use of this compilation is impossible to know fully, we have tantalising evidence that contemporaries did consider treatises on the soul – and especially the *De spiritu et anima* – as important sources of doctrine in a integrated body of knowledge about the soul and its salvation. Cedric Giraud has usefully noted that one of the manuscript witnesses of this text has attempted to make this programme of self-knowledge more explicit by changing the titles of the texts to better reflect the content of their teachings. Book one [*Meditationes*] is simply called *De anima*, possibly to highlight the soul as the beginning of the process; book two [*De spiritu et anima*] is *De viribus et affectionibus animae* ('On the Powers and Affections of the Soul'); book three [*De interiori domo*] is named *De conscientia* ('On Conscience'); and the final text [*Manuale*] is entitled *Liber de salute animae* ('Book on the Salvation of the Soul').<sup>1135</sup> When read together, the user could consult an ordered guidebook that begins with the definition of the soul and its powers, delves further into morality and the inner life, and concludes by setting out the actions required to procure the reward of eternal happiness and peace in heaven.

## Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, the Cistercians and Victorines occupy a distinct phrase in the *Rezeptionsgeschichte* of the Delphic Apollo's invocation to "know yourself", through their use of *Libri de anima* and psychological writings to place emphasis on the soul as the unique aspect of man's human nature. The maxim across history has held – and continues to hold – importance for theologians, philosophers, artists, psychologists and entertainers as an injunction designed to encourage ethical and intellectual transformation. We find the same usage of the maxim as an introductory motif in the prologues and opening chapters of works of political philosophy throughout the Enlightenment and Romantic writers, since self-knowledge continued to be treated as a subject deeply interrelated with the nature of man. Book 1 of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*, for example, displays sympathy for the Victorine pedagogical programme centred around the *Ars legendi* through Hobbes' famous parsing of *Nosce te ipsum* as "Read thy self" – a translation Hugh of Saint-Victor no doubt would have approved of.<sup>1136</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote in the prologue to his Second Discourse that the 'Temple of Delphi contained a precept more difficult and more important than is to be

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<sup>1135</sup> Giraud, *Spiritualité et histoire*, p. 219.

<sup>1136</sup> T. Hobbes, 'Introduction', *Leviathan*, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 10.



found in all the huge volumes that moralists have ever written.’<sup>1137</sup> Hegel’s *The Philosophy of Mind* opens, too, by justifying the philosophy of mind through an appeal to the absolute and universal (rather than particular) commandment to know yourself, to know that reality is shaped by mind. The objective, Hegel thought, ‘is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect to the *particular* capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self [but] of man’s genuine reality...’<sup>1138</sup>

Yet for the Cistercians and Victorines, self-knowledge was never an isolated act. Self-knowledge required, as I have shown, learning how to conduct oneself virtuously amongst many other selves. Whether in a Cistercian monastery or Victorine abbey, guilt and humility were key emotions to this process. What makes the Cistercian and Victorine model of self-knowledge different is that it was connected to institutions with distinctive anthropological and theological worldviews. For the Cistercians, self-knowledge is largely concerned with the individual restoration of self- and divine love, whereas in Victorine texts, knowing the self is considered as the foundational not only for love of self and God, but also love of neighbour.

Modern approaches to self-knowledge bear more of a resemblance to Michel Foucault’s understanding of “know yourself”. For Foucault, the invocation can be primarily understood by another Socratic imperative: that of self-care. Socrates’ advice to “take care of yourself” (*epimelēsthai sautou*), was a phrase that Foucault has argued was commonly interpreted as “take care of your soul”.<sup>1139</sup> Caring for the self was deeply embedded into Foucault’s understanding of power relations, as part of the ‘technology’ of governmentality.<sup>1140</sup> It is through the self, Foucault argues, that societies exert power over an individual. They prevent or

permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.<sup>1141</sup>

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<sup>1137</sup> J.-J. Rousseau, ‘Prologue’, *Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Men*, ed. and trans. V. Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 124.

<sup>1138</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, ‘The Philosophy of Mind’. in *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, 377, trans. W. Wallace, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind: Translated from the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1894), p. 3.

<sup>1139</sup> M. Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self’, in *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, eds. L. H. Martin, H. Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), pp. 19-22. See also Foucault, ‘The Cultivation of the Self’, in *The History of Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care of the Self*, tr. R. Hurley (London, 1986, 2020), p. 43-45.

<sup>1140</sup> Foucault, ‘Technologies’, pp. 17-19.

<sup>1141</sup> Foucault, ‘Technologies’, p. 18.

This self-transformation through ethics was indeed a cornerstone of Cistercian and Victorine self-knowledge, and Foucault's focus on power certainly does give an appreciation for the role of Cistercian and Victorine institutions in cultivating, promulgating and guarding the techniques to better know yourself and, by extension, God. However, it is the all-encompassing aspect of self-knowledge found in Cistercian and Victorine psychological texts that distinguishes the Hadotian from the Foucauldian approach.

As we have seen, for Pierre Hadot, Christian exercises were 'spiritual' as opposed to 'intellectual' because they were practical, lived out techniques and habits of behaviour that 'were intended not simply to develop the intelligence of the discipline, but to transform all aspects of... being – intellect, imagination, sensibility, and will'.<sup>1142</sup> Therefore, Hadot was right to critique Foucault's reading of spiritual exercises only as a 'lived ethics' that anachronistically strips away the 'lived logic' and 'lived physics' of an all-encompassing philosophy of life. A philosophy like Christianity was not 'just the theory of acting well, but it concerned actually speaking well, thinking well... [and] being truly conscious of one's place in the cosmos.'<sup>1143</sup> It is the broader Hadotian perspective that best encapsulates the dialogic, back-and-forth aspect of the Augustinian blend of Christianity that the *De anima* treatises of the twelfth century drew upon to frame the wider implications of the thoughts and affections in changing the soul's affectivity. Twelfth-century *libri de anima* and psychological writings, therefore, cannot be isolated from the practices and anthropological thinking of the communities they were produced by.

As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, the stress on cultivating a harmonious, ordered relationship between the powers of reason and love, intellect and affect, should be considered as embedded in the experiential understanding of life in Cistercian and Victorine communities. To end, it is worth briefly considering how several of the themes encountered in this psychology would become popularised in Alan of Lille's *Ars praedicandi* (*Art of Preaching*) written towards the end of the twelfth century around 1184. Alan spent his retirement at Cîteaux in the habit of the White Monks; and while not a Cistercian when he wrote his guide to preaching, the text does give a sense to the degree that the theme of self-knowledge was in the air. Chapter three, 'On Despising Yourself' (*De contemptu sui*), of this *vade mecum* offered a concise summary of to an inspiring preacher on the interconnection of

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<sup>1142</sup> Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, p. 21.

<sup>1143</sup> See Hadot, 'Philosophie, discours philosophique, et divisions de la philosophie chez les Stoïciens', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 45:178 (1991), p. 212, cited in *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, p. 24.

self-knowledge and the experiences of daily life. Alan reminds preachers to tell their audience to:

Remember your final end, which is written in the book of knowledge. You may read about yourself in the book of experience. You may discover yourself in the book of conscience. The book of knowledge – written in a volume – may reprehend, as well as the book of experience written in the heart. You read in the book of knowledge: “Know Yourself”. In the book of experience you will read that *the flesh battles against the spirit* [Ga 5:17], in the book of conscience that the day of judgement circles on remorseless wings.<sup>1144</sup>

It is from these three books – knowledge, experience, and conscience – that worshippers can observe themselves and cultivate the humility needed to amend their ways. Alan continues:

O man, look at yourself in this threefold mirror and you will not be pleased by the sight of yourself. The glass in which you should behold yourself in is triple: the mirror of Scripture, the mirror of nature, and the mirror of creation. In the mirror of Scripture you will read of your condition. In the mirror of creation you will behold your wretchedness. In the mirror of nature you will see you stand accused. But in your own nature, a threefold mirror reflects back again: the glass of reason, the glass of the senses, and the glass of the flesh.<sup>1145</sup>

Thus, self-knowledge for Alan of Lille represents the soul comparing itself to the examples found in Scripture, the cosmos, and other creatures. Indeed, it is only by considering the powers of the soul and body through which the world itself is experienced – reason, sense and flesh – that true self-knowledge can be achieved. In these respects, Alan was in complete harmony with prevailing Cistercian and Victorine thought. Self-knowledge here, like Cistercian and Victorine psychology, involves a constant act of self-understanding, self-examination and self-perfection that jointly involves the powers of both soul and body, reason and sense, and combines the temporalities of past, present and future in a coherent vision of life as the cultivation of virtue and the quest for God.

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<sup>1144</sup> Alan of Lille, *Ars Praedicandi*, 3, PL 210, 118B-C; tr. G. R. Evans, *The Art of Preaching*, CS 23 (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1981), pp. 29-30: ‘Memorare igitur novissima tui, in libro scientiae, ut te legas in libro experientiae, ut te invenias in libro conscientiae: ut te reprehendat liber scientiae scriptus in codice, liber experientiae scriptus in corde. In libro scientiae legis: “Nosce te Ipsum”; in libro experientiae legis: “Caro pugnat adversus spiritum”; in libro conscientiae legis: “Assiduis circumvolat alis, Saeva dies animi”.’

<sup>1145</sup> Alan of Lille, *Ars Praedicandi*, 3, PL 210, 1; tr. G. R. Evans, *The Art of Preaching*, CS 23 (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1981), p. 30: ‘O homo! Vide te in triplici speculo, et displicebis tibi. Triplex est speculum in quo te debes videre. Speculum Scripturae, speculum naturae, speculum creaturae. In speculo Scripturae legis statum tuum, in speculo creaturae videbis te miserum, in speculo naturae considerabis te reum. In tua autem natura triplex resultat speculum, speculum rationis, sensualitatis et carnis.’

## EPILOGUE – THE LEGACY OF ‘AUGUSTINIAN’ AFFECTIVITY AND PERCEPTION

### *De spiritu et anima* and Trinity College Cambridge, MS O.7.16

As an epilogue to this study, the significance of Augustine’s thought in the twelfth century upon the Cistercians and Victorines is perhaps best seen through the *De spiritu et anima* (*On the Spirit and the Soul*).

Historians today are fortunate that an artistic imagining of the doctrines of this *De anima* treatise survives as a bifolium drawing on folios 46v-47r of MS O.7.16 held at Trinity College, Cambridge (see Figure 28; and details in Figure 29 and Figure 30).<sup>1146</sup> This drawing was inserted at the end of a 23 chapter (folios 1-48r) copy of the text from the mid-thirteenth century, alongside other short texts written by Saint-Augustine, a papal bull and miscellaneous documents relating to a Cistercian house.<sup>1147</sup> This bifolium visualises the divisions and subdivisions of the soul’s capacities as a Horizontal Tree diagram on the verso (46v) and features a drawing of a monk (presumably a Cistercian) with labels designating the ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ senses on the body and mind on the facing recto (47r). I have transcribed and translated these labels in the Appendix.

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<sup>1146</sup> This manuscript is described as no. 1344 in *The Western Manuscripts in the Library of Trinity College Cambridge: A Descriptive Catalogue: Vol. 3* (Cambridge, 1903), pp. 357-358.

<sup>1147</sup> The contents are as follows: fol. 47: Augustine *De libero arbitrio*; fol. 48r Augustine’s *De anima* (fifteenth century); fols. 50r-v: bull of Pope Gregory X (1271-1276) for a Cistercian house, witnessed by Amadeus, the abbot of the Augustinian house of Saint-Etienne in Dijon, the dean of the chapel of the Duke of Burgundy, and the dean of the diocese of Dijon and Langres; fols. 51r-53v: a story about cleric Alberic.




Figure 28. Drawing of the soul and the outer/inner senses. Pseudo-Augustine/Alcher of Clairvaux, *De spiritu et anima*, Trinity College, Cambridge MS O.7.16, fols. 46v-47r (c. 1200). Ink on parchment, 160 x 115 mm. © The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge.






Figure 29. Tree Diagram of Anima ('Soul') and its Faculties and Powers. Trinity, Cambridge MS O.7.16, f. 46v © The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge.






Figure 30. Detail of the Inner and Outer Senses. Trinity, Cambridge MS O.7.16, f. 47r © The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge.




Figure 31. *De spiritu et anima* explicit. Trinity, Cambridge MS O.7.16, f. 48r © The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge.

This manuscript diagram is significant because it reflects two contrasting types of perception: a ‘horizontal’ model more common to medicine, and a ‘vertical’ model more common to Neoplatonic philosophy and theology. These are normally found as opposing one another in theories of perception in the late Middle Ages and Renaissance yet here are harmonised together.<sup>1148</sup> The diagram of folio 47r does not explicitly show how the sensory organs are connected via nerves to the brain as later visualisations do. Nonetheless, a ‘horizontal’ model of perception is clear: sense data collected by the five senses, passes from the outside world through each cell in turn, finally being deposited in the memory. Notable is the fact that the fifth cell, *fantasia* or ‘fantasy’, has been given a privileged place in contrast to the other cells: positioned atop the other four powers, *fantasia* connects all three sections of the brain and symbolically holds the highest position in the head.

<sup>1148</sup> Klemm, *Bildphysiologie*, p. 78.



In contrast to folio 47r, the primary mode of visualisation with the Horizontal Tree diagram is not through image but via text. The Horizontal Tree diagram structure not only enables each power or *virtus* of the soul (with its sub-divisions) to be explained at a glance, summarising the doctrines of the *De spiritu et anima* in a single page, but also visually communicates how these powers are progressively differentiated and rarefied yet come together to form a complete organism.<sup>1149</sup> Significantly, the lower section of folio 46v faithfully reconstructs an Augustinian account of the affectivity of the soul. On the far left a sphere representing the ‘affections of the rational soul’ (*affectiones animae rationalis*) has been drawn. From which issues two smaller circles representing the negative and positive appetites of the will (*voluntas*), each of which are associated with their respective affections – listed here as *dolor* (‘pain’) and *timor* (‘fear’) for irascibility and *desiderium* (‘desire’) and *gaudium* (‘happiness’) for concupiscibility.

The term *aspectus* in this drawing describes the stages of contemplation in the vision of God. This term was a favourite of Augustine’s and was used in the same context by Bernard of Clairvaux and especially by later Franciscans such as Bonaventure and Robert Grosseteste. Notably, *De spiritu et anima* also makes use of the term *aspectus* to refer to the soul’s use of reason (*ratio*) to gain sight of God via the ‘eye of the mind’ (*oculus mentis*).<sup>1150</sup> The text goes on to state that is through this sight that the powers of reason, affectivity and the senses are united together in experiencing God:

Reason (*ratio*) is a gaze of the mind (*aspectus mentis*) whereby good and evil are distinguished, the virtues are chosen, and God is loved. The mind... can grasp the invisible cause of things through understanding and gather the visible forms of physical things through the reception of the senses. Whether it goes out to sensible things through the senses or rises to invisible things through the understanding, the mind draws to itself the likeness of things.<sup>1151</sup>

Consequently, in Cistercian psychology the powers and spheres of affectivity (*affectus*), reason (*ratio*) and sense perception (*sensus*) are imagined as both discrete *and* overlapping. The *aspectus*, therefore, aids the activities of the *affectus* in discrimination between good and evil and directing the soul’s will or ‘gaze’ towards loving only those things relating to God.

<sup>1149</sup> DSA, 20-22 (PL 40, 794-795; CFS 24, pp. 212-214).

<sup>1150</sup> DSA, 10 (PL 40, 785; CFS 24, p. 192).

<sup>1151</sup> DSA, 11 (PL 40, 786; CFS 24, p. 194): ‘Ratio siquidem est mentis aspectus quo bonum et malum discernit, virtutes eligit, Deumque diligit. Mens... invisibiles rerum causas per intelligentiam comprehendit, et visibiles actualium formas per sensuum passiones colligit. Et sive per sensus ad sensibilia exeat, sive per intelligentiam ad invisibilia ascendant, rerum similitudines ad se ipsam trahit...’

No.	Grade of <i>Aspectus</i>		Description	<i>Affectio</i>
1	Higher Gazes ( <i>superior facies</i> )	Apprehensive ( <i>Apprehensiva</i> )	When the <i>aspectus</i> is joined with divine light ( <i>cum coniungitur lumino divino</i> )	Love ( <i>Amor</i> )
2		Speculative ( <i>Speculativa</i> )	When the <i>aspectus</i> is joined with intelligence ( <i>cum coniungitur intellegentie</i> )	Fear ( <i>Timor</i> )
3		Intelligence ( <i>Intelligentie</i> )	When the <i>aspectus</i> gazes through itself ( <i>cum per ipsam intuetur</i> )	Hope ( <i>Spes</i> )
4	Lower Gazes ( <i>inferior facies</i> )	Intellect ( <i>Intellectus</i> )	When the <i>aspectus</i> gazes through the cause of a thing ( <i>cum intuetur rem per causam</i> )	Admiration ( <i>Admiratio</i> )
5		Opinion ( <i>Opinio</i> )	When the <i>aspectus</i> gazes through the logical sequence of things ( <i>cum intuetur rem per consequentia</i> )	Doubt ( <i>Dubitatio</i> )
6		Phantasy ( <i>Phantastica</i> )	When the <i>aspectus</i> gazes by its own phantasy, that is, through exterior appearances ( <i>cum intuetur per sua phantastica, id est, per exteriores apparitiones</i> )	Terror ( <i>Terror</i> )

Table 20. The grades of *aspectus* and their associated *affectiones*. Trinity College Cambridge, MS O.7.16, fol. 46v.

The use of the term *aspectus* in the Trinity manuscript has a layer of additional significance because it is used with full cognizance of the blurred boundaries between the intellect and affect of the soul. Table 20 shows that MS O.7.16 divides the *aspectus* into six divisions: the three types of ‘lower’ gazes of the soul are phantasy, opinion and intellect, whereas the three ‘higher’ gazes are intelligence and the speculative and apprehensive experience of God. It is an experience because these six grades of *aspectus* are not solely confined to a perceptive or cognitive action; instead, each type of *aspectus* has a corresponding *affectio* associated with it. The lowest grade of *aspectus* – the perception of fantastical images – thus elicits the feeling of terror, whereas the intellect’s more reflexive act of perceiving the nature of God via the causes of things can evoke feelings of admiration. The affection of fear is associated with the penultimate grade of rational sight: the combination of reason with

intelligence. Yet, in the schema presented in the Trinity manuscript, the clearest and highest form of cognition – an *aspectus* super-infused with divine light and grace – also elicits the highest form of affectivity: love.

Overall, the compilation of folios 46v and 47r of Trinity College Cambridge, MS O.7.16 presents a sophisticated series of mirroring. Next to the vertical model of perception with a top-to-bottom *ductus* (‘flow’) on the verso folio is a horizontal model of perception of the inner senses and a bottom-to-top *ductus* on the recto page as the senses are vertically aligned, beginning with those possessing lowly connotations (i.e., touch) and ending with those understood by *De spiritu et anima* to be quasi-spiritual (i.e., fantasy). And if the text of the Horizontal Tree diagram on folio 46v moves inwards to the spine in a right to left movement, this is matched by the left to right orientation of the monk’s portfolio and the direction of his visual gaze on folio 47r. When examined in its totality, this bifolium points to just how complex *De anima* treatises could be with multiple overlapping modes of perception, yet also suggests how several competing ideals can be harmonised into one holistic view of body and soul.

This thesis began with Saint Augustine and the *De spiritu et anima* because this text is undisputedly the most significant *De anima* treatise of the twelfth century in terms of its significance. Being produced toward the end of the century, *De spiritu et anima* arguably can be said to represent one of the last great Augustinian syntheses of the soul. In 1995, Richard C. Dales comprehensively covered the history of problems of the soul in the thirteenth century at the universities of Oxford and Paris following the introduction of Aristotelian doctrines. The *De spiritu et anima* especially would become the text used to defend an Augustinian understanding of the soul in contrast to the Aristotle’s doctrine. Dales has called the period of 1235 to 1255 a period of confusion at Oxford since figures such as Adam of Buckfield, Richard Fishacre, Richard Rufus of Cornwall and R. de Stannington all demonstrated a common trait: ‘the incompatibility of what they considered to be Augustine’s teaching (although most of the works they cite for this purpose are not by Augustine; for example, Gennadius of Marseilles, *De Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, which they cite as Augustine, *De difficionibus recte fidei*, and Alcher of Clairvaux’s *De spiritu et anima*) that the human soul is one substance with a variety of powers, and their understanding of Aristotle’s teaching, that the vegetative and sensitive souls are educed from the potency of matter and are corruptive, and are distinct from the rational soul, which come from without

and is incorruptible.’<sup>1152</sup> Richard Rufus, Dales notes, begins his discussion of the soul by setting the views of the ‘philosophers’ sharply against the view of Augustine (using *De spiritu et anima*).<sup>1153</sup> Following this, Aquinas and the Dominicans would reject the teachings of *De spiritu et anima*. From there, it is possible to draw a line of influence from the twelfth-century theologians of the soul and the Franciscan and Dominican philosophers of the soul in the thirteenth. This conflict between an Augustinian, theological view of the soul and an Aristotelian, hylomorphic vision would reach a breaking point on March 7, 1277, when bishop Tempier would condemn a series of Aristotelian propositions.

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<sup>1152</sup> Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul*, p. 47.

<sup>1153</sup> *Ibid*, p. 58.

## CONCLUSION

### Summary of Key Findings

This thesis has examined theories and practices of perception and affectivity in Cistercian and Victorine *De anima* treatises in the twelfth century. These two groups, I have sought to argue, were distinctive in their project to provide a holistic view of man in their spiritual programmes, and as a consequence wrote *libri de anima* to explain the soul's capacities and how they relate to the body. These treatises are known because of the systematisation of the powers of sensuality, affectivity and cognition – sensing, feeling and thinking. I have tried to show throughout this thesis that these boundaries frequently overlap and these powers of the soul possessed a complementary relationship to one another in the emotional and psychic regulation of Cistercian monks and Victorine canons.

### Contribution 1: History of Institutions

The thesis has sought to make two interventions in scholarship. The first has illuminated the affective character of the institutions under study. Monks of the Cistercian Order and Victorine canons both were key innovators of a new affective spirituality during this period. In most of the authors we have studied, sensation or *sensus* is often intimately associated with affectivity, the *affectus*; meanwhile, the *affectus* is considered as the twin power of understanding, the *intellectus*. The highest stages of affective and intellective understanding often involve these latter two powers coming together in union, or even becoming indivisible from one another. Cistercian and Victorine psychology, then, was holistic: it was necessary to moderate and restore all the powers of the body and soul. In bringing the complementary attitude the Cistercians and Victorines had towards body and soul, affectivity and understanding, I hope to have provided a way around some historical narratives which portray these groups as either predominantly affective or intellective. Affectivity as a subject of study does this because it combines an appreciation of the body, emotions and thought. As Amos Yong has observed, affectivity is useful because it can provide a different perspective of looking at institutions – in my case, the Victorines – who are primarily considered as intellectuals, schoolmen and teachers, emphasising the emphasis of love and affection in their thought.<sup>1154</sup> On the other hand, when we consider how a group like the Cistercians –

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<sup>1154</sup> A. Yong, *The Spirit, The Affections and the Christian Tradition*, pp. 298-9.

overwhelmingly considered as affective in orientation – we can see an equal focus on intellectual endeavours.

Moreover, I have repeatedly argued throughout this dissertation that the creation of *De anima* treatises for these two communities cannot be separated from the new styles of monasticism and asceticism that they aimed to promote. Twelfth-century *libri de anima* cannot be considered as solely theoretical texts; they use their theoretical foundation to give advice on how to live virtuously and cultivate a new mode of perceiving and feeling that is based on an appreciation of God and God's love for the universe. These texts were produced to support Cistercian and Victorine spirituality and everyday practices. Reading a *liber de anima* helped to provide novices and seasoned masters the knowledge of their 'self' in order to best develop affective relationships with their coreligionists and God.

### Contribution 2: Intellectual History of the Cistercians and Victorines

Aside from this foundational contribution, this dissertation makes three further distinctive arguments necessary for understanding the contribution of Cistercian and Victorine *libri de anima* and psychology to the intellectual history of the twelfth century. (1) The first and most significant contribution of this thesis has been to provide a systematic study of the *De anima* treatises and psychological literature produced by these two groups. While several authors have noted the similarities in their genres, ideas and practices of both groups, there has been to date no systematic comparison of these texts produced by these groups. The prologue charted how Cistercian and Victorine thinkers received Augustinian-Neoplatonism and utilised the Bishop of Hippo's psychology to highlight the power of the *affectus* as a power virtually indistinguishable from the will.

This thesis, therefore, has argued that these seemingly theoretical psychological treatises were connected with to concrete practices and the *habitus* each canon or monk aimed to cultivate. By combining approaches from sensory, emotional and experiential histories, my aim was to highlight how affectivity, somewhat unsurprisingly, cannot be understood unless by showing how these theories of psychology relate to Cistercian and Victorine experience. I argued in chapter 1, chapter 2 and chapter 3 that the psychological schemas found in *De anima* treatises sought to increasingly classify and systematise the powers of the soul because the lives that Cistercian monks and Victorine canons led necessitated knowing the foundational components of man. Chapter 4 showed how the soul's powers of affectivity (*affectus*) and intellect (*intellectus*) were essential to the anthropologies of both groups: the restoration of the soul's power of feeling reflected the soul's growth in its

likeness to God, the restoration of the intellect confirmed the soul as made to the image of God. In chapter 5 we saw how the ‘motions’ of these twin powers, thus, become the two forms of spiritual change in the soul, which increasingly re-fashion the soul’s *habitus*.

In the reforming ethos of the Cistercians and Victorines and their understanding of the soul as a mirror of knowledge, we see how *libri de anima* and writings on psychology were enmeshed with the broader twelfth-century themes of moderation, reformation and, principally, self-knowledge. As we saw in chapter 6, self-knowledge is considered as the first, crucial step in soul’s conversion from love of the world or ‘negative’ affectivity to ordered love or ‘positive’ affectivity. Reconditioning the person’s *habitus* of perception, feeling and thinking clearly necessitated a series of exercises to guard and close off the senses, to orientate the soul’s affections (frequently joy, hope, sadness and fear), to their correct ends, and to focus thoughts on God. Chapter 7 showed how self-knowledge is an essential feature of *De anima* treatises and that several of these texts can be considered as part of a programme of reform.

(2) In doing so, this dissertation aims to have made a second, more granular contribution. *Libri de anima* plainly reveal the complex language connected with Cistercian and Victorine understandings of sense perception, affectivity and contemplation. I have shown that the Latin terms *affectio*, *affectus*, *sensus*, *ratio* and *intellectus* (among several others) were key concepts in Cistercian and Victorine psychological literature, subject to change and variation across the century, both between groups and individuals. Translating and interpreting the meaning of words such as *affectus* will continue to present challenges. Nonetheless, I have argued that some consistency in the usage of this term can be found in *De anima* treatises whereby affectivity is understood as the power or force of the soul by which the soul adheres to objects, people and God through its ‘attachments’ or ‘affections’. The role of the *affectus* in ordering and disposing the *affectiones* also means that affectivity is closely aligned with the language relating to morality and ethics. We encounter Latin nouns such as *sensus*, *affectus* and *intellectus* in close proximity with discussions on virtue (*virtus*) and vice (*vitium*). Affectivity was a core part of an Augustinian morality system developed by Cistercian monks and Victorine canons centred around the correct use and enjoyment (*uti-frui*) of perceptions, emotions and thoughts.

While this thesis has hopefully raised attention of this connection between affectivity and morality, this link has, admittedly, been acknowledged in past scholarship. Where this work breaks new ground is to show how investigations of the soul must look beyond the terminology used to designate the soul’s powers and capacities. Each of the chapters of this

thesis have explored how terms such as *affectus*, *intellectus* and *sensus* interact with technical Latin nouns and adjectives. In Chapter 4, for instance, I made the case for how the terms *intellectus/ratio* and *affectus/voluntas* reflect the creation of these powers in the *imago* and *similitudo* of God, respectively. The argument of chapter 5 advanced this anthropological claim in two ways. First, we saw how an *affectus* and *intellectus* were imagined as a form of *motus* and *mutatio*, that is, motion and change. Second, I showed that this psychological language sits within a much wider constellation of terms relating to a wider Christian anthropological worldview. I suggested that re-evaluating common wordplays – such as *affectus-effectus* (affectivity-effect), *affectus-defectus* (affectivity-failure), *defectus-profectus* (failure-progress) and *affectus-habitus* (affectivity-disposition) – offers a further, and previously underexplored, way of seeing how Cistercian and Victorine psychology maps onto the wider aims and motivations of the twelfth-century reform movement. These oppositions – when combined with the classic contrasts between affect and intellect – I argued can map out the dimensions of affectivity, the anthropological goal of reformation these groups subscribed to. Cistercian and Victorine life can be seen as restoring the *defectūs* present in the soul through cultivating attachments (*affectūs*) and an understanding (*intellectus*) that gradually re-forms the structure of the soul. Over time, these virtuous effects (*effectus*) and actions help the soul make progress (*profectus*) in its spiritual journey to be reunited with God in love.

(3) Finally, a further semantic connection was uncovered in chapters 6 and 7 which explored how this vocabulary intersects with the language of Christian Socratism: the injunction to “Know Yourself” (*Nosce/Scito te ipsum*) and develop self-knowledge (*cognitio sui*). Self-knowledge, I argued, regularly is found connected with the opposed Cistercian and Victorine notions of *humilitas* and *curiositas*. Given the deep interactions between all these terms, it is not surprising that we encounter the highest affectivities between the soul and God explained as a form of spiritual sensation. Since *sensus*, *affectus* and *intellectus* all denote a form of motion and change, it is therefore fitting that the *De anima* treatise of the Cistercians and Victorines – most clearly those of Hugh of Saint-Victor, William of Saint-Thierry and Alcher of Clairvaux – utilised the mechanisms of perception as an analogy for the perception of God through emotion and thought. Overall, this study of perception and emotions side-by-side through the prism of experience highlights how integrated psychological phenomena such as sensing, feeling and thinking were in the twelfth century.

## **Future Directions**



There are several future directions for studies of affectivity. Unfortunately, due to space, I was not able to explore instances of how Cistercian and Victorine ideas of perception and affectivity got implicated into the rules of life each community lived by and their everyday practices. There is, for instance, much scope to explore the examples of sensory and emotional self-regulation specified in the Benedictine and Augustine Rules. Individuals such as Aelred of Rievaulx, William of Saint-Thierry and Gilduin and Hugh of Saint-Victor all wrote customaries for how to live as a Cistercian monk or canon which make great use of the language of affectivity examined here. Moreover, *curiositas* as a form of negative affectivity and disordered perception is the focus of treatises such as Bernard of Clairvaux's *Apologia*, Aelred of Rievaulx's *De speculo caritatis* and Hugh of Saint-Victor's *Ark Treatises*. Each of these writers suggests tangible steps for cleansing and ordering the *affectus*.

Second, this thesis has predominantly focused on the Cistercians and Victorines, however, affectivity was not the exclusive preserve of these groups. Benedictine monks like Peter of Celle also were deeply interested in the *interior homo* and understanding the conscience. Indeed, perhaps the most fruitful line of further study is to trace how Cistercian and Victorine psychology was innovated upon by the Franciscan and Dominican Orders in the thirteenth century.

A third avenue of research is to further explore the Cistercian and Victorine preference for utilising symbols, metaphor, and allegory to convey and make memorable their understandings of affectivity and psychology. This thesis has noted in passing the use of cosmological and gender symbolism, in particular. The importance of biblical allegories, such as the Twelve Patriarchs and Noah's Ark, and their intersection with Victorine understandings of mnemonics and 'experiential exegesis' was also explored in the thought of Richard of Saint-Victor and Hugh of Saint-Victor. In previous publications, I have explored how medicine, gender and family symbolism were drawn upon by figures such as William of Saint-Thierry, Isaac of Stella and Richard of Saint-Victor.<sup>1155</sup> There remains, however, a rich undercurrent of symbols and metaphors in Cistercian, and Victorine texts especially, which compare the powers of the soul to musical instruments and harmonies, the sowing and cultivation of gardens, the angelic hierarchy and the construction of buildings, such as houses, temples and churches. Further research into this area is particularly warranted for

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<sup>1155</sup> Jacob's Family as a Symbol of Affectivity in Cistercian and Victorine Psychology', *Archa Verbi*, 18 (2021) pp. 39-9; 'Healthy Body, Healthy Mind: *Eucrasia* and *sanitas* in the Medical Approaches to Affectivity of William of Saint-Thierry and Richard of Saint-Victor', *Cîteaux – Commentarii Cistercienses* (shortly going to press).

Cistercian authors, who are rarely credited with the development of symbolism and mnemonics in the twelfth century.

A final area for further investigation is gender. Due to my source material, this doctoral dissertation has focused on the output of male monks and canons. In doing so, it has given tacit support for the ‘Southern thesis’ that the language and practices affective piety was male-led, often signalled with adjectives such as Anselmian, Bernardine or Franciscan. Sarah McNamer’s 2010 *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion* has shown that the opposite was the case. ‘When affective meditation was taken up by male monastics such as Bernard of Clairvaux, and later by the Franciscans, it continued to carry within it a gendered logic: to feel compassion is to feel like a woman.’<sup>1156</sup> Peter Dronke, Juanita Feros Ruys and Barbara Newman have contributed to our understanding of the relationship intellectuals such as Heloise, Hildegard and the nuns at Helfta had with the term *affectus*.<sup>1157</sup> Bonnie J. Wheeler has reflected on Heloise’s use of psychological terminology such as *cor*, *anima/animus*, *mens*, *opus/operatio*, *peccatum/vitium* and concludes that her skilful uses of these terms was on par with figures such as Peter Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux and Hildegard of Bingen.<sup>1158</sup> Unfortunately, no women wrote what is clearly identifiable as a *De anima* treatise in the twelfth century. A fact that raises a perplexing question: why not? Were these treatises gendered due to their association with male monks and schoolmen? What is clear, though, that affectivity and the term *affectus* was central to several Cistercian women such as Gertrude the Great and Beatrice of Nazareth, and comparative studies of the understandings of psychology with male Cistercian monks would be of great use. Clearly, the twelfth century is a dynamic period for studies of affectivity, and this dissertation aims to have contributed to raising an awareness of one aspect: the contribution of Cistercian monks and the canons of the Abbey of Saint-Victor.

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<sup>1156</sup> S. McNamer, *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), p. 7.

<sup>1157</sup> P. Dronke, *Women Writers of the Middle Ages: A Critical Study of Texts from Perpetua (†203) to Marguerite Porete (†1310)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 118; J. F. Ruys, ‘Before the Affective Turn: *Affectus* in Heloise, Abelard and the Woman Writer of the *Epistolae duorum amantium*’, in *Before Emotion*, pp. 61-75; B. Newman, ‘*Affectus* from Hildegard of Helfta’, in *Before Emotion*, pp. 97-107.

<sup>1158</sup> B. J. Wheeler, *Listening to Heloise*, xxii. See also the remarks of Marenbon in *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard*, p. 92.

## APPENDIX

### APPENDIX 1: TRANSCRIPTION AND TRANSLATION OF TRINITY MS O.7.16 (FF. 46v-47r)

Note on transcription: This transcription reproduces the text of the manuscript line-by-line (e.g., left to right) and vertically (e.g., top to bottom). Text in bold denotes main headings, whereas bold type signifies subheadings. Individual remarks within each sub-heading are differentiated using roman numerals. All abbreviations have been expanded and an English translation is provided in the parentheses. Square brackets supply any Latin text not included in the manuscript or titles.

#### I. Horizontal Tree Diagram of the Soul (f. 46v)

### ANIMA (Soul)

#### 1. Vegetabilis (Vegetative Power)

##### a. Nutritiva (Nutritive)

- i. Attractiva (Attractive)
- ii. Digestiva (Digestive)
- iii. Distributiva (Distributive)
- iv. Expulsiva (Expulsive)

Hoc viget (This nourishes)

- i. Radice (By the root)
- ii. Medulla stipitis (By the marrow of a tree trunk)
- iii. Nodis (By the node)
- iv. Ramis (By branches)

Hoc est modus, hoc conservat individuum (By this manner, the thing is conserved undivided)

##### b. Augmentativa (augmentative)

- i. Conservans species partium (Partly conserves the species)
- ii. Conservans specium totius (Completely conserves the species)
- iii. Conservans specium medii (Moderately conserves the species)

##### c. Generativa (Generative)

- i. Ex seminario (By a seed)
- ii. Ex se ipsa (By itself).

Hic est ordo. Hic conservat. (This is the order. This [order] conserves).

## **2. Sensibilis (Sensitive Power)**

### **a. Apprehensiva (apprehensive)**

#### **i. Deforis (from outside)**

- i. Visus (sight)
- ii. Auditus (hearing)
- iii. Olfactus (smell)
- iv. Gustus (taste)
- v. Tactus (touch)

Apprehendit (apprehends)

- i. Lucidum in materia transmutabilis ignis (The brightness in the changeable matter of fire)
- ii. Sonorum in materia transmutabili puris aeris (The sounds in the changeable matter of pure air)
- iii. Odoriferum in materia transmutabili minus puri aeris (The scents in the changeable matter of less pure air)
- iv. Sapida et insipidum in materia transmutabili aquae (The tastes and the tasteless in the changeable matter of water)
- v. Molle, durum, leve, asperum, leve et grave in materia transmutabili terrae (Soft, hard, smooth, rough, light and heavy in the changeable matter of earth)

#### **ii. Deintus (from inside)**

##### **1. Prima cellula cerebri (First cell of the brain)**

- i. Sensus communis. Apprehensiva (Common sense: Apprehensive)
- ii. Phantastica. Retentiva (Phantasy: Retentive)

##### **2. Media cellula cerebri (Middle cell of the brain)**

- i. Imaginatio. Apprehensiva (Imagination: Apprehensive)
- ii. Memoria. Retentiva (Memory: Retentive)

##### **3. Postremo cellula cerebri (Last cell of the brain)**

- i. Estimatio. Apprehensiva (Estimation: Apprehensive)
- ii. Reminiscio. Retentiva (Reminiscing: Retentive).

## **b. Motiva (Motive)**

- i. Imperans motum. In spiritibus venarum cordis (Ruling motion. Situated in the spirits [effecting motion] in the blood vessels of the heart)
- ii. Efficiens motum. In musculis et venis sita (Causal motion. Situated in the muscles and veins).

## **3. Rationalis (Rational Power)**

### **a. Aspectus (Rational Sight)**

1. Superior facies (Higher Gazes)
  - i. Apprehensiva cum coniungitur lumino divino (By the apprehensive power when it joins with divine light) – Amor (Love).
  - ii. Speculativa cum coniungitur intellegentie (By the speculative power when it joins with intelligence) – Timor (Fear).
  - iii. Intelligentie. Cum per ipsam intuetur (By intelligence. When it considers itself) – Spes (Hope).
2. Aspectus (Rational Sight)
3. Inferior facies (Lower Gazes)
  - i. Intellectus. Cum intuetur rem per causam (Intellect. When the soul considers something by its cause) – Admiratio (Admiration).
  - ii. Opinio. Cum intuetur rem per consequentia<sup>1159</sup> (Belief. When the soul considers something through a result) – Dubitatio (Doubt).
  - iii. Phantasia. Cum intuetur per sua phantastica, id est, per exteriores apparitiones (Fantasy. When the soul considers by its own by its own phantastic capacity, that is, through exterior appearances) – Terror (Terror).

### **b. Affectus (Affectivity)**

- i. Ad ea que sunt sine motu et mutatione, hoc est, ad divina (Towards things which are without motion or change, that is, towards the divine)
- ii. Ad ea que sunt in motu sine generatione, id est, ad celestia (Towards things in motion without generation, that is, towards heavenly things)
- iii. Ad ea que sunt in motu et generatione, id est, ad huius inferiora et transmutabilia (Towards things in motion and in generation, that is, towards lower and changeable things)

## **AFFECTIONES ANIMAE RATIONALI (AFFECTIONS OF THE RATIONAL SOUL)**

### **a. Voluntas (Will)**

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<sup>1159</sup> This could be translated as ‘by sequence’, ‘by recurrence’ or ‘by analogy’ or even ‘by logical sequence’.

1. Dolor (Pain)
  - i. Contritio pro malis, que sunt vitia (Contrition for evils, which are the vices)
  - ii. Gemitus pro bonis, que sunt virtutes (Sighing for the good, which are the virtues)
2. Timor (Fear)
  - i. Metus pro malis. [que sunt] futuris poenis (fear on account of evils, which are the punishments of the future)
  - ii. Tristitia pro bonis [que sunt] futuris gaudis (Sadness on account of good things, which the happiness of the future)

**b. Voluntas (Will)**

3. Desiderium (Desire)
  - i. Oratio. Pro quibus gemitur et tristatur (Prayer. When the will is aggrieved and sad for something.)
  - ii. Deprecatio. Pro quibus est contritio et metus (Supplication. Contrition and fear for something.)
4. Gaudium (Happiness)
  - i. Spes de futuris bonis. contra mala futura (Hope for future goods, as opposed to future evils)
  - ii. Leticia de praesentibus bonis. contra mala praesentia (Happiness for present goods, as opposed to present evils)

iii. Diagram of the Outer and Inner Senses (f. 47r)

[Labels surrounding the Head]

- i. Sinciput (Forehead)
- ii. Intercipit (Between the front and back of the head)
- iii. Occiput (Back of the head)

[Five Cells of the Brain]

- i. Sensus communis (Common sense)
- ii. Ymaginatio (Imagination)
- iii. Fantasia (Phantasy)
- iv. Estimativa (Estimation)
- v. Memorativa sensualitatis ut retentiva (Memory of sensuality in so far as it retains it)

[Five Senses]

- i. Visus (Sight)
- ii. Auditus (Hearing)
- iii. Olfactus (Smell)
- iv. Gustus (Taste)
- v. Tactus (Touch)

## APPENDIX 2: DIVISIONS OF THE COGNITIVE FACULTY

	Anagogical or Epistemological Stage				
Author and Work	1	2	3	4	5
Boethius <i>Consolatio philosophiae</i> 5	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intelligentia</i>	
Abelard <i>Tractatus de intelligentibus</i>	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	<i>intelligentia</i>	
Thierry of Chartres <i>Glosa super Boethii librum</i> , 2.3-10 <sup>1227</sup>	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	<i>intelligentia</i> “disciplina”	<i>intelligibilitas</i>
Thierry of Chartres <i>Commentum super Boethii</i> <i>librum</i> 2.5-6 <sup>1228</sup>	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intelligentia</i>	
Thierry of Chartres <i>Lectiones</i> 2.30-31 <sup>1229</sup>	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	<i>Intelligentia</i> “disciplina”	<i>intelligibilitas</i>
Clarembald of Arras <i>Tractatus super librum Boetii</i> <i>De trinitate</i> , prologus 20-23	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectibilitas</i>	
William of Conches <i>Glosae super Platonem</i> XXXIV	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	
William of Conches <i>Dragmaticon</i> 6.26	<i>opinio</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intelligentia</i>	
Hugh of Saint-Victor <i>De unione corporis et spiritus</i>	<i>sensualitas</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>Intelligentia /</i> <i>sapientia</i>	
Hugh of Saint-Victor <i>In Ier.</i> 3; <i>De sacr.</i> 1.10.2; <i>Misc.</i> 1.1	<i>oculus</i> <i>corporis</i>		<i>oculus</i> <i>rationis</i>	<i>oculus</i> <i>contemplationis</i>	

Hugh of Saint-Victor <i>Misc. 1.15</i> <sup>1230</sup>	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	<i>intelligentia</i>
Hugh of Saint-Victor <i>De archa Noe</i> 1.5	<i>sensus</i>		<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	
Achard of Saint-Victor <i>Discretione</i>	<i>sensus + sensualitas</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>		<i>intellectus</i>	
William of Saint-Thierry <i>Med. or.</i> 3.13	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intelligentia rationalis</i>	
Richard of Saint-Victor <i>De archa mystica</i> (Benjamin major)		<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intelligentia</i>	
Isaac of Stella <i>Sermo</i> 4; <i>Epistola de anima</i>	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	<i>Intelligentia/ mens</i>
Alcher of Clairvaux <i>Liber de spiritu et anima</i> 4 and 13	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	<i>intelligentia</i>
Alcher of Clairvaux <i>Liber de spiritu et anima</i> 37 <sup>1231</sup>	<i>sensualitas</i>		<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectus sive intelligentia</i>	
Alan of Lille <i>Distinctiones dictionum theologicalium</i> <sup>1232</sup>	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	<i>intelligentia</i>
Alan of Lille <i>Contra Haereticos</i> 1.28	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	<i>intelligentia</i>
Alan of Lille <i>Sermo de sphaera intelligibilis</i> 15-21	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectualitas</i>	
Alan of Lille* <i>Quinque sunt digressiones cogitationis</i> <sup>1233</sup>	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	<i>intelligentia</i>
Raoul de Longchamp <i>In Anticlaudianum</i> 41	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	<i>intelligentia</i>
John of Salisbury <i>Metalogicon</i> 4.9-19	<i>sensus</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intellectus</i>	<i>sapientia</i>



Godfrey of Saint-Victor <i>Microcosmus</i> 19 and 34	<i>sensualitas</i>	<i>imaginatio</i>	<i>ratio</i>	<i>intelligentia</i>	<i>(discretio)</i>
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### APPENDIX 3: TRANSLATION OF *DE UNIONE CORPORIS ET SPIRITUS*

#### Note on Translation

*De unione corporis et spiritus* (*On the Union of the Soul and Body*) is an opusculum or small treatise that is concerned primarily with the theology of the spirit and body. The text is noteworthy for combining biblical exegesis and theological imagery with the latest medical knowledge of the twelfth century to explain the soul.

There exists three Latin editions of the text and one translation (in Italian):

1. *Patrologia Latina*: PL 177, col. 285-296
2. The first edition of the text with an Italian translation can be found compiled with another work of Hugh of Saint-Victor known as *De tribus diebus* (*On the Three Days*): Ugo di. S. Vittore, *I tre giorni dell'invisibile luce. L'unione del corpo e dello spirito*, ed. Vincenzo Liccaro (Florence: Sansoni, 1974).
3. Six years later a critical edition was published by A. M. Piazzoni: 'Il «De unione spiritus et corporis» di Ugo di San Vittore', *Studi Medievali*, 21 (1980), 861-888 [text of *De unione corporis et spiritus* on pp. 883-888].

Additionally, a French translation and edition of part of the text: *De Verbo Dei*, edited and translated as *La Parole de Dieu* by Roger Baron in *Hugues de Saint-Victor. Six Opuscles Spirituels* (Paris: Les éditions du cerf, 2013), pp.60-81.

This translation is based on the text in the *Patrologia Latina*. Numbers in square brackets refer to the column locations of PL 177. I have, however, chosen to divide the text and translation below into 20 paragraphs, the number used by Piazzoni in his edition. The footnotes provide line and page references to the Piazzoni edition to make cross comparisons between the editions easier.

<i>De unione corporis et spiritus</i>	<i>On the Union of Body and Spirit</i>
<p><sup>1160</sup>(1) [285A] Quod natum est ex carne caro est, et quod natum est ex spiritu spiritus est (Joan III). Si nihil inter spiritum et corpus medium esset, neque spiritus cum corpore, neque corpus cum spiritu convenire potuisset. Multum autem distat inter corpus et spiritum; longe sunt a se duo haec. Est ergo quiddam quo ascendit corpus, ut appropinquet spiritui, et rursum quiddam quo descendit spiritus, ut appropinquet corpori. Id quo ascendit corpus, altius corpore est: et iterum id quo descendit spiritus inferius est spiritu. Sed et ipsa corpora non omnia ejusdem qualitatis sunt, sed facta sunt alia superiora, alia inferiora, alia suprema, et corpoream naturam pene transcendentia.</p>	<p>(1) [285A] <i>That which is born from flesh is flesh, and that born from spirit is spirit.</i> (John III). If there is no medium between spirit and body, neither can the spirit come together with the body, nor can the body come together with the with the spirit. But much is different between body and spirit; these two are far away from each other. Therefore, there is something to which the body ascends, so that it may approach the spirit, and, in turn, there is something to which the spirit descends, in order to approach the body. That to which the body ascends to is higher than the body; and again, that to which the spirit descends to is inferior to the spirit. But also, all bodies themselves are not of the same quality, but some are made superior, others inferior, others supreme, and have almost transcended the provision of corporeal nature.</p>
<p><sup>1161</sup>(2) Similiter et spirituum sunt alii superiores, alii inferiores, alii [285B] infimi, et pene infra spirituale naturam prolapsi, ut in hunc modum infima cum summis copulentur. Ascendit Moyses in montem, et Deus descendit in montem. Nisi ergo Moyses ascendisset et Deus descendisset, non convenissent in unum. Magna sunt in his omnibus sacramenta. Ascendit corpus, et descendit spiritus. Ascendit spiritus, et descendit Deus.</p>	<p>(2) And similarly, some spirits are superior, others inferior, others [285B] weak, and have almost descended below the provision of spiritual nature, so that in this way the lower [spirits] are connected with the highest. Moses went up the mountain, and God went down the mountain. Therefore, unless Moses was to ascend and God to descend, they would not come together as one. There are many sacraments (<i>sacramenta</i>) in all these. The body ascends and the spirit descends. The spirit ascends and God descends.</p>
<p><sup>1162</sup>(3) Quo ascendit corpus, superius est corpore. Quo descendit spiritus, inferius est</p>	<p>(3) Any reality which the body ascends to is superior to the body. Any reality which the</p>

<sup>1160</sup> Piazzoni, lines 1-10 (p. 883).

<sup>1161</sup> Piazzoni, lines 11-16 (p. 883).

<sup>1162</sup> Piazzoni, lines 17-23 (p. 883).

<p>spiritu. Rursum quo ascendit spiritus, superius spiritu: et quo descendit Deus, inferius Deo. Corpus sensu ascendit, spiritus sensualitate descendit. Item spiritus ascendit contemplatione, Deus descendit revelatione. Theophania est in revelatione, intelligentia in contemplatione, imaginatio in sensualitate, in sensu [Col. 0285C] instrumentum sensualitatis, et origo imaginationis.</p> <p><sup>1163</sup>(4) Vide scalam Jacob, in terra stabat, et summitas ejus coelos tangebatur. Terra corpus, coelum Deus. Ascendunt animi contemplatione ab infimis ad summa. A corpore ad spiritum, mediante sensu et sensualitate. A spiritu ad Deum, mediante contemplatione et revelatione. Dominus autem scalae innititur, ut ad infima suprema inclinentur. Ascendamus igitur et nos consideratione, quantum possumus, quia etsi totum non possumus, forte aliquid possumus.</p> <p><sup>1164</sup>(5) Si non sumus angeli volantes, tamen sumus homines ambulantes. Angeli scala non indigent qui volant divina contemplatione; sed homines qui repunt, vel, si amplius, ambulant humana ratione. Ego non [285D] puto angelos scalam quaesivisse propter se, sed ut homines docerent quid facere debeant ipsi. Ascensus est ab infimis ad suprema. Pone ergo primum quae infima sunt, ut ab illis incipiens ordine ad superiora conscendas.</p> <p><sup>1165</sup>(6) [286A] Sunt igitur in hoc mundi corpore quatuor elementa propriis qualitatibus distincta, id est terra, aqua, ignis, aer. Sed ex his primum, id est terra sola per se immobilis est, quia moveri non potest, nisi extrinsecus impellatur. Reliqua tria mobilia sunt, quia per se moventur sine</p>	<p>spirit descendit to is inferior to spirit. Conversely, any reality which the spirit ascends to is superior to the spirit: and any reality which God descends to is inferior to God. The body ascends by sense, the spirit descends by sensuality. In turn, the spirit ascends by contemplation; God descends by revelation. Divine manifestation [theophany] is in revelation, intelligence in contemplation, imagination in sensuality, in the senses is the instrument [285C] of sensuality and the origin of imagination.</p> <p>(4) Consider the ladder of Jacob: it was resting on the earth and its highest point was touching heaven. The earth is the body, the sky is God. Souls ascend by contemplation from the bottom to the top, from the body to the spirit, by means of sense and sensuality, and from the spirit to God, by means of contemplation and revelation. But the Lord leans on the scale so the lowest are inclined to the highest. Therefore, we, by consideration, ascend as far as we are able, because we are not able to do so totally, unless by a certain power.</p> <p>(5) For we are not flying angels but walking men. Angels do not need a ladder because they fly by divine contemplation; but men do need a ladder since they crawl or, if greater, walk, by human reason. I do not think the angels demanded a ladder on account of themselves, but in order [285D] that they may teach men what they ought to do themselves. The ascent is from the depths to the heights. Thus, place that which is lowest first, in order that you ascend, by succession, to the highest.</p> <p>(6) [286A] Therefore, there are in the body of the world four elements with their own distinct qualities, that is earth, water, fire, air. But of these, the first, that is earth, alone is immobile by itself, since it is not able to be moved, unless by an external force. The remaining three elements are mobile since</p>
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<sup>1163</sup> Piazzoni, lines 24-30 (p. 884).

<sup>1164</sup> Piazzoni, lines 31-36 (p. 884).

<sup>1165</sup> Piazzoni, lines 37-47 (p. 884).

impulsu extrinseco. Hoc tamen interest quod aqua teneri potest, ut non moveatur, aer et ignis non possunt. Rursum aer ad statum teneri non potest, ad praesentiam potest. Ignis vero nec ad statum tenetur, ut non moveatur, nec ad praesentiam, ut non elebatur. Quaecunque ergo extrinsecus sive ad praesentiam, sive ad statum teneri possunt, extrinsecus etiam moveri possunt, vel ut moveantur, si immobilia sunt, vel ut amplius moveantur, si minus sunt.

<sup>1166</sup>(7) Solus [286B] ignis sicut teneri non potest, sic etiam extrinsecus moveri non potest, in se omnem motum habens et ex se. In his ergo quatuor quaecunque magis sensui subjacent, magis corpora dicuntur: quae vero a sensu plus longe sunt, magis a natura corporum recedunt, et ad naturam spirituum accedunt. Hinc est quod ipse aer, quia prae sui subtilitate videri non potest, spiritus appellatur, cum corpus sit quoniam in ea parte qua sensum corporis excedit, tantum spirituali naturae appropinquat, ut in appellatione etiam nomen illius usurpet.

<sup>1167</sup>(8) Sed ignis qui ipso aere longe subtilior est et mobilior, et non sicut aer, extrinsecus terrena corpora afflando movet, sed interius vegetando vivificat, magis proprie vocatur spiritus. [286C] Sed hic spiritus, id est ignis alius est in iis corporibus, quae tantum vegetat, non sensificat; alius in iis quae et vegetat et sensificat. Vegetat enim quaedam, non sensificat sicut arbores et plantas, et universa in terra germinantia; quaedam autem vegetat et sensificat, sicut bruta animantia omnia, in quibus quaedam sunt quae sensum tantum habent, imaginationem

they move by themselves without an external impulse. And yet, water is different because it is able to be held in order that it is not moved: not so with air and fire. Truly, air is not able to be held in a permanent state of immobility, but it can temporarily. But fire cannot be held either to a position, nor temporarily, so that it is not moved, so that it does not escape. Thus, all the elements that are external can be held still, temporarily or permanently, can be moved from the outside, both to pass from immobility to motion, and from a certain mobility to a greater one.

(7) Only [286B] fire, just as it cannot be held still, so also cannot be set in motion from external forces, since all motion occurs within it and from it. Now in these four elements those realities which are more subjected to our senses appear more corporeal to us; those realities which are more removed from our sense, the more they move away from corporeal nature the more they approach the nature of spirits. For this reason, air, which cannot be seen because of its subtlety, is called a ‘spirit’, although it is a body, and it is this aspect according to which it escapes the bodily senses, and comes so close to spiritual nature, that it even takes its name from this designation.

(8) On the other hand, fire, both is far more subtle and more mobile than air and does not move bodies from the outside with its breath; but inwardly vivifies them with vegetative life and is more properly called a ‘spirit’. [286C] Now this ‘spirit’, that is, fire, is different in those bodies which have a vegetative and non-sensitive life, it is different in those who have a vegetative and sensitive life. It gives vegetative and non-sensitive life to those realities, such as trees, plants and everything that sprouts on earth; and it animates other realities with vegetative and sensitive life, like all brute

<sup>1166</sup> Piazzoni, lines 48-55 (p. 884-885).

<sup>1167</sup> Piazzoni, lines 56-64 (p. 885).

<p>non habent; quaedam quae sensum et imaginationem habent.</p> <p><sup>1168</sup>(9) Cum itaque sensificari majus sit quam vegetari tantum, constat profecto hanc vim subtiliorem esse ubi sensum praestat, quam illic ubi solam vegetationem confert. Ubi autem magis subtilis est, quodammodo magis spiritus est, quia in eo quo magis incorporeae [286D] naturae approximat, nomen pariter et proprietatem illius usurpat; non tamen propriae, quia in eo ipso quod spiritus dicitur, corporeae naturae proprietatem nequaquam excedere comprobatur.</p> <p><sup>1169</sup>(10) Infirmum [287A] vero et maxime corpus est illud quod per se omnino moveri non potest. Post hoc proximum et minus corpus est illud quod per se quidem moveri potest, et tamen extra se ad statum cohiberi potest. Deinde sequitur illud quod in natura corporis jam spiritus nomen sortitur; quod per se moveri potest et extra se quamvis ad praesentiam, ad statum tamen teneri non potest, quod non videtur et semper movetur. Summum est corpus et spirituali naturae proximum, quod per se semper moveri habet, extra nunquam cohiberi habet; quod quidem, in quantum sensum praestat, imitatur rationalem vitam, in quantum imaginationem, format vitalem sapientiam.</p> <p><sup>1170</sup>(11) Nihil autem in corpore altius, vel spirituali naturae vicinius esse [0287B] potest quam id ubi post sensum et supra sensum vis imaginandi concipitur. Quod quidem, in tantum sublime est, ut quidquid</p>	<p>[unreasoning] animals, among which some have only sensitivity and no imagination, others instead have sensitivity and imagination.</p> <p>(9) Therefore, since being animated by sensitive life is more than only receiving vegetative life, it is quite evident that this force is more subtle where it arouses the sensitive life, in contrast to where it confers only vegetative life. Wherever it is therefore more subtle, it is in a certain way more of a ‘spirit’, since, according to that aspect by which it comes closest to incorporeal nature, [286D] it assumes not only its name but also some characteristic of it. Not strictly speaking, however, since precisely according to that aspect for which one says ‘spirit’, it does not exceed in any way the quality of corporeal nature.</p> <p>(10) [287A] The lowest of all bodies [earth] is therefore the one which cannot move by itself at all. Immediately afterwards is that less corporeal body [water] which can move by itself and yet can be held in a state of immobility from an external force. Then follows that element [air] which, despite having a corporeal nature, already receives the name of ‘spirit’, that can move by itself and can only temporarily be held in the same state of immobility by external forces, and thus always moves and cannot be that is not seen. The highest body [fire] is that which is closest to the spiritual nature, which possesses a continuous movement by itself and can never be restrained from without, and insofar that it supplies the senses, it imitates rational life, in so far as it forms the imagination, the vital wisdom.</p> <p>(11) Nothing, however, can be higher in the body, or nearer to spiritual nature, [287B] than that where the power of the imagination is conceived after the senses and above the senses, which indeed is so high that whatever is above it is nothing else</p>
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<sup>1168</sup> Piazzoni, lines 65-71 (p. 885).

<sup>1169</sup> Piazzoni, lines 72-81 (p. 885).

<sup>1170</sup> Piazzoni, lines 82-95 (p. 885-886).

supra illud est, aliud non sit quam ratio. Ipsa utique vis ignea, quae extrinsecus formata sensus dicitur, eadem forma usque ad intimum traducta imaginatio vocatur. Forma namque rei sensibilis per radios visionis foris concepta, operante natura, ad oculos usque retrahitur, atque ab eisdem suscepta visio nominatur. Deinde per septem oculorum tunicas et tres humores transiens, novissime purificata et collata introrsum ad cerebrum usque traducitur, et imaginatio efficitur. Postea eadem imaginatio ab anteriore parte capitis ad mediam transiens, ipsum animae rationalis substantiam contingit, et [0287C] excitat discretionem, in tantum jam purificata et subtilis effecta, ut ipsi spiritui immediate jungatur; veraciter tamen naturam corporis retinens et proprietatem, ut constet quod scriptum est:

<sup>1171</sup>(12) Quod natum est ex carne caro est (Joan III). Sicut enim de spiritu corpus non nascitur, sic etiam de corpore spiritus non procreatur. Quamvis enim corpus usque ad spiritum sublimetur, et spiritus usque ad corpus humilietur, nec spiritus tamen in corpus, nec corpus in spiritum transmutatur. Sed quod natum est ex carne caro est, et quod natum est ex spiritu spiritus est. (Ibid.) Tamen quod summum est in corpore, propinquum est spiritui, et in ipso vis imaginandi fundatur, supra quam est [Col. 0287D] ratio.

<sup>1172</sup>(13) Quod enim imaginatio extra (substantiam animae rationalis sit, argumentum est quod bruta animalia vim imaginandi habere probantur, quae rationem omnino non habent. Est itaque imaginatio similitudo sensus, in summo corporalis

than reason. And thus, the fiery force (*vis ignea*) itself, which is said to be formed outside by sense, is called imagination (*imaginatio*) when the same form is carried all the way inside. For the form of a sensible thing, conceived by the rays of vision outside, by the aid of an active nature, is drawn back up to the eyes, and that which is received by them is named vision. Then, passing through the seven tunics of the eyes and the three humours, they are purified and collected in the last one, and then transferred further inwardly to the brain, and imagination is brought about. Afterwards, the same imagination, passing from the front part (*anterior pars*) of the brain to the middle (*medium*), touches the very substance of the rational soul (*substantia animae rationalis*) [287C], and stirs up discernment (*discretio*), so far as it has been purified and subtle, that it may be joined to the spirit (*spiritus*) itself immediately; yet truly retaining the nature and property of the body, so that what is written is clear.

(12) *That which is born of the flesh is flesh (John III)*. For just as the body is not born of the spirit, so the spirit is not begotten of the body. For although the body is raised up to the spirit, and the spirit is brought low even to the body, neither is the spirit transformed into the body, nor the body to the spirit. And *that which is born from flesh is flesh, and that which is born from spirit is spirit (ibid)*. Yet, that which is highest in the bodily nature, is that which neighbours the spirit, and in the same place the power of imagination is found, above which is reason (*ratio*). [287D]

(13) For proof that imagination is really outside the substance of the rational soul, it has been argued that brute [unreasoning] animals the power to imagine, but reason at all. And thus, the imagination is a similitude (*similitudo*) of sense, existing in the highest point of the corporeal spirit and in the lowest part of the rational spirit, and

<sup>1171</sup> Piazzoni, lines 96-102 (p. 886).

<sup>1172</sup> Piazzoni, lines 103-118 (p. 886-887).

spiritus, et in imo rationalis corporalem informans et rationalem contingens. Sensus namque sive per visum, sive per auditum, sive per olfactum, sive per gustum, sive per tactum, extrinsecus corpus contingens formatur, ipsamque formam ex corporis contactu conceptam intrinsecus reducens per meatus singulis sensibus emittendis et revocandis introrsum dispositos ad cellam phantasticam colligit, eamque illi parti puriori corporei spiritus imprimens imaginationem [0288A] facit. Quae quidem imaginatio in brutis animalibus phantasticam cellam non transcendit; in rationalibus autem usque ad rationalem progreditur, ubi ipsam incorpoream animae substantiam contingit, et excitat discretionem. Ergo imaginatio nihil aliud est quam similitudo corporis, per sensus quidem corporeos ex corporum contactu concepta extrinsecus, atque per eosdem sensus introrsum ad partem puriorem corporei spiritus reducta, eique impressa.

<sup>1173</sup>(14) Haec autem in rationalibus purior fit, ubi ad rationalem et incorpoream animae substantiam contingendam defecatur; tamen illic quoque extra substantiam illius manens, quia similitudo corporis est et fundatur in corpore. Rationalis autem substantia corporea lux est; imaginatio [288B] vero, inquantum corporis imago est, umbra est.

<sup>1174</sup>(15) Et idcirco postquam imaginatio usque ad rationem ascendit, quasi umbra in lucem veniens, et luci superveniens, inquantum ad eam venit, manifestatur, et circumscribitur; inquantum illi supervenit, obnubilat eam, et obumbrat, et involvit, et

imprints the bodily figure and touches the rational spirit. For instance, the senses, either through sight, or hearing, or smell, or taste, or touch, are formed by touching an external body; and the same form (*forma*) is conceived internally from the contact of the senses with a body and is brought back inside through the channels arranged for the emission and reception of individual senses, being placed and collected in the cell of phantasy, and imprinting (*imprimens*) [the form] on the purer part of corporeal spirit, it makes the [288A] imagination. Indeed, this same imagination in certain brute animals does not transcend the cell of phantasy; but in rational animals it progresses all the way up to the rational [cell of the brain], where it comes into contact with the same incorporeal substance of the soul (*substantia incorporea animae*) and excites discretion (*discretio*). Therefore, the imagination is nothing other than a similitude of a body, certainly conceived externally, by means of the corporeal senses, in contact with bodies, and then brought back inwards through the same senses to the purer part of the corporeal spirit, and imprinted upon it.

(14) But imagination is purer in rational animals, where it is purified in order to come in contact with the incorporeal substance of the soul, while remaining, however, even in this state, outside the substance of it, because it is a similitude of the body and is founded in the body. The rational substance, however, is like corporeal light; but imagination [288B], in as much as it is an image of a body, is like a shadow.

(15) For this reason, after imagination ascends all the way to reason, as if a shadow coming into light and overlaps it, as it comes towards it, it is made visible and circumscribed; in as much as it arrives to it, it obscures, and darkens, and envelops, and hides, reason. And it follows that reason, if

<sup>1173</sup> Piazzoni, lines 119-123 (p. 887).

<sup>1174</sup> Piazzoni, lines 124-129 (p. 887).

<p>conteggit. Et siquidem ratio ipsa sola contemplatione eam susceperit quasi vestimentum, ei est ipsa imaginatio extra eam, et circa eam quo facile exui et spoliari possit.</p> <p><sup>1175</sup>(16) Si vero etiam delectatione illi adhaeserit, quasi pellis ei fit ipsa imaginatio, ita ut non sine dolore exui possit, cui cum amore inhaesit. Hinc est quod animae corporibus exutae, corporalibus adhuc passionibus teneri possunt, quia videlicet a corruptione [288C] corporalium affectionum nondum mundatae sunt. Habet namque et ipse spiritus quamdam in sua natura mutabilitatem, secundum quam corpori vivificando appropinquat, in qua illa spiritualis et incorporea substantia nonnihil suae puritatis deponit, et quasi quamdam grossiori proprietate corpori assumendo occurrit.</p> <p><sup>1176</sup>(17) Quae quidam coaptatio, si secundum solam naturam fit, mutationem habet, corruptionem non habet. Sin autem vitiosa est, in hoc ipso puriorem naturam corrumpit, quod eam ad consortium ignobilioris terminos naturae transire compellit. Et hoc vitium quanto altius animae in corpore manenti inhaeserit, tanto difficilius a corpore discedentem deserit: et non tollitur passio, etiam cum tollitur causa passionis.</p> <p><sup>1177</sup>(18) Ipsa quippe anima, inquantum delectatione [0288D] corporis afficitur quasi quamdam corpulentiam trahens, in eadem phantasiis imaginationum corporalium deformatur, eisdemque alte impressis etiam soluta corpore non exuitur. Quae vero in hac</p>	<p>by contemplative vision alone, receives it upon itself, imagination remains outside it like a garment, so that it can easily be freed and detached.</p> <p>(16) On the other hand, if reason adheres to it too by delight, the imagination becomes to reason like a skin (<i>pellis</i>), and thus reason may not be detached from imagination without pain, since reason adheres to imagination with love (<i>amor</i>). For this reason, souls that have already been detached from their bodies, can still be bound by bodily passions, because in reality they are not yet cleansed from the corruption of corporeal affections (<i>a corruptione corporalium affectionum</i>). [288C] In fact, even the spirit itself has a certain mutability (<i>mutabilitas</i>) in its nature, according to which it approaches the body to which life is to be conferred; in this the incorporeal and spiritual substance depletes not a little of its purity, and with a somewhat heavier property, encounters the body to be assumed.</p> <p>(17) This adaptation in the conjunction, if it occurs according to the natural order, brings with it a change, but not a corruption. If it happens instead in a defective and vicious way, by this very fact it corrupts the highest essence, because it forces her to go beyond the boundaries of her nature to join the less noble reality. This viciousness, the more deeply it has inherited the soul, while it is in the body, the more difficult it leaves it when it leaves the body: the contamination is really not removed, even when the cause of the contamination ends.</p> <p>(18) In reality, the soul, [288D] insofar as it is affected by bodily enjoyments, derives from it, so to speak, a certain materialization, and thus is deformed by the fantasies of bodily imaginations; it cannot be liberated from these, because they are deeply impressed upon it, not even when it</p>
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<sup>1175</sup> Piazzoni, lines 130-137 (p. 887).

<sup>1176</sup> Piazzoni, lines 138-143 (p. 887-888).

<sup>1177</sup> Piazzoni, lines 144-149 (p. 888).



<p>vita se ab ejusmodi faeculentia mundare studuerint, hinc exeuntes quia nihil corporeum secum trahunt, a corporali passione immunes persistunt. Sic itaque ab infimis et extremis corporibus sursum usque spiritum incorporeum, quaedam progressio est per sensum et imaginationem; quae duo in spiritu corporeo sunt.</p> <p><sup>1178</sup>(19) Postea in spiritu incorporeo proxima post corpus est affectio imaginaria, qua anima ex corporis conjunctione afficitur, supra quam est ratio in imaginationem agens. Deinde ratio pura supra imaginationem, in qua ratione supremum est animae [289A] a corpore sursum.</p> <p><sup>1179</sup>(20) Quando autem ab anima sursum itur ad Deum, prima est intelligentia, quae est ratio ab interiori formata, quia rationi concurrens jungitur praesentia divina, quae sursum informans rationem facit sapientiam, sive intelligentiam, sicut imaginatio deorsum informans rationem, scientiam facit.</p>	<p>is released from the body. On the other hand, that soul that has tried to cleanse itself of this impurity in this life, leaving the body, since it does not draw with it any trace of bodily realities, remains forever immune from any bodily contamination. Thus, then, rising from the bodies which occupy the last and lowest place to the incorporeal spirit, there is an elevation in the sensibility and in the imagination, both of which exist in the corporeal spirit.</p> <p>(19) Subsequently in the incorporeal spirit, immediately after the body, there is the affect of the imagination (<i>affectio imaginaria</i>), by which the soul is affected (<i>afficitur</i>) through its conjunction with the body, and above it is reason, which acts on the imagination. Then, above the imagination, pure reason exists, and in it there is the highest reality of the soul in the ascending progression starting from the bodies.</p> <p>(20) Then when one ascends from the soul towards God, first it is intelligence, which is reason, insofar as it is formed within it, since the divine presence joins it by coming to meet it. This divine presence, forming reason from above, gives rise to wisdom, or intelligence; just as the imagination, informing reason from below, gives rise to knowledge.</p>
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<sup>1178</sup> Piazzoni, lines 150-155 (p. 888).

<sup>1179</sup> Piazzoni, lines 156-159 (p. 888).

#### APPENDIX 4: TRANSLATION OF *DE VERBO DEI*

In the *Patrologia Latina* edition of *De unione corporis et spiritus* another work of Hugh of Saint-Victor, *De Verbo Dei* (*On the Word of God*) follows seamlessly from *De unione* (PL 177, 289-294). *De Verbo Dei* has been edited and translated into French (*La Parole de Dieu*) by R. Baron in *Hugues de Saint-Victor. Six Opuscules Spirituels* (Paris: Les éditions du cerf, 2013), pp. 60-81.

This treatise is likely appended to *De unione* since it discusses many of the same themes, particularly the gradations of powers within the soul through the Augustinian hierarchy of *caro*, *spiritus* and *mens* (see Table 1 below). The text also includes substantial passages on the affections.

Substance	Action	Purpose	Symbol	Sacrament
Mind ( <i>mens</i> )	Discretion ( <i>discretio</i> )	True Judgement ( <i>sententia veritatis</i> )	Adam (male)	Intention ( <i>intentio</i> ); discretion ( <i>discretio</i> ); true judgement ( <i>sententia veritatis</i> ); the marrow ( <i>medulla</i> )
Spirit ( <i>spiritus</i> )	Thought ( <i>cogitatio</i> )	Forethought ( <i>providentia</i> )	Eve (female)	The spirit ( <i>spiritus</i> ); the necessary ( <i>necessitas</i> ); thought ( <i>cogitatio</i> ); the prudence of the flesh ( <i>prudentia carnis</i> ); the joints ( <i>compages</i> )
Flesh ( <i>caro</i> )	Delight ( <i>delectatio</i> )	Concupiscibility ( <i>concupiscentia</i> )	Serpent (The Devil)	Sensuality ( <i>carnalitas</i> ); animality ( <i>animalitas</i> ); the superfluous ( <i>superfluitas</i> ); the soul ( <i>anima</i> )

Table 1: Types of substances within the human being in *De verbo Dei*

<i>De verbo Dei</i>	<i>The Word of God</i>
<p><i>Semel locutus est Deus</i> (Psal. LXI), quia unum Verbum genuit, per quod omnia fecit. Hoc Verbum est sermo ejus. Unus est ergo sermo Dei, quia unum est Verbum Dei. Et ideo vere unus, quia unius unus, qui sententias multiplices non complectitur; sed [289B] uno et simplici verbo consummatur.</p> <p>Quare ergo dicitur in psalmo: <i>Ut justificeris in sermonibus tuis</i> (Psal. L). Et alibi: <i>Vivifica me ut custodiam sermones tuos</i> (Psal. CXVIII). Si enim vere sermo Dei unus creditur, quomodo multi sermones ejus dicuntur? Sed sciendum est quod aliter per hominum ora loquitur Deus, aliter per semetipsum. Nam quod Deus in hominibus per homines loquitur, hoc fere omnis et Veteris et Novi Testamenti scriptura testatur. Loquitur ergo Deus per homines, loquitur per se, multos sermones per homines, unum per semetipsum. Sed quoscunque per hominum ora protulit, iste unus in omnibus illis fuit, et omnes in isto uno unum sunt, qui sine isto quolibet loco vel tempore prolati esse non possunt. Videamus [289C] ergo magnum sacramentum, verbum Dei humana carne vestitum, semel visibile apparuit, et nunc quotidie idem ipsum humana voce conditum ad nos venit.</p> <p>Et quamvis aliter per carnem, atque aliter per vocem humanam hominibus innotescat, quodam modo tamen hic intelligenda est vox Verbi, quod ibi caro Dei. Humanitatem Christi mali quoque et increduli non solum videre, sed etiam occidere potuerunt: et adhuc quotidie sermonem Dei foris audiunt et contemnunt. Et quemadmodum illi hominem occidere non praesumerent, si Deum cognoscere potuissent, ita quoque isti nequaquam verba divina audita respuerent,</p>	<p><i>God has spoken only once</i> (Psal. LXI), because he has begotten a single Word through whom he has made everything. This Word is his word. There is therefore only one Word of God, because there is only one Word of God. One truly, because one and one; not developed in a plurality of statements, but [289B] totalized in a single and simple Word.</p> <p>Therefore, why is it said in the Psalm: <i>That you may be found righteous in your words</i> (Psal. L), and elsewhere: <i>Give me life so that I may keep the words?</i> (Psal. CXVIII). If we believe that the word of God is truly one, why are we talking about words in the plural? But we must know that God speaks differently by the mouths of men, otherwise by himself. That God indeed speaks among men through men, almost all the Scripture of the Old and New Testaments testifies. He therefore speaks through men; he speaks for himself: through men, in many words; by itself, only one. But in all these words that he uttered through the lips of men was present this unique word, and in its uniqueness all are one: without it, they could not be uttered in any place or time. Therefore, let's look [289C] at this great sacrament, the Word of God clothed in human flesh, appeared only once in a visible way, and now, every day, this same Word itself comes to us under the cover of a human voice.</p> <p>Different, of course, is the way in which he makes himself known to men, depending on whether it is through his flesh or through the human voice. And yet, in a certain way, the voice of the Word is to be understood now as the flesh of God was then. The wicked and the unbelieving were also able to see the humanity of Christ, and even to kill it, and still every day they hear the word of God from outside and despise it. And just as those of old would not have dared to kill man, if they had been able to</p>

si virtutem eorum interno sapore gustare valerent.

Sermo igitur Dei vivus est, quia vita in eo est. In eo quod foris auditum [289D] excitat, id quod intus est cor vivificat. In eo quod auribus illabitur, id quod cordi inspiratur. Quod foris est transit, quod intus est mutabilitatem non recipit. Quod foris decursus verborum explicat, intus veritas incommutabilis dictat. Propterea, inquit, *coelum et terra transibunt, verba autem mea non transibunt* (Luc. XXI). Ubi utique non transibunt ubi transitoria non sunt, quia sicut in multis unum verbum non dividitur, ita multa in uno verbo non variantur.

His itaque de sermone Dei breviter explicatis, nunc Apostoli verba inspiciamus: *Vivus est*, inquit, *sermo Dei et efficax et penetrabilior omni gladio ancipiti* (Hebr. IV). Vivus, quia non mutatur; efficax, [290A] quia non deficit; penetrabilis, quia non fallitur. Non mutatur in promisso, non deficit in facto, non fallitur in iudicio. Promissio ejus oblivione non moritur, nec intentione mutatur. Operatio ejus difficultate non vincitur. Iudicium ejus ambiguitate non fallitur. Veraciter promittit, fortiter facit, subtiliter discernit. Vivus est sermo Dei ut credas, efficax ut speres, penetrabilior ut timeas. Vivus est in praeceptis et prohibitionibus, efficax in promissis et comminationibus, penetrabilior in iudiciis et damnationibus. Sed quia veritas promissorum, et omnipotentia operum ejus credenda potius quam discutienda sunt, quae sit subtilitas iudiciorum ejus consideremus.

recognize God, those of today too would not in any way disdain the divine words they hear, if they were able to taste the virtue of their interior flavour.

Thus the word of God [289D] is alive, for the life is in it in what without outside excites the hearing, what inside vivifies the heart; in what touches the ears, what inspires the heart. What is outside passes; that which is within does not suffer mutation. What outside develops discourse, inside the immutable truth dictates. So, he said, *heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will not pass away*. Let us hear: they will not go where they have nothing temporary. For, as in multiple words the single word is not divided, in the single word multiple words do not suffer diversity.

With these brief explanations given on the word of God, let us now examine the words of the Apostle: *The word of God is alive and effective and more penetrating than any two-edged sword* (Hebr. IV). Alive, because it does not change; effective, [290A] because it is not lacking; penetrating, because it is not mistaken. It does not change in its promise; it is not lacking in deed; it is not mistaken in its judgment. His promise does not die from oblivion, nor does it change by intention. Its operation is not hampered by difficulties. His judgment is not deceived by ambiguity. It is with truth that he promises; with force that he acts; with subtlety that he discerns. The word of God is alive, for you to believe; effective, so that one hopes; penetrating, so that we fear. He is alive in the precepts and the prohibitions; effective in promises and threats; penetrating in judgments and condemnations. But since the truth of his promises and the omnipotence of his works are a matter of faith rather than of discussion, let us consider the acuteness of his judgments.

*Penetrabilior, inquit, est sermo Dei omni gladio ancipiti. Anceps est gladius, qui ex ambabus [290B] partibus incidit, qui cum infigitur penetrans ex utraque parte secundo viam sibi aperit, hic tamen non nisi carnem incidit; sed Dei gladius utrinque secatur, quia potest animam et corpus perdere in gehennam ignis (Matth. X). Sive in iudiciis utrinque secatur, quia utrumque diiudicat, incidit et discernit.*

*Sequitur: Pertingens usque ad divisionem animae ac spiritus (Hebr. IV). In unoquoque homine tria sunt, caro, spiritus, et mens. Ad carnem pertinet delectatio, ad spiritum cogitatio, ad mentem discretio. Delectatio est serpens, cogitatio Eva, discretio Adam. In delectatione est superfluitatis concupiscentia. In cognitione est necessitatis providentia. In discretionem est veritatis sententia. Delectatio providentiam obtentu necessitatis ad superfluitatem praecipitat.*

*[290C] Providentia rationem per compassionem inferioris inclinat a sententia veritatis. Prima divisio est inter serpentem et Evam, hoc est inter carnalitatem sive animam, vel animalitatem et spiritum, inter delectationem et cogitationem, inter superfluitatem et necessitatem. Secunda divisio est inter Evam et Adam, inter cogitationem et intentionem, vel discretio inter prudentiam carnis et sententiam veritatis. Sermo etiam Dei quasi inter animam et spiritum dividit, quando sacrum eloquium nobis, quae inter carnalia et spiritualia desideria repugnantia habeatur ostendit.*

*Sequitur: Compagum quoque et medullarum (ibid.), id est etiam usque ad divisionem compagum et medullarum pertingit ipse sermo Dei. [290D] Quid vero per compages et medullas accipere*

*The word of God, said the Apostle, is more penetrating than any two-edged sword. A two-edged sword is one that cuts from both [290B] sides; which, when it sinks and penetrates, opens the way by cutting on both sides. Such a sword, however, cuts only the flesh; the sword of God, it cuts on both sides, because it can lose the soul and the body in the hell of fire (Matth. X). Or again: in his judgments he cuts on both sides, because he judges, decides and discerns both.*

*He [The Apostle] continues: penetrating to the point of division of soul and spirit (Hebr. IV). In every man there are three divisions: the flesh (caro), the spirit (spiritus) and the mind (mens). Delight (delectatio) pertains to the flesh, thought (cogitatio) to the spirit, discretion (discretio) to the mind. Delight is the serpent, thought is Eve, discretion is Adam. Concupiscentia (concupiscentia) is an excess in delight. Foresight (providentia) is in the cognition of necessity. The judgement of truth is in discretion. Delight by using the necessary pretext makes foresight fall into the superfluous. [290C] Foresight, through compassion for the lower, inclines reason away from true judgement. The first division is between the serpent and Eve, that is, between sensuality and the soul (anima), or animality and the spirit, between delight and thought, between the superfluous and the necessary. The second division is between Eve and Adam, between thought and intention, or discretion, between the prudence of the flesh (prudentia carnis) and true judgement. Also, the word of God provokes a division as between soul and spirit, when Sacred Scripture shows us how much carnal and spiritual desires are opposed.*

*He continues: [there is a division] as well [between] the joints and marrow (ibid.), that is, the word of God itself penetrates even to the division of the joints and the marrow. But what we have to understand by joints and marrow is [290D] explained*

debeamus, explanatur cum subditur: *Cogitationum et intentionum* (ibid.). Compages sunt cogitationes, medullae intentiones. Primum foris sunt opera quasi cutis, deinde delectatio quasi caro, deinde cogitationes quasi ossa, deinde intentio quasi medulla. Sicut cutis carnem tegit, sic opera delectationem, et sicut ossa carnem fulciunt, sic cogitationes desideria pascunt; et sicut medullae ossibus interiores sunt, sic in cogitationibus intentiones latent. Cogitationes etiam compages vocantur, quia quodammodo ita desideria adinvicem copulant, sicut compages membrorum artus ligant. Compago enim vinculum est quod medium est, et extrema conjungit. Et similiter cogitationes, quia et ex desideriis nascuntur, et [291A] desideria generant quodammodo, et haec nutriendo, et illa gignendo utraque ad invicem ligant. Quasi enim praecedentibus sequentia connectunt, quia de illis et ipsae, et illae de ipsis prodeunt.

Quod vero desideria cogitationes gignere diximus, nemini qui seipsum cognoscit, ignotum esse potest, quia illius profecto saepius in cogitatione volvitur, cujus amore plus affecti sumus. Unde etiam Dominus in Evangelio dicit: *Ubi est thesaurus tuus, ibi est cor tuum* (Matth. VI). Ac si diceret: Ubi est desiderium tuum, ibi est et cor tuum, id est ubi est affectio tua, ibi est et cogitatio tua. Rursus quod cogitationes desideria generant, Psalmista ostendit dicens: *In meditatione mea exardescet ignis* (Psal. XXXVIII).

Quia cujus rei cogitatio animo frequenter insederit, illius [291B] amor acrior in corde exardescit. Convenienter igitur per medullas, quae in corpore magis secretae sunt et reconditae, intentiones accipimus, quae quasi cogitationum nostrarum medullae sunt, quia in cogitatione cordis

when he adds: *thoughts (cogitationes) and intentions (intentiones)* (ibid.). The joints are the thoughts, the marrow, the intentions. We first find works (*opera*) on the outside, such as the skin, then the delight (*delectatio*), like the flesh (*caro*); then thoughts, as if bones; then the intention (*intentio*), like the marrow. As the skin covers the flesh, the works cover the delight; as the bones support the flesh, the thoughts nourish the desires; as the marrow (*medulla*) is inside the bones, the intentions (*intentiones*) are hidden in the thoughts (*cogitationes*). Thoughts are also called joints, because, in a way, they link desires to each other, as joints tie limbs. A joint in fact is a chain because it is a medium, joining two extremes. And similarly, thoughts, since they are born of desires and [291A] engender desires, are in a certain way, by nourishing these and by producing those, the mutual bond of one and the other. It is as if they unite with those which precede which follow, then that they come out of the first and that from them emerge the second.

But we have said that desires generate thoughts, no one who knows himself can ignore it, for surely we often remember what love has touched us most. From whence the Lord say in the Gospel: *Where is your treasure, there is also your heart* (Matth. VI) As if he were saying: Where your desire is, there also is your heart, that is, where your affection (*affectio*) is, there also is your thought (*cogitatio*). On the other hand, that thoughts generate desires, the psalmist indicates by saying: *In my meditation a fire will be kindled* (Psal. XXXVIII).

When, in fact, the thought of a thing (*rei cogitatio*) has often been present in the mind (*animus*), its love (*amor*) [291B] is ablaze more vividly in the heart. It is therefore appropriate that through the marrow, which, in the body is more hidden and deep, we have designated the intentions (*intentiones*): they are like the



<p>latet intentio cogitationis. Quam dum subtiliter discutimus, quasi ad interiora ossium penetramus.</p> <p>Liquet ergo quod recte compages, cogitationes, et medullae dicantur intentiones. Superest inquirere quomodo sermo Dei usque ad divisionem eorum pertingat. Prima divisio est inter animam et spiritum, hoc est inter voluptates carnales et spirituales. Secunda divisio est inter compages, id est cogitationes carnales et spirituales. Primum enim discernuntur voluptates, et utrum bono an malo desiderio [291C] affectus sit animus. Quae discretio ideo prima est, quia facilius quisque sua desideria dijudicare potest; deinde sequitur discretio cogitationum, quae magis est occulta, et difficilius comprehenditur. Quia enim ex pravis desideriis bonae nonnunquam cogitationes oriuntur, et rursus ex bonis desideriis pravae cogitationes prodeunt: non facile est cogitationum qualitatem discernere vel discutere, cum non solum ex praecedentibus desideriis, de quibus oriuntur, sed etiam ex subsequentibus quae ipsae gignunt, eas oporteat judicare. Sed ut apertius videatur qualiter ex pravis desideriis bonae, et ex bonis desideriis pravae cogitationes nascentur, exemplo monstretur.</p> <p>Nemo est qui desiderium rapinae nesciat [291D] malum esse, sed aliquando ex desiderio rapiendi nascitur desiderium occidendi, et saepe ex desiderio occidendi nascitur horror homicidii. Dum ergo ex malo desiderio cogitatio bonorum gignens affectum prodit, quasi in radice mala</p>	<p>marrow of our thoughts, because in the thought of the heart (<i>in cogitatione cordis</i>) is hidden the intention of thought (<i>intentio cogitationis</i>). When we keenly scrutinize this intention, it is as if we are stepping inside the bones.</p> <p>It is therefore clear that thoughts (<i>cogitationes</i>) are rightly called joints (<i>compages</i>) and intentions (<i>intentiones</i>) are called marrow (<i>medullae</i>). It remains to find out how the word of God pertains to their point of division. The first division is between the soul (<i>anima</i>) and the spirit (<i>spiritus</i>), that is, between carnal and spiritual wills. The second division is between the joints (<i>compages</i>), that is, between carnal and spiritual thoughts (<i>cogitationes</i>). For we first distinguish between pleasures and whether the mind (<i>animus</i>) is affected (<i>affectus</i>) by a good or a bad desire [291C] (<i>desiderium</i>). This discretion (<i>discretio</i>) is first, for the good reason that it is easier for everyone to judge their desires (<i>desideria</i>); then comes the discretion of thoughts (<i>discretio cogitationum</i>), which is more obscure and more difficult to grasp. Indeed, good thoughts sometimes arise from bad desires, and conversely, bad thoughts arise from good desires: so it is not easy to discern and to question the quality of thoughts, because they must be judged not only according to the desires which precede them and from which they arise, but also according to the desires which follow them and which they generate. But so that we can see more clearly how to going to judge how good thoughts are born from bad desires, and how bad thoughts are born from good desires, let us show by an example.</p> <p>Nobody is unaware that the desire for theft is evil, but sometimes from the desire to steal [291D] is born the desire to kill, and often from the desire to kill is born the horror of homicide. When, therefore, from a bad desire (<i>ex malo desiderio</i>) comes a thought (<i>cogitatio</i>) which generates a good</p>
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surculus bonus dulcem fructum facit. Similiter aliquando ex bono desiderio mala cogitatio nascitur, ut nonnunquam pollutionem carnis abominando, turpitudinem carnis concupiscentiae cogitare incipimus, et ex ipsa nostra cogitatione ad delectationem illicitam inflamamur, et quasi de puro fonte aqua manare incooperat, sed paulatim defuens in sentinam turpitudinis ibat. Aliquando autem cogitationes et ex bonis desideriis prodeunt, et bona desideria gignunt, vel ex malis ortae similiter mala proferunt. In qua ambiguitate quia difficilius [292A] veritas discerni potest, bene post divisionem animae ac spiritus, id est carnalium et spiritualium voluntatum, divisio compagum, id est cogitationum bonarum et malarum, quasi perplexior et difficilior est posita.

Postremo, quia discretio intentionum iis omnibus secretior esse cognoscitur, merito in extremo medullarum quoque divisio subditur. Haec autem omnia sermo Dei dijudicando penetrat, quia ille qui per sapientiam suam intus secreta nostra subtiliter intelligendo discernit, foris per doctrinam suam utiliter nos illuminando eadem intelligere facit. Quia igitur *vivus est sermo Dei*, credamus eum vera promittere; quia *efficax* est, speremus eum promissa perficere; quia *penetrabilis* est, et falli non potest, offendisse eum poeniteamus, et de reliquo timeamus [292B] offendere. Ipse enim et voluntates nostras intelligit, et cogitationes videt, et intentiones comprehendit.

feeling (*affectum bonorum*), it is as if, born of a bad root, a good shoot produced a sweet fruit. Likewise, sometimes a bad thought (*mala cogitatio*) arises from a good desire (*ex bono desiderio*), so sometimes in our horror of carnal defilement, we begin by thinking of the shame of carnal desire, and because of our very thought, we catch fire for illicit delight (*ad illicitam delectationem*), and it is as if a water had started by flowing from a pure source, but gradually flowed into the bilgewater of deformity. Also, sometimes the thoughts at the same time issue good desires and engender good desires, or [from the thoughts] are born bad desires, which produce similarly bad ones. Given the ambiguous cases, [292A] where the truth is difficult to discern, it is good that it is after the division of the soul (*anima*) and the spirit (*spiritus*), that is, of the carnal and spiritual tendencies, that the division of the joints (*compagum*), that is, of good and bad thoughts (*cogitationum bonarum et malarum*), has taken place, as more complicated and more delicate.

Finally, since it is recognized that the discretion of intentions (*discretio intentionum*) is more obscure than all the others, it is right that the division of the marrow be added last. Now all this, the word of God penetrates him by judging, for he who, inside, by the effect of his wisdom, judges our secret dispositions by his keen intelligence, outside, by means of his teaching, we are illuminated to usefully understand by the same means. Since, therefore, the *word of God is alive*, let us believe that he promises us the truth; since he is *effective*, let us hope that he will fulfil his promises; since he is *penetrating*, and cannot be mistaken, let us repent of having offended him, and in the future, [292B] fear to offend. For he himself knows our wills (*voluntates*), he sees our thoughts (*cogitationes*), he understands our intentions (*intentiones*).



Sequitur: *Non est ulla creatura invisibilis coram ipso* (Hebr. IV). Oculi Dei et longinqua capit, quia ubique praesens est, et intima, quia in omnibus est, et subtilia, quia perspicax est, et maxima comprehendit, quia omnia in ipso sunt. Hoc prosequitur dicens: *Omnia sunt in conspectu ejus nuda* (ibid.), quia in ipso sunt omnia *et aperta* (ibid.), quia ipse est in omnibus, vel nuda creatura dicitur, nuda actio vel cogitatio, vel intentio humana.

Quidam est oculus, qui foris est et non intus, sicut oculus carnis; quidam intus est ad aliquid, et ad aliquid foris, ut oculus cordis; et [292C] quidam oculus, qui intus est tantum et non foris, ut oculus Dei. Oculus carnis videt tantum extima corporum, et oculus mentis extima cordium. Oculi Dei intima videt. Oculi cordis ad oculum carnis intus est, ad oculum Dei foris. Et sicut oculus carnis non capit quae capit oculus cordis, sic oculus cordis non capit quae capit oculus Dei; sed oculus Dei capit quae capit oculus cordis. Igitur oculus carnis tantum capit extima corporum. Oculi cordis et extima et intima corporum sed tantum extima cordium. Oculi vero Dei extima simul et intima non solum corporum, sed etiam cordium capit.

Ergo non est ulla creatura invisibilis coram eo. Omnia autem sunt nuda et aperta coram eo. Ab oculis nostris teguntur saepe etiam quaeabilia sunt; quae invisibilia [292D] sunt clauduntur. Actio visibilis est, intentio invisibilis est. Sed actiones hominum licet in sua natura visibiles sint, multis tamen modis teguntur ab oculis nostris, ne videantur. Intentio

He [the Apostle] continues: *There is no invisible creature before him* (Hebr. IV) The eye of God grasps what is far away, since it is present everywhere, and what is interior, since it is in all things; which is imperceptible, since it is keen sighted; and includes the immense, since everything is in him. This [idea] is pursued, saying: *Everything is bare under his gaze* (ibid.), because everything is in him, *and in the open*, because he is in everything. Or again: by bare creature is meant, a bare human action (*actio*) or thought (*cogitatio*), or intention (*intentio*).

There is a certain eye, which is outer and not an inner, such is the eye of the flesh (*oculus carnis*); there is a certain eye, interior to some things, exterior to others, such is the eye of the heart (*oculus cordis*); and a certain eye, which is only interior and not exterior, such is the eye of God (*oculus Dei*). The eye of the flesh sees only the outside of bodies, and the eye of the mind (*oculus mentis*) the outside of hearts; the [292C] eye of God sees the inside. The eye of the heart is more interior than the eye of the flesh, more exterior than the eye of God. And just as the eye of the flesh does not catch what the eye of the heart grasps, so the eye of the heart does not catch what the eye of God catches; but the eye of God catches what the eye of the heart catches. Therefore, the eye of the flesh only captures the outside of bodies. The eye of the heart catches both the exterior and interior of bodies, but only the outside of the heart. But the eye of God catches at once both the outside and inside, not only of bodies, but also of hearts.

Therefore, there is no invisible creature before him. Everything is bare and uncovered before him. Even what is visible often remains hidden from our eyes; [292D] what is invisible remains closed. The action (*actio*) is visible, the intention (*intentio*) invisible. Moreover, the actions of men, although visible by nature, have a thousand ways to hide from our eyes to

autem videri non potest, etiamsi ipsa actio videatur. Igitur oculis Dei omnia sunt nuda, quia ipse omnes actiones hominum videt ubicunque fiant, quia non sunt tenebrae, et non est umbra mortis, ubi abscondantur qui operantur malum; nec operimentum tegit, nec velamen protegit, nec paries intercludit, nec caligo abscondit nos ab oculis ejus. Ergo omnia sunt nuda, quia ipse videt omne quod agitur; omnia aperta quia ipse videt qua intentione agatur.

Sequitur: *Ad quem nobis sermo* (ibid.), id est ad Deum vel ad sermonem ejus, subauditur vel est, vel erit, vel [293A] esse debet sermo. Primum fit sermo Dei ad nos, postea sermo noster ad Deum. Duobus autem modis fit sermo Dei ad nos, interius et exterius. Interius per inspirationem, exterius per praedicationem. Item per inspirationem duobus modis, per naturam et per gratiam. Per naturam, quando conditis inspirat cognitionem boni; per gratiam, quando reparatis suggerit amorem boni. Duobus etiam modis fit noster sermo ad ipsum, vel consulendo rationem, vel reddendo rationem. Si modo rationem ex voluntate consulere ad faciendum nolumus, tunc ex necessitate de factis rationem reddemus: sicut in Apocalypsi dicuntur libri aperti, et deinde liber alius apertus qui est vitae, postea judicatos mortuos ex iis quae scripta erant in libris (Apoc. XX). Libri sunt [293B] corda hominum. Liber vitae est sapientia. Dei libri aperiuntur, quando manifesta sunt secreta cordium. Liber vitae aperiatur, quando unicuique luce interiori manifeste patecet omne quod faciendum est. Et mortui ex his quae in libris sunt, non quae in libro, judicantur, quia peccatores ex suis operibus judicabuntur. Libri nostri ad librum Dei scripti sunt, quia corda nostra ad similitudinem sapientiae Dei condita sunt sicut dicitur: *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine* (Psal. IV). Adhuc scribi debent libri nostri secundum exemplar libri vitae, sicut dicit Apostolus: *Estote imitatores Christi sicut filii*

remain invisible. However, Intention cannot be seen, even if the action itself is seen. Thus, in the eyes of God everything is bare, since he sees all the actions of men, wherever they are done, for there is no darkness, nor shadow of death where those who do evil; no cloak that covers us in his eyes, no veil that protects us, no wall that shields us, no cloud that hides us. Everything is therefore bare, since he himself sees everything that is done; everything is exposed, since he sees the intention with which it is done.

He [the Apostle] continues: *To whom our word* (ibid.), that is, to God, or, at his word, or the word is understood, or will be understood, or [293A] ought to be understood. First, there is the word of God addressed to us, then, our word to God. The word of God is addressed to us in two ways: interiorly and exteriorly. Internally, by inspiration; externally, by preaching. By inspiration, it is again in two ways, by nature and by grace. By nature, when it inspires in these created beings the knowledge of good; by grace, when he suggests to these redeemed beings the love of good. It is also in two ways that our word is addressed to God, either by taking advice from reason or by restoring reason. If now we are unwilling to take the advice of reason to act, then, of necessity, we will be held accountable for our actions, as stated in Revelation. The books were opened, then another book was opened, that of life. Finally, the dead were judged according to what was written in the books (Apoc. XX). Books are [293B] the hearts of men. The book of life is the wisdom of God. The books of God are opened when the secrets of the heart are revealed. The book of life will be opened when an inner light will make everyone see clearly what needs to be done. And the dead are judged according to the contents of the books, not the book, for sinners will be judged according to their works. Our books were written after the book of God, because our hearts were formed in the likeness of the

*charissimi* (Ephes. V). Etsi scripti non sunt, saltem corrigendi sunt. Conferamus itaque libros nostros cum hoc libro, ut si quid aliter habuerint, [293C] corrigantur, ne in illa ultima collatione, si quidpiam aliter inventi fuerint habentes, abjiciantur. Sic intelligi potest, ad quem, id est sermonem est nobis sermo.

Vel aliter, ad quem est nobis sermo. Loquamur ad Christum de nobis, ut ipse ad Patrem loquatur pro nobis, quia pontifex est, ut conferat Deo vota populi, et magnus. Magnus secundum divinitatem, quia Filius Dei; magnus secundum humanitatem, quia penetrat coelos. Accedamus ergo cum fiducia ad thronum gratiae ejus, id est ad ipsum in quo regnat gratia. Gratia autem in eo duobus modis regnat, quia nec in eo malitia est, quae affectum gratiae impediatur quin velit, nec in nobis miseria quin possit. Accedamus ergo cum fiducia, quoniam [293D] et officium ejus est ut pro nobis oret, quia pontifex constitutus; et meritum ipsius ut impetret, quia justus. Denique libenter compatiatur, quia et ipse propter nos infirmitatibus circumdatus est. Constitutus est, quia a Deo. Non enim ipse se constituit, sed Deus illum glorificavit, qui dixit: *Filius meus es tu: ego hodie genui te* (Psal. II; Matth. II, XVII; Marc. IX). Quando in baptismo hoc dictum est [294A] super Christum, tunc quasi ad pontificatum electus est.

wisdom of God, as it is said: *The light of your face, Lord, is impressed upon us* (Psal. IV). It remains to write our books after the copy of the book of life, as the Apostle says: *Be imitators of Christ as very dear sons* (Ephesians. V). Even already written, at least they need to be corrected. Let us therefore collate [293C] our books with this book, to correct any discrepancies that may be encountered there, lest during the final collation, if there is any discrepancy there, they will be discarded. You can understand in this way the words, to which our word, that is, speech-addresses.

Or another interpretation, to whom is our word. We speak to Christ about us, so that he may speak to his Father on our behalf, since he is pontiff, so that he can offer the people's wishes to God, and he is great. He is great according to his divinity, because he is the Son of God; great according to his humanity, because he penetrates the heavens. Let us therefore approach with confidence the throne of his grace, that is to say of him in whom grace reigns. Grace reigns in him in two ways, since there is no malice in him, which prevents him from willing the affect of grace (*affectus gratiae*), nor in us there is misery which prevents him from power. Let us therefore approach the throne with confidence, [293D] since it is his office to pray for us, since he was appointed as pontiff; and his merit so that he may succeed, because he is just. Finally, he will always like to sympathize, for he himself has been clothed with weakness because of us. He was established, for it is by God. It was not because of himself that he established himself, but God glorified him, who said: *You are my Son, today I have begotten him* (Psalm. II; Matth. II, XVI; Mark. IX).). When at baptism this word was spoken [294A] about Christ, it was then that he was elected to the pontificate.

Quando in monte dictum est, tunc quasi pontifex est ordinatus, et veste indutus gloriae. Postea in tertia voce quae ad eum venit de coelo, dicens: *Et clarificavi, et iterum clarificabo* (Joan. XVII), approbatus et confirmatus est in dignitate sua, sicut Aaron post ordinationem, quia quosdam aemulos et suo sacerdotio derogantes habuit, a Deo probatus est et confirmatus. In monte vestem gloriae in ordinationem accepit; in resurrectione ad offerendas pro nobis preces Deo induit. *Omnis namque pontifex ex hominibus assumptus pro hominibus constituitur in his quae sunt ad Deum, ut offerat oblationes et sacrificia pro peccatis* (Hebr. V). Duplex esse debet assumptio eorum qui praeficiuntur, scilicet ut primum [0294B] intus per gratiam assumantur ad excellentiam virtutis, postmodum foris per obedientiam vocentur ad excellentiam dignitatis. Alii assumuntur intus, et non foris sicut boni subjecti. Alii assumuntur foris et non intus sicut mali praelati, alii foris et intus sicut boni praelati, alii nec foris nec intus sicut mali subjecti.

Sequitur: *Pro hominibus constituitur in his quae sunt ad Deum* (ibid.). Dicitur in Evangelio: *Reddite quae sunt Caesaris Caesari, et quae sunt Dei Deo* (Luc. XX). Sicut Caesar habet praefectos suos ad populum qui exigant ea quae Caesaris sunt, sic et Deus habet praefectos suos ad populum suum, qui ea quae Dei sunt requirant. Et sicut praefecti Caesaris legatione populi [294C] funguntur ad intercedendum, et legatione Caesaris ad populum ad imperandum, sic et praefecti Dei, id est praelati in Ecclesia legatione populi funguntur ad Deum ut obsecrent, sive legatione Dei ad populum ut jubeant.

When it was said on the mountain, it was then that he was ordained pontiff and clothed in the robe of glory. Later, it is by the third voice which came to him from heaven, saying: *I glorified him and I will glorify him again* (Joan. XVII), that he was approved and confirmed in his dignity. So Aaron, after his ordination, was approved and confirmed by God, because there were people to envy and despise his priesthood. On the mountain, he received for his ordination the robe of glory. On the day of his resurrection, he clothed him to offer God his prayers on our behalf.

*Every pontifex, promoted from among men, is in fact established to intervene on behalf of men in their relations with God, in order to offer oblations and sacrifices for sins* (Hebr. V). The promotion of those to whom authority is entrusted must be twofold: [294B] first an interior promotion by grace to an eminent degree of virtue; then an outward appeal by obedience to a high degree of dignity. Some are promoted internally, not externally: such are the good subjects; some are so externally, not internally: such are the bad prelates; some are so externally and internally: such are the good prelates; some are neither external mentally or inwardly: such are the bad subjects.

Then: *He is established to intervene in favour of men in their relationship with God* (ibid.). It is said in the Gospel: *Give back to Caesar what is due to Caesar, and to God what is due to God* (Luke. XX) Just as Caesar delegates his prefects to the people to demand what is due to Caesar, God also delegates his prefects to his people to claim what is due to God. And as the prefects of Caesar act as legates of the people [with Caesar] to intercede, and as legates of Caesar with the people to ordain [294C], so the prefects of God, that is to say the prelates in the Church, act as legates of the people to God to implore on his behalf, or as legates of God to the people to command.



Aliud est enim officium praelati, in quantum est legatus populi ad Deum, et aliud est in quantum legatus Dei ad populum. In illo officio, quo est legatus populi erga Deum, devotionem exhibere debet, ut eum oblationibus et sacrificio spirituali precibusque placatum reddat. In eo officio quo est legatus Dei ad populum, ad ipsum pertinet ignorantes docere, peccantes corrigere. De illo officio in quo est legatus populi ad Deum dictum est, ut offerat sacrificia et oblationes pro peccatis. De illo officio in quo est legatus Dei ad populum, dictum est, [294D] *ut sciat compati iis qui ignorant et errant. Quoniam et ipse circumdatus est infirmitate* (Hebr. V). Quidam sunt qui se in infirmitate esse cognoscunt, sed circumdatos infirmitate non putant, hi videlicet qui in quibusdam actionibus suis fortes se esse considerant. Qui vero in omnibus suis se infirmari conspiciunt, in quantum ad existimationem suam, undique infirmitate circumdati sunt.

Another is in fact the office of the prelate as legate of the people with God, and another as legate of God to the people. In that office, which is the legate of the people to God, he must show a piety which appeases God through oblations, spiritual sacrifice, prayers. In that office, which is the legate of God to the people, it behoves him to teach the ignorant, to correct sinners. It is of the office of the people's legate to God that it is said to offer sacrifices and oblations for sins. And of the office of God's legate to the people it is said: [294D] *So that they may know have compassion on those who are in ignorance and error, since he himself has been clothed with weakness*. There are people who know they are weak, but do not think they are clothed with weakness: they are those who, in some of their actions, believe they are strong. But in all those people who in everything are conscious of their own weakness, they are in all respects enclosed by weakness.

## GLOSSARY

Latin	English Translation(s)
<i>anima</i>	Can refer to (i) the ‘soul’ and all its powers in its entirety yet more commonly refers to (ii) the non-rational power which bestows life to the body and flesh, known as the ‘living soul’. In this latter sense, the soul is the principle of life, which is shared by both humans and animals.
<i>animus</i>	The rational soul. Distinct from the <i>anima</i> , the <i>animus</i> is responsible for the higher, intellectual capacities of the soul relating to thinking, discriminating, remembering and, sometimes, willing.
<i>affectio</i>	‘Affection’, ‘movement of the soul’, ‘feeling’, ‘emotion’. Examples include love, joy, hope, sadness, anger, hatred, shame.
<i>affectus</i>	<p><i>Affectus</i> is often considered to be an untranslatable term.<sup>1180</sup> As a fourth declension noun, <i>affectus</i> is both singular and plural.</p> <p>Depending on context, <i>affectus</i> can be understood as a ‘feeling’, ‘mood’, ‘affect’, ‘disposition’, ‘condition’, ‘attachment’, ‘tendency’, ‘longing’, ‘desire’, ‘will’, and even ‘thought’, among others. It is a hallmark of the Augustinian-inspired psychology of the Cistercians and Victorines that an <i>affectus</i> is neutral <i>per se</i>: the object and intention behind the <i>affectus</i> attributes it with moral value. Today affect has specific connotations with pre-conscious, pre-linguistic states of feeling. As a consequence, where there is no better translation, I often prefer the term affectivity due to its neutrality.</p> <p>As the past participle of the verb <i>afficere</i>, (<i>afficio</i>, <i>afficere</i>, <i>affeci</i>, <i>affectum</i>) <i>affectus</i> designates the act of being ‘affected’ or ‘changed’ by an external force.</p> <p>While any attempt to systematically define <i>affectus</i> is impossible, the following themes and contexts can be identified:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) Power of the soul: The <i>affectus</i> is a fundamental activity of the soul, specifically the desiring or feeling capacity, often seen as synonymous with the will. In the bi-partite psychological system, the <i>affectus</i> is often described as working in harmony with the intellective power, the <i>intellectus</i>.</li> <li>(ii) Spontaneity: an <i>affectus</i> can be a spontaneous attachment of the soul towards something. In this configuration it is very often considered as similar to, or interrelated with, the bodily senses and sense perception.</li> </ul>

<sup>1180</sup> Thomas X. Davis, ‘Appendix’, CFS 15, p. 93; Feiss, VTT 4, note 6, p. 344. See also Marsha Dutton’s comments in *A Companion to Aelred of Rievaulx (1110-1167)*, pp. 11-12.

	<p>(iii) Affect: similar to modern notions of affect, an <i>affectus</i> can be interpreted as the unconscious feelings</p> <p>(iv) Permanence: one way that an <i>affectus</i> can be distinguished from an <i>affectio</i> is that an <i>affectus</i> is regarded as a form of stable or constant love that is maintained by grace whereas <i>affectiones</i> are fleeting and ephemeral.<sup>1181</sup></p> <p>(v) The heart: The physiological and spiritual location of the <i>affectus</i> is considered to be the heart.<sup>1182</sup></p> <p>(vi) Sensuality and spirituality: in Victorine theology, the <i>affectus</i> is linked both with sensuality and spiritual desire for God. If it pursues bodily pleasure it becomes <i>appetitus</i> ('appetite').<sup>1183</sup></p> <p>(vii) Virtue: the affections of the <i>affectus</i> – often joy, hope, sadness and fear – are considered for the development of the virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice, as well as the theological virtues of faith, hope and love.</p> <p>(viii) Like-for-like perception: The <i>affectus</i> and the <i>affectiones</i> springing from it can be considered as an emotional form of sense perception, moulding the individual's soul into a greater likeness to God.<sup>1184</sup></p> <p>(ix) Prayer and meditation: The <i>affectus</i> activated by meditative prayer, an emotional and contemplative dialogue with God, are of great concern to Cistercian and Victorine writers, notably Bernard of Clairvaux and Hugh of Saint-Victor.<sup>1185</sup></p> <p>(x) Activity: As part of the will, the <i>affectus</i> as a volitional power is considered an agent of the soul's reformation. Hugh of Saint-Victor and the Victorines often connect the <i>affectus</i> to effort and devotion.<sup>1186</sup> Wordplay between <i>affectus</i> and <i>effectus</i> ('effect') is common to show how the inner disposition of the mind, the affect, effects the outer world.<sup>1187</sup></p> <p>(xi) Passivity: The act of being affected by God's saving grace. The human <i>affectus</i> is deficient or lacking (<i>defectus</i>) in itself, seeking out pleasure and desires (negative affectivity); it thus requires help to stay on the path to God and virtue (positive affectivity).<sup>1188</sup></p>
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<sup>1181</sup> *Nat. dig.* 3, 14 (PL 184, 389A-B; Verdeyen, CCCM 88, 14, p. 188-189; CFS 30, 3, 14, p. 70): 'Affectus is one thing, affection (*affectio*) another. The *affectus* is that which possesses the mind by a kind of generalised force and perpetual virtue, firm and stable and maintained through grace. Affections, however, are things which vary according to the various occurrences of things and times.' (Aliud quippe est affectus, aliud affectio.

Affectus est qui generali quadam potentia et perpetua quadam virtute firma et stabili mentem possidet, quam per gratiam obtinuit. Affectiones vero sunt quas varias variis rerum et temporum affert eventus).

<sup>1182</sup> See especially A. Guillaumont, 'Cor et cordis affectus', *DS*, 2 (Paris, 1953), cols. 2281-2288,

<sup>1183</sup> Feiss, 'General Introduction', VTT 4, p. 85.

<sup>1184</sup> *Ex. cant.* 'Preface', 1-25 (PL 180, 473-483; CFS 6, 'pp. 3-19).

<sup>1185</sup> *Meditatione*. 3.1 and 3.3 (SC 155, pp. 48-55; VTT 4, p. 388-390); *Mod. or.*

<sup>1186</sup> Feiss, VTT 4, note 6, p. 344.

<sup>1187</sup> Feiss, *On the Three Days*, VTT 1, note 61, p. 100; *Med. orat.* 12 (PL 180, 247B-C; Ceglar, 12.26, p. 78; Penelope, 12.15, p. 176); *Nat. dig.* 16 (PL 184, 388D; CFS 30, p. 90).

<sup>1188</sup> *Nat. dig.* 2 (PL 184, 383A-B; Verdeyen, CCCM 88, 4, p. 180-181; CFS 30, p. 56). See also M. Champion et al, 'But Were They Talking About the Emotions?', 521-543.

	<p>The difficulty in translating this term comes in that (1) there is no stable meaning of this term across the twelfth century. Neither is there a (2) common understanding between Cistercian and Victorine communities, nor (3) between individuals of each community (the <i>affectus</i> of Aelred of Rievaulx has a different emphasis from that of William of Saint-Thierry, for instance), nor (4) in the works of a single author is there a consistent approach.</p> <p>For an excellent discussion of the meanings of <i>affectus</i> see Thomas X. Davis' comments as well as the remarks of Hugh Feiss and Zwingmann.<sup>1189</sup></p>
<i>afficere</i>	<p>Derived from the <i>Latin ad</i> ('towards') and <i>facere</i> ('to make'), the various meanings of <i>afficere</i> include 'to affect', 'to make', 'to move', 'to influence', 'to impress', 'to cause', 'to afflict' and 'to weaken'.<sup>1190</sup> As an infinitive form, <i>afficere</i> quite often indicates an active – as opposed to passive – usage of the <i>affectiones</i>, <i>affectus</i> or <i>voluntas</i>.</p>
<i>aspectus</i>	<p>'Rational sight'. The <i>aspectus</i> can be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) A sub-power of the soul's rationality responsible for directing the intellectual gaze of the soul towards God.</li> <li>(ii) Alongside the <i>affectus</i>, the other key faculty of the soul responsible for all the soul's intellectual operations. In this sense it can be equivalent to <i>ratio</i>, <i>intellectus</i> or <i>sensus</i>.</li> </ul>
<i>cognitio</i>	'knowledge'.
<i>cognitio sui</i>	'Self-knowledge' (see chapter 4). The foundational state of inner awareness or dialogue between the soul and the self that stimulates a reflection that the individual is made in the image and likeness of God and needs to reform their self to pursue knowledge of God.
<i>concupiscibilitas</i>	<p>'concupiscibility'. The desiring power of the soul – the attractive force which inclines a person towards something. In the Platonic tradition, this power is linked with the 'spirited' element of the soul and is its own potency. In Cistercian and Victorine psychology, however, concupiscibility is often designated as one of two sub-powers of the <i>affectus</i>, the other being <i>irascibilitas</i>. In this context, it is also commonly translated as 'positive appetite': the power of the <i>affectus</i> that moves the soul-body towards objects of perception believed to affect the soul beneficially or usefully.</p>

<sup>1189</sup> 'Appendix', CFS 15, pp. 93-95; Feiss, 'General Introduction', VTT 2, pp. 85-87; Feiss, VTT 4, note 6, p. 344;

<sup>1190</sup> D. Boquet, *L'ordre et L'affect*, p. 34



<i>curiositas</i>	‘Mental curiosity’. Overwhelmingly considered as a bad state of affectivity, although neutral and even good forms of mental curiosity are discussed by Cistercian monks and Victorine canons. Mental curiosity represents failure of the mind to focus its attention on things with an intention that promotes positive thoughts or emotions directed at God, neighbour or self. It is often associated with what I call ‘negative affectivity’. The other commonly utilised term for <i>curiositas</i> , <i>concupiscentia oculorum</i> (‘concupiscence of the eyes’), suggests the key link between mental curiosity and the sense of sight, although all of the five senses can be sources of <i>curiositas</i> .
<i>defectus</i>	Translatable as ‘failure’, ‘falling’ ‘lack’, ‘defectiveness’ or ‘weakness’.
<i>ingenium</i>	‘Forethought’ or ‘discernment’
<i>intellectus</i>	Often defined as ‘intellect’ or ‘understanding’.
<i>intelligentia</i>	‘Understanding’.
<i>irascibilitas</i>	‘Irascibility’. The repulsive power of the soul, responsible for emotions traditionally coded as negative, primarily anger. In Cistercian and Victorine psychology, the power is often considered as one of the two sub-powers of the <i>affectus</i> , the other being <i>concupiscibilitas</i> . In this context, it is commonly referred to as ‘negative appetite’: the power of the <i>affectus</i> that distances the soul-body away from objects of perception believed to affect the soul in a harmful or non-useful way.
<i>habitus</i>	The accumulated reservoir of behaviours, attachments and habits that constitutes the framework in which someone lives their life.
<i>liberium arbitrium</i>	‘Free will’. <i>Liberium arbitrium</i> is nearly always seen as the cooperation between reason and will.
<i>mens</i>	‘Mind’. The <i>mens</i> represents the highest part of the soul, identifiable with the understanding and the will that adheres to intellectual ideas.
<i>ratio</i>	‘Reason’.
<i>rationabilitas</i>	‘Rationality’.

<i>sensus</i>	<p>In psychological texts, the term <i>sensus</i> has a range of meanings.<sup>1191</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) The experience of ‘sensation’ or ‘sense-perception’</li> <li>(ii) A particular ‘sense’: e.g., touch.</li> <li>(iii) The ‘senses’: the five bodily senses of sight, hearing, smell, touch and taste as a collective.</li> <li>(iv) ‘power of knowledge’: a key power of the soul that subsumes the perceptive, rational and intellectual functions of the soul. In Cistercian and Victorine psychology, the power of knowledge normally has four to five epistemological divisions which chart how the soul learns about God through sense perception, imagination, reason, understanding and intelligence.</li> </ul>
<i>spiritus</i>	<p>‘Spirit’. The term <i>spiritus</i> had several connotations. In the context of psychology and medicine, the spirits often refer to the bodily operations of the soul. William of Saint-Thierry defines a spirit as ‘the power of the powers for performing their actions. For the spirit is kind of force of the soul through which its powers perform their acts’.<sup>1192</sup> Alcher of Clairvaux defines a spirit as ‘a certain power of the soul, inferior to the mind (<i>mens</i>), where the likeness of corporeal things are expressed.’<sup>1193</sup></p>
<i>virtus</i>	<p>When used in a psychological sense, <i>virtus</i> refers to specific ‘power’ or potency of the soul.</p>
<i>voluntas</i>	<p>‘Will’. The power of volition or willing an action. In Cistercian and Victorine psychology the will is often considered analogous to the <i>affectus</i>.</p>

<sup>1191</sup> This overview is dependent on McGinn, *Three Treatises*, p. 100.

<sup>1192</sup> *Nat. corp.*, 1.21 (PL 180, 801A; ed. Verdeyen, *Opera Omnia*, lines 259-263, p. 110; tCFS 24, 5, p. 112).

<sup>1193</sup> *DSA*, 10 (PL 40, 785; CFS 24, pp. 192-193).

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