Horton, Joe;
Ross, Jacob;
(2025)
Evaluative Uncertainty and Permissible Preference.
The Philosophical Review
(In press).
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Abstract
There has recently been an explosion of interest in rational and moral choice under evaluative uncertainty—uncertainty about values or reasons. However, the dominant views on such choice have at least three major problems: they are overly demanding, they are incompatible with supererogation, and they cannot be applied to agents with credence in indeterminate evaluative theories. We here propose a unified view that solves all these problems. According to this view, permissible options maximise expected utility relative to permissible preferences, and different kinds of permissibility for options correspond to different kinds of permissibility for preferences. Thus, rationally permissible options maximize expected utility relative to rationally permissible preferences, and morally permissible options maximize expected utility relative to morally permissible preferences. We argue that this view has more plausible implications than its rivals not only under evaluative uncertainty but also under ordinary uncertainty.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Evaluative Uncertainty and Permissible Preference |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-revi... |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10200046 |
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