Carter, Sam;
Hawthorne, John;
(2024)
Dogmatism and Inquiry.
Mind: a quarterly review of philosophy
, 133
(531)
pp. 651-676.
10.1093/mind/fzad070.
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Abstract
Inquiry aims at knowledge. Your inquiry into a question succeeds just in case you come to know the answer. However, combined with a common picture on which misleading evidence can lead knowledge to be lost, this view threatens to recommend a novel form of dogmatism. At least in some cases, individuals who know the answer to a question appear required to avoid evidence bearing on it. In this paper, we'll aim to do two things. First, we'll present an argument for this novel form of dogmatism and show that it presents a substantive challenge. Second, we'll consider a way those who take knowledge to be the aim of inquiry can mount a response. In the course of doing so, we'll try to get clearer on the normative connections between inquiry, knowledge and evidence gathering.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Dogmatism and Inquiry |
| DOI: | 10.1093/mind/fzad070 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad070 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher's terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10197125 |
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