Citizens' Preferences for Multidimensional Representation

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How do citizens want to be represented in politics? We investigate citizens' *multidimensional* preferences regarding six conceptions of representation that are derived from political theory. Using original item batteries and a conjoint experiment, we elicit the relative importance of the dimensions and the types of representation people prefer on each. Our results from surveys fielded in the US, UK, and Germany show that (1) descriptive representation has comparatively limited appeal for citizens at large, but is more important for historically marginalized groups; (2) citizens do not focus on local politicians when thinking about who represents them, but also seek representation from politicians in other districts; (3) while citizens strongly value substantive representation, they are largely indifferent as to whether their representatives are responsive to electoral sanctions. Our findings have important implications for how political scientists study democratic representation.

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1 Introduction

It is uncontroversial that good political representation is crucial for the functioning of democracy. But how do citizens want to be represented in politics? A growing body of literature investigates citizens' preferences regarding representation (e.g. Costa, 2021; Wolak, 2017; Arnesen et al., 2019; Harden, 2015; Bengtsson and Wass, 2010; Barker and Carman, 2012). It aims to understand how citizens relate to well-known conceptions of representation that have been used in empirical work, such as *substantive* and *descriptive* representation (Pitkin, 1967) or *delegate* vs. *trustee* representation (e.g. Eulau et al., 1959).

However, recent work in political theory suggests that conventional ways of conceptualizing representation may conceal important complexities and miss crucial additional dimensions of representation (see Mansbridge, 2003; Rehfeld, 2009; Saward, 2010; Wolkenstein and Wratil, 2021). This means that citizens' preferences for representation might also be more complex and multidimensional than we assume. For instance, voters might not only value that a representative has the same substantive policy positions or the same gender as themselves. They may also value the degree to which there is a direct electoral relationship between them and their representatives or the degree to which their representatives act as individuals, rather than members of a party, to cite just two examples (Wolkenstein and Wratil, 2021).

If we accept a multidimensional view of representation, then our current understanding of citizens' preferences towards representation is likely to miss important parts of the picture. Much existing work only considers citizens' preferences regarding one or two dimensions of representation (e.g. Bowler, 2017; Carman, 2007; Rosset et al., 2017), and where more dimensions are considered (e.g. Wolak, 2017; Harden, 2015; Bengtsson and Wass, 2010; Bøggild, 2020), it usually remains unclear which dimensions matter most to citizens (but see Costa 2021). Yet, if citizens' preferences are potentially multidimensional, it is crucial to understand which dimensions are more important to them, relative to others. It is crucial for predicting how citizens might assess trade-offs in finding good representatives. For instance, is the better representative one elected in another district who shares your policy

views on a given issue, or one that does not share your views but is elected in the constituency in which you live?

In this paper, we make four contributions. First, we provide a theoretical case, based on the constructivist turn in representation (Saward, 2010; Disch, 2021), for why citizens' views on representation should play a greater role in research on political representation. Second, integrating theoretical and empirical literatures, we present a conceptual framework for studying representation preferences which distinguishes six key conceptions of representation: substantive representation, descriptive representation, surrogation, justification, personalization, and responsiveness. To our knowledge, two of them — surrogation and justification — have never been addressed in the literature on citizens' representation preferences. Third, we present two original measurement instruments: (1) a new set of item batteries that allow us to measure citizens' preferences on each of the dimensions; (2) a novel paired-comparison conjoint survey experiment which allows us to assess the relative importance of the six dimensions for citizens' evaluations of their political representatives. Fourth, we field these instruments to survey respondents from three major Western democracies with different representation-affecting institutional features — the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. We therefore provide one of the first studies looking at citizens' preferences on various dimensions of representation across national contexts, while cross-national work has mostly focused on one dimension only (e.g. Bowler, 2017; Rosset et al., 2017).

Our findings have important implications for the empirical study of political representation. First, compared to the other dimensions of representation, *descriptive representation* plays a relatively limited role in citizens' evaluations of representatives, being only the fourth most important of the six dimensions. However, members of historically marginalized groups value descriptively congruent representatives more, making the dimension rank in third place among people with ethnic/racial minority or migratory background. Second, *personalization* — understood as representatives' relative independence from their party — matters a great deal to citizens, implying that researchers should explore the appeal of this conception in greater depth in the future. Third, citizens are mostly

indifferent about whether they are represented by someone from their own electoral district, but they do care about being represented by a member of their preferred party. This suggests that if scholars want to understand how citizens assess representation, they should pay more attention to non-electoral relationships between voters, their chosen representatives, and parties. Many citizens may see someone as their representative they never had a chance to vote for. Fourth, once we conceptually separate *responsiveness* qua representatives' sensitivity to the threat of electoral sanctions from *substantive representation* qua representatives' propensity to advance their constituents' policy preferences, it emerges that it is substantive representation and not responsiveness that voters deem relevant. This suggest we should critically reflect on the great attention that representation scholars usually pay to electoral accountability and "rational anticipation" (e.g. Erikson et al., 2002; Mansbridge, 2003). Finally, citizens' representation preferences vary by important covariates such as age, ethnicity/race, and trust, inviting scholars to study how different groups want to be represented differently and why.

2 Why Study Representation Preferences?

There are several good reasons for studying citizens' representation preferences. For one, if we as political scientists are committed to taking seriously what our fellow citizens think — if we believe, as Sabl (2015, 355) puts it, that "what ordinary people value is worth a provisional respect" — then we should also have an interest in exploring how citizens want to be represented by elected politicians. A more specific theoretical argument is available, too. This is inspired by the innovative new "constructivist" theories of political representation (major statements are found in Disch, 2021; Saward, 2010).

Unlike conventional theories of representation, constructivism foregrounds the performative and creative aspects of political representation. As Saward (2019, 271) puts it, constructivism assumes that "representation's political presence arises primarily by virtue of its being done — practiced, performed, claimed. Representative roles and relations gain a presence in our politics because ... actors

make claims to speak for others." For constructivists, it is not elections that bring representative relationships into existence, but a "claim" by an actor to speak on behalf of a particular group. Importantly, the addressees of such claims are also thought to play an active role in co-constituting representative relationships. Indeed, for constructivists, "[a]udiences accepting (or rejecting or contesting or ignoring) representative claims is a crucial part of the dynamics of political representation" (Saward, 2010, 27).

For many constructivists, moreover, the legitimacy of representation hinges on whether a political actor's "claim" to speak for a particular constituency is *accepted*, rather than, say, rejected or ignored, by that constituency (Montanaro, 2019, 193-94; Saward, 2010, 146). Indeed, some argue that "[g]iven the burdens of judgment and the extraordinarily difficult epistemological issues involved in forging independent criteria of legitimacy" (Saward, 2010, 146), this is the most democratic way of ascertaining whether a representative relationship is legitimate also (also see Wolkenstein, 2024, 283-6). As Saward (2019, 288) suggests,

> [d]emocracy, whatever else it may require, is based on popular power or control, so in principle evident acceptance of representative claims by the relevant constituency is the key, with no necessary or decisive place for independent criteria of, for example, what might make for a good representative. … Evidence of an accepted or authorized claim to representation can be taken, contingently, as an example of democratic representation.

Such acceptance will only be forthcoming, however, when what politicians say and do resonates with citizens' *normative expectations about political representation*, that is, how they want their representatives to present themselves and act in public. Note that conventional "selection models" of representation make similar assumptions, conjecturing that citizens seek out "good representative types" by using various personal characteristics as cues for how well politicians might represent them (see Fearon, 1999, 59; Mansbridge, 2009, 381).

If this is correct, then studying how citizens would like to be represented by political actors promises to teach us a lot about *why and when claims to representation may be viewed as legitimate*.

Indeed, as Wass and Nemčok (2020) put it, a sound understanding of citizens' expectations of representatives, and whether representatives fulfill these expectations, "is important knowledge for those interested in the legitimacy of democratic processes" (333) more generally. If we treat representation as a relationship that is co-constituted by citizens (together with politicians), then it could even be argued that the representation preferences of citizens should *influence which aspects of representation we empirically study*. After all, if certain aspects are relatively unimportant to citizens, studying them will not tell us much about the legitimacy of representation.

3 Existing Work on Representation Preferences

Thus far, the literature on citizens' representation preferences only makes up a small subset of the overall literature on representation (e.g. see Arnesen et al., 2019; Wolak, 2017; Campbell et al., 2019; Costa, 2021; Harden, 2015; McMurray and Parsons, 1965; Vivyan and Wagner, 2016; Bowler, 2017; Méndez-Lago and Martínez, 2002; Carman, 2006; Rosset et al., 2017; Bøggild, 2020; Wass and Nemčok, 2020). The question most often addressed in this literature is arguably whether citizens prefer either the trustee or delegate model of representation. While trustee representatives follow their own judgments, and thus are less responsive to the demands of citizens, delegates defer to their constituents' views and are responsive to them. Most studies have found that voters prefer aspects of the delegate over the trustee model (Carman, 2006, 2007; Barker and Carman, 2012; McMurray and Parsons, 1965; Rosset et al., 2017; Davidson, 1970; Bowler, 2017; Wolak, 2017; Dassonneville et al., 2021).[2] Some work has pitted "partisan representation" as a third model against trustee and delegate representation, demonstrating that citizens prefer both delegates and trustees over partisan representatives, who resolutely follow the party line rather than their own views or the views of their constituency (Bøggild, 2020). Recent studies suggest that the public generally dislikes representatives who loyally toe the party line (e.g. Campbell et al., 2019; Carson et al., 2010).

A second major theme in the literature on citizens' representation preferences is whether citizens

[2] But see Bengtsson and Wass (2010) and Patterson et al. (1975), who find little difference or even a blanket preference for the trustee model, respectively.

want representatives to focus their work on their district (e.g. through pork-barrel politics or constituency service) vs. on national policy issues. The findings are mixed and probably depend to some extent on question wordings and research designs. While Lapinski et al. (2016) find evidence that citizens most value legislators that represent them on "salient national issues," Vivyan and Wagner (2016) report that legislators who balance their efforts between national and constituency-level work gather the most citizen support on average. Doherty (2013) even demonstrates that when evaluating concrete instances of legislators' behavior, citizens actually prefer a district focus over a national focus (see also Wolak, 2017). Preferences over the focus of representation also vary considerably by individual-level characteristics: those in economic need, with lower education, and ethnic minorities (Harden, 2015; Griffin and Flavin, 2011; Lapinski et al., 2016) as well as respondents with a local as opposed to cosmopolitan orientation (Vivyan and Wagner, 2016) tend to prefer a district focus over a national focus.

While the literature on representation preferences has made important contributions, it also has limitations. First, many studies use conceptualizations of representation that are considered misleading or outdated by representation theorists. Take the literature on preferences for delegate vs. trustee representation. Theorists have widely rejected this distinction. Rehfeld (2009), for example, argues that three more fundamental distinctions in representation are conflated in these models: (1) whether representatives are sensitive to electoral sanctions; (2) whether they pursue the good of a group (i.e., their district) or of society as a whole; and (3) whether they rely on others' (e.g., their constituents) or their own judgments. This also means that multiple other forms of representation are conceivable, above and beyond trustee and delegate representation (e.g. representatives who aim for the good of society but are motivated by a desire to get re-elected by their constituency), and research on representation preferences should take these seriously.

The literature on preferences over national vs. district representation could also benefit from engaging more closely with representation theory. One key insight of recent theoretical contributions is that representation and electoral accountability may sometimes come apart (e.g. Mansbridge, 2003;

Saward, 2010). Representatives may represent individuals or groups from other districts that stand in no electoral relationship with them. This is relevant to the national vs. district distinction, because a representative who focuses on national issues thereby also needs to focus on constituents who did not elect them (e.g., constituents residing in other districts). Asking citizens only about their preferences regarding their local MP thus risks missing something important. The theoretical framework we present below integrates these insights.

A second limitation of existing work on citizens' representation preferences is that the focus is typically on only one or two dimensions of representation (but see Harden, 2015; Wolak, 2017). Much work implicitly restricts citizens' representation preferences to the substantive aspects of representatives' behavior, such as their policy positions or the constituency service they perform (see e.g. Vivyan and Wagner, 2016; Lapinski et al., 2016; Griffin and Flavin, 2011). In contrast, other relevant aspects of representation — for instance, whether representatives resemble citizens on descriptive characteristics, how they speak about things, or whether they present themselves as rebels who defy the party line — are rarely addressed. Recent work has tried to address some of these aspects (Campbell et al., 2019; Costa, 2021; Arnesen et al., 2019; Bøggild, 2020; Harden, 2015), but our knowledge about citizens' preferences regarding alternative dimensions of representation is still rather limited. To address this, we employ a *multidimensional* understanding of representation, distinguishing six different dimensions.

Third and relatedly, existing work has rarely assessed the relative importance of different dimensions of representation to citizens. Many studies focus only on a single dimension of representation or pit two models of representation against each other (e.g. delegate vs. trustee). Some research helpfully covers preferences on several dimensions, identifying individual or majority preferences on each (e.g. policy vs. service focus, pork-barrel vs. fair-share allocation), but their relative importance to citizens is not tested (e.g. Wolak, 2017; Harden, 2015; Bengtsson and Wass, 2010). Only some recent studies address that issue. Costa (2021) uses conjoint experiments to compare the relative importance of three dimensions of representation, showing that affective partisan rhetoric is less important to

citizens' representation preferences than policy congruence or constituency service. Arnesen et al. (2019) show that voters focus more on whether political candidates have particular policy positions they like rather than what descriptive characteristics they share with them.

Bracketing the relative importance of different dimensions of representation is problematic for two reasons. First, when preferences on each dimension are measured independently (e.g. with different survey items), respondents may simply draw inferences about other dimensions and let them shape their response. For instance, if they are asked whether they like representatives that follow their own judgment, they might also assume that such representatives are unresponsive, which they could dislike. Consequently, they may disapprove of representatives who are following their own judgment because of the unobserved confounder — the mental link to representatives' assumed lack of responsiveness. This leads to biased estimates of citizens' preferences.

Second, understanding how important different dimensions of representation are to citizens is crucial for the normative conclusions we draw from our findings. For example, the finding that citizens prefer delegates over trustees has vastly different implications depending on how important this distinction is to citizens. If this is what they care most about, then perhaps politicians should try to act more like delegates, and political scientists should study the workings of delegate representation. Yet, if citizens actually care most about whether representatives share descriptive characteristics with them (e.g. age, gender), then practitioners and scientists should devote more attention to descriptive aspects of representation than the delegate-trustee dichotomy. To overcome this limitation of the literature, we use a conjoint experiment to directly compare the average, relative importance of different dimensions of representation.

4 Conceptualizing Six Dimensions of Representation

We focus on six different dimensions of representation that figure prominently in contemporary theoretical research on representation. The first two, *substantive* and *descriptive* representation, which were initially defined by Pitkin (1967), are possibly the most widely-used conceptions of representa-

tion in empirical scholarship (see Wolkenstein and Wratil, 2021, 864-5). The latter four conceptions of representation — *surrogation*, *justification*, *personalization*, and *responsiveness* — are derived from Wolkenstein and Wratil's (2021) recent attempt to translate the theoretical insights of leading representation theorists (esp. Mansbridge, 2003; Rehfeld, 2009; Saward, 2010) into operationalizable conceptions of representation. Consistent with both the theoretical literature on which we build and our empirical interest in individual citizens' representation preferences, all of these dimensions of representation are conceptualized with individual constituent-representative relationships in mind. They are *not* addressed to representation at the collective level, which is typically conceived in terms of a congruence between policy and average public opinion. However, as we will explain more below, representation at the individual level is of course linked to collective-level representation.

We start with *substantive representation*, focusing on what we consider the conceptual core of Pitkin's (1967) original definition: representation as "acting in the interest of the represented" (209). On our reading, substantive representation thus defined does not contain any stipulation about the *mechanisms* that lead representatives to act in accordance with the interest or, better, preferences (we avoid the controversial assumption of objective interests) of the represented. This contrasts with many popular conceptualizations of substantive representation, which conceptually link substantive representation to electoral mechanisms: representatives are thought to act in line with what constituents want in order to forestall electoral sanctions – think of the classic "delegate" conception of representation or what Mansbridge (2003) calls "promissory representation." Pitkin does not make this link; given that she (1967, 209) envisages representatives to "act independently" on the basis of their own "discretion and judgment," it seems in fact that she leaves room for varying levels of substantive representation, as well as assuming that substantive representation can occur without the threat of electoral sanction (on this, also see Fearon, 1999; Mansbridge, 2009).

This makes good sense. After all, representatives might do what their constituents want for reasons other than wanting to be re-elected (e.g., because they are intrinsically motivated to follow their constituents' preferences, Mansbridge (2003) dubs this "gyroscopic" representation), or they might

substantively represent certain people that cannot vote for (and hence sanction) them because they reside in a different electoral district (what Wolkenstein and Wratil 2021 call *surrogation*).[3] So, here is what we are empirically interested in: we seek to study how important it is for citizens that their representatives advance their policy preferences, irrespective of the mechanism(s) (electoral or not) that lead to representatives advancing an individual's policy preferences.

We stress again that our individual-level conception of substantive representation is different from how substantive representation is often conceptualized in collective-level studies. These latter studies tend to conceptualize substantive representation in terms of policy responsiveness to average public opinion (e.g. Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Wlezien, 2017). At the level that we are interested in, this conceptualization of substantive representation does not make much sense, since individual citizen's policy preferences may well diverge from public opinion at the aggregate level. Suppose I individually prefer policy P1, but the majority of the public endorses policy P2. Suppose further that the government or majority of elected representatives are responsive to average public opinion and implement policy P2. In this case, I would not be substantively represented by the government or majority of elected representatives, although there is substantive representation as defined in the collective-level literature. In fact, I would only be substantively represented if politicians were *not* responsive to average public opinion. Thus, substantive representation at the individual level is not the same as substantive representation at the collective level, and we only seek to study the individual level.

The second traditional conception of representation that we focus on, *descriptive representation*, has also typically been linked to the work of Pitkin. For Pitkin (1967, 60), descriptive representation occurs when "a representative body is distinguished by an accurate correspondence or resemblance to what it represents, by reflecting without distortion." At the individual level, the notion of descriptive representation is usually employed to describe the extent to which single representatives "look" or "are" like their constituents with respect to gender, race, class, etc. With this in mind, we want to

[3]Similarly, recent research shows that substantive representation as conceptualized by us can also occur in single-party regimes, where electoral sanctioning mechanisms cannot be expected to work as effectively (Malesky et al., 2023).

assess how important it is for citizens that representatives actually resemble them, with a particular focus on the extent to which demands for descriptive representation vary across different groups of citizens.

Leading theorists have highlighted the importance of additional conceptions of political representation, beyond those of descriptive and substantive representation (see esp. Mansbridge, 2003; Rehfeld, 2009; Saward, 2010). Building on the groundwork of Wolkenstein and Wratil (2021), we investigate citizens' preferences regarding the following four additional dimensions.

First, *surrogation* was defined by Mansbridge (2003, 522) as "representation by a representative with whom one has no electoral relationship — that is, a representative in another district." In addition to Mansbridge's notion of *territorial surrogation*, where the surrogate representative is the representative of a different electoral district, we also conceptualize *partisan surrogation*, which occurs when a constituent expects representation from a representative of a party for whom she did not vote. For instance, during the US presidential campaign in 2020, Joe Biden appealed to such expectations of partisan surrogation, reaching out to Republican voters: "I'm running as a Democrat, but I will be an American president. Whether you voted for me or against me, I will represent you" (on Twitter, 2 Oct 2020). We seek to examine how important it is to citizens that they have direct electoral relationships with their representatives, considering both territorial and partisan surrogation.

Second, *justification* is defined as the degree to which representatives, when justifying their actions, refer to the good of the whole citizenry versus particularistic goods of some societal group(s). Justification, as understood here, is therefore about a specific contrast regarding *how* representatives justify, rather than about *whether* they justify/explain their decisions at all (e.g. cf. Esaiasson et al., 2017, 2013). This contrast tracks widely shared normative concerns in political theory and is derived from Rehfeld's (2009) distinction between pluralist (aiming for the good of a group) and republican (aiming for the public good) aims of representatives. According to Rehfeld, this is one of the three central distinctions underlying trustee and delegate models of representation, with the trustee aiming for the good of the whole and the delegate aiming for the good of a part. Wolkenstein and Wratil

(2021) reconceptualize this distinction in the realm of political justification, where representatives make claims about whose good they aim to serve when justifying their actions and policies. With regard to citizens' attitudes, our primary concern is with studying whether citizens want representatives to explain in public speech how their policies and decisions affect and benefit society as a whole, or whether they would rather like to see them explain how their policies and decisions affect and benefit the particular socio-economic, ethnic, age, gender, etc. groups that citizens identify with.

Third, *personalization* refers to the extent to which representatives and constituents regard representatives as individual persons versus agents of their party. Strong forms of personalization involve representatives emancipating themselves from their party. They might present themselves as capable of making the right decisions individually, and without guidance from the party — or as resolute followers of their constituents, who are ready to go against the party line (Mansbridge, 2009, 381). The key issue we want to shed light on is whether citizens prefer the "representative-as-party-member," who acts in accordance with the party platform or the commands of their party leader — or conversely find the "representative-as-individual," who presents themself as "independent leader," "spokesperson of her constituents" or even "party rebel" more appealing.

Fourth, *responsiveness* captures what we call, with Rehfeld (2009), the degree to which representatives are sensitive to electoral sanctions. Though linked to substantive representation (at least in democracies), this is a distinctive aspect of representation. It is not about whether representatives follow the views of their constituents per se, but about whether they do so in order to forestall electoral sanctions. Recall that sanction-sensitivity thus understood is often assumed to be the primary mechanism that ensures that representatives act in line with the substantive policy preferences of their constituents. But since we separate substantive representation's conceptual core from assumptions about incentive-generating mechanisms, we also study citizens' attitudes about sanction-sensitivity separately. Specifically, we want to investigate whether citizens prefer representatives that evidently care about being re-elected (e.g. by stating it or changing course under electoral pressure) versus representatives who are unfazed by the threat of being unelected (e.g. because they prioritize "what they

think is right" over short-term electoral success or failure).

As with all other dimensions of representation we focus on, responsiveness is pitched at the level of individual representative-constituent relationships, not at the collective level, where "responsiveness" is often conceptualized as policy responsiveness to average public opinion (see above). Notice, however, that there is a connection between our understanding of responsiveness and public opinion at the collective level. Effective electoral sanctioning requires that a critical mass of citizens votes in a particular way; an individual vote usually has little impact on the result. Thus, a real threat of being electorally sanctioned — to which a representative could be sensitive — only exists when public opinion at large (and not an individual constituent) finds the representative's record wanting. Our conception of responsiveness also has an elective affinity with another key concept in the literature, namely *electoral accountability*. Yet, while the literature on electoral accountability focuses more on whether citizens (can) hold representatives accountable in elections (e.g. Manin et al., 1999), our concern is with how representatives behave, or should behave in the eyes of citizens. This is exactly what Rehfeld seeks to capture by conceptualizing sanction-sensitivity as an *attribute of individual representatives*. For this reason, we do not use the term electoral accountability, but stick with Rehfeld's terminology.

Two final points. First, our six dimensions of representation are thought to capture different aspects of a single unified concept of representation. This means that several — possibly even all — six dimensions can be embodied in a single action (or a string of closely connected actions) performed by a representative. Think, for example, of a "rebellious" representative who votes against their own party on a particular bill B. In virtue of voting in this way, the representative exhibits a high level of *personalization*. At the same time, the representative *substantively* represents citizens with the same policy preference (i.e., against B), while not necessarily representing all of those citizens *descriptively* because that policy preference is mostly held by women and the representative happens to be a man. Downstream, the representative may further use a *republican justification* to justify their vote on social media, and this justification may resonate more with women than with men. Likewise, the represen-

tative may have voted against B because they are *responsive*, that is, sensitive to electoral sanctions, and the constituents in their district are against B as well. And women who feel represented by the representative may live outside of the representative's district, receiving *surrogate representation*. All of the dimensions are present in this example; they simply capture different aspects of it.

Second, analytically distinguishing the six dimensions does not imply that we do not expect correlations between them, or that they cannot not be empirically correlated in how representatives behave or in what citizens want from representatives. For instance, Wolkenstein and Wratil (2021, 872) note that highly responsive representatives may also aim for more personalization, emancipating themselves from their party to portray themselves as spokepersons of their constituents. Similarly, citizens' preferences on the different dimensions may be correlated. The only assumption we make here is that the dimensions are *analytically separable* and do not fully collapse on a theoretical level.

5 Research Design

Our central research questions are then: How do citizens want to be represented on each of the six dimensions of representation? And what dimensions matter more to them, relative to others, when forming their preferences about whether someone represents them?

To answer the first question, we develop and validate six new item batteries that measure citizens' individual-level preferences on the six aforementioned dimensions of representation. This allows us to explore, on each dimension, which kind of representation the majority of citizens prefers and how preferences for representation are related to standard socio-demographic and political covariates. Note however that we do not know a priori whether citizens have coherent preferences on all our dimensions of representation at all, since they are derived from theory rather than from citizens' own conceptions of representation. We return to this issue below.

To answer the second question, we use a paired conjoint experiment (Hainmueller et al., 2014),[4]

[4] Hainmueller et al. (2015) draw a distinction between multifactorial vignette and conjoint experiments depending on whether information is presented in a text paragraph (vignette) or a table format (conjoint). Our design primarily involves text but is organized in bullet points (see figure 1). While we use the term "conjoint," some may instead classify our design as a "vignette" experiment.

in which respondents consider two hypothetical politicians — whose profiles vary along the six dimensions of representation — and select the one that they think would "better represent [them] in politics." We use the distribution of responses to these comparisons to infer the importance of each dimension for determining the probability that a politician is selected as a representative. This of course means that our measures of importance are relative. That is, we cannot determine whether dimensions matter or not in any "absolute" sense, but only how important they are when compared to each other (i.e., when all are present and no others are present).

Item batteries

While the conjoint experiment allows us to determine the relative importance of different dimensions for citizens' aggregated choices of the preferred representative, it does not straightforwardly identify either the majority preference or individual-level preferences over representation (see e.g. Abramson et al., 2022). Hence, to explore what the majority of citizens prefers on each dimension of representation and how individual-level preferences are associated with key covariates, we design six batteries of survey items, each measuring preferences on one dimension of representation. Our goal in developing these items was to create a set of attitude statements that jointly cover the full theoretical breadth of the representation dimensions discussed above. To aid respondents' understanding, each battery begins with a short statement summarizing the content of the relevant dimension, followed by a common prompt: "Thinking about what you would want from someone who acts and speaks for you in politics. Do you agree or disagree..." Each battery then consists of between three and five items that respondents rate on a five-point agree-disagree scale.

For instance, our surrogation battery (in the UK) asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree with the idea that the person who acts and speaks for them in politics "needs to be the MP for your constituency," "needs to be the person you voted for," or "needs to be from the party you voted for." Similarly, our substantive representation battery asks respondents to indicate whether they agree their representative should "promote the policy views that I hold," "speak in favour of the

views and opinions that I hold on different political issues," "promote policies that would benefit me, even on issues I am unfamiliar with," and "raise issues that are important to me." We present the English-language versions of all item batteries as well as details on their development in appendix section A.

Conjoint experimental design

Our conjoint experiment consists of five choice tasks in which respondents consider vignette descriptions of two politicians and select which they believe better represents them in politics. After a short introduction, our respondents are asked to choose between pairs of hypothetical politicians by answering the question, "Which of these politicians do you think would better represent you in politics?" Each politician is characterized by six short sentences which correspond to the six dimensions of representation. We randomly vary the content of these sentences to manipulate the type of representation each politician offers on each dimension:

- **Substantive representation**: We provide information on the politician's position on a single political issue in a binary format ("supports" or "opposes" the policy). For each country, we selected six political issues that are a current feature of political debate, and which include both low and high salience topics (see appendix section B, "Substantive," for the set of issues). We also solicit *respondents*' binary position on each of these issues pre-treatment. Our measure of substantive representation is defined by the combination of respondents' issue positions and the positions of the hypothetical politicians. That is, we measure a hypothetical politician substantively representing a respondent when they share the same position on the issue that features in the conjoint comparison.
- **Descriptive representation**: We provide information on two descriptive characteristics of the politician. We always include the gender of the two politicians in a comparison, but the second characteristic is chosen at random from ethnicity (migratory background in Germany), sexual orientation, or social class. Respondents' characteristics on these dimensions of de-

scriptive representation are surveyed pretreatment. Again, our measure of descriptive representation is based on the combination of respondent and politician characteristics: a politician is more descriptively representative of a respondent the more descriptive characteristics they have in common (we provide more detail below and in appendix section G).

- **Surrogation**: We provide information on the politician's party affiliation as well as the electoral tier/district in which they were elected. Information on the party of the politician, in conjunction with the partisanship of the respondent (measured pretreatment) allows us to operationalize the concept of *partisan* surrogation, while information about the district in which the politician was elected allows us to operationalize the idea of *territorial* surrogation.
- **Justification**: We provide a statement about whether a politician more regularly engages in either pluralist or republican justification. The central challenge in operationalizing pluralist justification is that the number of possible groups whose good can be invoked is large and could also vary between countries. We tackle this problem by saying that the representative justifies by referring to the good of "people like you" or a generic category of "particular groups." The aim is to make people think of groups they identify with ("people like you") or other groups that they can readily think of ("particular groups").[5]
- **Personalization**: We provide a statement about how frequently the politician acts (votes, speaks, etc.) against or in line with their party.
- **Responsiveness**: We provide a quote by the politician that either emphasizes or rejects sensitivity to electoral sanctions.

At the respondent level, we randomize the order (top to bottom) of the six sentences. At the level of the choice task, we randomly draw the second descriptive characteristic as well as one political issue such that both politicians in a given comparison are characterized by information on the same descriptive attributes and their positions on the same issue. At the profile level (each politi-

[5]We use the same approach for the item batteries (see appendix section A). Note that a potential bias of this approach is that the reference to "people like you" may be understood by respondents as a cue that the representative is working towards the respondent's individual benefit. In this case, our design might underestimate the appeal of republican justifications.

cian), we randomly draw the attribute levels.[6] In general, our attribute levels reflect binary contrasts (e.g. high vs. low surrogation, high vs. low personalization). However, we deviate from this structure for some dimensions (i.e., descriptive representation, where there are more than two ethnicities) and dimension-country combinations (e.g. territorial surrogation in Germany due to the two electoral tiers) to better reflect reality. For the personalization, responsiveness, and justification dimensions we use three to four different text implementations of each attribute level (e.g. three texts that indicate "high" and three that indicate "low" levels of personalization) to guard against the possibility that any finding may be due to particular word usage in a single text implementation (Blumenau and Lauderdale, 2022; Fong and Grimmer, 2023).

In appendix section B, we provide all of the different text implementations for each attribute level. In figure 1, we provide an example of one comparison seen by respondents in our experiment.

Case selection, samples, and implementation

We fielded these instruments in bespoke online surveys on nationally representative samples in Germany, the UK, and the US. In terms of country case selection, we wanted to focus on the most studied political systems in mainstream representation research. In appendix section N, we provide an analysis of a random sample of quantitative articles on representation published in seven leading political science journals with regard to the countries these studies cover; this reveals that the US, Germany and the UK are the most studied systems by representation scholars. Moreover, this selection also allows us to explore whether the relative importance of representation dimensions (especially of surrogation) is significantly different between systems with majoritarian (US, UK) as opposed to largely proportional (Germany) representation. The choice of Germany is advantageous in this regard, as it is a mixed system with a single-member district tier whose disproportionality is compensated in

[6] For five of these dimensions, we draw attribute levels from a uniform distribution. For some of the descriptive attributes, however, we draw from marginal distributions that are informed by the relative prevalence of these attributes in the UK, German, and US citizen populations (De La Cuesta et al., 2022). In particular, we did not assume a uniform distribution for either ethnicity (migratory background in Germany) or sexuality. Full details are given in appendix section C.

Please read the descriptions below and consider each politician carefully before answering the question.

Politician 1...

- ...is a **woman** and **heterosexual**.
- ...said in a recent interview, "If I **lose an election** doing what I think is right, then **so be it**."
- ...**supports** increasing the rate of tax on income over £50,000 to 45%.
- ...is a **Labour** Member of Parliament, **but not for your constituency**.
- ...**usually votes according to party instructions**, even when that conflicts with the wishes of their constituents.
- ...regularly explains how their decisions help to promote **the interests of people like you**.

Politician 2...

- ...is a **man** and **heterosexual**.
- ...said in a recent interview, "I can only change society if I am re-elected. So, I always make sure that I **address voters' most important concerns**."
- ...**supports** increasing the rate of tax on income over £50,000 to 45%.
- ...is the **Labour** Member of Parliament **for your constituency**.
- ...**frequently** speaks out and votes **against their party leadership**.
- ...regularly explains how their policies matter to **society as a whole**.

Which of these politicians do you think would better represent you in politics?

○ Politician 1

○ Politician 2

Figure 1: Example comparison of politicians from conjoint experiment

clearance with the proportional tier, leading to a largely proportional vote-seat relationship. This allows us to sustain territorial surrogation by a politician elected in a single-member district as an attribute in our conjoint design across all three countries. Many other systems with largely proportional representation in outcomes rely on multi-member rather than single-member districts.

In each country, we aimed for samples of 2500+ respondents using nationally representative quotas for gender * age, education, and region. All respondents were recruited through the survey company Luc.id, were 18+ years of age, and were eligible to vote in their countries' respective national elections to the lower house of parliament (to the US House of Representatives, the UK House of Commons, and the German Bundestag). The responses were collected between 21st May and 5th September 2021. We implemented a straightforward attention check that asks respondents to tick a particular response in one of the batteries on representation preferences. In all analyses below, we exclude people that fail this attention check and apply survey raking weights to the remaining responses to render them nationally representative (also correcting for some quotas that were not fully filled). In line with Alvarez et al. (2019) we find that younger people and those with lower education more often fail the attention check. Our final analysis samples consist of 2,049 individuals in Germany, 2,204 in the UK, and 2,178 in the US.[7] We present results using the full sample of respondents (including the attention check fails) and without post-stratification weights in appendix section L.

Before completing the item batteries or the conjoint tasks, we also asked respondents questions that allow us to measure political and socio-demographic covariates, respondents' policy preferences on the series of six policy issues, their political placement on a left-right (UK and Germany) or conservative-liberal (US) scale, their level of political interest, trust in Members of Parliament (UK and Germany) or Congress (US), and satisfaction with democracy. We also included a need-for-cognition battery, which was shown at the end of the survey.

All of our core analyses were preregistered with the Center for Open Science's OSF Registry

[7]Note that we also excluded any "speeders" during sample collection that took less than five minutes to complete our questionnaire (median response time: 11 minutes) and must have been clicking through without engaging with the survey. We also drop some responses in the conjoint analyses, where respondents did not provide essential covariates (see appendix section H).

(Wratil et al., 2021) and we implement them here as described in our pre-analysis plan (unless indicated otherwise).

6 What Kind of Representation Do People Prefer?

In this section, we use descriptive results from our item batteries measuring individual-level preferences to identify what kind of representation the majority of citizens want on each dimension and how preferences vary by socio-demographic and political covariates. In the appendix, we extensively validate our item batteries. First, we use exploratory factor analyses to show that most of the items that are supposed to measure the same construct do load together empirically on a common factor and that we are able to capture preferences towards distinct dimensions of representation (for details, see appendix section D). Second, we report good test score reliabilities for four of our six dimensions, with some lower consistency for our item batteries on personalization and responsiveness (see appendix section E). The descriptive results for citizens' preferences on personalization and responsiveness presented in this section should therefore be interpreted with some caution. Essentially, we cannot be sure that citizens hold coherent preferences regarding our conceptualization of these dimensions. Third, we show that respondents' choices on the item batteries predict their choices in the conjoint experiment (see appendix section K). For instance, comparing respondents with a preference against vs. for personalization in the batteries, those who want more party independence also value more strongly a party-independent representative in the conjoint than others do. While results are stronger on some dimensions than others, they cross-validate our two instruments and provide some basic evidence of predictive validity of our item batteries.

Majority preferences

To ascertain what the majority of citizens prefers on a dimension of representation, we calculate each respondent's average answer to the items in a battery, reverse-coding items that were negatively formulated. "Strongly disagree" with a conception of representation is coded as "1" and "Strongly

agree" as "5", so that "3" represents the indifferent middle category of "Neither agree nor disagree." For example, if a respondent's average response for the personalization items is less than 3, they tend to prefer party loyalty over independence, while they prefer the party rebel over the loyalist if their average is above 3.[8]

We plot kernel densities of the average preferences of citizens on each dimension and for each country in figure 2. Most evidently, this figure reveals how similar preference distributions on our batteries are across countries, as the densities in each column have a similar shape. Perhaps the most noteworthy difference is that there are more citizens in Germany who have little aversion or even a preference for surrogation than in the two other countries. This may well be reflective of the German electoral system, in which territorially-defined electoral accountability relationships are less salient due to the proportional tier and the option for representatives to run in both tiers.

In terms of majority preferences, we can clearly observe that a majority of people want substantive representation as opposed to a representative who acts incongruent with their policy wishes. Depending on the country, 87-90% are on the side of preferring substantive representation. In contrast, citizens are much more split on descriptive representation, even if clear-cut views (i.e., towards the ends of the scales) are rare. In each country, a majority tends to *not* want the representative to resemble them personally on descriptive characteristics. This majority is 54% of voters in Germany and up to 72% in the UK. On surrogation, there is a clear aversion towards representation by politicians elected in other districts or from parties one did not vote for, with 76-81% preferring representation with electoral relationships when given the choice.

On justification, we find a very clear majority preference for republican justification (from 77% in the US to 83% in the UK). With regard to personalization, the figure shows some more mass towards party independence, with 54% preferring the independence in the US and up to 62% in Germany. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we find that between 71% (UK) and 83% (Germany) of citizens want

[8]This strategy makes the assumption that the answer categories map linearly to the latent preference and also that the items have equal discrimination. However, these assumptions allow us to aggregate information across items while preserving "3" as a value with substantive meaning, where the preferred direction of behaviour on a dimension flips.



Figure 2: Densities of preferences on each dimension

their representatives to be *unresponsive* to electoral sanctions. When separating responsiveness from substantive representation, it is clearly substantive representation that people like — not representatives' sensitivity to re-election incentives.

Correlates of representation preferences

The item batteries also allow us to investigate the individual-level covariates of representation preferences. Here, we use factor scores from a set of exploratory factor analyses as our individual-level measures of representation preferences. For each item battery, we estimate a single latent factor based on the polychoric correlation matrix of our items, and use the estimated factor scores for each respondent as our dependent variable in the analyses below.[9] Figures 3, 4 and 5 present estimates from a series of bivariate regression models, in which we regress the factor scores on single covariates which are plausibly related to people's representation preferences.[10] In these plots, each panel represents a

[9] In figure A1 in appendix section F, we also document the correlation between the factor scores of the different dimensions.

[10] Note that we plot 95% confidence intervals as solid lines in all figures derived from our analyses models. In appendix section M we also demonstrate that the patterns we report here are unaffected by subjecting our results to adjustments for multiple comparisons.

separate regression model, where columns indicate the dependent variable, rows indicate the covariate of interest, and the y-axis indicates the levels of the relevant covariate. The x-axis gives the effect of the relevant covariate, either as a standardized regression coefficient for continuous covariates such as "Ideology", "Trust", and "Democratic Satisfaction," or as the difference between the relevant covariate level and a baseline category.



Figure 3: Correlates of factor scores: UK sample.



Figure 4: Correlates of factor scores: US sample.



Figure 5: Correlates of factor scores: German sample.

Several patterns emerge from these analyses which are noteworthy. First, we find that there is a pronounced relationship between ethnicity (in the UK) and race (in the US) and citizens' demands for descriptive representation. Compared to White people, both Black and Asian respondents in the UK and Black and Hispanic respondents in the US are significantly more likely to favor representatives who share some of their own descriptive characteristics. We do not ask German respondents to provide details of their own ethnicity, but we also find German respondents with a migratory background are slightly more in favor of greater descriptive representation than those without such a background, but this result is not statistically significant.

Second, across all three countries, demands for personalized representation and for responsiveness correlate with respondent age. Older respondents want their representatives to differentiate themselves more from their political parties and be less concerned about electoral sanctions, while younger respondents favor representatives who act more in accordance with their party platforms and spend effort on securing their re-election. However, one concern is that our batteries on these two dimensions have relatively low consistency. Hence, citizens may not have coherent preferences on these dimensions and/or conceptualize them significantly differently than we do.

Third, there is an especially clear relationship between levels of political interest and demand for substantive representation. While it is unsurprising that respondents who have greater interest in politics are more likely to favor representatives who advance policies of which they approve, the consistency of this relationship across the three countries in our sample is striking. We also find that more politically-engaged respondents are also more likely to be in favor of representatives who provide republican, rather than pluralist, justifications.

Fourth, we also find that there is a negative relationship between satisfaction with democracy and demand for personalized representation in all three of the countries in our data. One explanation for this relationship is that those citizens who are dissatisfied with democracy are also likely to be opposed to the partisan institutions that are often the most visible actors in democratic politics, and therefore are more likely to favour representatives who find ways to distinguish themselves from

their parties.

7 Which Dimensions of Representation Matter Most to Voters?

We now describe the analysis strategy and report the results for our conjoint experiment, which aims to measure the relative importance of the different dimensions of representation to voters' judgements about which types of politicians better represent them in politics.

Analysis strategy

We operationalize the relative importance of a particular dimension of representation to voters as the (absolute) size of the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of the dimension's attributes (Hainmueller et al., 2014). The AMCE can be interpreted as the causal effect of a specific attribute value on the probability of a respondent choosing a politician compared to a baseline value of that attribute, marginalizing over all respondents and the values of all other attributes. The AMCE is a useful measure of aggregate relative "importance" of a dimension of representation to citizens, as it effectively tells us how much politicians' probability to be seen as the better representative compared to random alternative representatives is affected by the relevant dimension. If the AMCE(s) on a dimension are small, this implies that by adopting different behaviors on this dimension, representatives cannot change much how many citizens would see them as the better representative. In contrast, dimensions with large AMCEs may move the choices of many citizens. It is important to note, however, that large AMCEs do not necessarily imply that a majority of citizens prefers a certain behavior on a dimension over another, since AMCEs average over the direction *and* intensity of preferences (Abramson et al., 2022). Representatives may increase their probability to be the preferred representative by a few percentage points when speaking in more "republican" terms in cases where a small fraction of the electorate strongly prefers republican over pluralist justification, always choosing the republican representative. However, the majority may still weakly prefer pluralist over republican justification.[11]

[11]This implies that AMCEs may potentially not fully capture the relative importance of dimensions where citizens are highly polarized. In such circumstances, a dimension may "matter" to individual choices but does not matter for who is

In appendix section H, we describe how we stack the data and identify the AMCEs through an OLS model. We also describe in detail how our attributes relating to substantive and descriptive representation as well as partisan surrogation are defined by combinations of the politician's and the respondent's characteristics (e.g. do they share the same policy position? Do they have the same gender? Is the politician from the party the respondent voted for?). Note that we use standard errors clustered on the respondent level in all conjoint analyses to account for the non-independence of the choices of each respondent.[12]

Conjoint analysis results

We plot the AMCEs of all our attributes for each country in figure 6. This figure demonstrates that the most important dimension — in our comparison of six dimensions — for whether people think that someone represents them in politics is substantive representation. A politician who shares the respondent's view on a policy issue is between 13 and 20 percentage points (depending on the country) more likely to be selected as the better representative than a politician who does not share the respondent's view. The next two most important dimensions are partisan surrogation and personalization. Citizens are clearly more likely to see a politician from their favored party as their representative than a politician from another party. Politicians from parties other than the one the respondent voted for are between 11 and 15 percentage points less likely to be selected as the better representative compared to politicians from the respondent's party. Citizens choices are also influenced by whether the politician is party-independent, with loyalist politicians having much lower selection probabilities. On average, politicians with high personalization are approximately 8-11 percentage points more likely to be selected as representatives compared to politicians who toe the party line.

In contrast, we find much smaller and more mixed effects for the other dimensions of representation. Descriptive representation only makes a small difference in the UK and Germany but has

seen as a good representative by people in the aggregate (i.e., the AMCE may be small). However, in the previous section we showed that the preference distributions on the six dimensions are largely single-peaked, suggesting little polarization in citizens' representation preferences that could lead to AMCEs veiling this conception of "importance."

[12] A test of the central conjoint identifying assumption is provided in appendix section I.



Figure 6: Average Marginal Component Effects.

essentially no effect on citizens' aggregate choices in the US.[13] The magnitude of the effect of descriptive congruence is also reasonably modest, at least when averaging across all voters. In the UK, where we see the largest effects on this dimension, respondents who share both descriptive characteristics with a hypothetical politician are nearly 5 percentage points more likely to select that politician as their representative than a politician with whom they share no characteristics. Territorial surrogation is a small liability in the US and the UK, but the pattern is less clear in Germany, while pointing in the same direction. Republican justification is a small asset in the US but plays no role in the UK or in Germany. Finally, responsiveness makes no difference whatsoever in any of our countries. On average, across all voters, politicians cannot increase their appeal as representatives by promising that their behaviour will be (un)responsive to electoral sanctions.

In appendix section J, we present a series of conditional AMCE estimates for each of the dimensions. First, we investigate key interaction effects between the dimensions. We show that there is no difference in the relative importance of the other dimensions of representation conditional on whether a politician shares the policy preference of a respondent, i.e. provides substantive representation. We also show that there are only negligible differences in the AMCEs depending on whether the representative is from the party a respondent voted for.

Second, we demonstrate that the importance of substantive representation is moderated by self-reported salience that respondents ascribe to an issue. In particular, we show that when an issue is highly salient to a respondent, a politician offering substantive representation on that issue increases their selection probability by between 16 and 24 percentage points depending on the country, whereas on low salience issues the effect of substantive representation is between 13 and 16 percentage points.

Third, and importantly, we investigate heterogeneity in the effects of descriptive representation across different groups of voters and show that — although descriptive representation has only modest relative importance across all voters — shared descriptive characteristics are more important for voters of historically marginalized groups. For voters of colour (in the UK and the US), descriptive

[13] In appendix section M we also show that the significance of the German result on descriptive representation does not persist after correcting for multiple-comparison issues.

congruence increases the probability of selection by between 4 and 10 percentage points, whereas the effects for white voters are half the size. Similarly, for voters from migrant backgrounds in Germany, the effect of descriptive representation is nearly 7 percentage points, whereas it is just 1 percentage point for voters from non-migrant backgrounds. The picture is similar for gender, where descriptive congruence increases the probability of selection among female but not male voters (especially, in the UK and the US). However, we find no evidence of conditional effects by voter sexuality.

Despite this relatively higher importance of descriptive representation for historically marginalized groups, the dimension is still only the fourth most important for them (like for the public at large), except for people with racial/ethnic minority or migratory background, who rank it in third place. For them, it is about as important as personalization.

Our conjoint results also allow us to contrast the *preferences* of people on each dimension we elicited through the item batteries with the relative *importance* of these dimensions in the conjoint. First, we saw that a large majority of people in all countries prefer strong over weak substantive representation and this dimension is also important to them when deciding trade-offs between the dimensions in the conjoint. Second, with regard to personalization, people were relatively split between preferring party independence or loyalty, with only small majorities preferring rebellious politicians. However, the conjoint shows that party rebels are more likely than loyalists to be selected as good representatives. This suggests that the group of people supporting party independence care more intensely about personalization than those who favor loyalist representatives. Third, while a large majority generally does not prefer representatives to be surrogates from other districts or parties, the conjoint reveals that this aversion is only important with regard to partisan surrogation. Politicians from the respondent's party that have been elected in other districts only have a marginally lower probability of being seen as a good representative (e.g. 1-3 percentage points) than district representatives. Fourth, in comparison to the other dimensions, descriptive representation is only the fourth most important dimension, but clearly plays a larger — still not a top — role in the selection decisions of certain groups. Fifth, despite large majorities preferring republican over pluralist

justification, this dimension is of relatively little importance when citizens select between different hypothetical representatives. Finally, the majority of citizens do not want their representatives to be sensitive to electoral sanctions, but on average people do not care about this aspect of representation when they have to assess trade-offs between the dimensions.

8 Implications for the Study of Representation

Our results have important implications for how we should study representation empirically, and how we should think about it theoretically. First, while much recent work on representation has addressed the question of descriptive representation (notably the descriptive representation of women, e.g. Wängnerud, 2009; Betz et al., 2021), we find that, in the aggregate, citizens put comparatively little weight on this dimension. It is primarily historically marginalized groups, in particular ethnic/racial minorties and people with migratory background, who care more about it. These results challenge previous findings that ethnic majority groups (e.g. whites in the US) also significantly care about descriptive representation (Gay, 2002; Harden, 2015), while simultaneously underlining that descriptive congruence *is* valued by historically marginalized groups (cp. e.g. Bengtsson and Wass, 2010; Schildkraut, 2013). Crucially, our results also show that for marginalized groups descriptive representation can be more than simply a cue for substantive representation (as some have argued it is for voters at large, see Arnesen et al., 2019), since our conjoint design controls for substantive representation and four other dimensions of representation (see also Hayes and Hibbing, 2017).

Our results on descriptive representation therefore suggest that a research agenda that takes the citizens' perspective more seriously should devote genuine attention to the descriptive representation of women, ethnic minorities and potentially further groups. At the same time, our results show that descriptive representation is not a great representational concern of the public at large. This contrasts with findings that descriptive representation positively affects outcomes such as perceived decision legitimacy and fairness (e.g. Arnesen and Peters, 2018; Clayton et al., 2019; Hayes and Hibbing, 2017), democratic process evaluations (e.g. Karp and Banducci, 2008), or political efficacy (e.g. Stauffer, 2021)

in the general electorate.

Second, we find that citizens generally strongly care about whether a representative toes or defies the party line — what we call personalization. The majority prefers party independence, but citizens are divided here. These findings underline the relevance of recent work on personalization (e.g. Slapin et al., 2018; Campbell et al., 2019; Bøggild, 2020; Carson et al., 2010; Kam, 2009) and suggest devoting more attention to this dimension of representation. For instance, there still exists little work on how exactly representatives try to"personalize" their communications and self-presentations (e.g. during campaigns), and how citizens react to them.

Third, our results on surrogation show that, while most citizens prefer a representative from their territorial district, they ascribe relatively little importance to this dimension when considered alongside other dimensions of representation. Many citizens are ready to see someone as their representative who was not elected in their constituency or state. In turn, citizens clearly oppose partisan surrogation and put a great deal of weight on the party of their representative when choosing between politicians. This finding is relevant to many standard quantitative research designs that elicit state or district opinion and relate them to the behavior of the local elected representative — who will for a large fraction of citizens not be from the party they voted for. These designs are bracketing surrogate relationships that likely make up a substantial share of the representative relationships that matter to citizens. Paying more attention to these non-electoral representative relationships should be a priority in future research. The same goes for potentially conflicting preferences on the dimension of partisan surrogation: note that citizens' aversion to the latter conflicts with our results on personalization, since it suggests that the representative with the highest support is someone from one's preferred party who still defies the party line (see figure A4 in appendix section J). Citizens seem to value the party label while also wanting their politician to resist strong party discipline, but we do not know why.

Fourth, we show that the familiar finding that citizens prefer delegate-style representation over trustee representation may actually be due to confounding based on conceptual conflation. Once we

break up delegate representation into substantive representation, responsiveness to voters' electoral sanctions, and pluralist justification style, we can see that it is substantive representation and not the responsiveness to electoral sanctions that matters to voters. Moreover, majorities in all countries actually prefer a representative who does *not* focus upon their re-election prospects at the next election (see also Bøggild, 2016). The fact that our battery items on responsiveness have lower consistency may even underline that citizens hold no strong, coherent preferences towards this conception of representation. This suggests that the extensive treatment of substantive representation in the empirical literature is justified. Yet, it is doubtful that more attention should be devoted to understanding how politicians forestall electoral sanctions (e.g. Stimson et al., 1995; Erikson et al., 2002; Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004).

Finally, our results show that representation preferences vary by key socio-demographic and political variables at the individual level, but are rather uniform across countries. This suggests that a research agenda starting from the citizens' perspective must devote considerable attention to how different groups want to be represented. This promises to usefully inform both theory and empirics.

9 Conclusion

If we accept, in line with the constructivist turn in political representation, that representation is a relationship between citizens and politicians that is shaped by both sides, then citizens' preferences regarding representation should be a key concern for political scientists. Moving beyond existing accounts of citizens' representation preferences, our study sought to find out what citizens want from political representatives. Starting from a conceptual framework that incorporates recent innovations in political theory, we used a novel conjoint experiment and survey item batteries to measure the relative importance of different dimensions of representation to citizens as well as identify majority preferences, preference distributions, and correlates of preferences on the respective dimensions. Preferences on two of these dimensions (justification, surrogation) have never been examined before.

Our work has several limitations. First, while our focus here is on measuring and describing cit-

izens' preferences for multidimensional representation, a logical next step is deriving theoretical hypotheses that explain these preferences and empirically testing them. Partially, this exercise can draw on existing work on citizens' representation preferences that has identified key explanatory factors (e.g. economic position, education, ethnicity) as well as on work on related attitudes (e.g. the relationship between populist and democratic attitudes, see Zaslove and Meijers, 2023). However, some theoretical groundwork will still be needed, especially on "new" dimensions such as justification and surrogation, and on how preferences between the dimensions are connected (e.g. some preference configurations may occur more often in certain individuals). We view deductive, explanatory accounts of multidimensional representation preferences as a key avenue for future research that could even draw on our replication data to test hypotheses.

Second, we focus on general preferences towards representation that are largely uncontextualized and unconstrained. Our empirical instruments ask people how representatives should be or behave without providing much context (e.g. what consequences their behavior could have) and without imposing any resource, time or other constraints that exist in reality (e.g. representatives who represent across districts may spend less time on their own district). Clearly, providing more context and modelling constraints may change citizens' preferences and future work should investigate to what extent and in what directions. In part, this could also be based on work that first engages with the representative side and asks legislators what forms of representation they deem possible (e.g. in elite-level survey experiments), identifying the set of constraints representatives face. Nevertheless, we believe our focus on citizens' general tendencies regarding the different dimensions is important, as citizens may often not be aware of constraints or all relevant contextual factors when they evaluate representation in reality. Hence, contrasting our results with how representatives usually (can) act in reality, may provide key insights as to why many citizens are disaffected with how representation works in their country (e.g. they make like independent rebel politicians, but systems with strong parties may sanction rebellion; also see Wass and Nemčok, 2020).

Third, future survey experiments on preferences for multidimensional representation could ad-

dress specific limitations of our design. On the one hand, our design is not suited to unpack potential mediation relationships between the dimensions (e.g. a potential effect of responsiveness could be mediated by substantive representation). Such mediation could be investigated with amended designs, varying, for instance, the number of representation dimensions included in the choice tasks (Acharya et al., 2018). On the other hand, our operationalization of the justification dimension, in particular, is relatively narrow. For pluralist justification, we circumvent the mentioning of concrete, specific groups, since the number of groups that can be used by representatives to justify their behavior in pluralist terms is vast and may vary between countries. This could be tackled in the future. Moreover, one could also incorporate other understandings of justification in amended designs (e.g. see the more general understanding in Esaiasson et al., 2017, 2013).

Fourth, while our approach derives the dimensions of representation from political theory , thereby widening the set of dimensions usually considered in empirical research, this may still be limiting. A full constructivist approach that views representation as an interactive relationship between citizens and politicians should arguably pay more attention to how citizens make sense of and conceptualize representation in the first place. We think that — as of now — we cannot exclude the possibility that citizens may care about other aspects of representation not captured in the six dimensions and/or coneptualize the dimensions differently. The low consistency of our preference scales on personalization and responsiveness could be interpreted as a hint to this possibility. Hence, future complementary work could adopt a much more inductive approach to explore citizens' understanding of representation that abstains from administering researcher-derived conceptualizations of representation (e.g. through open-ended questions or qualitative interviews).

There are several broader takeaways of our paper. First and foremost, the paper suggests new directions for the study of political representation. Our results show that the focus of much of current work in the field of quantitative representation research contrasts with the representational demands of citizens. A research agenda that is more strongly informed by citizens' preferences for representation would pay more attention to surrogate representation across districts and investigate the role of

the party as a key enabler of this form of representation; it would explore the extent to which demands for descriptive representation are conditional on group identity; and it would reduce the attention paid to electoral sanctioning, which appears to be largely irrelevant to voters. Expanding representation research in these directions promises to provide us with new insights about how legitimate representation really is today.

Second, the research presented in this paper also has some more immediate takeaways for political practitioners, notably elected representatives themselves. Consider, in particular, our findings regarding surrogate representation. These suggest that elected representatives, especially so in countries with majoritarian electoral systems, should be more aware that constituents from other districts may expect or demand being represented by them as well. Although trying to represent those citizens does not in any straightforward way lead to more votes, it can increase the overall legitimacy of representation, in that it expands the circle of those whose representational demands are satisfied (see Mansbridge, 2003, 522-24).

Another practical implication has to do with citizens' rather ambivalent attitudes on how representatives should relate to their party: citizens appear to want representatives to be partisans (of their preferred party, of course), yet they also tend to want representatives to act independently of their party. The best way for elected political representatives to handle these conflicting demands may be to be more explicit about their specific role(s) within the party and, indeed, about the need for the party to function as an effective vehicle for realizing a broader political agenda. The alternative to this — strategically presenting oneself as independent agent who "rebels" against the party leadership — has its drawbacks for the functioning of representative democracy. It may not only destabilize parties internally (e.g. Rahat and Kenig, 2018), but also further increase public distrust in the party as a political form. This may put the long-term success of the party at risk, which cannot be in the interest of citizens, either. In this light, representatives would do well to achieve a balance between meeting citizens' personalization demands and keeping the party sufficiently cohesive and functional.

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Citizens' Preferences for Multidimensional Representation – Appendix

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Appendices

Contents

Appendix A Item battery development and wordings

To construct the batteries, we first formulated a large set of "candidate items" that we considered to tap into preferences for each conceptual dimension. While we aimed to create items that primarily relate to a single dimension and do not contain references potentially priming considerations about other dimensions, we faced some challenges in generating items with varying item difficulties. Mixing items with varying difficulty is important from a measurement perspective. To attain this, we also selected a few items that potentially make references to other dimensions to manipulate (indeed, benchmark) their difficulty. For instance, one of our personalization items is: "...focus on the priorities of their party, rather than those of their constituents." Another example on responsiveness is: "...not care about how they do at the next election, but just do what is right." In both cases, respondents could read these items as creating a tension between personalization/responsiveness and substantive representation, adjusting the difficulty of endorsing the conceptions of personalization/responsiveness in both instances. But both examples still clearly ask for the preference for the concept (e.g. "focus on the priorities of their party" and "not care about how they do at the next election"), just referencing some other aspects of representation to tailor the item difficulty.

We then reduced the pool of candidate items to smaller sets of items for each dimension based on our own assessment of how well the items should work with respondents (e.g. understandable, triggering wanted considerations). After that, we undertook an extensive pretesting process, in which we fielded the remaining items to relatively small samples in each country. In total, we conducted six pretest surveys with respondents sourced through the survey platform Prolific. We used the responses to these pretests to refine our item batteries in terms of wording and item selection. In particular, we used exploratory factor analysis to establish which of our items — which were intended to measure the same concepts — did indeed elicit correlated patterns of responses from our respondents. We also examined the response distributions of the items, and asked open-ended questions of our respondents to gauge the difficulty of the tasks.

Below we provide the English version of the final item batteries.

Substantive

Some people want their personal policy views to always be promoted by their political representative. Other people think their representative can also promote different views.

Think about what you would want from someone who acts and speaks for you in politics. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? This person should…

- …promote the policy views that I hold
- …speak in favour of the views and opinions that I hold on different political issues
- …promote policies that would benefit me, even on issues I am unfamiliar with
- …raise issues that are important to me

Descriptive

Some people want their political representative to "look like" them, in that they should share some common characteristics, while others want their representative to be different from them.

Think about what you would want from someone who acts and speaks for you in politics. Do you agree or disagree that this person should share your…

- Gender
- Ethnicity
- Education
- Class background
- Sexual orientation

Surrogation

In the UK, people are only able to cast a single vote for a parliamentary candidate in their constituency. Some people therefore view their constituency MP as their only political representative. Others think that different politicians can also act and speak for them in politics.

Think about what you would want from someone who acts and speaks for you in politics. Do you agree or disagree that this person…

- …needs to be the MP for your constituency
- …needs to be the person you voted for
- …needs to be from the party you voted for

Justification

Some people want their political representative to always justify their decisions by explaining how they will affect society as a whole. Other people want their representative to focus on explaining how policies affect people like them or specific groups.

Think about what you would want from someone who acts and speaks for you in politics. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? This person should…

- …explain how their policies matter to society as a whole rather than to people like me
- …justify their decisions on the basis of what is good for the whole of the UK, not what is good for particular groups
- …explain how their decisions help to promote the national interest rather than my personal interests
- …more often refer to society as a whole than to people like me

Personalization

Some people want their political representative to be a loyal member of a political party. Others want their representative to speak and act independently from their party.

Think about what you would want from someone who acts and speaks for you in politics. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? This person should…

- …always be loyal to their party and its leaders
- …focus on the priorities of their party, rather than those of their constituents
- …speak out and vote against their party leadership
- …present themselves as an independent politician rather than a member of a party

Responsiveness

Some people want their political representative to always pay attention to public opinion, and do what the public wants in order to win elections. Others want their representative to pay less attention to public opinion and not focus too much on elections.

Think about what you would want from someone who acts and speaks for you in politics. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? This person should…

- …not care about how they do at the next election, but just do what is right
- …always think about how they will fare in the next election
- …pay close attention to opinion polls to ensure voter support

Appendix B Conjoint experiment treatments

Substantive

UK	US	DE
supports/opposes reintroducing the death penalty for the crime of murder.	**supports/opposes** abolishing the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.	**befürwortet** die Abschaffung des Werbeverbots für Schwangerschaftsabbrüche./**lehnt** die Abschaffung des Werbeverbots für Schwangerschaftsabbrüche **ab**.
supports/opposes introducing more stringent measures to reduce immigration.	**supports/opposes** introducing more stringent measures to reduce immigration.	**befürwortet** die Einführung strengerer Maßnahmen zur Reduzierung der Einwanderung./**lehnt** die Einführung strengerer Maßnahmen zur Reduzierung der Einwanderung **ab**.
supports/opposes increasing the rate of tax on income over £50,000 to 45%.	**supports/opposes** increasing the federal tax rate on income over $510,000 to 40%.	**befürwortet** die Erhöhung des Steuersatzes auf Einkommen über 55.961 Euro auf 45%./**lehnt** die Erhöhung des Steuersatzes auf Einkommen über 55.961 Euro auf 45% **ab**.
supports/opposes increasing the Universal Credit grant.	**supports/opposes** increasing federal spending on welfare programs.	**befürwortet** die Erhöhung von Hartz IV./**lehnt** die Erhöhung von Hartz IV **ab**.
supports/opposes building HS2.	**supports/opposes** introducing a federal carbon tax.	**befürwortet** den Bau von Nord Stream 2./**lehnt** den Bau von Nord Stream 2 **ab**.
supports/opposes constructing thousands of new onshore wind turbines.	**supports/opposes** creating a federal school voucher program.	**befürwortet** die Erhöhung der Luftfahrtssteuer./**lehnt** die Erhöhung der Luftfahrtssteuer **ab**.

Note that we draw "supports" or "opposes" for each level with equal probability.

Descriptive

UK	US	DE
man	man	Mann
woman	woman	Frau
working class	lower class	Arbeiterschicht
middle class	working class	Mittelschicht
upper class	middle class	Oberschicht
Black	upper class	türkischen Migrationshintergrund
Asian	White	polnischen Migrationshintergrund
White	Black	russischen Migrationshintergrund
heterosexual	Asian	heterosexuell
homosexual	Hispanic	homosexuell
	heterosexual	
	homosexual	

Surrogation

UK	US	DE
the [PARTY] Member of Parliament **for your constituency**.	the [PARTY] congressman/congresswoman **for your congressional district**.	der [PARTY]-Bundestagsabgeordnete (Direktmandat) **für Ihren Wahlkreis**.
a [PARTY] Member of Parliament, **but not for your constituency**.	a [PARTY] congressman/congresswoman, **but not for your congressional district**.	ein [PARTY]-Bundestagsabgeordneter (Direktmandat) **für einen anderen Wahlkreis in Ihrem Bundesland**.
		ein [PARTY]-Bundestagsabgeordneter (Direktmandat) **für einen anderen Wahlkreis in einem anderen Bundesland**.

		ein [PARTY]-Bundestagsabgeordneter (Listenmandat) **für Ihr Bundesland**.
		ein [PARTY]-Bundestagsabgeordneter (Listenmandat) **für ein anderes Bundesland**.

Note that we draw [PARTY] with equal probabilities from the list of major parties in the country: US = "**Democratic**", "**Republican**"; UK = "**Labour**", "**Conservative**"; Germany = "**SPD**", "**Bündnis 90/Grüne**", "**CDU/CSU**". At the time of fieldwork in May/June 2021 the CDU/CSU was polling in front of the German Greens with the SPD in third position, with all three parties claiming the chancellorship. Hence, we included all three parties.

Justification

UK	US	DE
regularly emphasises the benefits of their political positions for **people like you**.	regularly emphasises the benefits of their political positions for **people like you**.	betont in der Regel die Vorteile seiner politischen Positionen für **Menschen wie Sie**.
regularly emphasises the benefits of their political positions for **society as a whole**.	regularly emphasises the benefits of their political positions for **society as a whole**.	betont in der Regel die Vorteile seiner politischen Positionen für **die gesamte Gesellschaft**.
regularly explains how their policies matter to **people like you**.	regularly explains how their policies matter to **people like you**.	erklärt in der Regel, wie sich seine Politik auf **Menschen wie Sie** auswirkt.
regularly explains how their policies matter to **society as a whole**.	regularly explains how their policies matter to **society as a whole**.	erklärt in der Regel, wie sich seine Politik auf **die gesamte Gesellschaft** auswirkt.
regularly justifies their decisions on the basis of what is good for **particular groups** in society.	regularly justifies their decisions on the basis of what is good for **particular groups** in society.	rechtfertigt seine Entscheidungen regelmäßig damit, was für **bestimmte Gruppen** in der Gesellschaft gut ist.

regularly justifies their decisions on the basis of what is good for **the whole of the UK**.	regularly justifies their decisions on the basis of what is good for **the whole of the US**.	rechtfertigt seine Entscheidungen regelmäßig damit, was für **ganz Deutschland** gut ist.
regularly explains how their decisions help to promote **the interests of people like you**.	regularly explains how their decisions help to promote **the interests of people like you**.	erklärt in der Regel, wie seine Entscheidungen **den Interessen von Menschen wie Ihnen** dienen.
regularly explains how their decisions help to promote **the national interest**.	regularly explains how their decisions help to promote **the national interest**.	erklärt in der Regel, wie seine Entscheidungen **den nationalen Interessen** dienen.

Personalization

UK	US	DE
frequently speaks out and votes **against their party leadership**.	**frequently** speaks out and votes **against their party leadership**.	kritisiert und stimmt **häufig gegen die Parteiführung und ihre Vorgaben**.
rarely speaks out and votes **against their party leadership**.	**rarely** speaks out and votes **against their party leadership**.	kritisiert und stimmt **selten gegen die Parteiführung und ihre Vorgaben**.
usually votes according to party instructions, even when that conflicts with the wishes of their constituents.	**usually votes according to party instructions**, even when that conflicts with the wishes of their constituents.	**stimmt in der Regel nach den Vorgaben der Partei ab**, selbst wenn dies mit den Wünschen seiner Wähler schwer vereinbar ist.
usually votes according to the wishes of their constituents, **even when that conflicts with party instructions**.	usually votes according to the wishes of their constituents, **even when that conflicts with party instructions**.	stimmt in der Regel nach den Wünschen seiner Wähler ab, **selbst wenn dies gegen die Vorgaben der Partei verstößt**.
usually votes according to party instructions, even when that conflicts with their own beliefs.	**usually votes according to party instructions**, even when that conflicts with their own beliefs.	**stimmt in der Regel nach den Vorgaben der Partei ab**, selbst wenn dies mit den eigenen Überzeugungen schwer vereinbar ist.

usually votes according to their own beliefs, **even when that conflicts with party instructions**.	usually votes according to their own beliefs, **even when that conflicts with party instructions**.	stimmt in der Regel nach eigener Überzeugung ab, **selbst wenn dies gegen die Vorgaben der Partei verstößt**.

Responsiveness

UK	US	DE
"I always **listen to voters' views**, because at the end of the day they get to choose whether to reelect me or not."	"I always **listen to voters' views**, because at the end of the day they get to choose whether to reelect me or not."	„Ich **höre** mir immer **die Meinung meiner Wähler an**, denn am Ende entscheiden sie, ob ich wiedergewählt werde oder nicht."
"Elections are important because they force me as a politician to **listen and respond to the views of voters**."	"Elections are important because they force me as a politician to **listen and respond to the views of voters**."	„Wahlen sind wichtig, weil sie mich als Politiker veranlassen, **auf die Wähler zu hören und auf sie einzugehen**."
"In a democracy, the voter has the last word. That is why I always **listen and respond to what voters want**."	"In a democracy, the voter has the last word. That is why I always **listen and respond to what voters want**."	„In einer Demokratie hat der Wähler das letzte Wort, deshalb versuche ich immer, **auf die Wünsche der Wähler einzugehen**."
"I can only change society if I am re-elected. So, I always make sure that I **address voters' most important concerns**."	"I can only change society if I am re-elected. So, I always make sure that I **address voters' most important concerns**."	„Ich kann die Gesellschaft nur verändern, wenn ich wiedergewählt werde. Deshalb stelle ich immer sicher, **mich um die größten Sorgen der Wähler zu kümmern**."
"I did not go into politics to win elections, but to **make this country a better place**."	"I did not go into politics to win elections, but to **make this country a better place**."	„Ich bin nicht in die Politik gegangen, um Wahlen zu gewinnen, sondern **um dieses Land zum Besseren zu verändern**."

"I don't care about making popular decisions to win elections, but about **standing up for my principles and values**."	"I don't care about making popular decisions to win elections, but about **standing up for my principles and values**."	„Ich möchte nicht einfach dem Wählerwillen folgen, um wiedergewählt zu werden, sondern **für meine Prinzipien und Werte einstehen**."
"If I **lose an election** doing what I think is right, then **so be it**."	"If I **lose an election** doing what I think is right, then **so be it**."	"Wenn ich **eine Wahl verliere**, weil ich das Richtige getan habe, dann **sei es drum**."
"I went into politics to **implement good ideas, not popular ones** that win elections."	"I went into politics to **implement good ideas, not popular ones** that win elections."	„Ich bin in die Politik gegangen, **um gute Ideen zu verwirklichen, nicht bloß populäre Ideen,** mit denen man Wahlen gewinnt."

Appendix C Survey randomization

We used randomizations throughout the survey, not only in the conjoint experiment. First, we randomized the order in which respondents see our item batteries or the conjoint experiment. This allows us to evaluate consistency effects in the distribution of conjoint responses.[1] Second, we randomized three question orders: the order of the six issues on which we asked respondents to provide their policy preferences; the order of the six batteries tapping the dimensions of representation that are our main conceptions of interest; within the item batteries, the order of the items presented to respondents.

Table A7 below shows the randomization distribution for our descriptive representation attributes in the conjoint. For ethnicity, migratory background, and sexuality, we deviated from a uniform distribution to better fit reality, where only a small fraction of politicians are from ethnic minorities, for instance. Our randomization distributions for these attributes roughly correspond to official statistics of how these characteristics are distributed in the citizen population.

Table A7: Randomization distribution for descriptive representation attributes in the conjoint

Attribute	UK	US	DE
Gender	{Male, Female}, equal probability	{Male, Female}, equal probability	{Male, Female}, equal probability
Class	{Working, Middle, Upper}, equal probability	{Lower, Working, Middle, Upper}, equal probability	{Arbeiterschicht, Mittelschicht, Oberschicht}, equal probability
Ethnicity	{Black, Asian, White}, $P(Black) = .065$ $P(Asian) = .075$ $P(White) = .86$	{Black, Asian, White, Hispanic}, $P(Black) = .13$ $P(Asian) = .06$ $P(White) = .63$ $P(Hisp) = .18$	NA
Migratory background	NA	NA	{None, polnischen, türkischen, russischen} $P(None) = .8$ $P(polnischen) = .066$ $P(turkischen) = .066$ $P(russischen) = .066$
Sexuality	Heterosexual, Homosexual $P(Hetero) = .9$ $P(Homo) = .1$	Heterosexual, Homosexual $P(Hetero) = .9$ $P(Homo) = .1$	Heterosexual, Homosexual $P(Hetero) = .9$ $P(Homo) = .1$

[1] A series of unreported models reveals that our estimates are insensitive to the ordering of the batteries and the conjoint tasks.

Appendix D Item batteries: Exploratory factor analysis

To assess whether our item batteries measure *distinct* preferences over the dimensions of representation that we hypothesize, we report results from an exploratory factor analysis of *all* items from each of the six batteries in our survey, where we use an oblique rotation ("oblimin") to allow the factors to be correlated. Table A8 presents results from an analysis in which we pool responses from all three country samples.

The results from this exercise provide reassuring evidence on the validity of our item batteries. The factor analysis results in six factors, each of which corresponds broadly to one of our six dimensions of representation. Our items load together as predicted with regard to four of our six dimensions of representation. For example, all five of the descriptive representation items load positively on the first dimension, and all four substantive representation and justification items load positively on the second and third factors, respectively. The same is true for the three items of the surrogation battery, all of which are associated with the fourth factor. Across these first four factors, there is no significant cross-loading of any item on any other dimension. This suggests that these items tap into distinct preferences on the citizens' side with regard to each conception of representation.

Our items for the responsiveness and the personalization dimensions, by contrast, partially cross-load together on the fifth and sixth factor. On factor five, the three strongest loadings are for the personalization items "always be loyal to their party and its leaders" and "focus on the priorities of their party rather than those of their constituents" as well as the responsiveness item "always think about how they will fare in the next election." The two personalization items worded in favor of party independence "speak out and vote against their party leadership" and "present themselves as an independent politician rather than a member of a party" define the sixth factor.

On the one hand, this may indicate that responsiveness and personalization are more closely linked in the minds of voters. Voters may see party independence as an opportunity to realize responsiveness to electoral sanctions. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the personalization battery items are distributed on the two dimensions according to the direction of their wording (those loading on factor five are in favor of party loyalty, those on factor six are in favor of party independence), which might point to an issue with how these items are understood or the possibility of less coherent preferences on the citizen side.

We also performed factor analyses with the same specifications as above by country (results are available upon request). The results for the US and the UK largely resemble the overall patterns across countries (only the size of the eigenvalues and thereby the ordering of the factors is a bit different in the US, but the same items load significantly on the same dimensions together). However, we find some deviation for German respondents, where descriptive representation is split up into two factors — one focusing on social background (class, education) and one focusing on resemblance regarding gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation. This suggests that Germans make a difference with regard to whether they want their representative to resemble them on their social background as opposed to on these other characteristics, whereas preferences for descriptive representation are unidimensional in the other two countries. Such cross-country differences in the dimensionality of preferences could be investigated in more depth in future work.[2]

[2] As we enforce the six-factor solution, the two-dimensionality of descriptive representation preferences in Germany also results in one change on the other factors: the personalization items loading on Factor 6 in the UK and the US

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
Substantive 1	0.02	-0.02	0.77	0.01	0.01	-0.01
Substantive 2	0.03	-0.02	0.74	0.01	0.03	0.02
Substantive 3	0.01	-0.02	0.60	-0.02	0.05	0.01
Substantive 4	-0.05	0.05	0.71	-0.01	-0.04	0.02
Surrogation 1	0.02	0.04	-0.05	0.64	0.01	0.01
Surrogation 2	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.85	-0.02	0.04
Surrogation 3	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.64	0.08	-0.07
Descriptive 1	0.83	0.00	-0.06	-0.01	0.06	0.01
Descriptive 2	0.77	-0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01
Descriptive 3	0.64	0.04	0.06	-0.01	-0.02	0.03
Descriptive 4	0.72	-0.01	0.08	0.01	-0.02	0.02
Descriptive 5	0.80	0.00	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.05
Justification 1	-0.01	0.78	0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
Justification 2	0.02	0.70	0.05	0.05	-0.09	-0.03
Justification 3	0.00	0.72	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00
Justification 4	0.00	0.72	-0.06	-0.02	0.12	0.06
Personalization 1	0.02	0.06	0.12	0.09	0.58	-0.20
Personalization 2	0.05	0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.64	0.01
Personalization 3	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.73
Personalization 4	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.03	-0.05	0.56
Responsiveness 1	0.00	0.16	0.23	0.06	-0.37	0.10
Responsiveness 2	0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.03	0.70	0.09
Responsiveness 3	0.02	0.03	0.20	0.05	0.36	0.07
Eigenvalue	4.84	3.06	2.20	1.91	1.27	1.17

Table A8: Factor loadings. Sample size = 6,431 (pooled across countries).

Appendix E Item batteries: Cronbach's alpha by dimension, by country

In general, we observe good test score reliabilities of our scales, which are reported in table A9 below. In the pooled sample, Cronbach's alpha is 0.86 for the substantive representation scale, 0.89 for the descriptive representation scale, 0.86 for justification and 0.8 for surrogation. For personalization we are at the lower end of the acceptable range with 0.54 and the responsiveness scale lacks in internal consistency with an alpha of 0.45. These figures vary modestly by county, and are higher on average in the US and UK samples than in the German sample.[3] Taken together, these analyses suggest that, in general, four of our six item batteries have high levels of internal consistency, and measure distinct preferences over the different dimensions of representation.

Table A9: Cronbach's alphas by dimension and sample. Sample sizes: UK = 2,204; US = 2,178; DE = 2,049; Combined = 6,431.

Dimension	UK	US	DE	Combined
Substantive	0.85	0.85	0.88	0.86
Descriptive	0.92	0.91	0.83	0.89
Justification	0.88	0.87	0.84	0.86
Personalization	0.54	0.57	0.52	0.54
Responsiveness	0.47	0.54	0.32	0.45
Surrogation	0.84	0.81	0.76	0.80

now load on Factor 4 together with other personalization and responsiveness items in Germany. This may again suggest that these two conceptions of representation are less clearly delineated in the minds of citizens than they are from a theoretical-conceptual perspective.

[3] This may be an issue of sample quality, as Germany is the market where we also had the highest share of respondents failing our attention check.

Appendix F Item batteries: Correlation between dimensions

Figure A1 shows the Pearson correlations between the factor scores for each of our dimensions (note that these are factor scores from separate models for each dimension). Positive correlations between preferences on a given pair of dimensions are displayed in purple, and negative correlations are displayed in green.



Figure A1: Correlation between factor score dimensions

Appendix G Conjoint: Mapping of respondent and politician descriptive characteristics

Some of the descriptive attribute levels we use in the conjoint design are necessarily less extensive than the options available to respondents in the survey. This is especially true for the race/ethnicity categorization, where we use question wordings and options from existing surveys. In order to code descriptive congruence between survey respondents and hypothetical politicians, we map respondents self-categorizations of race/ethnicity to a smaller number of categories that we include in the conjoint. For the UK, we use a wording from the British Election Study and use the following mapping:

- **White:** White British; Any other white background
- **Black:** Black African; Black Caribbean; White and Black Caribbean; Any other black background
- **Asian:** Pakistani; Indian; Chinese; Bangladeshi; Any other Asian background; White and Asian
- Other (not included in conjoint profiles): Any other mixed background; Other ethnic group

In the US we use question wordings from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) and we use the following mapping:

- **White:** White
- **Black:** Black
- **Hispanic:** Hispanic
- **Asian:** Asian
- Other (not included in conjoint profiles): Middle Eastern; Mixed; Native American

Additionally, the CCES asks two questions to assess respondents' race/ethnicity. The first asks respondents to select the race or ethnicity that best describes them, and the second asks specifically if the respondent is of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent. We ask both questions of our respondents, and code the respondents as "Hispanic" if they indicate this in their responses to *either* of the questions.

In Germany, we use a customized question for migratory background, since all existing questions on migratory background are very complex (e.g. eliciting family migration history of parents). We use a simple question that taps into the respondent's self-perceived migratory status, arguably the most relevant concept for preferences over descriptive representation. Our mapping is:

- **None:** Nein
- **Türkischen:** Ja, türkischer Migrationshintergrund
- **Polnischen:** Ja, polnischer Migrationshintergrund
- **Russischen:** Ja, russischer Migrationshintergrund
- Other (not included in conjoint profiles): Ja, anderer Migrationshintergrund; Keine Angabe

We note that, for all countries, we do not drop the characteristics mapped to the "Other" category in the conjoint analysis. Instead, we code these respondents as being non-congruent with all hypothetical politicians on the relevant dimension.

For sexuality, we ask respondents to select from response options of "Heterosexual", "Homosexual", "Bisexual", "Other", and "Prefer not to say". In the conjoint, we include only "Heterosexual" and "Homosexual" as attributes of politicians, and so respondents who provide "Bisexual" or "Other" responses are coded as non-congruent with all hypothetical politicians on this characteristic ("Prefer not to say" responses are dropped before the analysis).

The exact question wordings for all questions mentioned are included in the pre-analysis plan that contains the questionnaires for all countries.

Appendix H Conjoint: Analysis strategy

To analyze our data, we stack it such that each observation, i, is the rating of a politician in a given pairwise comparison of two politicians considered by a given respondent. We index politicians with j and respondents with r. For each respondent, in each country, we have two observations per choice task, and each respondent completed five such tasks. This equates to 22040, 21780 and 20490 observations for the UK, US, and Germany data, respectively. Consistent with the decisions we pre-registered in our pre-analysis plan, we drop all responses by respondents who fail to give information on their sexuality, class, ethnicity, or past vote — information that we need to derive their descriptive representation and partisan surrogation – and who are assigned politicians with these characteristics in the conjoint.[4] After dropping these observations, we are left with 21266 observations for the UK conjoint analysis, 21382 for the US analysis, and 19268 for the German analysis.

We identify the AMCE through an OLS model, in which the outcome variable is equal to "1" if the respondent selected the politician as being the better representative, and "0" otherwise. We cluster standard errors at the respondent level to account for the non-independence of the choices of each respondent. We use models of the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{i(j,r)} = \; & \alpha + \beta_1 PartialDescriptiveCongruence_{j,r} \\ & + \beta_2 FullDescriptiveCongruence_{j,r} \\ & + \beta_3 SubstantiveCongruence_{j,r} \\ & + \beta_4 RepublicanJustification_j \\ & + \beta_5 HighPersonalization_j \\ & + \beta_6 HighResponsiveness_j \\ & + \beta_7 TerritorialSurrogation_j \\ & + \beta_8 PartisanSurrogation_{j,r} + \epsilon_{i(j,r)} \end{aligned} \tag{A1}$$

In a traditional conjoint analysis, the researcher directly randomizes the treatment attributes and then simply defines a model where the levels of each attribute are converted into a matrix of dummy variables (with one level of each attribute excluded as a reference category). The analysis proceeds by regressing the outcome on that set of indicator variables. Here, however, several of our treatment

[4] Note that in slight deviation from the pre-analysis plan, we keep observations from respondents who did not provide information on a charateristic for those comparisons where this characeristic was not shown. Excluding such observations has little justification. This deviation does not affect any results.

variables are defined by the *combination* of respondent and politician characteristics. For instance, we operationalize substantive representation by measuring the congruence in issue positions between the respondent and each hypothetical politician. As we measure binary issue positions on six issues for each respondent prior to the conjoint, and then randomly assign each politician to have a position on one of these issues, we can define $SubstantiveCongruence_{j,r}$ to be equal to "1" when the respondent holds the same issue position as that attributed to the politician in the vignette.[5]

Similarly, we operationalize descriptive representation by considering the congruence between politician and respondent characteristics. We code two dummy variables which measure "partial" and "full" congruence between the descriptive characteristics drawn in the conjoint for a given politician and those reported by the respondent prior to the experiment. $PartialDescriptiveCongruence_{j,r}$ is equal to "1" when the respondent shares one descriptive characteristic (gender, ethnicity, class, or sexuality) in common with politician j, and $FullDescriptiveCongruence_{j,r}$ is equal to "1" when the respondent shares *both* descriptive characteristics in common with politician j. For instance, if a female, middle class respondent was to be presented with a female, working class politician, then $PartialDescriptiveCongruence_{j,r} = 1$ and $FullDescriptiveCongruence_{j,r} = 0$. By contrast, a White male respondent presented with a White male politician would have $PartialDescriptiveCongruence_{j,r} = 0$ and $FullDescriptiveCongruence_{j,r} = 1$. The baseline, when both these variables are equal to zero, represents the case where the respondent differs from the politician with respect to *both* of the descriptive attributes included in the vignette. Note that we cannot define this measure of descriptive representation for those respondents that answered "Don't know" or "Prefer not to say" with respect to their class, sexuality, or ethnicity. Hence, we drop these observations from our analysis of the conjoint.

We also operationalize partisan surrogation by measuring whether the party of a hypothetical politician is the same as the party supported by the respondent. Here, $PartisanSurrogation_{j,r}$ is equal to "1" when politician j is from a party other than the one respondent r reports having voted for in the previous election.[6] Note that the politicians in the profiles always came from the major parties in each country (e.g. Democrat vs. Republican in the US, Labour vs. Conservative in the UK), as shown in appendix section B. For Germany we used the SPD, CDU/CSU and Bündnis 90/Grüne. Hence, for some voters of smaller parties, the variable is always "1." By contrast, we operationalize territorial surrogation directly by stating whether the hypothetical politician is the politician "for your constituency/district" ($TerritorialSurrogation_j = 0$), or is a politician "but not for your constituency/district" ($TerritorialSurrogation_j = 1$).[7] Where we use several text implementations for an attribute level (i.e., responsiveness, personalization, and justification), these are assigned at random in the conjoint, and we then code a binary indicator for each dimension – $HighResponsiveness_j$, $HighPersonalization_j$, $RepublicanJustification_j$ – which captures which type of text a respondent received.

Given these definitions of our conjoint treatments, the β coefficients from equation A1 provide estimates of the AMCE for each value of the politicians' attributes, see Hainmueller et al. (2014).

[5] See Leeper and Robison (2020) (Appendix OA6) for a similar approach.

[6] Respondents who were not eligible to vote, or who did not vote in the previous election, are coded as "1" on this variable.

[7] In Germany's mixed electoral system, there are various levels of surrogation, depending on whether a politician was directly elected in another district in the respondent's Land or in another Land; or on a party list in the respondent's or another Land.

Appendix I Conjoint: "Stability and no carryover effects" assumption

A central identifying assumption for stated-preference experiments that allows the pooling of data across choice tasks is that the potential outcomes remain stable across choice tasks, see Hainmueller et al. (2014). We can test this assumption by plotting our AMCEs for each choice task separately. The results are presented in figure A2. We find very limited heterogeneity in the AMCEs across choice tasks. One outlier is the first choice task in the UK, where the estimate for substantive representation is significantly smaller than in the other choice tasks. Moreover, there is a small visible pattern that the attratctiveness of republican justification in swaying opinion among US citizens in favor of a representative develops gradually over the course of choice tasks. This may indicate that citizens just become aware of the potential value of this dimension of representation when engaging in more thoughts about representation or that they use this dimension as a cue when they have to make more choices (or other potential explanations). However, in total, given the multiple comparisons we look at here (e.g. more than 100 AMCEs), the few significant differences we observe have still a relatively high probability to have occurred by chance.



Figure A2: Main conjoint results, by choice task.

Appendix J Conjoint: Conditional AMCE estimates

Figure A3 shows estimates conditional on whether a given politician in the conjoint has policy views that are congruent or incongruent with those of the respondent on a given issue. That is, we ask whether, conditional on the substantive representation offered by a politician, there are differences in the effects of the other dimensions of representation. We find no evidence for this. Similarly, figure A4 conducts the same analysis, but here conditioning on whether a given politician is from the respondent's preferred party or not.

In general, we find that the AMCEs associated with each dimension are largely consistent irrespective of the conditioning variable. We find some evidence of heterogeneity when we interact the $SubstantiveCongruence_{i,j}$ indicator with a variable measuring the self-reported salience of each issue to our respondents.[8] As figure A5 shows, we find that the positive effect of substantive congruence on the selection of politicians is increasing in how salient the issue is to the respondent making the choice (this moderation effect is more pronounced in the UK and Germany compared to the US).

We also find some treatment-effect heterogeneity when we condition the estimates on various descriptive characteristics of our respondents. Importantly, although we find relatively small effects of descriptive representation across all voters, we do uncover some evidence that descriptive representation is more important to certain subsets of voters. For instance, figure A7 shows that shared descriptive characteristics are more important for voters of color (in the UK and US) and voters from migrant backgrounds (in Germany) than for white voters and voters from non-migrant backgrounds. Similarly, we find that female voters see descriptive congruence as a more important feature of their representatives than male voters do (figure A6), but this pattern is not replicated for voters who report different sexualities (figure A8).

Appendix K Cross-validation of item batteries and conjoint

The combination of the item batteries and the conjoint also allows us to cross-validate the two instruments. Specifically, we can test whether the item batteries have predictive validity for people's choices in the conjoint. If the factor scores of individuals on each representation dimension capture meaningful variation in respondent preferences over representation, then we would expect respondents with different scores to be differentially responsive to variation in the relevant attributes in the conjoint. For instance, if our descriptive representation battery is effective at distinguishing respondents with greater and lesser demands for descriptive representation, then we should observe respondents with high factor scores from that battery being more sensitive to descriptive congruence with hypothetical politicians in the conjoint than is the case for respondents with lower factor scores. Accordingly, we hypothesize that there will be an interaction effect between respondents' factor scores on a given dimension and the attributes levels on that dimension in the conjoint.

To evaluate this idea, we use the factor scores to predict respondents' choices between politicians in the conjoint experiment. Collecting respondents' factor scores on each of the six dimensions into

[8] We asked each respondent to report how important each issue we included in the experiment was to them on a 7-point scale from "Not at all" to "Very" important. We code these responses such that categories 1 and 2 correspond to "Low" salience issues, categories 3 to 5 are "Mid" salience issues, and categories 6 and 7 are "High" salience issues.



Figure A3: Average Marginal Component Effects By Substantive Representation.



Figure A4: Average Marginal Component Effects By Partisan Surrogation.



Figure A5: Average Marginal Component Effects by Issue Salience.



Figure A6: Average Marginal Component Effects by Respondent Gender.



Figure A7: Average Marginal Component Effects by Respondent Race/Ethnicity/Migratory Background.



Figure A8: Average Marginal Component Effects by Respondent Sexuality.

a matrix, X, we estimate regressions of the following form:

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y_{i(j,r)} \quad = \quad & \alpha + \beta_1 PartialDescriptiveCongruence_{j,r} \\
& + \gamma_1 (DescriptiveScore_r \cdot PartialDescriptiveCongruence_{j,r}) \\
& + \beta_2 FullDescriptiveCongruence_{j,r} \\
& + \gamma_2 (DescriptiveScore_r \cdot FullDescriptiveCongruence_{j,r}) \\
& + \beta_3 SubstantiveCongruence_{j,r} \\
& + \gamma_3 (SubstantiveScore_r \cdot SubstantiveCongruence_{j,r}) \\
& + \beta_4 RepublicanJustification_j \\
& + \gamma_4 (JustificationScore_r \cdot RepublicanJustification_{j,r}) \\
& + \beta_5 HighPersonalization_j \\
& + \gamma_5 (PersonalizationScore_r \cdot HighPersonalization_{j,r}) \\
& + \beta_6 HighResponsiveness_j \\
& + \gamma_6 (ResponsivenessScore_r \cdot HighResponsiveness_{j,r}) \\
& + \beta_7 TerritorialSurrogation_j \\
& + \gamma_7 (SurrogationScore_r \cdot TerritorialSurrogation_{j,r}) \\
& + \beta_8 PartisanSurrogation_{j,r} \\
& + \gamma_8 (SurrogationScore_r \cdot PartisanSurrogation_{j,r}) \\
& + \sum_{d=1}^{6} \delta_d X_{r,d} + \epsilon_{i(j,r)}
\end{aligned}
\tag{A2}
$$

The interaction terms (γ) allow our estimates of interest to vary according to the preferences that we estimate for our respondents from the application of the factor analyses models to our item batteries. The implication of the preceding discussion is that we expect all of the interaction coefficients to be positive. A positive interaction effect implies that a change in an attribute value on a given dimension of representation will have a larger causal effect on the probability of selecting a politician for respondents who express higher *a priori* demands for representation on that dimension in the item batteries.

One concern with equation A2 is that it assumes a linear interaction effect in which the AMCE of the various attributes changes at a constant rate with each of the modifier variables. This is a strong assumption, as we might think, for example, that the effect of increasing descriptive congruence on politician selection probability will be very large among respondents who have *a priori* declared that they see descriptive representation as important, but much smaller among respondents with moderate or low $DescriptiveScore_r$ values. Given this, we additionally adopt the approach proposed by Hainmueller et al. (2019) and estimate separate AMCEs for binned groups of each of our factor analysis score variables. Specifically, we partition each of our factor analysis score variables into three equally sized groups – Low, Mid, and High – and then substitute the dummies for the Mid and High categories into equation A2 in place of the existing score variables. As before, our expectation is that the AMCEs for respondents in the higher groups will be larger than those for respondents in the lower

groups on each dimension. As this analysis involves comparing preferences across subgroups defined by the factor scores, we also report marginal means as suggested in Leeper et al. (2020) to measure the degree to which differences in subgroup-level AMCEs are driven by differences in preferences for the various reference categories.

The criteria we will use for adjudicating the success of our validation test are the sign and significance of the interaction terms described in equation A2, and the equivalent interactions on the categorical transformations of our factor score variables defined above. For the model described in equation A2, we judge the validation of each battery to be successful when the coefficient on the relevant interaction is positive and significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level.[9] For the categorical transformations, we conduct F-tests that compare models with and without the interaction terms for each dimension, and judge the validation for a given dimension a success if the interaction effects for that dimension are not jointly equal to zero (and at least one of the interaction coefficients for that dimension is positive). As stated in our pre-analysis plan, given that the categorical specification makes weaker assumptions about the functional form of the effect sizes, if the results of these tests conflict with each other, we base our final evaluations of the validity of our measures on the categorical specification of the factor score variables.

Finally, the analyses described here involve two sources of estimation uncertainty: in the estimation of the factor scores, and the estimation of equation A2. To ensure that we do not ignore the estimation uncertainty from the first stage factor analysis, we bootstrap the entire procedure, resampling (at the respondent level) 2,000 times from the data with replacement and estimating the factor scores and AMCEs on each iteration. We then calculate and present 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals from the resulting estimates.

We present the results of this procedure in figures A9 and A10. These figures reveal partial, though incomplete, support for our measurement strategy. In particular, for some dimensions we find that respondents' answers to the item batteries clearly predict the choices they make in the paired-comparison task. For instance, we find that respondents who are more supportive of personalized representational styles are more likely to positively process indicators of personalization in the conjoint task. Similarly, we find significant and positive interactions for partisan surrogation, justification, responsiveness and — to some extent — descriptive representation in most instances, though the magnitudes of these interactions differ and they are inconsistent across groups of respondents. By contrast, we find very little evidence that being more supportive of either territorial surrogation or substantive representation is correlated with viewing these attribute levels more positively in the choice task.

Taken together, we view these findings as supportive of our measurement approach, as they indicate that — for the majority of the dimensions we study — the item batteries we constructed do appear to capture respondents' attitudes that are predictive of the ways in which they make judgements of hypothetical representatives.

[9] For those dimensions where we have multiple coefficients relating to attributes in the conjoint (i.e. for descriptive representation, and for surrogation in the German example), we consider the validation of the battery to be successful if *any* of the coefficients on the relevant interactions are positive and significantly different from zero.



Figure A9: Average Marginal Component Interaction Effects: The plot shows the interaction terms (γ) from equation A2 which allow our estimates of politician characteristics to vary according to the preferences that we estimate for our respondents from the factor analyses. We expect these interaction coefficients to be positive, implying that a change in an attribute value on a given dimension of representation will have a larger causal effect for respondents who express higher *a priori* demands for representation on that dimension.



Figure A10: Average Marginal Component Interaction Effects: The plot shows the interaction terms (γ) from between politician characteristics on each dimension and the indicators for the binned groups of respondents' factor scores on each dimension. These effects allow our estimates of politician characteristics to vary according to the preferences that we estimate for our respondents from the factor analyses, but relaxing the assumption of linear effects maintained in figure A9. Again, we expect these interaction coefficients to be positive, implying that a change in an attribute value on a given dimension of representation will have a larger causal effect for respondents who express higher *a priori* demands for representation on that dimension.

Appendix L Item batteries and conjoint results from full sample

As we describe in the main body of the paper, a non-trivial fraction of our respondents failed the attention check that we included in our survey. In the paper, we estimate all quantities of interest using the sample of respondents who passed the attention check, and use post-stratification weights to obtain nationally representative estimates. In this section, as a robustness check on our strategy, we replicate all the analyses presented in the main body of the paper using the full sample of respondents, including those who failed the attention checks, and without any post-stratification weights. As these analysis demonstrate, there are very few substantive differences in the estimates derived from the full and the restricted samples.



Figure A11: Densities of preferences on each dimension – Full sample



Figure A12: Correlates of factor scores: Full UK sample.



Figure A13: Correlates of factor scores: Full US sample.



Figure A14: Correlates of factor scores: Full German sample.



Figure A15: Average Marginal Component Effects – Full Sample.

Appendix M Correcting for multiple comparisons

Figures A17, A18, A19, and A16 replicate the main results from the paper but additionally indicate the significance of each estimate at the 95% confidence level after adjusting the estimated p-values for multiple comparisons. In particular, we apply a separate Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) correction to the estimates presented in each figure. Estimates for which the adjusted p-values are smaller than 0.05 are presented in black, while all other estimates are presented in grey.

The results of these analyses are substantively very similar to those presented in the main body of the paper. For instance, in the results of our conjoint analysis displayed in figure A16, only two coefficients that were significant at the 95% in the unadjusted analysis – the descriptive representation attributes and one of the territorial surrogation levels, all in the German data – are no longer significant at the 95% level after adjusting for multiple comparisons (they all remain significant at the 90% confidence level). Similarly, with respect to the analyses in which we estimate the relationships between the six dimensions of representation and various respondent covariates (figures A17, A18, A19), although there are some instances in which the unadjusted and adjusted p-values are somewhat different, these small differences do not affect any of the patterns that we draw attention to in section 6 of the paper.



Figure A16: Average Marginal Component Effects.



Figure A17: Correlates of factor scores: UK sample.



Figure A18: Correlates of factor scores: US sample.



Figure A19: Correlates of factor scores: German sample.

Appendix N Article analysis for country case selection

In this section, we analyze which countries are commonly covered in studies of political representation to identify cases of high interest to scholars of representation. This analysis is based on re-analyzing the random sample of 246 empirical articles on political representation published between 2013 and 2019 in seven leading political science journals that Wolkenstein and Wratil (2021) initially collected to characterize the state of how empirical scholars enegage with political theory. This sample is representative of the wider population of articles published on representation in seven English language journals with high impact factors and reputation: *American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Journal of Politics, Comparative Political Studies, British Journal of Political Science, European Journal of Political Research* and *West European Politics*. The details of how this sample was constructed can be found in the supporting information of Wolkenstein and Wratil (2021).

We draw on the authors' replication files and checked the data used by each article in their sample, recording all countries from which data was analyzed in each article (e.g. some are single-country studies, some draw on several countries). Our analysis excludes two articles for which we were unable to find out the whole set of countries covered by the data from either the article or the supplementary information as well as 15 articles that included data from a very large amoung of countries (i.e., >40), thereby providing little information about which countries are studied comparatively more often.

Table A10 shows how often a country is covered in the remaining sample of 229 articles. Table A11 shows how often a country is covered as a single case in the articles (i.e., it subsets on articles that only cover data from one country). We can clearly see that the US, Germany and the UK are the most studied cases in recent empirical representation research in these journals. On single-country studies, the US is clearly ahead, but overall across single- and multi-country studies, the frequency of coverage of all three countries is similar.

Appendix O Research ethics

According to the rules of the relevant author's institution this research was exempted from special ethics review under two exemption categories: 1) It is a purely observational (non-invasive and non-interactive) study that poses no risk of harm, stigma or prosecution, given that all participants are residing in advanced liberal democracies providing full freedom to express different preferences on representation. 2) We use a non-sensitive, completely anonymous interview procedure and exclude vulnerable participants (e.g. minors). The applicability of these exemptions was confirmed by the departmental ethics advisor according to the department's ethics review process.

We obtained informed consent from all survey respondents upon entering the survey. The specific consent statement reads as follows: "I consent to participate in this study which will involve questions on my political opinions. I understand that all data will be kept confidential by the researchers. My personal information will not be stored with the data. I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason. I consent to the publication of study results as long as the information is anonymous so that no participant can be identified." The survey was terminated for respondents withholding their consent to participate in the research.

As the participant recruitment for the survey was carried out by the survey company Luc.id, which draws on a variety of suppliers to create representative samples, incentive and compensation schemes

Rank	Country	Number of articles
1.	USA	88
2.	Germany	65
3.	UK	62
4.	Netherlands	51
5.	Sweden	48
6.	Spain	41
	Denmark	
7.	Finland	39
8.	France	38
	Austria	
9.	Ireland	36
	Italy	
10.	Portugal	33
	Belgium	
11.	Greece	28
12.	Norway	26
13.	Switzerland	23
14.	Hungary	22
	Poland	
15.	Czech Republic	20

Table A10: Number of articles covering data from different countries

Rank	Country	Number of articles
1.	USA	74
2.	Germany	11
3.	UK	10
4.	Sweden	7
	India	7
5.	Brazil	4
	Norway	4
6.	Switzerland	3
7.	Mexico	2
	Netherlands	2

Table A11: Number of single-country articles covering data from different countries

for participation may have varied widely, depending through which supplier a participant enters the survey. Compensation schemes by Luc.id suppliers include, among others, providing loyalty reward points, gift cards, or cash payments. Given that we paid 0.90 euro per US respondent and 1.00 euro per UK or German respondent to Luc.id, the monetary value of any compensation granted to participants must have been very limited. This limited compensation of participants corresponds to the very limited effort participants had to invest in research participation (i.e., median response time was 11 minutes). Granting more substantial compensation to participants could have compromised their ability to freely provide or withhold their consent to participate in the research.

Note that we avoid deception in the conjoint experiment by telling respondents before the first choice task that we will show them *hypothetical* MPs/congressmen/congresswomen.

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