

On the Ruins and Margins of European Identity in Cinema – international conference

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European Identity in Cinema in the Age of Neoliberal Globalization:

Keynote lecture

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The purpose of this conference is to reflect on contemporary debates around the concepts of ‘Europe’ and ‘European identity’ through an examination of European films from 2000 to the present dealing with various aspects of globalization (the refugee crisis, labor migration, the resurgence of nationalism and ethnic violence, international tourism, neoliberalism, transnational commodification, post-colonialism, transnational capital etc.) in order to understand how the phenomenon—and the concept—of ‘migration’ urges us to interrogate ethical and political borders and to rethink European identity and Europe’s Enlightenment legacy in the present post-national context of ephemerality, volatility, and contingency that finds people looking for firmer markers of identity.

Over the last couple of decades scholars across disciplines have sought to *re-politicize* the discussion of globalization: we can point to Appadurai’s rethinking of the imagination as a political rather than a merely cultural fact, Ranciere’s insistence on the political potential of ‘the aesthetic regime of images’, or William Davies’s analysis of the limits of neoliberalism. From this point of view, what Ranciere and Badiou have called ‘*the ethical turn*’ in the form of an “immeasurable

debt to the Other' may be seen as a manifestation of the destabilization of neoliberalism's logic of rationalization. We can point to various instances of the return of *the 'immeasurable'* or *'the incalculable'*: Derrida's notion of 'community' as "those who cannot say 'we'," Ranciere's distinction between 'politics' and 'police', and Balibar's distinction between 'justice' and 'procedural or normative justice' (what he calls 'the justice gap') are all attempts to recuperate *'the incalculable'*.

Both Badiou and Ranciere have challenged the current humanitarian/ethical climate and the 'art of testimony' or 'cinema of duty' it produces. In *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil* (2001) Badiou asked: "Who cannot see that this ethics which rests on the misery of the world hides, behind its victim-Man, the good-Man, the white-Man?" (12-13). In *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics* (2010) Ranciere criticized 'the ethical turn' as a result of our perverted understanding of the notions of 'community', 'the common', 'dissensus', 'politics', 'political subjectivization', and 'the rights of the subject'. The current ethical discourse, Ranciere argued, is preoccupied with promoting and defending not civic rights but 'the Rights of Man', which are nothing but "the rights of those who have no rights...The Rights of Man [thus] become humanitarian rights, that is, the rights of those who cannot enact them, of victims whose rights are denied" (72). The 'infinite openness to the Other' as a 'transcendental horizon'—the 'motto' of the dominant ethical discourse—keeps those 'Others' safely at a distance, denying them the proper process of political subjectivization.

Like the Holocaust, to which it has been (not unproblematically) compared on numerous occasions, the refugee crisis has become crucial to redefining European identity along ethical and

humanitarian lines, prompting some scholars to challenge the (Eurocentric) conflation of humanitarian with European values. The translation of humanitarian into European values happens already on the level of film financing, as evidenced by the Council of Europe's program Euroimages, which supports films promoting humanitarian, universalist values as European, thereby fulfilling the Council of Europe's mandate to 'strengthen human rights, racial tolerance and multicultural acceptance.'

Curiously, the 'ethical turn' in the arts and humanities, in the form of an "immeasurable debt to the Other," has been accompanied by a simultaneous turn to self-loathing and self-flagellation. In fact, one of the most fascinating aspects of recent scholarship on European cinema and European identity has been the transformation of the negative rhetoric of decline, decay, self-destruction, trauma, marginalization, Euro-skepticism, and Europhobia into an implicit basis for a shared European identity. For example, in *Mythopoetic Cinema: On the Ruins of European Identity* (2017) Kriss Ravetto-Biagioli argues that precisely the strong *anti-Europeanism* of what she calls 'mythopoetic cinema'—exemplified by the films of Godard, Sokurov, Abramovic and Angelopoulos, which "explicitly undermine the notion of a new European cinema, if by that term one means films that 'reflect' or 'represent' a new European identity (e.g. 'post-Soviet', 'former-Yugoslav', 'German of Turkish descent' or 'French-Algerian')" (5)—that makes it European. Similarly, Anne Jackel notes that so far the majority of winners of the European Parliament LUX prize have verged on an *anti-European European cinema*" (68). Insofar as European cinema no longer defines itself in opposition to its traditional big 'Other' (Hollywood), the editors of *The Europeanness of European Cinema* (2015) argue, Europe "itself may at times be the principal other in European cinema," which means that "negative perceptions of Europe – even Europhobia

– [are now] central to the Europeanness of European cinema” (11). Still, as the editors also remind us, too often Europe’s “self-deprecation is...a strategy signaling knowingness and a kind of perverse superiority” (11), an argument Pascal Bruckner already made in *The Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt* (1983), his merciless dissection of the hidden superiority underlying Europeans’ masochism.

All forms of anti-immigrant nationalism are predicated on the exclusion of (ethnic/racial/cultural/national) ‘Others’ and on the promotion of an illusory idea of Europe as a homogenous space and of its history as a linear narrative.<sup>1</sup> The history of these exclusions is also the process by which the ‘Other’ is constructed as an independent entity. However, while in *Beyond Anthropology: Society and the Other* (1990) Bernard McGrance suggested that during the Renaissance the non-European other was experienced on the horizon of Christianity, during the Enlightenment on the horizon of reason, and in the 20<sup>th</sup> century on the horizon of culture, I would argue that the figure of the non-European Other in the age of globalized migration contains aspects of all three.

The construction of national ‘Others’ mirrors that of the non-European Other. Laia Soto Bermant provides a succinct analysis of this process in her discussion of the way in which, beginning in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, and in opposition to a series of ‘Others’—from the Moors to the Jews, heretics, Protestants, Lutherans, gypsies, and Africans—a notion of a Spanish national identity, tied to Catholicism, gradually emerged.<sup>2</sup> It was through its disavowal of its African heritage that Spain’s ‘European-ness’ was eventually recognized, making way for Spain’s incorporation in the EEC. Tellingly, Vetri Nathan’s analysis of the process through which Italy’s ‘European-ness’ was eventually acknowledged echoes Bermant’s: “Italy sees itself as...being the

quintessential internal Other in Western Europe. [...] This permanent crisis—the contradiction of being both European and...yet not quite—has caused a situation of what I term as ‘chronic ambivalence’ with regard to its national identity.”<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, numerous critics have theorized the Balkans—rather than Spain or Italy—as playing the role of ‘the internal Other’ in the construction of European identity. Norman Davies summarizes the vast scholarship on the subject when he states that, “all of Europe’s historic ‘fault-lines’ (political, religious, ethnic, linguistic and cultural) responsible for all the continent’s historic upheavals, run preferentially through...the Balkans.”<sup>4</sup> In her seminal study of the Balkans<sup>5</sup> Milica Bakić-Hayden has shown Balkanism to be a version of Orientalism, which renders the Balkans both a part of Europe and outside Europe ‘proper’ because of their long history of Ottoman/Oriental rule, an in-between status they continued to ‘enjoy’ even after the end of the Cold War when they “were chosen as a little piece of Cold War Eastern Europe to be retained as the model of otherness’.”<sup>6</sup>

The fact that such a diverse range of countries and/or regions—Spain, Italy, the Balkans, Eastern Europe—have been identified as ‘Europe’s quintessential internal ‘Other’ reveals the multiple and intersecting processes of ‘Othering’ in Europe, both along the North-South axis (e.g. Southern versus Northern Italians, Italy versus Northwestern Europe) and the East-West axis (e.g. Romania versus Italy) so that the same country, e.g. Italy, can be viewed as occupying the core of Europe *and* its periphery. What this phenomenon of ‘nesting Orientalisms’ (Bakić-Hayden)<sup>7</sup> reveals is not only the relative meaning of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ but also the superimposition of cultural, political, ethnic, racial and technological processes of Othering, each with its own distinctive logic: e.g. geographically Italy might occupy the periphery of Europe but politically it belongs to the West and thus to the ‘core’ of Europe as it is imagined from the periphery (e.g. by East European, ex-communist countries). While recognizing the work of scholars like Dina

Iordanova and Maria Todorova on the different mechanisms of Othering in Europe, Leen Engelen and Kris Van Heuckelom nevertheless warn that it would be a mistake to “perceive the emergence of these modern discourses as a unidirectional process—the West constructing the East as its antithetic Other—while neglecting the interactional and dialectical nature of such practices” [e.g. strategies like ‘occidentalization or ‘self-orientalization’].<sup>8</sup> Paul Gifford and Tessa Hauswedell’s anthology *Europe and Its Others: Essays on Interperception and Identity* (2010) offers a corrective to established views about the process of identity construction by demonstrating that as much as Europe has constructed a series of religious, sexual and ethnic Others, these ‘Others’ have, in turn, constructed the idea of ‘Europe’.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, while the delineation of boundaries between in- and out-groups is common to all identity politics, Christian Karner reminds us that there is “*ideological variation* in how the relationship between self and other is understood.”<sup>10</sup> Drawing upon Gerd Baumann’s and Andre Gingrich’s notion of three “grammars of identity” (ways of conceptualizing self-other relationships)—an Orientalizing grammar, a grammar of segmentation, and a grammar of encompassment—Karner proposes that while the dominant grammar of identity in Europe has been the grammar of encompassment, recently a new type of grammar has emerged, an *instrumentalist* discourse of self-other relation based on arguments about the economic desirability of immigrant Others.

Over the last couple of decades ‘the Muslim’ has emerged as Europe’s pre-eminent ‘Other’. Patricia Ehrkamp has shown how public discourses in Germany and Switzerland presenting Muslim migrants as disrespectful of law and order, unenlightened, and anti-democratic have been used to justify restrictive legislation and increased surveillance of Muslim migrants and to introduce an imbalance in the expectation of German citizens and Muslim migrants to practice active citizenship and affirm democratic values.<sup>11</sup> Rinella Cere has drawn attention to the material

effects of the construction of the Muslim migrant as “Other” in the Italian media and the public discourse of the Lega Nord, Forza Italia, and Alleanza Nazionale. The criminalization of the Muslim migrant as ‘Other’, she claims, presupposes and reconfirms the problematic conflation of Italian identity with Catholic identity.<sup>12</sup> The instrumental role the Paris attacks of November 2015 played in the transformation of ‘the Muslim’ into Europe’s chief ‘Other’—despite the fact that all of the alleged culprits in the attacks were racialized minority Europeans—confirms that the controversies surrounding migration are better understood as reflecting deep-seated intra-European tensions rather than tensions between “a pre-existing, presumably largely unified [Western] Europe and a recently settling (invading) non-European ‘Other’ (‘Islam’).”<sup>13</sup>

That migration has put into question the idea of the nation state as the traditional ‘container’ of justice is evidenced by the growing role of European and international law in individual nations’ legal orders. At the same time, discussions of what an ethical relationship to the Other might look like have become central to rethinking European identity along ethical and humanitarian lines, with scholars remaining deeply divided in their views of ‘the ethical turn’, some arguing that the only justifiable concept of European identity is one based on hospitality to the Other and others remaining suspicious of the hidden agenda behind ‘the ethical/humanitarian turn’. According to advocates of Levinasian ethics—which has emerged as the dominant theoretical paradigm in current theorizations of European identity in ethical terms—the only way to combat Western philosophy’s preoccupation with ontology, which rests on the elimination of relationality and thus of ethics, is through Levinas’s notion of ‘hospitality’, which challenges the dominant notion of the subject in terms of self-identity. The Levinasian turn in philosophy has infiltrated other fields, from political philosophy and sociology through anthropology to cinema studies, via the figure of the migrant, who has become more or less synonymous with Levinas’s notion of the ‘Other’, as

well as via the concept of ‘hospitality’. Starting from the assumption that “hospitality has a bearing on the very way in which subjectivity is defined”<sup>14</sup> Meyda Yegenoglu has drawn a parallel between the ways in which the Levinasian notion of the Other interrupts the European concept of subjectivity and, on the other hand, “the ways in which the sovereignty of the European self or the self-founding European subject is established, maintained, as well as destabilized or compromised in its encounter with the migrant other.”<sup>15</sup> Although the debate about human rights, ‘rebooted’ by the migrant crisis, appears to be about the proper ‘distribution of rights’ between citizens and non-citizens, the real question is what constitutes a right in the first place. The notion of ‘rights’ is meaningless when thought of in relation only to a singular subject: it is only in relation to Others that I have rights, and it is only in relation to me that Others have rights. From this point of view, the concept of ‘rights’ can have two different meanings depending on whether one locates rights in the realm of ethics or in that of politics. Yegenoglu’s critique of Kant’s notion of ‘hospitality’ is premised on this distinction between a moral or religious realm of responsibility (the notion of ‘unconditional hospitality’ endorsed by Levinas and Derrida) and a politico-legal realm of responsibility (embodied by Kant’s ‘conditional hospitality’).

The problem of the *political* application of ‘unconditional hospitality’ is dramatized in the growing skepticism toward humanitarianism or what some have called ‘humanitarian ideology’. As Ruben Andersson has demonstrated, humanitarian initiatives by coast guards, the Red Cross, the IOM and UNHCR accompany, rather than contradict, strict migration controls, pointing to the intermixing of care with coercion in migratory reception.<sup>16</sup> In *No Path Home: Humanitarian Camps and the Grief of Displacement* Elizabeth Dunn posits humanitarianism as one of the new ordering principles of the international system since the end of the Cold War, dividing society into donors and receivers. Far from being a sentiment, humanitarianism has become “an ideology, a



system of categorization, a massive industry”<sup>17</sup> and, for many, a way of life. ‘Humanitarian ideology’ refers not only to the discourse of pity produced by humanitarian aid agencies but also to these agencies’ hidden agenda, which, far from protecting displaced people, consists of “protecting donor countries from the displaced.”<sup>18</sup> Ipek Celik, too, questions the discursive shift in contemporary representations of ethnic and racial Otherness “toward a dialectic of *humanitarianism*, in which racialized bodies function as affective objects [to be feared or pitied] rather than as political subjects,”<sup>19</sup> while Sonia Tascon warns that the ‘humanitarian gaze’ prevalent in human rights film festivals reproduces unequal geopolitical relationships by depriving migrants/refugees of agency.<sup>20</sup>

Bulent Diken and Carsten Bagge Lausten’s *The Culture of Exception: Sociology Facing the Camp* (2005) is exemplary of the ways in which the migrant crisis and ‘the ethical turn’ have challenged traditional disciplines like sociology. After a quick detour through Kantian ethics Diken and Lausten arrive quickly to the period ‘after the camp’ in order to pose a question one would not have expected from a couple of sociologists: can there be a “truly universal ethics...[that] testifies to the nakedness of *homo sacer*, a nakedness that is...shared by all?”<sup>21</sup> Unsurprisingly, given their theoretical reliance on Lyotard and Agamben, they frame their discussion with references to ‘Absolute Evil’ (the Holocaust), testimony and the incommunicable (Lyotard), and insist on the absolute necessity to infinitely bear witness without allowing our testimony to find a specific object, which, they believe, would be tantamount to attributing meaning to the Holocaust and thus justifying it. It is precisely this analogy between the Holocaust and the migrant crisis, between the figure of the Muselmann and that of the migrant/refugee, both viewed as instances of Agamben’s ‘homo sacer’, that critics of ‘the ethical turn’, notably Badiou and Rancière, have called into question.

In many ways Badiou's and Rancière's critique of 'the ethical turn,' which they view as an 'ethical ideology,' was already prefigured in Pascal Bruckner's merciless critique of the notion of 'the Other' as an embodiment of white man's guilt in *The Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt* (1986). For Bruckner, 'white man's guilt,' which forces the white man endlessly to atone for his 'sins,' is just an inverse form of the very Eurocentrism he is supposedly atoning for, inasmuch as his infinite guilt (his assumption of responsibility for *everything*) is just another way of restoring his power. From this point of view, the ethical turn is just the latest expression of postcolonial guilt, which depends on upholding the ideas of 'infinite guilt,' 'man in the abstract,' 'universal human suffering,' and 'universal human rights'. Bruckner is equally critical of the other side of white man's guilt, pity, which reduces 'Others' to subhuman victims, denying them the status of proper political subjects. Bruckner's critique of the concept of the Third World as a homogenous mass of 'indigenous/indigent' people (Arabs, Orientals and Africans) calls to mind numerous television and cinematic examples of suffering anonymous migrants and refugees whose only purpose is to awaken our moral indignation, arousing nothing more than mild sympathy accompanied by indifference.

In the conclusion to his book, however, Bruckner declares Eurocentrism not only unavoidable but fundamental for an ethical relationship to the Other. In a section called "In Defense of Eurocentrism" he proposes that the only way for Europeans to free themselves from bad faith/infinite guilt is through a compromise between Eurocentrism and Euro-hatred: "Both the anti-European Inquisition and aggressive Eurocentrism *must be affirmed together*. Because it is impossible to avoid choices that by themselves could tear us apart, to be legitimate we must practice both skepticism and allegiance."<sup>22</sup> Challenging the discourse of moral universalism predicated on the idea of a universal subject and universal human rights, Bruckner avers that ethics

cannot be a matter of dispensing justice in a disinterested, dispassionate manner *a la* Kant; on the contrary, the only genuine ethics is one sustained by “emotional particularism” and a certain exoticism—even eroticism—in our relationship to the Other: “My sense of moral responsibility can be sustained only by an admiring fascination for the other. Neither generosity nor duty is enough to establish strong ties, and the dictates of conscience are not what usually motivate people. [...] Nobody would leave his borders if the far-off were not, above all, *seductive*...A foreigner inspires me [enchants me] before he fills me with pity or astonishment.”<sup>23</sup>

In *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil* Badiou condemns the ‘ethical turn’ with its appeals to ‘humanism’ and ‘human rights’ as based on a meaningless notion of universal ethics—for Badiou (as for Bruckner) “there can be no ethics in general...only an ethics of singular truths, and thus an ethics relative to a particular situation.”<sup>24</sup> Reclaiming the anti-humanist idea of ‘the death of man’ Badiou rejects the abstract doctrine of ‘natural man’ and of ‘the rights of natural man’ (‘human rights’) as a possible basis for ethics, arguing that this ‘ethical doctrine’ is predicated on the splitting of the human subject into a “a passive, pathetic or reflexive subject—he who suffers”<sup>25</sup> and “the active, determining subject of judgment—he who in identifying suffering knows that it must be stopped by all available means. [...] Who cannot see that this ethics...hides, behind its victim-Man, the good-Man, the white-Man?”<sup>26</sup> Such an understanding of ethics reduces politics to nothing more than “the sympathetic and indignant judgment of the [privileged, Western, white] spectator of [suffering].”<sup>27</sup> Ostensibly rooted in Levinasian ethics, ‘ethical ideology’ actually perverts Levinas’s notion of ‘the Other’ to ‘the recognition of the other’. While in Levinasian ethics the Other embodies a principle of alterity that transcends finite experience—the principle of the ‘Altogether-Other’ (God)—ethical ideology strips Levinasian ethics of its religious dimension so that all we are left with is “a pious discourse without piety.”<sup>28</sup>

For his part, Rancière views ‘the ethical turn’ as resulting from a misunderstanding of the notions of ‘community’, ‘the common’, and ‘dissensus’, which has perverted our understanding of politics, political subjectivization, and the rights of the subject. “What lies behind the strange shift from Man to Humanity and from Humanity to the Humanitarian?”<sup>29</sup> he asks. His answer is that the discourse of Human Rights rests on the victimization of displaced people and on the idea of ‘humanitarian interference,’ which is used to justify various types of military campaigns and the struggle against ‘Radical Evil.’ Rancière blames the shift from ‘the rights of Man’ to ‘Human Rights’ on Arendt’s and Agamben’s radical suspension of politics in the exception of bare life and their (mis)understanding of rights as “merely the predicates of a non-existing being.”<sup>30</sup> Rights do not ‘belong’ to certain subjects that are located within a given ‘sphere’ (‘the sphere of politics’): just as the subjects that belong to a political community cannot be counted (counting is the logic of ‘the police’ whereas ‘politics’ is the name given to the count of the uncounted) so rights cannot be ‘apportioned’ among members of a pre-existing (political) community. There is thus no ‘Man’ of ‘the Rights of Man’, and there is no need for one: the only meaning the notion of a ‘right’ could have is “in the back-and-forth movement between the initial inscription of the right and the dissensual stage on which it is put to the test.”<sup>31</sup>

Rancière holds Lyotard (among others) responsible for the perversion of ‘rights’ into ‘Human Rights’. In his article “The Rights of the Other” (1993) Lyotard claims that renewed outbreaks of religious and racial violence are “not so much the specific effects of perverse ideologies and ‘outlaw regimes’ as the manifestations of an infinite wrong, one that could not be accounted for in terms of the opposition between democracy and anti-democracy...but which appears as an absolute evil—an unthinkable and irredeemable evil.”<sup>32</sup> What Rancière finds particularly pernicious about this claim is that Lyotard’s introduction of a positive notion of ‘the

Inhuman' (identified with 'the Other' or 'the Law of the Other'), the betrayal of which is the other Inhuman (Radical Evil), reduces ethics (and aesthetics) to a witnessing of 'unpresentable catastrophe', which is "nothing but the endless work of mourning"<sup>33</sup> easily perverted into a justification for 'infinite justice' under the pretense of humanitarianism.

The anthology *The Borders of Justice* (2012), edited by Étienne Balibar, is representative of 'the ethical ideology' targeted by Badiou and Rancière. All essays in this volume are heavily indebted to Lyotard's concept of 'the differend' and to Derrida's notion of "the structural excess of justice with respect to every historically given regime of justice administration."<sup>34</sup> Challenging a purely normative or distributive theory of justice, which views justice as simply a response to what is perceived as injustice, contributors to the volume explore the "justice gap"—the gap between claims for justice and governmental (including legal and juridical) regimes of justice—dramatized particularly well by the phenomenon of migration. One of the contributors even suggests that references to justice—to moral or legal definitions of justice—are, more often than not, used to depoliticize political conflicts.<sup>35</sup> On the contrary, Rancière urges us to think justice not only in the ethical-normative sense but also in the political sense, and this means, as Francisco Naishtat observes, recuperating the notion of a hermeneutic pre-comprehension of justice: "When we talk about the injustice of a particular social order it is because we have already understood the corresponding social order as a contingent historical product that can be disrupted by political action."<sup>36</sup>

As the preceding discussion of ethics and justice suggests, Western political culture based on liberal values has been in decline for some time now, demanding a rethinking of liberal values. While much of the scholarship on Europe has been shaken up by the ethical turn and the affective turn (see the Introduction and chapter 4), the increasingly central role occupied by citizenship in

debates about European identity is evidence of another, *normative turn* in European studies.<sup>37</sup> The ‘normative turn’ finds expression in the proliferation of comparative analyses of different political theories of citizenship, from liberal (emphasizing the equality of rights) and communitarian (prioritizing duties and responsibilities owed to the community over individual rights) to republican (stressing participation in public affairs as the foundation for the promotion of the civic good) and multicultural (challenging universal theories of citizenship while being themselves criticized as a dangerous retreat from universalism). Political subjects who are unauthorized yet recognized—‘illegal’ migrants and refugees—play an central role in redefining the borders of citizenship. Arguably, the most important transformation of our understanding of citizenship has been that from “a conception of rights attached to persons to a discussion of rules of inclusion, relational processes and rights attached to groups”<sup>38</sup> i.e., a shift from a notion of citizenship as a personal right to that of citizenship as a group right articulated in the form of ‘claims’. Conversely, some locate the main challenge of defining citizenship today in the difficulty of “finely calibrating...the infinite reserve of potentiality held in the materiality of labor-power”<sup>39</sup> inasmuch as it is precisely labor-power that is at stake in contemporary struggles over citizenship.

The traditional state-centric model of citizenship is increasingly seen as obsolete in our globalized world, in which rights are more often than not tied to residency rather than nationality, something Michael Lister and Emily Pia see as evidence of the emergence of a post-national and cosmopolitan citizenship, whose meaning is not stable but varies depending on whether one defines citizenship as a legal status, a system of rights, a form of political activity, or a form of identity.<sup>40</sup> Even as nation-states continue to regulate the distribution of citizenship and the process of naturalization they increasingly face the demands of international jurisprudence and can be held accountable for violating human rights in denying citizenship to certain ‘aliens’. This has resulted

in the growing liberalization impact of international law on citizenship in Europe (e.g. the legalization of dual citizenship) leading some to argue that the nation state is becoming “a territorial administrative unit of a supranational legal and political order based on human rights”<sup>41</sup>; conversely, others believe the liberalization of citizenship has led to its re-ethnicization inasmuch as dual nationality allows people to maintain ties to the nation despite their physical distance from it.<sup>42</sup>

Far from being self-evident, the term ‘citizenship’ has been reformulated multiple times, with scholars distinguishing between legal/juridical and cultural/affective citizenship, and between the notion of global citizenship (referring to global citizens’ lack of political loyalty to a state) and the idea of corporations as global citizens. The proliferation of different meanings of ‘citizenship’ has led to a ‘flexibilization of citizenship’ as the traditional nation state logic of political identity gives way to a ‘market-oriented’ notion of citizenship as a commodity to which particular subjects with particular skills have preferential access.<sup>43</sup> The main challenge to this market model, which subordinates national and civic attachments to the forces of the global market, has been Habermas’s model of civic citizenship, according to which the idea of a European ‘fatherland’ must be replaced by that of a European public space, a non-national political community, a ‘multitude’ freed from the idea of ‘ethnos’, a community without essentialized subjects. However, as Chantal Mouffe notes, Habermas’s ‘constitutional patriotism’—the idea that “the law of a concrete legal community must, if it is to be legitimate, at least be compatible with moral standards that claim universal validity beyond the legal community”—fails to take into account “the power relations and antagonisms that constitute the political completely,” and instead searches in vain “for a view point above politics [in universal rationality] from which one could guarantee the superiority of democracy.”<sup>44</sup>

The idea of a ‘post-national citizenship’ remains a matter of debate, breeding enthusiasm and skepticism in equal measure. On one hand, ‘cosmopolitanism’ has become one of the ‘buzz’ words in recent attempts to reinvigorate classic liberalism with the understanding that the politics of recognition, on which cosmopolitanism is based, “entails a positive recognition of difference”<sup>45</sup> rather than being merely about plurality (multiculturalism). The unbundling of nationality and territoriality, seen as one of the defining features of cosmopolitanism, has been promoted as somehow more ethical than other theories of political identity, such as communitarianism for instance: if communitarianism defends “the right of a specific political community, often a territorially bounded and idealized nation, to a substantial degree of ethical closure,” cosmopolitanism “argues in favor of a universal ethical schema.”<sup>46</sup> However, cosmopolitanism’s alleged ethical superiority rests on the valorization of mobility, travel, nomadism and hybridity, terms that may describe certain European subjects (mostly those living in the wealthier parts of Europe) dismissing non-mobile subjects whose lives cannot be written into “cosmopolitan scripts.”<sup>47</sup>

In *Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration* (2016) David Miller makes explicit the significant challenge migration represents for political philosophy, which has traditionally concerned itself almost exclusively with the internal relationship between the state and its citizens. Classic texts of political philosophy such as John Stuart Mill’s *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861) and Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* (1820) do not mention immigration, and although some point to Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” (1795)—in which Kant speaks of the principle of ‘cosmopolitan right’—as anticipating contemporary discussions of cosmopolitanism, Kant saw this right as having a limited scope, limited to the foreigner’s right to try to establish a relationship with the inhabitants of the country, mostly for business purposes.<sup>48</sup>



John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* (1971) does not consider immigration either, since he assumes that the principles of justice apply to a society whose membership is already fixed. With his book Miller proposes to fill this gap in political philosophy by discussing institutions and policies he believes should be adopted with respect to immigration (that is, he is *not* concerned with the *ethics* of immigration). Ironically, having criticized the limited scope of Kant's notion of 'cosmopolitan right' Miller ultimately defends a 'weak' version of moral cosmopolitanism grounded in a very narrow definition of 'refugee', according to which refugees are "people whose human rights cannot be protected except by moving across a border, whether the reason is state persecution, state incapacity or prolonged natural disasters."<sup>49</sup> Throughout the discussion Miller adopts the substantive definition of self-determination as 'national' rather than understanding it as citizens' self-determination without reference to the national identities of the people making up the citizen body. His 'weak version of moral cosmopolitanism' ultimately amounts to nothing more than a hypocritical affirmation of the need to respect migrants' human rights despite the absence of a basic human right to immigrate, an absence that Miller uses to justify his conclusion that there are 'considerable reasons' to keep borders closed.

Those who remain skeptical of the idea of a 'post-national' citizenship, argue that the construction of a post-national European citizenship weakens the political dimension of citizenship replacing it with social and economic claims, thereby obstructing the establishment of a European public sphere. Michael Heffernan is in agreement: describing 'post-national Europe' in terms of 'the new Medievalism' (inasmuch as the emergence of autonomous regions, like Lombardy and Baden-Wurttemberg, can be seen as a throwback to the medieval city regions and the older trading alliances that existed under the Hanseatic League) he reminds us that the 'unbundling' of the

concept of territoriality from its traditional ‘container,’ the state, functions mostly in the wealthier parts of Europe.

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<sup>1</sup> Asad, “Muslims and European Identity,” 216

<sup>2</sup> Bermant, 133

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 5

<sup>4</sup> Davies qtd in Previsic, “Europe’s Blind Spot,” 201

<sup>5</sup> On the differences between Balkanism and Orientalism, see Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford UP, 1997).

<sup>6</sup> Hammond qtd in Ostrowska, “Postcolonial Fantasies,” 178

<sup>7</sup> ‘Nested Orientalisms’ refers to the tendency of each Yugoslav region to view the cultures and religions to its South and East as more primitive.

<sup>8</sup> Engelen and van Heuckelom, “Introduction,” xii

<sup>9</sup> Tessa Hauswedell, “Introduction” in *Europe and Its Others*, 1-13

<sup>10</sup> Karner, 176

<sup>11</sup> See Patricia Ehrkamp, “Migrants, Mosques, and Minarets: Reworking the Boundaries of Liberal Democracy in Switzerland and Germany,” *Walls, Borders, Boundaries: Spatial and Cultural Practices in Europe*, ed. Marc Silberman, Kren Till and Janet Ward (London: Berghahn Books, 2012), 153-172.

<sup>12</sup> See Rinella Cere, “Globalization vs. Localization: Anti-immigrant and Hate Discourses in Italy,” *Beyond Monopoly: Globalization and Contemporary Italian Media*, ed. Michela Ardizzoni and Chiara Ferrari (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 225-244.

<sup>13</sup> O’Brien, *The Muslim Question*, 2

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<sup>14</sup> Yegenoglu, *Islam, Migrancy*, 15

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 29

<sup>16</sup> See Ruben Andersson, “Rescued and Caught: The Humanitarian-Security Nexus at Europe’s Frontiers,” *The Borders of Europe*, 64-94

<sup>17</sup> Dunn, 9

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 207

<sup>19</sup> Celik, *In Permanent Crisis*, 133. See also Ipek Celik-Rappas, “Refugees as Innocent Bodies, Directors as Political Activists: Humanitarianism and Compassion in European Cinema.” *Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios sobre Cuerpos, Emociones y Sociedad*, no. 9 (2017): 81–89.

<sup>20</sup> See Sonia Tascon, “‘The Humanitarian Gaze’, Human Rights Films, and Glocalised Social Work,” *Social Work in a Glocalised World*, ed. Mona Livholts and Lia Bryant (New York: Routledge, 2017), 71-86.

<sup>21</sup> Diken and Lausten, 177

<sup>22</sup> Bruckner, 149

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 153-154

<sup>24</sup> Badiou, *Ethics*, lvi

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 9

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 12-13

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 9

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 23

<sup>29</sup> Rancière, *Dissensus*, 63

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 78. For Agamben, “The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact or realize” (42).

<sup>31</sup> Rancière, *Dissensus*, 71

<sup>32</sup> Lyotard qtd in Rancière, *Dissensus*, 73

<sup>33</sup> Rancière, *ibid*, 200

<sup>34</sup> Balibar, Mezzadra and Samaddar, “Introduction,” 2

<sup>35</sup> Emmanuel Renault, “Struggles for Justice: Political Discourses, Experiences, and Claims” in *The Borders of Justice*, 99-122

<sup>36</sup> Naishtat, “Global Justice and Politics,” 38

<sup>37</sup> On the normative turn, see Michael Lister and Emily Pia, *Citizenship in Contemporary Europe* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2008)

<sup>38</sup> Berezin, 12

<sup>39</sup> Mezzadra and Neilson, *Border as Method*, 199

<sup>40</sup> Lister and Pia, *Citizenship*, 59

<sup>41</sup> Jacobson qtd in O’Brien, 69-70

<sup>42</sup> O’Brien, 75

<sup>43</sup> See J. Nicholas Entrikin, “Political Community, Identity and Cosmopolitan Place” *Europe without Borders*, 51-63

<sup>44</sup> qtd in Lister and Pia, 175

<sup>45</sup> Delanty and Wodak, “Introduction,” 6

<sup>46</sup> Williams, 36

<sup>47</sup> Yegenoglu, 79

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<sup>48</sup> Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst*, 14

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, 83