Suteu, Silvia;
(2024)
Friends or Foes: Is Unamendability the Answer to Democratic Backsliding?
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law
10.1007/s40803-024-00233-4.
(In press).
Preview |
Text
Suteu_s40803-024-00233-4.pdf Download (804kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Unamendability is often viewed as a ‘lock on the door’ that can keep enemies of constitutional democracy out, at least for a time. Unsurprisingly, it has also been invoked as a potential bulwark democratic backsliding. While it may not entirely thwart authoritarian populist takeovers, unamendability – including in the form of basic structure doctrines or constitutional identity review – is said to at least delay them, buy some time for defenders of constitutional democracy to resist, and clearly signal to the outside world (including supranational institutions such as the European Union) that foul play is afoot. This article questions such easy assumptions about the nature and operation of unamendability, both in general and in an authoritarian populist context in particular. It argues, based on the examples of India and Hungary, that unamendability is a tool either too ineffective to be deployed against authoritarian populists in power, even while courts may not have been fully captured, or one they are just as comfortable wielding as their opponents. For example, the Indian Supreme Court’s hitherto celebrated basic structure doctrine has been useless in the face of the court’s refusal to hear or decide key challenges against the government. Additionally, drawing on the Hungarian case, the article shows the dark side of constitutional identity review includes captured courts defending majoritarianism and exclusion in the name of a national identity perceived as under attack. In other words, doctrines of unamendability may quickly and subversively turn into instruments of entrenching the very authoritarian populist projects proponents of such doctrines abhor.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Friends or Foes: Is Unamendability the Answer to Democratic Backsliding? |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s40803-024-00233-4 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00233-4 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. |
| Keywords: | Unamendability, Democratic Backsliding, Basic Structure Doctrine, Constitutional Identity, India, Hungary |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Laws |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10193348 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
