

Franklin Roosevelt and the Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938: A New Perspective on Anglo-American Relations in the Era of Appeasement

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The mission of Walter Runciman to Czechoslovakia in August – September 1938 has received relatively little analysis from historians despite its obvious relationship to the Munich crisis. It has generally been regarded as simply a futile attempt to solve the Sudetenland problem before Chamberlain decided to intervene himself and negotiate directly with Hitler. **(1)** Fairly typical in its coverage of the Runciman Mission is Donald Watt's much acclaimed book on the origins of the Second World War, which says that the mission 'served only to occupy the month of August, a month in which nothing could happen as the German military planning was not yet complete.' **(2)** The significance of the Runciman Mission has also tended to be dismissed in the work of historians and political scientists concerned with Anglo-American relations in this period. **(3)** Barbara Farnham, for example, in her otherwise very detailed study on Roosevelt and the Munich crisis, makes no mention at all of Runciman's Mission. **(4)**

It is certainly true that the Runciman Mission was never likely to be successful in averting a crisis between the Czech Government and Nazi Germany over the future of the Sudetenland. The best chance the Mission had to succeed was to persuade Beněš, the Czech President, to come to an agreement with Henlein, the Sudeten German leader, whereby the German-speaking Sudetenland would be given autonomy within Czechoslovakia. But, as Professor Watt points out, Hitler prevented this through his control of the Sudeten German Party and Runciman's Mission was therefore unable to broker a deal. The resulting crisis led to the Munich Conference of 29-30 September at which Britain and France agreed to the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. **(5)**

However, the traditional view of the Runciman Mission is based upon the premise that it had only one aim – to avert, or at least delay, the impending crisis between Czechoslovakia and Germany over the Sudetenland. In fact, there was another important aim of the Mission, as Neville Chamberlain himself made clear when he announced it in the House of Commons on 26 July 1938. Arguing that a voluntary agreement between the two sides looked unlikely without assistance from outside, he said that the British Government had offered the services of Lord Runciman as 'an investigator and mediator' to help resolve the dispute. **(6)** 'I cannot assert that a proposal of that kind will necessarily bring about a solution of this problem', he said, 'but I think that it may have two valuable results. First of all, I think it would go far to inform public opinion generally as to the real facts of the case, and, secondly, I hope that it

may mean that issues which hitherto have appeared intractable may prove, under the influence of such a mediator to be less obstinate than we have thought.' (7)

The Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, echoed Chamberlain's words when he spoke in the House of Lords the next day. Referring to Runciman's 'public-spirited' and patriotic mission', Halifax said, 'his function as I see it will be to inform public opinion not only in this country but in many other countries.' This would be in addition to his other role which Halifax explained as 'to act as mediator and bring the two sides together, to explain perhaps where there is misapprehension and conceivably to make new suggestions and the like'. (8)

These two statements by Chamberlain and Halifax were virtually identical, although Chamberlain's was characteristically sharper. They suggest that the factor of 'public opinion' was an important consideration for the British Government in proposing the Runciman Mission. Significantly, Chamberlain referred to 'public opinion generally' while Halifax talked of 'public opinion ... not only in this country but in many other countries.' In other words, what they had in mind was not only British public opinion but also what might be described as 'world opinion' or 'international opinion', including public opinion in France, Italy, Germany, the Dominions and, of course, the United States. Historians have noted Chamberlain's attitude to public opinion, particularly his tendency to speak on behalf of public opinion as he saw it. (9) Less well known is the role, in terms of public opinion, that Chamberlain and Halifax envisaged for the Runciman Mission and, indeed, for Franklin Roosevelt.

It is the contention of this article that part of the significance of the Runciman Mission lies in the fact that it was intended as a means to enlist 'world opinion' in support of a solution to the Czech problem in line with the British Government's policy of appeasement. Furthermore, an important aspect of this strategy was to secure the support of President Franklin D. Roosevelt for the Runciman Mission and, thereby, for the appeasement of Germany. Roosevelt's support was seen as valuable by Chamberlain and Halifax not only because it might act as a warning to Hitler not to risk war over the Sudetenland but also because of the prestige that the American President seemed to enjoy, in respect of public opinion, both at home and abroad. An examination of the Runciman Mission therefore casts considerable light on Anglo-American relations at the time of the Munich crisis in September 1938.

Before examining the significance of the Runciman Mission in detail, some background is required as to the nature of the Sudetenland crisis of 1938 and the origins of the Mission. The coming to power of Hitler and the Nazis in January 1933 pledged to undo the 'wrongs' of the Treaty of Versailles clearly threatened Czechoslovakia, with its large German-speaking population in the Sudetenland. Czechoslovakia had alliances with France and the Soviet Union as well as respectable defences of her own but the *Anschluss* of March 1938 put enormous pressure on the Czech state which was regarded by Hitler as a 'dagger' pointing at the heart of the new Germany. (10)

The French Government's policy was to use Czechoslovakia as a counter-balance to the power of Germany but Chamberlain and Halifax did not believe that the Czech state was strong enough militarily to stand up to Germany and they did not think that British public opinion would support a war to defend the Czechs, with their large German minority. German expansion in Eastern Europe might even be useful in diverting Hitler away from the British Empire and in containing expansion by the USSR. In these circumstances the British Government's main concern was to avoid being dragged into a European war because of the alliance between France and Czechoslovakia. The French were anxious for a public statement of support from London but the most that Chamberlain was prepared to do was warn Berlin of the danger of Britain becoming involved in any general European conflict. This he did, indirectly, in a statement to the House of Commons on 24 March, 1938. **(11)**

In April 1938, emboldened by events in Austria, Henlein put forward the so-called Carlsbad points, which sought virtual autonomy for the German Sudetenland within Czechoslovakia. These demands were rejected by the Czech Government, which offered instead a Nationalities Statute to address the concerns of the Germans and other minority groups in Czechoslovakia – the Poles and Hungarians in particular. On 21 May there were rumours of a German invasion and this was met by a partial mobilisation of the Czech armed forces. This in turn led to warnings from Britain and France that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would lead to war. This *demarche* seemed to work in the short term but Chamberlain and Halifax were now even more convinced of the need to avoid war with Germany by pressuring the Czechs to come to terms with the Sudeten Germans. **(12)**

Accordingly, Chamberlain and Halifax sought a way to intervene in the dispute to secure the concessions desired by the Sudeten Germans. One idea that had been put forward was to set up an international commission to discuss the problem but this was dropped when Sir Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, argued that it would be unacceptable to Hitler. **(13)** The main alternative was to nominate a British adviser or mediator to get the negotiations between the two sides back on track. Although this would obviously involve Britain more directly, Halifax agreed that, as a last resort, 'we ought to be prepared to act alone – to try and resolve the deadlock'. He then began the process of trying to come up with a suitable candidate for the position of mediator. Interestingly, the first name he suggested was that of Lord Lothian – later Ambassador to Washington. The Foreign Office then added other names, including a number of ex-Ambassadors and Governors of Indian provinces. **(14)**

Real progress was made when, on 22 June, Sir Horace Wilson, Chief industrial Adviser to the Government in the 1930s and a close confidant of Chamberlain, sent his views to Halifax. He put forward five names – Runciman; MacMillan, the distinguished Judge; H.A.L. Fisher, the historian; Lord Riverdale, the industrialist; and Sir Norman Raeburn, another industrialist. He also mentioned a number of ex-Ambassadors. Amongst his many rejects was Lothian, possibly because of the latter's association with the so-called 'Cliveden set'. Of Runciman he wrote:

A record that would impress – ex-Cabinet Minister of wide and varied experience covering a period which must have made him known internationally. A puzzling demeanour which might, in certain circumstances, be of advantage. Someone would have to accompany him and do most of the work, but he could be relied upon to put the results across. Superficially not a model negotiator, but capable of a crispness which again might turn out to be what was needed. **(15)**

Runciman was Wilson's second choice, behind MacMillan, but it was Runciman who now became the preferred candidate of Halifax and Chamberlain and who was therefore asked if he would accept the job of mediator in Prague. However, on 30 June, Runciman wrote to Halifax rejecting his offer. When pressed by Halifax, Runciman rejected the task a second time. Still Halifax and the Foreign Office refused to give up. Eventually, on 16 July, Runciman met with Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, and other Foreign Office officials and accepted the assignment – more than two weeks after it had first been offered to him. **(16)** Runciman was naturally reluctant to take on what was bound to be an arduous and very difficult – if not impossible – task. He only agreed to lead the Mission on the understanding that he would be independent of the British Government and a 'mediator' rather than an 'arbitrator'. Beněs was less than thrilled when he was informed of the plan but, under pressure from both the British and the French Governments, he eventually accepted the inevitable with as much good grace as he could muster. **(17)**

Chamberlain and Halifax could now announce the Runciman Mission in Parliament, as they did on 26 and 27 July respectively, both stating the two aims of the Mission - to inform public opinion and to try to bring the two sides closer together. **(18)** But while the idea of the Mission was generally welcomed there was some suspicion that the Czech Government had been coerced into accepting it, although this was denied. **(19)** The Liberal MP, Geoffrey Mander, thought that the Mission was likely to be 'a very dangerous proposal' from the Czech point of view. He also expressed some misgivings about Runciman himself. 'I think we who knew him in this House, and admired his great gifts and talents and wide experience, have never regarded him as a man who was sighing for fresh worlds to conquer or was really waiting for some gigantic task into which he might throw the whole of his weight with all the energy and enthusiasm of youth. We formed quite the contrary impression'. **(20)**

Thus there was some surprise that Runciman should have been given this task and the question arises as to why he was chosen for the mission to Prague – in preference to a score of distinguished candidates – and pursued relentlessly by Halifax and the Foreign Office, even after he had turned the job down twice. It is normally assumed that, as a recent member of the Government – he had served as President of the Board of Trade from November 1931 to May 1937 – and a supporter of appeasement, he could be relied upon to support the

Chamberlain-Halifax line in Prague. **(21)** However, Runciman's relationship with Chamberlain was strained at best following his departure from the Cabinet upon Chamberlain's accession to the Premiership. Runciman had hoped for the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer in the new Government but this post was given to Sir John Simon and Runciman was offered the position of Lord Privy Seal. Runciman regarded this as demotion and refused to accept it, preferring to leave the Government instead. **(22)**

In fact, the choice of Runciman to lead the mission to Prague may well have had something to do with his relationship with Franklin Roosevelt for the two men were already acquainted with each other. Runciman had visited Washington in January 1937 to meet Roosevelt, a visit arranged by Arthur Murray, a former Liberal MP who was a good friend of Roosevelt's and whose friendship with Runciman went back to their time in the Asquith Government. Murray had suggested a visit by Runciman to meet Roosevelt as long ago as 1933 but it was not until January 1937 that it eventually took place. **(23)** Although ostensibly a private visit Runciman met with Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, to discuss his trip before leaving for the United States. **(24)**

The main item on the agenda during Runciman's visit to Washington was the question of trade negotiations and the possibility of an Anglo-American trade agreement. Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, was very keen to conclude such an agreement as he regarded trade liberalisation as the key to 'economic appeasement' – a term he often used – and world peace. The trade issue obviously fell within Runciman's remit and was discussed extensively while he was in Washington but with little apparent progress. However, as Runciman observed, while Hull was almost obsessed by trade issues Roosevelt was much less concerned. 'Fiscal questions are not the chief interest of the President', he noted, 'and it is only in connection with their bearing on the maintenance of peace that he discussed these questions at all.' **(25)**

More important to Roosevelt were his discussions with Runciman on Europe and the prospects for peace and this is what Runciman stressed in his report to the Cabinet upon his return from America – a report that was circulated to Chamberlain, Halifax and the Foreign Office. Roosevelt told Runciman that he hoped to secure wider powers under a revised Neutrality Act. 'He regarded the effect on the German mind of his possessing these powers as an important new fact,' noted Runciman. 'While he did not wish to exaggerate his influence, he told me plainly ... that he thought that collaboration between England and America would be pacifying.' Runciman had several meetings with Hull and Roosevelt, including an informal meeting with Roosevelt after dinner in the White House. 'Before going to bed late on Sunday night I asked the President how I might describe his having brought me across the Atlantic in the middle of winter.' Runciman cabled to London. 'He replied in order to bring us closer together.' Runciman gave this assessment of the President to Baldwin, Chamberlain and Eden.

He is very friendly towards us, shudders at the thought of a European war, will not and cannot commit America to action, but is so well disposed that he can be regarded as a firm opponent of any steps which might lead to hostilities. The risks of war in Europe are present in his mind, and he returns repeatedly to his statement that the dictators are the danger. The only safe guardians of peace are the Parliamentary countries ... The closer we are to their public opinion and to their rulers the more certainly we can count on American support sooner or later. **(26)**

Following his trip to Washington, Runciman became a firm supporter of trade negotiations with the USA and of better Anglo-American relations in general – not a position he had always taken. His trip meant that he was the only member of the British Cabinet who had met Roosevelt as President. It was all the more unfortunate, therefore, that he left both the Board of Trade and the Cabinet in May 1937, when Chamberlain became Prime Minister. Roosevelt certainly regretted this, as he wrote to Murray at the time. **(27)** Personal diplomacy was important to the President and the link to Runciman was a useful one. However, Runciman's visit to Washington allows an insight into Roosevelt's thinking at the start of his second term and was one of a number of reasons for the Foreign Office, becoming more optimistic about Anglo-American relations in the event of a European crisis. During his first term Roosevelt had been largely preoccupied with the New Deal and domestic recovery. But after his re-election more might be expected of him. As Sir Robert Vansittart, at that time Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, put it, 'There are signs that something *might* be made out of our Franklin Roosevelt II who may not be the same man as Mr F Roosevelt I.' **(28)**

Thus Runciman's visit to Washington in January 1937 was important because it highlighted the potential influence of Roosevelt and the United States in European affairs and the consequent need to bear in mind Roosevelt's attitude and American public opinion in general. This became more obvious in October 1937 following Roosevelt's speech in Chicago when he referred to the idea of a 'quarantine' for lawless nations. **(29)** In January 1938 Roosevelt initiated naval talks in London via Capt. Royall Ingersoll, USN. In the same month the President secretly suggested a conference – the brainchild of Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State – to discuss 'world issues'. Chamberlain's negative reaction to this proposal – which he felt would cut across his own policy of appeasement – had been a major factor in the resignation of Eden in February 1938 and his replacement by Halifax. **(30)** But another outcome of the so-called Roosevelt initiative was the decision by Chamberlain and Halifax to keep Roosevelt and the State Department better informed about their policies and to try to secure American endorsement of them. This produced dividends when, at the request of Halifax, Roosevelt issued a statement on behalf of the Anglo-Italian agreement of 16 April 1938 which sought to settle differences between the two countries. **(31)**

Especially after the Quarantine speech, the conviction grew amongst public opinion in Britain and elsewhere that the United States might play a major role in European affairs and

Roosevelt began to emerge as something of a knight in shining armour. By mid-1938 it was a commonplace to look across the Atlantic to Roosevelt's America and talk of closer Anglo-American relations. *The Times* ran a series of articles in June 1938 on 'The America of Roosevelt'. **(32)** Churchill constantly extolled the virtues of Anglo-Aerian friendship and accused the Government of not doing enough to develop it. **(33)** A notable example of Roosevelt's good works was his sponsoring of the Evian Conference to discuss refugees from Germany and Austria in July 1938. **(34)**

Significantly, relations with the United States featured in the House of Commons debate on 26 July when Chamberlain announced the Runciman Mission. The Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, referring to the dangerous world situation, stressed the need for good Anglo-American relations. The Government, he argued, must take the opportunity of Roosevelt's move away from isolationism. The Prime Minister should 'strike in his speeches the same note as President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull do in theirs', i.e. freedom, democracy, etc. There should also be a move towards an Anglo-American trade agreement. **(35)** Whatever his private doubts, Chamberlain was keen to be positive about the United States in public. 'I agree very much with the right hon. Gentleman in the value that he attaches to our relations with the United States of America. I am happy to think they have never been better than they are at the present moment.' As regards a trade agreement, 'All that I can say is, that I know there is good will on both sides, and I hope that we shall not have to wait too long before we are able to announce that we have finally come to an agreed conclusion.' **(36)**

That American opinion was indeed an important factor in the British Government's thinking is clear from Foreign Office and Cabinet papers at this time. On 28 July the Cabinet discussed the trade agreement negotiations that had opened in February 1938. Progress had been very slow and the American negotiators in Washington were demanding more concessions than the British delegation was authorised to concede. At the Cabinet meeting Chamberlain took the view that 'the practical results of the Agreement might not be very great, but that the psychological effect on the world was of great importance.' He continued characteristically: 'The more the impression could be created in Europe that the United Kingdom and the United States were getting together, the less would have to be spent on armaments'. **(37)**

The same Cabinet meeting also discussed the Czech crisis and the Runciman Mission and agreed that an approach should be made to Roosevelt to support the British initiative. As Halifax later put it, 'the Cabinet hoped (as I do) that we might be able to get some commendatory message out of Roosevelt about Runciman'. **(38)** On 29 July the American Embassy was given a message for Hull and Roosevelt and the background to the Runciman Mission was explained in some detail. 'The Foreign Office said that should the President or the Secretary feel that he could make some public statement expressing approval of Lord Runciman's mission this would have a favourable effect on world opinion and Lord Halifax would naturally be much gratified.' **(39)**

At the same time as this official contact, Runciman himself wrote a private letter to Roosevelt. Addressing Roosevelt as 'My dear President', he began: 'You may have observed during the past few days a new departure made by Great Britain for removing, in so far as it is possible, the dangerous elements in the Central European situation.' He said that the British Government had sought for a man trusted by both sides, 'and I am now about to set afloat in an open boat in the treacherous ocean, independent of this or any other Government, in the endeavour to reduce the points of friction between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans and to guide that unhappy country into smooth waters. As we stand at present war is far too easily excused and may spring on the old world at any moment appropriate to the aggressor.' **(40)**

Whether or not Runciman was chosen for the Mission to Czechoslovakia partly because of his earlier visit to Washington and personal contact with Roosevelt, there is little doubt that this was a useful device given the British Government's desire to enlist Roosevelt's support for its policy in Czechoslovakia and for appeasement in general. Arthur Murray, for one, was delighted at Runciman's Mission and was sure that Roosevelt would be. 'The "contact" you established with him may well be not unhelpful at this juncture', he wrote to Runciman. **(41)**

In fact, Roosevelt was on vacation, cruising in the Caribbean on the USS Houston, when the Runciman Mission was announced although he was informed about it at sea by the State Department. **(42)** Hull and the State Department were opposed to any American endorsement of Runciman's Mission. The Department did not have a very high opinion of Runciman who had been regarded as 'extremely nationalistic' at the time of his visit to Washington. **(43)** Hull had also differed with him over trade policies. **(44)** Pierrepont Moffat, the Chief of the Division of European Affairs – who was generally unsympathetic towards the British Government – also felt that the President's 'approval' of the Anglo-Italian Agreement in April 1938 had been used 'for partisan purposes by Chamberlain in the House of Commons and for the diplomatic purposes by Halifax at the League of Nations.' **(45)** Hull and the State Department were anxious to avoid being drawn into any British plan for solving the Sudetenland crisis, especially before the outcome of the Runciman Mission could be known. **(46)**

Just how sensitive Hull was about this issue is shown by his reaction to speculation that Hugh Wilson, the American Ambassador to Berlin, had flown to Prague shortly after Runciman arrived there in order to confer with him. Wilson had shortly after Runciman arrived there in order to confer with him. Wilson had dinner at the American Legation in Prague on 5 August and talked with a member of the Runciman Mission and with the British, French and Swiss ministers. He also attended a luncheon on 6 August at the British Legation given for Lord and Lady Runciman, which gave him the opportunity to speak to Runciman. Wilson was seated next to Runciman who referred very positively to his trip to Washington in January 1937 and spoke in general terms about his Mission to Prague. 'He appreciated the

great difficulties of the task he had assumed and would regard it as well worthwhile if even a few things could be accomplished.' **(47)**

Back in Washington, Moffat reported that the Czech, Yugoslav and Polish *Chargés d'Affaires* had visited him, one by one, on the morning of 6 August, to enquire about Ambassador Wilson's visit to Prague. 'All three pointed out the coincidence of his arrival with that of Lord Runciman was so marked that they wished I would tell them in confidence the circumstances of his trip'. Moffat replied that the trip by Wilson had, in truth, been planned for some time and that he was also visiting Warsaw. 'The fact that Mr Wilson's visit coincided with Lord Runciman's arrival was purely fortuitous'. With varying degrees of feeling, they all expressed regret that there was not a more definite intention on the part of the United States to join Britain in settling the Sudetenland controversy than appeared to be the case. **(48)**

According to Moffat, Hull was incensed by Wilson's visit to Prague and the consequent speculation in the American press that he was co-operating with Runciman. **(49)** The Secretary preferred to make statements of a general nature in favour of world peace. On 16 August he gave a radio address entitled 'International Relations and the Foreign Policy of the United States' in which he said that in a world that was increasingly confronted by the choice between peace and 'international lawlessness' the United States supported peace. **(50)** He also made a statement on the tenth anniversary of the Kellogg Pact on 27 August 1938 calling for world peace. **(51)** As regards more specific issues, his main concern, as he told Lindsay, was the slow progress of the trade negotiations with Britain because he saw an Anglo-American trade agreement as begin fundamental to improved international relations. **(52)**

Fortunately for Chamberlain and Halifax, Roosevelt's attitude to the Runciman Mission was not quite the same as the State Department's. Apart from the fact that he had personally invited Runciman to meet him in Washington and talked confidentially with him, the President was open to a wider range of influences than Hull. He received advice from a great variety of sources and some of this, at least, was very supportive of Chamberlain and the British Government's policy of appeasement. For example, when Runciman wrote his letter to Roosevelt he sent it to Arthur Murray to pass on to the President. In his own letter to Roosevelt, Murray spoke in favour of Chamberlain's policy. 'The Parliamentary session ended yesterday. Its outstanding features have been the unquestioned dominance of the Prime Minister, and the weakness in authoritative personnel and in debate of the Opposition. The Prime Minister's critics have never been challenged the sincerity of his desire for peace, and they seem to be becoming less and less certain that his methods are mistaken.' **(53)**

Roosevelt also received reports from the American Ambassadors in the major European capitals who were either supportive of the appeasement of Germany or terrified at the prospect of a war in Europe. This was, of course, particularly true of Joseph Kennedy in London and also of William Bullitt in Paris and Hugh Wilson in Berlin. Bullitt wrote to Roosevelt on August 17: 'The French Government is now convinced that there will be another crisis during the first week of September. If it should appear you will be urged to take action by all

sorts of people'. Bullitt suggested that Roosevelt speak to the German Ambassador in Washington to warn him that if war broke out over Czechoslovakia the United States might become involved sooner or later. If war seemed imminent he should propose a conference of representatives of England, France, Germany and Italy at the Hague 'to find ways and means' of settling the dispute between Czechoslovakia and Germany. But he added: 'I think you should not take either of these steps unless Runciman should fail and war appear to be imminent.' **(54)**

After his cruise on the USS Houston Roosevelt spent most of August at home in Hyde Park. But in the middle of August he was scheduled to take the short trip north to Canada to meet Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister of Canada, for the dedication of the Thousand Islands Bridge across the St Lawrence River. On the same day, 18 August, Roosevelt made an important speech at Queens University in Kingston, Ontario, where he was awarded an honorary degree. Here he took the opportunity to talk about the international situation in general and the Czech situation in particular. The speech was drafted in the State Department and it is clear that it referred directly to Czechoslovakia. 'The theory of the speech is an endeavour to create a certain amount of doubt abroad as to what our intentions may be. This, it is thought, may have a moderating effect.' **(55)**

In his speech Roosevelt referred to the dangerous situation in the Sudetenland. 'A few days ago a whisper, fortunately untrue, raced round the world that armies standing over against each other in unhappy array were to be set in motion.' He then said: 'We in the Americas are no longer a faraway continent, to which the eddies of controversies beyond the seas could bring no interest or harm. Instead, we in the Americas have become a consideration to every propaganda office and to every general staff beyond the seas. The vast amount of our resources, the vigour of our commerce and the strength of our men have made us vital factors in world peace whether we choose or not.' And he continued:

The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire. **(56)**

This was an extremely important speech in several respects. Not only did it commit the United States to the defence of Canada if that country was openly threatened by Germany or any other hostile nation, it was also a statement of America's foreign policy at this time, especially its attitude to the European situation in general and the Czech problem in particular. It was an acknowledgement of American influence on the international situation – influence that was of interest, as Roosevelt put it, 'to every propaganda office and to every general staff

beyond the seas'. It was also a commitment to contribute to world peace and it was seen as a significant development by the American Department of the Foreign Office. **(57)**

The speech also allowed Roosevelt to meet up again with Mackenzie King. The Canadian Prime Minister was certainly a supporter of Chamberlain's appeasement policy and Roosevelt could not be unmindful of this fact in view of his desire for close American-Canadian co-operation. Mackenzie King had welcomed the Runciman Mission and he wrote in his diary at the time: 'I have found tremendous enjoyment and peace of mind in the appointment of Runciman as mediator to Czechoslovakia.' **(58)** He also sent a private telegram to Runciman in which he offered his best wishes 'for the outcome of your efforts which I feel sure will be of the greatest benefit to all'. **(59)**

Thus the speeches of Hull and Roosevelt in mid-August 1938 were of great importance in defining the attitude of the American Government to the Czech crisis. They were also the subject of much interest outside of the United States. As Moffat noted: 'The Czech and Yugoslav *Chargés d'Affaires* both came to see me this morning to discuss the situation in Central Europe. Both expressed the opinion that the Secretary's speech, particularly when coupled with the President's Kingston speech, was causing Berlin anxious thought.' **(60)** The speeches did not include a direct endorsement of the Runciman Mission but they underlined America's interest in, and commitment to, world peace and were therefore very useful to the appeasement policy of Chamberlain and Halifax.

On 24 August Halifax met with Herschel Johnson, the American *Chargé* in London to discuss the Czechoslovak situation. Halifax said that reports from Runciman did not hold out much hope of a satisfactory outcome to the Czech-Sudeten negotiations. The British Government feared, on the basis of reports from Berlin, that Hitler was intending to use force to settle the question before the end of September and that he might act before Runciman could make his own recommendations. Halifax shared with Johnson the dilemma facing the British Government, both moral and strategic, i.e. whether to encourage France to honour her obligations to Czechoslovakia or to discourage France from such action. The situation was made worse by Hitler's personality and the fact that, for all practical purposes, he was a 'madman'.

Lord Halifax spoke with warm appreciation of the President's speech at Kingston, Ontario, and of your radio speech of August 16. He believed that these speeches had had a useful effect. He then said, but made it clear that he was not making any request, that if either you or the President could find it possible to make some further declaration directed toward the existing danger in Central Europe at some time before the Nazi Congress meets in Nuremberg he believed it might have a wholesome effect in restraining Hitler. **(61)**

On 27 August Sir John Simon, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (and a former Foreign Secretary) made an important speech at Lanark, setting out British policy which he described as 'a positive policy of peace'. Chamberlain and Halifax's efforts were directed 'to reduce tension and to promote appeasement'. Referring to Czechoslovakia he said: 'There is no need to emphasise the importance of finding a peaceful solution. For in the modern world there is no limit to the reactions of war. This very case of Czechoslovakia may be so critical for the future of Europe that it would be impossible to assume a limit to the disturbance that a conflict might involve, and everyone in every country who considers the consequences has to bear that in mind.' He then continued:

You will have read the striking speech made the other day by Mr Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, when he laid stress on the widespread reactions of war and on the necessity for substituting the method of friendly co-operation. What he said, and what President Roosevelt said a few days later in Canada, must waken a responsive echo in many British hearts. **(62)**

On 30 August Kennedy met with Chamberlain, following a Cabinet meeting earlier that day. Kennedy reported that Chamberlain was very disturbed about the Czech situation. The general view he was receiving was that 'Hitler has made up his mind to take Czechoslovakia peacefully if possible but with arms if necessary.' Hitler believed that France was not ready to fight and England did not want to go in. 'Runciman feels that if the matter were one just to be decided between the Sudetens and the Czechs it could be settled amicably but unfortunately it rests with Hitler.' Despite everything, Chamberlain was still hopeful that war could be averted. Opposition to Hitler was gathering, 'The *Anschluss* lost Hitler a great deal of public opinion in the United States', Chamberlain said. He also felt that 'public opinion is definitely against going to war for Czechoslovakia' unless France got involved.

I asked him whether he thought Hitler was affected by the speeches from America or Sir John Simon's the other night. He said he thought that psychologically the two speeches in America – the President's and the Secretary's – and Simon's had had an excellent effect, but he is advised that very little of the proper information, so far as world peace is concerned, gets to Hitler any more. **(63)**

Kennedy also saw Halifax the next day, 31 August. Halifax repeated the view that public opinion in Britain was definitely against going to war for Czechoslovakia and that the French

did not want to fight either. He also reiterated that the British Government was making no more speeches on the German-Czechoslovak situation, believing that all had been said that should be said. 'He feels very strongly, as does Chamberlain, that silence on their part and hoping our part will get the best results.' Halifax asked Kennedy what the reaction would be in the United States if Germany invaded Czechoslovakia and Britain stood aside. 'I told him a great deal would depend on the attitude the President would take as to whether he thought England should be encouraged to fight or whether he would contend that they should stay out of war until the last possible minute'.

On the same day Kennedy cabled Hull for some guidance on this point 'I think Chamberlain and Halifax would appreciate your reaction and judgement as to what should be done on this as far as the United States goes'. **(64)** Hull replied:

The President and I have read your recent telegrams with the utmost interest. I feel that the recent public speeches and public statements of the President and myself, which were prepared with great care, accurately reflect the attitude of this Government toward the European and world situation, and that it would not be practicable to be more specific as to our reaction in hypothetical circumstances. **(65)**

Thus mid-August speeches were as far as Hull and Roosevelt were prepared to go in commenting officially upon the Czech situation at this stage. They had not directly referred to the Runciman Mission but, on the other hand, their speeches were clearly designed to support efforts for peace and to warn Germany against the consequences of a war over the Sudetenland. In one sense at least American policy was similar to British policy which was to point out that if war began it might be impossible to contain it to Czechoslovakia and that other countries – probably Britain and possibly even the United States – might become involved, as had happened during the First World War. Just how effective these speeches were in influencing German policy towards Czechoslovakia was, of course, open to debate. While Chamberlain was pessimistic about their effect on Hitler himself it was reasonable to suppose that German opinion, more broadly defined, would take some notice of them. According to Hugh Wilson in Berlin, German officials were very interested in the American viewpoint. **(66)** Similarly, Ambassador Biddle reported from Warsaw that the Polish Government felt that Roosevelt and Hull's speeches 'had undoubtedly had a sobering effect' in Berlin. **(67)**

However, fearful that the German *Führer* might reject any agreement negotiated in Prague, Halifax urged Runciman, on 25 August, to offer to meet Hitler in person. The Foreign Office went so far as to send Runciman the draft of a telegram to send Hitler requesting a personal meeting. **(68)** But Runciman refused to follow up this suggestion, arguing that

whatever progress he had achieved in Prague had resulted from his role as an independent mediator and that to broaden his task by including a visit to Germany would be a mistake. **(69)** This incident suggests that he took his position as a mediator, independent of the British Government, very seriously, even though historians have often doubted this. **(70)** Indeed, Runciman had only agreed to take on the mission to Czechoslovakia on the understanding that he would be an independent mediator

Meanwhile, as August gave way to September without a breakthrough in Prague, the Runciman Mission began to run out of time. It was taken for granted by all interested parties that Hitler's speech at the Nuremberg Rally on 12 September was likely to be a prelude to war unless a peaceful solution had been found by then. The British Government's hope was that Beněš would be pressured by Runciman into making sufficient concessions to satisfy the Sudeten German leaders with some kind of system of self-government along the lines of the Carlsbad points. Runciman himself had never been very optimistic of finding such a solution but felt he was making progress, especially towards the end of August. However, there was no dramatic breakthrough and although the Czech Government was slowly making concessions these were never enough to satisfy the Sudeten German Party negotiators. **(71)**

Despite coming under increasing pressure from Halifax and the Foreign Office to publish new proposals of his own, he remained convinced that his usefulness, such as it was, depended on his being a mediator rather than an arbitrator. If he came out with his own proposals he risked alienating one side, if not both, and undermining his value as an 'honest broker'. He was therefore very reluctant to publish his own proposals until any possibility of a negotiated agreement had gone. **(72)** This cautious approach was a cause of great frustration for Halifax and the Foreign Office who were increasingly conscious of the need to inform and 'educate' world opinion in order to bring about a settlement of the problem in line with the British Government's policy of appeasement. **(73)**

In these circumstances Halifax and the Foreign Office stepped up their efforts to keep Washington informed about the Czech situation in the days before Hitler's speech. On 3 September Lindsay delivered a detailed *aide-memoire* to Hull on the progress made by the Runciman Mission to date. The memo explained that the British Government was still not sure 'whether the German Government's real objective is to secure to the Sudetens adequate rights of self-government within Czechoslovakia or whether they are aiming at nothing less than the break-up of Czechoslovakia as an independent state.' British policy was to bring about the basis of a settlement before Hitler's speech on 12 September. 'Every effort is being made by Lord Runciman with the support of His Majesty's Government to establish such a basis.' The *aide-memoire* concluded:

His Majesty's Government are anxious to acquaint the United States Government of the foregoing because of the serious menace which the present situation represents

for the peace of the world. They accordingly desire that the United States Government should be aware of the efforts which his Majesty's Government are making in order to restrain Germany from arrogant and forcible action, and at the same time to induce the Czechoslovak Government to make without further delay or evasion the far-reaching concessions which are necessary if an agreed settlement is to be reached between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudetens. **(74)**

A further *aide-mémoire* was transmitted to Hull by the British Embassy on 7 September bringing developments more up to date. As Moffat noted: 'A cursory reading showed that the British Government were conveying to the Czechoslovaks their belief that the Czechs should make concessions at least as far as the Carlsbad points demanded by the Sudetens'. Mallet, who delivered the note, said that the memorandum, which had reached the Embassy the previous evening 'obviously was already somewhat out of date as events were moving quickly but it was the latest news they possessed'. **(75)** Clearly the British Government was trying to facilitate an agreement based on the principle of self-government for the Sudeten Germans. Equally clearly, it was going out of its way to keep Roosevelt and the State Department informed about the Runciman Mission and British policy towards the Sudeten problem and this policy continued unabated during the period leading up to Hitler's Nuremberg speech, with daily meetings between British and American officials in London.

On the evening of 9 September following a Cabinet meeting, Cadogan told the American Embassy that the British Government had been considering a warning to Hitler so that he would be under no illusions as to the serious consequences if he tried to deal with the Czech situation through force. Cadogan emphasised that this information was highly confidential. 'They feel here that with the background of the May 21 experience it would be fatal to give Hitler any warning in the nature of a threat of which the German public and the world have any knowledge'. **(76)**

Kennedy also met with Halifax on 10 September. Halifax said that secret information reaching the British Government suggested that Hitler was prepared to march on Czechoslovakia and felt that now was as good a time as any. 'Halifax again asked what would be America's reaction. I said I had not the slightest idea; except that we want to keep out of war. He then asked me why I thought Great Britain should be the defender of the ideals and morals of the democracies rather than the United States – not in a nasty way, but merely for the sake of argument – and I told him they had made the Czechoslovak incident part of their business, their allies were connected with the whole affair, and our people just failed to see where we should be involved. Cadogan later said he was in complete sympathy with this opinion and wished in heaven's name they could maintain it'. **(77)**

Kennedy saw Halifax again on the morning of 11 September. Halifax informed Kennedy that Henderson had urged the British Government not to send a warning to Hitler

prior to his speech at the Nuremberg Rally as this might provoke Hitler into a rash move against Czechoslovakia. 'The Government has therefore decided to accept Henderson's viewpoint and to hold up the delivery of the ultimatum until some later time and then only if necessary'. **(78)** Henderson expressed a similar view to Hugh Wilson, the American Ambassador in Berlin. **(79)**

On the evening of 12 September Hitler made his long-awaited speech at the Nuremberg Rally. The speech was very outspoken and attacked the Czech Government, and particularly Benš, for the alleged mistreatment of the Sudeten Germans. **(80)** Despite this, the initial reaction of the British and French Governments was that the speech was not as extreme as it might have been and that it had not made war over the Sudetenland inevitable. **(81)** Speaking to Kennedy the next day, Sir Samuel Hoare, the Home Secretary (and another former Foreign Secretary) felt that the door had not yet been closed on peace. **(82)**

However, following the speech there were demonstrations and outbreaks of violence in the Sudeten region. There were serious incidents at Eger and Aussig where several Sudetens and at least one Czech were killed, and serious injuries to Czechs were reported from other areas. This led to the Czech Government declaring martial law in the Sudetenland and the Sudeten negotiators breaking off talks with the Czech Government. **(83)**

It was against this background of the breakdown of the negotiations between the Sudeten leaders and the Czech Government, and Runciman's continued reluctance to issue proposals of his own for a settlement, that Chamberlain made his dramatic offer to meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden, the *Führer's* mountain-top retreat near Munich. In one sense Chamberlain's meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 15 September marked the end of the Runciman Mission. Runciman and his team left Prague on the same day, never to return. As Carr, the American Minister in Prague, reported: 'He stated last night in my presence that his mission was at an end. He had failed except in prolonging the negotiations'. **(84)** However, in another sense Chamberlain's flight to Berchtesgaden was a continuation and culmination of Runciman's Mission. At Berchtesgaden Chamberlain made his own personal appeal to Hitler to agree to a peaceful solution of the Sudeten problem, which Runciman had refused to do. Significantly, when Runciman eventually produced his Report it was used by Chamberlain to support his agreement with Hitler at Munich. **(85)**

Chamberlain's flight to Berchtesgaden, and his subsequent trip to Godesberg, followed by the Munich Conference of 29-30 September, was also a continuation of the Runciman Mission in that the British Government's campaign to keep Roosevelt and the State Department 'on side' remained an important part of British policy. By 15 September the United States Government was already very well informed as to the situation in Berlin and Prague, thanks to the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Washington. On that day, at his afternoon press conference, Hull was asked to comment on Chamberlain's visit to Berchtesgaden. He replied in a prepared statement: 'The historic conference today between the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Chancellor of Germany is naturally being observed

with the greatest interest by all nations which are deeply concerned in the preservation of peace'. **(86)** In other words, the established American Government policy during the Czech crisis remained unchanged: general support for peace but not direct involvement.

However, under the pressure of events and the widespread calls for him to intervene in some way or another, Roosevelt felt unable to stand aside. This was signalled, as Farnham has pointed out, by his secret meeting with Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador, on the evening of 19 September. **(87)** Roosevelt indicated to Lindsay that their meeting was absolutely confidential. 'Nobody must know I had seen him and he himself would tell nobody of the interview. I gathered not even the State Department.' Roosevelt told Lindsay that the sacrifice being asked of Czechoslovakia 'would provoke a highly unfavourable reaction in America.' But he understood the difficulties of the British and French Governments and if their policy proved to be successful, he would be the first to cheer. 'He would like to do or say something to help it but was at a loss to know what. He had no illusions as to the effect in Europe of his previous statements.' Clearly Roosevelt was ready to intervene directly if the opportunity arose. **(88)**

Thus it was that, a week later, Roosevelt made his appeal to Hitler, Benš, Daladier and Chamberlain, on 26 September not to break off negotiations but to settle their differences peacefully. Roosevelt sent a second message to Hitler on 27 September in which he argued that agreement in principle over the Sudetenland had already been reached and urged continuation of the negotiations, raising the possibility of expanding them to include 'all the nations directly interested in the present controversy' and holding them in a neutral spot in Europe. While reiterating that the United States had 'no political involvements in Europe', Roosevelt declared: 'The conscience and the impelling desire of the people of my country demand that the voice of their government be raised again and yet again to avert and to avoid war'. **(89)**

Whatever the significance of Roosevelt's role in facilitating the Munich Conference, there can be no doubt that these messages were exactly the kind of backing Chamberlain and Halifax had been looking for from the President during the Czech crisis because of the support they gave to the British policy of continuing negotiations with Germany and their consequent effect on world opinion. They constituted the endorsement of Chamberlain's appeasement policy that had been sought from the outset of the Runciman Mission. Chamberlain was also grateful for Roosevelt's short, but eloquent, 'Good Man' telegram sent to him on 28 September after Chamberlain had accepted the invitation to Munich. Hoare later wrote that Chamberlain greatly appreciated Roosevelt's brief message. As Hoare said, 'What two words could better show his full approval of Chamberlain's efforts?'. **(90)**

This was certainly Chamberlain's view and the Prime Minister made reference to Roosevelt's role during the Munich crisis in his speech to the House of Commons on 3 October. This speech, especially when compared with the views he put forward in the Commons on 26 July, neatly conveys the Prime Minister's interpretation of events. The

strongest force in favour of peace, he said, was public opinion – ‘the unmistakable sense of unanimity among the peoples of the world that war somehow must be averted’. At Munich the leaders of Germany, Italy, France and Britain had all played their part. He then continued:

There is one other Power which was not represented at the Conference and which nevertheless we felt to be exercising constantly increasing influence – I refer, of course, to the United States of America. Those messages of President Roosevelt, so firmly and yet so persuasively framed, showed how the voice of the most powerful nation in the world could make itself heard across 3,000 miles of ocean and sway the minds of men in Europe. **(91)**

Thus the Chamberlain-Halifax policy of seeking an American endorsement of British policy towards the Sudeten crisis as part of a wider campaign to enlist public opinion, at home and abroad, behind the appeasement of Germany was, in the end, highly successful despite the State Department’s reservations and Roosevelt’s own initial reluctance to get involved. The Runciman Mission was an important part of this strategy. It not only involved the British Government directly in the struggle to prevent the Sudeten crisis from becoming a European War, it also paved the way for Chamberlain’s trips to Berchtesgaden, Godesberg and Munich. It obviously failed to bring about an agreement between the Czechs and Sudeten Germans of itself but it laid much of the groundwork for the cession of the Sudetenland at Munich. It also began the process of involving the United States in the crisis by encouraging American statements on behalf of peace and by keeping the United States Government as fully informed about the Sudetenland crisis as possible. Indeed, at times the American Government was kept better informed about the Runciman Mission than the French Government. All of this groundwork eventually paid off when, confronted with a choice between appeasement and war, Roosevelt chose appeasement.

The Chamberlain-Halifax policy during the Sudetenland crisis shows that, despite their reservations about the role of the United States in international affairs, the two men felt that Roosevelt had a useful part to play in the appeasement of Europe, provided that he was kept ‘onside’. While Chamberlain had no time for ‘bombshells’ like the Roosevelt initiative of January 1938 that might complicate his attempt to appease the dictators, he was happy to receive the President’s ‘endorsement’ of the Anglo-Italian agreement of April 1938 and to seek similar support for the Runciman Mission and British policy towards the Sudeten German problem. Looked at in this light, his oft-quoted comment that ‘it is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans except words’ takes on a somewhat different meaning. **(92)** Supportive American words – as opposed to eccentric American actions – could be very useful in enlisting public opinion behind appeasement while reminding the German

Government that, if war came, the United States might eventually become involved on the British side.

Roosevelt and Hull certainly had their doubts about Chamberlain and the direction of British policy. They were not convinced that the appeasement of Germany would be successful and they had no desire to be associated with the Runciman Mission and British pressure on Czechoslovakia. But whereas Hull took refuge, throughout the Sudeten crisis, in generalities about international morality and world peace and berated the British Ambassador for the slow progress of the Anglo-American trade negotiations, Roosevelt could not stop himself from becoming directly involved. As he had said to Runciman in January 1937, he saw the Parliamentary countries as the best hope to avoid war and as the European situation worsened in 1938 he went as far as he could to support British policy. This can be seen in his Kingston speech, which was much more clearly related to the Sudetenland crisis than Hull's radio address two days before. It can also be seen in his meeting with Lindsay on 19 September, following the failure of Runciman's attempts at mediation and Chamberlain's flight to Berchtesgaden. Above all, it can be seen in his messages at the time of the Munich crisis and his acceptance – at least initially – of the resulting settlement.

Runciman, like Chamberlain, received a great deal of praise in the days after the Munich agreement was reached. **(93)** Arthur Murray, who was staying with Roosevelt at Hyde Park in October, wrote to Runciman, no doubt with some exaggeration: 'F.D.R. realises to the full how you saved the situation and prevented war in August and is warm in his admiration for what you did and the manner in which you did it'. **(94)** Murray wrote again to Runciman on 1 January 1939, quoting from a letter he had just received from Roosevelt in which the President said 'I am delighted to have Runciman's Autographed Report. I do hope you will thank him for it and I only wish I had his real inside thoughts about Henlein and the latter's master'. **(95)** By this time, of course, the post-Munich euphoria had begun to abate and it completely disappeared with the German annexation of Prague soon after.

In November 1938 the long-awaited Anglo-American trade agreement was finally concluded. Hull envisaged it as a major contribution to world economic and political stability. Chamberlain and the British Government saw it more as the price to be paid for American cooperation in the future. Over the next few months increasing attention was given in London – both in Government and outside – to the potential role of the United States should war break out with Germany. When this finally happened Roosevelt was able to secure the repeal of the American arms embargo in November 1939, which a grateful Chamberlain acknowledged was largely due to the personal efforts of the President himself. **(96)** The era of appeasement was over and Britain was now, more than ever, dependent upon the vagaries of American policy and, above all, upon the goodwill of Franklin Roosevelt.

Notes

- (1) Recent accounts are to be found in J. Charmley, *Neville Chamberlain and the Lost Peace*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1989; R. A. C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War*, Macmillan, London, 1993; and P. Shen, *The Age of Appeasement: The Evolution of British Foreign Policy in the 1930s*, Sutton Publishing, Stroud, Gloucestershire, 1999. Fullest coverage of the Runciman Mission is to be found in J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich — Prologue to Tragedy*, Macmillan, London, 1963 (second edition); and T. Taylor, *Munich. the Price of Peace*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1979. See also A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, Penguin, London, 1963 (second edition).
- (2) D. C. Watt, *How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938—39*, William Heinemann Ltd, London, 1989, pp. 27-28.
- (3) D. Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937—41. A Study in Competitive Cooperation*, Europa Publications Ltd, London, 1981; C. A. MacDonald, *The United States and British Appeasement, 1936—1939*, Macmillan, London, 1981; W. R. Rock, *Chamberlain and Roosevelt: British Foreign Policy and the United States, 1937—1940*, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1988; D. C. Watt, 'Roosevelt and Chamberlain: Two Appeasers' *International Journal*, 28 (1973), pp. 185-204; W. V. Wallace, 'Roosevelt and British Appeasement in 1938', *Bulletin of the British Association for American Studies*, 5 (1952), pp. 4—30.
- (4) B. R. Farnham, *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis': A Study of Political Decision-Making*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1997. There is also no mention of the Runciman Mission in standard American works such as R. Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932—1945*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1979 and A. Offner, *American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933—1938*, W. W. Norton, New York, 1976
- (5) Watt, *How War Came*, pp. 25-29.
- (6) *House of Commons Debates*, 1937-38, Vol. 338, 26 July 1938, Neville Chamberlain, cols 2938—2961.
- (7) *House of Commons Debates*, 1937-38, Vol. 338, 26 July 1938, Neville Chamberlain, cols 2957-2958.
- (8) *House of Lords Debates*, 27 July 1938, Lord Halifax.
- (9) L.W. Fuchser, *Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement.' A Study in the Politics of History*, W. W. Norton & Co, New York, 1982, pp. 66—67. See also R. Crockett, *Twilight of Truth.' Chamberlain, Appeasement and the Manipulation of the Press*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1989 and A. Adamthwaite, 'The British Government and the Media, 1937-38', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 18 (1983), pp. 281-93.

(10) See Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement*; Watt, *How War Came*; and J. W. Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich - The German Minority Problem and British Appeasement Policy*, Cambridge University Press, 1973.

(11) Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement*, pp. 134—139.

(12) Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement*, pp. 139-151.

(13) FO 371, Vol. 21723, C5297/1941/18. Berlin tel. 254 from Henderson to Halifax, 1 June 1938.

(14) FO 371, Vol. 21723, C5297/1941/18. FO minutes by Halifax, 9 June 1938.

(15) PREM 1/265, Horace Wilson to Halifax, 22 June 1938.

(16) FO 800/309, Runciman to Halifax, 30 June 1938; Halifax to Runciman, 1 July 1938; Runciman tel. to Halifax, no date; Runciman tel. to Halifax, no date. FO 371, Vol. 21728, C7273/1941/18. FO minutes by Cadogan (16 July 1938) and Halifax (16 July 1938).

(17) FO 371, Vol. 21727, C7304/1941/18, Prague tel. 380, Newton to Halifax, 20 July 1938.

(18) *H.C. Debates*, 1937—38, Vol. 338, 26 July 1938, Chamberlain, col. 2958.

(19) *H.C. Debates*, 1937-38, Vol. 338, 26 July 1938, Colonel Wedgewood, col. 2992 and Mander, col. 3031.

(20) *H.C. Debates*, 1937-38, Vol. 338, 26 July 1938, Geoffrey Mander, cols 3031—3032.

(21) E.g. A. J. P. Taylor, *Origins of the Second World War*, p. 210.

(22) Runciman Papers, University of Newcastle, Record 285, Runciman to Chamberlain, 7 May 1938; Chamberlain to Runciman, 10 May 1938.

(23) Elibank Papers, National Library of Scotland, Box 8808, Roosevelt to Murray, 25 December 1936; Murray to Roosevelt, 26 December 1936.

(24) FO 371, Vol. 20656, A93/93/45; FO minute, 31 December 1936; A147/93/45: memorandum, 5 January 1937 of issues to be raised between Eden and Runciman.

(25) PREM 1, Vol. 291, Runciman to Baldwin, 8 February 1937. 'Conversations with President Roosevelt and Mr Hull'. Also FO 371, 20656, A1059/93/45.

(26) PREM 1, Vol. 291, Runciman to Baldwin, 8 February 1937. 'Conversations with President Roosevelt and Mr Hull'. Also FO 371, 20656, A1059/93/45. See also Richard Harrison, The Runciman Visit to Washington in January 1937, *Canadian Journal. of History*, XIX, August 1984, pp. 217—239.

(27) Elibank Papers, Box 8809, Roosevelt to Murray, 17 June 1937.

(28) FO 371, 19836, A8677/3173/45. FO minute by Sir R. Vansittart, 11 November 1936. FO minute by A. Eden, 12 November 1936.

(29) For the Quarantine speech see Rock, *Chamberlain and Roosevelt*; MacDonald, *The United States and Appeasement*; Dorothy Borg, Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' Speech, *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXII (1957) pp 424-433; John McV. Haight Jr, Roosevelt and the Aftermath of the Quarantine Speech, *The Review of Politics*, 24 (April 1962), pp. 233—259.

- (30) For the Ingersoll talks and Roosevelt's initiative see Rock, *Chamberlain and Roosevelt*; MacDonald, *The United States and Appeasement*; Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance*.
- (31) *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, Vol. 1*, 16 April 1938 Anglo-Italian agreement. SD 741.65/536 London telegram 319, Kennedy to Hull and Welles, 15 April 1938; 741.65/5416 State Dept tel. 160, Welles to Kennedy, 19 April 1938.
- (32) *The Times*, 27, 28, 29 June 1938.
- (33) E.g. *Daily Telegraph*, 21 July 1938.
- (34) *The Times*, 6, 7, 9 July 1938
- (35) *H.C. Debates*, 26 July 1938, Sir Archibald Sinclair.
- (36) *H.C. Debates*, 26 July 1938, Neville Chamberlain.
- (37) Cabinet Papers, 28 July 1938, CAB 36(38).
- (38) FO 371, 21730, C7757/1941/18. FO minute by Halifax, 29 July 1938. See also MacDonald, *The United States, Britain and Appeasement*, pp. 89—91.
- (39) State Department 760F.62/528: London tel. 699, Kennedy to Hull, 29 July 1938 (*FRUS*, 1938, Vol. 1 pp. 537-539).
- (40) Runciman to Roosevelt, 28 July 1938 (PSF: Great Britain: AS), in D. B. Schewe, *FDR and Foreign Affairs*, Garland. New York, 1979, Vol. 6, May 1938 — August 1938, No 1208.
- (41) Runciman Papers, Box 284, Murray to Runciman, 27 July 1938.
- (42) SD 760F. 62/508, State Dept tel. Hull to Roosevelt on USS Houston, 26 July 1938 (not in *FRUS*).
- (43) SD 033.4111/13: memo on 'Right Honourable Walter Runciman' 22 January 1937.
- (44) PREM 1, Vol. 291, Runciman to Baldwin, 8 February 1937. 'Conversations with President Roosevelt and Mr Hull'.
- (45) Pierrepont Moffat Diary, Houghton Library, Harvard University, 12 May 1938, quoted in MacDonald, *The United States, Britain and Appeasement*, p.90.
- (46) Hull to Roosevelt, 29 July 1938, President's Official File 20, referred to in MacDonald, *The United States, Britain and Appeasement*, p. 90.
- (47) SD 760F.62/673 Prague tel. 233, Carr to Hull, 6 August 1938 (*FRUS* 1938, Vol. 1, pp. 540—544).
- (48) SD 760F.62/556. Memorandum of conversations by Chief of Division of European Affairs (Moffat) 5 August 1938 (*FRUS*, 1938, Vol. 1, pp. 539—40).
- (49) Moffat Diary, 6 August 1938, referred to in MacDonald, *The United States, Britain and Appeasement*, pp. 90-91.
- (50) *The Times*, 17 August 1938.
- (51) *The Times*, 28 August 1938.
- (52) SD 7560F.62/1037, memo by Hull on meeting with Sir R. Lindsay, British Ambassador, 3 September 1938.
- (53) Murray to Roosevelt, 30 July 1938 (PSF: Great Britain: Murray: TS), *FDRFA*, Vol 6, No 1211.
- (54) Bullitt to Roosevelt, 17 August 1938 (PSF: France: Bullitt: TS), *FDRFA*, Vol. 6, No 1231.

- (55) Memo by A. Berle Jr, Asst Secretary of State, for Roosevelt, 15 August 1938. (PSF: State: Berle: T), *FDRFA*, Vol. 6, No 1225.
- (56) Speech by Roosevelt, Queens University, 18 August 1938. (Speech File: TS), *FDRFA*, Vol. 6, No 1234.
- (57) FO 371, 21526, A6491/64/45, Washington tel. 324, Lindsay to Halifax, 18 August 1938. FO minute by Perowne.
- (58) Mackenzie King Diary, 28 July 1938, National Archives, Ottawa.
- (59) Mackenzie King Diary, 18 August 1938.
- (60) SD 760F.62/589. Memo of conversation by Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat), 19 August 1938 (*FRUS*, 1938, Vol. 1, pp. 548—49).
- (61) SD 760F.62/597. London tel. 815, Johnson to Hull, 24 August 1938. (*FRUS*, 1938, Vol.1 pp. 549—551). Also Halifax to Lindsay, 24 August 1938, *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 3rd series, Vol. 2, 1938. No 679, p. 149.)
- (62) FO 371, 21732, C8867/1941/18 FO tel. 242, Halifax to Newton, 27 August 1938. (*DBFP*, 3rd series, Vol. 2, 1938, No 704, pp.172-175).
- (63) SD 760F.62/628, London tel. 838, Kennedy to Hull, 30 August 1938 (*FRUS*, 1938, Vol. 1, pp. 560—561).
- (64) SD 760F.62f634, London tel. 846, Kennedy to Hull, 31 August 1938 (*FRUS*, 1938, Vol. 1, pp. 568—69).
- (65) SD 123 Kennedy, Joseph P/109, State Dept tel. 492, Hull to Kennedy, 1 September 1938. (*FRUS*, 1938, Vol. 1, pp. 568—69).
- (66) E.g, SD 760F.62/640, Berlin tel. 410, Wilson to Hull, 1 September 1938. (*FRUS*, 1938, Vol. 1, pp. 566—67).
- (67) SD 760F.62/660, Warsaw tel. 168, Biddle to Hull, 5 September 1938. (*FRUS*, 1938, Vol. 1, pp. 576—577).
- (68) FO 371, 21733, C8715/1941/18, FO tel. 235, Halifax to Newton, 25 August 1938. (*DBFP*, 3rd series, Vol. 2, Nos 686 and 687, pp. 153-155).
- (69) FO 371, 21733, C8796/1941/18, Prague tel. 471, Newton to Halifax, 26 August 1938. (*DBFP*, 3rd series, Vol. 2, No 695, pp. 164—165).
- (70) E.g. A.J.P. Taylor, *Origins of the Second World War*.
- (71) FO 371, 21735, C9278/1941/18, letter from Runciman to Halifax, 30 August 1938 (*DBFP*, 3rd series, Vol. 2, 1938, No 723, pp.192—193).
- (72) FO 371, 21734, C9047/1941/18, Prague tel. 493, Newton to Halifax, 1 September 1938 (*DBFP*, 3rd series, Vol. 2, 1938, No 730, pp. 198-199).
- (73) FO 371, 21734, C9047/1941/18, FO tel. 252, Halifax to Newton, 1 September 1938 (*DBFP*, 3rd series, Vol. 2, 1938, No 739, pp. 206-207).
- (74) FO 371, 21735, C9280/1941/18, FO tel. 597, Halifax to Lindsay, 2 September 1938 (*DBFP*, 3rd series, Vol. 2, 1938, No 741, pp. 209-211). Also, SD 760F.62/706, Aide memoire, British Ambassador to Secretary of State, 3 September 1938. (*FRUS*, 1938, Vol. 1, pp. 574—576).
- (75) FO 371, 21735, C9374/1941/18, FO tel. 608, Halifax to Lindsay, 6 September 1938

- (*DBFP*, 3rd series, Vol. 2, 1938, No 787, pp. 252—253). Also SD 760F.62/719, memorandum of conversation by Chief of Division of European Affairs (Moffat), 7 September 1938. (*FRUS*, 1938, Vol. 1, pp. 58D-581).
- (76) SD 760F.62/715, London tel. 891, Kennedy to Hull, 9 September 1938. (*FRUS*, 1938, Vol. I, pp. 584—585).
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