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Epistemology is not optional: Assessing epistemic institutionalism as a response to the argument from analogy

Bowles, Dominic Aidan; (2024) Epistemology is not optional: Assessing epistemic institutionalism as a response to the argument from analogy. Masters thesis (M.Phil.Stud), UCL (University College London). Green open access

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to assess Chris Cowie’s epistemic institutionalism as a strategy for rescuing moral error theory from the argument from analogy (sometimes called the epistemic companions in guilt argument). I focus on what Cowie calls the internalism-based moral error theory. This is the view that moral judgements are mistaken because they concern reasons that are not suitably related to our desires. The proponent of the argument from analogy argues that epistemic judgements also concern such reasons and yet epistemology is not subject to an error theory, thus, the internalism-based error theorist’s argument proves too much. Epistemic institutionalism is the view that epistemic judgements are normative in the same way as judgements within sports and games, etiquette, fashion and the law. Cowie argues that these judgements are safe from the error theorist’s argument and therefore so are epistemic judgements. I present several challenges to institutionalism: I argue that even if we adopt institutionalism our genuine reasons to believe are very closely related to desires. I provide epistemic analogues to Plato’s Ring of Gyges and argue that institutionalism is not equipped to explain our intuitions in cases like these. I also argue that it is a problem for Cowie that epistemology cannot be opted in and out of in the way that sports and games can. I conclude that epistemic institutionalism is unacceptable. Epistemology is best understood as concerning genuine reasons unrelated to our desires. Therefore, the argument from analogy succeeds and internalism-based moral error theory leads to an unacceptable epistemic error theory. Thus, this version of moral error theory must be rejected.

Type: Thesis (Masters)
Qualification: M.Phil.Stud
Title: Epistemology is not optional: Assessing epistemic institutionalism as a response to the argument from analogy
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Language: English
Additional information: Copyright © The Author 2024. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request.
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10190549
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